IRAQ: SUCCESSION POLITICS

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MASTS FILE CUPY
Ca e,~f G~YE t'~'i
OR MARK 014
Secret
NESA 82-10278
June 1982
Directorate of Secret
Iraq:
Succession Politics
34U
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iraq:
Succession Politics
Information available as of 1 June 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by II Office of
Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA
This paper has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and the National Intelligence
Council
Secret
NESA 82-10278
June 1982
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Iraq:
Succession Politics
Key Judgments President Saddam Husayn's decision to go to war with Iran has been a
costly mistake. His battlefield strategy has placed Iraqi forces in a near un-
tenable situation, and damage to Iraq's domestic and foreign policy
objectives grows daily. Any rallying to the regime in the event of an
Iranian invasion of Iraq, in our judgment, will be temporary.
The ultimate consequences of Iraq's failures in the war will be increased
plotting against Saddam. The most serious threat-barring assassination-
is likely to come from civilian and military leaders who have so far
suppressed dissatisfaction with Saddam's policies. These leaders may
attempt to replace Saddam if the Tikriti-led ruling hierarchy believes he
has become a liability to its continued domination of Iraq. Saddam's
command of the intelligence apparatus and extensive levers of repression-
most run by trusted family or tribal members-as well as his record of
striking first would seem to preclude drawn-out coup planning.
A successful coup would have to be executed swiftly by a small group of
senior Ba'thists who would move on Saddam as soon as the decision to do
so is made. We do not possess hard evidence of plotting and expect little
warning given the secretive nature of the Iraqi system.
A takeover by the military acting alone appears unlikely. The officer corps
will be preoccupied with long-term border tension or fighting with Iran.
The Ba'th Party is entrenched at all levels in the Army and under Saddam
has made considerable progress toward reducing the military's involvement
in politics.
A popular uprising against the regime also appears unlikely unless the
Army disintegrates in the face of an Iranian invasion. Khomeini's appeals
to Iraq's majority Shia Muslim community to revolt have been largely
ignored. Rebellious Kurds continue to be more of an irritant than a threat
to government control.
The lack of an heir apparent to replace Saddam points to a period of
collective rule dominated by key military and security figures from the
current Tikriti ruling clique. Revolution Command Council (RCC) Vice
Chairman Ibrahim and First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan are strong
candidates to succeed Saddam; ailing former President Bakr could be
iii Secret
NESA 82-10278
June 1982
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brought out of retirement to shore up support for a new regime. A collegial
leadership probably would not make major foreign policy changes-it
would continue to depend on the Gulf Arabs for financial support, trade
heavily with the West for civilian and military goods, and rely on the
USSR as a major source of arms.
Collegial rule will eventually break down as its leading figures, schooled in
the politics of conspiracy and intrigue, seek preeminance. An unrestrained
power struggle risks a return to a pattern of rule similar to the early 1970s
when Ba'thist ideologues preoccupied with internal problems dominated
Iraqi politics. The breakdown would affect Baghdad's foreign policy
outlook, disrupting trends toward alignment with moderate Arabs and
closer economic and political ties with the West.
Nonetheless, any Sunni government in Baghdad-collegial or dominated
by a single figure-would have certain constant foreign policy goals,
including competition for Arab leadership with Egypt and Syria; rivalry
with Iran for domination of the Gulf; and an anti-Israeli outlook.
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Iraq:
Succession Politics
0
Regime Vulnerabilities
Two years ago Iraq had pretensions to succeed Egypt
as an Arab leader, to shape the policy of the non-
aligned movement for the next three years, and to use
proceeds from expanding oil exports to achieve eco-
nomic and political independence. Today, Iraq's hu-
man and material resources are being wasted in a war
it cannot win, its Gulf ports are closed to trade, its
domestic economic plans are being cut back, and its
international prestige and military reputation are
greatly diminished
Iraq's dream of supplanting Egypt as Arab leader has
been shattered. Iraq today is more supplicant than
leader, and its dependence on moderate Arab neigh-
bors, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan,
for financial, logistic, and political support grows
daily. The goal of independence from the USSR also
is now more distant because Iraq must maintain
deliveries of needed Soviet arms. Plans to hold the
nonaligned summit meeting in Baghdad in Septem-
ber, kicking off Iraq's leadership of the movement for
the next three years, are threatened.
