THE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00851R000300130002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE APPLICATION OF
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
STAT
v
CO tOf GIVE OUT
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THE APPLICATION OF
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
STAT
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This short report attempts to do a couple of things.
First, it attempts to identify and describe the quantitative
and qualitative research in political instability that has
been conducted since around 1960. It then attempts to deter-
mine just how useful that research is to the intelligence
analyst responsible for the production of political instability
analyses and estimates.
The identification and description of political instability
research is accomplished by classifying the research according
to the general methods employed and whether or not the work
can be described as descriptive, explanatory, or predictive.
Qualitative methods include all those which rely heavily upon
the wisdom, judgment, and experience of the intelligence analyst
as he or she attempts to discipher reliably and timely informa-
tion from all kinds of hard and soft data. Quantitative. methods
rely heavily upon the collection and statistical analysis of
empirical data in order to develop generalizations about political
instability. Descriptive political instability research attempts
to characterize or profile instability; explanatory research
seeks to identify "causes" of instability;' while predictive
research searches for the means by which political instability
and revolution can be forecast.
In order to assess how the political instability method-
ologies can best be applied in intelligence analysis this report
looks quickly at the components of useful intelligence analysis
and then turns to a method-by-method/findings-by-findings
analysis of how the methods and findings can contribute to the
production of useful intelligence.
The results of the applications assessment are very clear.
Because of enormous methodological and data availability/
reliability problems, and because of its concentration on the
development of cross-national theory, nearly all quantitative-
statistical research is of limited use to the intelligence
analyst who is by nature country specific, atheoretical, and
pragmatic. Qualitative methods and findings, on the other hand,
can contribute to intelligence analysis by reducing bias and
assuring deductive and inductive logic. Of particular applied
use are the qualitative predictive methodologies which rely
upon the structured judgment and experience of the intelligence
analyst. Fortunately, the qualitative methods are generally
easier to implement than their quantitative counterparts.
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Page
SUMMARY
ii
INTRODUCTION
1
POLITICAL INSTABILITY RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS
2
QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTIVE METHODS AND FINDINGS
3
Case Studies
3
Definitions of Political Instability
3
Classifications of Political Instability
4
Revolutionary "Stages"
5
QUALITATIVE EXPLANATORY METHODS AND FINDINGS
5
Peasants and Revolution
5
Elites and Revolution
6
Broad Social Change and Revolution
6
Social Movements, Ethnicity, and Terrorism
6
QUALITATIVE PREDICTIVE METHODS AND FINDINGS
Political Risk Analysis
The Delphi Method
Cross-Impact Analysis
Bayesian Forecasting
QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTIVE METHODS AND FINDINGS
Empirical Definitions
Event Data-Based Definitions
Quantitative Indicators of Instability
Internal Situation Profiles (ISPs)
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Page
QUANTITATIVE EXPLANATORY METHODS AND FINDINGS 11
Economic Explanations 12
Societal Explanations 12
Political Explanations 12
Psychological Explanations 13
Elitist Explanations 13
External Explanations 13
Causal Model-Based Explanations 13
QUANTITATIVE PREDICTIVE METHODS AND FINDINGS 14
Event Data-Based Prediction 14
Leading Indicators 14
Causal Model-Based Predictions 15
Simulation and Prediction 15
POLITICAL ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS 16
QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 17
The Applied Potential of Quantitative Research 21
The Applied Potential of Qualitative Research 22
The Implementation of Qualitative and Quantitative
Methodologies 24
CONCLUSION 25
REFERENCES 26
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In virtually every part of the world we can find regimes
that are far from stable. Unfortunately, many are geographically
close to the United States or closely tied to economic, military,
or political U.S. national interests. Yet while they may share
these similarities they are analytically distinct; as a matter
of fact, one can argue that each potential regime change or
collapse presents a set of unique analytical problems.
Given the pervasiveness and importance of political insta-
bility and the uniqueness of each "case," the need for systematic
analysis has never been greater. But how can we ensure the
production of the best possible analyses and estimates? We can
see at least three steps. The first requires the identification
and description of the many methods and techniques available
to the political instability analyst as well as the findings
that have been generated via the use of these methods and tech-
niques. The second step involves the development of a profile
of possible analytical requirements, while the third involves
assessing how useful the methods, techniques, and findings can
be in the various analytical contexts.
