DISSENT IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200150006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
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Dissent in China
Secret
PA 81-10400
September 1981
144
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Dissent in China
Information available as of 1 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by
the Office of Political Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, China Internal Division of the new Office of
East Asian Analysis
This report was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia
Secret
PA 81-10400
September 1981
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Dissent in Chiral 25X1
Key Judgments The Chinese Communist Party has again cracked down on dissent by
rounding up prominent dissidents, suppressing underground journals, and
placing restrictions on free expression in party and nonparty forums. Senior
Chinese leaders like Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and newly appointed
Chairman Hu Yaobang view dissent as a potentially serious threat to
internal stability. They are preoccupied with China's complex economic
difficulties and fear that dissidents will be able to capitalize on popular dis-
content with the party's new economic strategy, especially unemployment,
inflation, and the economic program's effect on vested interests.
In drawing the line on dissent, Deng has responded to the interests of party
conservatives in order to gain their backing for his political succession
plans. Deng, however, has tried to avoid alienating party liberals and
intellectuals-who make up one of his key constituencies-in the process of
defining stricter limits on the dissidents. The party's crackdown will not lay
the issue of dissent to rest. Rather, it is likely to:
? Further strain relations between the party and the Army, and between
leftists and liberals in the party and the bureaucracy. It may embolden
leftists to make use of cultural issues to attack reform policies.
? Cause the party to place greater restrictions on a variety of cultural and
personal contacts with the West.
? Lessen the enthusiasm of intellectuals for the party's modernization
program and reduce the likelihood that the party will overcome the
"crisis of confidence" in its mission and objectives.
? Lead to additional controversy, particularly within the Ministry of
Culture and intellectual circles, over the limits the party has placed on
freedom of expression.
Despite the party's concern, the level of dissent today is relatively low and
primarily nonviolent. Moreover, party leaders do not precisely define
dissidence. From their perspective, dissidents include not only outspoken
advocates of the "democratic movement" who have organized networks
across China and who generally work from outside the system to seek
change within it, but militant workers, university activists, and artists,
writers, and filmmakers who ask fundamental questions about the regime's
right to rule and the efficacy of the socialist system. Indeed, dissidents
themselves do not present a single, coherent program of opposition to the
party, but articulate the dissatisfaction, frustrations, and grievances of the
populace with the regime.
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PA 81-10400
September 198/
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The current restrictions on dissent are unlikely to loosen dramatically in
the near future. "The Resolution on Certain Historical Questions" passed
by the Sixth Plenum of the party Central Committee in June clearly stated
the party's determination to prevent another blossoming of dissident
activity. Even if the party can maintain such control, dissidence-which
the party cannot extinguish completely without undermining the modern-
ization program-will remain aloes-level irritant for the regime.
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Introduction
The Chinese leadership is again cracking down on
internal dissent following the spread of strikes, dem-
onstrations, and sporadic acts of violence late last
year. Senior party leaders, including Deng Xiaoping,
view dissent as both dangerous and along-term threat
to stability. The arrests of prominent dissidents, the
suppression of underground journals, and the renewed
restrictions on the arts all reflect the fear that dissi-
dent organizations unchecked will bring a growing
and more radical criticism of the regime
The tighter control over dissent comes at a time when
China's leaders are deeply concerned with maintain-
ing social order as they implement a new economic
strategy that may increase unemployment and threat-
en vested interests. Deng, who initially encouraged
and manipulated dissent to serve his own political
goals, now seeks to draw the line on unacceptable
political behavior. Deng has been under pressure from
opponents and some members of his own camp to deal
harshly with dissent outside the party, and he is
clearly willing to toughen his approach at the expense
of more liberal elements in his own reformist constitu-
ency to prevent hardliners from upsetting his political
succession plans.
The suppression of dissent has already widened the
gap between reformers and leftists in the party. It has
stirred up divisions over policy toward culture and
intellectuals in the party's senior ranks and has
enabled leftists to make use of cultural issues to
attack Deng's reform policy. Paradoxically, it has also
strengthened the resolve of liberal academics and of
dissidents to air their grievances.
