MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300080023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/0 t~IA-RDP83BO1027R000300080023-5
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NIO/W
NFAC-2141-80/1
24 March 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM
. National Intelligenc
e Office
r f
or Latin America
SUBJECT
. Monthly Warning Asse
ssment:
La
tin America I
1
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment
based upon our discussion of 19 March 1980. u
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 22 April 1980 at
1100 hours in room 5G00 at CIA headquarters. Tentative agenda for
the meeting is as follows:
- - El Salvador
-- Honduras
-- Colombia
-- Cuba - aid to revolutionaries in Caribbean and Central
America
-- Argentina - Soviet relations
-- Brazil - economic problems
Please call
by noon
on
23 March to ive her 25X1
the name of the individual participating from
you
r office.
25X1
Att: (1)
04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300080023-5
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THE DIRER OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Nai Tonal Intelligence Officers
FROM : NI0/LA
24 March 1980
As indicated in paragraph 2 of the attached
warning assessment, I judge that the prospects
for the junta in El Salvador remain poor. The US
decision not to send the MTTs until the junta con-
fronts the terrorism of the extreme right could
work to demoralize the military members of the
junta, rather than to galvanize them into action
against the right. While action against ri
htist
g
terrorists probably is necessary for ultimate
pacificati
th
on,
e junta members fear that it would
split the military.
As indicated in paragraph 5, I believe there
is perhaps a one in three chance that the hostage
situation in Colombia will take a violent turn
over the next two weeks.
Attachment
Distr: 1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - NIO/W
2 - NI0/LA
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? SECRET ?
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC-21 41-80
24 March 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM . National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT . Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America (C)
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. (U)
2. El Salvador
-Pressures on the junta are likely to increase, despite the
recent launching of reform programs. Increased armed attacks and
popular agitation on the part of the extreme left seem likely, as a
calculated tactic to undercut the political gains to the junta from
its agrarian and other reforms. Potentially more destabilizing in
the short run is the increase in right-wing terrorism. This seems
calculated to drive the Christian Democrats from the junta and to
force the latter to move toward the right and away from serious reform
programs. (S)
The likelihood that the junta will take effective steps to
curb right-wing terrorism -- which is to some extent condoned and
assisted by conservative officers in the army and the security forces --
is small. Thus, the likelihood that the present junta can substantially
enhance its effectiveness and popularity is small. (S)
3. Honduras
The approach of the April constituent assembly elections
will lead to a rise in political violence, as various political groups
try to disrupt and discredit the event. The elections probably will
take place, but are unlikely to effect a dramatic step forward toward
effective civilian government. (S)
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4. Guatemala
Concern about events in El Salvador and about reports of
plans for increased terrorism by Guatemalan leftist extremists seem
to be fueling right-wing and government attacks on known leftists
and suspected sympathizers. This strong-arm reaction will help maintain
conservative control over the short terms, but it diverts attention
from needed political measures to assure internal peace over the long
haul. (S)
5. Colombia
The hostage situation may soon reach a decisive stage. The
terrorists may decide that the Colombian Government is rejecting their
minimum demands on prisoner release. They may resort to an act of
violence against a hostage to force concessions. Colombian security
forces might then insist on attacking the Dominican Embassy. Over the
next two weeks, there is perhaps a one in three chance of violence in
connection with the hostage situation. (S)
6. Jamaica
Along with the recent rise in nonpolitical violence (because
of increased economic deprivation), there now has been a rise in
political violence as both Manley's party and the opposition seek
advantages for the general elections. Party leaders believe that
the calculated violence can be kept in bounds. An unintended blending
of the two sources of violence, however, could provoke large-scale
riots that would overtax the small and demoralized security forces. (S)
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Distribution :
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - NIO/W
1 - NI0/AF
1 - NI0/CH-EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/PE
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NI0/WE
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/ O PA
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - ER
1 - NFAC Reg
2 - NIO/LA
1 7:
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