SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST DECADE

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CIA-RDP83B00851R000300090002-3
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RIPPUB
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S
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10
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December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2007
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2
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Publication Date: 
October 1, 1982
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Directorate of Secret Intelligence Soviet Presence in the Third World: Developments in the Past Decade Secret GI 82-10228 October 1982 Copy 4 8 5 Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Approved or Release - 83B00851 R000300090002-3 Directorate of Intelligence in the Past Decade Soviet Presence in the Third World: Developments Information available as of 15 October 1982 has been used in the preparation of this report. This paper was prepared byl Political Instability Branch, Off-ice of Global Issues, with support from the Communist Activities Branch and the Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Political Instability Branch, OGI, 1!7 Secret GI 82-10228 October 1982 Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 25X1 25X1 Soviet Presence in the Third World: Developments in the Past Decade The position of the Soviet Union in the Third World today is stronger than it was a decade ago, despite recent setbacks. Trends During the 1950s, following the reversal of its self- defeating division of the world into "two camps," the Soviets succeeded in making major inroads in Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ghana, and other former Western colonies. But Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda support, modest economic aid, and arms sales failed to deter continuing US activism and did not prevent a string of major setbacks during the 1960s-in Zaire, Laos, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Ghana Indo- nesia, Mali, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.II Nor did the Soviets make major headway during the next half decade, notwithstanding US difficulties in Southeast Asia: ? In 1972, two years after Moscow obtained a major military presence in Egypt, the Soviets were just as suddenly ousted by President Sadat. ? In the Sudan, a Soviet-supported coup attempt against President Nimeiri failed. ? President Salvador Allende's regime in Chile was overthrown. Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Type, 1972-81 Auxiliaries 351 Surface combatantsa Amphibious ships General purpose submarines Mine warfare ships 1 SSBNs 1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 a Includes mine warfare ships in 1972 and 1973. ? Hanoi was made to accept a compromise settlement notwithstanding the withdrawal of US ground forces from South Vietnam. ? Although the Soviets contributed to India's victory over Pakistan in 1971, they watched quietly when the US and Israel strongly backed King Hussein during Jordan's conflict with the PLO and Syria in 1970. Thereafter, however, and through the remainder of the 1970s, the Soviet Union notably improved its position and influence in the Third World. Whereas the general global perception in the two previous decades usually was of trends encumbered by enough conflicting developments and complications to make interested observers cautious in their conclusions about the real extent of Moscow's gains and losses, most analysts currently believe Moscow has apprecia- bly improved its position in the Third World, both in absolute terms and especially in its competition with the US. The major events leading to this conclusion include: ? North Vietnam's 1975 defeat of South Vietnam, acquisition of control over Laos, and 1978 interven- tion in Kampuchea. Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation, 1972, 1976-81 TU-95 Bear D, Cuba Badger, May, Mail, Egypt TU-95 Bear D, Angola IL-35 May, South Yemen TU-95 Bear D, Vietnam IL-38 May. Ethiopia TU-142 Bear F, Vietnam TU-16 Badger, Syria IL-38 May, Syria IL-38 May, Libya Secret ? The Soviet-supported MPLA's 1975-76 victory in the Angolan civil war, following the intervention of Soviet-armed Cuban troops transported by Cuban and Soviet aircraft. ? Ethiopia's 1977-78 Soviet-Generaled drubbing of Somalia in the Ogaden War, following the interven- tion of Cuban troops supported by a massive Soviet military airlift. ? The 1978 Soviet-supported Communist coup in Afghanistan, acquisition of considerable Soviet in- fluence in Kabul, and the 1979 Soviet invasion. ? The Shah's ouster in Iran, the new clerical regime's vituperative hatred of the United States, and seizure of the American Embassy and ensuing hostage crisis. ? China's relative restraint and early withdrawal dur- ing the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. ? The Cuban-supported Sandinista's ouster of Presi- dent Somoza from Nicaragua in 1979 and develop- ing insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. ? Moscow's signature on 12 friendship treaties be- tween 1971 and 1981 (two of which were later abrogated). USSR and Allies: Combat Forcesa Out of Country, 1972-82 Cuba Vietnam -nlclucies Soviet forces in Mongolia, which in 1981 totaled 56,000; excludes several hundred North Korean combat personnel; excludes Soviet forces e More recently, prominent developments less favorable