Dissidents have stirred official fears that Western
"bourgeois" ideas will erode popular support for
Marxism-Leninism by praising aspects of Western
democracy, economics, and culture. They articulate
widely held grievances and will continue to irritate the
regime with their critiques in the future. In the long
run, dissidents have the potential to galvanize popular
discontent against the regime in the event of a crisis.
More immediately, however, they point to the party's
inability to build support fo; its mission and ideology
among the young and the intellectuals.
Who Dissents and Why
Chinese leaders regard dissent as any activity that
opposes the policies of the Central Committee. In this
context, dissent encompasses activities that range
from the expression of political opinions at odds with
current policy to overtly criminal behavior. As such,
any definition of dissent must be somewhat arbitrary.
In his speech to the party work conference last
December, for example, Deng Xiaoping,excoriated all
those whose actions threatened "the stability and
unity of the political situation"-lumping together
political radicals, rioting "down-to-the-countryside"
settlers, and rapists, prostitutes, arsonists, and smug-
glers.
Dissidents have been a persistent irritant to the
regime since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central
Committee in 1978, when the party endorsed the
slogan "emancipate the mind" and in effect broke the
Maoist ideological mold. Dissidence reached its
height in the "Beijing spring" of 1979 when young
"democrats" used wall posters to air their views on
the "democracy walls" of Beijing and other cities, and
published dissenting essays, poetry, fiction, literary
criticism, and woodcuts in spontaneous journals. An
outbreak of public disorder that spring forced Deng
and party reformers to accede to pressure from both
conservatives and leftists and to crack down on as-
saults on the party's legitimacy. More than 40 dissi-
dents were arrested in Beijing; Wei Jingsheng, Fu
Yuehua, and other prominent "democratic figures"
were tried and imprisoned later in the year. As a
consequence, the level of dissidence dropped sharply
and many activists went underground.
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Dissidents were arrested at
Democracy Wall in Beijing
when they attempted to
distribute the transcript of Wei
Although dissent currently remains at a relatively low
level, it embraces a broader spectrum of activity than
in 1979, ranging from localized flurries of wall poster
writing to small-scale, violent demonstrations and
underground networks. Dissidents today include both
the outspoken advocates of the original "democratic"
or "human rights" movement of 1979 and militant
workers and university activists. Allied with them
across the nation are writers, artists, and filmmakers
who, like many party cadres, ask fundamental ques-
tions about the system.
Dissidents do not present a single, coherent program
of opposition to the party but rather express a variety
of views that articulate the dissatisfaction, frustra-
tions, and grievances of the populace with the regime.
Most dissidents support socialism, at least in the
abstract, and primarily urge the reform of the party
and society. Overall, they appear to back Deng
Xiaoping, but believe that there must be steady
pressure from the outside to prevent Deng and the
reform program from succumbing to Maoist counter-
currents and bureaucratic inertia.
Wall poster protesting harsh treatment accorded
petitioners from the countryside. Dissidents like
Fu Yuehua, arrested in 1979, were accused 4f
organizing these victims gjthe Cultural
Revolution whollocked to Beijing to seek redress
A minority of dissidents loudly rejects socialism and
argues for a variety of systems, including capitalism.
Other dissidents, particularly in academic circles,
criticize the current regime from the viewpoint of
classical Marxism. Such critics challenge the ideologi-
cal soundness of concepts fundamental to the legiti-
Some general themes are common to most dissidents:
? Bureaucratic abuses and special privileges for offi-
cials. The dissidents accuse the party of forming a
new class and argue that socialism engenders bu-
reaucratic abuses that separate the people from the
government.
? Party domination of intellectual life and violation of
constitutional guarantees. Dissidents advocate ex-
panded intellectual freedom, including the freedom
to publish opinions at variance with orthodox party
views, and an end to party interference in the arts
and sciences. Dissidents also attempt to hold the
party to the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and assembly, and of rule by law.
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Mass demonstrations in Beijing
and other major Chinese cities
on 5 April 1976 helped to
undermine the regime gf'Jiang
Qing and paved the way to
Deng Xiaoping's ascent to
? Subordination of democracy to the requirements of
modernization. Dissidents assert that democracy,
the "fifth modernization," should be a national goal.
