EGYPT, THE ARABS, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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7 -1
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Egypt, the Arabs, and
the Peace Process
Secret
NESA 82-10135
April 1982
312
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Directorate of
Intelligence
the Peace Process
Egypt, the Arabs, and
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 15 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared b Arab-
Israeli Division, Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
NESA,
Operations.
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and with the Directorate of
Secret
NESA 82-10135
April 1982
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Egypt, the Arabs, and
Key Judgments Egypt's key foreign policy objective after the Israeli withdrawal from
eastern Sinai on 25 April is to end its isolation in the Arab world. President
Mubarak and his advisers are convinced that a return to the moderate
Arab camp will help maintain domestic stability, boost the country's
economy, and enhance Egypt's regional leadership role.
Egypt's contacts with the other Arab states have increased dramatically
since Mubarak took power last October and have included discreet talks
with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, and the Palestinians. After
April the Egyptians will make a major effort to convert these private
discussions into a public rapprochement. While most moderate states are
interested in a reconciliation, radical states like Syria and Libya will resist
Egypt's return to the Arab fold.
To facilitate Cairo's rehabilitation, Mubarak is prepared to take a tougher
position toward Israel and its policies. If there is no progress in the stalled
autonomy negotiations this summer, Egypt will probably seek justification
for abandoning the talks and will consider other negotiating proposals.
Mubarak may also allow elements of Egypt's normalization of relations
with Israel to wither and will criticize more harshly controversial Israeli
actions like the recent crackdown on West Bank unrest. The Egyptians will
not violate the military provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
A gradual reconciliation with the moderates, especially Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, probably will develop over the course of the summer and fall. A
more rapid reconciliation between Egypt and the Arabs is possible if Israel
invades Lebanon or takes other extremely controversial steps. Under such
circumstances Mubarak will feel compelled to react sharply. He could
withdraw Egypt's Ambassador or even break diplomatic ties with Israel.
He would not go to war.
An eventual Egyptian-Arab rapprochement is probably inevitable and will
have far-reaching consequences for US-Egyptian ties. A less isolated Egypt
would be less receptive and less vulnerable to US influence. At the same
time it would be better able to deal with its critics and could broker future
Arab-Israeli contacts.
Secret
NESA 82-10135
April 1982
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Egypt, the Arabs, and
Egypt's chief foreign policy goal since the war with
Israel in 1967 has been to regain the lost Sinai
Peninsula. Egyptians hope that objective will soon be
reached; Israel is scheduled to withdraw the last of its
troops from the Sinai on 25 April. Last-minute Israeli
allegations that Egypt was violating the peace
treaty-largely unfounded-and hints that the with-
drawal would be postponed worried Cairo and seem
likely to have a negative impact on Egyptian-Israeli
ties even if the withdrawal occurs on schedule.F-
If the withdrawal takes place as planned, Egyptian
foreign policy will move into an era of transition.
Egypt will continue to value close ties with the United
States and peace with Israel, but a primary objective
in the months ahead will be to end Egypt's isolation
caused by the Arab rejection of the Camp David
accords
Mubarak is a much more cautious and methodical
individual who eschews open confrontation. He also
dislikes ambiguity and tends to simplify issues. His
military training has encouraged him to value the
advice of his staff.
Mubarak's Foreign Policy Advisers
Mubarak's chief foreign policy adviser and closest
confidant is Usama al-Baz, who also serves as a
deputy foreign minister. Al-Baz is known to favor a
more independent foreign policy that is less intimately
linked to the United States. Like many in the Egyp-
tian diplomatic establishment, al-Baz believes Sadat
went too far in accommodating US inter2gX4nd in
making concessions to Israel in the peace process. He
wants to retain close ties with Washington but prefers
that Egypt project an image of greater nonalignment,
adopt a more balanced approach to the superpowers,
Mubarak's Style
Since assuming power on 6 October 1981 Hosni
Mubarak has moved quietly but forcefully to impress
his own style on Egyptian foreign policy. He has
emphasized his desire to improve Egypt's relations
with the country's Arab neighbors and to refurbish
the country's nonaligned credentials. Simultaneously
he has sought to reassure the United States and Israel
that he is committed to the essentials of Sadat's pro-
Western foreign policy.
and move closer to the Arabs.
