JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000200210005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 20, 1970
• Content Type: NOTES

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CONft0ENTIAL
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2
Wednesday - 20 May 1970
25X1 4. Accompanied Bruce Clarke to an
unclassified briefing of Ed Braswell, Senate Armed Services Committee
staff, on the nature of the Soviet threat. The briefing was primarily
directed to the historical background of the Soviet weapons program.
Mr. Clarke also reviewed material which had been prepared by Bill
Baroody, of DOD, and expressed his agreement with the figures contained
in Baroody's paper. Braswell said this briefing would be most helpful
to him in assisting Senator Stennis in his work on the ABM issue.
I asked Braswell if he had any reservations about our going ahead
with the submission of our retirement package as indicated in the outline
which we had provided him earlier. Braswell said he had no real problems
on this but suggested that instead of a flat repealer of the ceiling on our
number of retirements that we suggest a new ceiling figure. With regard
to the section on the reemployment of refired annuitants, Braswell
expressed some reservations about our following the Foreign Service
provisions, but did not state a flat objection.
25X1 5. I 1 Ambassador Torbert, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, called about a letter the
Department had received from Senator Jacob Javits inquirying of the possi-
25X1A bility of freeing a prisoner held by the Cubans since participating in the
Bay of Pigs invasion. After checking with WH Division,
I called Torbert to say our area experts had been in touch with their
opposite numbers in State and I thought it best for the matter to be
handled through that channel, to which Torbert agreed.
25X1
25X1A
25X1A
6. I .1 Dorothy Fosdick, Staff Director, Senate
Governments Operations Subcommittee on National Security and Inter-
national Operations, called to request, as early as possible tomorrow,
an all-source briefing on the costs of major Soviet strategic weapons
programs. I told her I would check and confirm.
later called Miss Fosdick and advised that he and
of OSR would be there at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow morning.
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WASHINGTON POST DATE 1 WA-el -10
PAGE
Secrete Pentagon Report
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
A top-secret report locked
, _
Up in the Pentagon throWs a
different light on the grim pic-
ture Defense Secretary Melvin
R. Laird recently painted of
the Soviet missile threat.
The report is based on pho-
tographs taken from Ameri-
ea's Samos satellites as they
passed over the Soviet Union.
The secret findings are bound
to figure in congressional de-
bate on whether the U.S. mis-
sile defense should be ex-
panded.
According to the eye in the
sky, the Soviet Union actually
built fewer sites for its biggest
missiles, the SS-9, in 1969 than
It did in 1965.
Film parachuted back to
earth from the unmanned
Samos satellites, the Central
Intelligence Agency's succes-
sor to the U-2 spy planes, is a
major basis for the Pentagon's
estimates of Soviet weaponry.
Laird revealed part of the
SS-9 count when he told Asso-
ciated Press editors in New
York on April 20 that he was
releasing "maximum informa-
tion" so the American people
could see "that we are liter-
ally at the edge of prudent
risk" as far as holding back on
? -
the deployment of new weap-
ons.
Laird has argued that an an-
tiballistic-missile (ABM) de-
fense must be built to protect
U.S. Minuteman interconti-
nental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) from a surprise at-
tack by the SS-9.
"In 1965," Laird told the edi-
tors, "there were no opera-
tional launchers for the large
ispu es
aird on Red Missiles
Soviet SS-9 missile 'which, in
Its single warhead version, can
carry up to 25 megatons.
"Today," Laiid continued, "I
can report to YOU that there
are Orne 220 SS-9s operational
with at least 60 more under
construction . . ."
Laird did not mention that
66 SS-9 missile sites were spot-
ted in 1965, compared to 54 in
1969. The secretary evidently
added up each year's construe-
tion sincd 1964 to reach his
total of 280 for "today."
His reference to "no opera-
tional launchers" in 1965 ap-
parently meant they were not
ready to fire.
Laird's comparison could be
read as a sudden jump in SS-9
missile site construction. In-
stead, the intelligence esti-
mates show an up-and-down
trend for the SS-9.
The SaMos, according to in-
formed sources, counted a few
over 40 SS-9 sites in 1964, then
the 66 for 1965. The next three
years showed a tapering off
before surging upward again
to 54 in 1969.
How many SS-9 missiles the
Sbviets build in 1970 will be
watched as one indication of
their attitude toward slowing
down the strategic arms race.
Laird has served notice that
if the Soviets do not slow
their current pace, the United
States will have to move
faster into such new strategic
weapons as a super-size sub-
marine armed with longer-
range missiles than the Pola-
ris.
Soviet SS-9 deployment is
one of the concerns of the
American negotiators at the
strategic arms limitation talks
at Vienna.
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Apl 30, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE H 3721
proach continues to look at the South-
east Asia problem as simply a military
problem and not one which requires a
political solution.
The events in Cambodia are so omi-
nous that prompt and responsible action
is required by the Congress to avert a
wider war involving the United States
throughout all Indochina.
Section 401 of the military procure-
ment bill, which we are considering to-
day, is an open-ended authorization for
the very type of action which yesterday
resulted in American advisers and air
support crossing into Cambodia with a
iarge-scale South Vietnamese attack
Force.
As I have informed my colleagues by
etter, today I intend to offer an amend-
ment which would strike out section 401?
.n an effort to avoid involvement in an-
3ther war created by the executive
3ranch.
Section 401 provides that funds author-
zed under the military 'procurement
Dill or any other act involving the Armed
Forces may be used to "support" Viet-
namese and other free world forces in
Vietnam, and local forces in Laos and
Thailand. This is the very support which
accounts for yesterday's U.S. interven-
tion into Cambodia. What is more, it will
enable this country to marshal a proxy
army, drawing us further into the well of
death and destriaction which has cost
over 41,000 American soldiers' lives in
Vietnam.
The House will have an opportunity
todaytto act. By voting for the amend-
ment which I will offer, and thereby de-
leting the open ended authority for
support of South Vietnamese, Thai, and
Laotian forces, we will be able to exer-
cise our constitutional responsibilities.
The President will have to request spe-
cific authority, and will have to explain
his actions fully. That is the very least we
owe this country and its young men, who
are risking their lives in misguided con-
flict in Southeast Asia.
CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(Mr. LONG of Maryland asked and
was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker,
the Pentagon announcement that we are
moving into Cambodia in a fairly large
way, with advisers, tactical air support,
and, other combat support and equip-
ment, is upsetting.
For '7 years, we have tried to win a war
In a nation with as many as a half mil-
lion men. Now, the tantalizing vision is
held out that with half as many men
we can somehow emerge trimphant by
spreading the war into two nations.
The Pentagon announcement is par-
ticularly upsetting because we have been
assured repeatedly by the administration
that we would not become involved in
another Asian Conflict without consulta-
tion with the Congress. Just a week ago
today, Secretary of State Rogers reiter-
ated that assurance to the Foreign Oper-
ations Subcommittee of the House Ap-
propriations Committee.
Our commitment in Cambodia is al-
ready substantial enough to remind us
of how we gat committed to Vietnani in
the first place. It will become even more
substantial if the Cambodian Govern-
ment is given all the support it has re-
quested.
The administration has broken both its
promise and its constitutional obligation
to consult the Congress by committing
American troops, American treasury, and
American prestige to the defense of one
more nation that lacks the will to defend
itself.
President Nixon has launched us into
another undeclared war.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAM-
BODIA OFFER AN OPPORTUNITY
(Mr. BLACKBURN asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, we
have heard several comments today re-
garding developments in Cambodia in
recent weeks. In my opinion, the devel-
opments in Cambodia are one of the
greatest breaks that the United States
has received since our involvement there.
Recent developments are favorable to the
United States both militarily and psycho-
logically; military because the Commu-
nists are being denied sanctuary in Cam-
bodia and psychologically because it
shows that the freedom-loving people in
Southeast Asia are anxious to throw off
their pro-Communist rulers and stand up
and fight. The Communists remind me of
a man playing poker who has run out of
blue chips when someone else raised
the ante.
I am glad to say that I can support
a cause, the cause of victory in South-
east Asia. When I heard the loud cries
on this end of the Capitol, as well as the
opposite, from those praying secretly for
American defeat, I am glad that I can
stand up for an American victory. An
American victory will be my victory. I
pity and hold with some disgust those
who must pray for an American defeat
in the hope that in some perverted way
they might benefit politically.
MINSHALL OPPOSES RAISE IN
FIRST-CLASS POSTAGE
(Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Speaker, as the
postal reform hearings progress in the
House Committee on Post Office and
civil Service, I wish to be recorded in
opposition to the proposed 2-cent in-
crease in first-class postage.
First-class letters already show a
profit at 6 cents. There is no reason why
first-class mail users should be penalized
by an increase in rates.
And there is absolutely no justification
for the general taxpayer to continue
digging in his pocket to subsidize un-
wanted, unwelcome third class "junk"
mail which does not begin to pay its own
way and which is a constant nuisance to
recipients.
In its most fair form, the cost of de-
livering any article through the mail
should be a direct-user tax. I hope that
the postal reform bill will reach the
House floor under a parliamentary sit-
uation which will permit us to vote sep-
arately on the postal r e i
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
RESERVE STRENGTH AUTHORI-
ZATION, 1971
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I move
that the House resolve itself into the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union for the further con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 17123) to
authorize appropriations during the fis-
cal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, and tracked com-
bat vehicles, and other weapons, and re-
search, development, test, and evalua-
tion for the Armed Forces, and to pre-
scribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
Reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
The motion was agreed to.
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly, the House resolved itself
into the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further
consideration of the bill H.R. 17123, with
Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Before the Commit-
tee rose on yesterday, it had agreed that
the bill be considered as read and open
to amendment at any point.
Are there further amendments?
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WYMAN
Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer
and amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. WYMAN:
On page 2, line 19, strike out the period,
substitute a comma, and add the following:
"Provided further, That no funds author-
ized to appropriated by this,Act for the use
of the Armed Forces of the United States
shall be expended for the contract procure-
ment of DI) 963 class destroyers unless the
procurement planned for such vessels makes
provision that the veisels in that plan shall
be constructed at the facilities of at least two
different, United States shipbuilders."
(Mr. WYMAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall
not take too much time on this amend-
ment. However, it is an important
amendment in that this DD-963 class of
destroyer procurement involves an initial
contract for some 30 vessels and an addi-
tional commitment
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I
make the point of order that a quorum
is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.
Evidently a quorum is not present. The
Clerk will call the roll.
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11 3722
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE April* 3(), 1V70
The Clerk called the roll, and the
following Members failed to answer to
their names:
[Roll No. 98]
Edwards, La.
Feighan
Foley
Gallagher
Garmatz
Gialmo
Griffiths
Hanna
Anderson,
Tenn,
Ashley
Baring
Bean, Md.
Berry
Biaggi
Bolling
Brasco Hays
Brock Hebert
Brown, Cant,. 4Irs IsMass.
. acS4 s
Burton, Utah Johnson, Calif.
Bush Jones, N.C.
Cabell Kee
Celler Kirwan
Clark Langen
Clawson, Del Lennon
Cohelan Lujan
Colmer ' Lukens
Cowger McCarthy
Cramer Madden
Daddario Mahon
Dawson Melcher
Dent "Meskill
Dutra! M011ohan
O'Neal, Gs.
Ottinger
Passrnan
Patman
Pepper
Poage
Powell
Price, Tex,
Roberts
Ruppe
St. Onge
Scheuer
Schneebeli
Stratton
Stubblefield
Stuckey
Sullivan
Symington
Taft
Taylor
Teague, Calif.
Tunney
Weicker
White
Whitehurst
Accordingly the Committee rose, and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, reported that that
Committee, having had under considera-
tion the bill H.R. 17123, and finding it-
self without a quorum, he had directed
the roll to be called, when 354 Members
responded to their names, a quorum, and
he submitted herewith the names of ab-
sentees to be spread upon the Journal.
The Committee resumed its sitting.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Commit-
tee rose the gentleman from New
Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) was explain-
ing his amendment. The gentleman will
proceed.
Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, this
amendment is not a complicated one. It
Is designed to require that at least two
different souKces shall construct the new
DD-963 class of destroyer which Is the
projected new destroyer for the Navy
over the next 10 to 20 yea's. The initial
procurement here involves some 30 ships
a a cost of approximately $2 billion.
Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion as a
member a the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee that this is altogether too
much for a single source Kocurement.
I think a , dual procurement would
strengthen the procurement process as
well as our national-shipbuilding capa-
bility.
As Members remember, last year there
-was provision in the bill when it went over
to the other body providing for three
sources. At the present time in response
to specifications and contract definition
the competing sources on this procure-
ment are down to two.
In the long haul many more than 30
such vessels may be required.
I think It very much in the interest of
the Procurement process and more com-
patible with a greater measure of pro-
tection...AM national defense that at least
two facilities develop and construct this
destroyer. Sole source of procurement
here Outs altogether too many eggs in
one basket
Dual procurement will involve a brief
Initial delay to assure commonality. In
the prototype there may be a small cost
increase in the beginning. But shortly
down the line as completed ships come
off the ways this increase will be recouped
and we will have the continuing added
protection of two sources of production
for this main line item. To me this is a
wise and sound policy.
I would like to ask the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee at this time if the committee has
a position in regard to this amendment?
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. WYMAN. Yes; I yield to the chair-
man of the committee.
Mr. RIVERS. I think this amendment
Is substantially the same as the one we
had in the bill last year. I can see no
harm in it. Insofar as I am concerned I
will accept it.
Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time I
will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise
In support of the amendment.
(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I may
not take up the entire 5 minutes. I think
we have found we can spend a great deal
of money for some of these procurements,
but we spend it all in one particular
place in many instances. At my instance,
we have had some amortization of the
work with respect to ship procurement
by provisions we added in the bill al-
ready providing that of the funds made
available, $600 million would be avail-
able only for expenditures in naval
shipyards.
I think there are sound reasons for
this. I would like to submit into the
RECORD an analysis of this Committee
amendment, which I sent to the Chair-
man under date of April 6, and which
has tables attached to it. I will ask per-
mission to print the tables when we get
Into the House.
The material referred to is as follows:
APRIL 6, 1970.
Hon. L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Rouse of Representatives, Washington,
D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Shortly we will be
Introducing our Public Law 412 Authoriza-
tion Bill for fiscal 1971. A question arises
whether our Committee has the power to halt
the apparent administrative desecration of
our Naval Shipyards. I know you are con-
cerned about the sometimes fiscal slight of
hand of the Pentagon. What with Congres-
sional and Presidential limitations on spend-
ing over the past few years, I believe our
long-term defense priorities have become
confused.
When the red tape and official budget mis-
information are cleared aside and the num-
bers are viewed in perspective, the rather
disastrous desecrating action of the Admin-
istration comes to light.
Toil recall in the early 1960's we fought
jointly to maintain a proper balance be-
tween public and private shipyard apportion-
ment of Naval repairs, alterations and con-
,
versions (RAC). We opposed mandatory ap-
portionment of 35 percent of this work to
private yards when for the previous 10 years
the average had been 15 percent private. For
the past five years, there has been no man-
datory apportionment, but it is interesting
to note that private yards have enjoyed re-
spectively 32.6 percent, 35.4 percent, 40.8 per-
cent, 37.4 percent and 32.8 percent of the
work.
The point is that our victory was rather
hollow since in spite of the discretion given
the Administration, the Navy has averaged
over the last 5 years only $682 million of
RAC work whereas private yards have aver-
aged $385 million and 36.1 percent of the
work.
While the Navy has mesmerized us with
the repair figures, apparently there has been
scrnove in the Administration to work disas-
ter in new construction.
You recall in 1965, when Secretary Mc-
Namara issued his order closing certain
Naval Shipyards, he talked of modernizing
and building up the remaining yards so that
they could be competitive on new construc-
tion. The Navy bought and paid for the
Kaiser Report which looked to expending $700
million to modernize Naval Shipyards in
5 to 7 years. Now four years later, it is my
understanding that the Administration has
opted for a 10 year modernization program?
recommended for the first time last year a
$70 million initial program which was even-
tually reduced by budget limitations to $49.9
million. For fiscal 1971, I understand the
Navy recommended $98 million and this was
cut by OSD to $34.5 million. The lioint is
that at best the Navy yards will only get 50
percent of the Navy recommended program,
which means that a 10 year modernization
is now extended to 20 years.
On new construction, there has been a sta-
tistical disaster which is now wreaking havoc
in Naval Shipyards, and I charge destroying
our Defense Shipyard capability.
In the 10 year period before 1967, Navy
yards were apportioned on the average $405
million of new construction work annually?
about 20 percent of the new work. Private
yards were awarded 80 percent or about $1.4
billion annually.
In 1967, apparently without much fanfare
and amid budget confusion, the Navy yard
share of new construction was cut to less
than 1 percent or $61/2 million, while private
yards received a whopping $1.8 billion. Out-
side of $71 million awarded to Navy yards in
1968, there has been no new shipwork allo-
cated to any Navy yard in 1969, 1970 and
now 1971; while there has been apportioned
to private yards during this period $553 .
million, $351 million, $2.45 billion, and $2.72
billion or a total of $6.07 billion private to 0
for Naval Shipyards. The last figure, as you
know, is subject to our Public Law 412 power
this year.
Not only are private yards fat from Navy
contracts, but the new 30 ship per year
Merchant Ship Program of the Maritime Ad-
ministration and the 10 ship per year Charter
and Build Program of the MSTS will swell
-private yard coffers an additional billion dol-
lars a year.
This feast on the one hand, famine on the
other, has had its effect in shipyard employ-
ment. In 1956, private yard employment stood
at 110,000 vs. 102,000 in Naval Shipyards. In
1961, when the Democrats came to power, the
ratio was 116,000 to 98,400 for Navy yards.
In 1968, it was 144,000 private vs. 95,200
Navy yards. Over the past three years, with
the disastrous work allocation policy afore-
described, Navy yard strength has fallen to
86,000 and is projected to deteriorate to 82,000
in June and perhaps 72,000 by the end of
fiscal 1971.
I personally believe that our national de-
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fense posture Will be substantially com-
promised if our Committee allows a 25 per-
cent reduction in crucial' shipyard personnel
talents in this short space of time.
Several solutions present "themselves to
ameliorate the foregoing.
(A) A proviso could be added which would
limit the ship authorization so that $600
million would bR available only for expendi-
ture in Naval Shipyards.
(B) A proviso could be worked out which
would guarantee that at least 20 percent of
the new construction funds would be al-
located to Naval Shipyards.
Either of these provisions are a far cry
from the 50-50 apportionment called for in
the Vinson Trammel Act, which I understand
is still law today.
While perhaps only a portion of the Naval
Shipyards are involved in new construction,
H 3723
the policy aforementioned affects everyone
of them lest they all try to survive out of the
same paltry repair dollar allocation.
Mr. Chairman, I know you are vitally con-
cerned with these matters. The contentions
can be easily reinforced by calling in civilian
and military Navy Shipyard managers to
Washington to testify.
Very sincerely,
ALLOCATION OF SHtPWORK BETWEEN NAVAL AND PRIVATE SHIPYARDS FISCAL YEAR 195$ TO FISCAL YEAR 1970
!Dollars in thousands!
EiOBERT L. LEGGETT.
Fiscal year
New construction
Naval Private
Percent
Total private
Total repairs, alterations, conversion and new construction
Percent '
Naval Private Total private
195$
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
$256, 390 $303, 059 $559, 449 54.2 $690, 781 $335, 859 $1, 026, 640 32. 7
0 427, 818 427, 818 100. 0 378, 811 483, 418 862,229 56. 1
320,288 415, 218 735, 506 56. 5 724, 538 491, 618 1,216, 156 40. 4
388,411 861, 390 1,249, 791 68.9 907, 287 949, 101 1, 856,388 51. 1
549, 686 1, 010, 601 1, 560, 287 64.8 1, 233, 521 1, 271, 083 2, 504, 604 50.7
303, 302 1, 281, 300 1, 584, 602 80. 9 825, 856 1, 349, 000 2, 174, 856 62. 0
474, 131 1,376 699 1, 850, 830 74.4 1, 086, 040 1, 472, 998 2, 559, 038 57. 6
86, 160 42, 9615 515, 775 83. 3 531, 478 504, 984 1, 036, 562 48. 7
483, 702 1, 488, 935 1,972, 637 75. 5 972, 352 1, 568, 635 2, 540,987 61. 7
772, 371 1,620, 824- 2, 393, 195 67.7 1, 372, 615 1, 786, 624 3, 159, 239 56.6
274, 192 1, 888, 108 2, 162, 300 87. 3 872, 401 2,214, 795 3, 087, 196 71. 7
321, 945 I, 390, 818 1, 712, 763 81.2 1, 030, 860 1, 690, 154 2, 721, 014 62. I
441, 100 I, 361, 476 1, 802, 576 75. 5 896, 762 1, 581, 996 2, 478, 758 63. 8
255, 300 1,390, 436 1,645, 736 84. 5 932, 444 I, 792, 405 2, 724, 849 65. 8
6, 500 1, 827, 300 1, 833, 800 99. 6 695, 588 2, 343, 794 3, 039, 382 77. 1
71, 500 553, 200 624, 700 88. 6 868, 296 1, 028, 806 1, 897, 102 54.2
0 351, 600 351, 600 100.0 796, 422 741, 221 1, 537, 643 47.2
ALLOCATION OF SHIPWORK BETWEEN NAVAL AND PRIVATE SHIPYARDS FISCAL YEAR 1953 TO FISCAL YEAR 1970
'Dollars in thousandsl
Repairs and alterations
Fiscal year ' Naval Pi 'vats
Conversions
Percent Percent
Total private Naval Private Total private
Total repairs, alterations and conversions
Percent
Naval Private Total private
1953 $301,700 $32, 800
1954 285, 600 55, 600
1955 255, 400 76,400
1956 294,000 77,200
1957 269,400 64,200
1958 293,300 67, 700
1959 299,500 57,500
1960 350,900 63,500
1961 347,300 79,700
1962 394, 300 133, 400
1963 309,909 140,487
1964 315,053 150,972
1965 432,962 148,620
1966 511,044 349,619
1967 664, 088 352, 494
1968 667, 896 264, 106
1969 665, 022 235, 521
$334,500
341,200
331, 800
371, 200
333, 600
361, 000
357, 000
414, 400
427, 000
527, 700
450, 396
466, 025
581, 582
860, 663
1, 016, 582
932, 002
900, 543
9.8 $132,691 $0
16.3 93,211 0
23.0 148,850 0
20.8 224,876 10,521
19. 2 414, 435 196, 282
18.8 229,254 0
16. 1 312, 409 39,799
15.3 94,418 11,889
18.7 141,350 0
25. 3 205, 944 32, 400
32. 2 288. 300 186, 200
32.4 393,862 148,364
25.6 22,700 71,900
40,6 166,100 20,650
34.7 25,000 121,500
28.3 128,900 211,500
26. 2 131, 400 154, 100
$132, 691 0 $434, 391 $32, 800 $467, 191 7. 0
93,211 0 378,011 55,600 434,411 12.8
148, 850 0 404, 250 76, 400 480, 650 15. 9
235,397 4.5 518, 876 87, 721 606, 597 14.5
610, 717 ' 32. 1 683, 835 260,482 944, 317 27. 6
229, 254 0 522, 554 67, 700 590, 254 11.5
351,208 11.0 611,909 96,299 708,208 13.6
106, 287 11. 2 445, 318 75, 369 520, 687 14. 5
141, 350 0 488, 650 79, 700 568,350 14. 0
238, 344 13. 6 600, 244 165, 800 766, 044 21.6
474, 500 39, 2 598, 209 326, 687 924, 896 35. 3
542, 226 27.4 708, 915 299, 336 1,008, 251 29. 7
94, 600 76. 0 455, 662 220, 520 676, 182 32. 6
186, 750 11.1 677, 144 370, 269 1, 047, 413 35.4
146, 500 82. 9 689, 088 473, 994 1, 163, 082 40.8
340, 400 62. 1 796, 796 475, 606 1, 272, 402 37. 4
285, 500 54.1 796, 422 389621 1, 186, 043 32.8
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I think
that the amendment offered by the gen-
tleman from New Hampshire is a good
amendment. It is going to allow for dual
source procurement, and I think it is go-
ing to lead to the construction of these
ships more competitively and more rapid-
ly, and it is not going to add to the cost.
I yield back the balance of my time.
AIRPORT AND SEAPORT CRIME CONTROL
ACT OF 1970
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the last word.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. KocH
was allowed to speak out of order, and
to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, today I am
introducing the Airport and Seaport
Crime Control Act so we can break the
grip of organized crime at_our ports of
entry.
In February, I expressed the hope that
this CortgresS wOUld concern itself with
stopping the massive theft of interna-
thinal cargo by criminals operating with
impunity at both our seaports and air-
ports. At that time I cited the failure of
the New York-New Jersey Waterfront
Commission to wage an effective and
conscientious fight against the infiltra-
tion of organized crime in the port of
New York. Now the waterfront commis-
sion is seeking to extend its jurisdiction
to New York's airports, despite its sorry
record in ridding the waterfront of or-
ganized crime and protecting valuable
cargo.
It appears that the problem is beyond
the capacity of State or local authorities.
The Attorney General has charged that
the largest air cargo center in the world,
New York's Kennedy Airport, is virtually
controlled by organized crime. 'Earlier
this year, the Nixon administration an-
nounced that it would propose legislation
designed to prevent theft of interna-
tional cargo at all ports of entry
throughout the Nation. But no legisla-
tion seems to be forthcoming. As with
many other critical problems facing this
country, we cannot wait upon the Nixon
administration while it tries to decide
what, if anything, it will do.
For all these reasons, the Airport and
Seaport Crime Control Act of 1970, which
I am introducing today, seeks to place
the responsibility and power for dealing
with this problem squarely on the Treas-
ury Department's Bureau of Customs.
The bill creates a Cargo Protection Divi-
sion in the Bureau of Customs for two
primary purposes:
First, the prevention of infiltration by
organized crime of legitimate waterfront
and airport business by the use of licens-
ing powers; and
Second, the creation of Federal stand-
ards of cargo protection and the crea-
tion of freight security areas in both air-
ports and seaports.
It is desirable that there be Federal
responsibility for cargo protection as it
involves the control and regulation of
interstate commerce. The exercise of
such regulatory functions by local au-
thorities does not permit the efficient co-
ordination and surveillance of organized
crime. In addition, a Cargo Protection
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Division with national powers will pre-
vent the circumvention or evasion of reg-
ulations by the utilization of other ports
for various forbidden transactions.
The at provides for the licensing of
companies doing business in the airports
and seaports. All prospective licensee
companies would have to meet the stand-
ards of good character and integrity.
These companies Would include the steve-
dore companies, air freight delivery
and warehouse companies, trucking
companies utilizing the ports, mainte-
nance companies of all kinds, special
service companies, such as those that
provide coopering, container and car-
pentry services on the waterfront.
Individuals also would be licensed;
they would include longshoremen, pier
superintendents, hiring agents, clerks,
air employees. Those with very serious
or recent criminal records, or with a
provable connection to organized crime,
would be denied a license.
Initially, the licensing power would
probably be exercised selectively by con-
centrating on the major ports where
there is an obvious need for control.
Eventually, the licensing power could be
,utilized at lesser ports as commerce in-
creases and crimp problems arise. The
bill specifically permits bis tate, State,
and local authorities to exercise licensing
powers of their own. Under the act, the
Cargo Protection Division can accept
State or municipal licenses of cargo han-
dlers, supervisors and transporters in lieu
of Federal licenses if the Division deter-
mines that the non-Federal standards
for licensing are consistent with the pur-
poses of the act.
In order to enable the Division to in-
vestigate violations of laws committed
at either airports or seaports, the act
provides that the Division possess full
subpena and the imniunity powers to en-
able it to investigate the penetration of
organized crime into various airport and
seaport components. It also provides
strong criminal penalties for evasion or
violation of the act itself.
We should not delay in providing the
authority and finding the money to at-
tack this problem. The volume of cargo
at Kennedy Airport will quadruple in
the next decade. Reported losses repre-
sent only a fraction of what is actually
being Stolen.
The Senate Select Committee on Small
Business which has investigated this
problem has emphasized that the ulti-
mate victims of this multimillion-dollar
thievery and corruption are the small
businessmen and the consumer public.
The increased costs resulting from busi-
ness monopoly, fraudulent practices and
cargo theft are passed on to them. It is
time for the Federal Government to be
given specific responsibility for crime
control at our ports of entry if we are to
save legitimate businesses arid the Amer-
ican consumer from the increasing men-
ace of organized crime.
Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr.
Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
nnnaber of words.
Mr, Chairman, I use in support of the
amehdinert
(Mr. 'ANDERSON of California asked
arid Wa,s given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr.
Chairman, I rise in support of the Wy-
man amendment which would require
the DD-963-class destroyer contract to
be split between two shipyards.
I feel that this amendment will serve
the national interest in several ways:
First, it will revitalize our sagging ship-
building industry in two areas?not one.
Second, it would avert a total halt in
construction if one yard runs into labor
trouble and has a strike. At least one
yard will be in production. Third, the
amendment would allow for continued
construction if one shipyard is hampered
by mismanagement.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize the need
to spread our shipbuilding capabilities
over several geographical areas. Shortly,
I will be presenting an amendment which
moves in the same direction as the Wy-
man amendment, although much broader
in scope. To show that there is no_con-
flict, however, I urge support of the Wy-
man amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) .
The amendment was agreed to.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT:
On page 2, line 8, after the words, "For
missiles: for the Army," strike "$1,086,600,-
000" and insert "$428,200,000".
(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I
intend to offer two amendments this
morning with respect to the anti-bal-
listic-missile program. The present
amendment would purport to cut $660
million, which is the total amount
of the procurement in the pending
bill for the anti-ballistic-missile pro-
gram. If that amendment fails then I
intend to offer a second amendment
which would cut out $203 million for
the phase II deployment.
We have spent today for the anti-
ballistic-missile system a total of $4.3
billion for research and development,
$550 million for procurement, and $1
billion for military construction. In the
bill that we have before us today we are
laying the foundation to add on addi-
tionally this year $660.4 million for
procurement which includes the ? $203
million fel' the phase II procurement.
$365 million for additional research and
development, $357 million will be in the
military construction bill which will
come out of our committee later this
year, $158 million for other research and
development on anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tems, $53 million for -operation and
maintenance, $14 million for personnel
compensation, or a total this year which
will either be in this bill, the military
construction bill, or the military appro-
priations bill, of a total of $1.608 billion.
Mr. Chairman, I do not think we need
an awful lot of new arguments against
the anti-ballistic-missile system this year.
There are a lot of them available. I think
the arguments that we gave 2 years ago
and last year against the system are
very cogent and appropriate today.
1970
I said last year I do not believe the anti-
ballistic-missile system makes much
sense. It is clearly costly and ineffective.
It is very, very expensive for the very,
very limited objective that could be sat-
isfactorily handled with other existing
hardware, and there is actual question
as to its effectiveness under battle con-
ditions. There is no doubt it creates
massive real estate, personnel, training,
and related problems never before at-
tempted by modern man and, assuming
it is successful, it can lead to added esca-
lation between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
I think we have found this year that is
exactly what has happened. The Soviets
have escalated. Now we are responding
to that escalation with the phase II ABM
program right now.
I say that we do not build a school un-
less you have two-thirds support for the
bonds. Again last year we supported an
ABM system with a 50-50 vote in the
Senate and the 50 Members of the Sen-
ate who voted against the system it just
so happens represent 58 percent of the .
American public.
So we have a minority supported pro-
gram at the present program, and I have
real reservations as to whether or not
the Senate is going to support this pro-
gram again this year. For that very rea-
son, unless you have a strong polarity
and strong support for a program, I do
not thing it is worthwhile to get into this
$10 billion or $12 billion or multibillion-
dollar training programs.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. RIVERS. Why would not the gen-
tleman accept a vote of the House on
this?
Mr. LEGGETT. As the gentleman will
recall, we had a very restricted vote in
the House last year as we had this year,
and we were unable to get a clear vote
on the issue of curtailment of procure-
ment alone on the ABM and allow re-
search and development to go ahead,
If the gentleman would allow us to
have a recommital vote this year and
limit it just to phase II of the ABM pro-
gram, I would almost support it at' this
time.
Mr. RIVERS. The gentleman is talk-
ing about last year and he spoke about
the other body. What was the vote in
the House last year?
Mr. LEGGETT. The vote on a very ob-
scure amendment for the ABM, we got
141 votes against them. I do not think
I voted against the recommital at that
time.
Mr. RIVERS. What about our crowd?
Mr. LEGGETT. I do not know about
"our crowd."
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle-
man.
(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise, first of all, to cornmend the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT)
for his leadership in the fight to prevent
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the United States from further escalating
'the arms race by proceeding with the
deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile
system. I support his amendment. Its
adoption would signal support by the
House of Representatives for the con-
cept that we have a fully adequate sys-
tem of security, now and in the foresee-
able future, based on the principle that
the United States could arid would re-
spond to any nuclear attack upon it,
whether by the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China or any other power, by in-
flicting intolerable destruction on the at-
tacker. This principle of deterrence, dis-
agreeable and unpleasant as it is has
been fundamental to our strategic secu-
rity ever since World War II and it will
continue to be fundamental in the fu-
ture. There is no evidence that the Chi-
nese Communists or any other power are
so irrational as to invite destruction up-
on themselves.
Again and again in debating amend-
ments to this bill the chairman and
some members of the Armed Services
Committee have told us that U.S. se-
curity will be jeopardized if the Con-
gress does not approve the Pentagon's
desires for bigger and better weapons
systems. Yesterday we were told that it
was absolutely essential that the United
States proceed to deploy MIRV's. To-
day we are told the same thing about
the latest plans for expanding the Safe-
guard ABM system.
All this is right in line with the recent
scare campaign mounted by the Nixon
administration. Secretary Laird has been
trying to give the impression that the
Soviets are accelerating the rate of de-
ployment of their SS-9 land-based mis-
siles, when the rate has actually slowed
down, since no new sites for SS-9 launch-
ers have been detected since last August.
Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Re-
search, made headlines by charging that
"giant hen house radars" had been
erected in the Soviet Union, foreshadow-
ing extensive ABM capabilities; he did
not say that these hen houses had first
been detected years ago and are con-
sidered highly vulnerable to attack. The
President himself added to the panic
atmosphere, charging that opponents of
ABM and MIRV would concede to the
Soviet Union military supremacy.
These speeches comprise a combina-
tion of long-known facts trotted out as
something new and ominous, exaggera-
tions and distortions, and a system of
conjuring up remote contingencies for
the future as if they present a "real and
present danger" requiring immediate ac-
tion.
The basic case made by the adminis-
tration for the Safeguard ABM system
has been an alleged potential threat to
our Minutemen if the Soviets continue
to deploy SS-9's at the rate of the last 2
years and Will be able to equip them with
accurate This is pure supposi-
tion. Even tf it should prove to be true,
we wetild Still: have a fully adequate de-
terrent force in our bombers and sub-
marines.
Tlioi.iite4 out on tbe fiOor yesterday,
the Congres,s,is constantly being badger-
ed to take Steps based on a fear of what
the Soviets might do in the future. What
the advocates of these steps always fail
to point Out is what the Soviets will be
bound to do in response to our escalation
through the deployment of weapons sys-
tems such as the ABM and the MIRV.
The Pentagon, as it stresses the risks
involved in restraint, never sepns to be
concerned with the risks involved in go-
ing ahead full speed with the arms race.
For myself, I believe that our security
can be best pursued through a system of
balanced deterrents, maintained at a rea-
sonable level through the process of
mutual restraint, and through negotia-
tions for controls and limitations such as
are now underway in Vienna. Down this
road lies not only greater security, but
also the opportunity to cut back on our
fantastic military spending and to begin
to give the necessary priorities to our
needs here at home.
Mr, LEGGE171'. I thank the gentleman
very much.
Mr. FRIEDEL Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle-
man.
(Mr. FRIEDEL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, in re-
cent months, I have spoken out repeated-
ly on the pressing need we have in this
country in the early 1970's to restructure
and reevaluate our national goals or
priorities. It seems to me that this bill to-
day, at this time, is the proper place to
begin. In recent days, segments of our
domestic economy have suffered reverses
which remind many of us in this Cham-
ber of the late 1920's. This week the sav-
ings of millions of Americans in securities
went down precipitonsly while we have
at the same time the worst price inflation
that the Nation has known in a decade.
Unemployment levels have recently
reached a 6-year high. While this goes
on, the White House seems disinclined or
powerless to take the necessary steps to
reverse or retard the fateful cycle of
recession that seems to be occurring.