Deng and other senior leaders argue, in contrast,
that the selective use of democracy is simply a
means to stimulate enthusiasm for the regime's
programs. Their final goal is a powerful socialist
state akin to the more traditional aim of "wealth
Wei Jingsheng, at his trial in
the fall of 1979, argued that
without democracy, the ':/Jth
modernization,"China would
who are skillful political organizers and tacticians.
Like the Red Guards of 1966-67, many are children
of high-ranking party officials who know the activities
of senior officials and the government's inner work-
ings in detail. Their underground journals, which
publish the most strident criticism of the regime, have
been found in every major city.
and power."
Focal Points of Dissent
The "democratic movement, "which probably num-
bers several thousand activists across China, is the
most intractable and troublesome dissident element
and, as such, is the primary target of periodic crack-
downs. The party, mindful of its own origins, is wary
of challenges from small, organized groups, as well as
apprehensive about the influence that dissidents can
exert over young intellectuals throughout the country.
The "democratic movement" comprises articulate,
well-educated veterans of the Cultural Revolution era
(Their leaders are
men like Wang Xizhe and Xu Wenli, two well-known
polemicists who were arrested in the crackdown last
spring. Wang first came to national attention in 1973
as one of the Li Yizhe group-writers of a widely
circulated wall poster, put up in Canton, that criti-
cized in highly emotional terms the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution. Xu and Wang were "heroes" of
the spontaneous mass demonstrations on 5 April 1976
in Tiananmen Square and later set the pace for the
protests of the "Beijing spring" in 1979. Some high
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Zhang Zhixin, a dissident
persecuted by Mao's nephew
and Liaoning party boss Mao
Yuanzin, has become a cause
celebre among youn
democrats in China
party officials, who believe that they represent the
views of many educated youth, have given them tacit
support, and they have published their views in Hong
Kong leftist publications.
Militant workers, some of whom are political radi-
cals, have sporadically challenged party hegemony in
the factory and may have organized some of the
strikes that hit the country last fall. Party officials-
sensitive to the parallels with the Polish situation-
have tried hard to preverit alliances between radical
intellectuals and young workers, especially where
labor unrest has occurred. In the northern city of
Taiyuan last October-the scene of shutdowns and
labor agitation~issident journals ridiculed the offi-
cial notion that workers are the "masters" of China
and denounced the Communist party's suppression
and exploitation of the working class. Some publica-
tions were discovered by police in factories that went
on strike.
The "down-to-the-countryside"settlers-people sent
to rural areas under party policy established in the
early 1960s-were at the forefront of the first out-
burst of dissident activity in 1979. They have contin-
ued to agitate for an improvement in their living
conditions and for return to their home cities. Last
December, for example, 60,000 to 70,000 settlers
staged mass demonstrations in Xinjiang to protest the
regime's failure to improve their conditions and to
demand the right to return to Shanghai. A stall in
negotiations led to rioting, the occupation of the local
party headquarters, clashes with officials, and a
standoff with troops called in to quell the disturb-
ances.
News of the rioting in Xinjiang sparked sympathetic
demonstrations in Shanghai, where an estimated
10,000 people gathered to listen to returned settlers
describe their plight. The authorities in Shanghai and
other eastern cities have been unable to send back
illegal returnees, who may number some 20,000 and
remain a persistent source of anxiety for local offi-
cials.
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CHINA: Chinese Settler Disturbances in Xinjiang
Disturbances, Dec.1980
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Some of the protesting settlers have links to the
"democratic movement" and have published unoffi-
cial journals critical of the regime. Because of the
depth of their discontent, and because large numbers
of such settlers are concentrated in the strategically
important region of Xinjiang near the Soviet border,
their actions have provoked great concern among the
leadership about maintaining order. Beijing wants to
prevent settlers from returning because this would
exacerbate the existing problem of urban unemploy-
ment
Criticism of the party is a strong undercurrent on
university campuses. Last fall the elections of dele-
gates to Local Peoples' Congresses gave dissidents the
opportunity to galvanize China's largely apathetic
campuses. Widespread demonstrations occurred that
focused on various issues-including party control of
academic life and cadre abuses.