The other key members of Egypt's foreign policy
establishment, Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali,
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, and Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali, share much of al-
Baz's world view. Ghali, a Coptic ChristXi an
advocate of improving Egypt's ties to Third World
countries like Yugoslavia and India. Ali and Ghazala
are strongly pro-American but fear Egypt might
Mubarak's decisionmaking style is sharply different
from that of his predecessor. Anwar Sadat was a man
given to devising strategy on his own; he often isolated
himself for days while he planned great initiatives like
the 1973 war and his trip to Jerusalem in 1977. He
also ignored the advice of his closest aides when he
believed his own views were correct. Sadat increasing-
ly saw himself as a "man of destiny," and on occasion
his self-image tended to blur his perspective.
become too dependent on the United Stg.
Mubarak and these men believe that Egypt's chief
foreign policy priority after Israel's withdrawal from
Sinai is to end Egypt's isolation from Arab neighbors.
They have already encouraged Mubarak to end media
attacks on the other Arabs and to maint4f)Xfirm line
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Figure 1. Mubarak and Presi-
dent Reagan with Foreign Min-
ister Kamal Hassan Ali, Egyp-
tian Ambassador Ghorbal. and
in negotiations with Israel. Mubarak's refusal to visit
Jerusalem reflects the advice he is getting from his
foreign policy experts.
Many Egyptians also hope that a rapprochement with
the moderate Arabs will lead to renewed financial
assistance from the Persian Gulf states, especially 25X1
Saudi Arabia. Between 1974 and 1978 Arab states
disbursed $6.4 billion in economic aid and $2.8 billion
in military aid to Egypt. Saudi Arabia provided
almost half of the economic aid and two-thirds of the
The Domestic Setting
A return to the Arab camp would be popular with the
overwhelming mass of Egyptians. Although Egyptians
tend to take a condescending view of their Arab
neighbors, their country's isolation from the Arab
world has become an increasing irritant. Egyptians
can travel freely in most of the Arab world-some
1.5-2 million are employed in other Arab countries-
but many feel uncomfortable cut off from the main-
stream of Arab politics, ousted from the Arab
League, and subject to criticism for allegedly "aban-
doning" their Palestinian and Arab allies
military assistance.
Egypt's mounting economic problems, caused in part
by the soft world oil market and declines in tourism,
Suez Canal revenues, and worker remittances, have
increased the incentive for Mubarak to seek renewed
ties with the Saudis and other potential Arab sources
of aid. Egyptian military leaders especially hope that
the Saudis can be encouraged to help fund replac
ments for aging Soviet tanks and aircraft.
A public rapprochement with the other Arabs would
be especially well received among the groups most
critical of Mubarak. The largest opposition forces, the
fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood on the right and
the loosely organized Nasirite left, both advocate
closer ties with the Arabs and an end to relations with
Israel. Mubarak's refusal to visit Jerusalem reflected,
in part, his unwillingness to arouse the ire of these
groups. The Islamic fundamentalist movement in
particular takes a hard line on Jerusalem, an issue
that arouses strop emotions among many Egyptians.
Mubarak also believes that closer links with the
moderates would improve Egypt's security by creating
a united front of anti-Soviet states that could confront
the subversive activities of radical states like Libya
and South Yemen. Egyptian officials have sought to
play on the fears and insecurities of the moderates by
promising Egyptian support a ainst Iran and the
USSR in the Persian Gulf. 2$X1
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The longing for better ties with the Arabs coincides
with a growing disillusionment with Israel. Many
Egyptians believe Israel has not lived up to the spirit
of Camp David and has sought to humiliate Egypt by
annexing Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Israeli
attacks on Iraq and Lebanon have added to Egyptian
bitterness. Some believe Prime Minister Begin ma-
neuvered Sadat into accepting a separate peace treaty
that removed the pressure on Israel to negotiate a
settlement of the Palestinian issue. Most Egyptians
are convinced that Israel is determined to keep Egypt
isolated from the other Arabs so that it can impose its
will on the West Bank and Gaza without fear of
serious Arab reprisals
The disillusionment with Tel Aviv does not translate
into support for a return to belligerency. Few if any
Egyptians would favor another military encounter
with the Israelis, and it is very unlikely that Egypt
will violate the military protocols of the peace treaty.