In Southeast Asia, the administration's
policy of Vietnamization and withdrawal
apparently is being massively subverted
with the war daily spreading to Laos and
Cambodia. In other words, we see before
us absolutely no light at either end of our
domestic or international tunnels. I
therefore believe that in these particular
dark days we must go very, very slowly
indeed in any new areas of military
procurement.
I will therefore, Mr. Chairman, vote
against the authorization in the bill for
the development of the Safeguard mis-
sile system. Yesterday, I voted for the
amendments that were offered to cut
some of the fat out of the bill. I was dis-
appointed that we were not able to elim-
inate the $200 million contained in the
bill which provides legislative backing
for Deputy Secretary of Defense Pack-
ard's negotiations with Lockheed Air-
craft over the gigantic cost overruns in-
volved in the C-5A contract. In my
judgment, this is literally throwing good
money after bad. I am for the Govern-
ment and the company getting together
and working out their mistakes without
it costing the American taxpayers addi-
tional millions of dollars. Mr. Chairman,
it is this very kind of military planning
and spending which has tinged our pre-
viously hallowed Pentagon with credi-
bility problems.
I was also disappointed that the
amendment failed that would have de-
leted the $475.2 million requested for the
procurement of the Minuteman III, the
MIRV, and the ICBM. This amendment
would not have stopped this program but
merely deferred procurement of the mis-
siles pending completion of the current
SALT talks. We could have continued the
research and development aspects of this
program but delayed the actual procure-
ment of hardware. If our efforts to reach
some accommodation with the Soviet
Union on disarmament fail, then the
Minuteman III deployment could be un-
dertaken and procurement initiated. In
essence, I felt that this amendment would
have given great force and effect to the
action taken earlier this year by the Sen-
ate when it passed Senate Resolution 211
by the vote of 72 to 6, which urged Pres-
ident Nixon to propose a bilateral halt on
new strategic weapons systems deploy-
ment including the MIRV at the begin-
ning of the SALT talks.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I intend to vote
for the efficiency substitute bill which
will be introduced today as an amend-
ment by my distinguished colleague from
Pennsylvania. This substitute measure
will be identical to the version reported
by the committee but will contain, in
its terms, an across-the-board efficiency
cut of 5 percent. In effect, this bill will
reduce the committee measure by about
$1 billion. It will contain, under title IV,
a provision that will prohibit the Gov-
ernment from making payments to Lock-
heed until the Congress has been ad-
vised of the arrangements for untangling
the financial relationships that exists
between the Government and Lock-
heed. This is particularly important in
light of other important weapon sys-
tems contracted currently to Lockheed
Including the S3-A's and the Scram mis-
sile that have already exhibited signifi-
cant cost overruns. The efficiency sub-
stitute bill will contain, again under title
IV, the legislative basis for quarterly
GAO reports to the Congress on major
weapons systems and provide the GAO
with subpena power to audit defense
contractor books. The sad story of the
F-ill's and the C-5A cost overruns are
indeed eloquent testimony to the ef-
fect that we need GAO oversight in
these areas.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California has expired.
(Mr. LEGGE'rE asked and was given
permission to proceed for an additional
5 minutes.)
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LEGGE'ri . I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I hope
that the gentleman will not mind or ob-
ject to a facetious comment, but I know
of his desire to have the right to offer
a motion to recommit. I would suggest
to him that the Republican Party is the
minority party and has that right. So we
will be glad to accept his application for
membership.
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Mr. LEGGJTJ.. I would reply that on
this recommittal, and I would do it, as
long as I could get out afterward.
But I would say this on this question
of what about the ABM system?it is a
massive escalation?
We said last year we were talking
about a $10 billion system and this is
not the end. When Mr. Packard and Sec-
retary Laird came before our committee
this year, what they were talking about
was escalation which they readily ad-
mitted was $1.6 billion in just 1 year.
We asked them if we had the ultimate
In system and control last year how does
it so happen that we have additional
costs this year?
He said that we have a thing called
price increases.
I asked how much was that? He said
it was $450 million.
The cost-of-living increase for 1 year,
and it is going to take us 10 years to
build this system so extrapolate that
and you have about $4.5 billion costs in
cost-of-living increases.
Then they said we have another esca-
lation.
I said, "What is that?" They said that
is the stretching out of the program.
You did not give us an ABM program
last year, as fast as we thought we could
get ready to build it?$550 million for
that stretchout.
I said, "Is that the end?" They said,
"No, there is another thing called de-
sign changes."
I said, "How could you have a design
change added on?"
I asked how we could have additional
design changes when we had spent $4
billion to design the ultimate program
presented last year.
Now we have $680 million worth of
design changes and that was the amount.
I said "Is that all?" They Said that we
are working on the improved Spartan.
I said, "Do you have figures on that?"
He said, "No."
I said, "Maybe you could give us a
guess?"
They came up with maybe a half bil-
lion dollars for the improved Spartan to
attack the improved Soviet missiles. That
might be launched in a flat trajectory
from perhaps some submarines that
might be constructed sometime in the
future. So we have had two add-on plus
a thing called the missile site radar sys-
tem?MSR.
Why? Because the system we designed
last year might be overrun.
How much was that?
We do not know.
Make a guess.
That might be another $200 million.
You add all these things up and you
have an escalation in 1 year of $2.35
billion,
Mr. RIVERS, Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Ur. LEGGETT. yield to the chair-
man of the committee.
gr. ravEns. Would the gentleman's
position be different if he knew that the
Chinese Communists had-an ICBM?
Ur..LEOGETT. I think not. I think we
can presume that the Chinese, having
launched an orbiting vehicle, certainly
have the capability to design and launch standing work in respect to the ABM sys-
a modified projectile which is known as tern, and I wish to associate myself with
an ICBM. his remarks.
Mr. RIVERS. How do we know that Mr. LEGGE-rT. I thank the gentleman
the booster to which the gentleman has very much. We have today a total, as
referred is not capable of projecting an pointed out in our report last year, now
ICBM? projected for the middle 1970's, not the
Mr. LEGGETT. I think this. We are 4,000 warheads that were admitted by
going to have to live on trust of the Secretary Laird or the 9,000 projected
Chinese for the next 5, 6, or 7 years, warheads, projected by Secretary Laird?
until we get an ABM system constructed. but by the time you MIRV all these pro-
I say that if we can live on diplomacy grams and include tactical warheads and
and balance of power, with our tremen- MIRV and warheads in the F-111 and
dons 20,000 warhead capability of ther- B-1, we will have better than 20,000
monuclear bombs and warheads, if we ICBM's and thermonuclear warheads?
can live on that for the next 5 years and I think that is plenty to deter a first
while we are designing this system strike.
against the Chinese, certainly it does not Mr. Chairman, let us consider some
make a lot of sense to say, Well, we are facts of strategic military life, as they
going to design a system and in 5 years, apply to the ABM.
we are going to be protected, when we First. A first strike against the United
need protection from the Chinese today States is impossible, and will remain so
and we do not have it. I think the best in the foreseeable future.
Let me emphasize what is required for
such a first strike.
The generally accepted rule of thumb
Is that 400 one-megaton warheads or the
equivalent delivered to the Soviet Union
would in effect destroy their society. We
presently have more than 4,200 warheads
in our strategic weapons, plus many more
mounted on so-called tactical aircraft
which ring the Soviet Union and which,
"tactical" or otherwise, could strike deep
and hard, particularly if they were sent
on one-way missions.
This is the problem facing a Soviet
general considering a first strike:
He must be able to destroy our hard-
ened Minuteman and Titan silos before
they can be emptied. He must be able to
destroy our manned bombers and tacti-
cal aircraft before they can take off, or
else rely on his antiaircraft defenses to
take them out once they arrive over his
territory. He must have every one of our
deployed and in-transit missile subma-
rines pinpointed and ready for instant
destruction.
More importantly, he must have abso-
lute confidence in his ability to do all of
these things and to do them simultane-
ously, because if only 10 percent of our
forces get through, his society is de-
stroyed.
The impossibility of a simultaneous
attack against manned bombers and
hardened silos, and the impossibility of
any attack against our missile sub-
protection against the Chinese is the
same kind of protection we have against
the Soviet Union, and that is a balance
of thermonuclear destruction. That is
what we have today. And I think that is
necessarily our best defense.
I think we have got a program that
we are funding in this bill known as
ULMS, Underwater Long-range Missile
System that gives much better 'bang for
the buck' than the ABM.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California has expired.
(At the request of Mr. RIVERS, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT was al-
lowed to proceed for 21/2 additional
minutes.)
Mr. LEGGETT. The ULMS submarine,
which many of us who are for a reduc-
tion of defense spending support, seems
to be a very cost-effective vehicle. It has
24 tubes and is buried at the bottom of
the sea. It is perhaps two or three times
the size of the Polaris submarine fully
MIRVed. I do not think you can have
it both ways. I do not think you can be
against MIRV and be against the ABM.
That is my personal view. I think we get
more bang out of a buck from the MIRV
system than from the ABM. The total
purpose of the $12 billion ABM system is
to assure that 200 missiles will survive
in the middle 1970's and middle 1980's. I
think if you get 200 missiles out of one
ULMS submarine, and we know we have
that capability, we will have a much
more cost-effective system. marines, have been discussed at great
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will length and I shall not belabor the point.
the gentlemanyield? But I suggest that the development of
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- the thermonuclear warhead has ruled
man from Missouri. out the possibility of a first strike by
Mr. RANDALL. Did I correctly under- either of the great powers against the
stand the gentleman to' say that under other virtually forever, regardless o
the ULMS system, 24 tubes would be technological developments.
buried in the bottom of the sea? If so, I say this because of the fantastically
;would they not be just as vulnerable as high confidence levels required. Let us
some of our land-based vehicles? suppose, for example, that the Soviets
Mr. LEGGETT. They would be mobile. develop some as-yet-undreamed-of sub-
They could be moved. We have a good marine technique which appears to be
capability to tie all of that down. effective. It cannot be tested under real-
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the istic conditions. They will never know
gentleman yield? what countermeasures we have until they
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle- are faced with them in combat and must
man from Michigan. overcome them on the first try. The
Mr. NEDZI. I thank the gentleman for history of untired advanced weapons
yielding. I take this opportunity of corn- systems living up to theoretical expecta-
mending the gentleman for his out- tions has not been good. As one of many
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examples, before the air war over North
Vietnam began we estimated the effec-
tiveness of the Soviet SAM-2 missile at
50 Percent, but in practice its effective-
ness turned out to be only 2 percent.
Consider the disastrous effect of such
a miscalculation on ,the part of a Soviet
first-strike planner. If only 10 percent
of our Poseidon fleet survived long
enough to launch its missiles, the Soviet
Union would receive more than 400 war-
heads, each twice as big as the Nagasaki
bomb. If we turned out to have a counter-
measure that enabled our entire fleet to
survive, Russia would be showered by
over 4,000 of these warheads, plus more
than 200 larger Polaris A-3 warheads.
The Soviet planner would face a similar
problem with regard to a preemptive
attack against ,our ICBM's and our
mantled aircraft, and his problems would
be supercompounded by the need to
carry out all elements of his attack
simultaneously.
Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the prob-
lem is insoluble. One would have to be
absolutely insane to risk one's national
existence on the possibility that an un-
tried and highly complex weapons sys-
tem would approach 100 percent effec-
tiveness. And coming back to reality, the
Soviet Union could double its projected
military budget for the next 10 years,
and it would still not approach even a
theoretical first strike capability.
Second. Granting for the sake of argu-
ment that we need to improve our de-
terrent, the Safeguard ABM gives us less
deterrence for our money than ani of
several other options available to us.
The Department of Defense claims
Safeguard will increase the number of
survivable Minuteman ICBM's from
about 100 to about $00. So granting the
dubious assumption that Safeguard will
perform up to expectations in a heavy
sophisticated surprise attack, and grant-
ing the even more dubious assumption
that the Soyiets will tailor their offense
to maximize the effectiveness of Safe-
guard, we find ourselves proposing to
spend upwards of $12 billion in order to
Increase our survivable deterrent by
about 200 ICBM's.
Let us compare this with our other
options.
? For perhaps one-sixth the price of
Safeguard we could buy 200 additional
Minuteman rn missiles with silos. I do
not recommend this course, both because
It could be considered provocative and
because its deterrent effect would event-
ually be washed out by improvements in
Soviet MIRV accuracy. But at least in
the short run it offers a cost exchange
ratio of about 1 to 1, which is a great
deal more Clan can be said for Safe-
guard. I should also note that the lead
time for this option is only 2 or 3 years,
as opposed to 5 years for Safeguard. We
could thus afford to do nothing for a
year while we await SALT developments.
For perhaps one-half the price of Safe-
guard, we could superharden all 1,000 of
cur existing Minuteman ICBM's. I do not
recommend this course either, because it
too would in time be washed out by im-
provements in Soviet missile accuracy.
But assuming the technical problems
can be worIced out, it would serve to
extend the deterrent life of Minuteman
by several years, which is more than
Safeguard would do. And whereas Safe-
guard would be the most complex device
in the history of man, with all the pos-
sibility of failure that implies, hard rock
silos would be simple and reliable.
Against the threat for which Safeguard
is designed, superhardening would save
far more than 200 ICBM's. Finally, su-
perhardening differs from Safeguard in
that it is totally nonprovocative. Once
we have set up production lines for
Sprint missiles and missile site radars,
the Russians might expect us to build a
few more and put them around our cities,.
which in a sense would make them pro-
vocative first-strike weapons. But one
cannot superharden a city.
Now let us consider the option of put-
ting the Safeguard money into an un-
dersea deterrent. Mr. Chairman, the de-
terrence we could gain in this way stag-
gers the imagination.
Let us consider what we could gain by
putting this money into the underwater
long-range missile system, known as
ULMS.
One of the most important?probably
the most important?factor affecting
missile submarine safety is the volume
of water in which it can operate. By
increasing the missile range from the
present Poseidon and Polaris 2,500-3,000
miles to 5,000-8,000 miles, ULMS would
convert the Soviet Union's antisubmarine
problems from impossible to superimpos-
sible. We could even station these ships in
controlled environments such as our own
great inland bodies of water. I suggest
that the Soviets would find it somewhat
difficult to conduct antisubmarine war-
fare in Lake Superior or the Mississippi
River.
Official cost estimates of this program
are not yet available, but as a rough
estimate it appears that for the cost of
Safeguard we could build a fleet with
approximately the same number of war-
heads as the Poseidan fleet now under
construction?that is, about 5,000 MAW
units. In addition to being supersecure,
UtlV1S would be more effective than
Poseidon because its longer time on sta-
tion would permit a larger proportion of
the fleet to be deployed at any given
time. Finally, the advanced technology
required for ULMS is modest compared
to that for Safeguard, and the main-
tenance costs would be nominal.
Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize that
ULMS could mean the end of the arms
race. Once we built it, there would be
no need to increase it, and no need to
further protect it. The strategic weap-
ons business would be reduced to the
relatively inexpensive task of developing
advanced warheads to keep ahead of pos-
sible city-defense ABM developments.
We could gradually retire our manned
bombers and land-based ICBM's. We
could cancel the Minuteman III and B-1
programs. This is cost effectiveness.
But instead, we are choosing the most
ineffective and cost-ineffective of all our
options.
Third. Ballistic missile defense, like
Vietnam, is a bottomless pit that will
swallow as much of our Lational treasure
as we care to throw into it, and still cry
for more.
Already we are seeing ourselves being
sucked onto the cost-escalation tread-
mill. I am not referring merely to the
20-percent increase in total system cost
estimates which occurred in the past
year, although that is nothing to sneeze
at. More importantly, I refer to the fact
that, while last year Mr. Laird told us
Safeguard as proposed would defend our
Minuteman from a heavy Soviet attack,
now he tells us Safeguard will not be
enough; we will need more. This is going
to go on forever; if we are gullible enough
to let it.
In our additional and dissenting views
on this bill, Congressmen NEDZI, PIKE,
STAFFORD, WHELAN, and I discussed how
an offense-defense arms race places the
defense in a progressively more disad-
vantageous position. Today I will merely
point out, if the offense were to attack
with 10,000 warheads, even a 90-percent
effective defense would not be noticeably
better than no defense at all. And the
cost of this defense, assuming it to be
possible, would certainly exceed a hun-
dred billion dollars.
I do not mean to suggest the existence
of some God-given principle that ther-
monuclear missile offense shall always
be placed ahead of the defense. But I do
suggest it is an empirical fact of life, and
will remain so throughout the forseeable
future. Every dollar we spend on ABM
can and surely will be offset by the Sov-
iet expenditure of a few cents on their
missile offense. And the way these
things always go, the Soviets will over-
compensate for our ABM, leaving us in
the end less secure than before the in-
sane cycle began.
Fourth. A missile defense against
China is unncessary. No one denies that
a Chinese attack on the United States
would result in the obliteration of ,their
entire country. What basis do we have for
thinking the Chinese would commit na-
tional suicide just for the satisfaction of
killing a few million Americans?
All the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. China has traditionally been
one of the most cautious nations in the
world in the conduct of its foreign af-
fairs. Today it has no troops in combat
anywhere. To the best of my knowledge,
it has no troops stationed outside its
borders. Even in Vietnam, it has yet to
commit a single combat soldier?an ex-
ample we would have done well to emu-
late. Since China now has joined the
space age nations, surely it has the pow-
ers today to launch a suicidal ICBM
attack. We will not be able to stop
her for 5 years with the ABM at most.
Probabilities dictate that if China does
not act for 5 years she will not act.
Fifth. An anti-Chinese defense is not
possible.
Let us set aside for the moment the
question of whether the Chinese would
be able to penetrate or overwhelm the
thin area defense which is the only pro-
tection Safeguard would give our popula-
tion centers. Let us consider only the
alternative methods by which China
could kill several million Americans.
It would be no trick at all?it
would not even be very expensive?for
the Chinese to place a thousand mega-
tons aboard each of several trawlers or
submarines, and to detonate these off
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our coasts. The resulting tidal waves
would cause great death and destruction;
favorable winds would enable fallout to
wreak even greater havoc.
For that matter, they could place a
thosuand megatons aboard a tramp
steamer, hoist a neutral-country flag, and
tail into /slew York Harbor, or San Fran-
cisco, or Baltimore, or all at once. Such
a ship could be entering New York Har-
bor this very minute, for all we know. If
any Member of this House can suggest
a practical method of defense against
such an attack, I would like to hear it.
Mr. Chairman, I suggest that our de-
fense lies in our deterrent ability. This is
not ideal, but it is all we have, and we
had better learn to live with it. We must
always be sure that our deterrent is more
than sufficient, and more than credible
to any potential aggressor. We must al-
ways provide a generous safety margin.
But we must also distinguish between
real threats and imaginary threats. And
most importantly, we must rectify our
mistakes rather than locking ourselves
into them and compounding them.
Neither the present Administration nor
Its predecessor has brought credit on it-
self by beginning with the decision that
an ABM should be built and then fran-
tically changing from rationale to ra-
tionale in tope of finding one that might
sell.
So I urge adoption of the amendment
to strike all ABM procurement funds.
In the coming fiscal year,:Lt will save us
$660.4 million, In the years to follow it
will save many billions, and it may mark
the moment when we began to turn our
resources to helping our citizens instead
of tilting at windmills.
Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
New York is recognized.
(Mr. PIRNIE asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PIRNIE, Mr. Chairman in re-
sponse to the remarks of the gentleman
who preceded me in the well, I would
like to remind my colleagues that last
year, after the most extensive discus-
sions, both in our committee and in
public forms of debate, the Congress
voted to begin a phased deplOyment of
the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem. At that time the opponents of the
system said that the Soviet threat was
overstated. This year, however, as the
commitee report clearly shows, we have
learned that the threat was understated
last year. The Soviets have gone from
230 to 280 58-9 missiles and, at the
present rate, they could by the mid-
1970's provide a threat that would
neutralize the deterrence of our Minute-
man missiles,
When we authorized the program last
year, there were all kinds of allegations
that it would wreck the chances for the
SALT, talks, In point of fact, if anything
our affirmative decisions on ABM en-
cOttraged, the Soviets to seek strategic
arnsiilnit,tjpns talks. There has been
no evidence of any kind that the SALT
talk are being delayed or held up be-
ca Of Safeguard. There has been no
evidence of any kind that the Soviets
consider It necessary to delay their
weapons development because of Safe-
guard.
When the ABM was debated last year,
there were a lot of allegations about the
technical feasibility of the system. Our
review this year showed that the sys-
tern is proceeding on schedule. The test
version of the missile site radar is work-
ing well at Kwajalein. The work on the
software computer programs, the most
difficult part of the system, is proceeding
at the expected rate. And there is no
evidence that the system will not be
able to meet its technological goals. The
first firing of a missile at an ICBM will
take place sometime this fall.
In short, there has been no evidence
to indicate that the Congress was wrong
In the decision it took last year and
much evidence to indicate that it was
right. There is, therefore, no evidence to
Indicate a turn-around should be taken
at this time.
In addition, of course, if the system
was stopped now, the production and
construction work would be halted and
if it was later determined the system was
required there would be a time delay of
about 2 years and a great increase in
cost on the order of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.
We are discussing the price of sur-
vival. I hope the amendment will be
defeated.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman
from South Carolina.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I won-
der if we can arrive at some point to cut
off debate on this amendment.
I ask unanimous consent that all time
expire on this amendment and all
amendments thereto at 12:45.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South
Carolina?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from New York (Mr.
PIKE).
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I would like
to express my support of this amendment
offered by my colleague, the gentleman
from California (Mr. LEGGETT) who has
done a tremendous amount of research
on this subject and whose arguments I
find most persuasive.
We are embarking on the business of
pouring money down an obviously bot-
tomless pit.
We are this year spending $1.6 billion
on a program whose total cost has in-
creased $1.6 billion in 1 year.
The thing which concerns me most
about our ABM system today is the fact
that without any question, the control of
the firing of our nuclear ABM weapons
must, if the system is to work at all, pass
from the hands of humans into the
hands of computers. The system simply
cannot work in any other way. Deputy
Assistant Secretary Packard this year
backed off from his statement of last
year to the effect that the President
would retain the control of this system.
In the time frame within which an
ABM has to be launched it is just plain
impossible to get a message to the Pres-
ident of the United States, wherever he
may be, and a rational decision from
him, under whatever circumstances he
may be in, whether he is in Rumania, in
the Far East, at a ballgame or out on a
sailboat somewhere, as to a command
decision to fire the weapon. It is not go-
ing to be done that way. It is going to be
done by machinery.
When we say it is going to be done by
the President we are only kidding our-
selves. The firing of this nuclear system
has now passed into the thoughts and
hands of computers. I believe it is a very,
very sad age in which we live.
This amendment is a thoroughly
proper amendment and should be ap-
proved.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from California
(Mr. LEGGETT)
(By unanimous consent, Mr. NEDZI
yielded his time to Mr. LEGGETT.)
Mr. LEGGETT Mr. Chairman, I be-
lieve that all the arguments against this
system are in the RECORD for last year
and are in the dissenting and separate
views we have already put in the REC-
ORD.
One thing we have to keep in mind
is that, when we buy the ABM system, we
still have an opportunity now, of course,
not to buy the system even though we
have spent $4 billion or $5 billion in re-
search and for construction of sites and
so forth. We still barely have our foot
in the door.
What we are buying with this system,
of course, is the most gigantic fire de-
partment ever known to mankind. For
the first time this year we have the fig-
ures on the total number of personnel
who are going to be required to man this
system and to build it.
A $12 billion system of course does not
run by itself. When we say $12 billion,
we do not include the continuous oper-
ating cost of this fantastically large sys-
tem. It is going to cost us a billion dol-
lars a year at a minimum to run the sys-
tem after we get it, to pay the salaries
and to pay the housekeeping, even if we
do not expand the system to more than
$12 billion, and assuming we can rely
on the figures we have so far.
What we are buying is this: Military
personnel to run the system perpetually,
12,550 men; civilian personnel to run the
system perpetually, 6,8-70 civil servants;
for a total of 19,420.
If this system is like the ICBM system
that we have we will require, in addi-
tion to that, 45,000 separate contract per-
sonnel, who are the- contract personnel
currently attached to our Minuteman
III's and the Titan program we have,
and the silos, at the present time.
In addition, we would have the salaries
of the people to build thesystem; 22,-
300 production people plus 16,000 mili-
tary personnel?for a total of 102,720
people.
If we are concerned about inflation in
this country?and certainly, with an 8.4
percent escalation in the cost of living in
the 15 months since President Nixon took
office, we should be?we should look
around to try to figure out where there
Is some place we can help the President,
where we can go slow for a year or two
and cut down on expensive hardware and
massive escalatory systems.
I believe the place to do it is not an
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across-the-board cut in this bill, which I
certainly do not support. If we cannot
figure out individual places to cut this
bill, after working on it all year long,
certainly we ought to fold up our tent.
The place to cut is in the ABM sys-
tem. We have been doing R. & D. for a
great many years. We are not at the
ultimate in design at the present time.
We are still conducting d great number
)f tests down at Kwajalein. We can
naintain a posture with the state of the
Lit by continuing research and develop-
nent.
The only thing my amendment would
to would be to grind to" a halt the pro-
urement of this missile at the present
ime.
It makes good sense, because we are
alking now about spending $500 million
o develop a new advanced Spartan,
vhich is a long-range missile which goes
vith this system. Even the Spartan we
we buying today is not what we ulti-
nately intend to buy.
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the
rentleman yield?
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle-
nan. from Missouri.
Mr. RANDALL. The gentleman sug-
cests that there will be a considerable
verational expense involved in the cost
>f men, military and civilian, to man this
>ystem. The gentleman a moment ago
nentioned the ULMS system. Would he
have us believe there would be no ex-
pense involved in operating that sys-
tem in terms of military and civilian
personnel?
Mr. LEGGETT. I am glad the gentle-
man brought that point up, because op-
posed to the 100,000 people it will take to
build and operate this fantastically large
ABM system, which would insure 200
missiles are going operation in the 1970's
and the 1980's, the ULMS system will
Involve the use of 10,000 shipyard person-
nel for about a year, to construct one
submarine which would have the same
capability as the entire ABM system.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
RANDALL) .
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, last
year when this issue was discussed it
seemed to me that there were two reasons
that the opponents gave for opposing it.
No. 1, there is the expense involved and
they said it would lead to an escalation.
The second was that it would not work.
Well, if the vote was difficult for some of
our colleagues last year, then on those
two principal arguments it should be
quite a bit easier this year.
In the first place, the argument that
our priorities should be reordered is no
longer valid, because this has been done.
Our priorities have been reordered. I can-
not give you the figures, but it runs into
several billions of dollars. I am sure that
many Members remember the closing of
the bases which came to about $1.5 bil-
lion in. savings. There was about $5 bil-
lion in one phase by the executive branch
alone and $1 or $2 billion in the differ-
ence between the budget and the final
authorization and appropriation last year
by the Congress.
Now let Us look at this argument as to
whether this will work or not. Certainly
our Chief Executive, who is my President
and your President, our Commander in
Chief, has the greatest military sources
of intelligence of any man in America.
He says it will work. But we do not have
to rely on that source alone in our com-
mittee. Some of the information is classi-
fied, but the tests have been going on for
all of this year, since lest year, and I can
report to You that these tests have been
successful. That is the difference between
the situation last year and this year.
There has been a significant reduction in
military expenditures. The system has
been proved in the Kwajalein tests that
it will work.
As we approach this vote those two
arguments should be paramount in your
minds.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. RANDALL. I am glad to yield to
the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentleman
yielding before he leaves that point. It is
a relatively simple argument. We all now
accept that the ABM is now technologi-
cally feasible. We need the defense. But
what needs to be said here, is that we
are arguing from a humanitarian point
of view on this defensive system where
we are absorbing the first strike delivery
of the enemy aggressor and saving 20 to
60 million American lives. That is argu-
ment enough forme. Does not the gentle-
man agree?
Mr. RANDALL. Thank you, Dr. HALL.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr.
FRASER) .
(By unanimous consent, Mr. OLSEN
yielded his time to Mr. FRASER.)
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, one of
the reasons given for the United-States,
I think, to go ahead with the ABM sys-
tem is that the Soviets are building an
ABM system. This argument is fallacious.
.The Soviet ABM system has not given
them any increase in security because it
is so easy for the United States to satu-
rate and overcome the Soviet ABM de-
fense. Similarly it is wasteful and unwise
for us to build an ABM system expecting
It to give us any significant defense from
the Soviet Union.
I think it is worth taking a moment to
notice what the Soviet Union is doing.
Around Moscow there is a launching sys-
ter that has been under construction. To-
day they have some 62 or 64 launchers in
place and it is said that they are opera-
tional. What kind, of a deterrent or a
threat does that pose to American offen-
sive weapons? Let me tell you how small
a deterrent it would be to an American
MIRV onslaught.
After the Poseidon missiles are in place
on an American submarine, one-half of
the missiles froth just one submarine
could knock out all of the ABM inter-
cepts around Moscow and incinerate
Moscow. In other words, those 64 launch-
ers could be taken out by the firing of
seven Poseidon missiles because they each
carry 10 warheads and the 70 warheads
would exhaust the Soviet ABM system.
Then, one more Poseidon missile with
10 warheads would incinerate Moscow.
Each of those 10 warheads dropped on
Moscow would have a nuclear force of
double that dropped on Hiroshima or
Nagasaki.
So, the fast is today, the Moscow ABM
Is nothing. As has been made abundantly
clear we could go through that like a hot
knife through butter.
The reason I presented this was to give
you an idea how this situation would look
from the point of view of the Soviet
Union
If the United States deploys an ABM
system the Soviets would be forced to
put multiple warheads on their offensive
ICBM's. If they put 10 warheads on top
of each of their ICBM's, they would take
out 10 Spartans or 10 Sprints with one of
their missiles.
This would be the easiest and most
effective Soviet response to an American
ABM system, They would be compelled
to go to multiple warheads as we were
when we thought the Soviets were build-
ing an extensive ABM defense.
We know the ABM was not a well-con-
ceived system, because the Department
of Defense says today that they have to
redesign the missile site radar because
it is too big. They have got to go to
smaller units that could be scattered
around the Minuteman site in order to
survive an onslaught such as would be
expected. I think, for once, we ought to
begin to test what we are being told.
For once, the Congress ought to stand
up and begin to challenge some of the
claims coming out of the Department of
Defense.
Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. FRASER,. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. HUNGATE. I thank the gentleman
for his statement and urge support of
this amendment.
Mr. FRASER. I would like to further
point out in response to some of the
remarks which have been made by the
gentleman from Missouri, with respect
to what this chart. shows with respect
to ICBM Soviet nuclear warheads I have
added a few more paragraphs to illu-
strate exactly what I was trying to say.
I have here the additional number of
ICBM launchers by the Soviet Union,
beginning in 1967 with 380 launchers and
have extended it down to 1968, 1969, and
to 1970 to an annual rate. It is probably
120 and, perhaps, even less, because we
are having to annualize a 5-month
period.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FRASER. I yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois.
Mr. ARENDS. The gentleman is say-
ing something I know nothing about with
reference to the fact that the Depart-
ment says we have to reconstruct or re-
design this whole system. Where did the
gentleman get that information? There
is no testimony in the hearings at all
to this fact and I have never heard it
before.
Mr. FRASER. If the gentleman will
remember during the hearings they
stated that they are redesigning the ,
MSR. They said the advantages to hav-
ing a single missile site radar were very
little and stated the fact that they are
in the process of redesigning them.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Minnesota has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from California (Mr. GUBSER) .
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(Mr. OUBSER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.) ,
Mr. GUI/SER. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to point out two errors in the state-
ment of the gentleman who has just left
the well of the House. First of all, there
is no major redesign of the MSR system.
There is only the addition of a small
MSR radar for the purpose of creating
hard point defense. This does not con-
stitute a redesign of the MSR, no matter
how the gentleman from Minnesota
wishes to distort the testimony.
The second point I would like to make
is this, that the gentleman's chart which
he has Just shown us is not a complete
chart. It does not include the latest in-
telligence estimates. You will note the red
line and the straight line. If he had been
able to show you the remainder of the
Updated chart it would have been evi-
dent that the red line would again have
curved up and crossed the first line to
completely vindicate what Secretary
Laird predicted in his testimony before
the Congress.
So I point out that the chart that was
presented is not accurate because it is
net complete, and as such it gives a dis-
torted picture.
Mr, ERASER. If the gentleman will
yield, the last figure is from the threat
chart given to the committee. It gives
the threat as of February 1970. There
are no additional published figures.
There are no figures available after that.
The chart is accurate.
Mr. GUBSER. My response to the
gentleman is that the published figures
are incomplete, and the figures the
gentleman has cited are incomplete.
Mr. Chairman, in committee I offered
amendment to delete $25,000,000 for
long leadtime items connected with the
itlVe A/3M sites to be constructed after
the first three.
Last year I supported phase I of the
Safeguard system because I believed it
was imperative that we insure the sur-
vivability of a credible deterrent. I also
believed that prudence require that we
do not waste a year's time in taking out
81.10h insurance,
X, still support phase I for the same rea-
sons. I also support that portion of phase
I/ Which deals with installations at
Grand Forks Air Force Base, lVfahlstrom.
, Air nrei 1461,e, and Whiteman Air Force
Base- These installations are to protect
otr _IVIinuteman missiles and preserve our
deterrent capabty. They should be corn-
_ _
Pletecl as sOQII as possible.
But the five additional sites are for a
different purpose and introduce a totally
new concept and philosophy of defense.
It is a concept which, in my opinion, is
not as urgent as protecting our Minute-
man sites. I think it can wait and we
.should not embark upon what will be a
multibillion dollar expenditure in the
tIVP. a,
was overwhelmingly
WOuld be again defeated if
y. Nevertheless, I want the
c early show my reservations
his new commitment.
Chair recog-
ent eman. frn Illinois (Mr.
1 minutes.
.Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the proposed amendment.
It is very evident that what is happen-
ing here is a continuation of the fight we
had last year, and I feel the proponents
are weak in their argument.
I would like to cite one or two matters:
Recall if you will the mood and reaction
of Russia a few days after the passage
by the Senate in 1968 of the ABM pro-
gram. After Congress approved the ABM
program, the Soviet leaders suddenly
dropped their negative attitude as to
arms limitation talks and offered to talk
about arms control limitations. The situ-
ation of the SALT talks today is basically
the same. We are bringing the Soviet
leaders to the table to talk about arms
limitations, this is, in part, because the
Soviets recognize that we are not going
to be caught short in the continued de-
velopment and improvement of our de-
fense posture.
The gentleman a moment ago talked
about what would happen if we were to
initiate an attack on the Soviet Union.
That is not in the policy or tradition of
the United States, and it has been so
stated many, many times. Our position
has always been of a defensive nature.
Should some hostile situation develop, we
might then find this strength indispensa-
ble. I feel the objective of this amend-
ment is therefore entirely wrong.
Let me add that our safeguard
posture should always be that if we are
going to err we are going to err on the
side of having too muck instead of too
little. I personally hope we may never
need the use of these missiles?and we
will not?if we continue to operate from
a position of streigth in the troubled
and upset world.
Mr. Chairman, our position today
should be to vote down overwhelmingly
the proposed amendment.
Mr. HALL, Mr. Chairman, if the gen-
tleman will yield, I would like to point
out the inconsistency in the alleged
number, regardless of the source, or the
"military intelligence" of the proponents,
Insofar as the number of warheads are
Concerned, as displayed before the Mem-
bers here on the part of the gentleman
from California and the gentleman from
Minnesota.
Mr. AREMS. Might I also add to what
the gentleman has said, that when we
talk about numbers we cannot forget to
talk about the megatonnage, this is
vitally important in thinking about what
could happen with the further develop-
ment of Russian missiles.
The CHAMMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from South Carolina
(Mr. Mynas) for 21/2 minutes.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I want
everybody to listen to this: This amend-
ment does one thing. It just about kills
the whole ABM program. Everybody who
is for waste should vote for this Decau,se
almost eyerything we have put into this
program could disappear,
Nobody?but nobody?knows what
that booster was that the Chinese used
to put that gadget up,into space this
week. Nobody knows what Russia has in
these gadgets it has put up into space. I
would think these two things alone
would cause some people to have second
thoughts. Now, how on earth can we ever
have an ABM system if we do not perfect
one that works? This will allow us the
capability to build the ABM. We know
Russia has one.
Is it a crime to defend this country?
The gentleman from California (Mr.
LEGGETT) spoke about a balanced defense.
This gives it to us. This gives us an even
balance insofar as a deterrent is con-
cerned.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance
of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is or
the amendment offered by the gentlemar
from California (Mr. LEGGETT).
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I de
mand tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chair
man appointed as tellers Mr. LEGGETT am
Mr. RIVERS.
The Committee divided, and the teller
reported that there were?ayes 85, noes
131.