At Beijing University, for example, the elections
embroiled the campus in turmoil for two months.
They sparked rallies, student journals, discussion
groups, and big character posters in which students
aired their views on current political issues, including
the history of the party, the assessment of Mao
Zedong, the meaning of democracy, and the critique
of "bureaucratism." Candidates at Beijing University
and other campuses who described themselves as
"anti-Marxist" ran and won election as deputies.
Criticism of the party and of Mao was vigorous, and
party attempts to refute student views in debates were
largely unsuccessful. The recent crackdown has bot-
tled up expression of dissent for the time being, but
the prevailing campus critique of the party and its
general acceptance by students pose a potentially
serious morale problem in the long rung
The arts-particularly fiction and films-have pro-
duced the most trenchant criticism of the party. The
persuasive power of the written word-traditionally
esteemed in China-and the recent Chinese fascina-
tion with films provide dissident writers with a large
and receptive audience. In the last few years, they
have articulated mass grievances and have been the
cutting edge of social criticism in China.
With the emergence of the "scar" literature' since
1978, a literature of protest has grown up that is
remarkable for its boldness in exposing "contradic-
tions" in Chinese society. Writers-many of them
rehabilitated rightists who no longer feel they have
anything to lose by criticizing the party-began first
to explore the inequities of the Cultural Revolution
and have subsequently spared no sector of official
China in uncovering fraud, deceit, and corruption.
The bravest authors have documented cadre incompe-
tence, accused army generals, exposed the cruelty of
the "down-to-the-countryside" program, and ruthless-
ly satirized Mao and all that is sacred to the old
guard.
Senior reformist officials, like party Chairman Hu
Yaobang and cultural leader Zhou Yang, generally
sympathize with the artists' critiques of the party.
This has also encouraged expose writing and some
investigative reporting in China's national press. Con-
servatives and some party reformers, however, have
been alarmed and have attempted-so far to little
effect-to direct the writers toward service to the
party.
Deng and Dissent
Deng Xiaoping, the prime mover in the recent crack-
down on dissent, initially supported the right of
dissidents to criticize the party and clearly sought to
use their critiques to his advantage against his oppo-
nents. He told that wall
posters had been "in con ormity with the Chinese
constitution" and that the Chinese people had "the
capability to judge the truth." He encouraged dissi-.
dents to attack the leftist excesses and manipulated
their critiques to gain support for his personnel and
policy positions in the Politburo. He lashed out at
adversaries for attempting to "still dissent" and to
suppress the "activism of the masses," and was suc-
cessful in purging leftist opponents like party Vice
Chairman Wang Dongxing after party debates that
echoed dissident complaints.
the Mao era
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Deng's initial manipulation of dissident critiques ex-
posed his flanks to political attack in the Politburo.
Deng's opponents linked his moderate policies toward
intellectuals, his calls for the democratization of the
party and society, and his reform-oriented social
policies with support for dissidents. They charged that
Deng and his reform policies were largely responsible
for growing social disorder in April 1979, and alleged
that dissidents constituted a fifth column, rather than
a loyal opposition, because they refused to acknowl-
edge the primacy of the party.
Deng himself, now concerned about the dissidents'
potential as a long-term threat to internal stability,
responded with arrests of the most prominent dissi-
dents and an enunciation of the "four basic princi-
ples." These insist that despite the party's determina-
tion to "emancipate the mind," all criticism must
defer to socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat,
party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Ze-
dong Thought.
Deng and his allies not only are antagonized by
dissident critiques of the validity of the socialist
system but also have drawn lessons from the crisis in
Poland, where grass-roots political action snowballed
into abroad-based effort to reform the party. Deng
has become increasingly concerned that dissident
ideas may attract workers and intellectuals away from
the party and believes that dissident critiques have
aggravated, not healed, the party's "crisis of confi-
dence." Asense of eroding support for the Communist
party and a general disdain on the part of Chinese
intellectuals for Marxism-Leninism have almost cer-
tainly buttressed these apprehensions.