On the other hand, Egyptians see little advantage in
continuing the normalization process or the stalled
autonomy negotiations if these elements of the Camp
David process stand between Egypt and the rest of the
Arab world.
No major interest group in Egypt favors closer ties
with Israel. The military is suspicious of Tel Aviv and
still considers Israel its most likely future opponent.
The Islamic establishment is strongly opposed to
Israel's presence in Jerusalem, and few in the business
community see much value in commercial ties with
Israel. Barely 3,000 Egyptians have toured Israel
since the treaty, versus some 50,000 Israeli tourists
who have visited Egypt. Only some elements of the
small Coptic community are nervous about resuming
relations with the Arab world and they have virtual)
no influence on Mubarak.
This is not to say that Egyptians do not have mixed
feelings about their Arab brethren. Egyptians resent-
ed their dependence on Arab financial largess in the
mid-1970s and do not want to beg Riyadh for aid.
Moreover, they do not want to be dragged into
another war with Israel by Syria or the Palestinians.
Egyptians believe they can manipulate the Arabs,
however, and can avoid becoming too dependent on
them or ensnared in their politics.)
Dry Bones
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BECAUSE OF
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25X1
Many Egyptians expect some kind of rapprochement
to develop this summer. Expectations are already
unrealistically high about the chances of resumed
Arab financial aid. If Mubarak fails to meet these
expectations, at least in part, his standing at home will
suffer. While he has performed impressively to date,
the President is well aware that his position is fragile
and that he has failed to engender widespread and
deep popular support.
25X1 I
Quiet Contacts 25X1
Ties with the other Arabs were never fully severed.
Egypt retained links with most other Arab states
through interest sections and the large Egyptian
worker presence in many countries. (See table 1.)
Discreet diplomatic contacts also took place after the
initial storm of anti-Camp David emotions cooled.
25X1
25X1
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Egyptian Diplomatic Representation in
Arab League Countries
Oman
Algeria
Libya
Somalia
Bahrain
South Yemen
Sudan
Djibouti
Syria
Iraq
United Arab
Emirates
Sadat placed increasing emphasis on developing con-
tacts with the other Arabs during 1981, which Cairo
labeled the "year of the Arab-Egyptian dialogue." In
February 1981 Sadat negotiated an arms deal with
Iraq, and in May he visited Khartoum, his first trip to
another Arab country since signing the peace treaty
with Israel. Had he lived, there is little doubt Sadat
would have sought to develop these contacts into a
full-scale rapprochement. His biting personal criti-
cism of other Arab leaders, however, would have
made such negotiations very difficult, and a reconcili-
ation might not have been possible unless Sadat
gained Arab favor by putting greater distance be-
tween Egypt and Israel.
Most Arab moderates seem pleased by Mubarak's
performance to date and are eager to strengthen his
hold on power. He traveled to Oman in February and
has met with Sudanese President Nimeiri and Somali
President Barre in Egypt to demonstrate his interest
in restoring ties with the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
Egypt's key priority is the develo
relations with Saudi Arabia.
Mubarak has said publicly that Egypt is prepared to
support Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's eight-point peace
plan if the other Arabs endorse it. The Egyptians have
also hinted that they would welcome Saudi efforts to
secure US support for the Fahd plan as an alternative
or supplement to the Camp David process.
25X1
Mubarak has apparently succeeded in persuading the
Saudis to convince the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
to give the Mubarak regime a chance and to minimize
its opposition activity. Many prominent Brotherhood
leaders fled to Saudi Arabia after Sadat's crackdown
on the opposition last fall, and the Brotherhood has
longstanding ties, including financial ones, with the
Saudi royal family.