to Soviet interests have occurred. The momentum of Soviet gains and shocks to US interests appears to have slowed considerably owing to: ? The continuing stiff insurgency in Afghanistan, where Moscow has been reluctant to make new major commitments. ? Third World and particularly Islamic hostility to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and related failure of Cuba's chairmanship of the Non- aligned Movement. ? The continuing crisis in Poland that has required substantial Soviet attention and perhaps made Mos- cow reluctant to be more aggressive elsewhere. ? The war between Iraq and Iran, in which Baghdad and Tehran have condemned Soviet aid to the other more than they have appreciated the modest Soviet support that they have each received. ?' The US shootdown of two Libyan fighters, with- drawal of Libyan troops from Chad in 1981, and failure of Qadhafi's 1982 OAU summit. ? The negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's cool relations with Mos- 25X1 cow, and the eclipse of Joshua Nkomo, Moscow's principal ally. ? Increased South African and local insurgent threats to Angola and Mozambique. USSR and Other Warsaw Pact Nations: Military Agreements With Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-81 Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and South Asia 0 Middle East and North Africa r b Approved For Release (;IA-RDP 0 -3- Secret ? Successful elections in El Salvador and the im- proved counterinsurgency outlook there and in Guatemala. ? The 1982 conflict in Lebanon in which the Syrian Air Force was humiliated, the PLO was driven from Beirut, and Moscow was a bystander. Soviet Gains Although Moscow has recently failed to make new major gains comparable to its earlier achievements, its position in the Third World nevertheless remains greater than it was a decade ago: ? Soviet naval aircraft periodically operate out of Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, and Libya, whereas a decade earlier they spent far less time in the Third World and operated only out of Cuba, Egypt, and Somalia. ? Moscow is the principal supplier of arms to 34 LDCs compared with 17 a decade ago (including Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia, and North Korea). ? The Soviets are earning up to $6 billion a year in hard currencies from the sale of arms and military equipment to Third World countries. ? The USSR and Cuba play a major role in southern Africa and on the Horn of Africa, while Libya now seeks to influence developments in West Africa. USSR and Other Warsaw Pact Nations: Economic Aid Agreements With Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-81 Latin America IS Sub-Saharan Africa f~ East Asia and South Asia Middle East and North Africa ? Nicaragua poses a serious conventional military threat to its neighbors and seeks to sustain the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. ? Vietnam dominates Indochina and threatens Thailand. ? The Soviets may yet turn Afghanistan into a new Mongolia, and Pakistan and Iran have been further threatened. ? The setback to US interests in the Persian Gulf caused by the Shah's ouster re resents a continuing Soviet gain. Moscow's aggressive foreign and defense policies also have paid off in the daily currency of Third World attention to Soviet interests. The Soviets have not gained control over noncontiguous Third World coun- tries; but they have helped to install, keep in power, and otherwise support a host of governments amena- ble to Soviet interests and objectives and hostile to those of the US. In still other nations, the USSR has gained an entree and a respect leading to caution among some other- wise inclined to deny or attack its interests. Thus, Moscow has gotten off relatively lightly in interna- tional forums, despite its frequently aggressive behav- ior. The increased Soviet presence in the Third World North Korea, Libya, and Cuba: Military Aid Agreements With Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-81 Iran Libya Other Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa Asia and Latin America ? Syria ~ Ethiopia = Other Sub-Saharan Angola Libya Total: 213 Cuba Total: 173 Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Secret also affords greater opportunities for intelligence gathering and subversion. Instruments of Soviet Diplomacy Besides its strategic nuclear arsenal and Eurasian- based conventional forces-the principal foundations of its international position vis-a-vis the West, China, and relatedly the Third World-the Soviet Union has sought to increase its assets and influence by: - Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, Cuba, Libya, and North Korea have given LDCs military 25X1 and economic aid and technical assistance. - 35,000 Cuban troops are deployed in Angola and Ethiopia. ? Military activities and operations: - Weapon and other military equipment sales totaling $59.8 billion in 1972-81. The USSR is now the world's leading arms exporter. - Training LDC military personnel in the USSR-1,615 in 1981-and dispatching So- viet military training teams abroad. - Inviting foreign military personnel to the USSR to observe exercises, celebrate holi- days, and otherwise visit; and sending Soviet military delegations to LDCs. - Forward deploying naval units in the world's oceans, including the Mediterranean, Carib- bean, West African waters, and Arabian Sea. - Crisis and other special activities-including naval presence, airlifts, sealifts, military exer- cises, and the deployment of