Since the December 1980 work conference, when the
party acknowledged the depth of China's current
economic problems, party leaders have stressed the
importance of "stability and unity" to ensure the
success of economic readjustment. They were con-
cerned that dissident critiques would only fuel popular
unhappiness with high inflation, unemployment, and
temporary shortages while factories are restructured.
In support of his harder line against the dissidents,
Deng has expressed concern about their:
? Critique of the socialist system. Deng does not want
to extinguish legitimate criticism, but he will not
tolerate views that question the validity of the
socialist system or party supremacy. Deng has told
party leaders more than once that dissidents
"wished to practice democracy without party lead-
ership" and has promised that this would never be
permitted.
? Competition with the leadership and the reform
program. Deng, Hu Yaobang, and other senior
reform leaders are concerned that the public recog-
nition accorded the dissidents has included the
perception that the party has lagged behind their
actions. Mao was first openly debunked in wall post-
ers and only later-after the party adopted the
dissidents' slogan-officially described as "a man
and not a god."
? Organization and infiltration into the party. Despite
the small size of the dissident movement, Deng and
party leaders are worried-with some reason-
about the organization of networks among dissident
groups on college campuses, in cities across China,
and in factories. Deng wants to prevent young
reformers in the party from forging links with
dissident organizations. The party leadership real-
izes that as in Poland dissidents could well begin a
reform movement from below in the party.
leaders, demeans China's dignity.
? Foreign involvement. Deng has criticized the dissi-
dents for accepting foreign, "bourgeois" ideas of
democracy and freedom. He has been wary of the
contacts dissidents have developed with foreign re-
porters and has backed accusations that they are
passing state secrets. The party made an ideological
case last spring that "class struggle" must be car-
ried out against the influence of foreign ideas like
"anarchism" and "ultra-individualism." Beyond
these concerns, moreover, Deng believes that dissi-
dent activity fosters an image of Chinese instability
abroad and, through its blunt criticism of Chinese
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Deng has continued to line up with conservative views
on the need to control dissent since the party's central
work conference last December. While ostensibly
supporting the principle of "socialist democracy,"
Deng has agreed to a dragnet to arrest the most
outspoken dissidents and to permit party documents
that mandate the restriction of forums for dissidents.
He has again demonstrated that he will sacrifice the
interests of some in his group who favor greater
.freedom of expression to the more urgent need for
social order and discipline. Indeed, this trade-off on
Deng's list was apparently a precondition to the
endorsement for his critical objectives-removal of
party Chairman Hua Guofeng and agreement on the
reassessment of Mao Zedong-from senior party
leaders.
Although agreeing with the need to limit dissent,
Deng has squelched the efforts of hardliners to broad-
en the crackdown significantly. In particular, he has
tried to separate the harsher approach toward "dis-
sent" from the maintenance of a moderate policy to
intellectuals whose support he believes is critical to
the success of his reform program. Deng has reas-
sured them that the crackdown does not mark a
fundamental change in the regime's policies and has
told them that they will not become targets of a
political campaign against dissent. In trying to limit
the targets for the hardliners, Deng has reined in
some of his own supporters who have backed dissi-
dents and who want greater liberalization. Neverthe-
less, Deng must move cautiously or risk alienating
some of his own supporters in the party as he moves to
accommodate the concerns of the hardliners.
The Views Surrounding Deng
Hardliners who oppose the liberal emphasis of
Deng's reform program-like number-two ranking
Ye Jianying and Army General Political Department
Director Wei Guoqing-attribute the dissidents' ex-
cesses to difficulties created by reform. They have
sought to tie the demands for greater democracy and
"human rights" with a wide range of social and
economic problems, especially rising crime rates, poor
economic performance, the party's "crisis of confi-
dence," and labor unrest.
Leading military figures have been most strident in
asserting that Deng's moderate policies toward intel-
lectuals provide fertile ground for the growth of
dissent. The Army, which has forcefully expressed
displeasure with the reformers' emphasis on material
rewards and pragmatic ideology, vigorously criticized
liberal writers this spring as representatives of the
"ideological trend toward the liberalization" of Chi-
nese society.