The Egyptians have also increased contacts with tNX1
smaller Persian Gulf shaykhdoms that look to Saudi
Arabia for leadership. Oman, which never broke ties
with Cairo, has acted as an intermediary with the
other Persian Gulf states including Iraq. Minister of
State Ghali reportedly has visited the United Arab
Emirates to discuss improving ties, and an Egyptian
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delegation attended a nonaligned movement confer-
ence in Kuwait in early April. Bahraini leaders have
openly called for Egyptian-Arab reconciliation.
The Saudis and other moderates apparently accept
Mubarak's position that Egypt will not renounce the
peace treaty with Israel to facilitate a return to Arab
ranks, and none of the moderates are asking Egypt to
do so. These states, however, are unwilling to take the
first step toward restoring full diplomatic relations.
Egyptian contacts with the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization have also increased since Sadat's death.
The Saudis' reluctance to take the initiative reflects
their continued hostility to the Camp David process.
Although they accept the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty as a reality and welcome Egypt's return to the
Sinai, they are unwilling to associate themselves in
any way with the Camp David autonomy negotia-
tions. A full-scale reconciliation may come after April
only if the Egyptians can convince Saudi Arabia that
such a move will not link Riyadh with Camp David.
The smaller Gulf states will not act until the Saudis
take the lead.
Jordan and the Palestinians
Mubarak has also sought to improve contacts with
King Hussein.
Hussein is convinced that Egypt must be brought
back into the Arab decisionmaking process in order to
strengthen the moderates' position. Initially the King
seemed more willing than the Saudis and others to
move toward a public rapprochement, but he is
cautious and may wait for the Saudis to take the lead.
The Egyptians believe the PLO must ultimately be
brought into the negotiating process, and Mubarak
has reiterated Sadat's call for the United States to
deal directly with the Palestinians. Egypt recognizes
that the PLO is vulnerable to Syrian pressure and
doubts that Arafat is ready to resume open ties with
Cairo, but it hopes to maintain a quiet dialogue in
order to keep Fatah from siding with the Arab
radicals against Egypt's return to the A2Xo4d.r
The Egyptians calculate that the pressuQs5 'lthe war
with Iran are gradually pushing the Irag2i}ne into
a closer relationship with the Saudis and other Gulf
moderates and are leading to a moderation of Iraq's
radical tendencies. Mubarak also believes that Egyp-
tian support for Iraq will earn Egypt points with the
Saudis and other Gulf states which strongly back
Baghdad's struggle with Tehran. In early March the
Egyptian leader for the first time expressed open
support for Iraq by saying publicly that, while Egypt
favors a negotiated settlement of the war, its sympa-
thies are with Iraq. 25X1
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President Assad has claimed that Syria supports 25X1
In Egypt's return to the Arab camp, but Damascus
early March an Egyptian cement company signed a probably will try to keep Mubarak isolated. Egypt and
contract to construct military installations in Iraq- Syria are longtime rivals for influence in the Arab
the first commercial arrangement between an Egyp-
tian firm and Iraq since Camp David. The Iraqi
media have largely ceased attacks on Egypt
To date the Iraqis have shown little interest in
improving political ties with Egypt or in aiding
Egypt's efforts to rejoin the Arab world. Baghdad is
deeply suspicious of Cairo's ties with the United
States and is fundamentally opposed to Egypt's peace-
ful approach to settling the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Moreover, the Iraqis have long regarded Egypt as a
rival for influence in the Arab world and are not eager
for Cairo to resume its role as leader of the moderate
camp.
world, and Egypt's rehabilitation would erode Syrian
influence. The Syrians will probably oppose any eft26X1
to restore Egypt's membership in the Arab League25X1
arguing that Mubarak must first renounce the peace
treaty and announce his support for the Baghdad
Arab Summit resolutions that rejected the Camp
David accords.
Libyan leader Qadhafi also has little desire to see
Egypt return to the Arab camp. Libya's radical views
on the Arab-Israeli dispute are antithetical to the
peace treaty, and Qadhafi has long sought to destabi-
lize the Egyptian regime. Along with Syria, LibyaX1
the primary backer of the largest Egyptian exile
opposition group, the National Front, headed b
former Egyptian Chief of Staff Saad al-Shazli.