This short report attempts to take these three steps. Based
upon our much larger report, An Assessment of Political Insta-
bility Research Methodologies STAT
which should be regarded
as the companion to this one, what follows will hopefully help
analysts select the methods and findings most likely to con-
tribute to the description, explanation, and prediction of
political instability. But beyond the matching of methods and
findings to analytical situations we will try to develop rationale
about the costs and benefits of each method, technique, and
finding. This report may thus be regarded as a mini-handbook
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while our larger report should be regarded as a sourcebook.
Both documents are concerned with how we can improve our analyses
and estimates of the likelihood of political instability, crisis,
and revolution.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS
It is possible to categorize political instability method-
ologies according to the way they use data or information and
according to three analytical goals. We may categorize the
methods as qualitative or quantitative, and useful for the pro-
duction of descriptive, explanatory, and predictive intelligence.
Descriptive research includes that which focuses on the intra-
national and international factors that contribute to political
instability. Explanatory research includes those studies and
analyses that attempt to explain why political instability occurs
generally and in specific geographical regions and countries.
Predictive research attempts to correlate factors like economic
scarcity, political repression, and ethnic conflict with the
likelihood of future political instability.
Qualitative research usually involves the use of methods
and approaches which rely principally upon the wisdom, experience,
and judgment of the analyst. Qualitative researchers frequently
adopt historical, institutional, and sociological approaches
within single and comparative case study analyses. Contrary
to some views of methodology, qualitative researchers frequently
use quantitative concepts and data. But they do not use them
in the same way as quantitative researchers, who use "hard" data
to test hypotheses about political instability. For example,
concepts like political repression would be converted by the
quantitative researcher into data (representing, perhaps, the
number of government crackdowns or number of government censors)
and then used to test a specific hypothesis about political
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instability, such as one which states that as the level of
political repression rises over time so does the likelihood
of instability (which would also have to be defined precisely).
Qualitative descriptive political instability research has
focused on case studies of political instability and revolutions;
definitions of political instability usually grounded in def-
initions of collective action; classifications of political
instability; typologies of political instability and revolutions;
and stages through which revolutions can be expected to pass.
Case Studies
Case studies rely upon "illustrative cases" rather than
systematic evidence, analysis, and comparison. Researchers
often "ransack" history for supporting cases and ignore or
explain away cases that contradict, qualify, or negate their
arguments. The emphasis is on minute description, leading to
the application of the label of "natural history" as a catch-
all term for the entire analytical genre. Countless case studies
have been conducted over the last twenty years and no doubt
countless more will be undertaken in the future.
Definitions of Political Instability
Tilly's (1974, 1978) work on collective action provides
an example of attempts to define political instability. His
theory of collective action is based on Marx-plus. Marx high-
lighted the key role of major classes and their interests--
which emerge from organization or production--whereas Tilly
expands this notion to include generally shared interests. He
also adds Max Weber and especially John Stuart Mill to the
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picture, all as suggested below.
Mill's Model
DECISION RULES
INDIVIDUAL _i INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE
INTEREST ACTION ACTION
Marx's Model
ORGANIZATION
OF PRODUCTION
CONFLICTING
INTERESTS
COLLECTIVE
ACTION
Weber's Models
NON-ROUTINE ROUTINE
INTEREST COLLECTIVE ACTION INTEREST --~ COLLECTIVE ACTION
l/ I 1 1
BELIEF o- ORGANIZATION
BELIEF -- ORGANIZATION
(From Tilly, 1978)
Classifications of Political Instability
Qualitative descriptive research has also included class-
ifications of political instability. Tilly (1975, 1978), for
example, distinguishes between communal and associational types
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of collective action, thereby excluding random or spontaneous
activity. Another classification of revolution belongs to
Chalmers Johnson (1964). He uses four criteria--targets, per-
petrators, goals, and initiation--to develop six kinds of rev-
olutions.
Revolutionary "Stages"
Another major output of the natural history school is the
identification of sets of stages through which revolutions are
supposed to pass. David Schwartz (1968, 1972) provides a good
example of this research. He suggests a sequence from allegiance
to ambivalence, passive alienation, and then active alienation.