Syria, Iraq's enemy on its western flank, has become a
more dangerous adversary as the Damascus-Tehran
alliance has strengthened. With quiet Soviet approval,
Damascus has increased its arms aid to Iran. It has
also closed its land border with Iraq and cut Iraq's oil
pipeline across Syria to the Mediterranean, depriving
Baghdad of about $6 billion annually in oil revenues.
The stated Iranian-Syrian goal is Saddam's over-
throw.
The domestic costs also are substantial. The govern-
ment can no longer insulate the public from the
economic consequences of the war. Reduction of oil
revenues by more than two-thirds has slowed the
steady growth in the standard of living that was an
important factor in regime stability during the 1970s.
Oil sales, which account for almost all export earnings,
are projected between $8.5 and 9 billion in 1982; the
import bill for 1982 is estimated at $21.5 billion.1
In January the regime curtailed its ambitious develop-
ment program; only priority imports associated with
the nonaligned summit meeting, military equipment,
and food have been exempted. Consumers are being
hurt by spending cutbacks. Imports for state-owned
retail outlets, for example, have been suspended
through June 1982. Despite more than $20 billion in
aid from the Gulf Arabs, new Iraqi austerity meas-
ures will be necessary and are likely to include more
contract cancellations. Baghdad wants to limit deple-
tion of its estimated $26 billion in foreign exchange 25
reserves so that it can finance postwar reconstruction.
Responsibility for this remarkable transformation
clearly rests with President Saddam Husayn and his
decision to invade Iran. It would be surprising if the
Iraqi people or elements within the elite did not at
some point turn him out of office.
Principal Threats
The ultimate consequences of Saddam's failures will
be serious attempts to oust him. We have scanty 25
evidence of coup plotting and expect little warnin
given the secretive nature of the Iraqi system 25
Over the last several years we have received numerous
reports of assassination attempts, 25
Thousands of
Iraqis have strong motivation for revenge because of 25X
Saddam's ruthless suppression of real or imagined
enemies and his costly war. The Iraqi leader's fre-
quent public appearances as well as his visits with 25
troops at the front increase the risk of a successful
attack despite the protection of formidable personal
security forces.
Coup Peril
The most serious threat-barring assassination-is
likely to come from key civilian and military leaders.
Iraq's fading prospects in the war against Iran, cou-
pled with suppressed grievances over Saddam's per-
sonality cult, his refusal to share power, and his
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Major Ethnic Groups
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Sunni Kurd
Sunni Arab
Shia Arab
Oilfield
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deemphasis of the Ba'th Party, would be the principal
stimuli for a palace coup. Potential opponents prob-
ably fear that continued public disgruntlement over
having to bear the burdens of "Saddam's war" could
grow and engulf the entire current leadership.C
Saddam Husayn's political system is highly central-
ized, heavily repressive, and narrowly based on family
and clan from a small geographic section of the
country-the city of Tikrit in north-central Iraq. To
oppose or even question the Iraqi leader, in public or
private, can have dire consequences. Few challenges
to Saddam's authority escape the notice of the sec-
urity services.
? The unity of the Sunni Arab Tikriti clan, which--
dominates the government, has been disturbed by
low-level feuding.
? Relations between Saddam and the Shammar tribe,
an important Sunni Arab ally, have cooled because
of the war.
? Saddam suffered an embarrassing loss of face last
summer when he had to cancel the result of a local
Ba'th Party election because his handpicked candi-
dates were rejected.
? A small number of middle-level Ba'th Party and
government officials who did not display enthusias-
tic support for the war were purged early this year.
The military has reason to hate Saddam. He is a
civilian who owes his position to the Ba'th Party and
the security apparatus. Since 1968 Saddam has
worked hard to establish a tradition of civilian leader-
ship in a state where military coups have been
commonplace. He has used forced retirements, fre-
quent transfers, and politically directed promotions to
place loyalists in key commands and to deny individ-
ual officers the opportunity to build personal follow-
ings. Generous salaries and benefits as well as high
levels of defense spending have probably helped buy
only shallow loyalty from the armed forces
"Saddam's war" is probably stirring additional mili-
tary resentment of the Iraqi President's leadership.
Political interference by Saddam and his cronies and
the presence of political appointees masquerading as
generals in key command positions have contributed
to the Army's poor showing.