So the amendment was rejected.
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I mov
to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. GUBSER asked and was givei
permission to revise and extend his re.
marks.)
(By unanimous consent, Mr. GUBSE1
was allowed to proceed for an additiona
2 minutes.)
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I talc*
this time in an effort to inject cool ra-
tionality into what is becoming an ex-
plosive, emotional issue. I speak of tilt
fast moving situation in Cambodia and
along the Cambodian border with South
Vietnam. Now is the time for cool heads
to deliberate, to cooperate, and guard
against hasty action which could com-
plicate an already delicate situation.
I well remember the highly charged
emotional atmosphere in which the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution was passed. As one
who supported it I can say that I would
have second thoughts if I were voting on
the resolution today. I believe it has been
used beyond all congressional intent to
justify an escalation of the war in South-
east Asia which none of us envisioned.
The House should not forget what hap-
pened that day and it should not make
the Mistake of legislating again in reac-
tion to powerful emotion and on the basis
of incomplete information.
Mr. Chairman, I am privy to more than
ordinary information regarding the situ-
ation in Cambodia and within the last 3
days have been thoroughly briefed on
highly sensitive matters. Yet, I say to
you quite frankly that I have unanswered
questions about Cambodia and I submit
that not a single Member of the House of
Representatives knows the full truth of
the situation.
Then there is the matter of the con-
situtional prerogative of the President of
the United States to act as Commander
in Chief of our Armed Forces. Our Pres-
ident will address the Nation tonight on
this subject and I presume will give the
world his assessment of the situation
which prevails. He will make his state-
ment on the basis of information not
available at this moment in this Cham-
ber. This House should hear what the
Commander in Chief has to say before it
takes hasty action which could have long
range consequences.
I hold, a strong personal view about
what should be done with respect to
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Cambodia. Based upon my present in- take out $203 million of the phase II
(Mr. SISK asked and was given per-
formation I would strongly oppose the item on ABM procurement. mission to revise and extend his re-
commitment of a single American Trail- The effect of this procurement an- marks.)
tary man to grotind combat in Cambodia. flounced by Secretary Laird the first of Mr. LEGGETT. I thank the gentleman
I feel that the time has come to truly the year would be to construct addi- very much.
test the Vietnamization program. The tional sites in addition to what we au- Of course, this is just the same kind
upper delta area in so-called IV Corps thorized last year at Grand Forks, N. of escalation of support I was talking
and IIT Corps have seen what we have Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont. about, in support of this particular
been told are the greatest successes in It would authorize a new ABM missile amendment.
the Vietnamization program. It is my base, at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. If we were really sincere in the ra-
understanding that with the exception It would allow for advance procure- tionale last year for the ABM system,
of a few American advisers military op- ment at five other additional bases there is no reason for the additional
erations in these area are alinost corn- around the country, either included in phase II program this year.
b t s of the Re- this i
is bill or will be included in the military If Members will look at the second and
plete y coflcluceU
public of Vietnam. If an operation is to construction bill which will be offered n
be conducted against North Vietnamese relation thereto.
troops who retreat to Cambodian sane- I believe we have to keep in mind that
tuaries, then the ground operation we are talking about a sensitive area, but
should, in my opinion, be completely con- we can say this, which is the fact we
ducted by South Vietnamese troops even said - in the report: The effect of the
without 'U.S. military advisers. If Viet- phase II add-on, adds between 250 and
narnization is working, now is the time to 300 percent more missiles than the num-
test it. We should not start down another ber of Spartans and Sprints we were
road of committing advisers today, addi- talking about last year in phase I.
tional U.S. support forces tomorrow and If we can believe the rationale for the
a full-scale commitment of manpower reason for the ABM system last year,
day after tomorrow. then we ought to stop right there and
If one would look at this situation take a look at what we have done and
through the eyes of the South Vietnam- where we are going and such as that be-
ese he could not help but understand lore we advance additional systems.
that this is not a new war?this is the If I were the chairman of the coin-
saint 'War against the same enemy, the mittee, defending this system, I believe
troops governed by "Hanoi in North Viet- I would be a little bit concerned about
narri. I have seen the area referred to as the massive escalation that has occurred
the Parrot's Peak and understand the with respect to support for the positions
terrain. Many Vietcong and North Viet- opposing the ABM system.
namese base camps are situated directly Last year I believe the greatest num-
on the border. -Frequently an attack ber of votes we could muster on this floor
against this enemy stops in the middle of in opposition was something like 45 votes.
a ase camp as he gains sanctuary by This year we have had 80 or 85 votes
moving to the western limits of the same against the total ABM system, and I have
camp. If South Vietnam on its own voli- had a great number of people approach
tion elects to utilize the principle of hot me during the debate and say, "We can-
pursuit and attack these sanctuaries or not repeal what we have done last year,
North Vietnam forces anyplace else, this but we certainly do oppose any escala-
is their decision, but no U.S. ground tion or any add-on."
forces of any kind should be employed.
Mr. Chairman, this is my strongly held
personal view, but despite having been
to Vietnam on three occasions, despite
dozens of highly classified briefings on
t subject I say once again, I still have
third pages of my remarks in the report
on the bill, on the ABM system, they will
see that the rationale for the phase I
is given.
The office, Secretary of Defense, ra-
tionale was, No. 1, to preserve the Presi-
dent's future options by establishing a
minimum base for expansion if the
threat requires it.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from California has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. LEG-
GETT was allowed to proceed for 3 ad-
ditional minutes.)
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman,
gentleman yield?
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle-
man from Missouri.
Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentle-
man's yielding.
The way it came out in his speech in
the well, it sounded as though the gentle-
man did not realize Whiteman Air Force
Base was a missile center already in
existence.
Putting in these funds does not go to
that purpose. Those Minutemen are al-
ready there, in silos. It is well established.
This is the defensive base.
Mr. LEGGETT. To give it a multiple
capability with new ABM's.
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the
will the
Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, will the gen- gentleman yield?
tleman yield? Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentle-
Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to my col- man from Missouri.
league from California. Mr. RANDALL. There is classified in-
Mr. SISK. I thank the gentleman from formation which we cannot discuss, but
California for yielding. I can say there is already a Minuteman
. .
Unanswered questions about the situation Let me say that, as the gentleman complex surrounding Whiteman
In Cambodia. TomorrOw after hearing knows, I voted against his earlier amend- Force Base which is unprotected. This is
our Commander in Chief who is the man ment because I supported the Safe- the only unprotected complex in America
responsible for decisionrnaking in this guard program in its initial phase. today.
Important matter, I will know more. To- As I understand his amendment now, What sense does it make to start on
,. day I could not in good conscience par- it will strike out only those funds dealing phase I and proceed to protect our
ticipate in another situation like that with phase II. Is that correct? ICBM's in Montana am:. North Dakota
V?Vhich prevailed in passage of the Gulf Mr. LEGGETT. That is true. and leave large numbers of our offensive
a Tonkin resolution where Congress ad- Mr. SISK. I am going to support the strength without any protection in Mis-
dicated its responsibility. I could not in gentleman's amendment because, souri? Unless we proceed with some kind
good conscience participate in writing of frankly, I believe there is a very strong of a defense at Whiteman all these
law in a partial vacuum of factual in- feeling that the steps we have taken must ICBM's would become sitting ducks. We
formation and which is a reaction to be fully justified. I am not altogether should proceed with phase II without
the emotion of the moment. I will not sure I am right. I am sure I do not have
delay.
legislate tor political purposes. Our duty as much information as the President
Mr. LEGGETT. Further analyzing the
is to legislate only in the light of truth. has, or as others may have who proposed rationale from last year, we have tried
AsatiInmEmr OFFERED In nit. 1.2mtrr this, I recognize we are taking certain to protect the options of the President,
'
Air. Lnocaa-.0. Mr. Chairman, I offer Chances.and we have protected them. To those
an amendment. I wish to say that basically I believe the who say that we have the SALT talks
The Clerk read as follows: initial phase I should be given an op- today because of the ABM, it is important
Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: portunity to be in place and to at least to remember it is possible that that could
,
Q.n. page 2, lino 8, after the word "missiles: have an opportunity to indicate what its be, but there is no reason to expand the
Ir ABM system after we have the SALT
;apart St88X00,000". It is doing. talks going.
--lo;,,th. g_ Army," strike "$1,086,600,000" and capabilities are and what tests may show
14x,, ttodtTT. Mr. Chairman, this therefore, I propose to support the Second, the Secret,ry of Defense justi-
-arrieridifilnt does what I indicated earlier gentleman's amendment to eliminate fies phase I to provide a means for work-
it, wentel AO. It relates to the $203 million. Phase II, in the hope we can go ahead ing out problems that inescapably arise
It is included in that item on page 2 of with phase I and see what happens. in any major weapons system. We had a
the bill with respect to missiles. It would I thank the gentleman for yielding, debate in our committee and we heard
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from no less illustrious a member than
the chairman of the committee, who sug-
gested that we get the phase I system
working before we move on to the phase
II program. Before we will do that, here
we are moving ahead with a 250- or 300-
percent escalation of the program.
Mr. Chairman, I also think this: As
far as the ABM system is concerned, the
official testimony before our committee
concerning the ABM in Moscow?and as
I understand it, they have about 67 me-
chanically operated radar type ABM's
which are clearly of an inferior capabil-
ity?the official testimony before our
committee is that Moscow is less safe
today with the 6'7 ABM's than they would
be without an ABM system. Why? Be-
cause we make no secret about it that we
have overtargeted our ICBM capability
so as totally to account for any defense
that they might provide in that area.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield at that point?
Mr. LEGGETT. I am glad to yield to
the chairman.
Mr. RIVERS. How many ABM's did the
gentleman say Moscow had?
Mr. LEGGETT. Moscow has 6'7.
Mr. RIVERS. And how filmy do we
have?
Mr. LEGGETT. And they are less safe.
If we had no ABM's we would be more
safe.
Mr. RIVERS. According to the gentle-
man's amendment, we would only have
two sites.
Mr. LEGGETT. With my amendment
we would have 300 percent less than we
would have with this first buy procure-
rnent for the phase II program.
Mr. RANDALL,. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
(Mr. RANDALL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.) -
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, the
very first thing we should settle is to cor-
rect the statement made by the gentle-
man from California who just left the
well. He said we were starting a new de-
velopment at Whiteman Air Force Base.
That is not true. It is an old B-47 base
and later a B-52 base. The base has been
there for several years. The birds have
been put in silos in a circumference
around this base. I refer to our Minute-
men ICBM's.
Frankly, with regard to some of the
comment that the gentleman naad.e a
moment ago, if there is any validity at
all to them, about his concern for the
cost of operation of the Safeguard sys-
tem then he should agree that White-
man is the ideal place to locate a Safe-
guard unit. The base is well preserved--
with ample facilities to house personnel
to operate Safeguard. This is the place
it should be located, because these
ICBM's are altogether unprotected.
There is quite a substantial number of
them in this area. The Minuteman com-
plex at Whiteman Air Force Base near
Secialia?, Mc_g. is the only major Icpm
cOMPlex In America today that is unpro-
tected by a defensive missile system.
The gentleman from California spoke
about a, balanced defense system bal-
anced tweep the see, and the air. I sup-
pose I should not go into this, but maybe
we should balance this thing out. Maybe.
at the moment there is a need for reduc-
tion in some of our naval shipyards?
for instance at Mare Island?but that is
not the real issue before us now. We are
talking about establishing a new unit of
the Safeguard system. There has been
some talk during this debate about waste
in the military. If the gentleman's
amendment prevails, it will result in some
real waste. There will be big cost overruns
because the postponement of the decision
to authorize modified phase II would
increase both the costs and the risks to
the United States. It is estimated that a
delay of 1 year could add another $300
million to the total acquisition cost if
this, system is later approved. This is the
kind of an increase which always occurs
in a stretch-out.
What the gentleman proposes would
disregard the best source of military in-
telligence which is the Commander-in-
Chief and he is your President and my
President. It would disregard the warn-
ing from what the Chinese did a few days
ago when they orbited a satellite and
what the Iku,ssians did a few days later.
It should be kept in mind that the Safe-
guard program, all of it, has been based
on what we call a phased development.
The President and the Secretary of De-
fense are ready to stop this if the threat
reaches an acceptable risk. But there is
no ' indication that the threat has
reached an acceptable risk. The opposite
evidence exists, as a matter of fact, and
in the past year the risk from the Chi-
nese has increased and the same is true
as to the soviet *Union. If this situation
turns around to the good and the risk
should for some reason diminish, then,
of course, we could suspend further
deployment.
Mr. LEGGETT. Will the gentleman
yield?
Mr. RANDALL. The gentleman had 8
minutes. I will yield briefly in a minute.
I anticipate not taking too much longer,
but I may have to ask for some more
time.
Let me repeat, we can always stop the
deployment of the Safeguard missile. But
If we lose time now, we will never get
that time back again. It is just that sim-
ple. For example, if we expect to have any
kind of a system deployed and opera-
tional by the mid-19'70's when the threat
would stand at an unacceptable level if
the Chinese Communists proceed, at their
present pace which has been admitted to
even by those who even oppose the de-
ployment of this system.
But if we delay today, if we delay the
earliest possible deployment of phase II?
then we are really going to be losing not
3 months, or 6 months, or a year but
perhaps, as much as 2 years time. If we
follow such a course we will be losing too
much time. That is the issue before us to-
day. Can we afford to lose time that can
never be regained?
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RANDALL. I yield briefly to the
gentleman and hope the gentleman
would return the courtesy sometime.
Mr. LacroErr. We are talking about
this massive escalation. I believe we
brought out a minute ago the fact that
ii 30, 1970
there are around Moscow 6'7 launchers,
which is the ABM system. There is no
doubt about it, we have recognized but
we have authorized more launchers than
that in our phase I program. So we beat
them without the phase II program. With
the figures which we have here and which
have been submitted by the gentleman
from Minnesota, we have already beat
them on ICBM's 9,000 to 1,000.
Mr. RANDALL, Let me interject. I
would like to be able to use a, little bit of
my time. As I understand the figures
offered by the gentleman from Minne-
sota, they presumed all of our ABM's
were MIRVed. However, all he described
are not MIRVed at present. Moreover, as
I understand either the gentleman from
New York or the gentleman from Minne-
sota will offer an amendment to strike
out all funds of MIRV or ABM's either
sea based or land based.
Mr. Chairman, the figures showing
such a large increase in our ABM
strength is thus not only misleading but
quite false and fallacious. Then also let
us not forget the gentlemen who show
what strength we will have after MIRV
are the very same ones who will try to
amend this bill to strike out all funds
for MIRV. This is a curious and I may
add deceiving way to debate the issue.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder
if we could arrive at some time to close
debate on this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con-
sent that all debate on this amendment
and all amendments thereto terminate
at 1:30.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South
Carolina?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
FISHER) .
(Mr. FISHER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I associ-
ate myself with those who are opposed
to this amendment. This identical debate
on the same subject matter was thor-
oughly covered right here last year with
the same people being present. There
has developed, as we all know, in recent
months a very determined drive in this
country designed to undertake to weaken
our defense structure. In my judgment
it is of such serious proportions that we
must take note of it. I think this is an
example, this and a number of other
amendments.
Actually, one would almost be tempted
to think that the armed limitations con-
ference instead of being held in Geneva
is being held here in the House of Repre-
sentatives with the wrong people calling
the shots.
It is time, Mr. Chairman, that we take
note of this trend and vote this amend-
ment down.
Mr. Chairman, I desire to also discuss
the F-111.
The bill has already been well ex-
plained by Chairman RIVERS and others
and I will therefore restrict my remarks
to a brief discussion of one element of
the bill. I am referring to the F-111. I
have had assigned to me some respon-
,
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sibility with respect to this aircraft and
I have devoted a substantial amount of
time to informing myself on this very
Important matter.
Let me begin by saying that unfortu-
nately a proponent of the F-111 starts
his case not at the bottom rung of the
ladder rather but down in a hole some-
Whereinlow it. Before ie can give infor-
mation he must dispel misinformation.
One does not start even, so to speak,
when talking about the F-111.
An example of what I mean is that
have found wholly intelligent people?
even Members of Congress?people for
whom I have the greatest personal re-
spect, who believe?I should say who are
wholly convinced?that the F-111 has a
very bad safety record. Not just a bad
safety record but a very bad one, It is
almost impossible to convince them that
this is not so because in overcoming mis-
understanding of the safety record of
the F-111 one is not faced with the usual
case of persuasion on the basis of mere
fact. One instead is faced With the much
more difficult job of overcoming a pre-
judged, preformed bias, an "I already
know" attitude on the part of the lis-
tener. -Unhappily, however for those who
have been opposed to the F-11.1?for
whatever reason?the statistical facts are
unavoidable. They leave no room for
argument. They are official Air Force fig-
ures. I am fully aware that I do not have
here today the difficulty I have discussed,
but I do think it wise to mention it. And
/ cannot help but be reminded oi Fin-
ley Peter Dunne's "Mr. Dooley" when he
said:
It ain't what people don't know that hurts
them, it is what they do know that ain't so.
I would like to speak briefly about the
military requirement for the F-111. This
is the prime consideration, and indeed
the only one. I do not hold, myself out as
one capable of making this judgment, al-
though my deep interest and intimate as-
sociation with the F-111 since its in-
cer tion do cause me to be not uninformed
in this respect. For judgment as to need
we must go to the military and civilian
leaders of the Department of the Air
Force. And in order that my remarks
about the national need for the F-111
can be presented in a context that is
both understandable and persuasive I
will ask your indulgence while I quickly
cite a few authorities whom I know this
committee considers to be just that.
First. I will quote Dr. Harold Brown,
until recently Secretary of the Air Force
and, incidentally, previously Director of
Research and Engineering for the De-
partment of Defense. This is what Dr.
Brown had to say about the F-111:
We believe that the aircraft is capable of
performing and will perform a task, a vital
task that we can't do any other way.
And Dr. John S. Foster, the present
Director of Defense Research and Engi-
neering who said just last year:
The F-13,1 has more range . . . than our
other aircraft , . higher navigation and
bombing accuracy . . . probably more ac-
curate than any other in our inventory.
And Dr. Searrians, the present Secre-
tary of the Air Force, who says:
The F--111's great Unrefueled range enables
it to strike targets much deeper in enemy
territory than any existing fighter.
And former Chief of Staff of the Air
Force McConnell's statement:
The F-111 possesses the best night and
adverse weather bombing capability of any
of our tactical attach aircraft.
? The present Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, General Ryan says:
The F-111 is now coming into its own as
the best fighter attach aircraft in the world
for the task of all-weather, deep Interdiction.
These statements need no amplifica-
tion and, while they speak most specifi-
cally of capability, they implicitly em-
body the need for the F-111 in the light
of today's world and the threats of today
and the future.
I suggest that to define need or re-
quirement one first looks at the threat,
and second, at the means for countering
that threat. So the question is: Have
these means been achieved? Let us look
at what the planners wanted. The plan-
ners sought an aircraft that would be
capable of being deployed to austere
bases, be capable of all-weather bomb-
ing, of penetrating enemy territory at
supersonic speed and carrying either
conventional or nuclear weapons. The
aircraft would have to be able to take
off and land on short and unimproved
runways and be virtually perfect in its
navigation, and therefore bombing ac-
curacy. As for penetration of enemy ter-
ritory there was, and is, only one way to
do this and that is to have an aircraft
that could hug the contours of the earth
even while traveling at supersonic speed.
Aircraft on a bombing mission, even in
an atmosphere where air superiority is
not in question, such as in Vietnam, re-
quire the accompaniment of a number?
sometimes a large number?of other air-
craft to perform essential collateral ac-
tions. There is no such requirement with
the F-111. They go it alone.
And the number of aircraft available
to our forces by itself becomes meaning-
less if bad weather or lack of daylight
prevents them from flying and bombing
with accuracy. There are to such limi-
tations on the F-111. Night or day, bad
weather or good weather, the F-111 flies
and bombs with pinpoint accuracy.
Virtually all aircraft can be detected
by enemy radar. By the time that radar,
or the human eye, has seen the F-111 it
is already too late.
And coupled with all these enumerated
capabilities the F-111 travels two times
the distance with three times the load of
bombs of our other aircraft.
As we all are aware, the F-111 has had
actual tactical, operational experience in
Vietnam. The detachment of F-111's that
was deployed to Southeast Asia and
which flew over to combat missions be-
fore the bombing of North Vietnam was
discontinued. All of the missions were
flown at night and 80 percent of the mis-
sions were in weather so bad that other
aircraft were not operating. I will draw
particular attention to the fact that on
these missions the bombing accuracy was
better than that being realized on day-
light visual missions of other aircraft.
Also the enemy initiated defensive action
on 88 percent of the missions but no
F-111 was hit. These operations clearly
established the feasibility of low-alti-
tude penetration and all-weather bomb
delivery.
As you know, three F-ill's were lost
in Southeast Asia but none of these losses
was due to enemy action. The suspected
cause of these losses was later discovered
and fixed in the F-111 fleet.
I hope that the foregoing is an ade-
quate presentation of both the need for
and the capability of the F-111. And I
will point out that every one of these
statements is fully agreed to by the U.S.
Air Force.
Next, I would like to speak of costs.
The charge has been made that the
F-111 has unreasonably increased in
cost. This is a matter with which we have
all become very familiar; an increase in
cost of aircraft from the time of the
original estimate until the aircraft get
Into our inventory.
The F-111 has indeed increased in cost,
but when the details of these increases
are understood they appear very much
less serious. At the beginning of the F-111
program the belief was that there would
be something over 2,400 of these air-
craft produced and, quite importantly,
there were to be only two versions of
the F-111. You could say three ver-
sions, but two of them were so much
alike as to make little difference between
them. So, there was a production plan
of some 2,400 aircraft and in only two
versions. Obviously, this would make for
great efficiency ana an almost ideal learn-
ing curve. Together these two elements
would virtually insure relatively low cost.
But?as it is a very big "but"?the 2,400
aircraft became something around 600
aircraft, and the essentially two versions
became seven versions. The planned
monthly production rate of 49 became a
monthly rate of eight aircraft. Add to
these considerations some concededly
faulty estimating on the part of both
the manufacturer and the Air Force, an
unforeseeable increase in the rate and ex-
tent of inflation, and a number of lesser
matters, and the efficiency and almost
ideal learning curve that I referred to
becoming almost the reverse of that.
Both need and capability are, I sub-
mit, established by the fact that those
most capable of making judgment in this
respect?I am referring to the leading
military and civilian people in the De-
partment of the Air Force?have con-
sistently requested a greater number of
F-ill's than the Office of the Secretary
of Defense has permitted to be requested
of this Committee. In plain words, if they
do not know, who does?
Mr. Chairman, the F-111 has had its
troubles. For the very advanced aircraft
that it is, it is a wonder that it did not
have many more. And for reasons that
I think are apparent to all of us, these
troubles?actually in number and kind
no more than any other of our aircraft?
have been the recipient of an almost
obsessive interest by the press. It may
seem a little strange to use the word
"justice" in relation to an airplane, but
if any aircraft or any military develop-
ment has been more subject to injustice
in the press, and elsewhere, then I am un-
familiar with it.
Perhaps all of this was inevitable,
given the turbulent context of the F-ill's
genesis, the difficulty attendant upon its
birth and the strongly expressed feelings
of some of its parentage, but my own
view is that it is pretty hard to success-
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RD?HOUSE A 30, 1970
fully maintain that a jewel that looks
like a diamond, and that the experts say
is a diamond, and which cuts materials
that can be cut only by a diamond, is not
actually a diamond. If the F-111 had
troubles, so did every one of our reason-
ably advanced combat aircraft. And not
one of them that emerged into our in-
ventory has anything approaching the
capability of the F-111.
Mr. Chairman, although almost every-
thing I have said has application to all
versions of the F-111, I would like to
make one specific and very important
reference to the FB-111, the strategic
bomber version of the aircraft.
Over the years we have all heard ref-
erence to the matter of assured destruc-
tion by our Strategic Air Command. Ity
is not my place, but of course it is most
assuredly the place of this committee, to
make judgment with respect to the size
and composition of our Strategic Air
Force. I think it is not inappropriate for
me, however, to suggest that the present
limitation of only 76 FB-111's for SAC
poses a very real possibility that there
will be, in the very near future a very
serious gap in our assured &estruction
capability. I state this in the light of the
age of even the newest of the :B-52's and
the point in time at which the advanced
manned strategic aircraft, the B-1, will
come into our inventory.
One last thought, Mr. Chairman. We
have invested over $6 billion in the F-111
to date. Something over $1.5 billion of
this is in material now awaiting use in
the building of additional aircraft. For
this amount of money?over $6 billion?
we have 230 F-ill's. For almost exactly
$1.5 billion we can acquire 324 more of
these superb aircraft. Accepting the un-
equaled capabilities of the F-111?the
only aircraft specifically mentioned by
the Soviets in the SALT talks?sheer
economics would dictate that any course
other than the continued procurement of
the F-111 would verge on irresponsibility.
We have already spent the big money.
Mr. Chairman, it is time that the F-111
is approached with what I will call an
aggressive sanity. The picture of this ex-
traordinary aircraft as it has been por-
trayed is not, of course, the result of cal-
culated imprecision?there has been no
"conspiracy" against the aircraft?but
had there been a careful, conscientious,
coherent and dedicated effort to the end
of deprecating this aircraft out of exist-
ence it could not have been very much
more successful than what has been done
through apparent inadvertence.
I earnestly urge the support of the
whole House for the closely studied pro-
grams which are contained in this weap-
ons authorization and research and de-
velopment bill.
The CHAIRMAN. The Qhajr recog-
nizes the gentleman from Louisiana (MT.
WAGGONNER) .
Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman,
when we authorized phase I of this Safe-
guard system last year, we do so with
the understanding that we would give to
the President of the United States addi-,
tional options some time in the future,
whenever it WAS lig-tern-tined that the
threat to the United States made ex-
pansion necessary. It is enlightening to
me today, as it wts yesterday, to sit here
and listen to predictions about Russian
intentions. But how any man who reads
the newspapers can possibly believe that
the Russians are not expanding their
threat is beyond comprehension to me.
We cannot continue to prostrate this
country before the Russians or the Chi-
nese. We Should expand our ABM sys-
tem now as the President proposes.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from New York (Mr.
BINGHAM).
(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, this
amendment is aimed to prevent the kind
of escalation of the Safeguard ABM pro-
gram that was predicted last year. We
said last year, those of us who were op-
posing this program, that it was going
to grow. We now see that very thing
happening.
If this amendment is not agreed to,
the ABM will grow further until it be-
comes a monster, devouring resources
which we can ill afford, and providing
in the long run no security to this coun-
try, because it will surely lead to off-
setting responses by the other side.
When will we begin to accept the fact
that there is not just one kind of secu-
rity, based on arms? There is another
kind of security, and that kind of secu-
rity is based on mutual restraint, on bal-
anced deterrents, and on the agreements
that we hope will come out of Geneva.
The question is not whether we want
national security; the question is how
we get national security.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentlewoman from Oregon
(Mrs. GREEN) .
? (Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend her remarks.)
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Chair-
man, I rise in support of the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Cali-
fornia.
I would make clear at the outset that
I have resisted and will continue to re-
sist the blandishments of those who urge
unilateral disarmament on the part of
the United $tates because I see no evi-
dence on the Communist side of a dis-
position to follow this sort of moral in-
itiative. To the contrary, the evidence is
that in the current phase of the interna-
tional arms race, the Soviets are not
merely setting the pace but setting a
very brisk one indeed, particularly in
the stepped-up deployment of their SS-9
intercontinental ballistic missiles. I
think it would be wishful thinking, there-
fore, to pretend that we can, for the
time being let our guard down. At the
same time, I believe it not only possible
but mandatory to make rational choices
even in what is essentially?and tragi-
cally?an irrational preoccupation of ci-
vilized men.
Mr. Chairman, once again we face a
whopping appropriations request for
defense and once again it involves the
making of hard choices. As always, this
means hard economic choices because
the "guns versus butter" analogy con-
tinually reasserts its truth on our Judg-
ments?as it seems to be doing with par-
ticularly disturbing effects at this very
moment.
We are faced also with the necessity
of hard moral and philosophical choices
as well. I need hardly remind anyone
in this Chamber that sustained high
military budgets at the level proposed in
H.R. 17123 imply a continuation of the
emphasis on naked military power which
Is somehow alien to the concept held by
most Americans of American traditions.
The youth who are expected to man,
and, if need be, use this awesomely de-
structive hardware, that it is proposed
that we buy, are increasingly the seg-
ment of our society most alienated by
the implications of these and associated
actions undertaken by the Congress.
Finally, there are hard choices to be
made in the matter of simple survival in
a still polarized world armed to the
teeth. In such an atmosphere, one uni-
laterally disarms himself at his own
peril.
It is truly unfortunate that the prob-
lem of reconciling all of these difficult
choices must inevitably involve making
complex judgments of some very sophis-
ticated and technical proposals. Many
will simply defer to the "experts," over-
looking the fact that all too often the ex-
perts themselves have shown some griev-
ous lapses of judgment. In some cases, in
fact, they admit?as the outgoing Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does on
page 22 of the report?that important
judgments cannot be made at all and
that it is necessary, therefore, to "cover
all bets." In this case it involves sustain-
ing, through enormously expensive mod-
ernization programs, duplicate air arms
committed to essentially the same stra-
tegic tasks?one on land and one at
sea. The possibility that one may have
a distinct competitive edge over the
other?becoming in the parlance of the
defense experts more "cost effective"?
studiously ignored and instead we are
distracted with arguments for such "re-
dundancy," another favored word of late
in the lexicon of defense planners. What
we would have considered in another
day as unforgivable "gold plating" has
now become "redundancy" and, further-
more, a military virtue.
My point in all this is that someone is
going to have to make these hard judg-
ments and for the moment the "ball is,"
so to speak, "in our court." One cannot
agree tirelessly with his constituents
that our national priorities are badly
awry and that defense spending is at
the heart of the problem?and hold forth
a defense appropriations bill which pares
off a miniscule seventeen one-hundredth
of 1 percent of the total that the admin-
istration has asked for?and not inci-
dentally, apparently everything the
Pentagon could possibly have hoped for.
Against the background of the impera-
tives as I see them, I am forced to make
some necessary judgments. The first of
these concerns the highly controversial
ABM system which, in my view, should
never have been given the go ahead in
the first place and which at this time
certainly does not merit my support in
the matter of the $665 million being re-
quested for Safeguard procurement.
There is sufficient "redundancy," I think,
guaranteeing the survivability of our
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strategic retaliatory forces, in 1,054
ICBM's, the bulk deployed hi hard-to-hit
underground silos, in 41 Polaris-firing
nuclear submarines in the trackless
depths of the ocean and, finally, in 255
nuclear-carrying strategic bombers dis-
persed at airfields around the world. The
problem of mounting a credible first-
strike capability against this force is, in
my view, sufficiently complicated with-
out ringing three ICBM missile fields
With the Safeguard system.
In passing, I might add that I am not
dissuaded by arguments advanced favor-
ing matching the Soviets missile for mis-
sile and plane for plane. Neither "parity"
nor "superiority" should concern us in
these considerations: only considerations
of strategic "sufficiency" should. In a
World where there is weaponry enough
to kill at least twice over every man,
woman ahd child on the face of the
globe, "parity" and "superiority" have
lost whatever meaning they may have
once had.
It is logical that I oppose not only the
procurement proposal for the basic Safe-
guard system but the proposal to enlarge
the deployment to a phase II level. Bigger
Is not necessarily any better. All of up
ought to be wary of any proposal that has
gone through as many planning convul-
sions as this one has in slightly less than
2 years. Just as there appears in the
report to be some lack of unanimity
among the service chiefs on the need for
More nuclear-poWered aircraft carriers,
there appears to have been a great deal
of difficulty encountered in their ar-
riving at a consensus on what they de-
sired in the way of missile defense. It has
been reliably reported that neither the
Air Force nor the Navy preferred the
option to protect Minutemen ICBM's in
their silos and that the Army was not
particularly enthusiastic for the mission
in the , first place. One wonders, then,
why we are proceeding in this direction.
As "Nike X," the Joint Chiefs of Staff
originally proposed that populations in
27 selected cities be defended against
Soviet attack. As "Sentinel," Mr. /vIcNa-
Maxa proposed instead that a "light"
defense of the entire population of the
United States be provided solely and ex-
clusively against a developing Chinese
threat. AS "Safeguard" it was proposed
by President Nixon a few months after
assuming office that Minuteman ICBM's
in their underground silos be protected
against Soviet attack. Now for a few
billion more, it is proposed that with
"Safeguard phase II" we can do both?
protect ICBM's from Soviet attack and
People from Chinese attack. One has the
instinctive feeling that more heat than
light is being generated in all this fever-
ish activity.
For this reason I am supporting the
amendment to strike Safeguard procure-
ment funds and, failing this, the amend-
ment to foreclose the phase II extension
of Safeguard.
? The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
My. ICErria,
`a\liK.TOITU,asiced arid was given per-
mission t,o revise and extend his re-
marks,)
Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, when de-
ployment of an ABM was first voted on
by this House in 1968, I was one of the
few on this side of the aisle who raised
questions about the wisdom of such a
step. However, at that time, and again
last October, I supported deployment of
a limited system, largely because it would
give us the added technological know-
how upon which we could base future de-
cisions about expansion of the program.
Additionally, I felt that phase I of the
Safeguard system would prove to be a
valuable bargaining card at the SALT
talks?and perhaps it has been.
Now we are being asked to expand that
limited system of two sites to include an
additional ABM base and advance work
on five others. Such an expansion at this
time, I believe, is unwise. The enormous
and escalating cost of this system and
the fact that the original two sites are
not yet operational or tested, lead me to
question the advisability of authorizing
phase II. The marginal increment in se-
curity which it would provide, does not
justify the expenditure of an additional
$203 million.
Without further involving myself in
the technological arguments on this
question, I would point out that the
ICBM's protected by phase I, linked with
the capability of our Polaris fleet and our
manned bombers, should adequately de-
ter any Soviet first strike. As far as the
Chinese are concerned, the unquestioned
superiority of our nuclear forces, with
or without an ABM, clearly provides an
adequate deterrent against nuclear ag-
gression or blackmail should Peking ac-
quire a deliverable nuclear weapon.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that ex-
pansion of the Safeguard system at this
time will enhance the chances of success
at the Vienna SALT talks. What should
impress the Soviets and make them more
amenable to bargaining is not the size
of our ABM program but rather the fact
that it exists and that we have the tech-
nological capability of expanding it if
circumstances require such steps. Indeed,
a show of restraint on our part at this
time might underline our good faith as
we establish our bargaining position at
Vienna. It certainly could not be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness in view of
our past resolve in facing up to the
challenges of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Chairman, the time has come for
the Congress to show more prudence as
it exercises its powers of authorization
and appropriation in the field of military
weaponry. Excessive cost overruns, the
danger of obsolescence and the apparent-
ly hopeful developments in Helsinki and
Vienna dictate that we move more de-
liberately, in the future as we procure
military hardware. Phase II of Safe-
guard, in my view, is a good place to
begin exercising that restraint.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr.
THOMPSON).
(Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr.
Chairman, I rise in opposition to this
amendment. Not only do I rise in opposi-
tion to the amendment, but I want the
Members of this body to know that the
gentleman from Georgia will not feel
safe until we have an ABM shield for
our cities as well as our missile sites.
Mr. Chairman, I do not trust the Rus-
sians, and until there is concrete evidence
that they are willing to cut down their
offensive capability, I have no intentions
of cutting down on our defensive ability
in this country.
The gentleman made the comment a
moment ago that Moscow is worse off
because there are 67 ABM's protecting
it. But I would like to make this point:
that if we have to overtarget to get to
Moscow because of the interception of
our missiles by their ABM, then, because
of this, there would be other areas in the
Soviet Union that would be safe because
the missiles we would otherwise have
used on those places would then be go-
ing to Moscow. This is the sane approach,
and I am for defending and protecting
the people of our country. and not for
placing my faith and confidence in the
Russians.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Minnesota
(Mr. FRASER).
Mr. FRASER,. Mr. Chairman, I would
only like to emphasize that phase I of
ABM will put in place-many, many more
launchers than the Soviets have around
Moscow. The number of launchers is
classified, but I think it is safe to say
that they will substantially exceed the
number in place around Moscow today.
I am a little surprised at the reac-
tion I get from some Members of the
House when I display in front of them
figures submitted by the Pentagon for
the public record. They act as though
this is an act of treason or subverting
the Republic by publishing the Pentagon
figures.
The figures lhave published are effec-
tive as of February 1, 1970. I have the
hearings right here and it says as of
February 1970, the operational ICBM's
of the Soviet Union are over 1,100.