Qualitative explanatory political instability research
focuses on explanations attributable to the position and behavior
of the agrarian, peasant, or otherwise disenfranchised classes
in society; explanations attributable to the activity of the
elites in society; explanations grounded in surveys of civil-
izations and broad social change; and explanations grounded in
research on social movements, ethnicity, and terrorism.
Peasants and Revolution
On a lower level of analysis, what do we know about peasants
and revolution? Unfortunately, the research leads to confusion
rather than clarity. Wolf (1969) attempts to generalize on the
basis of six twentieth century cases. Migdal (1974) develops a
theory of how imperialistic, modernizing forces impinge on peasant
villages. Wolf (1969) sees middle peasants as the most likely
participants in revolutionary movements, and Paige (1975) develops
explanations on the basis of the structure of peasant/landlord
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relations, especially whether or not peasants and landlords
get their income from land ownership, wages and capital, or some
combination of the two. Migdal (1974) assigns primary responsi-
bility for revolution to political organizations.
Elites and Revolution
Trimberger (1978) focuses on elite-based revolutions and
attempts to explain four cases of such instability (Turkey in
1923, the Mejii Restoration in Japan in 1868, and coups in Egypt
in 1952 and Peru in 1968). In all four instances, traditional
rulers were ousted and extensive programs of modernization were
launched.
Broad Social Change and Revolution
Eisenstadt (1978, 1980) adopts the comparative case method
to demonstrate the applicability of a single theory. He offers
a wide-ranging and ambitious qualitative theory of revolution
in his comparative survey of civilizations and social change.
His theory is unique in the emphasis given to cultural orienta-
tions.
Theda Skocpol (1979) offers a theory of revolution which
is less grandiose than Eisenstadt's and much better grounded in
the processes of historical change. The figure below displays
Skocpol's analytical scheme, which she applied to the revolutions
in France, Russia, and China.
Social Movements, Ethnicity, and Terrorism
Research on social movements, ethnicity, and terrorism can
be used to illustrate some "comparative case studies." For example,
Maatsch, et al. (1980) categorize the research into the sources,
processes, characteristics, and consequences of social movements
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and attempt to synthesize the existing literature into theories
and categories of movements.
Skocpol's Analysis of Revolutions
Preconditions of Revolution
AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(Autonomous, organized peasant
communities and traditional
(precapitalist) peasantilandlord
relations)
STATE STRUCTURE AND GOALS
(Centralizing,
agrarian -bureaucratic state)
REVOLUTIONARY
SITUATION
resources)
ELITE STRUCTURE
and/or leverage vs.
the state)
RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION
AMONG CONTENDERS
FOR POWER
International Pressures
INTRUSTION OF
CAPITALIST MARKETS ON
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION
MILITARY COMPETITION
pressures on state
REVOLUTIONARY
OUTCOME
Ethnicity is an inescapable facet of politics within as
well as between countries; internal conflict and instability
and external conflict and war often flow from ethnic tensions
and processes of mobilization.
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The largest portion of the qualitative terrorist literature
features case studies of particular countries, regions, movements,
and even individual terrorists. The research is almost completely
atheoretical.
QUALITATIVE PREDICTIVE METHODS AND FINDINGS
Qualitative predictive research in political instability
focuses upon political risk assessment; intuition and judgment;
delphi forecasting; cross-impact forecasting; and Bayesian
forecasting.
Intuitive qualitative forecasting is central to intelligence
analysis. An individual immersed in the history, culture, and
politics of a country or area generates estimates and projections
on a continuing basis. There is no real substitute for such
wisdom, insight, and intuition. There is, however, a stockpile
of systematic analytical techniques that are useful for processing,
refining, and structuring human judgments. Such techniques, if
used properly, can be very useful to the individual country or
area analyst.
Political Risk Analysis
Political risk analysis for the corporate sector usually
tasks experts (often overseas managers) to conduct "case studies,"
using a very intuitive strategy for scanning the political envi-
ronment and generating forecasts (Haendel, 1981). This is not
at all unlike the process of traditional instability analysis.
Unfortunately, the record of these risk assessors is far from
impressive.
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The Delphi Method
A panel of experts is polled in a series of questionnaires.
At the end of each session, feedback is given to the panelists
regarding the response distributions and the arguments offered
in favor of deviant positions. Average group judgments from
the final round usually serve as the final data.