ground and air units. ? Economic aid and cultural exchanges: ? Other activities: - Direct and indirect Soviet and allied materiel assistance and training to insurgent and ter- rorist groups attempting to overturn or other- wise threaten the governments of up to 21 Third World nations (including Turkey). - Financial support to Communist parties, front groups, and other opposition organiza- tions in numerous LDCs. - Media propaganda and disinformation activities. - Subversion of moderate and pro-Western re- gimes. Crises and Other Major Third World Developments Eliciting Soviet Military Activities - Between 1954 and 1981, the USSR extended $22.4 billion in credits and grants to LDCs , 65 percent of this in 1972-81. - In 1981, 34,970 Soviet economic technicians were in LDCs, and some 4,800 LDC techni- cal trainees departed for the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations last year. 1973 Dho Assa leade Iraq- Midd far Rebellion in Oman. ssination of Portuguese-Guinean insur r. Kuwait dispute. le East war. gent - At the end of 1981, 42,800 LDC academic students were in the USSR. 1974-75 Kurd Cypr Syria ish insurgency in Iraq. us conflict. -Israel conflict. Encouragement, support, and orchestration of allies as surrogates: 1975-76 Ango L b lan civil war. i il A e a non c v war. - pattern of cooperation and coordination- threatening the stability of moderate and pro- 1977-78 Ethio pia-Somalia conflict. Western LDCs and enhancing their own mu- 1978-79 Chin a-Vietnam conflict. tual security-exists between the USSR, oth- 1979- Insur gency in Afghanistan. er members of the Warsaw Pact, Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethio- South South African incursion in Mozambique. African incursion in Angola. pia, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, and a number of other states. Seizu Israel Coup re of Soviet fishing vessels by Morocco -Syria conflict in Lebanon. attempt in Seychelles. . 1982 Falkl Army Israel and Islands conflict. mutiny in Seychelles. i invasion of Lebanon. Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Secret also affords greater opportunities for intelligence gathering and subversion. Instruments of Soviet Diplomacy Besides its strategic nuclear arsenal and Eurasian- based conventional forces-the principal foundations of its international position vis-a-vis the West, China, and relatedly the Third World-the Soviet Union has sought to increase its assets and influence by: - Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, Cuba, Libya, and North Korea have given LDCs military 25X1 and economic aid and technical assistance. - 35,000 Cuban troops are deployed in Angola and Ethiopia. ? Military activities and operations: - Weapon and other military equipment sales totaling $59.8 billion in 1972-81. The USSR is now the world's leading arms exporter. - Training LDC military personnel in the USSR-1,615 in 1981-and dispatching So- viet military training teams abroad. - Inviting foreign military personnel to the USSR to observe exercises, celebrate holi- days, and otherwise visit; and sending Soviet military delegations to LDCs. - Forward deploying naval units in the world's oceans, including the Mediterranean, Carib- bean, West African waters, and Arabian Sea. - Crisis and other special activities-including naval presence, airlifts, sealifts, military exer- cises, and the deployment of ground and air units. ? Economic aid and cultural exchanges: ? Other activities: - Direct and indirect Soviet and allied materiel assistance and training to insurgent and ter- rorist groups attempting to overturn or other- wise threaten the governments of up to 21 Third World nations (including Turkey). - Financial support to Communist parties, front groups, and other opposition organiza- tions in numerous LDCs. - Media propaganda and disinformation activities. - Subversion of moderate and pro-Western re- gimes. Crises and Other Major Third World Developments Eliciting Soviet Military Activities - Between 1954 and 1981, the USSR extended $22.4 billion in credits and grants to LDCs , 65 percent of this in 1972-81. - In 1981, 34,970 Soviet economic technicians were in LDCs, and some 4,800 LDC techni- cal trainees departed for the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations last year. 1973 Dho Assa leade Iraq- Midd far Rebellion in Oman. ssination of Portuguese-Guinean insur r. Kuwait dispute. le East war. gent - At the end of 1981, 42,800 LDC academic students were in the USSR. 1974-75 Kurd Cypr Syria ish insurgency in Iraq. us conflict. -Israel conflict. Encouragement, support, and orchestration of allies as surrogates: 1975-76 Ango L b lan civil war. i il A e a non c v war. - pattern of cooperation and coordination- threatening the stability of moderate and pro- 1977-78 Ethio pia-Somalia conflict. Western LDCs and enhancing their own mu- 1978-79 Chin a-Vietnam conflict. tual security-exists between the USSR, oth- 1979- Insur gency in Afghanistan. er members of the Warsaw Pact, Cuba, Vietnam, Libya, Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethio- South South African incursion in Mozambique. African incursion in Angola. pia, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, and a number of other states. Seizu Israel Coup re of Soviet fishing vessels by Morocco -Syria conflict in Lebanon. attempt in Seychelles. . 1982 Falkl Army Israel and Islands conflict. mutiny in Seychelles. i invasion of Lebanon. Approved For Release 2007/01/10: CIA-RDP83B00851 R000300090002-3 Secret Secret