Even senior leaders associated with party reform like
Vice Chairman Chen Yun and party Chairman Hu
Yaobang deeply distrust dissidence. They see dissi-
dent wall posters and pamphlets as an extension of the
disruptive mass politics of the 1960s. These leaders
have accused young dissidents of being proponents of
a "second Cultural Revolution," and "anarchists" and
"ultra-individualists" who are unpatriotic and infatu-
ated with Western ideas.
Even so, many reformers, who now occupy important
positions in culture, the media, and the scientific
establishment, tolerate dissent. They fear that sup-
pression would lead to a restriction of the regime's
liberal policies toward intellectuals and have contin-
ued to lobby for increased intellectual freedom. Deng
has tried to convince reformers to accept his conces-
sions to hardliners on dissent, but he will face pressure
in the future to reopen the "window of democracy."
Containing Dissent
The party has instituted a variety of measures to
control dissent in addition to the arrests of leading
dissidents and the suppression of unofficial publica-
tions.
strengthen the political reliability of intellectuals.
Media campaigns have tightened guidelines for intel-
lectuals, chastened errant writers and artists, and
warned against further dissident activity. The cam-
paigns seek to increase confidence in the party and to
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The intensified political indoctrination on college
campuses and in the party insists upon adherence to
party leadership and the "four basic principles." It
invokes the virtues of patriotism, and resurrects
Maoist social models and slogans to guide the behav-
ior of intellectuals. The party has wrapped itself
ostentatiously in the mantle of Chinese traditional
culture, called for proper behavior among youth,
reiterated the necessity for hierarchy and obedience to
authority, and sought to channel youthful energies
into the creation of a Marxist "spiritual civilization."
The national media have also urged writers to adhere
to party guidelines. The military, which has been
disgruntled because of its dim prospects for benefiting
from modernization despite the party stress on mate-
rial incentives, took the lead in reining in liberal
writers in mid-April. Then, the Liberation Army
Daily openly attacked writer Bai Hua for his film-
script "Bitter Love" in a manner that smacked of the
tactics of the Cultural Revolution
The party has issued central directives that assert
tighter control over art and literature and call for the
suppression of dissident organizations. The directives
attack dissidents in harsh language for attempting to
seize party power and to "see the state plunged into
chaos." They restrict dissident activities, ban "links"
between dissident organizations, order the arrest of
dissidents who continue to publish in defiance of party
orders, and call for the investigation of party members
suspected of having connections with dissident groups.
The directives also order officially sponsored writers
to accept the consensus on the historical evaluation of
Mao Zedong and place restrictions on further criti-
cism of sensitive periods in the party's history-such
as the Cultural Revolution and the 1957 Anti-
Rightist Movement. The party has instructed writers
to submit to greater party control over the arts by
emphasizing their responsibility to socialist society.
The party has also decided to use its propaganda
apparatus to check dissidents within its own ranks.
Reactions and Implications
Dissidents have won widespread sympathy-mostly in
China's cities-for their positions, which has given
them prominence and potential influence that exceeds
their numbers. They have articulated the grievances
of China's young and its intellectuals with the party,
and, most tellingly, have by their example forced the
party to address many of their complaints. They have
made national issues out of the special privileges of 25X1
party officials and the need for rule by law and party
obedience to the constitution. Even though the more
radical "democratic movement" dissidents are vulner-
able to periodic crackdowns, dissidents in art and
literature continue to command sizable audiences and
to address similar issues.
The dissidents do not pose a threat to the regime;
indeed, it has easily rounded up as many as 200
dissidents across China and closed down all unofficial
publications. Nevertheless, the dissident issue is
symptomatic of larger problems the Chinese leader- 25X1
ship faces. The party will be able to muffle, but not to
extinguish, its critics, and dissent will continue to
appear in one form or another, sounding similar
themes
The suppression of dissent has caused friction between
the Army and the party, and between conservatives
and liberals in both organizations. The Army used its
critique of Bai Hua in the Liberation Army Daily to
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raise broader objections to party reforms; it has also
sought to blunt the reformer's critique of "leftism" in
the Army and to revive Maoist standards for the arts.