Cross-Impact Analysis
Cross-impact analysis is another subjective forecasting
method useful for political instability analysis. The cross-
impact method provides a way of determining probabilistically
how a change in one event or condition will affect other events
and conditions (Andriole, 1982). It allows for a systematic
assessment of how "everything affects everything else."
Bayesian Forecasting
In addition to Delphi and cross-impact forecasting, quite
a few examples of Bayesian forecasting are available (Andriole,
1981, 1982; Heuer, 1978; Hopple and Kuhlman, 1981). Bayesian
inference involves a mathematical procedure for revising proba-
bility judgments on the basis of new information. Experts are
asked to make conditional probability judgments for each relevant
piece of "evidence." The expert is asked: "given the truth of
the hypothesis, what is the probability of seeing the evidence?"
There are at least three variations on the Bayesian analytical
theme. The first involves the application of Bayes' theorem of
conditional probabilities for updating estimates in the light of
new information. The second involves structuring the forecasting
problem into an influence diagram which portrays the forecasting
object as "driven" by interrelated sets of variables; while the
third is known as hierarchical inference structuring, which en-
ables a forecaster to decompose hierarchically and systematically
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aspects of the forecasting object that are interrelated and
interdependent.
Quantitative approaches to the study of political instability
apply one or more statistical techniques to the analytical goals
of describing, explaining, or predicting instability, and have
generally focused upon the development of definitions of political
instability grounded in empirical "counts" of various conflictual
events and conditions; event data-based definitions of political
instability; the development of quantitative indicators of polit-
ical instability; and the development of "Internal Situation
Profiles" (ISPs) of potential domestic stress.
Empirical Definitions
Rummel (1963) was the first of many to build upon the pio-
neering work of Raymond Cattell (who searched for general cultural
patterns across societies) and try to identify some basic em-
pirical dimensions of domestic and foreign conflict. Rummel
used factor analysis, a statistical technique which is designed
to reduce many relationships to a few central patterns. For
Rummel Sand others domestic conflict breaks down statistically
into two broad types, internal war or rebellion and collective
protest.
Event Data-Based Definitions
Some instability research takes an event approach. An event
is a specific action defined on the basis of an actor, a target,
and a form of behavior. This who-does-what-to-whom format is
used to organize activity into many discrete and specific actions.
Event data may be taken from any kind of a source which reports
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"news." The methodology is the same whether the source is public
(for example, a newspaper or news chronology), private, or
classified. The domestic event data banks used to study political
instability consist mainly of domestic conflict events (number
of assassinations, number of general strikes, number of purges,
and so forth).
Quantitative Indicators of Instability
Spector, et al. (1975) report on research which develops and
tests a set of international, economic, and internal indicators.
The event-based domestic indicators were evaluated as predictors
of international behavior for Japan.
Internal Situation Profiles (ISPs)
An example of a quantitative descriptive approach not based
upon domestic events is the Internal Situation Profile or ISP
(Hopple, 1978). What are the specific factors which tap the
concept of "potential domestic stress?" This question constituted
the basis for a study to develop a set of internal indicators
which would function together as an overall "thermometer" for a
political system. At the same time, the profiling scheme was
designed to avoid the event data approach, which limits indicators
to those which can be derived from an actor-event-target scheme.
A list of 67 indicators was developed (15 economic, 12 societal,
7 military, 12 governmental, and 21 political). The ISP is
designed to monitor three distinct sets of events and situations:
preconditions for internal crises; precipitants (immediate deter-
minants) of internal crises; and manifestations of internal crises.
QUANTITATIVE EXPLANATORY METHODS AND FINDINGS
Quantitative explanatory studies of political instability
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tend to do one of two things: they either evaluate specific
propositions or build and test elaborate "causal models" of
instability. The propositional studies often consider only one
or a few determinants at a time, while the large models can be-
come so complex that they defy clear interpretation.
Economic Explanations
Economic explanatory research has concentrated on the
explanatory impact of short-term economic change, the level of
economic development in a country, economic growth rates, and
a country's level of socioeconomic inequality. All of this
research has merit but a lot of it is also contradictory. Often
the "statistically significant" is completely atheoretical.
Societal Explanations
Explanations have also been traced to societal problems such
as cleavages, structural imbalances, and modernization. Some very
noteworthy analysts--like Huntington--believe that modernization
leads to political instability.
