MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050044-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: July 24, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC-4602-81
24 July 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for
Western Europe
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe
1. Germany: The increasingly strident outcry against TNF is causing
some dif iculties for the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn, although resistance
has not yet reached crisis proportions. Both Chancellor Schmidt (SPD) and
Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP) have been able to keep their respective
parties in line and, at least in parliament, there is no current threat of
a serious split in either party. Although the anti-TNF sentiments thus far
have largely been identified with the left-wing of the SPD, they have
encompassed other movements such as ecological (the so-called "Greens") and
confessional groups as well. Anti-TNF sentiments reflect not only genuine
fear of lowering the nuclear threshold in Germany, but also a certain
nostalgia for the benefits of detente, and may be related as well to vague
hopes of eventual German reunification. While one may posit that the USSR
is exploiting and encouraging anti-TNF sentiments in Western Europe generally,
it has thus far been largely successful in concealing its role to such an
extent that direct Soviet involvement, however plausible and likely, is
difficult to document.
Against this backdrop, the role of Willy Brandt and his recent
"mission to Moscow" is particularly intriguing; the evidence to hand rather
forcefully indicates that optimistic quotations to the contrary notwith-
standing, Brandt in fact brought back no significant new Soviet concessions,
and, if anything, confirmed Soviet rigidity in its method of calculating
Western systems (insistence upon including US FBS, as well as British and
French capabilities). It is difficult to establish precisely Brandt's
motives for this initiative, but it is likely that his own personal aspirations
played a role in his thinking. Over the longer term, it may emerge that the
decision to go to Moscow was not of net benefit to Brandt, as the thinness
of the Soviet offer becomes clearer, and as Brandt comes to be seen as over
his head in a highly technical area where he cannot claim expertise.
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Whatever the reasons for Brandt's trip, he has succeeded in causing
Chancellor Schmidt a certain amount of political discomfort and, unofficially
at least, is seen by some as a leading, if unintended, spokesman of the anti-
TNF coalition. While it remains to be seen whether TNF can continue to generate
significant emotional response across a broad spectrum of the German body
politic, it is clear that a concerted educational effort is required by the
West German and American authorities to demonstrate convincingly why TNF is an
essential element of NATO strategy to redress the current imbalance.
2. France: President Mitterrand's calculations in bringing the Communists
into his government have never been publicly articulated, although the general
lines of the thought process are not hard to discern: he genuinely believes
in his historical role as the leader of Socialism in France, and recalls too
well the fate of the last Socialist government in the thirties, brought down
by Communist intransigence, in part occasioned by its exclusion from the
government. Mitterrand probably also sincerely believes in the "unity of the
left" as a concept, and holds that he paid a small price for bringing in
Communist ministers, by which device he has to some extent bound their fate
to his, at least as long as they remain in the government. He also holds that
the presence of PCF ministers will to some degree inhibit labor agitation and,
over the longer haul, he hopes to reduce even further the PCF's strength at
the local level on the occasion of the municipal elections of 1983. Inclusion
of the Communists will also still, at least temporarily, the left-wing of his
own Socialist Party (the "Ceres" group), and should buy time to set the new
course of his administration with his left flank fully protected.
That Mitterrand must realize that he is taking a calculated risk is
clear, yet he must have concluded that the move was a net benefit to his
administration. The problem of protection of sensitive defense and intelligence
information has been forthrightly addressed by a number of senior French
officials, yet it remains unclear just how effective such measures will be,
since there have also been contradictory statements concerning what specific
steps will be taken. The presence of the PCF in the government also provides
that party, which suffered severe losses in its electoral base, a chance to
regain some modicum of respectability, and it always has the option of dropping
out over an issue which it is unable to endorse. There are also those who
maintain that presence in the government will afford the PCF an opportunity to
infiltrate the system more effectively, so that at the time of their departure,
theywill have better ensured their continuing access to information they deem
important to their own political ends. Similarly, the PCF in government may
enable its representatives to anticipate economic and political moves, the
better to thwart them by advance knowledge, or at least to prepare their
responses to controversial moves by prior knowledge of the government's
intentions.
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A major unknown for the future remains the economic impact of the
reform measures already announced by President Mitterrand and his government.
Conventional wisdom suggests that raising the minimum wage, increasing social
benefits and similar measures will result in larger deficits and pressure on
the franc, if the experience of the Chirac experiment in 1975 is a valid yard-
stick. The full effects of these measures will probably not be felt until
1982, however, and much will depend on additional steps adopted in the future.
For example, how radical will the changes be in the nationalization sector,
and how rapidly will they be pushed? Will the French government impose price
controls, as the weakness in the franc boosts inflation and heightens pressure
on the international exchange markets? Will the French opt for a protectionist
approach, and will they devalue? If so, when and by how much? How much
support can they expect from Bonn? There remain many imponderables, but the
passage of time in this instance will provide a much clearer picture of both
the specific measures the Mitterrand government will adopt, and the time-
frame in which they plan to proceed, providing a better base for projecting
the longer-term impact of such significant changes. on the French economy.
3. Italy: The precedent-shattering appointment of a non-Christian
Democratic Prime Minister is generally perceived as a holding operation,
reflecting the disarray in the Christian Democratic Party on the one hand,
and the realization in the Socialist Party, on the other, that it lacks
sufficient electoral strength to press unduly aggressively for the Prime
Ministership now, particularly when the President of the Republic is a
Socialist. How long this government will survive is difficult to predict
now, yet it is apparent that it is in the interest of no one (except the
miniscule party which Prime Minister Spadolini represents) for this government
to be a smashing success. As a result, we can predict that while there may
be minor accomplishments, and Spadolini may linger on longer than might
appear likely at first blush, it is clear that his fate rests in the hands
of others, notably the DC and PSI parties, and they will be the ultimate
arbiters of when they feel themselves sufficiently strong to bring him down
and make their own moves.
The one uncertain element in this equation is the Italian Communist
Party, which finds itself with both good news and bad. The good news is that
in theory, at least, it has the option of courting both the left-wing of the
DC Party and the PSI, and of playing one off against the other, yet the bad
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news is that its recent electoral performance suggested stagnation if not
modest erosion of its electoral appeal, which has raised an internal debate
within the PCI over what course to follow in the months ahead. The PCI will
no doubt attempt to turn this interim government to its own advantage, but
neither the DC nor PSI represents a viable option at this time, and it will
probably require another national election (which no party wants at this
time) to sort out accurately relative popularities of individual parties in
a fashion which might then permit formation of a stronger and more effective
government at the national level.