Those are the figures I have on my
chart. If in 60 days there has been some
dramatic turn-around?which is totally
incredible?I have yet to hear of it.
The reason why it is incredible, of
course, is that we know of the launchers
under construction. We know ahead of
time what is coming out. But this is the
figure that is operational and these are
the figures I have used on my chart
throughout.
I do not understand why people get
up -and announce in such a loud voice
that I am misleading the House. I am
only trying to bring to them some facts
that I think are very much worth
reading.
But the posture statement is in the
hearings and it lays out very clearly that
the Soviets appear to be on a declining
rate in ICBM construction.
{Mr. PIKE addressed the Committee.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.]
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
RANDALL).
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in opposition to the amendment.
At this point in the debate we are
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pretty much baCk Where we were in th
discussion of last year. We hear again
the arguments as to whether Safeguard
will work or not. That is, whether it wil
be effective. 'The .fact remains that there
have been repeated tests since the au-
thorization and appropriation of las
year arid the fact also is that the great
majority of those tests have been suc-
cessful.
Last year we were talking about a
billion dollars to deploy phase I of Safe-
guard. The gentleman's amendment to-
day involves a total of $203 million.
To those who say that the ABM will
not work, I would say I am not so much
concerned about Whether they are right.
But I am concerned if they are wrong.
Because if they are wrong, we are going
to wake up witout any ABM system of
any kind and be subject to pure and sim-
ple nuclear blackmail. So today we are
talking not about a billion dollars but
of $203 million. The issue is the expendi-
ture of an XJ11.1Mber of dollars as against
the security of this country. If those who
oppose the Safeguard are right then we
will have lost Some money?or we will not
have lost it completely because as the
tests continue we will have gained more
knowledge to make the system ultimately
workable.
munimorNATAfiewiT29186
(Mr. HALL asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
1 Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, if one con-
siders the question of credibility as
brought up by the proponents of this
t amendment, one wonders wherein we
differentiate between hope on the one
hand and truth insofar as military in-
telligence and the security of our Nation
are concerned, on the other.
I think the song has pretty well been
sung. We have a technically feasible de-
fensive means. We know what the op-
position is doing in their singing satel-
lite from Red China and the multiple
capability of delivery of Red Russia.
The thing that needs to be emphasized
in our capability is technical feasibility,
which has been proved regardless of all
the soothsaying that has been stated
here on the floor, some out of context
and others, I feel, wilfully with half-
truths.
Finally, it will save American lives
with us in a purely defensive pasture.
I am for saving those lives.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
ARENDS).
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I oppose
the amendment with all my heart. I
think it must be recognized that our
But, if the opponents are wrong and the
system was workable then we would be
in pretty bad shape Without it and they
are asking all of ,us to do without the
Safeguard at our owarisk.
Mr. Chairman, There is the issue. As
our distinguished Speaker said last year
if we are to risk error let us err on the
side of the security of this country.
The CHAIRIVIA.N. The Chair recog-
nizes the ?gentleman from California
(Mr. LEsour).
Mr. LEGGE'TT, Mr. Chairman, the
amendment relates only to modifying
the procurement amount. It is $203 mil-
lion. It does not preclude us from mov-
ing ahead with the phase 1 program
that We. a.uthollzed last year. Former
Secretary of Defense McNamara, said
a few Years ago that the danger of pro-
viding this relatively light but reliable
Chinese-oriented ABM system is going
to be that pressures will develop to ex-
pand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented sys-
tem. Vast year we expanded it into a
light Sovlet system, Now we are moving
to a reaSconably heavy system at the
present time.
The PAR?perimeter acqusition ra-
dar?that support this total system can
be knocked out. There are only 12 PAR
in the whole ABM system. Then they
could be kneelmd ont by 12 Shillelaghs
or Tow missiles. If anyone can feel safer
Under this system, they certainly do not
know_ the international facts of life
that prevail at the Present time.
I. do not think that the escalation on
the part of the 201riet Union from 200
S8-9 jas.Silea in 106.6 to 235 missiles at
the beginning of last year and 255 mis-
siles at the Aline we heard this. bill last
year and,_ now escalating it to 275 this
yea? aictate that_ we move ahead with
thieniUltibiliiRR-Clollar.PYstern today.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleMan from Missouri (Mr.
HALL). ,
1200210005-9
April 30, 1970
(Mr. HUNT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from South Caro-
lina (Mr. RIVERS).
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, this is
$200 million. What does it do? What does
it do? The gentleman from Minnesota
spoke about numbers of missiles. Not
once did he mention megatonnage; not
once. He did not mention MIRVed mis-
siles. Russia has more megatonnage, and
I positively believe they have the M1RV
missile.
This amendment for $200 million im-
proves your Sprint missile. You get more
Sprint missiles for the existing bases.
You build one other base and put in your
long lead items for five others. It does
not take an adult to know that with only
two bases they could saturate them and
church would be out. Unless you start,
you will never get started. It is as simple
as that.
For the want of $200 million, you
might lose the ball game, and that is
what the question is all about.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California (Mr. LEGGETT).
The question was taken, and on a di-
.
sion (demanded by Mr. LEGGETT) there
ere?ayes 48, noes 89.
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I de-
and tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chair
ppointed as tellers Mr. LEGGETT and Mr.
IVERS.
committee studiously went into this w
whole matter. We in the committee col-
lectively believe, without partisanship of m
any kind, that this is the best thing to "
do in the interest of the American pee- a
ple, for our security in the future, and R
to b
Y 101 any eventuality.
I yield to the gentleman from New te
Jersey (Mr. HUNT).
Mr. HUNT. I thank the gentleman
from Illinois for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I want to set the record
straight today.
a
The New York Times, 2 days ago
quoted Representative DONALD FRASER,
of Minnesota, as saying the Pentagon's 3,
own figures prove the Russians have 700
slowed down their production of strategic
nuclear weapons.
miss
I am afraid the gentleman allowed the
wish to be the father to the thought.
The fact is that the Soviet Union con- all
tinues to increase its production of mi
ICBM's at a constant pace.
In 1965 the Russians had about 220 th
ICBM's. In 1066 they were up to 250. ut
Then they really took off. By 1967 they
had a little over 500. From then on the me
graph shows not a curve but an almost R.
straight line slanting upward at a rate is t
of increase of about 180 ICBM's a year. B-
r should point out, though, that it th
deals only with ICBM's. When it comes bo
to ABM's they have 64; we have none. tha
Other figures show they are rapidly in- ess
creasing their numbers of submarine- is
launched ballistic missiles. vel
The facts are plain: the Soviet Union evi
in some areas is rapidly reaching parity me
with the United States. In other areas ret
it has gone beyond us. fled
The gentleman heads the Democratic T
Study Group. I would suggest the group !lied
spend more time at study?unpleasant Nin
as that may be?and less with its col- c"
The committee again divided, arid the
Hers reported that there were?ayes 86,
oes 128.
So the amendment was rejected.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEDZI
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
mendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Nom: On page
line 16, after the comma, strike out $2,909,-
,000" and insert $2,809,700,000."
(Mr. NEDZI asked and was given per-
ion to revise and extend his re-
arks.)
(By unanimous consent, Mr. NEDZI was
owed to proceed for 3 additional
flutes.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
e gentleman from Michigan for 8 min-
es in support of his amendment.
r. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, this amend-
nt strikes $100 million from the
D.T. & E. funds for the Air Force. This
he amount in the bill provided for the
1, formerly known as the AMSA?
is is the go ahead for the new manned
mber. For years we have determined
t a new manned system is not nec-
ary for our national security. There
no evidence that the Soviets are de-
oping a new heavy bomber. There is
dence that they are developing a new
diurn bomber, however, to quote Sec-
ary Laird on page 105 of his unclassi-
posture statement:
he intelligence.. community believes that
him bombers do not figure prominently
Soviet plans for an initial attack on the
h American continent.
lective head in the _sand.
hile thentnount in this bill appears
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'relatively modest, the fact of the matter
is that this authorizes the Air Force to
enter into procurement agreements for
five prototypes which are presently pro-
gramed to cost $2.3 billion. I emphasize
programed because we are all aware of
what happens to programed costs.
Mr. Chairman, we are presently in-
volved in the strategic arms limitation
talks, aALT talks, in order to determine
Whether arms limitations are feasible.
Some may argue, as do some proponents
of the ABM, that we need this authoriza-
tion as -a bargaining chip. They argue
further that we can abandon our pro-
gram should there be success at the
talks. Of course, there would be closing
costs?it is obvious, however, that the
further along a program, the more it will
cost to close it out. Not only will it cost
more, but it will be so much more difficult
to stop this program because of the in-
trinsic momentum which weapons sys-
tems develop. Weapons program advo-
cates develop a proprietary psychology
which increases the enthusiasm with
which they support a system which they
have once sold to their colleagues or the
public. It is difficult for one to admit an
error in judgment and reverse course.
Add to this the vested interest which de-
fense contractors 'develop and that of
their employees, usually represented' by
influential labor unions, and you have a
momentam which can be braked only in
a very slow and costly manner as was the
Case with the B-70 when we built 21/2
aircraft at a cost imexcess of $11/2 billion.
I am deeply troubled, Mr. Chairman,
by the double standard which our Secre-
tary of Defense uses in appraising the in-
ternational arms race. His emphasis on
Soviet capabilities as opposed to inten-
tions is understandable and justifiable.
However, his sweeping review of new
Soviet deployments skirts the fact that
we are still far ahead of the Soviets and
that they have a corresponding desire
not to be a second rate military power.
If "sufficiency" is our policy, we must
define it?for if it means superiority
then we may just as well face the fact
that no nation in the world with the
"capability" is going to sit still and per-
mit this kind of condition to persist with-
out international agreement and the im-
pact on the arms race is obvious.
While Secretary Laird views Soviet de-
ployment as developing a "first-strike
capability," he assures the world that our
ABM deployment is defensive?avoiding
the fact that an effective ABM has a very
significant "firststrike" role in that it
could protect us from any missiles not
destroyed in a first strike. The world is
eXpected to rely upon our word that
MIRVing our missiles, both Minuteman
and Poseidon, is defensive. The world is
expected to rely upon our word that the
development of an ULMS?underwater
long-range missile system?is defensive;
that the procurement of a new fighter for
the lsl'avy and for the Air Force is de-
fensive* that the capability to deploy
enorMoUs Van-titles of men and materiel
afound'tlie *orld in the C-5A is defen-
sive; and that the deployment of a new
nialth,ed ttack bomber?the B-1 is de-
fensive. Can we fairly expect the world
to look to our intentions and not our
capabilities?
I have avoided getting into the tech-
nical details of the B-1 since the new
"open news policy" described by my col-
league (Mr. PixE) has imposed certain
constraints. An unclassified comparison
Of the F13-111 and the new B-1 furnished
upon my request by the Air Force has
all the pertinent B-1 data deleted and
the House must again have faith in the
expertise of the majority of the Armed
Services Committee.
In summary, there is testimony that
our B-52's, and I appreciate how old our
B-52's are, but let me remind the House
that $100 million is in this bill for
SRAM's for their modernization, and
FB-111's will be effective into the late
1980's. We have awesome deterrent power
In our Minutemen and Minutemen III
being added to the inventory?we have
an invulnerable deterrent in our Polaris
and Poseidon submarines. We boast about
our capability to destroy sophisticated
incoming missiles and yet we are ex-
pected to believe that another nation
does not have the capability to destroy
incoming manned aircraft.
The B-1, Mr. Chairman, is not essen-
tial to our security?its ability to per-
form a meaningful role in our defense
posture is extremely skeptical?its effect
on the arms race cannot be salutary, and
it has all the earmarks of another ex-
pensive mistake at a time when there is
a pathetic requirement for resources in
other areas.
Mr. NEDZI. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
(Mr. ARENDS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ARENDS. It seems to me that the
gentleman has left the impression that
we want to go on the offense with some
of our weapons. However, the gentleman
should recall what has taken place in
Vietnam. As you know we have followed
a defensive pattern in Vietnam. We have
exhibited our bombing. We have not used
nuclear warheads.
Mr. NEDZI. I had no intention of sug-
gesting that we do intend to go on the
offense. However, we do have the ability
to go an the offense. I think we are using
a double standard when we fail to con-
sider our capability. They have no way of
knowing our intent. I think what is good
for the goose is good for the gander.
Mr. ARENDS. And, if the gentleman
will yield further, we, of course, have no
way of knowing or determining what
Russia's intentions are for the future.
Mr. NEDZI. Nor do they have any way
of knowing what our intentions are.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. HEBERT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, if ever there was an
ill-timed amendment, it is this amend-
ment. The distinguished gentleman who
offered the amendment has listened to
the story for the need of the so-called
follow-on bomber for 7 years. He has
been one of the most devoted members
of the committee. We have had exhaus-
tive hearings on this matter. He has told
us many things which, apparently, would
be very significant if the sugar was tak-
en off the top of the cake.
The things he has not said are the
things that are important.
The gentleman has not told you that
over $140 million is already invested in
the research and development of an
. AMSA. He has not told you that when
the last B-52 goes out of existence, it is
the last of the strategic bombers. We
have no follow-on. He has not told you
that the Joint Chiefs unanimously have
advocated the development of a bomber,
against the resistance of the former Sec-
retary of Defense Mr. McNamara.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from
Michigan has not told the Members of
the committee that the B-58 has been
phased out over the objection of the
military by the former Secretary of De-
fense. He has not told you the answer
as to what will be the situation if we do
not have a follow-on to the B-52. In
other words, we will have no mixed stra-
tegic force.
Mr. Chairman, I am sure no one in
this body would want to have all our
eggs put into one basket. The greatest
offense or defense, whichever one you
want to take, is to be found in the fact
that we have a mix in our strategic
inventory.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman sug-
gested that the bomber can be mended,
? modified, or tied up with wire, in effect,
and perhaps last a little bit longer. How-
ever, that is like asking one to rehabil-
itate a 90-year-old man. How many times
can you fix him up to continue life?
Mr. Chairman, the B-52 is running out
of time. Unless we proceed with this par-
ticular advance we will have no succes-
sor to the strategic bomber.
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HEBERT. I yield to the gentle-
man from Michigan.
Mr. NEDZI. Are we not purchasing the
FB-111?
Mr. HEBERT. We are, and I am glad
the gentleman asked me that question.
Mr. Chairman, the F-111 has been cut
from 264 to 76. But the most important
thing about the F-111, as the gentleman
knows, it was never to have been con-
jectured in any manner, shape or form
to replace the B-52. It was only at best
to have been an interim bomber while
the follow-on was being developed.
The gentleman I think knows this. The
gentleman sat in the committee, and he
has heard all of this.
Mr. NEDZI. The gentleman knows that
the Air Force has commended the air-
craft as being a fine airplane.
Mr. IIEl3ERT. The gentleman admits
that the Air Force has commended the
F-111 as being a fine airplane to do the
job for which it is intended to do, but it
was never held up as a follow-on bomber.
Mr. NEDZI. But it is expected to be in
the inventory until the late 1980's.
Mr. HEBERT. In the late 1980's the
B-52 will be 27 years old.
Mr.NEDZI. The F-111.
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Mr. REBERT, But only 76 aircraft at
the most. How long sloes the gentleman
think you can have an interim airplane,
and how long does the gentleman think
you can have an interim bomber? You
cannot have them forever.
Mr. NEDZI. For as long as it does a
good job.
Mr. HEBERT. Maybe the gentleman
has some new formula of everlasting
light and power for fixing up a 90-year-
old man forever, But I do think it is MI--
portant that we do have this bomber
which, incidentally, can only be pur-
chased after it flies, It is a fly before you
buy program. I suggest that any thought
?or any suggestion of stopping this par-
ticular plane at this time is ill advised.
Mr. DRAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to point
out to the Members that buying a
bomber is not the same as going to a
hardware store and buying a hammer.
There are many years of developmental
work involved in developing a bomber.
We do note know whether we will ever
have a need for this bomber, and every-
body in this body hopes that we will never
have to use the bomber.
However, r would like to point out that
In 1961 Secretary McNamara stopped
all development on the long-distance
bomber. He also refused to build any
more bombers. He stopped all production
on the long-distance bombers we had;
that is, the B-52's and B-58's. In fact,
this body for 2 years after that, author-
ized and also appropriated money for
these bombers. However he refused to
use the money.
Secretary McNa,mara,'s philosophy, as
we all know, was that if you had a deter-
rent, a massive deterrent of many, many
missiles that could destroy this city or
that city, that we worild not need a
manned bomber. I for one do not want
to come to the place where the only
defense that we have is massive destruc-
tion by the use of ICBMs. So for tnat
reason we do need a bomber, but whether
we might need to use that bomber no
one will ever know for certain. We hope
not.
The Russians are developing a
bomber. It is not as large as this bomber,
frankly, and not as good as this bomber
will be, I hope. But if we approve this
amendment we will place ourselves out
of the development of a long distance
bomber. If this amendment is carried,
would do, would be saying to ourselves,
that the only defense to an enemy action
would be surrender, or resort to massive
retaliation, and all the destruction that
such action would bring.
RUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BRAY. I yield to the gentleman
from New Jersey.
Mr. HUNT, Mr, Chairman, I want to
CoMmend tbg _gentleman from Indiana
for his observations, but I would like to
stipplement his thoughts with this: that
about 14) days ago we were apprised by
thepress and by intelligence sources that
the Rtissians were conducting massive
clPera.,49As Off the northern part of their
conntry, 1,vere Wing all of their bombers
and using refueling techniques, and en-
larging their rilriways, and. so forth.
So in the case of any hostilities, or
any offensive action, the Russians have
a very fine bomber fleet ready. There-
fore we simply cannot be so naive as
we were, say, back in 1940, where we
were caught off base.
I say to you that this message is well
taken, we do need to go ahead with new
bombers that will at least be a protec-
tive factor for this country, and there-
fore we should be thinking about it now,
, and not find ourselves in the position
of wondering whether we can protect
America or whether we cannot.
(Mr. HEBERT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend remarks
he previously made.)
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike out the last word and rise in sup-
port of the amendment,
Mr. Chairman, the thing that intrigues
me most under the new complete infor-
mation policy about cost of weapons sys-
tems, which has been enunciated by the
Secretary of Defense, is as always?what
they really do compared to what they are
saying.
On page 7517 of the hearings, Mr.
Nedzi tried to find out how much the
B-1 program cost:
Mr. Nnozi. Have we any estimates at all
as to the cost of this program?
Secretary SEAMANS. Yes,, we do. The present
estimate for the research and development,
including the test aircraft, and the tests
with the aircraft, is $2.3 billion in 1970 dol-
lars. And the production estimate for the
[deleted] aircraft is $7 billion, which in-
cludes the initial spares.
Mr. NEDZI. What does that come to per
unit?
Secretary SEAMANS. It comes to a program
unit cost of about [deleted] million, that
takes all the cost, research and development
and production, dividing by the total num-
ber of the aircraft. Or it comes to [deleted]
million on a production unit-cost basis, that
Is just taking the procurement costs and
dividing by the [deleted].
So that is what you know, if you read
the hearings about what this thing costs.
Now if you also want to go into it fur-
ther and find out what it can do, you can
look at page 7590 where they make a
comparison between the FB-111 and the
B-1. Out of about 20 questions, they have
deleted all but two answers on the FB-
111 and they have deleted all of them on
the B-1.
So you cannot find anything about
What it can do and you cannot find any-
thing about what it is going to cost.
However, the Russians know all about
this. They know how much it is going to
cost and they know what it is going to be
able to do because they all subscribe to
a paper caned the Defense Marketing
Survey Intelligence Report.
Back last December that included the
maximum speed was mach 2.5 to 3; the
range was 10,000 miles; the crew was
four; the price range was from $25 to
$30 million per copy?at that time.
Now the Russians know all this. The
Russian Army and Navy and Air. Force
have access to all this information. But
you do not have it?the public does not
have it?unless you read the Defense
Marketing Survey Intelligence Report.
You cannot get it out of the hearings.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PIKE. Of course, I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. RIVERS. The gentleman keeps
saying "they." Does the gentleman say
that the Committee on Armed Services
did this and hushed this up?
Mr. PIKE. We raised this point last
year?and you are absolutely correct?I
do not say that the Committee on Armed
Services did this in any manner. It is
done in the Pentagon. I know the chair-
man has tried time-after time after time
to get some of this stuff unclassified, but
they will not unclassify it.
The Secretary of Defense says we are
going to give the public complete cost
figures and he does not give the members
any cost figures.
The last time we went this route was
with the B-70. We spent $1.5 billion and
we built 21/2 planes. One crashed?one is
in the Air Force Museum at Wright-Pat-
terson and nobody knows where the
pieces of that half are and we have to
admit that $1.5 billion was wasted.
This is only going to cost $2.33 billion
to build what they now say is five pro-
totypes. But we do not know what it is
going to cost and we do not know how
much it is going to be.
Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. EVANS of Colorado. While we are
trying to shed some intelligence on the
question we are discussing here, and with
all deference to the committee, because
I know they tried very hard to get the
facts before us?we are talking about
$100 million for another advanced
manned bomber. You have mentioned the
B-70 and in your minority report you
Pointed out the acquisition of 21/2 planes
at a cost of $1.5 billion.
I would like to know what happened
to that plane and why it is not being
carried forward?
Mr. PIKE. Because the people who are
responsible in the Pentagon for the plan-
ning and procurement of strategic air-
craft said it was not worth the money.
Secretary Foster this year said in ret-
rospect we were right to cancel it.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I address
my remarks particularly to the gentle-
man from New York (Mr. Prim). What
he has said with respect to lack of in-
formation concerning this new bomber,
sounds strangely like the beginning of
the F-111, better known originally as the
'110..x., back in the days of Defense Secre-
tary McNamara. This business of being
unable to obtain information concerning
moves to obtain new planes is repre-
hensible. Back in those days the then
Comptroller General, Joseph Campbell,
tried to obtain information from Mc-
Namara, and McNamara tapped his head
nd said he was crrying the specifictions
In his hed. Is that the kind of situation
that still confronts us?
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, if the gen-
tleman would yield, I would simply say
to the gentleman in response that despite
all of the fine speeches and press releases
about the availabilit of info m ti I
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have seen no improvement whatsoever
since that time.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman
from South Carolina.
Mr. RIVERS. For over 7 years Mr.
HEBERT has been working on this matter.
He tried to get McNamara to come for-
ward with an answer in respect to the ad-
vanced strategic manned aircraft. He has
held special hearings on the subject.
McNamara sent one excuse after an-
other. Curtis LeMaiwanted it. O'Connell
wanted it. The radar was blamed; the
configuration of the plane itself was
blamed. He blamed it on everything. He
blamed it on aeryonics. Finally here it is.
It has been almost 20 years since we have
had anything that resembles a new
bomber as such. I am not talking about
the TFX. I am not talking about a multi-
purpose airplane. We have nothing like
this.
We have had nothing since the B-18
was laid down. We have changed the en-
gines. This is the last version of the en-
gine, a fan engine.
No one has done the work that Mr.
HEBERT has done on this question. He has
tried to give America something that will
work. This plane can go a foot from the
ground, 10 feet from the ground, or
90,000 feet from the ground.
Mr. GROSS. I am not criticizing the
House Armed Services Committee. What
I am criticizing is the repetition of what
we ran into several years ago in connec-
tion with what is now the F-111--in-
ability, almost total inability to find out
what was going on. After all, the com-
mon, garden variety of -members of the
House of Representatives ought to have
some information about what is going on
in the DefensePepartment.
Mr. RIVERS. We could not get them
to get to the point of a definition of it.
Shrive r begged for it. Now Ferguson has
begged for it. It is long overdue. It is due
to the credit of this great Louisianan,
who has been after them for over 6 years,
to my certain knowledge.
Mr. GROSS. And we are still asked to
take on faith the F-111 with a half bil-
lion dollars in this bill for it.
Mr. RIVERS. May I finish my state-
ment. This administration has what is
called a milestone concept. Every so often
a report is made on the progress. This
thing is being run in a businesslike fash-
ion under Secretary Packard. This is a
good program.
Mr. pIKE;Mr. Chairman Will the , ,
gen-
tleman yield?
Mr GROSS I yield to the gentl? man
from New York.
Mr, PIKZ. I will simply say it has been
a long, long time since we have bought
a new bow and arrow in this couritrY,
too, but if we were doing it, I guarantee
the gentleman that both its cost and its
performance characteristics would be
ClasSifteahy the Pentagon.
ma% Gross, AU t an trying to say
here today is that do not want to vote
- for another fl,Y111,g Edsel? That is all.
Mr. RIVERS. You are not doing so.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr, Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman
from Louisiana.
Mr. HEBERT. I assure you this will not
be. a flying Edsel, because it will not be
put into the inventory until it is a proven
flying machine to do the Job it is sup-
posed to do. I want to say to the gentle-
man from Iowa I share his opinion and
his observations about the difficulty of
getting information.
Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Iowa has expired.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I wonder
if we could place a limitation on the de-
bate. I ask unanimous consent that all
debate on the amendment be ended at
2:15.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Louisiana?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr.
BUCHANAN) .
Mr, BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in opposition to this amendment, and
address myself to the remarks made ear-
lier concerning the alleged double stand-
ard in which we seek to judge the Soviets
by their capabilities while we ask the
world to judge us by our intentions.
I would say we have a single standard,
a standard of performance, of the his-
tory of these two nations. Where is our
Poland? Where is our Hungary? Where
is our Czechoslovakia? Where are our
captive nations? Where is there one
shred of evidence that this Nation has
sought anything other than the freedom
and self-determination of the peoples
of the world at great sacrifice to the
United States?
Yet look at the record of the Soviet
Union, and it becomes crystal clear we
had better judge the Soviets by their
capabilities. Their record is one of the
subjection of the people by force and
without free elections to the absolute
rule of a Communist minority, both in
the Soviet Union and in its captive na-
tions. Their record is one of the extreme
and persistent abrogation of human
rights, including an absolute disregard
of the right of self-determination for any
people to whom they can extend their
Colonial rule. Nor has there to my knowl-
edge been any retraction of their stated
and restated intention to "bury us" and
to ultimately achieve world domination.
Before the judgment bar of history,
their growing military strength stands as
a clear threat to world peace. The same
record reflects our strength to be, in con-
trast, the world's best hope for peace.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
JAcotts).
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I com-
mend the gentleman from Alabama for
pointing out the problem of a double
standard, because we have been told
here in this debate that the Soviet
Union has anti-ballistic-missile weapons
that can shoot down items in the sky
going 1,700 miles an hour. And we are
also being told we must update, as the
gentleman from New York says, a bow
and arrow that will go 2,000 miles an
hour.
My question is: How will these up-
dated bows and arrows get past that
superduper defense that has been estab-
lished in Moscow?
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from New York, (Mr.
PIKE).
(By unanimous consent, Mr. PIKE
yielded his time to Mr. NEDzi.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr.
FRASER) .
Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, again we
are asked to approve a new version of
our strategic delivery system, a new
strategic bomber which will add to our
nuclear arsenal. In addition to the figures
which are on this chart, indicating 9,100
warheads after we MIRV our submarines
and half of our Minuteman missiles, we
are asked to add a new bomber to this
9,100, giving something on the order of
an additional 1,700 deliverable warheads
or bombs, to take us up to a total of
about 11,000 warheads or bombs.
Let me again, contrast that with the
Soviet position as of September 1 of last
year of 1,300 deliverable warheads or
bombs. Every single strategic system we
have?the three modes?is going to be
increased by the money in this bill. At
some point we need to call a halt.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL)
(Mr. HALL asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think we
need to clarify the atmosphere. This is a
follow-on, armed, manned, strategic air-
craft. We have been planning it for a
long time in the Research and Develop-
ment Committee and in the Airlift Sub-
committee. It does have the planned
capability of standoff penetration by
long-ranged air to surface missile, be-
cause of the Golosh and the Tallinin sys-
tems of Soviet defense; which we will
need in case of response, or retaliatory
capability. Members of the Airlift Sub-
committee have visited the mock-ups of
these B-1's. There are definite fall-outs
from the XB- or SB-70, on the beryl-
lium and titanium techniques, honey-
combing, hi-thrust propulsion units, and
so forth.
It is in competition. The competition is
ready for announcement and/or decision
on or about May 15. It would be disas-
trous to the future defense of this Nation
if, by an action of those who live on hope
instead of full backgrounding and knowl-
edge, we struck by amendment in a willy-
nilly fashion the capability of following
on our B-52's and B-58's and the FB-
111's, under these circumstances.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly recommend
that this amendment be defeated.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
NEozr).
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I shall not
belabor the arguments which have been
made, but it appears to me, when we are
having such dire economic problems in
the country, it is a time when we should
be absolutely certain of what we are
doing when we launch upon a $2.3 billion
program.
That is precisely what we are doing.
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The B-1 program is of questionable value
when it comes' to our military posture.
We do not know what the costs will be.
In the light, of the pathetic require-
ments which exist in other problem areas
of the country, this amendment should
be agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr.
Muss) .
(By unanimous consent, Mr. RIVERS
yielded his time to Mr. Mimi') .
- The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr.
HEBERT) .
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, obvi-
ously there is little or nothing more to
be added to the debate which we have
had today.
Backed up against what has been said
on the floor today I submit the record
of 7 years of hearings by a special sub-
committee of the Committee on Armed
Services, of which the distinguished gen-
tleman from Michigan was a ranking
member.
I cannot too eagerly or too strongly
Stress the necessity for defeating this
- particular amendment at this particular
time. We cannot throw away 7 years of
constant study and effort on the part
of the Armed Services Committee, in its
endeavor to protect this Nation and to
give it a mix in our attack forces and
a Mix in our defense forces.
The passage of this amendment would
be the abandonment of a follow-on
bomber, which we cannot afford at this
particular time.
The rejection of the amendment will
give notice to the Russians that we are
dedicated to the proposition that we will
fill our inventory from day to day with
the most advanced weaponry at our com-
mand.
Mr. Chairman, I certainly urge once
again the defeat of this particular
amendment,
The CHAIRMAN, The qnestion is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Michigan (Mr. NEnzr) .
The question was taken; and the
Chairman announced that the noes ap-
peared to have it.
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I demand
tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chair-
man appointed as tellers Mr. NEozx and
Mx. RIVERS.
The ,committee divided, and the tell-
ers reported that there were?ayes 51,
noes 91.
So the amendment was rejected.
AleiENDMENT OFFERED DT MR. RINGTIA1VI
Mr. BINGTIAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BlIsTGHAM:
On page 2, line 3, delete "$2,452,200,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "81,724,200,000".
(ML Bzygivoil asked and was given
perinission to revise and extend his re-
Mr. BINGHAM, Mr. Chairman, this
iliteridinentyretkld eliminate $658 million
of procurement funds?and] emphasize
procurement funds?for the P-14. It
would not touch research arid develop-
ment funds for the development of the
F-14A, B, C. The F-14 is a plane which
is highly controversial. It is controversial
both as to cost and as to performance.
The Pentagon estimates the total cost
anticipated for these planes at $11.8 bil-
lion. Other experts estimate the total
cost will run as high as $25 billion.
The performance of.. the F-14 is also
gravely in doubt. It is one of the most
complex fighter-bomber carrier planes
ever proposed. It is supposed to perform
many missions including fleet air defense,
air superiority, escort, air-to-ground at-
tack, and cruise missile defense missions.
It must carry a Phoenix missile for the
purpose of the defense of carriers. This
is one of its primary responsibilities. This
means it will be a heavy aircraft. Many
of the pilots who have flown this plane
are known to have criticized it on the
ground that it will not be as maneuver-
able as the Mig-21 that it will be up
against. Its acceleration will be relatively
poor, at least until the new engine can
be developed for the F-14B. This bill
provides for the procurement of 26 copies
of the F-14A, the one with the unim-
proved engine.
If the F-14 as designed proves out, it
will indeed be a miracle plane, but no-
body knows whether it will prove out,
because it has not been flight-tested and
will not be flight-tested until next
January.
The Congress knows what happened
with the F-111. Let us not have a repiti-
tion of that disaster.
Mr. Chairman, the GAO has recom-
mended against the procedure of going
ahead with procurement before R. & D.
is completed, which is the procedure con-
templated here.
There is no need for a special speed-up
in this situation because the Navy admits
that the potential threat to the carrier
fleet, which is the primary threat that
the F-14 is supposed to meet, is years
away.
Mr. Chairman, last year I proposed a
similar amendment to defer the produc-
tion funds and proceed with research and
development on the F-14. The House re-
jected that amendment in the authoriza-
tion bill, but the Appropriations Com-
mittee in its wisdom recommended that
the procurement funds be eliminated and
added to the research and development
funds so that research and development
could proceed.
Mr. Chairman, no one argues that a
successor to the F-4 will not be needed,
but there is grave question as to how we
should proceed. Should we go ahead with
the procurement which would be called
for in this bill of 26 copies of this plane
at a cost of $658 million when it is still
8 months away from any flight testing
whatsoever?
What this amendment would do would
be to defer the production procurement
funds and to allow the Navy to proceed
with the necessary research and devel-
opment.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for support of this
amendment in order to save $658 million
and to prevent what may otherwise prove
to be as great a disaster as the F-111.
Mr. STRATTON. I move to strike
the last word.
(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I do not anticipate tak-
ing the full time because I think the
members of the committee are aware of
the fact that this amendment, which has
just been offered by the gentleman from
New York, is the same amendment he
offered last year and which did not get
very far last year, and there is even less
reason for considering it seriously this
year.
The gentleman says that this is a
highly controversial plane, the F-14. As
a matter of fact this is so uncontrover-
sial a plane that even the bitterest
critics of excessive and wasteful spend-
ing in the Pentagon who are members
of our committee have not undertaken to
oppose this particular aircraft. They are
familiar with it. They know what it can
do.
Mr. Chairman, I think this amend-
ment is an example of what happens
when one who has not had the oppor-
tunity of examining some of the details
of the defense budget nevertheless offers
an amendment?in good faith, of
course?but one that is not going to
accomplish what he thinks it would
accomplish.
Mr. Chairman, let me just point out
that we have recently been told some of
the horrors of the F-111, the old TFX.
Well, of course, the biggest problem that
the F-111 got into was in connection with
the version to be used by the Navy. And
the Navy recognized, very wisely, at a
very early stage, that there was no point
in going ahead with the F-111 for car-
rier use because it could not effectively
be used on a Carrier. So, what the Con-
gress ordered was an adaptation of the
F-111, with all of the existing tech-
nology, in a reduced version so that we
would not have to go beyond the present
state of the art. We ordered the Navy
to come up with a modern fighter air-
craft for carrier use to be flown now and
not at some vague, future time. That is
what the F-14 is.
As the gentleman from New York him-
self indicated, this plane is going to be
flying by January of next year. We are
not talking about something that might
happen in the remote future. These are
the planes that are going to be needed on
our carriers in the immediate future.
Mr. Chairman, I have had the privi-
lege of serving on the Carrier Subcom-
mittee?and, presumably, we, will be into
that question in a few moments?but let
me just say that of all the critics of the
CVAN-70 that came before our subcom-
mittee, not a single one was opposed to
the aircraft carrier as such. Some of
them were opposed to the total number of
carriers that the Navy wanted. Some of
them were opposed to authorizing a new
carrier in this 1971 budget rather than
another year. But they all said carriers
are great and that America needs them.
But you cannot have carriers without
having planes to fly on them.
The F-4 is a great plane, but that was
first put down on the drawing boards
back in 1953, and hi the years since then
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30, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
the Soviets have developed eight new
modern, fast fighters. So if we are going
to have an up-to-date Navy, and if we
are going to have up-to-date carriers
that will protect our forces as we with-
draw from all our exposed positions in
Europe and the Pacific, as the Nixon
doctrine suggests, the one thing that
will provide American power around the
world and back up our forces wherever
they may be, and will serve as a dem-
onstration of support for our friends
without requiring us to go ashore and
put men ashore, it is the aircraft car-
rier. So for heaven's sake let us put a
modern plane on the carriers that we
still have.
This F-14 is the plane that will do the
job.
Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to this amendment of the
gentleman from New York (Mr. BING-
HAM).
A great deal of thought, effort, and
discussion has been expended in rela-
tion to the needs of the modern Navy's
attack carrier fleet. I should like to take
this opportunity to present a few perti-
? nent remarks on the defense of that fleet,
regardless of its ultimate size or com-
position. I refer to the aircraft known
as the F-14.
The need for a new air superiority
fighter aircraft has been well-doCU-
mented.. The current backbone of the car-
rier fighter force is the F-4 Phantom.