Political Explanations
Political development analysts have generally focused upon
the level of democratization and durability present in a nation,
as well as upon how well or badly the political system performs
and how legitimate it is perceived to be. The results here have
been contradictory and counterintuitive. For example, nations
incapable of satisfying basic demands and held in low esteem by
their citizens often persist over time.
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Psychological Explanations
The "psychological-aggregate" approach to the study of
political instability has stressed the importance of the frus-
tration-aggressiveness hypothesis of human behavior in the
context of national political behavior. When citizens feel
"deprived" they can be expected to become discontent and some-
times collectively violent, but the evidence for this sequence
of behavior is thin.
Elitist Explantions
Some research focuses upon elite-based coups and revolu-
tions and, on the other side of the coin, elite repression. The
evidence suggests that protest and rebellion lead to elite be-
havior that can accelerate or undermine the process of political
instability.
External Explanations
External determinants of political instability include
economic and political penetration, war, and the contagious
effects of conflict. While a lot of wars and conflict tend to
occur non-randomly throughout history it would be unwise to over-
emphasize the "contagion effect" of intranational and inter-
national conflict. The relationship between intranational and
international conflict has also been studied extensively with
little or no verifiable results.
Causal Model-Based Explanations
. Causal models of instability have been used to explain
intranational conflict with only limited success, largely because
they are methodologically and statistically cumbersome.
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QUANTITATIVE PREDICTIVE METHODS AND FINDINGS
The analyst who wishes to quantitatively forecast political
instability has a lengthy menu of forecasting techniques available.
The techniques range from simple extrapolation, which project the
present into the future on the basis of assumed current trends,
to a series of increasingly complex statistical methods. Dis-
cussed briefly below are foreign domestic event data-based com-
puterized systems for forecasting political instability; a leading
indicators approach to prediction; the use of causal models; and
the use of simulation for predicting domestic instability.
Event Data-Based Prediction
A project on Africa uses domestic event data from two
"prestige" newspapers (New York Times and Manchester Guardian),
FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) Daily Reports, and
cable traffic. The driving assumption is that event-based "early
warning systems" will predict the immediate future from the recent
past. Unfortunately, the African system was never evaluated as a
forecasting tool.
Leading Indicators
Abolfathi, et al. (1980) provide an example of an approach
based upon leading or anticipatory indicators as the source for
early warning signals about potential instability. They consider
three types of leading indicators--stock markets, the weighted
average of interest rates on loans to Third World countries (or
the "spread" over the London Interbank Offer Rate or LIBOR), and
international credit ratings of borrowing countries. But how
did the indicators approach fare? Both stock market activities
and international credit ratings work pretty well for Egypt and
the Philippines. Stock market indicators correctly foresaw the
upsurge of instability in the early 1970s in the Philippines (as
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did private construction activities). In Egypt, stock market
patterns generally predicted several periods of political insta-
bility and government policy change. Trends through the end of
the 1970s suggested increasing instability in the Philippines
and uncertainty in Egypt.
Causal Model-Based Predictions
Gurr and Lichbach (1979) use their basic causal model for
forecasting to measure the intensity of protest and rebellion
in the 1971-1975 period. Rebellion is forecast better than pro-
test, intensity better than extent, and cases close to the average
better than extreme cases. While the model performs adequately
as a forecasting tool, quite a few specific countries are not
predicted well at all. It is also fair to say that the use of
causal modeling to forecast political instability is in its
infancy. Factors are almost always left out of models, factors
which usually affect some countries more than others.
Simulation and Prediction
Rastogi (1977) uses simulation to generate forecasts of
future trends. Among the factors analyzed are public expectations,
administrative effectiveness, pressure on the government from
several sources, economic trends such as inflation, unemployment,
and general growth, population growth, and several additional
forces. Rastogi delineates past, present, and future time paths
(1960-1980) for four nations--Brazil, India, Nigeria, and the
United States--to illustrate how his simulation model operates.
He is able to explain patterns retrospectively through 1975 and
then offers sets of possible courses for the four societies from
1976 to 1980. But simulation models have not been verified as
tools for forecasting political instability. Our balance sheet
is therefore premature at best.
