MONTHLY REPORT - BANGKOK BUREAU - MARCH 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00385R000200030018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 7, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, FBIS 7 April 1981
THROUGH _ Chief, Operations Group
SUBJECT . Monthly Report - Bangkok Bureau - March 1981
Although April Fool's Day overshadowed the developments of the month,
March had sufficient excitement on its own. The "telex crisis" in late
February carried with it not only confusion but the first real trouble
for Gen Prem Tinsulanon's government. The controversy and squabbling
within the government over who had the right to telex authority to Industry
Minister Chatchai to sign an oil deal with Saudi Arabia brought charges and
countercharges from and among government and party leaders. Amid numerous
rumors of military unrest, coup planning and ministerial resignations, Prem
announced on 2 March that a cabinet reshuffle was necessary. This prompted
mass resignations of first the Democrat Party ministers and then Social
Action Party ministers and officials. After what many people felt was
too long a delay, Prem appointed a new cabinet on 11 March, but the in-
clusion of many "technocrats" and several controversial personages,
particularly Maj Gen Sutsai Hatsadin, only served to cause additional
discontent and disappointment among the military and politicians and to
stir the emotions of the students.
Political problems and pressures were rudely pushed into the back-
ground on 28 March when a hijacked Indonesian plane. landed in Bangkok. A
dramatic end to three days of tension came early in the morning of the 31st
with the successful storming of the plane and rescue mission.
Almost exactly 24 hours later--ironically, while.Prem was receiving
due credit from Thai and foreign leaders alike for his decisive and success-
ful operation against the hijackers--his resignation as prime minister and
commander in chief was announced by Gen San Chitpatima, the leader of the
April Fool's Day coup.
The bureau was alerted to the "possible coup" via an early morning
(0430) phone call to the bureau chief from After
making several phone calls to round up a skeleton crew and to activate
Bang Ping, the bureau was opened at 0500 local. Thai monitor
who had alertly started recording Thai radio after being
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awakened, arrived at the bureau within minutes after the bureau chief and
quickly dispelled nagging fears on the chief's part that he had been the
victim of a well executed April Fool's joke by announcing: "It is a coup;
I've got it recorded." The initial flash fyi and several short announce-
ments were translated and edited quickly but had to await the teletypist's
arrival. Even though we didn't "catch it live," the bureau's initial fyi
on the coup beat by 29 minutes and was sent several minutes
ahead of the sign-off time of the Wire editor's NIACT alert, which was
received more than an hour after the bureau opened. Within an hour of
opening, the bureau was fully manned and abreast of the rapidly developing
situation.
Although there have been approximately six (depending on whose score-
card you read) coups or coupt attempts in Thailand within the past 10
years, this one surprised all the local experts. It also caught the Embassy
and bureau at an awkward moment--during the school spring break when many
Mission families were on holiday out of the city and during the summer
school break for the Thai. Fortunately, the bureau had all its employees
and families accounted for by noon the second day of the coup. Rumors
and scares to the contrary, no bureau employees experienced any security
or traffic problems.
The manpower drain on the staff was heavy owing to the 91 consecutive
hours of operation, but it was especially heavy for the monitorial operation.
Unlike previous coups, both military factions had separate radio networks,
which were joined by a third (Free Radio Group) during the second day. This
"open watch" duty on three separate radios forced the bureau to draft Thai-
language monitors from the Cambodian, Lao and Vietnamese sections.
Not surprisingly, the bureau served also as an information desk to
other concerned elements of the Mission. Requests for confirmation of
reports or rumors heard by Embassy personnel were combined
with requests for visual observations of military activity from our choice
"eagle's nest" location. Spotting armored vehicles in Lumpini Park adjacent
to the bureau and watching military aircraft over the city added extra
excitement to that generated from regular monitoring activities.
. An anticipated curfew prompted panic buying by locals and "farangs"
alike, with traffic-stopping queues observed at most gasoline stations
and food stores. Contingency planning at the bureau included a collection
of "temporary" beds for possible use during curfew hours. At the Ambassador's
instructions, all "non-essential" employees were sent home around noon the
first day of the coup and remained there for its duration. As part of the
Embassy's emergency security preparations, hourly headcounts were taken
on staffers on duty at the Mission. Most employees visibly enjoyed the
hectic experience, but all also were relieved when the threat of civil
war ceased and the "known quantity" regained power. With no curfew or
other public restrictions declared, the city regained its normalcy almost
immediately and within six hours after the coup had failed, it was next
to impossible to observe any indication that the city had just changed
from one military leadership to another and back again.
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A. Editorial/Monitorial
was winning was by keeping a box score of who controlled which radios
throughout the country. Many claims of support from various military
groups and regions by the coup leaders were often rapidly disproved by
determining whether the corresponding military-radio stations were re-
laying Bangkok Domestic Service controlled by the coupists or the Prem-
1. The "radio war," as the recent unsuccessful military coup
in Thailand was most appropriately labelled by the local press, was tailor-
made for FBIS in that the most accurate way one could determine which side
controlled military radio in Nakhon Ratchasima. Cruiser
and associate editorl along with the editors, wirefiled some
29 radio behavior reports over the 3-day period in order to supply con-
sumers with a current tally.;
It was obvious from the beginning that the Revolutionary Party's
so-called "control" of Bangkok was not complete as it had continuing
problems controlling local radio stations and the press. As the Prem
forces organized and it became known he had not resigned but enjoyed the
support of the royal family, more and more radios began relaying the
Nakhon Ratchasima broadcasts. On the third day, the end of the coup became
obvious as soon as cruising verified that all Bangkok stations were in
parallel with Prem's station.
