KAMPUCHEA: THE KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000200130005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Nati?nall
Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Kampuchea: The Khmer People's
National Liberation Front
Secret
PA 81-10119
March 1981
Copy 2
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Kampuchea: The Khmer People's
National Liberation Front
Summary The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) is the only signifi-
cant non-Communist resistance force operating in Kampuchea. Its activities
are modest and concentrated near the Thai border. Thailand and China
have pressed the KPNLF for some time to join a united front with Pol Pot's
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces to broaden the base of the anti-
Vietnamese effort and to help counteract Pol Pot's negative international
image.
Earlier this year, it appeared that KPNLF leader Son Sann, who has long
resisted pressure to join Pol Pot, might be nearing an agreement to partici-
pate in a united front. Whatever momentum toward a merger may have
existed, however, was slowed when Prince Norodom Sihanouk suddenly
suggested he might participate. Having successfully delayed any announce-
ment of a merger by the KPNLF and DK in this way, Sihanouk then refused
to join the DK, although he kept open the possibility of reconsidering
sometime in the future.
Thailand and China will now probably return to their original plan and
resume pressure on Son Sann. Although he has agreed in principle to join a
united front with the DK, Son Sann has yet to enter serious discussions on
implementing a merger. Son Sann hopes to obtain support from the United
States in building his own military force to counterbalance Chinese aid to
the DK and to improve his bargaining position in future negotiations. It is
unlikely, however, that an effective non-Communist fighting force would be
available to replace the DK in the near future. Moreover, any DK-KPNLF
united front would probably be short lived and ineffective.
This memorandum was prepared b froutheast Asia Branch, EasQA)04
Pacdic Division, Off ce of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Strategic
Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia.
Information available as of 10 March 1981 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Branch, East Asia-
Pacific Division, OPA, 25X1
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Kampuchea: The Khmer Peo le's
National Liberation Front 25X1
Organization and The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) is the only signifi-
Personalities cant non-Communist Khmer political force. Other self-styled Free Khmer
groups tend to be little more than armed bandits participating in the
lucrative Thai-Kampuchea border trade, but the KPNLF has cohesion,
nationalistic motivation and a small measure of international support.'
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Established in October 1979, the Front operates largely on the Thai side of
the border or close to it inside Kampuchea. The movement is headed by 70-
year-old President Son Sann and Vice President Chhean Vam. Most day-to-
day operations, however, are handled by an Executive Committee with
headquarters in Bangkok; its most prominent member is Armed Forces
Chief of Staff Dien Del, a respected former Cambodian Army officer with
little guerrilla warfare experience. Subsidiary bodies include a National
Council, a Military Council, and a Council of Elders, composed in pa2f.X1
expatriates living in France and the United States
For administrative purposes, the KPNLF has divided Kampuchea into
Northern, Central, and Southern military regions, but the jurisdiction over
these areas is more theoretical than real. The Front maintains approxi-
mately 3,000 to 5,000 armed troops, compared to approximately 35,000 of
Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea (DK) troops inside Kampuchea.' The
Front's occasional claims of military activity deep inside Kampuchea are
usually unsubstantiated, and its frequent claim to thousands of supporters
throughout Kampuchea and abroad is untested.
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Although it controls a few villages in Kampuchea close to the border and
occasionally harasses Vietnamese troops, the KPNLF concentrates on
recruiting supporters from refugee camps inside Thailand. The recruits
receive some military training but lack adequate arms and ammunition.
They also receive a six-week political indoctrination course designed to
produce a cadre capable of assuring victory if UN-supervised elections ever
take place in Kampuchea.