Military plotters could try to enlist the prestige of
former President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, once the
leading figure of the Tikrit clan. Bakr,
was pushed into retirement by Saddam in 1979.
He is still a widely respected figure, however, because
of his extensive military background and role in the
revolution against the monarchy. Age and poor health
probably rule out more than a symbolic role for Bakr.
level officers.
A successful military takeover bid would face major
obstacles:
? The officer corps is preoccupied with the war with
Iran.
? Key military commands are in the hands of Saddam
loyalists.
? The military is riddled with Saddam's spies, making
it dangerous to even talk about the leadership.
We know little of political attitudes within the mili-
tary and can expect little or no warning of a coup
attempt. Such an attempt, if it occurs, would most
likely come from an as yet unknown group of middle-
Prospects are slim for a coup in which the Ba'th Party
plays no role. The party organization is too wide-
spread to be ignored, and the military probably would
have to make an accommodation with civilian leaders
to run the country.)
Popular Uprising Unlikely
Popular revolt against Saddam seems the least likely
near-term cause of a change of government. Saddam
has made effective use of a carrot-and-stick policy to
buy off and intimidate potential opposition. Draconi-
an police powers have been used to cow opponents.
The regime has used its oil revenues to create jobs,
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 Saddam Husayn in 1964 0 Saddam's leadership style reflects lessons learned
during his formative years: be ruthless and preemp-
tive; get "them" before they get you; trust few
people-family, tribesmen, and Tikritis, in that
order, plus a few selected, but expendable, outsiders.
These traits were reinforced in 1979 when Saddam
discovered opposition to his elevation to the presiden-
cy among handpicked proteges on the Revolutionary
Command Council. He ordered the immediate execu-
tion of the plotters and personally presided over his
inauguration.
Iraq's poor showing in "Saddam's war" has caused
speculation about the Iraqi leader's staying power.
Other Arab rulers-Assad of Syria, Hussein of Jor-
dan, Nasser of Egypt-have clung to power despite
military failures and serious domestic challenges.
Saddam's strengths could allow him to do the same.
Saddam's talent for survival has helped him climb to
a position of authority and remain there for 14 years
in a country notorious for its conspiratorial politics
and violent change. His whole political experience
has been grounded in secrecy and intrigue. As a
young man in the 1950s and 1960s, Saddam lived a
furtive life as a member of the underground inter-
rupted by periods of imprisonment and exile. He was
involved in the 1959 plot to assassinate Prime Minis-
ter Qasim that has become part of Ba'thist folklore.
The attempt failed, but a wounded Saddam made
good his escape and established his reputation by
swimming the Tigris River to freedom.
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His radical rhetoric has not always been matched
with radical deeds. He has learned to be flexible,
abandoning beliefs and positions when they get in the
way of larger interests. Bath ideology, for example,
has been modified or shelved to advance economic
development schemes and Saddam's Arab leadership
goals.
Under pressure to end the war with Iran and stop the
erosion of his position, Saddam probably will blame
others for Iraq's shortcomings. He is undoubtedly
aware of reports of unhappiness with his leadership
and at some point will display his characteristic
ruthlessness with a preemptive purge of potential
rivals and an even greater display of clannishness in
choosing key aides. The outcome of a power struggle
in an environment as violent and secretive as Iraq is
hazardous to predict, but Saddam's years of expe-
rience at the top give him advantages over other
contenders.
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subsidize prices, and improve education, housing,
medical care, and transportation. Saddam undoubt-
edly is aware that his regime cannot afford a loss of
public faith in its ability to continue improving living
standards. A severe decline seems unlikely, but the
regime may have difficulty insulating the public from
the effects of economic austerity measures
Although the government's preoccupation with the
war has given Iraqi opposition forces greater opportu-
nities to work against the regime, their actions so far
have been limited to isolated sabotage and assassina-
tions. Antigovernment activists have been unable to
provoke sustained or widespread protests among
Iraq's majority Shia Muslim community, despite its
traditional aversion to a Sunni-dominated central
government. Many Shias are unwilling to risk opposi-
tion to the regime for fear of punishment.
Maintaining a psychology of fear is probably crucial
to regime survival. Concessions to oppressed groups
would probably be seen as weakness and would
stimulate more active opposition. Withdrawal of the
Army from Iran relatively intact, therefore, is vital to
Saddam's prospects for maintaining internal control
and preserving minority Sunni dominance of the
country
Other Shias have been co-opted by the Ba'th Party.