This venerable aircraft has, unfortunate-
ly, reached its ultimate designed capa-
bility. It has been modified and improved
to the extent that further effective modi-
fication is no longer economically feasi-
ble. Although still an excellent fighter
and proven versatile tactical bomber, the
Phantom can be beaten, At least two air-
craft in the current, operational inven-
tory of the U.S.S.R. have exceeded the
performance characteristics of our best
bird.
Now what this means is that in terms
Of fighter air defense, in particular the
defense of attack carriers, the United
States is second, not first. We can no
longer claim that our fighter escorts and
carrier air protection are unbeatable. We
can no longer be absolutely assured of
adequate protection for our bombers, our
attack aircraft, our reconnaissance air-
craft, or even our aircraft carriers.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot tolerate such
a situation. We must never accept any
role that would place the Armed Forces
of this country at an acknowledged dis-
advantage.
This bill provides $517 million for the
Purchase of 26 F-14A's with $60.1 mil-
lion for advanced procurement of long-
lead-time items, $80.9 million for initial
spares, and $324.2 million for R.D.T. & E.
These expenditures would remove the
serious handicap currently facing our at-
tack carrier forces. They would, in my
opinion, return the,Navy to its deserved
status of quiet confidence from its pres-
ent state of prayerful hesitance.
Mx, Chairman, the F-14 is no antique
biplane. Conversely, the Mig-21 is not
the ultimate weapon. But does the mag-
nitude of difference have to reach such
ridiculous proportions before we do
something about it? I certainly hope not.
Mr. Chairman, the United States is in
second place in air superiority aircraft.
The F-14 will change that and I urge
its authorization.
(Mr. WRIGHT, asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
[Mr. WRIGHT addressed the Com-
mittee. His remarks will appear here-
after in the Extensions of Remarks.]
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr, 13mIcHANI)
The question was taken, and on a divi-
sion (demanded by Mr. BINGHAM) there
were?ayes 22, noes 66.
So the amendment was rejected.
SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR.
MOORHEAD
Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I of-
fer an amendment in the nature of a
substitute.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment in the nature of a substitute
offered by Mr. MOORHEAD:
Strike out all after the enactment clause
and insert the following:
"TITLE I?PROCUREMENT
"Sac. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to
be appropriated during the fiscal year 1971
for the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles,
and other weapons, as authorized by law, in
amounts as follows:
"Aircraft
"For aircraft: for the Army, $279,775,000;
for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $2,329,-
590,000; for the Air Force, $3,149,155,000 of
which $344,400,000 is authorized only to meet
unfunded prior year production commit-
ments on C-SA aircraft.
"Missiles
"For missiles: for the Army, $1,032,270,000;
for the Navy, $899,270,000; for the Marine
Corps, $26,220,000; for the Air Force, $1,430,-
035,000.
"Naval Vessels
"For naval vessels: for the Navy, $2,863,-
205,000, of which $570,000,000 is authorized
to be appropriated only for expenditure in
naval shipyards: Provided, That none of the
funds authorized for appropriation by this
Act for the construction of naval vessels shall
be obligated until the National Security
Council has advised the President of its rec-
ommendation in respect to construction of
the attack aircraft carrier designated as
CVAN-70.
"Tracked Combat Vehicles
"For tracked combat vehicles: for the
Army, $195,890,000; for the Marine Corps,
$46,265,000.
"Other Weapons
"For other weapons: for the Army, $64,790,-
000: Provided, That none of the funds au-
thorized for appropriation by this Act shall
be obligated for the procurement of M-16
rifles until the Secretary of the Army has
certified to the Congress that at least three
active production sources for supplying such
weapons will continue to be available within
the United States during fiscal year 1971; for
the Navy, $2,649,550; for the Marine Corps,
$4,180,000.
"TITLE II?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST, AND EVALUATION
"Sze. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to
be appropriated during the fiscal year 1971
for the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States for research, development, test, and
evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts
as follows:
?
113741
"For the Army, $1,565,505,000;
"For the Navy (including the Marine
Corps), $2,087,435,000;
"For the Air Force, $2,764,215,000; and
"For the Defense Agencies, $437,665,000.
"Sm. 202. There is hereby authorized to
be appropriated to the Department of De-
fense during fiscal year 1971 for use as an
emergency fund for research, development,
test, and evaluation or procurement or pro-
duction related thereto, $47,500,000.
"TITLE III?RESERVE FORCES
"Szc. 301. For the fiscal year beginning
July 1, 1970, and ending June 30, 1971, the
Selected Reserve of each Reserve component
of the Armed Forces will be programed to
attain an average strength of not less than
the following:
"(1) The Army National Guard of the
United States, 400,000.
"(2) The Army Reserve, 260,000.
"(3) The Naval Reserve, 129,000.
"(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 47,715.
"(5) The Air National Guard of the United
States, 87,878.
"(6) The Air Force Reserve, 47,921.
"(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 16,590.
"SEC. 302. The average strength prescribed
by section 301 of this title for the Selected
Reserve of any Reserve component shall be
proportionately reduced by (1) the total au-
thorized strength of units organized to serve
as units of the Selected Reserve of such com-
ponent which are on active duty (other than
for training) at any time during the fiscal
year, and (2) the total number of tndividual
members not in units organized to serve as
units of the Selected Reserve of such com-
ponent who are on active duty (other than
for training or for unsatisfactory participa-
tion in training) without their consent at
any time during the fiscal year. Whenever
any such units or such individual members
are released from active duty during any fis-
cal year, the average strength for such fiscal
year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve
component shall be proportionately increased
by the total authorized strength of such
units and by the total number of such in-
dividual members.
"TITLE IV?GENERAL PROVISIONS
"Sze. 401. Subsection (a) of section 401 of
Public Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966
(80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
" 'Funds authorized for appropriation for
the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States under this or any other Act are au-
thorized to be made available for their stated
purpose to support: (1) Vietnamese and
other Free World Forces in Vietnam (2)
local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for
related costs, during the fiscal year 1971 on
such terms and conditions as the Secretary
of Defense may determine?
"SEC. 402. No part of the funds appro-
priated pursuant to this Act may be used at
any institution of higher learning if the
Secretary of Defense or his designee deter-
mines that at the time of the expenditure
of funds to such institution recruiting per-
sonnel of any of the Armed Forces of the
United States are being barred from the
premises of the institution except that this
section shall not apply if the Secretary of
Defense or his designee determines that the
expenditure is a continuation or a renewal
of a previous grant to such institution which
is likely to make a significant contribution
to the defense effort. The Secretaries of the
military departments shall furnish to the
Secretary of Defense or his designee within
60 days after the date of enactment of this
Act and each January 30th and June 30th
thereafter the names of any institutions of
higher learning which the Secretaries deter-
mine on such dates are barring such recruit-
ing personnel from the campus of the insti-
tution.
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00210005-9 April 30,
190
V?QUARTERLY CONTRACT - RE-
. PORTING AND GAO AUDITS
"SEP. 501. (a) After January 1, 1971, the
Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to
in this section as the Secretary'),' in coopera-
tion with 4he Comptroller General of the
United. States (hereafter referred to in this
section as the 'ComPtroller General'), shall
develop a reporting system for major acqui-
sition programs managed by the Department
of Defense, any department or agency there-
of, or any armed service of the United States,
for the development or procurement of any
Weapons system or other need of the United
States.
"(b) The Secretary shall cause a review to
be made of each major acquisition program
as specified in subsection (a) during each
period of three calendar months and shall
make a finding with respect to each such
contract as to--
'(1) the estimates at the tinie pf the origi-
nal plan as to the total dost of the program,
with separate estimates for (A) research,
development, testing, and engineering, and
(B) production;
"(2) the estimates of the Department of
Defense of Q0,5t for completion of the pro-
gram uri- to the time of the review;
"(3) the reasons for any significant rise or
decline from prior cost estimates;
"(4) the options available for additional
procurement, whether the department or
agency concerned intends to exercise such
options, and the expected cost of exercising
such options;
"(5) significant milestone events associ-
ated with the acquisition and operational
deployment of the weapon system or item
as contained In the plan initially approved
by the Secretary, actual or estimated dates
for accomplishment of such milestones, and
the reasons for any significant variances;
"(6) the estimates of the Department of
Defense as to performance capabilities of
the subject matter , of the program, and the
reasons for any significant actual or esti-
mated variances therein compared to the
performance capabilities called for under
the original plan and as currently approved;
and
"(7) such other information as the Secre-
tary shall determine to be pertinent in the
evaluation of costs Incurred and expected
to be incurred and the effectiveness of per-
forzna,noe achieved and anticipated under
the program.
"(c) The Secretary after consultation with
the Comptroller General and with the chair-
man of the Committees on Armed Services
and the Committees on Appropriations of
the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall prescribe criteria for the determina-
tion of major acquisition programs under
subsection (a).
"(d) The Secretary shall transmit quarter-
ly to the Congress and to the Committees
on Armed Services and to the Committees
on Appropriations of the Senate and the
House of Representatives reports made pur-
suant ti? EillbSOCAOLI (P), which shall include
a full and complete statement of the find-
ings made as a result of each program re-
view.
(e) The Comptroller General shall,
through test checks, and other means, make
an independent audit of the reporting sys-
tem developed by the Secretary and shall
furnish to the Congress and to the Commit-
tees on ArMed. Services and the Committees
on Appropriations not less than once each
year a report, as to the adequacy of the re-
porting system, and any recommended im-
."(1) The Comptroller General shall make
independent audits of major acquisition pro-
grams and related Contracts where, in his
opinion, the -Wets inourred and to be in-
curred., e delivery schedules, and the ef-
fectiveness of performance achieved and
anticipated are such as to warrant such
audits and he shall report his findings to
the Congress and to the Committees on
Armed Services and the Committees on Ap-
propriations of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives.
"(g) Procuring agencies and contractors
holding contracts selected by the Comptrol-
ler General for audit under subsection (1)
shall file with the General Accounting Office
such data, in such form and detail as may
be prescribed by the Comptroller General,
as the Comptrolled General deems necessary
or appropriate to assist him in oarrying out
his audits. The Comptroller General and any
authorized representative of the General Ac-
counting Office is entitled, until three years
after final payment under the contract or
subcontract as the case may be, by subpena,
inspection, authorization, or otherwise, to
audit, obtain such information from, make
such inspection and copies of, the books,
records, and other writings of the procuring
agency, the contractor, and subcontractors,
and to take the sworn statement of any
contractor or subcontractor or officer or em-
ployee of any contractor or subcontractor,
as may be necessary or appropriate in the
discretion of the Comptroller General, re-
lating to contracts selected for audit.
"(h) The United States district court for
any district In which the contractor or sub-
contractor or his officer or employee is found
or resides or in which the contractor or sub-
contractor transacts business shall have ju-
risdiction to issue an order requiring such
contractor, subcontractor, officer, or employee
to furnish such information, or to permit
the inspection and copying of such records,
as may be requested by the Comptroller Gen-
eral under this section. Any failure to obey
such order of the court may be punished by
such court as a contempt thereof.
"(1) There are hereby authorized to be
appropriated such shills as may be required
to carry out this section."
Mr. MOORHEAD (during the read-
ing) . Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be consid-
ered as read and printed in the RECORD.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Penn-
sylvania?
There was no objection.
(Mr. MOORHEAD asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, on
behalf of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
SCHWENGEL) and myself, I rise in support
of this efficiency amendment which I be-
lieve is a step all of us can take on behalf
of the increasing beleaguered American
taxpayer. We have limited resources in
this Nation to maintain our national se-
curity and sustain a quality of life befit-
ting a great nation. We can no longer
tolerate wasteful and inefficient use of
our resources in the name of national
security or aggregate demand or any
other guise.
Over the last year I have heard testi-
mony before the Military Operations
Subcommittee and the Joint Economic
Committee, on which I serve, which
would make any taxpayer weep. We have
heard procurement horror stories which
range from the infamous $2 billion cost
overrun on the C-5A; to the Mark II
Avionics?the brain of the F-111 h' h
now costs more than the original estimate
for the whole aircraft; to the Mark 48
Torpedo which the Navy told the Con-
gress they could buy for $65,000 a copy
and for which they just let a contract for
the astronomical figure of $1.2- million
per copy; to the production of tanks for
which the Army had no usable amuni-
tion; to the deletion of overrun figures
from Air Force internal reports because
of possible adverse effects of the con-
tractor stock on the stock exchange if
the information became public.
It is instructive to point out that the
first casualty of poor procurement prac-
tices is the guy out in the field or in the
air who either does not have the weapon
system because of schedule slippages or
is provided with a faulty weapon or one
that does not meet specifications. Our
submarine forces still do not have the
Mark 48 torpedo. They were scheduled
to receive it in 1968. The Air Force cur-
rently has several hundred F-ill's which
do not meet specifications and are cur-
rently grounded with wing problems. Yet,
according to press reports, the contractor
for the F-111 may make a profit on this
defective aircraft.
These are only a few of the stories that
could be recited. Gordon Rule, the Chief
of Naval Procurement, told the Joint
Economic Committee that contractors
and the Pentagon play games with the
Congress. How much longer can the Con-
gress and the American taxpayer tolerate
these games?when billions of dollars are
involved?
' Waste and inefficiency in defense pro-
curement is not a partisan issue. The tax
money of the American public has been
wasted by the Pentagon under Demo-
cratic as well as Republican administra-
tions. It is interesting to note that this
amendment is supported by various
groups spanning the political spectrum
from the National Taxpayers Union to
the Americans for Democratic Action. It
is not our purpose here to discuss the
question of national priorities?rather,
what we are concerned about here today
is the single important issue of eliminat-
ing waste at the Pentagon and of reliev-
ing an unfair burden on the American
taxpayer. We are also concerned about
making information on Pentagon pro-
curement available to the Congress of
the United States, the representatives of
the American people.
Mr. Chairman let us consider these two
effects of the amendment.
First. It would provide for a 5-percent
efficiency cut in the total authorization
of $20.24 billion, or a little over $1 billion.
Second. It would create a quarterly re-
porting system to the Congress by the
GAO on major weapons acquisition pro-
grams.
THE 5-PERCENT EFFICIENCY CUT
The 5-percent cut would mean an
immediate savings of $1.012 billion. Many
procurement experts have appeared be-
fore committees on which I serve and
have testified that if the Congress
adopted uniform accounting practices, a
Wider use of the "should-cost" pricing
technique, and tougher costs-perform-
ance measurement systems we could cap-
ture up to 30 percent of the total price of
many contracts in costs savings. This
also requires that the military services
get tough with contractors and deal with
them on a business-like basis.
The sponsors of this amendment feel
that the 5 percent figure is conservative,
realistic and attainable. Hopefully by
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April h, 1970
forcing increased efficiency we can also
realize future savings.
It is also the intention of the sponsors
of the amendment that the services do
not absorb this 5-percent cut by merely
reducing the number of weapons bought,
but to turn the efficiency screw on as
many contracts as possible on behalf of
the American taxpayer.
I think that two steps can be taken
now to partially remedy this situation:
First, but the military on notice that
they no longer have unlimited funds with
which to buy their hardware; and
Second, upgrade Congress' ability to
scrutinize major procurement programs
where billions of the taxpayers are in-
volved.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 113743
aao QT.martaty nEpoars
This part of the amendment--title
V?would provide a legislative basis for
the submission to Congress of quarterly
reports on costs and performance of
major weapon system contracts. The re-
ports would be analyzed by the GAO and
transmitted to the Congress. This much
of the amendment is already being car-
ried out. In addition the GAO would be
empowered to conduct independent au-
dits and analysis on programs and to su-
poena books which defense contractors
have in the past refused to supply. All
too often the Congress finds it nearly im-
possible to receive understandable and
timely information on costs, perform-
ance, specifications, and schedule changes
In major weapons programs. The amend-
Ment would establish a reporting system
designed to improve the timeliness and
qUality of information On major weapon
acquisition programs.
A similar amendment passed the Sen-
ate last year but was defeated on the
?
floor of the House by a teller vote of 99
to 102. This year, hopefully, we in the
Congress are wiser and " will demand
more and better information on these
costly programs.
I urge the adoption' of the substitute.
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MOORHEAD. I yield to the gen-
tleman.
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I rise
In support of my colleague and his
amendment and congratulate him on his
leadership.
Mr. Chairman, we have been allowed
to debate the military procurement and
research and development bill only 4
hours. A mere 4 hours is not enough time
for a serious discussion of a bill amount-
ing to $20 billion?one-tenth of our na-
tional budget. Such a meager time allo-
cation simply illustrates and underscores
many Members' dissatisfaction with this
bill, I oppose this bill, however, for rea-
sons far more susbtantial than the time
limitation on the debate, namely the un-
necessary and overpriced programs
funded by this bill.
I would call the attention of the Aleut-
bers to a r2cent report by the Congres-
sional ,quart,erly about Our defense
ep..(j2ing, in which they, citect the con-
c'1181941 (4 top most Defense Department
offi4als-7both, Military and civilian?
that we could cut $10 billion out of our
Military budget and improve our fighting
capability.
The most objectionable feature of this
bill is the ABM System. This country
already has, and plans to maintain,
three separate nuclear deterrent sys-
tems, each capable of destroying the
homeland of any attacker by itself?our
land-based missiles, our missile
equipped submarine fleet, and our jet
bombers. A Soviet attack could neutral-
ize only one of these deterrents and
would thus leave the Soviet Union open
to a fatal counterattack. As our leading
experts point out, only one deterrent is
necessary to deliver a successful coun-
terattack.
For years our experts have also told
us that missiles and jet planes were
diminishing the importance of the
Navy. Reportedly the Soviet Union is
deemphasizing its own Navy. Yet this
bill inexplicably gives the Navy $435
million more for ship construction than
even the Defense Department requested.
Far less justifiable is the $200 million
slush fund for the Lockheed Corp.'s
negligence. In effect, this provision di-
rects the citizens of this country to pay
for a company's lax managerial prac-
tices that would make any normal com-
pany go bankrupt. The Government of-
fers no such subsidies to other com-
panies and should not establish a pre-
cedent for Lockheed.
In the past few months, the President
and the Congress have taken stanch
stands against inflation. This bill pre-
sents us with a sufficiently clear case of
financial irresponsibility to mandate
the striking of these flagrantly over-
priced giveaway programs from the bill.
Otherwise, 1970 will become "the year
of the military giveaway" just as 1969,
in the words of the House Appropria-
tions Committee, was "the year of the
cost overrun."
" Our scrutiny of this bill should be
more stringent, not less, not only to
reorder our priorities, but also to achieve
a disciplined and efficient military de-
fense, which continual cost overruns
and faulty planning have prevented us
from realizing. A vote against H.R.
17123 is not a vote against our country's
military interests. On the contrary, as
Admiral Rickover has indicated, a vote
against this bill would spur the Defense
Department to improve its programs
and, in the long run to serve this Na-
tion's military interests far more effec-
tively and economically.
Mr. MOORHEAD. I thank the gen-
tleman,
(Mr. MOORHEAD asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
(Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike out the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I have listened with
avid interest to this debate. I think I
perceive a new day in the House. Mem-
bers of the House are beginning to assert
themselves. They are reflecting that they
are giving some very serious thought to
some important business that prevails
here and they are acknowledging once
again the spirit of our Government which
dictates that we as citizens should pre-
side over the Army, Navy and the defense
of our country.
I want to commend the debaters on
both sides who have been honest, fair
and forthright and who have spoken
with deep conviction. So are we, the co-
sponsors speaking with convictions and
after rather thorough study. In addi-
tion, we are reflecting the thinking of
the country?we think.
It is true, Mr. Chairman, one of the
major elements in the Defense Depart-
ment budget is military procurement.
Over the past few years, a number of
programs that have received congres-
sional support have proved far more
costly than originally estimated. In
some cases, it appears that contractors
have been woefully, and sometimes, some
believe wilfully inefficient in determining
the probable cost of producing the sys-
tems for which they are responsible.
Because of such wasteful practices, my
distinguished colleague (Mr. MOOR-
MAD the Congressman from Pennsyl-
vania, and I have offered an amend-
ment to the military authorization bill
which will answer to many of the charges
leveled against current military procure-
ment policy.
The efficiency amendment has two
parts. They are: A 5-percent cut in the
total authorization of $20.24 billion, re-
sulting in a saving of $1.012 billion; and
creation of a reporting system whereby
the Government Accounting Office will
report to the Congress on major weap-
ons acquisition programs on a quarterly
basis.
It is evident, Mr. Chairman, that cor-
porations that do busir ess with the Gov-
ernment follow a variation of Parkin-
son's law. In its latest incarnation, the
law reads: Corporate expenses rise to
a level that is equal to the amount that
can be squeezed out of the Government.
In order to combat this pernicious trend,
the amendment would in effect require
companies to become more efficient or
cease to do business with the Govern-
ment.
A number of persons have commented
on the gross inefficiency of defense pro-
curement. The indefatigable Admiral
Rickover, in testimony before a commit-
tee of Congress, stated that "paying more
than we should prevents us from buying
many items we need to defend the coun-
try." Over the past decade, Admiral
Rickover has pointed a number of times
to the wasteful management practices
both in the Defense Department and
those corporations that contract with it.
Robert Benson, formerly of the Comp-
troller's Office in DOD, wrote that "wip-
ing out the inefficiency would annually
save the Government $2.7 billion."
All too often, we in Congress are un-
aware of the development problems that
plague contractors. The second element
of the efficiency amendment would g9 a
long way in meeting that problem. It
would require the General. Accounting
Office to report to the Congress every
3 months , on the development of each
major weapons system. This reporting
would, in all probability, obviate such
problems as the Mark 48 torpedo and the
C-5A transport aircraft. At least Con-
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u 1970
gress Would not be presented with an un-
conscionable cost growth as was wit-
nessed in the case of the C-5A. Congress
would be able to assess on an on-going
basis vniether or not a Program was
being properly funded. We would not be
confronted with a cost growth of 443.9
percent in the case of the Mark 48 tor-
pedo, a 151.6 percent cost growth in the
case of the F-111, or a 249.2 percent cost
growth as in the case of the short range
attack misslle?SRAM. Congress would
then have the option of questioning the
management" practices of those concerns
responsible before they have become too
entangled in production problems, as
happened with the Lockheed Corp. as
regards both the C-5A and the Cheyenne
AH-56 helicopter.
The third section of the efficiency
amendment is more specific than the
other two. It is the deletion of the $200
million contingency fund for payment of
claims to Lockheed under the C-5A con-
tract pending outcome of litigation. This
amount represents nothing more than a
slush fund for Lockheed?sort of a gra-
tuity for mismanagement. The procure-
ment bill includes $544.4 million for pro-
curement, none of which will purchase a
single aircraft. Of this amount, the Air
Force admits to $344.4 million in cost
growth for which it is responsible. The
remainder is apparently to be allocated
to Lockheed in the event that after liti-
gation it turns out that the Air Force is
also responsible for further cost growth.
It is patent that the Air Force might have
a greater incentive to defend its own
position if it did not have money to give
away.
The efficiency amendment does not cut
the numbers of weapons to be purchased.
Rather, it is designed as an incentive to
contractors to be aware of and more
careful with the taxpayers' money. There
is no contention here Mr. Chairman that
contractors have no inherent right to
make a fair profit. It is my contention,
however, that they have absolutely no
right to so mismanage program= within
their area of responsibility that the tax-
payers pay far more than originally
anticipated.
I include the following:
?
FACT SHEET IN SUPPORT OF THE MOORHEAD -
SC HWENGP, EFFICIENCY AMEN DMENT
? This Amendment to the $20.24 billion
Procurement Bill is offered in the form of a
substitute bill. The Amendment is a con-
servative effort to build in an incentive for
more efficient acquisition of major weapon
systems and to gain greater visibility for the
Congress concerning the many multi-billion
, dollar contracts let bythe Pentagon. The
Amendment will not affect the purchase of
any weapon systems.
TIlE AranNsiassri ?
The ArnentiMent consists Of two sections:
a) A 5% efficiency cut in the total au-
thorization of $20.24 billion?resulting in a
reduction of 0,01.2 billion,
b) Creation of a !quarterly reporting sys-
tem to Vfig ,congress by the GAC on major
wenlibut itC0isition programs.
itatratsr,'t PERCENT EFFICIENCY CUT
' rag 5 R
Over thets , ar e Congress and the
atV
American taxpayers have been shocked by
the revelations ot tinge cost overruns and
charges of 'contractor inefficiency in almost
eyery-weaporiS program. The GAO in a recent
report to the Congress documented over $20
billion in cost overruns on only a few sys-
tems. (Attached is a partial list of those
overruns.)
Statements on contractor inefficiency
A. E. Fitzgerald, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force, before the JEC
on June 11, 1969 testified: "We annually
spend over one-third of our military pro-
curement funds to buy only waste and in-
efficiency . . in the operation of the major
contracts we could save as much as $5 billion
without compromising our national se-
curity."
A survey of the top corporate executives
as reported in "What Business Thinks" in
Fortune, September, 1969, concluded: "De-
fense expenditures are higher than they need
to be, mainly because of waste and ineffi-
ciency."
Robert Denson, a farmer analyst in Office
of the Comptroller of DOD, in the Washing-
ton Monthly wrote: "Wiping out the ineffi-
ciency would annually save the Government
$2.7 billion."
Admiral Hyman Rickover testified before
Congress: "Paying more than we should pre-
vents us from buying many items we need
to defend our country."
Senator Len Jordan (R-Idaho) during the
JEC Hearings in June, 1969, concluded: "The
ineffectiveness of cost control procedures
have been a result of the fact that contracts
with major suppliers tend to adjust to the
financial needs of the contractors."
The sponsors of the Amendment will make
it clear on the floor that the objectives of
this Amendment is to turn the efficiency
screw 5% on as many contracts as possible
on behalf of the American taxpayer and not
to merely cut the number of weapons bought.
RATIONALE OF GAO QUARTERLY REPORT ON
WEAPONS PROGRAMS
At present the Congress has no systematic
means of determining the cost and perform-
ance status of major weapons programs. The
Congress is too often at the mercy of the
eiltagon, who reveal only what they choose
and when they choose. Congress is often
faced with accomplished facts when it is too
late for corrective action.
This Amendment would enable the Con-
gress to determine systematically and fac-
tually the status of programs soon enough to
avoid repetition of some of the worst dis-
asters of the recent past. Last year, the GAO
documented over $20 billion in cost overruns
on only selected programs.
By aiding effective congressional scrutiny,
this example of preventative medicine will
help Congress meet effectively its responsibil-
ities to the American taxpayer. (A similar
amendment passed the Senate last year and
failed 102-99 on a teller vote in the House.)
NEWS RELEASE FROM THE NATIONAL
TAXPAYERS UNION
The National Taxpayers Union today called
upon all members of Congress to support a
5% reduction in FY 1071 Military Procure-
ment and Research & Development Author-
ization. James Davidson, Executive Director
of NTU said, "Congressmen Fred Schwengel
(R. Iowa) and William Moorhead (D. Pa)
have stood up on behalf of every taxpayer
in America in recommending an efficiency
reduction in Defense spending. It is common
knowledge that there is much waste in Pen-
tagon procurement. The examples of the
C-SA, the F-111, and the Mark 48 Torpedo
are still fresh in the memories of many tax-
payers. We cannot afford to provide a "carte
blanche" for waste merely because it oc-
curs under the guise of 'defense.'
"Leading experts," ,Davidson continued,
"whose knowledge and "patriotism are un-
questioned have testified that several bil-
lions more could be cut with no loss of mili-
tary potential Congressmen who fail to sup-
port the Amendment should be asked upon
what principle they support waste in the
Pentagon. There is simply no excuse for
tolerating misuse of the taxpayers money.
Ernest Fitzgerald, now of NTU'8 Board of
Advisors, was fired from the Pentagon when
he told the truth about military spending.
Politicians who fail to support prudence
should expect no better treatment at the
hands of the voters."
"The Schwengel-Moorhead proposal elimi-
nates only one billion dollars of the amount
authorized by the House Armed Services
Committee. Of this amount, as much as $435
million could be deleted from authorizations
for naval ship construction. This Naval Ship
Add-on was never requested by the Navy.
There is no dobut that It could be cut with-
out jeopardizing defense capability."
"The Congress should remember that pas-
sage of unnecessary appropriations for mili-
tary spending lends credit to the Marxist
charge that the U.S. economy is kept going
because of wasteful defense allocations. If
we spend one cent more than is necessary
we secretly acknowledge that the Marxists
are right. For this reason alone, every effort
at stewardship should be applauded by those
who understand that much of the world's
fate is decided in men's minds. We cannot
expect to defeat collectivism if we act as if
its policies were correct."
Davidson called upon Congress to remem-
ber the words of the late General Douglas
MacArthur . . . "indeed, it is part of the
general pattern of misguided policy that our
country is now geared to an arms economy
which was bred in an artificially induced
psychosis of war hysteria and nurtured upon
an incessant propaganda of fear, While such
an economy may produce a sense of seeming
prosperity for the moment, it rests on an
illusionary foundation of complete unreli-
ability and renders among our leaders al-
most a greater fear of peace than is their
fear of war."
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that all debate on
the amendment close in 3 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
South Carolina?
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I object.
I would like to be heard on the amend-
ment.
Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Indiana is recognized.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I am for
a strong national defense and always
have been, and I have been voting con-
sistently that way in this debate as I
have in the past and expect to continue
to do in the suture. But it is indeed diffi-
cult to determine in these matters, when
you are also a person who would like to
save some money for the taxpayers if he
could do so without damage to the na-
tional defense, as I happen to be, just
what if any proposals for reduction
ought to be supported.
Mr. Chairman, this becomes particu-
larly difficult because of the situation
which we always seem to have in this
body on this particular subject matter.
Unfortunately,. from my point of view,
most of the reductions which are pro-
posed seem to be advanced by gentle-
men, or at least too often are advanced
by gentlemen, whose devotion to the
principle of a strong national defense I
am not as well satisfied about as I would
like to be; and also often by gentlemen
whose standing as economizers do not
appeal to me as much as I would like, be-
cause, as to many of them, I practically
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113745
never hear them asking to reduce an ex-
penditure here except a defense expen-
diture.
On the other hand, gentlemen knowl-
edgeable in this field in whom I have a
little more confidence in some of these
respects and who might be able to en-
lighten me, by the time we get to this
stage on the floor, have done their argu-
ing in the committee, and they are com-
mitted to defend the bill. Therefore, it
Is very hard for an independent Member
of a cast of mind such as mine to decide
when, if ever, it is in order to accept a
cut. ,
This particular amendment does two
things, as I understand. It gives a statu-
tory basis for a cost report, which seems
to me a sound idea in and of itself, as far
as I can tell.
Then it cuts each item 5 percent. That
at least has the advantage that I do not
have to determine here how many C-5's
we need or what the technical merits of
the ABM mmY. be or how many carriers
we ought to have, because none of these
things are cut out by the amendment.
It is just a reduction in each figure
right across the board. On the other
hand, it is not a particularly scientific
approach, because undoubtedly there are
some items that ought to be cut more and
some that ought not to be cut at all.
We have just about one guide perhaps,
which is that on almost all appropria-
tions, defense and others, almost always
we have enough fat to take a 5-percent
cut.
Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. DENNIS. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr., Chairman, I
commend the gentleman from Indiana,
whom I think everybody at least on our
side of the 'aisle resiiects for his judg-
ment. I do not think anybody can call
him a flaming liberal. If anything,
think he is very economy minded and
conservative. I associate myself with his
remarks. It seems to me the conservatives
ought to be every bit as concerned, if not
more so, about defense spending, and I
think they ought to be willing to take the
lead to cut what I believe is a great deal
of fat out of the defense budget.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman
from Indiana.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr, Chairman, I thank
the gentleman from Illinois for his sup-
port, which I do appreciate.
Mr. Chairman, I was about to say that
It really is a puzzle to me, on a great
many of these things. I cannot say a cer-
tain element ought to be cut 5 percent
and something else not at all, from per-
sonal knowledge, and I do not want to
jeopardize- defense; yet I do feel that
almost any budget I have ever known
anything about has had at least 5 per-
cent of fat in it and possibly it will not
endanger anything to cut that.
I have wOndered why the gentlinnan
who offered thefi,mendment did not offer
it as a cut 41 the overall or total authori-
zation figj.ire.
The C14414:44N, The tiple'of the gen-
tleman from Indiana has expired.
(BY unanimous consent, Mr. DENNIS
was allowed to proceed for 1 additional
minute.)
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, / would
like to say that I am honestly inquiring
a bit on this one. I do not have a fore-
gone conclusion right at this moment,
although I have some inclination to sup-
port the amendment, but if I am wrong,
I would like to have the gentlemen on
the committee, perhaps the distinguished
chairman or others, give me some really
good convincing reason why we cannot
absorb a 5-percent cut, or why it would
jeopardize anything important if we did.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. DENNIS. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to say that I also, like the gentle-
man, want a dollar of defense for every
dollar we spend. In addition, I would like
to see us economize. But if the gentle-
man will recall?I do not have the exact
figures just now?the percentage of ex-
penditures for national defense today in
comparison with the gross national prod-
uct is the lowest since 1952.
Mr. Chairman, I have a real concern
in my mind that we are moving down
the road very rapidly to where we might
not get more time when we ought
to have more.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
Opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I have been here 30
years and 7. have heard of military waste
since I have been here. I have to make
the decision now. The buck stops on my
desk. So I told the gentleman from Il-
linois (Mr. PRICE) who is one of the most
dedicated Members in this Congress, to
find out where we can cut research and
development. I said, You cannot tell me
there is not some place where we can
cut research and development." He had
the best brains of the committee to work
with him to come up with a cut of a
little over a million dollars out of $7
billion.
When the President told the Congress
to reduce expenditures in the executive
department, he took it out of the De-
partment of Defense?$3 billion. We re-
duced, at the word of the distinguished
chairman of the Appropriations Com-
mittee, $5 billion, and most of it came
out of the Department of Defense. It is
always the Department of Defense?
those are the soldiers, sailors, marines,
and coastguardsmen, Do Members know
how much money we spend a year on
people in the Defense Department?just
people? Over $40 billion a year.
Go ahead and cut the 5 percent across
the board. We can cut it 1p percent. We
can cut it all out. We can throw the
whole kit and caboodle out. But if we
take a 5 percent across on this, we will
pay for it. It is as simple as that. Of
course, we can do it. But it is very un-
wise.
Th,e gentleman asked a question. Let
me see if I can answer it. Of course, the
gentleman is sincere about it. But the
bill which the gentleman brings to us
is a new bill. We have been in session for
over 10 weeks having hearings. Not once
did the gentleman ask us to come and
let him bring these things to our at-
tention. Yet he gets up here and he tells
us, with the authority of which he is
capable, the things that are wrong with
it. Even the gentlemen on the front row,
who have been disagreeing with me en-
tirely, are not going to support this.
They know this thing is ridiculous. This
is the most idiotic way on earth to run a
railroad.
The gentleman asked me how much we
cut this? It is $473 million less than was
authorized last year, and $1.7 billion
less than the Departmen,, requested last
year. We have cut it. We are down to the
bone.
This is a new bill the gentleman brings
in here to us. My job is to state what
the military needs. I will tell you that if
you want to really serve your country,
raise this budget. The bill is too low. Ask
any )ailitary man who is worth the salt
of the rank he holds in the service.
You cannot vote for a provision like
this, You will hurt everything we have in
the military.
If you want to cut, close up all the bases
and put your faith in the SALT talks.
Then you may live with your memories,
but your memories will not be security.
This is a bad amendment. This is a
bad bill. You cannot do it this way.
Our doors are always open. Nobody
has knocked trying to help us find a way
to answer the questions, based on the
allegations that have been made in this
well under this amendment.
Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS. Of course I yield.
Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, I ap-
preciate that you have done a great deals
of work. I know this is a very complicated
subject matter.
I believe this is why many of us are
concerned about this particular procure-
ment bill. About 2 years ago I asked you
on the floor of the House how much it
cost to develop the F-111B, the Navy
version of the so-called TFX. You said
at that time that you did not have those
figures, but .you would get them for me.
To date, I have never received that in-
formation from you.
I wonder how much it did cost to de-
velop the F-111B, which was completely
scrapped.
Mr. RIVERS. I am sorry that I do not
have that information. I just do not know
at the moment.
Mr. RICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, this is a serious amend-
ment and it should be seriously con-
sidered.
I believe that what Chairman RIVERS
has just said is absolutely right. This is
not the place to try to cut, nor the way
to cut.
If we are going to cut defense spend-
ing, the way we can do it, and the way we
can hurt the least, is to cut personnel.
As the chairman said, $40 billion of our
defense costs go into personnel. We do
not need the number of people we have
right now, but those we do keep need the
best weapons.
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Certainly we need the research And
devtopnentI we have" authorized or are
authorizing in this bill.
Our committee did cut. research and
development. We should not have cut re-
search and development, to keep our
defense strong.