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We are concerned here with how the analytical methods,
approaches, and findings discussed above can be productively
applied to the analysis of information about political insta-
bility and the production of political instability intelligence
estimates. But what is it that intelligence analysts actually
do? First, we should state that neither of us are formerly
or presently intelligence professionals. Our backgrounds are
in the analytical methodology and international relations fields
of inquiry. We have, however, spent a lot of time trying to
bridge the gap between analytical methodology and intelligence
analysis and, along the way, have developed a profile of what
it is intelligence analysts do.
Above all else intelligence analysts are oriented toward
substance. The pursuit of theory, as pointed out by Kringen
(1981), Andriole (1979), and Bobrow (1980), among others, is of
virtually no interest to the analyst who has little time or
incentive to explore every analytical nuance connected with the
problem at hand. Intelligence analysts are also, according to
Kringen (1981), preoccupied with the reduction of analytical
complexity and the development of "key findings" likely to be
integrated directly into an analysis or estimate. By way of
compounding the analyst's problems, intelligence analyses and
estimates are almost always "due yesterday." Organizationally,
the intelligence community is by and large geared toward the
conduct of country- and issue-specific analyses and estimates.
Against this rather crude backdrop, it is possible to
assess the applications potential of the various methods and
findings discussed above. The following sections will thus
look at just how the methods and findings can best be applied.
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First, it is important not only to understand the differ-
ences between qualitative and quantitative research methodologies
and findings but the alternative ways that they can be used in
political instability intelligence analysis as well. Generally
speaking, and given the structure and organization of the intel-
ligence community, qualitative analyses which concentrate upon
individual countries, regions, political parties, religious
organizations, and the like, are much more likely to be inte-
grated into the intelligence production process than cross-
national aggregate data analyses. In our view, this is likely
to be the case regardless of the quality of the qualitative or
quantitative analyses in question.
Qualitative analyses and findings are also more likely to
be influencial because they use the methods that are the most
widely used and understood in the intelligence community. We
would also argue that qualitative political instability research
findings and analyses have been more accurate than quantitative
ones, so long as "accuracy" is understood as consistency and
relative clarity.
The problem with most quantitative analyses as we see them
is, first, their lack of substance. Many quantitative descrip-
tive, explanatory, and predictive analyses are not only unin-
formed by theoretical insight but they are sadly lacking in the
"stuff" of the intranational politics they are trying to des-
cribe, explain, and predict. Secondly, quantitative analysts
have yet to get their methodological house in order. There is
still angry debate about even the most basic methodological
issues. The sources and reliability of data remain serious
problems as does the tendency to generalize on the basis of a
large number of disparate "cases" across various points in time.
An even more serious methodological problem is the variance
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that can be produced in one's quantitative results by varying
even the smallest methodological component of one's analysis.
A change in data groupings, time periods (for example, yearly
versus monthly periods), and data sources can completely alter
the results of analyses of the same basic phenomena. Related to
this problem is the statistical model that performs perfectly,
but because of theoretical and substantive anemia, says very
little about instability.
A third general problem revealed in our survey and assess-
ment concerns the partial nature of many quantitative studies
and analyses. In his Conduct of Inquiry, Abraham Kaplan (1964)
talks about how explanations in behavioral science research
are "partial," "conditional," "indeterminant," "inconclusive,"
"uncertain," "intermediate," and/or "limited." Interestingly,
many quantitative political instability analysts are far more
ambitious than Kaplan (whose Conduct of Inquiry is generally
regarded as a behavioral science research classic). The problem
arises when a quantitative analysis is presented as a piece of
finished research when in reality it is merely a tiny step in a
long, long journey. On the other end of the interpretive con-
tinuum is the complex model which defies disentanglement to the
point where it is impossible to attribute analytical influence
to any of the variables within the model.
Yet another problem with much of the quantitative research
can be found in the motivations and goals of the analysts them-
selves and the analytical requirements of the research "consumers".
Traditional analysts have from the.beginning attempted to influ-
ence analysis and practice while quantitative ones often attempt
to develop empirical theory. Traditional analysts seek to change
through study, insight, wisdom and intuition; quantitative
empiricists try to demonstrate, test, and ultimately "prove"
their hypotheses about the way nations act and interact, regard-
less of possible applied implications. Underlying all of these
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activities are sets of reinforcing incentive systems which widen
the gap between traditional and quantitative researchers who,
in the first instance, reap rewards by publishing articles in
Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs and, in the second, by filling
the pages of the International Studies Quarterly, the Journal
of Conflict Resolution, and Comparitive Political Studies.