The party has been willing to allow Shia participation
in government and party activities including the rul-
ing Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which
has at least three Shia members. Still others, in our
judgment, do not want to see a disruptive Islamic
revolution jeopardize the steady rise in their standard
of living under the Ba'th Party
The Ba'th also has skillfully exploited ancient-but
still lively-Arab-Persian animosities to counter Kho-
meini's appeal. The Ba'th propaganda machine has
made sure that Tehran's mistreatment of its Shia
Arab minority has not escaped the notice of Iraqi
Shias.
Kurdish guerrilla leaders have been unable to take
advantage of increased aid from Tehran and a signifi-
cant reduction of government forces in the north since
the beginning of the war with Iran. Kurdish strength
also is dissipated by the continuing rivalry between
the Barzanis and Jalal Talabani, the leaders of the
two main antigovernment groups, and by apathy
among the Kurdish populace. The Barzanis, in par-
ticular, have been discredited by their connections to
Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Kurds and Shias, as well as Iraqi Communists
and renegade Ba'thists-split by personal, religious,
ethnic, and political differences-are unlikely to com-
bine forces against Saddam. Moreover, they have
failed to secure enough financial and military backing
to pose a military threat
Succession Dynamics
Saddam's systematic purge of rivals has left Iraq
bereft of figures of national stature. A new govern-
ment, therefore, is likely to lack a single strong leader
initially and to have a collegial leadership with a
neutral figure serving as president.' If Saddam were
suddenly killed or removed from power in a palace
coup, the leadership would seek to ensure that the
attendant disruption did not jeopardize continued
Sunni rule.
Moreover, Iraqi Shias are not so well organized as
their Iranian coreligionists and seem less influenced
by their religious leaders. Saddam removed a poten-
tial rallier in the spring of 1980 when he executed
Ayatollah Baqr Sadr, the only Arab among Iraq's
Shia hierarchy-the other prominent Shia leaders in
Iraq are of Persian origin. The regime's expulsion
since 1980 of over 50,000 Shias of Iranian on in has
reduced a dangerous fifth column threat.
The Tikrit clan would continue to play an important
role in any Sunni-dominated regime. The Tikritis are
scattered in important positions throughout the mili-
tary and security services. Among the most important
Tikriti clansmen who would play a role is Interior
Minister Sa'dun Shakir. He controls an ubiquitous
' The Iraqi Constitution calls for the Revolutionary Command
Council to elect a new president within seven days of a vacancy
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Sunni Arabs, who comprise 25 percent of Iraq's
population, have dominated Iraqi politics since inde-
pendence. Their ascendency resulted in large part
from traditional Shia reluctance to become involved
with the secular state. The Sunnis, for their part,
willingly cooperated with colonial authorities, estab-
lishing a preeminence in the military and bureaucra-
cy that has persisted into the 20th century.
Sunnis also control the Bath Party. Underprivileged
Shia Arabs dominated the party in the 1950s and
early 1960s, but before the end of the decade the
party had been transformed into a Sunni organiza-
tion. Shia control declined because:
? Discriminatory police practices allowed Sunni
Ba'thists to escape with light punishment while
Shia colleagues were treated severely.
? The leadership of the party was captured by army
officers from Tikrit led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr
and his kinsman Saddam Husayn.
The Tikriti dominance of the Bath Party goes far in
explaining Iraqi political dynamics. Institutions such
as the Bath Party and the military, which touch all
levels of Iraqi society, play important roles in legiti-
mizing the exercise of power, but individual and
group loyalty based on common family, tribal, and
religious ties is still the key to understanding politics
in Iraq.
Institutional debate or competition has little impact
on decisionmaking in Iraq because the process is
dominated by a small group of individuals-Tikritis
and their loyal followers-who hold important party,
government, and military posts. The key institution is
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), where
supreme legislative and executive power resides. Sad-
dam, for example, is chairman of the RCC, President
of the Republic, head of the Bath Party, and Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Saddam's
colleagues on the RCC likewise have overlapping
functions; every Council member holds at least one
other major position in the cabinet, the party, or the
National Assembly.