To answer specificalli the question of
the gentleman from Indiana, this is a
bare bones budget as far as the Procure-
ment of weapons is concerned.
If wc want to Cut defense spending,
then start scaling down the ceiling on the
anion/it of personnel the military, serv-
ices can have. That is the way to cut the
budget. That is the way to cut it fast,
and the 'defense of this country will re-
main just as strong as it is right now.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. DENNIS. For 4nformatton, what
would the gentleman say to the proposi-
tion which, instead of trying to do what
the gentleman from Pennsylvania is do-
ing here in cutting each of these items
5 percent, would cut 5 percent off the
total and put a 5 percent lower ceiling
on the total expenditure, leaving the
selection of items to be reduced to the
Secretary?
Mr. HICKS. Of course, that has been
done in the past, as I understand it, in
times prior to when I came on this com-
mittee, and I understand it just does not
work when that is done, The military
have certain systems they want to get or
retain and they go ahead and push them.
If we are going to do our job, we have
to help to select those systems. If I were
going to choose that path, I would say
fine and cut out the ABM system, for
example, because I do not believe we
need the ABM. Ilowever, this nOUSe de-
cided we do need it. That is, the reason
why we cannot do it the way the gentle-
man suggests. I do say that we can save
substantial sums by placing a lower ceil-
ing on personnel and then give them
the very best weapons that we have, and
we will continue to have a strong defense.
Mr. JACOB8. Mr. t hairman, I move
to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, just a few minutes ago
I sat and listened to the chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services slan-
der the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
IL/ma's/km) by saying that "apparently
the gentleman from Illinois did not care
about his country." I have heard a lot
of excessive debate since I have been in
the House, but this rises to a new low.
The fact is that the gentleman from
Illinois cared enough about his country
to serve in its Armed Forces.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The, CH-AMMAN. The question is on
the amendment in the nature of a sub-
atitute offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD) .
-? The question was taken; and on a di-
via= (demanded by Mr. MOOEHEAD)
Ulvri.W.95IeS 27, noes 74.
the substitute amendment was re-
I ec
Ontatti irr ma. rust
Mr. ,FIKE, ph% Chairman, I offer an
anientitileat,
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered b Mr. Pram
Page 6, after line 6, insert a new section 403
as follows:
- "No more than half of the funds appro-
priated pursuant to this bill for G-5A or
S-3A aircraft, Cheyenne helicopters, or SRAM
shall be used until congress has approved a
settlement of the fiscal differences between
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and the Department
of Defense."
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PIKE. I yield to the chairman.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, a little
while ago, even though the gentleman
from Illinois accused me cif not giving
him certain information, that did not
justify me in reflecting on his patriotism.
I want to apologize to the gentleman,
and I ask unanimous consent to delete
that remark from the RECORD. This is
not based on what the gentleman from
Indiana said. Not at all.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South
Carolina?
There was no objection.
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, yesterday
when we started this debate I expressed
the hope that we could go through it
all without anybody questioning any-
body's motives at any time.
Frankly, I think we have done pretty
well in relation to what happened on
the floor last year. I think this has been
a pretty good debate. I think that we
can question the judgment of each other
very, very frequently and we frequently
do.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment which
I have offered does not cut one dime out
of the bill, because it has been made
somewhat obvious to me that the great
ground swell for reordering our na-
tional priorities is not yet quite strong
enough to cut any money out of the bill.
What it does is it says that on four pro-
grams, all of which are Lockheed pro-
grams, no more than one-half of the
money which this bill authorizes to be
appropriated can be spent or used until
there has been some overall settlement
between Lockheed and the Department
of Defense.
Now, the reason I offer this amend-
ment is to first, acknowledge that there
has to be some overall settlement be-
tween Lockheed and the Department of
Defense. They are about $1 billion apart,
with Lockheed saying the Government
owes them $660 million, I think, and the
Government saying, I think, that Lock-
heed owes them some money.
Mr. chairman, if we are going to re-
solve this by litigation, it is going to
dribble on for years and years and years.
For example, we are starting new C-
5A's at the rate of two every month and
with every one we start the spread be-
tween what Lockheed and what the
Government says gets bigger and bigger
and bigger.
In the meantime, Lockheed comes in
and says they are broke. Well, what are
they doing while they are saying they
are broke? Here is a publication dated
PeCember 1969. It, is aJAocklieed pub-
lication.. it is 100-and-something pages-
108 or 109 pages?of glorious public re-
lations on behalf of Lockheed. They are
197?0
mailing it around the country. This one
came to my district.
Now, Mr. Chairman, we say this is a
bare bones budget. Two weeks after the
Secretary of Defense came to the com-
mittee and said what trouble Lockheed
was in, they were spending their money
in this manner. This happens to be
Newsweek, a two-page ad in Newsweek.
This same ad was carried all over the
country in different publications. This is
how their money is being spent.
Well, if we are going to be asked to
bail them out, I think we have a right
to insist that the money not be spent
in this way. The postage alone in mail-
ing this from Burbank, Calif., was 14
cents. I do not know how many of them
they mailed out. I do not know how
much it cost to produce them. These ads,
I think, cost $27,000 in Newsweek. The
same ad was in Life magazine and in
Time magazine at one time.
Mr. Chairman, this is how they are
spending their money. Well, if they are
broke and if we have to bail them out
because they are broke, I think we ought
to get a final settlement of it.
My amendment would permit them to
spend one-half of the money. This would
let them get halfway through the year
before they had to come to a settlement.
but that could be done and should be
done.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. RIVERS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. RIVERS. Now, Mr. Chairman, let
us analyze this amendment. It is true
that Lockheed is in trouble. However, it
seems that the gentleman from New
York wants to keep on their back for-
ever and ever. We settled the item of the
$200 million last night. I produced the
document from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense saying that he would not permit
any of the $200 million to be spent until
satisfactory contractual arrangements
had been made with Lockheed and then
was cleared with the committee having
jurisdiction over this matter.
Now, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman in
his amendment takes in the whole busi-
ness of Lockheed's operations, including
the Cheyenne, the SRAM, the S-3A as
well as the C-5A. If you are going to do
this to Lockheed, why do you not do it to
every other defense contractor who is
having trouble, and they all are. Look
at their earnings. They do not make any
money out of the Government.
Have you forgotten World War II, the
arsenal of democracy? Now it is called a
vicious military-industrial complex.
I asked one of the contractors how
much he made out of the Government
contracts, and he said he did not make
anything. He said that if he did not have
a sideline on tools that he would not
make anything.
What does this amendment do? It
completely?completely?cuts off this
company's capacity to make long lead-
time contracts, and they will never be
able to achieve the thing that Admiral
Rayburn described as the bringing of all
systems together so that you do not lose
time. They would be wiped out. You
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would also 'wipe out thousands of small
cOntractors in this country. This could
not work. You could not enter into a con-
tract like that, this just simply could not
happen. And moreover you would not
have the Poseidon, and you would not
have the retrofitted Polaris, you would
not have the S-3A, the P-3C, the C-5A,
which is working. You would not have
anything, but you would have the pleas-
ure of stopping a company?you would
have the pleasure of stopping a company.
This might sound fine, but it Cannot
work. It positively cannot work. That is
how simple it is.
Mr. &RENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
- Ur. RIVERS. Of course I will yield to
the gentleman from Illinois.,
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I thor-
oughly agree with the gentleman from
South Carolina that this is a completely
destructive amendment, rather than be-
ing an objective amendment, because if,
as the gentleman says, it is going to slow
down or possibly stop some of the
essential production we need in this
country so as to keep America strong
and safe, then I think the amendment
? ought to be completely and overwhelm-
ingly defeated.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not
know how long in the future they make
contracts for ads in one of these maga-
zines. I would imagine it is many, many
-inenths, and I would recommend them
stopping it, although I do not know any-
thing about this. I do not know anything
about them _putting ads in magazines,
bit I would recommend that they stop
until they are out of their financial
Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to
help anyone because of sentiment, but
because it is for the security of America,
and if it not advantageous to the secu-
rity of this country then do not give
them anything, but cutting off a half a
loaf will not hurt Lockheed as much as
It will hurt you.
I urge you to reject this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York (Mr, Pu).
The Question was taken; and on a di-
vision (demanded by Mr. PIKE) there
were?ayes 21, noes 58.
?So the amendment was rejected.
AMENDMENT OFFERED DT MR, REID OF ilsw FORK
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman,
I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. REID Of New
York:
On page 6, following line 8, add the fol-
lowing new section:
"Sm. 406. In dile With the expressed, in-
tention of the President of the OniteAS tate%
no part of the funds authorize to be appro-
priated pursuant to this Act shad be used
t9 41-1=4.- $41.0 int4)7431Etion, _?of American
ground - combat Jroops into Laos, Thailand
or tar00410.."
?
? -
434E, RVID tiew York asked and
was Aven,-PerNissiOn to reldse an ex-
044.414 nal,eaud
RgulZ 44-$NeX York, Zolr. Chairman,
the purpose or this amendment is simple;
it is to prohibit the 13,se 4merican
ground conibat forces in Cambodia, Laos,
or Thailand,' rhe House, in my judg-
ment, is coequal with the Senate in this
regard, and it has to some extent been
derelict in the past for not taking a
position that is obviously clear, and I
think in this instance it must fulfill its
constitutional obligation and responsi-
bility.
In the fiscal year 1970 appropriation
bill for the Department of Defense, as
Members know, there is a limitation
based on the amendment offered by Sen-
ator COOPER and Senator CHURCH. pre-
cluding funds for the use of U.S. ground
combat troops in Laos or Thailand.
Last December, after the bill had been
signed and enacted into law, the admin-
istration, through Press Secretary Ziegler
said:,
Anyone familiar with the Nixon doctrine,
as outlined on Guam, knows the amendment
is totally consistent with the President's
policy. As we have said on a number of
occasions, there are no U.S. ground troops
In either country nor did this Administration
visualize under this bill putting any ground
-combat troops into these countries.
My amendment would have the simple
effect of adding Cambodia to this pro-
hibition on the use of ground forces. It
is a limitation. It provides no sanctions.
It has been repeatedly stated by the
President and high administration offi-
cials that there is no present intention to
use our ground combat forces in these
countries.
Since approving the amendment to the
appropriation bill last year precluding
the introduction of ground combat troops
In Laos and Thailand, President Nixon
has reiterated his desire to limit the war
in Asia?not to broaden it. He has said:
We have no plan for introducing ground
combat forces into Laos.
In addition, on explaining his doctrine
pronounced at Guam, he said in his No-
vember 3 speech:
In cases involving other types of aggres-
sion, we shall furnish military and economic
assistance when requested in accordance
with our treaty commitments. But we shall
look to the nation directly threatened to as-
sume the primary responsibility of providing
the manpower for its defense.
Finally, I would like to briefly 'quote
Secretary Rogers, who, when asked
whether Laos would become another Vi-
etnam, answered:
The President won't let It happen.
Continuing, he said:
I mean we have learned one lesson, and
that is we are not going to fight any major
wars in the mainland of Asia again and we
are nOt going to send Arnerican troops there,
SM we. certainly aren't going to do it unless
'we have the American public and the Con-
gress behind us.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is also
consistent with the national commit-
ments resolution passed by the other
body on June 25, 1969, by a vote of 70 to
16, expressing the sense of the Senate
that the U.S. Armed Forces should not be
used abroad or promised for use abroad
except by joint authority of the Presi-
dent and the Congress.
Mr. REUSS, Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr, REID of New York, I yield to the
gentleman.
,
Mr. REUSS, Mr. Chairman, I com-
mend the gentleman for bringing this
amendment .to, the floor, I support it.
We ought to be extracting ourselves
from Vietnam and not, implicating our-
selves in Cambodia.
I would ask the gentleman whether
in his amendment the words "American
ground combat troops" include the con-
cept of American combat advisers.
Mr. REID of New York. Yes, that is
correct,
Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. REID of New York. Further, as
Members know, article I, section 8, of the
Constitution gives the Congress the au-
thority to declare war, raise and support
armies, to provide and maintain a navy,
and to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval
forces.
These powers were authorized explic-
itly to the Congress as a vital part of
the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Alexander Hamilton, a strong advo-
cate of strong Executive power, wrote in
the Federalist -Paper No. 69 showing the
clear distinction between the British and
American systems in the delegation of
American power S to the legislature. He
said:
The President is to be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States.
In this respect his authority would be nomi-
nally the same with that of the King of
Great Britain, but in substance much in-
ferior to it. It would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of
the military and naval forces, as first gen-
eral and admiral of the Confederacy, while
that of the British King extends to the de-
claring of war and to the raising and regu-
lating of fleets and armies?all which, by
the Constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the legislature.
Indeed, in 1848 Abraham Lincoln, then
a Congressman, said:
Allow the President to invade a neigh-
boring nation whenever he shall deem it nec-
essary to repel an invasion and you allow
him to do so whenever he may choose to say
he deems it necessary for such a purpose and
you allow him to make war at pleasure.
Study to see if you can fix any limit to his
power in this respect, after you have given
him so much as you propose.
The provision of the Constitution giving
the warmaking power to Congress, was dic-
tated, as I understand it, by the following
reasons. Kings had always been involving
and impoverishing their people in wars, pre-
tending generally, if not always, that the
good of the people was to object. This, our
convention undertook to be the most oppres-
sive of all Kingly oppressions; and they re-
Solved to so frame the Constitution that no
one man should hold the power of bringing
this oppression upon us.
Dwight Eisenhower said very explicitly
in March 1954:
There is going to be no involvement of
America in war unless it is the result of the
constitutional process that is placed upon
Congress to declare it. Now let us have that
clear.
In a word, therefore, I think it is clear
that the Congress, and this House, must
not let its powers be eroded. We must not
back into a wider war.
Our responsibility is clear.
Further, this amendment in my judg-
ment is consistent--
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The CHAIR/WAN. The time of the gen-
tleman haS-q1Pired. -
(Mr. 4,440 pt New torKASILect#Pel VMS
given permission to proceed for 3 addi-
tionalnutes,)
Mr, Vhlt? pf New Xork, Axially, let me
just say I think this amendment is con-
%latent both with existing la4,? and with
the PreSidenw t's determination to narrow
_ the war and not to widen it.
I thin) 4,.Will,reassure the country that
there are limits to the extension of
American power.
Mr. IIORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RID of New York, 3 am happy
to yield to my colleague from New York.
Mr. *DORTON. I wish to commend the
gentleman for the amendment he has 9f-
fgred. I support it. I certainly think it is
a reasonable amendment, It s certainly
In line with the statements the Presi-
dent has made on minierous occasions
with regard to the Nixon doctrine.
On the ,eve of the President's message
to the Nation on the Cambodia Crisis, I
want to state publicly my own analysis
of the problems and priorities which
face us in Indochina,
Some background review is important
before discussing what our decisions
should be at this juncture.
First, the President is in the midst of
a laudable program to Vietnamize the
war in Vietnam and has made subatan-
tial progress in withdrawing American
Marine and Army units which serve in
an infantry or ground combat capacity.
During the unfolding of the President's
withdrawal program, the Communist
North, Vietnamese Military threat to ,two
nominally neutral nations, Cambodia
and Laos, has been severely intensified.
Both these countries, have been impor-
tant as sanctuaries and supply routes for
North Vietnamese and Vietcong units
operating in South Vietnam. But, until
recently, the neutralist governments of
LaOS and CAMbodia :were not immedi-
ately endangered, although there was
partial disclosure of American military
support efforts to help the Royalists in
Laos hold back Communist Pathet Lao
advances.
Then the overthrow of Prince Sihan-
ouk in Cambodia by an anti-communist
coup dramatically altered the focal point
of military confrontation in Indochina,
with the North Vietnamese seeking to
gain military and political control over
at least a substantial portion of Cam-
bodian territory, and announcing their
intention to install Sihanouk as a pre-
sumably Communist ruler of this terri-
tory.
A whole host of U.S. interests and for-
eign policy questions are being tested by
the decision our Government makes in
this crisis, Having been requested by
the neW"Cambodiap rsgime to send U.S.
militau hardware and assistance to use
against North Vietnamese and Vietcong
who are advancing on Phnom Phen, the
President must decide far more than the
desirability of supporting this fledgling
regime.
The following arguments have been
put forth m support of American mili-
tary assistance and involvement in Cam-
bodia:
First. That neutralization of Cam-
bodian territory, now in Communist
hands, is essential for the protection of
American troops remaining in South
Vietnam. The President has mentioned
repeatedly that he would not permit his
policy of withdrawal to endanger those
American GI's who remain on duty in
Southeast Asia. The use of Cambodia,
Particularly the "Parrot's Beak" area
nearest Saigon, as a military sanctuary
has made the task of allied troops in
Vietnam more cliffigult. The question is
whether this fact alone warrants Amer-
ican irivolvement in the confrontation
between two opposing Cambodian re-
gimes, and whether defense of U.S. troops
requires an active invasion deep into
Cambodia.
We must continue to protect the lives
of American soldiers remaining in South
Vietnam. In my view, military actions
we have been undertaking for many
months, permitting hot pursuit of enemy
units attacking from across the Cam-
bodian border, or seeking sanctuary in
Cambodia should not be curtailed if
deemed necessary to protect American
lives. But hot pursuit dqes not encom-
pass supporting or undertaking an in-
vasion of Cambodia, with the intent of
supporting the regime there. It may en-
cdrnpass supporting an action limited to
destruction of sanctuary areas used to
shelter Communist troops which Operate
In South Vietnam.
In the final analysis, the best way to
defend and protect American lives in
South Vietnam is to continue policies
that would enable these young men to
return home at the earliest possible date.
It is doubtful that any extension of our
military commitment into Cambodia
would hasten this homecoming.
Second. That the de facto control of
most of Laos by the Communists and the
current threat to Cambodia is proof of
the domino theory at work, and that if
the United States does not help restore
neutrality to these areas, Thailand will
be threatened next.
There is little Question that Commu-
nist military persistence, backward so-
cial organization, and the impoverish-
ment of the people of these countries
would have led to North Vietnamese
dominance if it were not for the presence
of large numbers of U.S. forces and
equipment in Thailand and South Viet-
nam, and for U.S. advisory and hard-
ware assistance to Laos. The question
is, Has our military involvement done
anything but postpone North Vietnamese
Communist dominance? Or, if Vietnam-
ization will be successful, will it take a
similar injection of American lives and
dollars to accomplish a stalemate in
Cambodia, or Laos, or later on, in
Thailand?
Third. A third argument is made that
the provision of adviser and hardware
assistance, short of sending U.S. ground
units, is consistent with the Nixon for-
eign policy doctrine announced in the
summer of 1969 in Guam. This, in my
judgment is too narrow an interpreta-
tion of the Nixon doctrine, The doctrine
does preclude the unilateral dispatch of
U.S. ground troops to a nation like Cam-
bodia, but it also requires, as a prere-
21 30, 197O
quisite to any U.S. assistance, a decision
by other free world governments in the
region to send material and troop sup-
port to defend a government threatened
by Communist military takeover. Al-
though there has been some discussion
that Thailand, the Philippines, Japan,
and Indochina, in addition to South
Vietnam and Korea should mount some
joint assistance program to the new
Cambodian regime, no positive steps
have been taken to carry out any such
plan. There is little question that the fall
of Cambodia to Communist rule is a far
more important threat to these East
Asian and Pacific nations than to the
United States.
The Nixon doctrine seeks to modify
the U.S. leadership of the free world,
and to remove from our shoulders the
primary burden of serving as world po-
liceman wherever anti-Communist gov-
ernments are threatened.
These arguments put forth for U.S.
involvement in Cambodia indicate the
far-reaching consequences of the Presi-
dent's decision. First, he must weigh
what commitment, if any, the United
States has to this or any Cambodian re-
gime. At what point would U.S. involve-
ment or assistance cease if the threat
to the current regime is not immediately
ended?
Second, he must weigh the actual
threat to American lives that continued
Communist occupation of Cambodia
would entail. Remembering that the
Vietcong and North Vietnamese have
been operating out of Cambodia for sev-
eral years, the question must be asked
whether the current threat to our troops
is so much greater now that it justifies
a widening of U.S. involvement in the
war across all of Indo-China, and going
beyond the restricted policy of hot pur-
suit.
Third, and perhaps most important,
the President must be aware that his
decision will set crucial precedents for
the application of his own Nixon doc-
trine. If he narrowly construes it to mean
that only the sending of organized units
of U.S. ground troops is prohibited, it
will mean little in terms of the changing
U.S. role in the world. Also, the role of
advisers to ground units of other nations
must somehow be explained in the con-
text of the doctrine. If we do not begin
now to apply the principle that free na-
tions in the threatened region must
choose to involve themselves before
America gets involved, ?then it will be
difficult if not futile to try to encourage
or enforce any regional defense concept
in the future.
The whole question of the Nixon doc-
trine and its application to Cambodia
and Laos includes the consideration of
the American crisis of national priorities.
We have, with the President's policy of
disengagement from Southeast Asia,
been moving toward a realistic balance
between military and domestic budg-
etary efforts. If suddenly the U.S. role
In Southeast Asia is widened, and not
narrowed, if our financial commitments
to these countries promises to tie down
billions of U.S. dollars in Indochina for
years to come, then we will not have met
the challenge of our most serious domes-
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tic crisis. At a time When the very in-
stitutions of American government are
being tested as to their adequacy and
relevancy to respond to the needs ?of our
people, this could be a disastrous error.
I believe strongly that the people of
the United States have no interest in
Cambodia that would override our in-
terest in disengaging from Southeast
Asia, or that would override the Presi-
dent's earlier announced intentions to
place the burden for defense of these
gdverninents on themselves and on other
free nations in the East and Southeast
Asian area.
Any commitment of U.S. treops, to Prop
up the new Cambodian regime, whether
as advisers or as ground units, will render
the most important plank of the Nixon
doctrine meaningless. Even if we were to
attain a quick military victory in Cam-
bodia, which is extremely doubtful, the
overall effect of U.S. involvenwnt will be
a widening of the Vietnam conflict
across the whole subcontinent of Indo-
china.
We in 1970, are still suffering from the
effects of a decision to enter a halfway
war in the early 1960's. Any risk of ex-
tending the United States into an escala-
tion or widening of this military stale-
mate should be avoided at this stage of
American history.
The military budget in this fiscal year
and the next is already too high. I have
voted on the House floor today, in teller
vdtes, to cut substantial amounts from
the military procurement bill in areas
where I believe national security is not
compromised and where domestic consi-
derations are overriding.
fully support the amendment offered
by the gentleman from New York (Mr.
REID) to prohibit the use of any U.S.
ground combat troops into Cambodia,
Laos, or Thailand.
No one has suggested that outfight
destruction s:if all Communist forces and
governments in Indochina is or should
be our goal. Without any justification
for a decision this drastic, there is ab-
solutely no justification for America
to extend its entry into a military hold-
ing action, or standoff confrontation
In Cambodia or Laos. It was a mistake
to sacrifice 41,000 Americans in Vietnam.
We must not make the same mistake
again, when the evidence is so clear that
other international and domestic Crises
may engulf us if we do.
The best way to protect American
tropps is not to,.enlarge the war to include
Cainbodiabut to bring American troops
home.
Mr. sraxmoN, Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the
gentleman from New york, ,
Mr., STRATTON. I appreciate the
gentleman's yielding. I wanted to under-
stand whether the gentleman's amend-
met, if it were Adopted, would prevent
the zi:Otbn thatls neW underway in the
Parrot's Beat seetion ef Caminclia, which
the, President is oparentLy going to dis-
eits,s 6.4 14037,140tenight. Would this
ameildnient _outlaw, that Activity even
before the PresIdent.has had an oppor-
tunity to explain what the situation is?
Mr. hvip of N'ew -York. I would say
to the gentleman that this is a limitation
on the use of ground combat forces. It
provides no sanction, but it clearly does
not preclude the use of funds for advisers
or air support.
Mr. STRATTON. This would not inter-
fere then with advisers, or with air sup-
port, or with medevac personnel and so
on, is that correct?
Mr. REID of New York. It does not
preclude their use. It provides no sanc-
tion for it. It provides a limitation
against the use of regular ground combat
forces.
Mr. STRA.TTON. Does the amend-
ment or does it not eliminate funds for
the kind, of people who are now operating
in the Parrot's Beak area?
Mr. REID of New York. It does not
preclude funds for advisers or for air
support.
Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle-
man. I am glad to have his statement,
Mr, GERALD R. FORD,_Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. REID of New York, I yield to the
distingiushed minority leader.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad
there was an apparent clarification of a
response that was given a moment ago.
If I recollect the question asked by the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REuss),
he asked whether your amendment
would preclude the military advisers. The
impression I got from the response was
that the amendment, under ground com-
bat forces, would preclude the utilization
of military advisers.
Mr. REID of New York. If the gentle-
man will permit me, my understanding
is that the gentleman from Wisconsin
asked whether the amendment would
permit the use of advisers. My under-
standing is that this amendment would
not preclude their use.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In other words,
your amendment would not in any way
interfere with the current operation the
President has authorized to destroy the
sanctuaries of the North Vietnamese and
the Vietcong in Cambodia?
Mr. REID of New York. It does not
preclude air support. It does not preclude
advisers. It does not preclude equipment.
But it does preclude the use of regular
American ground combat forces in
Cambodia.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of words.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I have in
the well of the House two maps I want
ell Members to see. I think if I get beside
them I can explain them best. I am indi-
cating the areas that are presently af-
fected. Just about everyone of my ac-
quaintance belives in the concept of hot
pursuit. The Vietcong troops would go
into sanctuaries inside of Cambodia and
Laos. We are now talking about Cam-
bodia. These areas to which lam pointing
are the areas where they have been caus-
ing the most trouble. Observe how close
that area is to Saigon?only 30 miles. We
have been wondering how they could
blow up Saigon every week. It was simple
for Sihanouk. They are only 30 miles
away. They could get the stuff where the
troops have R. & R. in very large deploy-
ment areas. They have all sorts of storage
areas there. They have training areas.
They have just about developed this
country as a staging area from which to
attack Vietnam.
Moreover, they have been flanking our
troops and causing terrific damage. We
could win the war right here. We tried to
get Sihanouk to let us do it. Nothing
doing. This crowd did let us do it. I do not
know how long this crowd is going to be
in business and running this country, but
while they are giving us the opportunity
to go in and wipe out what has killed so
many of our American boys, right on the
border?less than 25 miles in, because I
am not talking about going all over this
country and taking it over?we should
take advantage of the opportunity. This
is to our advantage and to the advantage
of the Vietnamese. We can get right
across the border and clean out the
bases. This is what they have been doing.
This is right along where the Ho Chi
Minh Trail comes, right down this way
(indicating) and through Laos and into
Cambodia, and right across into the Me-
kong. Nothing stops them.
We can go in there and intercept the
Ho Chi Minh Trail insofar as it applies
to Cambodia.
We do not want to stop the President
from doing that. I do not know what the
President is going to say tonight. I have
not talked' to him. But this is what he
has got to think about. If the Vietnami-
zation is going to succeed, we have to do
this first. It is as simple as that. I would
not want the gentleman's amendment
to keep us from going in and to keep us
from doing those things that all of the
generals?including Westmoreland and
Abrams?have told us we must do. But
while they are letting us do it, we are
doing what we have begged Sihanouk to
let us do. Members must remember when
Sihanouk captured our sailors.
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman
from Maryland.
Mr. LONG. of Maryland. Mr. Chair-
man, is it the chairman's opinion that
to accomplish this, we have to use ground
combat troops?
Mr. RIVERS. It is just across the
border, 25 miles across the border.
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair-
man, do we have to use ground combat
troops?
Mr. RIVERS. They would be on the
soil, yes, but it would not have anything
to do with running the government. It
Is doing what we want to do and what
we need to do. It will destroy these areas.
Until we destroy these areas, they will
Infiltrate South Vietnam forever and
ever, and the minute Sihanouk gets in,
we would not be able to get in there any-
way. These are the areas I am talking
about. See how every one of them is on
the border of the countries.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman
from Missouri.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think the
point needs to be made certainly that,
first of all, this border has not been sur-
veyed and it vacillates and the sanctu-
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arles are on the places where theoretical-
ly the border is not by treaty, but by mu-
tual agreement between these peoples
who oppose each other.
Second, our only men going in there
are in an advisory capacity to the Viet-
namese who, themselves, need to elimin-
ate these sanctuaries. Would the gentle-
marragree with that?
Mr. RIVERS. Yes.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentlemen yield?
Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman
from Indiana.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I think
it ought to be pointed out in addition
that throughout our history the Presi-
dent of the United States as Commander
In Chief has had and has exercised the
power and the authority on occasion to
land ground combat troops in case of
emergency. But under this amendment,
if American citizens' lives were being
jeopardized in Thailand or Cambodia?
or for that matter, in the Mediterranean
or anywhere else?the President could
not send the Marines in under this
amendment. This is no time or place
to attempt to circumscribe or reduce the
historical powers and peroga Lives of the
President of the United States.
Mr. RIVERS. Of course not. The Pres-
ident should be commended. This saves
the lives of our troops. We should have
done this long ago.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from South Carolina has expired.
(On request of Mr. NEDZI, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. Ft's/Eas was
allowed to proceed for 5 additional
minutes.)
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, as I say,
I have not talked with the President, but
this is undoubtedly what he has tcfrthink
about. These people have been standing
there and lunging at us and they have
the stuff in there, and do not let anybody
kid us about it. They will bring old
Sihanouk back there in short order.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman
from Michigan for getting me this addi-
tional time.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman
from Illinois.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I must
say I am in direct opposition on this
particular amendment.
Mr. Chairman, those who serve on the
Armed Services Committee, while we do
not have all the answers, are privileged
on occasion to ?get some inside informa-
tion. But, being 'activated, like every
Member of this House, by pure love of
our countrk, those of us who are priv-
ileged to know some of these things are
in direct opposition to this amendment.
It is not in the best interest of this
countrY?
Who can outguess the President of the
United States at this Particular time?
He is going to be on the television tonight
at 6' 0'.61Qpk.
. Mr. Cbairrnan, let us see what the
President is going to say. Then, after
what is ,4aid, we will support him in
what hwts;) done in the best interest
O f this 00111147-
,
. This is ril? time fel' is to say to the
man who has more information than
any other single person in America, who
is motivated by the same things we are
motivated by, what is to be done. I re-
peat, what is being done is what has to
be done for the sake of this country.
Mr. RIVERS. I agree with the gentle-
man.
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, the
gentleman yield?
?Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the distin-
guished gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. NEDZI. Would the chairman com-
ment on the headline which appears in
the Washington Daily News today which
summarizes or epitomizes a radio col-
umn which I heard this morning quoting
the Cambodian Government spokesman.
The headline says, "Cambodia as Neu-
tral Can't Approve Our Aid."
He clearly indicated, or at least was
quoted as saying aid was not asked for.
Mr. RIVERS. I do not know a thing
about that.
Any excuse we can get to go in and
help clean out this thing will help Viet-
namization and save the lives of Ameri-
cans. I would hate to see us do anything
to stop it.
Furthermore, we could never tell the
President how to run foreign policy. He
will tell us, as the gentlemen know, it is
none of our business.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS. Of course I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. REUSS. Do I have the gentleman's
position straight? Is it that the gentle-
man from South Carolina feels the
United States should introduce American
ground combat troops into Cambodia
and therefore opposes the Reid amend-
ment?
Mr. RIVERS. No; that is not true.
Mr. REUSS. Will the gentleman state
his position?
Mr. RIVERS. My position is we should
introduce troops in there if it is neces-
sary to remove those things which are
killing American boys. If we can do it
by way of the Vietnamese Army, by way
of giving them the material they need,
when thcy get there they will find enough
material.
Mr. REUSS. If we cannot do it by the
Vietnamese Army, would the gentleman
favor it with the American Army?
Mr. RIVERS. If we are ever going to
secure that country these things have to
be eliminated.
This is the only government that per-
mitted us to go in there. We have tried
every way before. This is the only gov-
ernment left.
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS. Certainly I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. REID of New York. I appreciate
the chairman's yielding.
Might I ask the chairman whether it
is now a matter of law we cannot intro-
duce ground combat forces into Laos and
Thailand?
Mr. RIVERS. That is right. That is a
mistake.
If there is any country we ought to
go to the aid of, if needed, it is Thailand,
because they let us come in there in the
darkest days of our adversity and never
told the world a thing. We built bases
ii 30, 1970
there and used our fighters and our
bombers out of Thailand.
To keep us from going to their aid is
just a monumental act of ingratitude, in
my opinion.
Mr. REID of New York. One final quick
question, and I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
If the President did send ground com-
bat troops into Cambodia, for whatever
reason it might be necessary, does the
gentleman see an end of the war or does
he see that as leading to a wider war?
Mr. RIVERS. If the gentleman is talk-
ing about these areas here, it is bound
to shorten the war.
It will do two things. It will eliminate
these things (pointing) and it will inter-
cept the Ho Chi Minh buildup, which
is coming down there like an interstate
highway. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is very
vast, over a very wide area. This is a
part of it.
Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I take this time?and I
hope not to take it all?to caution the
House about taking an action of this
kind this afternoon just before the Presi-
dent is going to address the Nation.
I, for one, might even support this
amendment at a different time. I am op-
posed to the entering of U.S. ground
troops into Cambodia without prior con-
sultation with Congress. However, I
would caution the Members of this House
this afternoon that if this amendment is
passed, you will see the greatest exodus
from that press gallery you ever saw, and
they will all be heading for the tele-
phones. What they will be doing is broad-
casting all over the country, all over the
world, that the Congress of the United
States has predetermined the judgment
of the President even before he made his
remarks. This is the worst time that this
amendment could possibly be brought
forth.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. CEDERBERG. I am happy to yield
to the gentleman.
Mr. RIVERS. I not only agree with the
gentleman, but let me say this: We have
less than a month of fair weather over
there. If we are going to eliminate these
things, the time to do it is now?the time
Is now. When the rainy season comes it
is more difficult, and that is what these
people are waiting for.
Mr. CEDERBERG. May I say in addi-
tion to that that militarily I do not be-
lieve we should allow a sanctuary of this
kind to exist. I am all for the South Viet-
namese taking care of it and I hope they
Will do the task, but to allow these troops
to come in during the day or during the
night, into combat and kill our troops
and maim the civilians and the South
Vietnamese and then go back to a sanc-
tuary and resupply themselves just does
not make any combat sense.
I plead with the Members of this
House, please do not take this action of
approving this kind of an amendment
just before the President is going to go on
television. It is a tragic mistake.
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
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April 3.0, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE
Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gen-
tleman from Maryland.
Mr. LONG of Maryland. The gentle-
man's statement puzzles me a little bit.
The President argued and only last week
the Secretary of State told by subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions that the Congress would be con-
sulted before any movement into another
Asian country would take place. All this
amendment speaks to is the introduction
of ground combat troops. Does the gen-
tleman argue that?if the President
malres a goad case tonight or any other
night that we need combat troops in
Cambodia to protect American lives--the
Congress would not give him that au-
thority in a very short time?
Mr. CEDERBERG. I will not prejudge
what the President will say tonight or at
any other time.
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Of course, we
do not know what he will say.
Mr. CEDERBERG. The gentleman
knows what will happen if the House of
Representatives takes this position this
afternoon before the President can ad-
dress the Nation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the,last word.
Mr. Chairman, today we are faced with
a very serious problem, one that affects
every home in our country. In 1964 we
had a problem similar to this. At that
time we were told that the Turner Joy
and the Maddox had been attacked by
North Vietnamese ships. Now in looking
into that you find that the commanding
officers of those ships will not ?tate they
were under attack. But under pressure
such as exists here and under strong
pleading and suggestion from men high
in the offices of this House, our House
succumbed and passed the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution. I want to tell you that
since that time we have had 7 years of
the most horrible war that has ever been
visited on the people of the United States.
You know, one of the sad things about
this war is that if a youngster can get
Into college, he does not go to the war. If
he can get into the Reserves, he does not
go to the war. If he can get into the
National Guard, he does not go to the
war. It is the poor people, the fellows
who cannot go to college, who are
brought in. If there was ever a war, a
horrible war, that was unjustified, this is
It. Plainly this is a rich man's war and
a poor man's fight.
In a war involving the poorer sons of
our country. I strongly support the
amendment of the gentleman from New
York and I ask that you consider this.
I ask that you think calmly and deeply
as to whether we are going to enter into
a war worse than we are in at the present
time. I say that this possibility exists to-
day and now.
Mr. Chairman, Stephen Decatur once
said:
Our country in her intercourse with other
nations may she always be in the right, but
our coUntry, right or wrong.
We Might alter that today, Mr. Chair-
man, 8,nd saY, dour Countny, right or
wreng. If right, to be kept right. If wrong,
to be set right."