Some more specific methodological problems with quantita-
tive cross-national analysis include--according to Merritt (1971):
? "Functional Equivalence," where one must
question whether or not data, concepts,
and indicators measure the same things
across countries;
? "Inferencial Fallacies," where research
is generalized in both directions, that
is, inferring from an aggregate analysis
to all individual cases, and inferring
from an individual case to a group;
? "Universal Fallacies," where the quanti-
tative cross-national political insta-
bility analyst rejects an entire aggregate
analysis because the statistical relation-
ships are not "significant" but in the
process rejects significant sub-group
relationships;
? "Selective Fallacies," where the analyst
selects the data and information most
likely to confirm his or her hypotheses;
? "Historical Fallacies," where analysts
incorrectly assume that historical pro-
cesses will hold when a cross-section of
nations at various stages in their develop-
ment is analyzed at any point in time; and
? "Cross-Sectional Fallacies," where an
analysis at a given point in time is
expected to hold for all of history.
But perhaps more serious is the possibility that trends and
patterns about political instability are undiscoverable because
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they do not exist. In other words, if it is the case that the
recalcitrance of political instability defies systematic study
aimed at developing generalizable propositions and theories
then the quantitative analyses of political instability is likely
to remain pretty much where it is today. Those who believe that
patterns and trends of political instability activity cannot be
discovered believe that all cases are unique; those who believe
that patterns and trends can be discovered believe that there are
similarities across cases. But even if there are, we have already
argued that cross-national generalities about political insta-
bility are much less useful to intelligence analysts than infor-
mation about particular countries, groups, and political systems.
This "attack" upon quantitative-empirical cross-national
political research is not to suggest that there is nothing useful
in the quantitative search for patterns and trends or that
qualitative research is in any respect foolproof. Many have
warned about the biases inherent in subjective data, about the
problems connected with treating subjective information as dis-
crete and (for example, during Bayesian analysis) equally impor-
tant. Many qualitative analyses are also overtly normative.
This is particularly true of the analyses conducted by qualitative
philosophers, social engineering theorists, and ideologues of one
persuasion or another. Intelligence analysts should thus be care-
ful to distinguish between objective and normative qualitative
analyses.
The structured qualitative techniques (Delphi, cross-impact,
Bayesian) can help a great deal in lending order and some pre-
cision to qualitative analysis but here one must be extremely
diligent about the selection of "experts," who under normal
conditions will disagree as often as they agree.
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The Applied Potential of Quantitative Research
Quantitative research can be used by intelligence analysts
in the following ways:
? Cross-national quantitative definitions
of political instability can be used to
suggest ways to conceptualize specific
national and regional definitions and
to "check" existing applied definitions;
? Quantitative indicators of political
instability can be used to supplement
applied indicator lists and suggest how
indicators can be integrated into indi-
vidual country lists or rejected;
? Quantitative Internal Situation Profiles
(ISPs), and similar unsophisticated
indicator systems can be used to organize
and monitor internal political processes
especially when integrated with experienced
judgments about how to interpret changes
in the indicators and larger ISP;
? Quantitative explanatory research can
help with the assessment of determinants
of political instability that traditional
analysts undertake on a routine basis;
highly correlated determinants--while
almost always non-comprehensive--can be
scrutinized a little more carefully than
uncorrelated ones;
? Quantitative explanatory research can be
used to develop inventories of indicators,
determinants, and other factors that have
been empirically linked with political
instability, inventories that can then
be used to develop lists of determinants
for individual countries and/or regions.
These lists would of course have to be
compiled by country analysts; the strength
of the empirical relationships--because
of countless methodological and other
problems--would not alone be enough to
"admit" an indicator into an active
indicator group;
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? The processes of problem structuring
which are indigenous to scientific problem-
solving can inform some analytical activ-
ities; scientific problem-structuring
frequently involves concept formation,
data collection, hypothesis construction,
and modeling. These processes can be of
help to those who must formulate the old ones,
and avoid at all costs those questions
unrelated to the problem at hand; and
? The information, or data, management
aspect of quantitative research is also
potentially valuable to analysts. Infor-
mation collection, storage, retrieval,
analysis and display are all useful--
especially when computer-based in inter-
active management systems. Since fre-
quently "institutional memory" is confined
to but a few individuals, computer-based
information management can provide immediate
feedback to users who need to retrieve past
and analyze current information.