Nonetheless, the war with Iran is likely to preoccupy
the Iraqis for some time and has forced Baghdad to
give secondary importance to Arab-Israeli issues in
general. As a result, the Iraqis may be willing to
accept tacitly improved ties between Egypt and other
Arab countries.
In addition, Egypt will seek to exploit Baghdad's
recent military setbacks.
[Cairo has reiterate its
public offers to help defend the Persian Gulf, taken a
more explicit pro-Iraqi stance, and increased arms
sales to Baghdad. The Egyptians also may offer to
send military training teams to the Persian Gulf states
to help them improve their defensive capabilities.
Syria and Libya
Syria is the Arab country that feels most betrayed by
Sadat's treaty with Israel. Syria believes that the
treaty left it isolated against Israel and constituted
desertion of an ally. The Syrian press rejoiced after
Sadat's death, hailing the "end of a traitor" and
expressing hope that Egypt would soon return to
confrontation with Israel.
25X
Mubarak, as did Sadat in the year before his death,
25X
25X
Nonetheless, the Egyptians are deeply suspicious (25X1
Libya and, despite promises to the contrary, Mubarak
has upgraded Egyptian military forces deployed near
Libya. The Egyptian leader is especially concerned
about Libyan efforts, in cooperation with Tripoli's
allies in the so-called Aden Pact-South Yemen a$f)X1
Ethiopia-to overthrow Sudanese President Nimeiri,
Egypt's closest ally in the Arab world. 25X
Implications for Israel
Mubarak has repeatedly promised that Egypt will not
attempt to gain favor with the Arabs by abandoning
the peace process with Israel after April. He has told
Israelis that they have nothing to fearl
25
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Key Outstanding Issues Between Egypt and Israel
in the Autonomy Talks
Size and structure of self-
governing authority (SGA)
Israeli View
SGA should have 80 to 100 elected representatives
who would have legislative as well as administra-
tive authority
SGA should have strong role in internal security,
with Israel's role limited.
Specified security locations for Israeli military to
be small cantonments.
and participate in SGA.
No new settlements and no territorial expansion of
existing ones. Jewish settlers should be subject to
laws of SGA.
Aside from specified security locations and exist-
ing Israeli settlements, SGA should have full
authority.
Provision must be made to permit Palestinians to
redress Israel's currently disproportionate use of
West Bank water.
Begin favors no more than 17 members, whose
authority would be strictly administrative.
Israel should have full responsibility for internal
security.
Specified security locations to be large, and Israel
could, if it wishes, establish new civilian settlements
within them.
Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem should not vote
for SGA, nor are they eligible to be elected to it.
Provision for new settlements and territorial expan-
sion of existing settlements would have to be made.
Jewish settlements would remain under Israeli control
and not be subject to the authority of SGA.
Only privately owned Arab land would be fully free of
some measure of Israeli control. Public domain land
would be subject to joint control of SGA and Israel.
SGA and Israel would jointly allocate water rights. If
agreement not reached, status quo prevails.
He and other Egyptian officials
maintain that Egypt can have good relations with
both Israel and the Arabs. These protestations are no
doubt sincere, but Mubarak is well aware that any
improvement in Egyptian-Arab ties will cause great
concern in Tel Aviv, and that, conversely, the Arabs
will expect Egypt to take a tougher line against Israel
once the Sinai is returned.
Mubarak is likely to move cautiously after 25 April to
avoid unduly alarming the Israelis. The Egyptians are
already planning to minimize ceremonies marking the
return of the Sinai in order to avoid offending Israeli
sensibilities. Mubarak has also said that he still plans
to travel to Israel, although the dispute over the
Israeli demand that he visit Jerusalem appears to rule
out any prospect for an early trip. At the same time,
however, the Egyptians are stepping up their contacts
with the other Arabs and will push hardlti least
one Arab state to reopen its embassy in Cairo later
this year. They hope that if one state ac s, the
others will follow suit. 25X1
As time passes, Mubarak is likely to take additional
steps to improve ties with the Arabs by putting more
distance between Egypt and Israel. If there is no
progress in the autonomy talks this summer-as
seems likely given the wide gap between2 t"vo
sides-the Egyptians probably will look for some
pretext to abandon the negotiations entirely. The talks
are already in abeyance because of Israel's insistence
that at least part of the next round of negotiations be
held in Jerusalem, a demand that Egypt rejects.