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. FASCELL asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I am
not going into the military aspects of the
Southeast Asia prOblem.
However:, I want to put in perspective
what it is we are adtually going to do
under this amendment because I think
that is important in the consideration of
the overall principle sought to be raised
by the gentleman's amendment.
I think regardless of how we are going
to vote, it is important to have a clear
understanding of the actual operative po-
tential as compared to its being an ex-
pression of congressional policy.
So, first, I would like to ask the chair-
man of the full Committee on Armed
Services whether there are any funds in
this bill to finance ground troops.
Mr. RIVERS. There are no funds for
personnel and no 0. & M. money.
Mr. FASCELL. I am sorry but I did
not hear the chairman,
Mr. RIVERS. There is no money for
military personnel and no 0. & M. money.
Mr. FASCELL. What does "0. & M."
money mean?
Mr. RIVERS. Operations and mainte-
nance.
Mr. FASCELL. Therefore, in order for
the prohibition in the gentleman from
New York's (amendment to be effective
or have any real meaning as far as the
subject matter of this bill, it must apply
to equipment and other materiel used to
move ground forces into Laos, Cambo-
dia, or Thailand; is that correct?
Mr. RIVERS. Am I to understand that
the amendment is certainly germane?
Mr. FASCELL. I understand it is ger-
mane to the bill, but I just want to know
what the fund prohibition really ap-
plies to.
The question I raise does not go to the
overall principle as an expression of
sentiment by the Congress. I think ex-
pression is worthwhile any time the
Congress wants to speak on such an im-
portant matter. The question of the in-
troduction of ground troops into any
area of Southeast Asia is relevant, but
I would like to know whether the fund
prohibition in the amendment actually
is effective as it applies to this bill.
From what I understand, as the chair-
man just responded, it really is not.
So, it is not a legal proscription of the
President's right to commit troops, or to
pay for them out of other funds. It is
an expression of the sense of Congress,
however, which might or might not be
important to the administration and
which it may consider. But it legally does
not proscribe the President. This is the
only point I am making, at this juncture.
Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, I submit
that this amendment as a matter of legal
action cannot possibly change the treaty
commitments which the United States
has with Thailand. As a matter of law, I
do not believe the Congress can do that.
I do not believe, therefore, even as an
expression of sentiment, the gentleman's
amendment can change the treaty com-
mitments and the-right of the President
?
H 3751
under the Constitution to implement
those requirements.
It still is, however, if adopted, a very
important and vital expression of the
sentiment of Congress. But I do not want
us to deceive ourselves that we afe put-
ting,. some monetary restriction on the
President or that we are changing some
treaty commitment or that we are chang-
ing the authority under the Gulf of Ton-
kin resolution. We are not doing any of
that With this amendment.
Finally, Mr. Chairman this amend-
ment can only be effective on the date
this bill becomes effective, if passed. The
effective date is the beginning of the next
fiscal year, July 1,1970.
Notwithstanding that, Mr. Chairman,
I believe the amendment is an expres-
sion of a fundamental policy by this
Congress which is vital. However, it does
not undermine the President's right to
say anything he wants to say tonight
about this deplorable situation in South-
east Asia; it does not restrict him mone-
tarily; it does not restrict him legally,
and does not modify this country's treaty
obligations, and does not change Pres-
idential policy.
It does say, therefore, by inference and
construction that it does want the Pres-
ident to come back to Congress.
* Therefore, this expression of Congres-
sional sentiment, very limited In its ac-
tual application, nevertheless is a use-
ful guideline.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words,
and I rise in support of the amendment.
(Mr. MOSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I must ex-
press my sense of dismay at the state-
ment made by the gentleman from
Michigan in talking about his President
and our President over here. I have only
one President, at one time. As I recall,
that is the precise provision in the Con-
stitution of the United States. President
Nixon is my President, and he is the
President of the United States, and I
respect the onerous nature of the office
he occupies, and the awesome problems
which confront him but I also recognize
that this House is one house of a two-
house, coequal body which has very seri-
ous responsibilities imposed upon it by
the Constitution and by the people of the
United States.
Mr. Chairman, if this situation is so
very delicate that we should not act at
this moment in advance of the Presi-
dent's speech this evening, then it seems
to me that the appropriate action
would be for the Committee to rise and
await the statement of the President,
and then act, following that statement,
upon the basis of any new evidence. Upon
the absence of that evidence and under
the compulsion to act now, I am going
to support the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. REID)
because I have returned not many weeks
ago from Southeast Asia, where I think
I undertook a rather responsible inquiry
and a very comprehensive inquiry, and
the developments which have occurred
since ray return have not surprised me
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H 3752 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE AprilST, 1970
greatly, and there are other develop-
ments which could take place which
Would not surprise me greatly.
Mr. Chairman, I would point out that
it is 17 years since we went into South
Korea', and I can see two or three dec-
ades of involvement in Southeast 4sia,
and I can see it on an ever-eXpanding
basis of our material resources, and I
know that there is an increasingly stri-
dent demand in this Nation for a greater
share of those resources.
I have no question as to the motives
of some of those who oppose the United
States overseas, but I know what dire
dangers we face here at home if we con-
tinue to do the bad job of housekeeping,
to ignore the ills of our own domestic
society. We can be destroyed as surely
from within as we can by any force or
combination of forces from without.
It is time that we start to realize our
priorities. The fact that a man steps into
this well and opposes an expansion of
Military activities is in no sense an in-
dictment of his patriotism. I believe that
at some times, under the conditions of
the moment, it takes more courage to
step here and say, "Let us go slow, let
us evaluate and reevaluate. Let us know
what the hazards of the action we are
taking might be," than it does just to
stand up and say "I am going along, and
I am going to wrap myself up in the
flag in the process."
Mr. REIT) of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chair-
man, I wish to say I agree with and ap-
preciate this statement and concur that
this is a matter that the House should
act on.
But I would like to advise the Mem-
bers that I suggested to the leadership,
due to the seriousness of the matter and
the fact that the President is going to
speak tonight, that I thought it might
be appropriate to adjourn so we could
vote after the President spoke and not
before. But I would advise the Members
that suggestion, that I was very sensi-
tive to, and which the gentleman men-
tict\ned, was declined.
SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY
Ant. FINDLEY ?
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I of-
fer an amendment in the nature of a
substitute.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY in the
nature of a substitute for the amendment
offered by Mr. REID of New York:
In place of the amendment, substitute
the following language:
"SEC. 403. In line with the expressed in-
tention of the President of the United
States, none of the funds authorized by
*this act shall be used to finance the, intro-
duction of American ground combat troops
into Laos, Thailand, or C,arnbodia without
the prior consent of the Congress, except to
the extent- that sucla is required, as deter-
Mined by the President and reported
peoMptly to the Congress, to protect the
lives of Apae Amu troops remaining within
South Vialaag;0-"
Ur. PrzmX.Ey. Mr. Chairman, I think
we all we the gentleman from New
York a debt of gratitude because he has
caused us to enter into a very timely
and, I think, very helpful discussion of
fundamental military POLICY, one of the
very few such occasions in the 9 years I
have been here in the House of Repre-
sentatives, years in which I have seen
an unfolding of military operations un-
precedented in our country, and yet al-
most never do we discuss the funda-
mental issue of the role of the United
States in these far away places.
The distinguished chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, I feel,
put his finger right on the heart of this
issue?and I say this kindly?when he
closed his comments by saying that if
we try, by an amendment of this sort,
to tell the President of the United States
what to do in the field of foreign policy,
the President would respond quite
properly, to use the words of the gentle-
man from South Carolina, "It is none of
your business."
I believe that that is a rather widely
held assumption, that what happens in
foreign policy, especially in fundamental
military policy, is really none of the
business of the Congress.
It is hard for me to accept that. In
fact, I disagree absolutely with such a
conclusion.
The amednment I have presented in
the form of a substitute retains all of
the langauge of the amendment offered
by the gentleman from New York (Mr.
REID). But, it adds some things that are
unspoken by the gentleman from New
York, and I think these unspoken items
should be spelled out.
It deals with the item that has been in
so much controversy here. Whether in a
crisis, requiring a split-second decision
by the President through his command-
ers as to whether ground combat forces
should move a few feet across the Cam-
bodian border in order to protect the
lives of American troops in South Viet-
nam?whether or not he could respond.
Of course, the President has a grave
responsibility as Commander in Chief?
an overriding responsibility to protect
U.S. lives whether they are in American
uniform or not.
So, even if the Congress would say to
the contrary?that he should not do it?
it is my belief that he would have the
fundamental responsibility to these
American citizens to take the action?to
protect their lives.
Mr. FINDLEY. I am sorry, I missed
the last part of the gentleman's question.
Mr. RIVERS, Does the gentleman's
amendment say in so many words that
we may enter Cambodia for the purpose
of protecting the lives of American
troops?
Mr. FINDLEY. Yes.
Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman read
that language of the amendment again?
Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, indeed. I am glad
to. It states, "without the prior consent
of the Congress"; then it adds the words,
"except to the extent that such is re-
quired, as determined by the President
and reported promptly to the Congress,
to protect the lives of American troops
remaining within South Vietnam."
I am glad to clarify that point and
appreciate the question.
Mr. RIVERS. That is what I was try-
ing to say. I can find no fault with an
amendment like that.
Mr. FINDLEY. I appreciate the gen-
tleman's comment.
Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? I would like to ask a
question on the subject about which you
were just speaking.
Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
man from New York.
Mr. HORTON. As I understood the
statement the gentleman in the well
made, he was talking about the idea of
hot pursuit, and as I would understand
hot pursuit, that would be immediately
over the border to protect the ground
forces in the immediate vicinity of Cam-
bodia, the South Vietnamese border.
Mr. FINDLEY. I will say to the gentle-
man, if I may interrupt, that I would
hope and expect the President to exer-
cise a very narrow construction on this
implied authority to use ground troops
outside the borders of South Vietnam,
but I can conceive of instances when
this would be necessary.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Illinois has expired.
(On request of Mr. HORTON, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was
allowed to proceed for 5 additional
minutes.)
Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to
the gentleman from New York.
Mr. HORTON. The chairman of the
Armed Services Committee referred to
the map to the immediate right of the
gentleman in the well. I am not familiar
with it, but I assume it is a map of
Cambodia. There are certain MRS with
different numbers. I do not know whether
those are military targets or what they
are. But do I correctly understand that
the gentleman's amendment would not
permit the introduction of ground troops
under any circumstances to go into the
heart of or into the major portion of
Cambodia?
Mr. FINDLEY. The only circumstance
In which ground troops could be in-
troduced into Cambodia would be in the
event that the President should deter-
mine that such is required in order to
protect the lives of American forces
within South Vietnam.
Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
man from New York.
Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I wonder what
would occur if the success of the Cam-
bodia forces and our forces and of those
allied to us should unexpectedly cause
the other side to retreat toward, say,
Phnom Penh? Would we then be obliged,
under the interpretation the gentleman
Is giving the amendment, to pursue the
enemy through the rest of Cambodia in
order to be certain that at some future
time they would not come back to the
areas where they could harass our troops
in South Vietnam?
Mr. FINDLEY. That is a question to
which I do not think the answer would
appear at this moment. It is up to the
President as Commander in Chief to
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? make his interpretation of the implied
powers that he exercises as Commander
in Chief.
I wish to add Qne other thing before
I yield further. This aniencirnient to me
is very important, because it speaks to
the role of congress in dealing with
fundamental policy. It illustrates the
limitations on our role in this area. But
it also shows our authority, our respon-
sibility. You will note that my amend-
ment does express affirmatively the right
of Congress to consent _prior to the use
of combat troops. If that is our decision,
then we can affirmatively make the de-
cision that our troops should be used.
But it also requires that if the President
makes a determination to use troops
under the implied powers, then he must
report promptly to the Congress that he
has made that determination. That re-
porting requirement is nowhere spelled
out in present law, to my knowledge. I
think it is high time that we impose that
reporting requirement on the President.
I think this alone will have a salutary
effect and will tend to discourage any
unjust use,
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
? Mr. FINDLEY. I promised to yield to
the gentleman from Indiana. I yield to
the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. JACOBS. I wonder if the gentle-
man would state whether or not it would
be correct to say that the operative lan-
guage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution=
and the amendment is set opposite the
language in that resolution?was not
contingent upon the protection of
personnel in Vietnam and if, at the time
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was
adopted, it was not also hoped a very
,Strict construction of that resolution
Might be made by the President of the
United States?
? Mr, rarpLgy. I gather the drift of the
gentleman's comments, and I must say
the President may very broadly construe
his implied powers. What we 0.0 or fail
to do here cannot diminish his respon-
sibility. He may fail to exercise it, but
we cannot diminish his responsibility.
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, the gen-
tleman did not respond. My question
was: Was not the operative part of that
language contingent on the protection
and safety of troops?
Mr. FINDLEY. It had two opeiative
parts and one had to deal with the
attack on onr ships, and the other dealt
with the process through which our Gov-
ernment should go to counter an attack
in Southeast Asia.
Mr. JACOBS. It was dealing with the
safety of American personnel in Viet-
nam, as I reeall.
Mr. FINDLEY. I believe only section 1
dealt with the safety of American per-
sOnnel.
Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentlemanyield?
_
,zar, Mpg, gv. I yield to the gentleman
fromNI-ight
Mr. CEaD ERG, Mr. Cnairman, in-
asartiCh as spoitp,, in opposition to the
Reid of V* Xi:Mk ainendment because
I felt very strongly about that, I do be-
lieve the aniendrilent Of the gentleman
from Illinois is a real improvement, and
I see no real reason to oppose that
amendment.
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
man from Michigan.
Mr, RIEGLE Mr. Chairman, as I un-
derstand the amendment of the gentle-
man and his explanation, it seems to me
he is inferring by what he said, that the
President now has delegated authority
to act on his own to introduce American
military personnel in Cambodia.
Mr. FINDLEY. He has an implied re-
sponsibility to do so In Cambodia to
protect American lives in South Viet-
nam.
Mr. RIEGLE. Where specifically in
the Constitution can the gentleman find
that? I question that.
The CHAIRMAN. The time a the gen-
tleman from Illinois has expired.
(On request of Mr. Gaoss, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was al-
lowed to proceed for 1 additional
minute.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentle-
man from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, in the
event the gentleman's substitute should
be defeated, I wonder if the gentleman
from New York (Mr. REID) would accept
an amendment to his amendment to
provide that in perpetuity no American
combat troops be sent anywhere in the
world, including the Middle East?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair-
man, ? move to strike the requisite num-
ber of words.
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair-
man, during the full decade_ of the six-
ties, I had the opportunity to sit down
with several Presidents, and it was my
privilege, following such conferences, to
support the President, whether he was
from my party or another party, in what
he thought was in the best interests of
the United States.
I am proud of the fact that in this
country we can have that kind of co-
operation between the leaders on one side
of the aisle with a President coming from
the other side of the aisle. I have always
been very proud of the fact that in this
body the Democratic leadership has re-
sponded as strongly in support of a Re-
publican President as most of us re-
sponded and supported a Democratic
President.
I happen to think this is a very crucial
hour?and I use that word not literally,
but figuratively?and it is my strong
hope that at this particular point we,
not as Democrats or Republicans, make
a basic decision in the overall interest of
the country.
I personally do not believe that either
the Reid amendment or the Findley
amendment ought to be approved here
this afternoon. I do not know precisely
what the President of the United States
is going to say tonight. I think it is
awfully important that the impact of his
remarks not be hampered or hindered by
some action taken here this afternoon.
I am a strong believer in the right
of the legislative branch to participate
in decisions involving our national se-
curity. But the problem of time right
now is extremely serious. We could very
easily take some action here this after-
noon which might adversely affect the
full beneficial impact of what the Presi-
dent will say tonight.
If I had my choice I would be opposed,
as a consequence, to either amendment.
I have looked over the Findley amend-
ment. I have consulted with experts in
the executive branch of the Government.
The choice between the Findley amend-
ment and the Reid of New York amend-
ment is easy.
The Findley amendment in effect says
what the President has promised he will
do. He has said that before introducing
American ground combat troops into
Lios, Thailand, or Cambodia he will seek
the prior consent of the Congress of the
United States.
On the other hand, he has said that
if emergency situations arise where it is
incumbent upon him as Commander in
Chief to take action to protect the lives
of American soldiers, sailors or marines,
then he will act, but he will report im-
mediately to the Congress and to the
American people his reasons for taking
such action under emergency circum-
stances.
Therefore, it seems to me that this
proposed amendment offered by the gen-
tleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) does
no harm, because it coincides with what
the President has promised us and the
American people; and therefore I intend
to vote for the substitute, and I would
ask all on our side of the aisle and as
many as possible on the other side of
the aisle to do the same.
It seems to me that this is the best
course in a situation which could be
complicating and harmful. The facts of
life are that since 1965 the Vietnamese
and the Vietcong have occupied sanctu-
aries just across the border from which
they have made forays into South Viet-
nam, and atfer they have made those
forays?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Michigan has expired.
(On request of Mr. PELLY, and by
unanimous consent, Mr. GERALD R. FORD
was allowed to proceed for 3 additional
minutes.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair-
man, after the enemy has made these
excursions into South Vietnam, killing
Americans and killing our allies, they
have escaped back across the border and
they have rested and recouped and re-
grouped, and they have rearmed. Then
they would come back on another occa-
sion, at their option, with the full pro-
tection of the former Government of
Cambodia.
In order to save American lives the
President has authorized the kind of ac-
tion, in conjunction with the forces of
our allies, which he will describe in de-
tail to the Nation in a few hours.
I hope and trust that we take no ac-
tion here today or tomorrow or next
week that will undermine this long over-
due effort to protect the lives of Ameri-
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A I se, 19 7-0
Compared to the major health prob-
lems which we have already solved, the
solution to this problem is relatively sim-
ple: It can be solved on a local level.
-Unfortunately, however, our local gov-
ernments are not able to cope with this
matter on their own. Many local gov-
ernments have enacted ordinances
against the use of lead-based paint on
housing interiors. However, enforcement
of the ordinance proves difficult. Fur-
ther, the lead-based paint all too often
has been covered over. In addition, there
is the problem of lack of knowledge by
many parents as to the causes and early
signs of lead poisoning.
This situation can and must be cor-
rected; and, it must be corrected now.
The two bills I introduced are designed
to provide a two-pronged coordinated
attack to remedy the situation.
The bill, HR. 17234, concerns itself
with the people who live in these homes.
It would authorize the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to make
grants to assist local governments in de-
veloping and carrying out local programs
to detect and treat incident of lead-based
paint poisoning. In addition, it would
assist in developing and carrying out
programs that identify those areas that
present a high risk to the health of the
residents because of the presence of lead-
based' paints on interior surfaces, and
then to develop and carry out programs
to eliminate the hazards of lead-based
paint poisoning.
The other bill, H.R. 17260, is concerned
with the housing itself. It would author-
ize the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to make grants to units of
local government to assist in developing
and carrying out local lead-based paint
elimination programs. The bill would re-
quire that there be an approved work-
able program for community improve-
ment for the locality, containing a pro-
gram to eliminate lead-based paint. In
addition, the bill would amend other
HUD assistance programs to require that
they include an effective plan for elimi-
nating the causes of lead-based paint
poisoning.
Mr. Chairman, both of these programs
are vitally important to the solution of
this major health problem and a coordi-
nated attack is needed. Therefore, I be-
lieve it is important to note that both of
these bills contain a section requiring the
Secretaries of the respective departments
to "cooperate with and seek the advice of
the heads of other departments or agen-
cies regarding any programs under their
respective responsibilities which are re-
lated to, or would be affected by, such
authority" under the acts.
Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the
Housing Subcommittee of the Banking
and Currency Committee, to which H.R.
17260 has been referred, I will make every
effort for favorable consideration by that
committee. I will also endeavor to have
H.R. 17234, which was referred to the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee, receive favorable action.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to
join with me in sponsoring and support-
ing legislation to attack the problem of
lead-based paint poisoning.
(Mr. PODELL asked and was given
cans now being killed in South Viet-
nam.
I Sifijold that the statement to be
Matie by the President tonight is con-
Sidered to be one of Major importance.
, I belieye the best answer for its here this
afternoon is to accept an amendment
which I am assured coincides with the
commitments already made by the Presi-
dent. I believe it is a far preferable
amendment to the one offered by the
gentleman from Nev York (Mr. REID) .
/dr. LONG of 1Vlaryland. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD 11. FORD. I am glad to
yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr, LONG of Maryland. I believe that
words about saving American lives? con-
fuse the issue. I believe that is what we
are all trying to do, to save American
" lives. U Congress had sieted many years
ago, perhaps we could have saved many
of the 40,000 American lives that have
been lost in Vietnam.
Is it noetrue that the Findley amend-
ment merely pulls the few teeth that the
Reid amendment has in it and allows
the President to do basically as he
pleases?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I do not think
It pulls the teeth of the Reid amend-
ment. What the Findley amendment does
Is tell us that the President will consult
with us in advance if he takes such a
step in Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand,
which is a promise that he has already
made to us and to the American people.
Then he is also given the flexibility to act
If there is an emergency that arises to
protect American lives and then report
promptly thereafter. I think that is con-
structive and not harmful.
Ur. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the
gentleman from New York.
Mr. REID of New York. I thank the
? gentleman for yielding.
I Merely ask him, in the light of our
earlier conVersation this morning wheth-
er in deference to the President's speech
tonight he would be willing to recom-
mend that the House rise so that we can
vote after the President's speech.
The CHAIR1VIAN. The time of the
gentleman has eXpirecl.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. OERALD
R. Faso was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I know that
there can be an argument made that we
should defer, but I do not have the privi-
lege nor the prerogative of making that
decision. Therefore I do not feel that I
slaoul4 comment one way or another on a
decision that was made earlier to con-
clude the business of the day.
Mr. REID of New York. If the gentle-
man will yield further very briefly?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the
gentleman.
Ur. VIM of -New York. In deference
to the, point- that the gentleman was
? =king is it not accurate that I said
an effort should be made to have a vote
'after the President's speech so that we
would not preclude whatever he might
eaY" hut equally pr'Otect the right of the
House to vote pn a matter wherein we
have constitutional responsibilities?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I simply ,say
an argument can be made?
Mr. REID of New York. I was simply
asking whether the suggestion was not
made earlier by this gentleman.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. The gentleman
from New York did make that sugges-
tion. Right. It seems to me that in this
circumstance we ire faced with today
the wise action, the constructive action,
the action that is in the best interests
of the United States would dictate that
we support the Findley substitute and
get on with the business of approving
this legislation.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the
gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. EDMONDSON. I would like to
have the gentleman's opinion as to
whether the Reid amendment or the sub-
stitute offered by the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) would impact in
any way the President's authority to
have advisers in Thailand at this time,
and, in the judgment of the gentleman,
would it withdraw the advisers we now
have operating in Thailand.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In listening
to an earlier colloquy between the gentle-
man from New York and the gentleman
from Wisconsin I was led to believe that
the Reid amendment would preclude the
utilization of military advisers in Cam-
bodia. Sul3sequently there was another
colloquy that I am not sure clarified it,
but there were more words concerning it.
Mr. REID of New York. It does not
preclude that, I would say to the gentle-
man.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to
have that observation.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman has expired.
SILENT EPIDEMIC
(By unanimous consent, Mr. BARRETT
was allowed to speak out of order and
to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, on
Monday, April 27, 1970, I introduced two
bills, H.R. 17234 and H.R. 17260, designed
to attack and eradicate, what has been
labeled the "silent epidemic," afflicting
an estimated half million infants and
children in our Nation's cities and towns.
An epidemic of poisonings resulting from
the use of lead-based paints in the in-
terior of houses. The effects of such
poisonings are at times fatal and, when
not fatal, far too often tragic?leaving
children with mental retardation, blind-
ness and chronic kidney disease among
other consequences.
Lead-based paint has not been used
on interiors for over 10 years, but in old
buildings it lies just beneath the sur-
face of newer coats of lead-free paint.
When the old walls are not properly
maintained, the old paint lifts away in
layered chips along with the new. This
is the decor of older housing, particu-
larly of slum housing. The children liv-
ing in deteriorating houses, whose walls
are layered with sweet-tasting flakes of
paint, are the victims. This condition is
a major health problem for the infants
of thoke families living in older housing.
In fact, aside from infectuous diseases
this is the major infant health problem.
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30, CNGRE'SSION L KLCRD ? HOUSE Et 3755
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman, the
Members of the House and the Senate
and the American people were informed
late yesterday of President Nixon's de-
cision to provide American military ad-
visers and American air support to the
attacking South Vietnamese Army now
in Cambodia. This decision Was reached
with the "advice and consent" of the
President and his advisers and provides
Just cause for profound dismay.
The reasons cited for the action are
similar to those given in support of the
1965 decision to widen the war in Viet-
nam?that widening of the conflict
would bring a speedier end to the fight-
ing. After 5 years of continued bloody
fighting, 40,000 American lives, $100 bil-
lion, the war in Vietnam continues un-
abated.
The faultiness of our earlier reasoning
Is then obvious. Yet, American decision-
makers in the executive branch are still
working under the same assumptions
and appear ready to make the same mis-
takes again. The opening of this )new
front in Cambodia is in direct contradic-
tion to American experience and to the
recently issued "Guam doctrine."
I am deeply distressed at both the con-
tent of the decision and the manner in
which it was reached. There is a con-
stitutional requirement that the respon-
sibility to commit American forces and
arms abroad rests with two branches of
Government?with the executive and the
legislative branches concurrently, The
President, whose search for a strict con-
structionist for the Supreme Court is
well known, seems unwilling to follow
the letter of the Constitution on this
issue.
Instead, the Congress has, except for
Incomplete briefings, been bypassed.
After being consulted "after the fact," it
has been asked to concur in the decision
because of responsibility to ow fighting
men.
The logic of such ex post facto reason-
ing escapes me. Decisions of such magni-
tude and potential consequence as troops
to Cambodia require that approval be
given by all representatives of the Ameri-
can people.
American policy seems directionless
at this point. Vietnarnization of the Viet-
namese war and widening American in-
volvement in Cambodia are contradict-
ory. If the conflict expands into a pan-
Indo-Chinese effort, American lives will
be needlessly sacrificed.
We cannot continue to make up rules
as we go along?or to spout outdated
slogans. Is it too late to ask President
Nixon to reconsider his decision? It is
certainly not too late to ask Congress to
express its disapproval. Congress has the
Moral and constitutional responsibility
to act,
A su,pport the amendment of the gen-
tleman from New York (Mr. Pam) ?
purrowNr45T INQUIRY
Mr. STRATTON, Mr. Obairman, a
parliamentary inquiry.
The CHATR1VIAN. The gentleman will
state it.
Mr. S'TRATTON. Would it be in order
to move at this time that the Reid a
New York amendment and all amend-
ments thereto be tabled so that this mat-
ter of grave consequence might be con-
sidered at another time?
The CHAIRMAN. A motion to table
is not in order at this time.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT TO THE
SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR.
FINDLEY FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY
MR. REID OF NEW YORK
Mr. LEGGET.C. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment to the substitute amend-
ment offered by the gentleman from Illi-
nois (Mr. FINDLEY).
The Clerk read as follows:
? Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT to the
amendment in the nature of a substitute
offered by Mr. FINDLEY for the amendment
offered by Mr. RIED of New York:
After the word "Congress" strike out the
proviso exception.
[Mr. LEGGETT addressed the Com-
mittee. His remarks will appear here-
after in the Extensions of Remarks.]
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. OBEY asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to support the amendment offered
by the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr.
FINDLEY) but in my judgment that
amounts to little more than a Gulf of
Tonkin resolution for Cambodia.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
amendment of the gentleman from Cal-
ifornia to prohibit the use of any funds
under this bill to introduce American
troops into Cambodia.
Mr. Chairman, I have most certainly
not harassed any President?Mr. John-
son or Mr. Nixon?on the conduct of the
war in Vietnam. I have expressed doubts
about President Johnson's policy since
1965, but I did not ask for, nor did I
support immediate unilateral with-
drawal.
When in October Senator SCOTT, the
Republican minority leader, asked for a
60-day moratorium on criticism of the
President's policies in Vietnam, I sup-
ported that.
When debate on Vietnam threatened
to become highly partisan in late Octo-
ber, I gave speeches to my own party
units asking them to give the President
more time. When the Wright resolution
came before the House, I voted for it
because of my reluctance to restrain the
President in the conduct of foreign af-
fairs. At that time, however, I pointed
out that my support for the resolution
should not be interpreted as a blanket
endorsement of every facet of the Presi-
dent's November 3 speech, nor as a pledge
of unqualified support for any future
Presidential action as yet unknown and
undefined.
It is difficult for me to support this
amendment because I do not like to in
any way restrict the action of the Presi-
dent. But Mr. Chairman, the issue today
is broader than the freedom of move-
ment of one man, and that issue is two-
fold. It is first a question of whether
this Nation is willing to risk a widening
a the war by involvement of American
troops in another unhappy nation in
Indochina, and it is second, a question
of the responsibility of the Congress in
determining the policies the country will
follow.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we
should vote on this bill, or on this ques-
tion, until after the President's speech
tonight. If we had any sense, we would
postpone our action until at least tomor-
row, and possibly later. But, in the ab-
sence of any delay in the consideration
of this subject, I believe we have no al-
ternative but to support the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, since the late 1950's we
have been involved in Vietnam without
specific congressional declarations of
support. Since 1964 we have required
young men to fight in combat in that un-
happy land without specific congres-
sional approval except for the Tonkin
resolution, which is, at best, of dubious
clarity. We are now faced with the ques-
tion of whether in the absence of specific
congressional consideration of this new
question we should send our young men
into another area of war.
We have been told by the President
"no more Vietnams." Mr. Speaker, if we
continue to send troops into Cambodia
we run the high risk of having at least
one more Vietnam and that is two more
than we can afford. Indeed, it may al-
ready be too late to avoid it. Mr. Speaker,
we cannot in conscience and we should
not, out of respect for the Congress as
an institution, allow involvement in
Cambodia without specific congressional
approval of that added involvement. We
have had men die in an undeclared war
in Vietnam for 9 years. We should not
support actions which would lead to the
killing of Americans in another unde-
clared war. In the absence of congres-
sional consideration of this added in- ?
volvement, and in the absence of con-
gressional determination that this added
involvement is in the best interest of the
United States, I cannot vote to financially
support such efforts. I am tired of young
Americans dying in "unofficial" wars.
I am opposed to sending American men
into new areas of warfare without a
statement from the Congress that their
sacrifice is both necessary and wise.
Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, the re-
cent unilateral Presidential decision to
send American combat advisers, tactical
air support, medical evacuation teams,
and other support to Laos, Thailand,
and Cambodia indicates that there is a
total disregard for the advise and con-
sent role of the Congress in making for-
eign policy decisions that affect our
economy and the lives of our citizens.
The prior consent of Congress should,
in all instances, be obtained before any
decision of such potential military mag-
nitude- is made. Surely the lessons of
Korea and Vietnam must not be repeated
over and over again before the Congress
is allowed to have a voice in determining
whether or not expanded American in-
volvement in Southeast Asian nations is
In the best interests of the United States.
No doubt the safety of American troops
In Vietnam must be a serious consid-
eration in determining our Southeast
Asian policy. However, the additional
Implications of such vital action should
be approved by debate in the Congress
before America is involved and com-
mitted in any 'other nation. This is. the
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only way rational foreign policy can be
established.
Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in emphatic support of the amendment
offered by the gentleman from New York
(Mr. REID) , which says:
In line with the expressed intent of the
President of the United States, no part of the
funds authorized to be appropriated pur-
suant to this Act shall be used to finance the
Introduction of American ground combat
troops into Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.
This House, by sustaining this amend-
ment, will make it clear to the President
and more importantly to the people of
the United States and the world, that we
will no longer support America military
exceSses in Southeast Asia. Rather than
sending our boys into Cambodia, we
should be loading them on troopships
and bringing them home. And it is at
home, in the United States where we
should be concentrating our efforts and
our money.
Have the mothers, wives, families, and
soldiers of this Nation not suffered
enough? Why must we perpetuate our
existence in Southeast Asia, when it has
been demonstrated time and time again
that the people of this Nation want no
more Vietnams.
President Nixon entered office on the
strength of three promises; to end the
war, to cool the economy, and generally
to lower the voices of discontent and
wrangling in our country.
Not only has he failed to do any one of
these things. He took new steps yesterday
to generate new, and who knows how far
reaching, antagonisms when he ordered
Americans into Cambodia American
blood has stained the earth of Vietnam.
I will not see that same blood wasted on
pe soil of Cambodia.
I for one will not waffle on this latest
Nixon folly. No money for a war in Cam-
badia. No American 'lives lost in a war in
Cambodia. To this I pledge myself. And
I hope that my colleagues will do simi-
larly by voting for the Reid amendment.
Mr. TAFT, Mr. Chairman, while I
support the military procurement au-
thorization bill providing for about $20
billion for military procurement for the
next year, I hope we will be able to scale
the expenditure level back in the appro-
priation bill that will come later. In any
event, the authorization bill for 1971, on
whiph we are voting, is $400 million less
than the authorization for last year. It
Includes funds for the Safeguard system
that believe is sound as a wholly de-
fensive and deterrent weapon. Its devel-
opment may well have been helpful in
the progress to date at the SALT talks.
believe that that weapon system, as
well as the other military procurements
authorized by the bill, are necessary in
toclay'S world when the Russians con-
tinue their buildup in strategic missiles
and their Activities in support of trouble-
makers such as the Arab nations.
le I voted on a numbc'T of amend-
WIlt4 tOda,y,, n9 final vote occurred on
tile bill, and final action was deferred
uco, 'Wednesday, May 6. The deferment
curred "to permit the Cone res.s to study
g?P-Psictent's message on Cambodia be-
fore actir,ig on an amendment proposed
by Congressman REID of New York, and
an amendment to that amendment pro-
posed by Congressin-an FINDLEY of Illi-
nois. The Reid amendment would have
prohibited the use of the funds being
authorized for the purpose of introduc-
tion of American ground troops into Laos,
Thailand, or Cambodia. The Findley
amendment to the Reid amendment
added an exception to permit such use
to the extent required to protect the lives
of American troops still remaining in
South Vietnam. It also would have re-
quired a report by the President to the
Congress on any shah finding.
My own feeling is that no American
ground troops should be introduced into
Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia and cer-
tainly it should not be done without the
expressed authorization of Congress.
However, the Findley amendment seemed
to me to be consistent with inherent
powers of the President, as to the defense
of our forces and I, therefore, would
have supplorted both the Reid amend-
ment as amended by the Findley amend-
ment.
Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, there is no
question in my mind that President
Nixon has neither the moral nor legal
right to commit American military
forces in Cambodia without the consent
of Congress.
The administration has now emharked
on widening the war in Southeast Asia
which will further delay the withdrawal
of American troops from South Vietnam.
President Nixon persists in the tragic il-
lusion that military action rather than
political settlement is the answer to the
Indochina turmoil of the last 16 years.
As I have said before on the floor of this
House, the President's policy is simply
the persistence of national pride beyond
any political, economic, or moral justifi-
cation. It is a policy that has cost the
lives of almost 50,000 American young
men. We must not let it continue. Let our
policy be committed to saving lives
rather than saving face.
By ordering American military action
in Cambodia this week, President Nixon
has shown contempt for the overwhelm-
ing desire of the American people to get
our troops out of Southeast Asia. The
President was elected to terminate our
involvement, not complicate and deepen
it. The democratic process is gravely
threatened when any President inten-
tionally ignores such a mandate.
I will urge my constituents to make
known their opposition to the President's
Cambodian decision. It is their sons and
their dollars that he uses without their
consent or the consent of Congress.
The American people know a tragic
mistake has been made in Vietnam. It
remains only for the Nixon administra-
tion to accept once and for all that judg-
ment. So let the Government be re-
minded who is master and who is serv-
ant.
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, the House
deliberation today on the question of
Introducing U.S. ground combat troops
In Cambodia has taken us a giant step
toward restoring the role of the Congress
in foreign policy.
I am opposed to the introduction of
U.S. combat troops into Cambodia. I
view the presence of American advisers
and medical personnel with the South
Vietnamese attack force invading Cam-
bodia as extremely dangercius. To me,
the Nixon doctrine clearly precludes
sending in American troops, leaving open
the question of tactical air support and
logistical support.
The memory, that advisers were only
the forerunners of combat troops in the
quagmire of Vietnam, is all too fresh.
While the motions before the House
would preclude only combat forces, I
believe the Congress in the exercise of
its responsibilities should be informed
and its consent sought before even ad-
visers are dispatched into foreign war
zones.