The KPNLF has attracted some international attention outside Thailand. In
his press interviews from Kampuchea, Bangkok, and Paris, Son Sann
projects the image of a somewhat melancholy patriot working tirelessly for
' See appendix for the genesis of the KPNLF.O 25X1
2 We do not know the actual size of the KPNLF army. If the Khmer forces loosely associated
with the Front are included, the number may be as high as 8,000 to 10,000.1 25X1
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the good of his nation against both Pol Pot and the Vietnamese.' He served
in Cambodian governments beginning in the 1940s-eventually becoming
Prime Minister in 1967-and earned a reputation for integrity; he was
critical of both Lon Nol, who seized power in 1970, and Prince Sihanouk,
who supported the DK from exile in Beijing. The KPNLF benefits from the
authenticity of Son Sann's claim of being an honest patriot. 5X1
A Strategy for Survival Although KPNLF leaders hope their army will become a significant mili-
tary force and although they have bold military plans for operations inside
Kampuchea, their political strategy reflects their military impotence. They
seek primarily to survive as a political alternative for Kampuchea. Their
goal includes an internationally sponsored Vietnamese withdrawal and the
withering away of Pol Pot's forces. As part of this strategy, the KPNLF
wants financial support and arms-beyond what it has received from China
and Thailand-from the United States, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), Japan, and West European countries. The aid probably
is sought less for direct material benefit than as tangible evidence of broad
international support that could eventually translate into political backing in
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a UN-sponsored negotiated settlement.
F
The KPNLF also may hope that Moscow and Hanoi will eventually consider
it an acceptable alternative to the existing pro-Vietnamese regime and the
DK; KPNLF leaders have occasionally hinted that they have received
feelers from the Soviets and the Vietnamese. The KPNLF's desire to emerge
as an attractive third force in Hanoi's eyes gives it a strong incentive not to
cooperate with DK leaders. For the same reason, the Front would prefer to
keep China at arm's length while at the same time seeking its financial and
military assistance. 25X1
The KPNLF operates in an uneasy relationship with other non-Communist
Khmer resistance groups. It has undertaken a campaign to absorb through
co-optation and coercion as many of the smaller Khmer armed groups as it
can. This occasionally leads to armed clashes and may taint the KPNLF's
reputation 25X1
' Pol Pot's DK "government," currently headed by Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, was
brought to power by the Khmer Rouge in 1975 and was toppled by Vietnamese troops in late
1978. Most of Kampuchea now is administered by a Hanoi-backed puppet Khmer govern-
ment, headed by Heng Samrin and called the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The DK,
with Chinese support, still maintains a government structure, retains some international
recognition, and has an army that operates inside Kampuchea. The DK also controls
Kampuchea's UN seat over the strenuous objections of the Soviet Bloc. Various neutral and
pro-West governments, appalled by the excesses of Pol Pot when he was in power, do not
recognize his regime although most of them support DK retention of the UN seat.
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The KPNLF has consistently shunned association with Pol Pot's army and
government, although it has declared a policy of not fighting the DK army
inside Kampuchea. Many of the Front's members suffered during Pol Pot's
terror campaigns in 1975-78 and are convinced that any association with the
repudiated DK leaders would cost the KPNLF its support among the
Kampuchean people. 25X1
Pressure for a The KPNLF's major backers, Thailand and China, have long pressed Son
United Front Sann and his followers to join a united political front with Pol Pot's forces.
The latest such proposal calls for top DK leaders to step down, turning over
key leadership posts in the DK to KPNLF leaders. The purge, however,
would not be total, and the plan is vague regarding how far removed from
the scene the current DK leaders would actually be. The plan is designed to
convince the international community that the DK regime has been genu-
inely reformed, but to do this without damaging the DK's fighting ability,
which depends on a chain of personal loyalities that connects the lowest
ranks with Pol Pot. 25X1
The plan's promoters tacitly acknowledge that the plan is a marriage of
convenience in which each participant can harbor different expectations.
The current DK leaders assume that they will eventually destroy their non-
Communist partner, as they have done with such groups in the past. Some
KPNLF advocates of the plan probably believe that outside support will
enable them to come out on top. The Thais, and perhaps the Chinese, may
hope that a renovated regime will become a vehicle that will not only unite
the Khmer resistance but also attract Prince Sihanouk into the resistance
effort against Vietnam 25X1
The impetus for the latest merger proposal came from a pessimistic ASEAN
assessment of the chances that the DK can retain international support.