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The Egyptians, however, will be reluctant to withdraw
precipitately from the autonomy talks because of
fears that Israel will annex the West Bank and Gaza
if negotiations collapse and that US-Egyptian rela-
tions will be damaged. Mubarak probably calculates
that Israel will eventually give Egypt a justifiable
pretext such as new measures to extend Israeli civilian
rule over the West Bank or some military action
against the PLO in Lebanon or against one of the
radical Arab states. Mubarak could then argue that
Israel, not Egypt, is to blame and that it is Washing-
ton's responsibility to ensure that Israel does not take
other steps that would preclude meanin ful future
negotiations in some other form.
In the months ahead Mubarak is likely to look for
additional ways to demonstrate Egypt's opposition to
Israeli policies. He is not likely to halt completely the
normalization process, but he may allow parts of it to
wither. New agreements on trade and cultural ties
probably will be indefinitely postponed, and existing
arrangements may be permitted to lapse. Private
business arrangements are more likely to endure but
remain limited in scope.)
Although Egypt may take action in other areas, it will
almost certainly adhere scrupulously to the terms of
the military disengagement protocols of the peace
treaty. Cairo will also continue to support the multi-
national peacekeeping operation in eastern Sinai that
Egypt views as a deterrent to Israeli moves to reoc-
cupy the area.
New Initiatives in the Peace Process
Mubarak will also seek alternatives to the current
negotiating framework. He has already labeled the
Saudi plan a "good draft" and probably is prepared to
endorse any reasonable peace proposal that receives
the blessing of another Arab summit conference.
Mubarak has no illusions that Israel would accept
such an Arab plan, but he would view Egyptian
endorsement as a way to win the favor of Arab
moderates.
The Egyptians will probably be more supportive of
West European peace proposals as well. Cairo has
backed the European Community's Middle East ini-
tiative since Sadat visited France in January 1981,
and Mubarak reiterated his interest in European
involvement during visits to London, Paris, Rome, and
Bonn in February 1982. Egypt hopes that the Europe-
ans can persuade the United States to deal directly
with the PLO and perhaps even broker an indirect
dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians.
25
Mubarak may also encourage other European coun-
tries, including Austria and Romania, to continue
their efforts to arrange discussions between Israel and
other Arab states. Finally, the Egyptians may give
lipservice to the Soviet Union's call for an internation-
al conference on the Middle East, although Muba2X1
will be reluctant to give the Soviets a major role in
Middle East peacemaking. 25F1
Cairo probably does not expect any of these initiatives
to produce significant results in the near future. It
does hope they will slowly push the United States
toward direct dealings with the Palestinians and exert
pressure on Israel to make major concessions that
would attract other Arab countries into the peace
process. In his contacts with the United States, M~5X1
barak will increase calls for a US-Palestinian dia-
logue.
2h
Prospects for Egyptian-Arab Ties
Egypt's reconciliation with its Arab neighbors is likely
to be a gradual process. The resistance from Arab
hardliners like Syria and Libya will make a rapid
improvement in relations difficult to accomplish. The
Saudis and other moderates will also want to move
cautiously to avoid the appearance of a shift in thc25X1
opposition to Camp David. The presence of an Israeli
Ambassador in Cairo will trouble some Arabs and
hinder formal reconciliation. Even the Egyptians fa-
vor a gradual approach in order to avoid unduly
alarming Israel and the United States. 5X1
If the nonaligned movement summit conference in
Baghdad takes place in September as scheduled, it
will provide an opportunity for the Egyptians to hold
high-level talks with other Arab leaders. Egypt also
hopes that it will be invited to send a delegation to X1
Arab League summit to be held in Morocco later this
year. Moroccan King Hassar has been quoted public-
ly as su ortin at least token Egyptian representa-
tion 25)11
F By late summer Egypt's approaches2fDX1
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the Arab world may begin to bear fruit, especially if
the current autonomy process has been replaced by
another negotiating format that does not bear the
Camp David label.