Since coming to power in 1968, Bath leaders have
made skillful use of mass organizational techniques
and the media to secure public acquiescence to
government policies. The government has stressed
party ideology with its emphasis on Arab national-
ism, secularism, and social justice to overcome the
country's serious sectarian and ethnic differences.
Ba'th officials take party doctrine seriously, but in
recent years the leadership's strict adherence to ide-
ology has weakened. Narrower state interests now
assume greater weight in defining domestic and for-
eign policies.
internal security apparatus involving tens of thou-
sands of police, spies, and informers. Shakir has
ruthlessly served Saddam's interests since the Ba'th
revolution in 1968, including service as a member of
the regime's assassination squad and head of Bagh-
dad's infamous "Palace of the End" prison. Barzan
Ibrahim, Saddam's half brother, is the chief of the
Mukhabarat, the RCC's strong arm for intimidating
and eliminating antiregime elements. Although he
owes his position to family connections, Barzan has
had several years to put his own imprint on the
Mukhabarat. If a lone assassin removed Saddam,
Barzan's long-term position would weaken, but in an
immediate post-Saddam period he might play an
important role.
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Sa dun Shakir and Saddam
Husayn at Interior Ministr
on 19 August 19811
Barzan Ibrahim (left) with
Saddaml
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Left to right, Ibrahim, Sad-
dam, and Ramadan
Senior Tikriti officers and their supporters from other
important Sunni clans permeate the military estab-
lishment. Gen. `Adnan Khayrallah, who has family
ties to both Saddam and former President Bakr, is
Defense Minister and Deputy Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces, as well as Deputy Prime Minister
and a member of the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil. Khayrallah reportedly is a competent professional
soldier, but he is disliked because of his rapid, politi-
cally influenced advancement. Top military intelli-
gence and police functions as well as the commands of
the Baghdad garrisons, which play essential anticoup
roles, are in the hands of trusted officers.
Shia RCC members such as National Assembly
leader Nairn Haddad would probably play a promi-
nent role in a collective regime as symbols of the
Ba'th's commitment to Shia participation in govern-
ing Iraq.
nonthreatening interim figure attractive to behind-
the-scenes power brokers with leadership aspirations
of their own. Ibrahim, a non-Tikriti, is a longtime
Ba'thist who has served the regime loyally in a
number of sensitive posts over the past decade. I.Jnlike
his more secular-minded Ba'thist colleagues, Ibrahim
is a devout Sunni Muslim. He has had little contact
with Westerners throughout his career.
Taha Yasin Ramadan, RCC member and First Depu-
ty Prime Minister, also is a likely contender to
succeed Saddam. Ramadan, 44, is an intelligent,
crafty politician who has held many responsible party
and state posts involving both domestic and foreign
policy functions. His political skills make him a
contender in a post-Saddam period. His political
power is strengthened by his command of the People's
Army, the 350,000-man Ba'th Party paramilitary
force. Ramadan not only survived the leadership
purge that followed the alleged coup plot against
Saddam in July 1979 but was elevated to First
Deputy Prime Minister, making him de facto prime
minister and number-two man in the governments
`Izzat Ibrahim, the current Vice Chairman of the
RCC, in our judgment seems the most likely candi-
date to assume the presioency His nnnarent lack of
ambition and poor health!
fmake him a
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Leadership figures who are wary of Ramadan's power
and ambition would probably try to block him from
moving to the presidency, and he may not be strong
enough to overcome concerted resistance. Distrust of
Ramadan may be particularly strong among clannish
Tikritis because he comes from Mosul. Nor does
Ramadan seem well positioned to seize the top job.
The People's Army by itself would be no match for
the regular forces, and Ramadan's apparent lack of
important allies in the security forces and military
would make a strong-arm bid for the presidency
risky.'
Foreign Policy Implications
A collegial regime in which the Sunnis were strongly
motivated to maintain group unity to ensure their
continued domination would be unlikely to produce
dramatic foreign policy changes. Foreign policy con-
tinuity also could be achieved if a strongman emerged
swiftly from a collective leadership.
