MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT: LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040029-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: April 30, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NIO/W
25X1
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council DDI #3656-82/1
30 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment based upon
our discussion of 21 April 1982.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on 19 May 1982 at 1015 hours in
room 7D64 CIA Headquarters with the following tentative agenda and requested
brief oral presentations (2-3 minutes) by department/agency or individual as
indicated:
Argentina/UK/Falklands
- Current military balance and losses on both sides (DIA)
- Possible next military and political steps (DIA/military;
INR/political)
- Any possibilities of Argentine action against Chile (CIA)
- Actions of Latin American countries (CIA)
-- pro-Argentina
-- other territorial conflicts
- Soviet/Cuban actions and possible next steps (CIA)
- Impact on the Argentine economy of war costs and economic sanctions --
likely effects in next weeks (CIA)
Central America
El Salvador (DIA)
- Coalition politics; implications for reforms, potential negotiationt1
etc.
- Guerrilla/military balance; guerrilla plans and intentions
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SECRET
Guatemala (INR)
- Chances for another coup; political realignments; implications for
insurgency
Nicaragua (CIA)
- Military actions at the borders--attacks from Nicaragua; attacks into
Nicaragua; export of subversion; military buildup; MIGs
Venezuel a/Guyana
- Evidence of possible military conflict over the disputed territory
A brief look at countries with recent elections
- Dominican Republic (CIAII 25X1
- Colombia (CIA 25X1
3. Please call with names and clearances of 25X1
individuals attending a next warning meeting by noon, 18 May 1982.
k"e-
Constantine C. Menges
Atts: (1)
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? SECRET I* 25X1
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH . National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America
1. Argentina/UK/Falklands
Either side might initiate preemptive military attacks on the naval
or air forces of the opponent. A separate NIO/LA memo of 26 April 1982, has
suggested four or five possible tactical surprises which each might attempt
under the assumption that salient military losses (aircraft carrier, cruiser,
other large ships) might unravel the internal political support in either
country for a continuation of the military conflict. The facts of geography
and climate which will reduce the operational capabilities of the British
fleet two weeks to three weeks from now also reinforce the political argument
for preemption against Argentinian naval and air forces. Decisive Argentinian
naval defeats might also leave less opportunity for other Latin American
states to send military help as Peru and Venezuela seem to be promising.
Soviet/Cuban moves to take advantage of this situation will probably
focus on covert political action to stir up anti-Anglo-US feeling in Latin
America and perhaps deceptive terrorism--rather than direct military
involvement. It should be assumed that both Cuba and the USSR will be using
their covert assets to establish contacts with military officers who might
play a "Nasserite" role after the Argentinian defeat. We should be alert for
signs of Cuban or Soviet military aid which might range from
communications/electronic warfare equipment to weapons systems (sent openly or
secretly). The announcement of a Soviet military aid mission going to
Argentina for "consultations", for example, could add to uncertainties in a
large way.
The likely defeat of Argentina by the UK could bring great confusion
in Argentine internal politics and foreign policy. Galtieri could be replaced
by a highly nationalistic military regime which establishes military ties with
the USSR, or a civilian government, or a military-civilian technocrat regime
anxious to rebuild the economic damage. 5X1
DDI-3656-82
30 April 1982
SECRET
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The actions of Latin American countries could become a major
complicating factor--and this is more probable the longer the military actions
continue. Venezuela has offered to send aircraft to help Argentina, and there
are reports that the military there are thinking of taking action against
Guyana to obtain territory that is in dispute. Guyana obtained independence
from the UK and London was a part of the diplomatic process which in 1970 led
to a 12-year "cooling off" period during which Venezuela agreed not to exert
pressure.
Peru has also offered Argentina military assistance. It has a long
history of disputes with Chile (dating from the loss of Peruvian territory in
the 19th century), and there are unconfirmed reports that Argentina might use
its southern military buildup against Chile as a way of settling the Beagle
Channel dispute. To illustrate the uncertainties and potential dangers of
these intra-Latin American disputes, one report suggested that the Argentine
military might invade the Chilean territory in dispute using the claim that
Chile and the UK were cooperating. The Argentine military might assume that
Chile would not get international help and therefore settle rather than fight
both Peru and Argentina--that would then ive Argentina one victory to makeup
for the impending loss in the Falklands 25X1
2. Central America
There is consensus that the Cuba/Nicaraguan strategy will continue to
combine the use of negotiations and propaganda to make political gains and
reduce the level of military pressure on the guerrillas while continuing to
build up their military and political strength.
In El Salvador there was agreement that the guerrillas suffered major
military and political-defeats in March due to a combination of better
government intelligence and military actions. However, some analysts noted
that guerrilla casualties were very low while government losses remained high-
-that raises some still unanswered questions. Nevertheless, the return of the
1,400 US-trained Salvadorans in May is viewed as offering the government a
major opportunity to increase the military offensive.
Most analysts were optimistic about the new government in Guatemala
due to the end of its connection to extreme rightist violence while conceding
that the available information made its base of support unclear and quite
shaky. A few analysts were far more concerned about future cohesion because
of the sharp divisions among the younger officers, the still ambiguous
evidence about the personality of junta leader Rios Montt and the reports of
additional Cuban support through Mexico for the strong though not completely
united extreme left guerrilla groups.
Cuban/Nicaraguan efforts to intimidate and persuade the governments
of Honduras and Costa Rica into a posture of neutrality continue and could in
time threaten their cooperation in the regional struggle against the extreme
left. However, the removal of two senior Honduran military officers who had
visited Cuba and then urged neutralism was a s positive event 25X1
Constantine C. Menges
SECRE
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