MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: USSR-EE (MEETING HELD ON 17 FEBRUARY 1981)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300060032-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 19, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300060032-7
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC 875-81
19 February 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Assistant Nationa Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 17 February 1981)
Polish Situation:
1. Tensions in Poland have eased at least temporarily. A new mood
of conciliation is being exhibited by the unions following the appointment
of General Jaruzelski as Prime Minister. That appointment has had a sober-
ing effect on the unions, but how long this relative calm will last is
problematic. The pattern of the past months -- sporadic disputes over
local and national issues associated with fulfillment of the Gdansk Agree-
ments -- is likely to reassert itself. It is doubtful that the present
calm will last for the ninety days for which the regime has asked. The
National Solidarity Organization has refused to give an unconditional
three-month guarantee of no strikes; it is in any case incapable of doing
so since it remains the right of local union organizations to call strikes
at their own initiative. The moral and political suasion of the national
Solidarity, however, if combined with a more conciliatory stance by the
regime, could have the effect of dampening regional pressures for strikes.
The apparent settlement of the student strike, and the registration of an
independent student union,`bodes well for a period of continued calm
in the near-term. The desire to maintain calm before and during the forth-
coming CPSU Congress is an additional reason for the regime to adopt a
placatory stance and for the Soviets to forebear, at least in the near-
term. All of this suggests that there will be no early crackdown by the
DIA review completed.
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300060032-7
 Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300060032-7
? SECRET
?
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE NFAC 875-81
(Meeting held on 17 February 1981)
regime against dissidents and union organizers. The critical issue is
whether or not over the next few months the regime or the unions can work
out a modus vivendi which channels worker frustrations and substitutes
negotiations for strike action. In the event of renewed and widespread
strike action, we believe the regime will use coercive measures, but it
will seek to limit the extent of such measures. On the military side, we
are at a high point in the training cycle of Warsaw Pact armies. On
balance the level of military activity is consistent with the pattern of
previous years. There have been some anomalous military activities, but
neither their nature nor their scale suggest that thev are associated
Soviet Support for Revolutionary Movements in Latin America:
with preparations for an intervention into Poland.
2. DIA representatives presented a briefing on Soviet-supported
activity in Latin America. The view was offered that the Soviet percep-
tion of the erosion of US resolve to defend its interests in the region has
resulted in greater assertiveness of Moscow in undertaking political and
military support for leftist movements. The briefing was confined for the
most part to El Salvador. DIA concluded that the Soviet Union has supported
and orchestrated the leftist insurgency since at least the beginning of 1980,
but has made a careful effort to obscure the Soviet role. There is no
evidence that the Soviets have supplied.weapons directly to the insurgents,
but there is evidence that they have acted through third parties to supply
weapons. Moscow has arranged for weapons to be shipped via Vietnam,
Ethiopia, Cuba and Nicaragua. The Cubans and,the PLO have provided training
for Salvadoran insurgents, and Cuban advisers are actually serving in El
Salvador. DIA speculated that Guatemala would be the next Soviet target,
and there is some evidence that the Soviets are seeking to unite leftist
factions in that country, even while seeking once again to conceal the USSR's
involvement. A National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet role in Central
and Latin America is in preparation.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP83BOl027R000300060032-7
 Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300060032-7
Approved For Release 2008/01/04: CIA-RDP83BO1027R000300060032-7
25X1
2 A11