2. As dress rehearsals in handling the 1 April crisis, two
hijackings occurred in the bureau's coverage area: the 3 March hijacking
of the Pakistani airliner to Kabul and then Damascus; and the 28 March
hijacking of the Indonesian airliner to Bangkok which immediately preceded
the coup. Between these two events, the Cambodian monitors stretched
their production capabilities to the maximum in processing the 8,000-word
draft PRK Constitution and the 4,000-word KPRC decree on elections to the
PRK National Assembly. These events made for a very hectic month for
bureau personnel, whose combined hours of overtime is expected to approach
the 200-hour mark. Excluding production ponpted by the coup, which will
be reported in the April monthly report, production figures jumped from a
total of 670,960 in February to 814,910 in March.
3. Split coverage with Gulf Bureau of late night Karachi radio
broadcasts to assist our undermanned South Asian Unit worked well during
the 1-4 April period when one of our monitors was on EOT leave. Earlier,
on 25 March, Gulf was called upon; to process a lengthy priority item from
its backstop recording of Karachi English due to deteriorating reception
at Bangkok.
B. Cruising
Associate editor I land cruiser I Iconducted
a cruising survey in Songkhla, southern Thailand, 2-6 March of Indonesian
regional and other area stations to compare reception with that at Bang Ping.
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Although disappointing, the reception ratings did prove that Songkhla was
not a viable alternative to Bang Ping for coverage of Indonesian or other
area stations. In many cases, particularly with the Indonesian stations,
reception was worse than at Bang Ping. Survey results will be pouched to
FCS in the near future.
C. Lateral Services
1. The bureau received a much appreciated kudo from Amemb
Vientiane on 11 March. contained in Airgram A-009 addressed to the Depart-
ment of State and info'ed to a number of major U.S. missions abroad.
Subject of the Airgram was the "8th Resolution" of the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) embodied in the lengthy speech delivered to
the Supreme People's Council by LPRP General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan
on 6 January. To quote from the Airgram: "...the English text done by
FBIS Bangkok is the first non-Lao version to emerge, and so far the oniy.
one. This year it ran to about 30,000 words and became available in com-
pleted form in mid-February. We would like to observe, with a deep bow
of appreciation to the FBIS staff in Bangkok, that their very polished
translation is of great usefulness, not only to this Embassy, but to many
of the other foreign mission staffs here...."
2. Early in the month, the bureau completed a second Thai
language-taping project on behalf of DDO/NEA/Language School (first
project was done last November). A total of 20 video tapes--comprising
news programs, documentaries, Thai dramas, sports events, movies, and
interviews with Thai officials--and another 20 audio tapes were turned
over to the Station for pouching back to Headquarters. The tapes were
supplied by the requester.
3. Kudos in several forms were received from the Embassy Pol-
itical Section and the Station during and after the April Fool's Day
coup. A message of appreciation from Director, FBIS received during the
coup served to buoy spirits at a very critical time.
A. Personnel
1. A suitable candidate to fill the vacancy in the South Asian
Unit was identified early in the month and accepted a job offer with a
starting salary of FSN 7/10. A background investigation has been requested
from the Regional Security Office which, hopefully, will be completed within
a couple of months.
2. Following an im ressive and exhausting series of farewell
dinners and parties, editor departed Bangkok
PCS on 6 March for an assignment in Headquarters.
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B. Other
1. Upon receipt of State Department authorization to include
the bureau's TCN's in the Embassy housing program, the bureau officially
joined the newly formed housing pool on 24 March. Under its general policy,
arriving Mission employees are assigned housing based primarily on family
size and availability of housing. It is a phased program, the goal of
which is to have all Mission staff and TCN employees in Government-leased
housing by 1984. The two next arriving bureau staffers (both August) have
already been assigned housing.
2. Bureau management and PRA employees were pleased to learn
of the recent revision of documentary requirements for returning PRA's
that eliiates the need of most PRA's to travel to the States every two
years for visa' redocumentation. Five bureau PRA's will benefit from
the revision, while the other five, all of whom are "stateless," must
continue redocumentation travel in order to retain Thai residency
authorization.
While the above was evolving, the bureau received surprising
news on 4 March that the Thai Foreign Ministry had routinely approved the
issuance of non-immigrant visas to three of our "stateless" Vietnamese
PRA's and their families and prom tl had so notified the Thai Embassy
in Washington. This will allow to complete
their redocumentation travel at the most opportune time--during school
vacation and at the very end of their current visa extension periods.
The bureau deliberately had forwarded the visa issuance requests well
in advance to counter anticipated bureaucratic stalling on the part of
Thai officialdom, which is not noted for its pro-Vietnamese attitude.
On 4 March, visiting NFAC Indochinese analyst I Ivisited the
bureau in the company of Station NFAC representative Both
visitors had an extensive exchange with the chief and deputy chief, the
editorial staff and with several monitors.
Chief, B ngkok.Bureau, FBIS
WRS:eep
Attachments:
Engineering
Production Report
Production Report by Language, Country & Source
Embassy Circuit Outage Report
Distribution:
C/Okinawa Bureau
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