Even if the Saudis and other Arabs restore ties with
Cairo, it is unlikely that massive Arab aid will
immediately begin flowing to Egypt. The decline in
world oil prices and Iraq's already heavy demand on
Arab financial resources will limit the Arabs' ability
and willingness to provide aid to Egypt. But even a
modest Saudi package would be a significant political
and economic boost for Mubarak.1
A more rapid improvement in relations is possible if
Israel takes some new controversial and dramatic
action similar to last year's air raid on Iraq's nuclear
reactor. An Israeli invasion of Lebanon or air attacks
on Syrian missile units in Lebanon would provoke
heavy popular criticism in Egypt and the Arab world,
and Mubarak would have little choice but to side with
the other Arabs and strongly condemn the Israeli
action. Egypt might choose to exploit such a develop-
ment to boost its Arab credentials further and take
other actions such as:
? Indefinitely suspending or even abandoning the
autonomy talks.
? Recalling Egypt's Ambassador from Israel for con-
sultations or downgrading relations to the charge
level.
? Suspending the normalization process and revoking
some agreements.
? Mubarak might even break diplomatic relations
with Israel, retaining only an interest section in Tel
Aviv.
The Egyptians almost certainly would not go to war
with Israel. Mubarak has publicly signaled the PLO
and Syria that Egypt will not come to their aid in the
event of another war. Egypt did not send troops to
Lebanon when Israel invaded the country in 1978
and it is even less likely to do so today.
A major change in the Iran-Iraq war could also spur
more rapid Egyptian-Arab contacts. If the Iraqi
military collapses and Iran becomes the dominant
military power in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf states
25X1
may look to Egypt to aid in their defense. The
Egyptians would be reluctant to send sizable numbers
of troops to the Gulf, but they would be eager to
restore relations and send military training teams.II
Implications for the United States 25X1
A gradual improvement in Egyptian-Arab relations is
likely to have both positive and negative conse-
quences. On the positive side, it would help strengthen
the moderate Arab camp. Egypt would advocate a
negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute and
might even be able to broker contacts between Israel
and some other Arabs, perhaps includi S'ai3di Ara-
bia. 25X1
An Egyptian-Arab reconciliation would also assist US
efforts to develop stronger regional security relation-
ships among Arab moderates. 25X1
25X1
Arab financial aid for Egypt would also serve to
improve the prospects for domestic stability in Egypt,
at least in the short run. Arab money could also
increase Egypt's ability to purchase sophisticated
military equipment from the United &46I
Improved Arab-Egyptian ties would have drawbacks
for the United States, however, especiallrEyptian-
Israeli relations deteriorate markedly. Any collapse of
the autonomy negotiations would be a setback to US
policy and could provoke Israeli annexation of the
West Bank and Gaza, seriously complicating efforts
to find an alternative negotiating format. A dramatic
downturn in Egyptian-Israeli ties caused by an Israeli
incursion into Lebanon or some other cXrtltation
would lead to demands from both Cairo and Tel Aviv
for Washington to pressure the other.
25X1
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Even without a crisis in Israeli-Egyptian relations,
improved Arab-Egyptian ties may lead to some fric-
tion with the United States. The Saudis and other
Gulf states have generally been critical of Egypt's
close military relationship with the United States,
especially Egypt's willingness to participate in joint
military maneuvers with American forces. The Egyp-
tians might be less willing to continue the more highly
visible aspects of US-Egyptian military cooperation if
they concluded that such activity would harm bud-
ding relationships with such states as Saudi Arabia.
Friction may also develop as Mubarak seeks to im-
prove Egypt's nonaligned image. A more active role in
the nonaligned movement, however, should not be
interpreted as a rejection of US ties. Improvements in
the tone of Soviet-Egyptian ties, including the possible
return of a Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, should also
not be interpreted in the West as a dramatic change
in Egypt's approach to Moscow.
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