Although an ASEAN resolution supporting the DK's retention of the
country's UN seat was carried by a large margin at the General Assembly
session in September, ASEAN nations and others left New York with the
impression that the DK, at least as then constituted, would not fare well at
the 1981 session. A reshuffling of the DK government in 1979, which
removed Pol Pot from political leadership, and a subsequent DK repudiation
of past excesses had clearly failed to convince the international community
that the DK merited lasting support. ASEAN members were also concerned
that planned Vietnam-sponsored elections in Kampuchea would cause more
countries to recognize the pro-Vietnam Heng Samrin regime.
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A Change of Strategy? After mid-January, signs appeared suggesting Son Sann had second
thoughts about his rejection of the latest Thai-Chinese proposal. At the
same time, unconfirmed press reports alleged that the DK leadership had
agreed to go into exile in China and to turn over the top posts in the DK gov-
ernment to the KPNLF; a few minor DK officials would be retained but
would hold less important portfolios.
Although it is unlikely that the DK officials will banish themselves, it is
possible that Son Sann agreed to a coalition in principle on the condition that
his own organization retain the senior posts and receive large amounts of
arms aid and financial support. Facing a probable end of crucial Thai
assistance, Son Sann may have decided to accept a deal. He also may be
stalling for time on the assumption that the merger will founder over
implementation while he benefits by appearing flexible. In the past, when
Son Sann has appeared close to accepting association with the DK he has
ended by backing away
Son Sann may be under pressure from other KPNLF leaders to agree to a
coalition. Chief of Staff Dien Del supports the merger and has strongly
criticized Son Sann in the past for his refusal to compromise with the DK.
Dien Del reportedly believes that if the coalition were successfully sold to the
Kampuchean people and quickly recognized by a significant number of
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countries, a united front might work to the KPNLF's advantage. Chhean
Vam, who has family ties to the DK leadership and who also reportedly has
differences with Son Sann, may favor the plan as well. The KPNLF rank
and file, however, may have a less calculating and less o timistic view of
association with the hated DK. 25X1
Sihanouk as Spoiler? Son Sann's late December visit to Beijing, coupled with increasing interna-
tional speculation that a united front between the KPNLF and the DK was
near, evidently persuaded Prince Sihanouk to act to preserve his political
equities. Sihanouk's long-range objective is to be influential in any future
government in Phnom Penh, when and if the Vietnamese leave, and to
prevent the DK's return to power. His only bargaining chip is his value as a
legitimizing symbol for any proposed coalition. He has no armed force
sufficient to compete with the KPNLF-much less the DK-as a potential
resistance force in a united front. 25X1
Sihanouk probably believes his only hope of achieving his objectives is to
delay creation of a united front until he can participate in more than
symbolic terms. Thus on 8 February he announced that under certain
conditions he would participate in a front including the DK; on 10 March he
rejected participation because DK leader Khieu Samphan would not accept
his conditions, but at the same time he did not foreclose the possibility of
future discussions 25X1
Sihanouk's on-again, off-again approach to participation probably is in-
tended to indefinitely delay any possibility of a merger between the KPNLF
and the DK. Son Sann, for his part, appears increasingly unwilling to
cooperate with Sihanouk. He fears that Sihanouk and the DK combined
would overpower him in any tripartite union, and so he has toughened his
own conditions for a merger. China and Thailand prefer that both Sihanouk
and Son Sann participate, but with the Prince once again backing away,
they will probably renew their pressure on Son Sann to merge with the DK.
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Prospects for a Son Sann has three choices:
KPNLF-DK Merger ? Resist Thai pressure and remain independent of the DK.
? Agree to a coalition with the DK.
? Attempt to do both by appearing to go along with a merger, while keeping
open the option to back out if the deal looks bad on closer examination.