The first priority of a Sunni-dominated regime, as-
suming the war with Iran was still in train, would be
to end the war. Iraq might initially attempt to im-
prove relations with the radical Arabs in hopes that
these states could persuade Iran to suppress its desire
for revenge against Iraq. Iran would not countenance
a lasting reconciliation with a secular Ba'th govern-
ment.
especially well placed to benefit from Iraq's develop-
ment and reconstruction needs because of its fulfill-
ment of military supply commitments despite the war
with Iran. Baghdad's dissatisfaction with the quality
of Soviet and East European goods has led to a sharp
decline in recent years in the Soviet share of Iraq's
nonmilitary imports.
US help in reconstruction also would be sought,
especially in the oil sector. Some Iraqis would even
push for arms purchases from the United States.
Recent moves by Washington to upgrade bilateral 25
relations-approval of civilian aircraft sales and the
removal of Iraq from the list of states that support
international terrorism-have been welcomed in
Baghdad, but a major improvement probably would
depend on changes by the United States in its position
on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Iraq's perception of the
threat from Iran, and its dissatisfaction with the state
of Soviet-Iranian relations.
Iraq's friendly ties with moderate Arab neighbors
probably would continue under a collegial regime
drawn from the current leadership in Baghdad. Even
if the war with Iran were to end, tension between
Baghdad and Tehran would continue, leaving Iraq
with the need for financial assistance, secure trade
routes across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan, and
Arab political support. Moreover, so long as a hostile
regime remained in Damascus and it cooperated with
Iran, Iraq probably would continue to improve rela-
At the same time, genuine improvement in Baghdad's
relations with Moscow would be unlikely. The USSR
is seen as an unreliable ally. Ba'thist leaders are
suspicious of Moscow's support for rebellious Iraqi
Communists and would not easily forget the Soviet
arms embargo, Moscow's arms sales to Iran, and
Soviet support for Iraq's enemy, Syria. Baghdad,
however, would try to avoid a break with Moscow
until it secured significant alternative arms sources.
Close contacts with the West would be maintained to
facilitate rebuilding of the economy and the military.
The pace of modernization would be slowed by eco-
nomic austerity as well as a political need to reempha-
size Islamic values and traditions. France would be
' For further information on Kha rallah Ibrahim, and Ramadan,
see the appendix.
tions with Egypt.
Breakdown of Collegial Rule
Collegial rule, however, would be under great strain.
Individual ambitions would not stay restrained for
long, especially in the absence of a dominant figure to
arbitrate disputes. We cannot make confident predic-
tions about who would ultimately seize power, but
given the conspiratorial backgrounds of the current 25
leadership, the struggle almost certainly would be
violent.
An unrestrained internal power struggle would weak-
en the central government and accentuate the serious
sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraqi society among
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Muslim sects, Christians, Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans,
Assyrians, and others. A battle at the top could usher
in a period of instability similar to the turbulent era
between the fall of the monarchy in 1958 and the
consolidation of the Ba'th regime's power in the early
1970s.1
The breakdown of collegial rule would affect Bagh-
dad's foreign policy outlook, disrupting trends toward
alignment with moderate Arabs and closer economic
and political ties with the West. The length and
duration of the disruption would depend on who
comes out on top from among the various Ba'thist,
military, and opposition group contenders
Nevertheless, any Sunni-dominated government in
Baghdad-even one preoccupied with consolidating
control internally-would have certain constant for-
eign policy goals. These include:
? Competition for Arab leadership with Egypt and
Syria, which will frequently see two of the states
allied against the third.
? Rivalry with Iran for domination of the Persian
Gulf.
? An anti-Israeli outlook as long as the Palestinian
issue remains unsettled.
? A willingness to use oil leverage to secure advan-
tages for Iraq
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Appendix 3
`Izzat Ibrahim
Vice Chairman, Revolutionary Command Council
A member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) since 1969, `Izzat
Ibrahim became Vice Chairman of the RCC in July 1979 when Saddam Husayn
assumed the RCC chairmanship and the presidency. Ibrahim seems respected by
the Iraqi people, but he lacks an independent political base and is not a charismatic
personality. For many years Ibrahim has been influential in agricultural and
general economic matters and in the formulation of Iraq's Persian Gulf policy.