Deng, who gave the Army its opening by permitting
criticism of Bai Hua's film "Bitter Love," subseguent-
ly ordered limits on the Army's critique.
Reaction to the party's harder line among intellectu-
als, especially liberals in the Ministry of Culture, has
been cool. Liberal writers-including senior cultural
figures like Zhou Yang, deputy director of the Propa-
ganda Department~ountered the Army's initiative
by awarding a prize to Bai Hua for another of his
works and publishing speeches in People's Daily that
endorse a comparatively moderate cultural policy.
These actions helped to limit the scope of a crackdown
and worked to ensure that cultural policy would
guarantee at least a modicum of intellectual freedom.
The provincial media have mostly echoed the line
contained in the restrictive central directives, but
actual compliance with the documents has been
spotty. Provincial First Secretaries in several prov-
inces have protected writers who were singled out for
criticism by the party Propaganda Department and
have tried to soften the criticism of authors overall.
Others-notably in Hebei Province-have, however,
loudly endorsed the tougher line of Liberation Army
Daily.
The party, which has traditionally associated dissent
with foreign influence, has already made some efforts
to supervise more closely or curtail cultural programs
and contacts with foreigners. It has also placed great-
er restrictions on the activities of American social
scientists doing research in China and has issued
documents limiting the access of Western reporters to
Chinese officials. The party, moreover, has banned
The decision to suppress dissent could also pose
political problems for Deng's reform program. Faced
with serious economic and political difficulties, Deng
has leaned toward conservative demands for "stability
and unity," muffling the voice of popular dissatisfac-
tion that has served his interests in disciplining and
rectifying the bureaucracy. He risks alienating mem- 25X1
bers of his reform group who advocate the tolerance of
dissent and liberalization of Chinese society.
As the suppression of dissent strains relations between
reformers and leftists in the party, it may raise the
level of tension in the bureaucracy and embolden
those who seek to discredit the reform program.
Senior reformers, who are known to have protected
dissidents in the past, will be vulnerable to leftist
critiques. Although dissidents attack the left with
vehemence, the ultimate victims may be the party
reformers.
Deng must deal with the prospect that diminishing
enthusiasm among the intellectuals may extinguish
the sense of innovation required for modernization as
well. The party has never successfully disciplined
intellectuals and won their allegiance to its programs.
While reformers have to a degree championed and
used dissident issues, their need to compromise with
vested interests in the party to secure key changes in
the leadership will restrain further identification with
those themes.
Efforts to recruit more intellectuals to party ranks are
likely to be slowed by revivals of the worn out and
unappealing Maoist themes of the 1950s and 1960s.
Problems with young intellectuals-particularly those
now on college campuses-in the future could well
appear in efforts to emigrate, a lack of active support
for the regime, and indifferent performance in the
work place
The move to suppress dissent is likely to strengthen
the resolve of those who oppose or seek to criticize the
party. Reflecting the complexity of the dissident
movement, the PLA's thwarted attack on writer Bai
Hua provoked a strong reaction from more liberal
figures in the Cultural Ministry and in the media-a
further encoura ement to dissidents outside official
circle
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Current restrictions on dissident activity seem unlike-
ly to loosen in the near future. The "Resolution on
Certain Historical Questions" recently passed at the
party Central Committee's Sixth Plenum clearly stat-
ed the party's determination that dissidents not "air
their views in a big way," and it supported the party's
decision to prosecute "rightists" in the late 1950s.
Hence, another blossoming of dissent probably will
not occur, but dissidents will remain aloes-level
irritant for the regime in the future.
In the event that a crisis within the leadership occurs,
dissidents have the potential to rally the people
against the regime and to spark mass demonstrations
like the Tiananmen rally that led to the fall of the
Gang of Four in 1976. Dissidents have shown an
extraordinary ability to organize and articulate mass
frustrations with the regime-a legacy they have
inherited from the Cultural Revolution. In the long
run, however, the course of dissent will depend upon
the success of Deng and party reformers in reviving
the economy and consolidating their hold on the
party.
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