MONTHLY WARNING MEETING - JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040049-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: January 25, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
25 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR; Director of Central Intelligenc.+e
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - January 1982
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1. Southern Lebanon. A clear consensus exists that a significant
Israeli incursion into South Lebanon, aimed at inflicting mayor damage on
the PLO, remains probable. This judgment is made despite high level
Israeli assurances they will not act without significant provocatiQn,and
rests on the following:
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-- Continued presence
of troops in northern Israel, including the nor
border area with Lebanon.
Israel's perception of Palestinian rearming activities,
particularly the obtaining of heavier caliber weapons,
including 130mm artillery.
-- Continued Israeli military activity in Haddad's enclave.
-- Sentiment within the IDF and specifically of Defense
Minister Sharon for such action.
Two new elements in the situation portend a larger-scale operation than tha~5X1
which occurred in spring, 1978:
-- The possession by the Fedayeen of 130mm artillery with a
range of 27.5 km extends the northernmost point from which
Israel could be hit to beyond the Litani River, just south
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of the Zahrani River. Hence, an Israeli operation
which would provide security for its territory under
current conditions requires securing territory well
beyond Israel's historic northern border at the
Li tani .
to eliminate the FLU
as a mi lifary force. This would require blocking
Palestinian retreat lines northward and eastward.
It may also require operations inside Beirut and
possibly Tripoli in at attempt to eradicate the PLO
top leadership.
Since sufficient troops are already iii place to initiate operations, US
intelligence would probably not detect an intention to move into southern
Lebanon until it had commenced.
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3. Soviet Equipment Upgrading in Afghanistan. Opinion was divided in
the Community on whether Soviet equipment changes in Afghanistan portend a
more aggressive policy towards Pakistan. Specifically:
-- A communications upgrade enhances Soviet capability to
operate outside Afghanistan.
-- Delivery of SA 8's and a more capable IFF radar could
be regarded as a normal upgrading. Why Soviet forces
in Afghanistan, where no air threat exists, should
take precedence is troublesome, however. It could
enhance Soviet capability, both inside and outside
Afghanistan's borders.
-- The presence of MIG-23 aircraft, although a permanent
presence has not been verified, would enhance
capabilities outside the borders.
-- Significant truck shipments, while possibly mere
replacements for extensive losses, have been noted.
These changes, combined with the recent entry of security troops to release
combat units from static duty, add up to a greater capability for offensive
operations into Pakistan than three months ago. Should such an operation
occur, it would probably target on Mujahidin training camps and supply points,
be comprised of one regiment plus, and be a rapi entry and exit operation
designed to avoid contact with Pakistani forces. 25X1
4. Libya. No new significant reports on Libyan terrorist planning against
US officers have been received, nor has conclusive evidence of a standdown.
The reason for Qadhafi's surprise trip to Algiers and later Tunis is
unknown. 1 1 25X1
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5. Sudan. Nimeiri is clearly more threatened than at any time in
recent years, and his future to a large extent rests on Saudi, Kuwaiti,
and European donor assistance in meeting IMF requirements. On the" more
positive side, Nimeiri's opposition has not coalesced, the Muslim Brotherhood
is still backing the regime, and Libyan subversion has not had significant
impact. 25X1
6. Iraq-Iran War. Despite three recent small Iraqi successes on the
ground, what momentum there is in this war remains with Iran. There are
strong indications of Iranian preparations for an attack in the Dezful-Shush
area, while the Iraqis are anticipating an attack at Khorramshahr, further
to the south. Other pertinent observations are as follows:
-- There is now evidence of three new Iraqi divisions
having been formed.
-- A normally reliable human source has reported the
charging by the Iraqis of 250 81mm mortar rounds with
mustard gas. This quantity would not be sufficient
to change the course of the war.
-- Although the revolutionary guards are increasingly
engaged in the war effort, command and control remains
with the regular military. This situation could
progressively evolve, however.
recent re orts of unrest in Iraq have been received.
7. Bangladesh. A consensus exists that, while President Sattar's national
security council and other policies do not satisfy General Ershad's perception
of desired military influence, there are significant disincentives to a
declaration of martial law. The feasibility of imposing martial law, possibly
in February, has been enhanced by movement of units loyal to Ershad into the
'
problems would
Dacca area. With or without martial law, long-te m
remain, and Sattar does command popular support.
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Charles E. Waterman