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Outright rejection risks a cutoff of Thai aid, something the Thais claim to be
willing to do if the KPNLF does not go along. It also risks that the Thais
might promote a faction within the KPNLF that would be favorable to a
merger, and perhaps even deport Son Sann. The KPNLF leader has
withstood Thai pressure in the past, but the KPNLF could not operate
without Thai cooperation. If he continues to balk at a merger Son Sann may
decide, or be forced by his colleagues, to resign as president. 25X1
A merger in which the senior DK leadership steps out of sight as the KPNLF
assumes control of the largely theoretical government would create a
structure whose long-term effectiveness is doubtful. The antithetical and
competitive nature of the participants alone would create instability, and
such a recast DK regime would be unlikely to achieve the objectives sought
by the Thais and Chinese. On the one hand, a coalition in which the KPNLF
leaders merely coexisted with important DK leaders would not be much
more attractive to either the international community or the Kampuchean
people, who would both be aware of the lurking presence of Pol Pot offstage.
On the other hand, a coalition on Son Sann's terms, in which senior DK
leaders were exiled, would have difficulty sustaining the loyalty and thus the
cohesion of the DK army, the only effective fighting force. Prospects are dim
that an effective non-Communist Khmer fighting force would be available
to replace the DK in the near future. Any DK-KPNLF united front would
probably be a short, unhappy, and ineffective union
Son Sann probably will try to adopt the ambiguous position of the third
tactic in the hope that it will end with an independent KPNLF free from
association with Pol Pot. He may reason that he can forestall Thai pressure
by agreeing in principle to a merger. If he discovers that the old DK
leadership continues to compete for power, he can bow out on the grounds
that the agreement is not being implemented as he understood it. In the
meantime, he will have shown flexibility and perhaps obtained some extra
material support and political commitments from the Thais and others.
For now, Son Sann wants to strengthen the KPNLF military, particularly
by attracting support from the United States. This would not only counter-
balance Chinese aid to the DK in the event a merger occurs but also reduce
KPNLF dependence on Thai and Chinese support, giving the KPNLF more
room to maneuver during any future negotiations on a united front.)
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Appendix
The Making of the KPNLF
In March 1979, Son Sann, in association with other Khmers in Paris,
formed an organization known briefly as the Khmer Liberation Movement.
The Thais by then were supporting Pol Pot, who was ousted from power in
Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978, and they urged
Son Sann to place his organization under the command of the DK. Son Sann
seriously considered this, and in April 1979 he traveled to Bangkok ajUX1
Beijing for meetings with DK Foreign Minister leng Sary and senior
Chinese officials.
The details of Son Sann's discussion with leng Sary are not known, aWN1
talks may have been deliberately ambiguous on both sides. Son Sann
demurred on forming a united front with the DK at that time but may have
agreed to cooperate quietly with operati -
licly maintaining distance from the DK. 25X1
By August 1979, it was clear that the tentative step toward cooperation was
a false start. Son Sann returned to Bangkok from Paris, reportedly frus-
trated by an unsuccessful effort to obtain Prince Sihanouk's backing for his
group and angered by public DK statements about its cooperation with him.
He resisted further Thai pressure to associate with the DK and refused to
join a DK-sponsored united front organization established in early Septem-
ber. One month later, he presided over a ceremony in the Kampuchean
jungle near the Thai border at which the KPNLF was established
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The KPNLF occasionally received favorable mention in the Western press
throughout 1980 but remained militarily impotent. It was unable to attract a
significant number of recruits and remained under intense pressure to unite
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with Pol Pot. China ceased its support in January after delivering only the
first installment of its promised aid. Bei'in promised more assistance if the
KPNLF would cooperate with the DK.
Son Sann continued to resist while hinting that he might form a provisional
government of his own. In June he returned to Paris, frail and, as a colleague
put it, working without conviction that his cause would win. A trip to China
in July produced no new aid, and the Chinese suggested he should seek aid
from countries more sympathetic to his viewpoint. The most recent Thai-
Chinese campaign to forge a united front is thus another chapter in a long,
inconclusive story. 25X1
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