MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300070038-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: July 29, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300070038-0
NIO/W
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-5343-80
29 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.
2. Jamaica
Political violence has taken on a more menacing character. The
radicals are believed responsible for a growing number of attacks,
including against police outposts, which appear aimed at sowing general
terror and a breakdown of order, and not merely the intimidation of
opposition voters in a given constituency. We still judge that the
radicals are too weak to succeed in any effort to lock onto power
illegally (10-15 percent chance). But we expect desperate actions, some
of which would directly engage US interests. For example:
-- attacks on Embassy personnel;
-- attacks on US businessmen, especially in the exposed
bauxite facilities;
-- assassination of prominent Jamaican figures (perhaps Manley
or Seaga), which would be blamed on CIA.
3. El Salvador
Distrust, criticism, and political infighting between moderates
and conservatives in the armed and security forces appear to be growing.
Concern about institutional unity among the officer corps still is strong.
Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300070038-0
 Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300070038-0
A military offensive by the extreme left would test this unity, especially
if the conservative high command reacted with what the moderate and
progressive younger officers supporting Colonel Majano considered indis-
criminate violence. The officer corps is thin as it is, and any sizeable
losses through open confrontation or resignation would be a hard blow to
the Junta government.
4. Nicaragua
The Sandinistas continue to tolerate a measured degree of
pluralism and polite relations with the US, in order to gain maximum domestic
and international support for their economic reconstruction efforts. Certain
contingent developments could provoke them into a more openly authoritarian
and Marxist mode over the next several months (20 percent likelihood):
-- concern about armed action by weak and scattered anti-
Sandinista guerrillas;
-- increase in public disorders based on popular impatience
with high unemployment and depressed living conditions
generally;
-- increased fervor as a result of escalation of the civil war
in El Salvador.
5. Guatemala '
Violence on the part of both the extreme left and right is
increasing. The government and the military can probably keep the lid
on for some time, and will not face major guerrilla challenges at least
until El Salvador is taken over by the extreme left. But the rising
level of violence, especially when directed against moderates, will
probably increase the international isolation of the government and
reduce the opportunities for isolating the extreme left through political
reform, economic development, and limited military action.
6. Bolivia
The recent right-wing coup is likely to set in motion several
particularly disturbing trends in this troubled nation. We could witness
a generally rising level of violence, if and when volatile civilian
groups set out to retaliate for the military's unusually brutal tactics
in executing the coup. Miner and peasant organizations have declared
their intention to resist the regime, and there have been some clashes
already. Along the way, heavy-handed moves by the regime could contribute
Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300070038-0
 Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300070038-0
to the very radicalization its cynical perpetrators profess to be
combating. Successive annulments of presidential elections may already
have convinced many civilians that there is no alternative to violence
to protect their interests. At the same time, the nation's economy could
be seriously disrupted if miners make good their threat to shut down the
tin industry, which accounts for much of the country's foreign exchange
earnings. Prolonged repression could also lead to splits within the 25X1
military, if army moderates, who have been trampled upon several times,
attempt at some point to reassert themselves
r- r-
o the
g on cou increasingly find itself at odds with Buenos Aires,
and Possibly Brasilia, over how to treat Bolivia.
7. Cuba and Latin American Revolutionaries
After recent setbacks, the increased influence of Castro's hard-
line advisers and his increased need to reassure himself of the brightness
of Cuba's future could lead to greater Cuban willingness to promote
guerrilla groups outside of Central America. Chile and now Bolivia would
be likely target countries.
extent that US interests include furthering democracy in South America,25X1
Washin t IA
8. Soviet Opportunities in Latin America
We judge that the Soviets repeatedly find themselves surprised
by the limitations of US "control" over Latin America--which they still
view as a US sphere of influence (Cuba aside). For example, Nicaragua
surprised them, and the extent of Argentina cooperation on grain sales
probably surprised them. Moscow probably now senses greater opportunities
for expanding Soviet relations and influence. We expect them to be
cautious--still fearful of US power advantages in the regime and still
concerned about the costs for supporting weaker "client" states. But we
also expect them to be less cautious than in the past--especially in the
area of increased state-to-state relations and funding of communist
parties.
Aooroved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027ROO0300070038-0
 Approved For Release 2007/05/17: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300070038-0
? ?
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/W
T - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NI0/GPF
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/PE
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/WE
1 - NIO/SP
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - NSC Coordinator
1 - SA/NPI
1 - SA/CI
1 - D/OCO
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OGCR
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/ O PA
1 - D/OSR
1 - D/OSWR
1 - NFAC Reg
1 - ER
1 - AS/NFAC
2 - NI0/LA