REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE GROWTH OF ASEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00551R000100070002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Secr
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Regionalism in Southeast Asia:
The Growth of ASEAN
Secret
PA 81-10002
January 1981
214
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Secret
The ASEAN States
Secret ii
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Secret
Regionalism in Southeast Asia:
The Growth of ASEAN 25X
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-consisting of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand-was
founded in 1967 as an economic, social, and cultural organization, but its
main achievements have been political and diplomatic. Initially, it devoted
its energies to preventing bilateral squabbles from escalating into serious
conflict; in the process member states developed the common objective of
preserving ASEAN even at the cost of leaving some problems unresolved. In
1975 the emergence of Vietnam as a potential threat to regional stability,
combined with ASEAN's perception of declining US interest in the area,
gave the association the momentum and cohesion it previously lacked. As a
result, its leaders be an to try to exert direct influence on policy and events
affecting the region
The association's political successes, however, rest on a weak foundation.
The ASEAN method of decisionmaking through gradual consensus has
enhanced unity but resulted in inaction in some areas. The difficulties in
translating policies established at summit meetings into coordinated and
effective joint efforts are most obvious in the economic arena
ASEAN's common philosophy of economic development has enhanced close
economic cooperation, but-except for Singapore-the dependency of its
member states on commodity and labor-intensive industry exports makes for
competition. Efforts to develop joint economic projects founder because
short-term national benefits still take precedence over potential long-term
regional gains. Elaborate structures for economic interaction thus produce
no substantive cooperation. In part, the economic successes of the individual
member states during the 1970s work against cooperation by making it less
crucial to short-term development. Growing cooperation in the private
sector in recent years, however, could hold the key to greater regional
economic integrations I
ASEAN's image as an influential grouping has been enhanced since the
mid-1970s by the series of dialogues established with major trading part-
ners. These began in 1972 with the ASEAN-EC dialogue and now include
most states with important economic interests in the region. Through these
discussions, ASEAN seeks to end tariff restrictions against its manufac-
tured goods, promote greater trade, and encourage foreign private invest-
ment. Although efforts to obtain liberal tariff concessions have been dis-
appointing, the dialogues have promoted investment and trade generally and
have made ASEAN's trading partners much more sensitive to regional
economic concerns and often to political ones as we1li I
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In recent years, growing foreign policy cooperation among the ASEAN
states has made the organization an effective interest bloc in international
political forums. This was recently demonstrated by its response to the
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978. The invasion has also
heightened security concerns among the ASEAN states and encouraged
greater cooperation among them. Although ASEAN leaders continue to
reject a formal multilateral defense grouping, bilateral and occasionally
trilateral cooperation in military training and intelligence has intensified
and led to discussions of standardization and joint production arrangements
for military equipment. ASEAN states, however, continue relying on the
West, particularly the United States, for defense against potential external
threats.II
ASEAN states are ambivalent toward the United States. On the one hand
they wish to avoid too close identification with one of the superpowers; on the
other, they believe US economic and security cooperation is crucial to
regional development and stability. Some of them believe the United States
is not doing as much as it should or could to meet regional economic and
political wishes. The ASEAN states want Washington to consult with them
before making key foreign policy decisions that will affect the region
ASEAN's continued success will depend on many factors, some of which are
beyond the control of member states. During the 1980s the leadership in
many member states will pass to a new generation. It is not certain that these
leaders will be as committed to the regional concept as are the present ones
who helped create ASEAN. The association needs to intensify the sense of
regional identity among its peoples. Increasing contacts among the political,
economic, and military elites of the five states create a sense of common
interests at the leadership level, but this has not spread to the public at large,
which in many cases does not yet have a firm national, much less a
supranational, sense of identity
Continued domestic stability of the member states is also crucial to regional-
ism; the appearance in any of them of serious opposition groups based on an
inward-looking nationalism or radical economic philosophies could destroy
the basis for cooperation in a regional framework. Outside events and
threats could also play their part. Serious differences among member states
over the role of China in the region, increased activism of local Muslim
groups in response to currents from the Middle East, or efforts by Vietnam
to drive a wedge between members will continue to test the commitment of
member states to the primacy of regional unity over national fears.n
25X1
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QAOrO*
But unity and regional stability can only be assured by expanding the
commonality of political interests to encompass economic, social, and cul-
tural bonds. An act of political will is required to overcome the inherent
conflict between national and regional interests
F
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A Slow Beginning
1
Structural Shortcomings
2
Joint Economic Programs
4
Sociocultural Cooperation
8
The ASEAN Dialogues
8
Cooperation on Foreign Policy
12
The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
14
The Pacific Basin Concept
15
Promoting Regional Security
15
Bilateral Cooperation
16
Future Security
17
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Secret
Secret
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