The Applied Potential of Qualitative Research
This assessment of political instability research method-
ologies favors the use of qualitative methods over purely quan-
titative ones. But this is not to say that all qualitative
methods are useful or that the results of qualitative analyses
are always relevant to political instability intelligence analysis
and estimating. In fact, a strong case can be made that the
qualitative analyses that have been conducted have been largely
unsystematic, and that some of the more promising qualitative
methods have been underutilized. Nevertheless, the. useful methods
and findings are as follows:
? Qualitative case studies of specific
instances of political instability,
revolution, and domestic crises can be
useful to an analyst engaged in similar
analyses;
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? Qualitative high- and low-level general-
izations, when verifiable by an analyst's
experience, judgment, and wisdom, can
be applied to real-world analysis on a
country or regional basis, but general-
izations that extend beyond countries
or regions should be very carefully
scrutinized;
? Qualitative definitions and classifica-
tions of political instability can be
used productively when passed through a
set of situational filters;
? Stages of revolution grounded in quali-
tative analysis are useful--when modified
for specific country application--as
descriptive or monitoring tools;
? Qualitative normative explanations of
political instability should be "objec-
tivized" before use; some normative
concepts, notions, and theories can help
with the analysis of individual instances
of instability as well as interpretations
of the motivations of revolutionary leaders;
? Objective qualitative explanatory analyses
can be used to develop pre-instability
checklists, although such checklists
should be regarded as non-comprehensive;
? Delphi, cross-impact and Bayesian pre-
dictive methods can lend order and pre-
cision to qualitative analyses;
? Bayesian, Delphi, and cross-impact methods
exploit the expertise of analysts, the
uniqueness of instability events and
conditions, and the strength of group
forecasting; and
? Hierarchical inference structuring which
involves identifying the "preferred
options" or undefined expected utility
of "perpetrators" can be used to organize
and "solve" instability problems; this
method is perhpas the strongest one iden-
tified in this applied assessment because
it permits the focusing of different exper-
tise at a single problem. It also permits
the integration of quantitative empirical
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research in a way unlike nearly all other
hybrid alternatives.
The Implementation of Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies
It is also important to understand just how difficult or
easy it is to implement the various methods and techniques dis-
succed in this report. As a general rule, it takes more time,
data, and expertise to implement the quantitative methods than
the qualitative ones. Quantitative methods require a good deal
of empirical data, computer support, and expertise in the sta-
tistical routines which comprise them. Qualitative methods
require a good deal of expertise, sometimes computer support,
but less frequently large amounts of data.
Both quantitative and qualitative methodologies have been
computerized in a number of software systems that greatly accel-
erate the problem-solving process. Some of these programs are
"interactive," that is, respond immediately to user queries,
while some others are not nearly as flexible. The Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is a good example of an
interactive system for quantitative analysis. Many of the sub-
jective forecasting methodologies have similarly been incarnated
in'interactive computer programs.
The question of data is more difficult to assess. Quanti-
tative empirical data is often incomplete and unreliable, while
qualitative subjective data is just as frequently biased. How-
ever, the "biases" often present in qualitative data are precisely
those which mirror the wisdom, experience, and judgment of the
analyst and therefore contribute to the analysis and estimates
process. At the same time, this is not to say that all subjective
biases are analytically useful. Sometimes they distort the very
process that they seek to accelerate.
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Finally, it is important to understand that the quantitative
techniques are best suited to problems that are relatively time
insensitive because they are less applicable to "on-line" analysis
than the qualitative techniques.
This short report has attempted to present a broadbrush
look at the methods and techniques that have been used to study
political instability. It has also attempted to determine which
of the methods are best suited to the production of intelligence
analyses and estimates about political instability, revolution,
and domestic crises of all kinds. As suggested in the Introduc-
tion, this report should be read in conjunction with our much
larger and thorough An Assessment of Political Instability
Research Methodologies
aAT
Nevertheless, certainly presented
here is the flavor of our larger argument; hopefully, it can be
applied productively to the study of political instability and
revolution.
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