Health problems have recently slowed his activity
Ibrahim was arrested three times during the late 1950s and early 1960s for
participating in Ba'th-sponsored antigovernment activities. After the coup in July
1968 that brought the Ba'th Party to power, he became a supervisor of provincial
development projects. Ibrahim has served in the cabinet as Minister of Agrarian
Reform (1969-72), Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (1972-74), and
Minister of Interior (1974-79). He has been a member of the Ba'th Party Regional
Command since 1972 and a member of the Ba'th Party National Command since
1977. In 1975 Ibrahim was appointed chairman of the politically sensitive Ba'th
Party Military Bureau. This organization ensures military loyalty to the regime by
controllin appointments, transfers, retirements, and promotions of military
officers
Ibrahim, about 40 years old, is a Sunni Muslim
' Material in this appendix was contributed b
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Taha Yasin Ramadan
First Deputy Prime Minister; Member, Revolutionary Command Council; Com-
mander in Chief, People's Army
Taha Ramadan is an ambitious and crafty politician who probably would like to be
president of Iraq. Often said to be one of President Saddam Husayn's most
formidable political rivals, he has survived over the years while others have been
executed, jailed, or exiled. The President regards Ramadan as a reliable spokes-
man on Iraqi policy and has delegated to him many government and Ba'th Party
duties. In addition Ramadan travels abroad as Saddam's official
representative.
Since 1970 Ramadan has held concurrent key positions in the cabinet, the Ba'th
Party, and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). He has been a member of
the party Regional Command since 1966 and of the RCC since 1969. He became
Commander in Chief of the People's Army, the party militia, when it was
established in 1975, and has been a member of the party National Command since
October 1977. His appointment as First Deputy Prime Minister came during the
government shakeup in July 197 that accompanied Saddam Husayn's assumption
of the presidency
Ramadan has many supporters in the Ba'th Party, the civil service, and the
People's Army. He is reputed to be unpopular with the Tikriti clique, and the mili-
tary may resent him for havin secured an enhanced role for the People's Army
during the Iran-Iraq war.
For over a decade Ramadan has played a key role in Iraq's economic and
industrial expansion. He was influential in formulating and implementing develop-
ment programs while serving as Minister of Industry (1970-76), acting Minister of
Planning (1974-76), and Minister of Public Works and Housing (1976-79).
Appointments as chairman of the foreign economic relations and trade regulation
committees in July 1979 give him authority to oversee the formulation of foreign
aid and trade policies. He has also participated in the activities of the Iraqi-Soviet
Com4ssion for Fennomic and Technical Cooperation, which was established in
1972.1
Born in Mosul, where he completed his elementary and secondary education,
Ramadan probably attended the Military College in Baghdad. During the 1960s
he was involved in antigovernment activities, which eventually led to his expulsion
from the military and arrest. He participated in the coup in July 1968 that brought
the current regime to power: During 1969-70 Ramadan served in the politically
sensitive position of director of the Ba'th Party Military Bureau. This organization
ensures the loyalty of the military to the regime by controlling appointments,
transfers, retirements, and promotions of military officers.
Ramadan, about 44, is a Sunni Muslim.
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`Adnan Khayrallah
Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Defense; Deputy Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces; Member, Revolutionary Command Council
A hard-working career military officer, Staff Gen. `Adnan Khayrallah owes his
positions to his family connections. He is a cousin and brother-in-law of President
Saddam Husayn and a son-in-law of former President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr.
Khayrallah was appointed to the Revolutionary Command Council in September
1977 and succeeded the aging Bakr as Defense Minister a month later. In October
1979, three months after Saddam became President, Khayrallah was appointed
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Saddam trusts Khayrallah and
relies on him to ensure the military's loyalty to the regime.
Khayrallah has not been a popular figure among the officer corps. He was
promoted over other senior officers and viewed as a symbol of political interference
on Soviet-made weapons, which he considers inferior to Western armaments
in military affairs. Since at least 1977 he has advocated curtailing Iraq's reliance
Command, the ruling body of the party, since January 1977.
Khayrallah, about 42, is a Sunni Muslim. He is the son of Khayrallah Talfah, who
is Saddam's uncle and Bakr's brother-in-law. Khayrallah and Saddam were raised
in the same house in Tikrit. Khayrallah graduated from the Military College in
1961, the Staff College in 1970, and the College of Law and Politics of al-
Mustansiriya University in Baghdad in 1976. During the 1970s he was a member
of the Ba'th Party Military Bureau and head of the Baghdad Branch Military
Office. He also commanded the politically important Baghdad-based Republican
Guard Brigade. Khayrallah has been a member of the Ba'th Party Regional
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