In all of this, Mr. Chairman, our at-
tention continues to be diverted from
other troubled areas of the world. In my
opinion, the danger of confrontation
with the Soviet Union and of full-scale
war is in the Mediterranean. While we
have concentrated on Vietnam, the
Soviet Union has placed a major fleet
in the Mediterranean and has developed
bases in Egypt. There is evidence that
the Middle East fighting is entering a
new and dangerous phase with Egyptian
troops, armed with the latest Russian
equipment and backed by Russian tech-
picians, carrying out a major offensive.
New SAM missile systems have been de-
ployed in Egypt, manned by Russian
technicians. Today there are persistent
reports of Soviet pilots flying Egyptian
jets over Egypt.
This is a very trying time for U.S.
policymakers. But it seems clear to me
that the interest of the United States in
working toward a lessening of tension will
not be served by our involvement in
Cambodia. Our energies, on the other
hand, should be directed toward a politi-
cal settlement in Indochina and our at-
tention directed to dangers of enlarged
conflagration in the Middle East.
Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, the ex-
tension of the Vietnam war into Cam-
bodia is most regrettable. This is espe-
cially so since the undefined, open-ended
policy of Vietnamization appears to in-
clude a willingness to follow the South
Vietnamese on a course of military
adventurism.
One wonders, with great concern, if,
as we followed South Vietnam into Cam-
bodia, we would also follow South Viet-
nam on an invasion of the north, some-
thing that has been advocated by Vice
President Ky.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, the
President in expanding the war in
Vietnam into an Indochina war is pur-
suing an illusionary dream. We have
heard the "we can win the war if only
we expand it" logic before, and each
time it has turned out to have cruel and
predictable consequences. The Pentagon
told us in 1965 if only we committed
American forces to Vietnam we could
drive Ho Chi Minh out. When that did
not succeed, we were told, if only we
bombed the northern ports, it would de-
stroy the spirit of the North Vietnamese
and brink military victory.
When we sent massive numbers of
young Americans to Vietnam, it did not
deter Ho Chi Minh, and when we began
massive bombing of the north, it did not
break the spirit of the enemy.
Now the President has decided to ac-
cept the advice of the military who say
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an expansion of the war to Cambodia
can bring military victory in Vietnam.
I believe the President is wrong, both
In terms of the situation and in terms of
the legality of his move.
This is the kinil of situation that can
only get worse. The Chinese will not per-
mit Hanoi to be defeated. If we escalate,
they can do so more easily. We must get
out; we must not widen this war. Under
no circumstances can we permit this
country to get into an Indochinese war.
No amount of Presidential explanation
can overcome this fact that we have sent
our soldiers into Cambodia?call them
advisers or whatever.
From the legal standpoint, I believe
the President has overstepped his au-
thority. The Constitution requires the
consent of the Congress to declare war.
The President has not gotten nor even
asked for this.
To go into any nation, requires an In-
vitation from the government. As far as
I know, we have received no request from
the Cambodian Government to invade its
territory.
The recently passed national commit-
ments resolution supported py the ad-
ministration required Presidential con-
sultation with the legislative branch be-
fore taking any new military action.
And last year, the administration re-
jected the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as
legal justification for our presence in the
area.
We have no legal justification for being
In Cambodia,
This is a new war. We should get out
right now.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder
if we could arrive at some reasonable
limitation of time with respect to these
amendments.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous con-
sent that all debate on this amendment
and all amendments thereto close at 5
o'clock.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South
Carolina?
Mr. GIBBONS. I object, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that all debate on
this amendment and all amendments
thereto close at 10 minutes after 5.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South
Carolina?
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I object.
The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.
MOTION ormaxp BY MR. RIVERS
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move
that all debate on this amendment and
all amendments thereto terminate at
5;30 o'clock.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the motion offered by the gentleman
from South Carolina.
The motion was rejected.
_
r/tRiAttAgzupx meonly
Mr. 1OLgA,ND. Mr, ChairMan, a par-
liamentary inquirx
The CHAIRMAN, The gentleman will
state it,
lqr: BOLAND.' jr. chairman, is it in
order to move that the CoMMittee do
now rise?
? The, cumurAN. Yes; it is in order.
?
MOTION OFFERED BY MR. BOLAND
Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I move
that the Committee do now rise.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the motion offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, on that
I demand tellers.
Tellers were ordered, and the Chair-
man appointed as tellers Mr. BoLAND,and
Mr. RIVERS.
The Committee divided, and the tellers
reported that there were?ayes 131, noes
100.
So the motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the, Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, reported that that
Committee, having had under considera-
tion the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize
appropriations during the fiscal year
1971 for procurement of aircraft, mis-
siles, naval vessels, and tracked combat
vehicles, and other weapons, and re-
search develepment, test, and evaluation
for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe
the authorized personnel strength of the
Selected Reserve of each Reserve compo-
nent of the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes, had come to no resolution
thereon.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COM-
MITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS -
The $PE4kFIR laid before the House
the following communication from the
chairman of the Committee on Public
Works, which was read and referred to
the Committee on Appropriations:
APRIL 24, 1970.
The Hon. JOHN W. McCoameicK,
speaker of the House,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR Mn. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the
provisions of the Independent Offices and
Department of Housing and *Urban Develop-
nlent Appropriation Act, 1969, the House
Committee on Public Works on April 23, 1970,
approved the following lease prospectus re-
visions:
Area of Fresno, Calif., Treasury Depart-
ment, Internal Revenue Service Automatic
Data Processing Center
Suffolk County, Long Island, N.Y., Treasury
Department, Internal Revenue Service Auto-
matic Data Processing Center
Memphis, Tenn., Treasury Department, In-
ternal Revenue Service Automatic Data Proc-
essing Center, with an amendment that the
annual rental cost of the required space not
exceed $7.00 per square ft., including service..
Sincerely yours,
GEORGE H. FALLON,
Chairman.
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY
Mr. BURTON of California. Mr.
Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman will
state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. BURTON of California. As I un-
derstand, the armed services bill will not
be further dealt with today. Is that the
Chair's understanding?
The SPEAKER. That is the under-
standing of the Chair.
Mr. BURTON of California. In that
event, that will permit the country to
tell the Congress whether or not they
want us to vote in approval or disap-
proval of widening the war in Southeast
Asia. Am I correct in that, Mr. Speaker?
The SPEAKER. The Chair will state
that the Chair does not understand that
to be a parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. BURTON of California. I thank
the Speaker.
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR WEEK
OF MAY 4
(Mr. GERALD R,. FORD asked and
.was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
I take this time for the purpose of ask-
ing the distinguished majority leafier the
program for the remainder of this week,
If any, and the program for next week.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the
gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, in re-
sponse to the inquiry of the distinguish-
ed minority leader, may I advise that
after consulting with members of the
committee and Members of the leader-
ship on both sides, it is generally agreed,
and we will act accordingly, that the
military procurement bill, should go over
until Wednesday next. That decision
will vary the program that we had in-
tended to announce.
Members know that tomorrow is Law
Day, and there are numerous Mem-
bers?large numbers of Members?who
have petitioned me that they have com-
mitments which they have made in an-
ticipation of being able to fulfill them.
With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, we will
ask to go over at the conclusion of busi-
ness today.
The business for next week is as
follows:
Monday is Consent Calendar day, and
there are eight bills under suspension:
H.R. 6951. To enact the interstate
agreement on detainers into law;
House Joint Resolution 546. To provide
for commemoration of the 100th anni-
versary of Yellowstone National Park;
H.R. 16661. To authorize a maximum
of $15,000 coverage under servicemen's
group life insurance;
H.R. 16739. To extend the authority
to maintain Veterans' Administration
offices in the Philippines;
S. 856. To provide for participation in
international expositions;
H.R. 11628. To transfer the authority
to purchase office equipment and furni-
ture for the Library of Congress;
? H.R. 12619. To amend the act re-
lating to the policing of the Library of
Congress;
Senate Joint Resolution 193. To pro-
vide for the appointment of James E.
Webb as Citizen Regent of the Smith-
sonian Institution.
Tuesday is Private Calendar day. Also
on Tuesday we have H.R. 10138, Public
Health Service commissioned officer re-
tirement benefits, with an open rule and
1 hour of debate.
Then for Wednesday and the balance
of the week the continuation of H.R..
17123, the Military Procurement Author-
ization Act for 1971, also the second sup-
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on weapons deployment.
Th committee headed jv
-'' J. McCloy, consiSts of
leading representtatives of busi-
ness, labor and scientific ,pr-:
tions as well as former
merit officials. Several
orils members have informed
Republican Senators that they
interpret their recommendatjpn
as. including the moratorium
apProach advocated today in
th,e-fienate resolution. But this
_
interAretation was disputed by
other members of the commit-
tee, who said they were not
indorsing a moratorium. .
White House officials today
ere passing the word that the
dministration was not pre-
gared to accept such a mora-
tprivin .as its opening propiisal
fpr the resumption of the talks
with the Soviet Union on the
limitation of srategic arms. The
talks, now entering the sub-
Df the !ay.,: -*as reported to have offered
principal objections to the
all lpffensive
nuclear s iW-nate proposal for a mutual
tlite ?F
to"
i on weapons de-
ms, subject' o ployment.
en ication Of -oilier' " One was that such a step
iservation ATV-Alfa -got the United States
be appropVvilf trapped in an open-ended mora-
some te.
torhun that would be difficult
,mernbeirit tp terminate, even if there was
lvisory cOmirtTie nosrogress in the arms-limita-
-States Arms-tiki- dim talks. Second, Mr. Risen-
te-r was said to have argued,
Is "riot accurate the Unitted States must proceed
The New 4row wsutioulsy in what are expected
Senator Edmund S. Muskie,
e ld retTarl- .Democrat of Maine, sought to
a WeaponsWeE67 meet at least some part of these
Ilium to the 160?-Afections today by propOSIng
the initial "standstill" in
??? 4444"-
?iPpolutt '
44444
?
staling _that to be protracte nego a ons.
weapons deployment be limited
ot Disclosed'
rrhs. At the same
t
, ,,.,_ . .
committee's report IS e the Maine Democrat, in a
ate,' and committee milir ate speech, accused the Ad-
.j4 to discuss furtlinistration of "massive am-
angua
ge of the rF
e to ti in is aatt " , 't attitude toward
S'c-"'n- ttguy
9 , - ?4=7- 4nia_Time Limit Asked
to committee _Ina- 'In contrast to the Muskie
14'4 i-Ob-e-idexITT: i, the resolution adopt-
, Was that the milted' Sls Araz oihne zatseugaescteesdnomtimorae_
Ould propose a comprehensive torrium on weapons deployment,
agreement limiting state-41c :4tholitit Senator Edward W.
WhIRMS. This would be in con: otthlfirmIctriake- of Massachusetts, the
"with a.inore -ex rftfir sponsor, talked of a
. -treene lasting months to two
erli recommendation,
lite% Mat 18VVITor Release 2007/03/
ithrient cOvertrig
WtatiOria 'systems.
I.C.)
As Mr. Kissinger s comtnents
indicated, this indefiniteness of
the proposed moratorium is ex-
pected to be a major point of
Administration criticism of the
risolution. On the technical
level, objections also are ex?
pt cted to be raised about the
fteasbility of monitoring a halt
it testing of multiple-missile
Ata,rhgads which is contemplat-
1 in the Senate resolution.
.
The- resolution was adopted
NstIth almost no opposition, al-
though Senator John Stennis.,
chairman of the Senate Armed
Sprvices Committee, objected at
6he point in the final debate
teat the Senate was interfering
With the negotiating preroga-
tives of the President.
Senator J. W. Fulbright,
chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, retorted
that by means of the resolution
the Senate was just reassert-
* its constitutional right to
advise the President, as it had
done yesterday in rejecting the
reme Court nomination of
Harrold Carswell. '
The six Senators voting-
attainst the resolution were
jimes B. Allen, Democrat of
Alabama; Henry L. Bellm.on,
Republican of Oklahoma; Paul
Fannin, Republican of Ari-
zona; Barry Goldwater, Repub-
lican of Arizona; Russell B.
Long, Democrat of Louisiana,
and Strom Thurmond, Republi-
can of South Carolina.
Idea Discussed by Nixon
At a recent news conference,
President Nixon dismissed the
proposed resolution as "irrele-
vant" since, he asserted, it
merely stated the Administra-
tion's objective of reaching an
arms limitation agreement with
the Soviet Union. But through-
out the Senate debate, the
sponsors of the resolution
argued that their purpose was
to seize the psychological in-
itiative by having the United
States propose a morotorium
on weapons deployment right
at the outset of the resumed
talks with the Russians.
'Without such a pause, they
contended, the chances for a
permanent agreement might be
Inst as both sides continued
deploying such weapons as
niultiple-missile warheads and
antiballistic missile systems.
'Now that the Senate has
approved the resolution, the
President finds himself caught
between conflicting counsels as
he decides unon the opening
American position for the talks
in Vienna.
Mr. Kissinger and other Ad-
rrrinistration officials are be-
lieved to be urging a cautious
"building block" approach in
the talks, seeking agreement in
certain areas, depending upon
the Soviet reaction, rather than
64rotaittligR721i0013,7cROOD 2 0 0 21 0005-9
Atensive freeze on strategic
Wirt#44114*,--
PAGE
200210hi90-9
W e he advisory committee
of the Arms Control and Dig-
armament Agency is urging the
President to seek, a compre-
hensive agreement, its recom-
mendation is open to varyine
frtteapretations on whether it
also contemplates an immediate
moratorium on weapons deploy-
ment.
., -Though the Senate resolution
ti
riot binding upot 'Mr. Nixon.
It teflects the preponderande of
bipartisan opinion within the
tipper chamber and thus can not
be ignored by the President,
who will ultimately have to re-
turn to the Senate with any
treaty agreed upon in the arms-
limitation talks. The resolution
was initially introduced by
Senator Brooke, amended by
Senator John Sherman Cooper.
Republican of Kentucky, and
then indorsed by the Senate
Democratic Policy Committee.
, In the resolution, the Senate,
in effect, is telling the Presi-
dent that he can count upon
bipartisan support if he pro-
poses a moratorium at the
opening of the Vienna talks.
Conversely, he faces the possi-
bility of Senate criticism if he
Ifails to take such an initiative
it-the talks.
April 7, 1970
of his unanimous-consent request
those statements and to that type of
business which is conducted prior to and
during the period for the transaction of
routine morning business which would
not exceed 10 or 15 minutes, so that we
would be protected in the event that
some item of business at that point were
to go on for, say, an hour or an hour and
a half.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That was under-
stood. I do not want the Senate to get
caught short again by having an un-
objected to bill brought up in the morn-
Mg hour and then have the rule of ger-
ataneness apply.
In my opinion, that is indefensible. It
runs against the intent of the Senate. It
violates the Pastore rule, It was for that
reason that I offered the unanimous-
consent request, that little bills to which
there is no objection do not have the
rule of germaneness apply, but that the
germaneness rule will apply only after
the morning hour and the laying down
of the unfinished business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, Is there
objection to the request of the majority
leader?
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, re-
seryin.g the right to object?
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator from New Jersey yield for a brief
comment?
M. CASE. Mr. President, I yield first
to the distinguished majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
there is any argument about the request,
I will withdraw it. There are other ways
by which I can accomplish its purpose.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr, President,
under the rule of germaneness I have not
been able to make a statement on the
floor for the better part of a week.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect. But he was coming in under theess
rule of germanen when it actually ap-
plied, not during the morning hour or
routine morning business.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, is
It possible to ask unanimous consent to
extend, the 3 minutes to say 10 minutes
in the morning hour?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, it
was virtually impossible to get the floor
during the debate on the Carswell nomi-
nation.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 5191
to Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I
withdraw it.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I hope the majority leader will
not withdraw the request.
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I feel
remiss at holding up the Senator from
New Jersey.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I did not
know what the request was.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the request.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK.
The Senator from Montana (Mr. MANS-
FIELD) asks unanimous consent that for
the remainder of the second session of
the 91st Congress, the Pastore rule of
germaneness of debate shall not begin
to run until the conclusion of routine
morning business or until the unfinished
business is laid before the Senate,
whichever comes later.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, does the
request that was just read include the
modification that the Senator from West
Virginia proposed?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. I
have so asked that the modification of
the Senator from West Virginia be in-
cluded.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, may. I
have the modification restated?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, if I might restate it--
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
this goes on for 1 additional minute, I
withdraw it. It is too picayune a matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from Montana renew his re-
quest?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ob-
ject. I withdraw it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is
objection.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
would have no objection.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, has the
minority leader been consulted?
Mr. MANSFIELD Yes. The Senator is
In full accord with this, because he un-
derstands the rule of germaneness.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Iowa did not know that If
the-minority leader has indicated that
he has no objection, I have no objection.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I dis-
e it with the Minority leader as
well as the understanding of the inter-
pretation placed on it by the Senator
from West Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
majority leader renew his request?
Wiz. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I do not be-
lieve I know what the request is.
side mistrusts
OPPOSITION TO USE OF SAFEGUARD
ABM EXPANSION AS A "BARGAIN-
-11TG-CPOUNTER" IN SALT NEGOTIA-
TIONS ,
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, two decades
of the greatest arms race the world has
ever seen have brought the Soviet
Union and the United States to the
realization that neither country can or
will permit the other to achieve a P
permanent advantage in nuclear capa-
bility.
Both nations understand that the
nuclear weapons deployed by each deny d
the other the opportunity of launching n
a surprise attack without being destroyed e
in return. They have come to realize that e
this rough parity is in the interest of
each country to preserve. That, of t
course, is the reason we have been able to g
enter into the strategic arms limitation w
talks. a
Maintenance of this parity is both the
aim and the condition of effective arms c
limitation. By effective, I mean limitation fr
which will be observed because neither w
side feels disadvantaged by it. Effective a
arms limitation will lessen tensions and p
permit the allocation of resources to B
more productive purposes.
glf
Conversely, an agreement which either
other side gains an advantage is ob-
viously worthless. The nation that be-
lieves it is disadvantaged will be more
determined than ever to "catch up,"
setting off another round of arms escala-
don and thereby increasing tensions once
more.
But, like all simple truths, this hard-
won knowledge which has brought us to
Vienna is elusive. It must constantly be
restated. Too readily can it be lost in
the mechanics of bargaining, tactics,
and countertactics. Too easily can each
side slip back into the mistaken view of
the other side as an opponent to be
coerced or outwitted.
There is some evidence that this cor-
rosive process may already be underway.
In recent weeks, a disturbing argument
has been resurrected to justify further
expansion of the Safeguard Anti-Ballis-
tic Missile system, an argument which
can endanger the very mutual interest
and confidence which is vital to success-
ful negotiations. It is privately urged,
though seldom publicly stated, that Safe-
guard expansion must be approved so
that it can serve as a "bargaining coun-
ter" by the United States in the SALT
talks.
The suggestion is that congressional
approval of the proposed Safeguard ex-
pansion is necessary in order to con-
vince the Soviet Union of a fact of which
I think they are well aware?that we,
the United States, can and will match
them in another arms race if they do not
cooperate at Vienna.
I believe that the Congress and the
American people should be told in clear
terms whether or not the executive
branch is requesting the expansion of
Safeguard as a negotiating counter in
Vienna.
I, for one, will not believe this unless I
am forced to. Certainly it is clear that our
negotiators at these talks, the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, do not
hold this view.
For understandable reasons, Mr. Ge-
rard Smith, head of this Agency, felt he
could not respond directly to my question
on this point in recent Foreign Relations
Committee hearings. But he did say:
I do not think that the United States
should start new programs Just for the sake
of trying to establish additional bargaining
ower. I think there is plenty of bargaining
ower on our side with our present on-going
rograms. . . .
The hard advice of those who have
ealt with the Soviet Union across the
egotiating table is as direct and un-
quivocal as it is realistic in view of our
xperience. Again, Mr. Gerard Smith:
For two nations who are grappling with
he immense problem of controlling strate-
ic arms, it probably is more likely that there
ill be some sort of arrangement if the sides
re more nearly alike in strategic forces.
This mutuality of interest in, and the
onfidence of both sides which comes
om, the existing parity in strategic
eapons are the condition for successful
fans limitation talks. Moreover, their
reservation is the goal of such talks.
oth are endangered by the use of Safe-
ard expansion as a bargaining counter.
If Safeguard is approved and if it turns
ut that the SALT taw are .stretched
because it believes the o
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S 5192
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 7, 1970
out over a period of years, then this We all are aware that what followed
country will have on its hands a bur- this bold initiative was one of the most
geoning ABM system, one to which the important breakthroughs in American-
Soviets would have to respond on the Soviet relations since World War II.
possible chance that it might prove ef- Within 5 days of the President's
fective. By our actions we will have guar- speech, Chairman Khrushchev had wel-
anteed the very continuing Soviet SS-9 corned the proposal and further had or-
deployment which we are seeking to halt, dered a halt in the production of So-
a deployment which, according to Sec- viet strategic bombers. Within a month,
retary La,ird, Safeguard could not defend negotiations were underway on the nu-
us against, clear test ban treaty. Then, on August
There is already some evidence that 5, 1963-8 weeks to the day following
this "bargaining counter" approach may the President's speech?the treaty was
be feeding Russian suspicions and in- signed. It never has beeli, broken.
spiring fundamental uncertainty regard- This initiative did not originate in any
lug the U.S. intentions toward the SALT wishful view of Soviet good will or out
talks, of any expectation of a sudden revolif-
As pointed out by Dr. Shulman of tion in human nature. But the President
Columbia University, the Soviet press re- did warn the American people not to
cently has been posing two basic ques- look upon communication with the So-
tions: viet Union "as nothing more than an
First. Is the United States really pre- exchange of threats." And, as he noted,
pared to accept approximate strategic even the most hostile nations can be
parity as a basis for negotiations? relied upon to keep those agreements
Second. What is the meaning of Amer- which are in their own interest.
ican moves to deploy MIRV, expand Safe- Mr. President, I emphasize that again
guard, develop a new strategic bomber? because it is the basis of all international
We can be certain that this Soviet relations: The recognition that nations
puzzlement to some extent is put on for act and will always act in their own in-
r benefit terest; that the problem in dealing be-
in its original form had been cosponsored
by some 45 Members of the Senate.
Mr. President, I would like to add this
observation. We shall be dealing in this
body at considerable length somewhat
later in this session on the justifications
offered by the administration and the
Department of Defense for the expansion
of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile
system. Of course, the major justifica-
tions were three: The defense of our
missile sites, protection against the so-
called Chinese threat, and protection
against stray or accidental missiles which
might be fired and which might have
devastating effect in a particular locality.
Many questions will be presented as
to the effectiveness of the Safeguard sys-
tem from the standpoint of its tech-
nology. I have not attempted to go into
these questions in this talk, since such
technical issues must be gone into at
length at the proper time.
But at this time I did want to bring
out into the open and express my own
belief that any further justification?
apart from the technical question, apart
from the question of the necessity of
Safeguard as a weapons system?does
ou not have a sound basis in fact, and, in
But we also can be certain--if the long tween countries and among nations is fact, would be counterproductive; name-
years of the cold war have taught us anyt based upon the recognition by each of ly, the argument that we need it as a
thing?that at least some among the them that the other will act in this bargaining counter for the SALT talks
in Vienna I think this argument is
Soviet leadership can be expected to
place the worst possible construction on
our actions. They will seize upon the fact
of Safeguard expansion, if we do go
ahead with it, as an immediate threat
to be responded to. All they will want to
knew is whether this so-called bargain-
ing counter shoots missiles. Sepculation
about American motives they will leave
to the philosophers.
Vastly more direct and constructive is
the proposM of Senate Resolution 211
that: First, prompt negotiations between
the United States and the Soviet Union
to seek agreed limitation of both offen-
sive and defensive strategic weapons
should be urgently pursued; and second,
the President should propose to the So-
viet Union an immediate mutual suspen-
sion of the further deployment of all
offensive and defensive nuclear strategic
. weapons systems, subject to national
verification and other inspection meas-
ures as may be appropriate. The Soviet
Union well may consider such a freeze
in their interest.
Instead of confronting the Soviet
Union with Safeguard expansion and
letting them figure out what we are
really up to, the United States should, in
Prof. Roger Fisher's words, present the
Soviets with a "yesable proposition,"
sernething to which they have only to
agree.
That, of course, was the intent and
spirit of the resolution which I offered
last summer calling upon the President
to suspend flight tests of multiple reentry
vehicles for so long as the Soviet Union
does the same.
Almost 7 years ago, President John
F. Kennedy confronted the Soviet Union
with a sinlijar, proposition, saying:
manner; and that the problem is to
things on which agreement can be wholly without a sound basis, and even
reached, things which are in the interest to urge it could present an added dif -
of all nations concerned?in this partic- ficulty to the success of the SALT nego-
ular case, in the interest of both Russia tiations.
and the United States. Any other agree- I yield the floor.
ment between two nations which is not Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the able
based on the recognition of this prin- Senator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) has.
ciple cannot be relied upon at all for made another of his incisive contribu-
the future. tions to this vital debate. I wish to em-
The results of President Kennedy's in- phasize one of the points he makes;
itiative, which reflected this principle, are namely, his reference to the character of
every day with us in the decreased levels Soviet discussions of SALT and arms
of atmospheric radioactivity and in the control prospects in general.
health of our children. It has long been common for some U.S.
The lesson is clear. . observers to suggest that the Soviets
were not interested in a general freeze
Of course there is no prospect that a on strategic weapons. In particular, some
sweeping, permanent freeze on the de- spokesmen in and out of the T.J.S. Gov-
ployment of all strategic nuclear weap- ernment have implied that the Soviets
ons, or even of any single major weapon were not interested in or concerned
system, can be quickly and easily agreed about MIRV technology and would not
upon at SALT. But precisely because the agree to a limit on ABM systems.
SALT negotiations undoubtedly will be I believe any such conclusions are
lengthy and involved, it is vital that the plainly unfounded. We do not yet know
present rough strategic parity between what the Soviets may be willing to ac-
the Soviet Union and the United States be cept and will not find out until firm
frozen at its present level while these proposals have been thrashed out. That
negotiations take place. is why it is so essential for the United
To present the Soviet Union with a States to advance a concrete, compre-
specific, "yesable" proposition designed hensive plan when the SALT talks re-
to buy time for these negotiations is no sume in Vienna.
confession of weakness. /t is a prudent Much has been made in the West of a
recognition of our mutual interests and comment by Premier Kosygin some years
of the realities of modern technology, ago indicating that defensive weapons
The present mutuality of interest be- were not destabilizing and apparently
tween the United States and the Soviet suggesting that they should not be sub-
Union must not be endangered in the ject to the same controls as those pro-
effort to achieve what could not be even posed over offensive weapons. But I think
a temporary advantage of bargaining it is now clear that the Premier's re-
position, one which could only inspire un- marks were not read in context and were
certainty and suspicion imperiling the given exaggerated weight. As a current
SALT talks themselves, article in the Soviet periodical, Twentieth
I urge that the Senate overwhelmingly Century and Peace, reveals, only 3 days
I now declare that the United States
does not propose to conduct nuclear tests approve Senate Resolution 211 as it was after Kosygin's famous remark in a Len-
in thq atmosphere so long as other states unanimously reported out by the Senate don press conference, Pravda offered an
do not do so. Foreign Relations Committee and which explicit corrective, stating:
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April 7, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE S 5193
The Soviet Government is ready to nego-
tiate the problem of prohibition of further
armament race both in the field of offensive
as well as defensive weapons,
Indeed, the authoritative chairman of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences Com-
mittee on the Scientific Problems of Dis-
armament, Prof. V. S. Errielianov has re-
peatedly underscored this receptivity to
controls over both offensive and defen-
sive weapons. Emelianov has stated
that?
The salvation from the dangers which face
the peoples of our planet in connection with
the creation of modern weapons, should be
sought not in the creation of illusory means
of defense, but rather in the annihilation of
the very source of the dangers--the nuclear
weapons.
There is good reason to believe that
the Soviet Government is divided on
some of these issues, as the U.S. Govern-
ment has always been. But it would be
incorrect to approach the SALT nego-
tiations on the assumption that the old
myths of Soviet disinterest in limits on
both offensive and defensive weapons will
apply. The situation is different from
past arms negOtiations and the prospects
are more hopeful, if we but realize the
opportunity for mutual restraint. The
fluidity of Soviet attitudes, though
marked by caution as are our own, is a
fact we should recognize. Helsinki has
been followed, for example, by a number
of quiet Soviet feelers which appear to be
inviting a proposal such as that contem-
plated in Senate Resolution 211.
It is to help President Nixon seize
this great opportunity for turning the
arms competition into more secure.chan-
neis that the supporters of this resolu-
tion believe the Senate's opinion should
be expressed in this manner. If the So-
viets do not prove receptive to the rec-
ommended suspension of deployments of
both offensive and defensive weapons,
there will be ample opportunity there-
after to explore more limited arrange-
ments.
Once again I commend the distin-
guished Senator from New Jersey for his
enlightened and constant efforts to ad-
vance this great cause.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that I May pro-
ceed for not to exceed 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OlorICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, the Sena-
tor from Arizona is recognized i'or not
to exceed 10 minutes.
NEW EVIDVICE SUPPORTS JUDGE
CARSWPILL
Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. President, the
debate on Judge Carswell has greatly
interested me because of figures which
have been used which just have not
Sounded reasonable to me non/awyer.
Questions kited of judges in other
courts, who are friends of mine, have
verified my misgivings and research by
My staff has backed this up,
am able to releaSe today the results
of a study which proves beyond any doubt
that Judge Carswell is eminently well
suited for a position on the Supreme
Court bench.
This study is the first complete anal-
ysis that has been made of Judge Cars-
well's decisions while he was sitting as
an appellate judge. It clearly reveals two
previously overlooked facts which are
highly pertinent to Judge Carswell's
qualifications.
First, the study discloses that the
nominee holds the special distinction of
having been assigned, while he was a dis-
trict judge, to sit with the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in no less than 54 dif-
ferent cases.
What is more, his record in these cases
gives him an average of 93 percent as an
appellate judge. In other words, his deci-
sions and opinions as a visiting judge on
the circuit court have prevailed 93 per-
cent of the time.
When his record of 54 cases as a visit-
ing appellate judge is added to the mini-
mum of 100 decisions which he has joined
in since coming to the higher court, it
becomes clear that his judicial record on
the Court, of Appeals is over 50 percent
more extensive than the number, of his
published decisions from the district
court. This means that his critics have
built their attack against Judge Carswell
based on much less than half of his
total record.
Mr. President, this new data provides
convincing evidence of the high esteem
- with which Judge Carswell is held in the
Fifth Circuit. It is an unusual tribute
for any district judge to be chosen so
many times to sit with circuit judges in
the decision of appellate cases.
Of particular interest is the fact that
none other than Chief Judge Tuttle, who
headed the Fifth Circuit, picked out
Judge Carswell time after time to be a
member of the same review panel of
which he, Judge Tuttle, was a member.
Judge Carswell sat together with Judge
Tuttle on at least 25 different occasions.
This certainly gives a true picture of the
high regard and great confidence which
Chief Judge Tuttle had for the creden-
tials and skills of Judge Carswell. It
clearly gives renewed meaning to the let-
ter of endorsement which Judge Tuttle
had written on behalf of Judge Carswell.
Mr. President, throughout this debate,
I have noticed an unusual preoccupa-
tion by Judge Carswell's opponents with
various sets of statistics compiled by law
students. I hope they will give equal con-
sideration to the striking new data that
I have released today.
This evidence, going as it does to Judge
Carswell's performance as an appellate
judge, is much more pertinent than the
incomplete and misleading statistics
which the critics have been using.
His detractors have ignored the total
of 4,500 cases which Judge Carswell has
handled as a district judge and have
focused only on those cases which were
appealed. There is no question that this
is a greatly distorted method of examin-
ing the nominee's credentials. It gives no
weight at all to the vast majority of cases
which Judge Carswell handled so well
that there was no ground for appeal.
Also, it completely ignores the setting
of each decision. It hides such important
considerations as whether or not new law
was handed down by the higher courts
after the lower court decision.
For example, many of Judge Carswell's
critics have pointed to two school de-
segregation cases of his which were
reversed by the fifth circuit court of
appeals. These are supposed to demon-
trate that Judge Carswell is hostile to
civil rights.
What his detractors neglected to tell
us, however, was that 11 other district
judges in the fifth circuit were reversed
by the same higher court ruling. And
someone forgot to mention that Judge
Carswell himself voted to reverse 11 of
these cases-419 F.2d 1211. He was in
complete agreement with his fellow
judges that an intervening Supreme
Court case required swifter school de-
segregation in the fifth circuit.
In fact, Mr. President, the statistics
used by the opponents are not even ac-
curate. They have accepted data pre-
pared by law students without making
an examination on their own. My office
has discovered five cases of Judge Cars-
well's that were affirmed by the circuit
court, but overlooked by his critics-
293 F.2d 261, 337 F.2d 753, 341 F.2d 351?
two cases, 21107 and 21111-399 F.2d 93,
and 420 F.4160.
Who knows how many more they may
have omitted before arriving at their
misleading statistic?
Mr. President, the school integration
decision I have cited is not the only one
which demonstrated the nominee's con-
cern with human rights.
The study which I have initiated has
uncovered 11 aditional decisions that are
without any question procivil rights-
353 F.2d 585; 415 F.2d 325 and 1377;
417 F.2d 838, 845, and 848; 418 F.2d 549
and 560; and 420 F.2d 379, 527, and
690.
Mr. President, the opponents could
have discovered this for themselves. It
should not be necessary for a Senator
who is not a lawyer to have to seek out
these hidden facts. In the face of this
balanced record, the minority report on
the nomination of Judge Carswell makes
the unqualified charge that the nomi-
nee's supporters can find no activities to
show "his commitment to equal rights."
Now each of my colleagues who signed
this report is a lawyer. With all due re-
spect, I must suggest to my colleagues
that if I, who am not a lawyer, can turn
up 10 or 11 decisions solidly backing
minority rights then surely they can do
even better.
This same failure to do their home-
work has marked the testimony and
speeches of nearly every one of Judge
Carswell's critics. As another example,
I might refer to Dean Pollak, who is nor-
mally well prepared.
And yet he appeared before the Senate
Judiciary Committee to express his con-
cern about Judge Carswell when he had
merely read some of his district court
opinions _covering a period of 5 years.
This is 5 years out of an 11-year span
on the lower court.
To top it all off, Dean Pollak admitted
that he had only spent the Saturday
evening and Sunday morning previous
to his testimony running through these
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S 5194 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 7,
cases. He did not study any of Judge
Carswell's Circuit Court cases at all.
Now, I really must ask?is this fair?
Can Senators trenly reach a reasoned de-
cision on the basis of opinions volun-
teered by individuals who have failed to
review the whole record? Or have we
been fed a bunch of snap reactions
founded solely on emotional judgments?
Mr. President, the study I have under-
taken reveals 54 decisions in which
Judge Carswell joined while he sat as a
Visiting judge on the Fifth Circuit bench
and at least, another 100 in which he
participated after he became a circuit
judge.
In fact, I have come across seven opin-
ions which Judge Carswell himself wrote
during the years he sat as a visiting
Judge on the higher court and another
16 which he has written since becoming
an appellate Judge.
In all, his decisions from the appellate
bench total over 150. This is half again
as large as his printed decisions as a
district judge. In other words, his op-
ponents have ignored more than half of
Judge Carswell's judicial record in
reaching their position.
To my mind, anyone who is actually
seeking the truth of the matter will ex-
amine each of these cases before jump-
ing to the conclusion that judge Cars-
well is not fit for the Supreme Court.
In my opinion, his complete career
leaves no doubt that Judge Carswell is a
highly capable individual and a skilled
jurist.
His record is a balanced one. His de-
cisions prove that he has often voted on
the side of human rights.
His testimony before the Senate com-
mittee rings out with expressions of deep
concern and knowledge about human
problems.
There is no sound reason for opposing
his nomination.
Judge Carswell is extremely well qual-
ified to serve as a member of the Su-
preme Court. I shall support his nomi-
nation 100 percent.
Mr. President, at this point, I ask
unanimous consent to insert in the REC-
ORD a table of citations which will verify
the findings have released.
There being no objection, the citations
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STUDY OF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE CARSWELL'S
RECORD OF DECISIONS AS AN APPELLATE JUDGE
An analysis of every Fifth Circuit appel-
late decision published in the Federal Re-
porter, Second Series, beginning with 19 59
cases and continuing into 1969 cases, reveals
that District Judge Ilarrold Cars cell has been
assigned to sit on the higher court bench as
a visiting judge on at least fifty-four occa-
sions.
Chief Judge Tuttle participated as a mem-
ber of the mile appellate court as Judge
Carswell in twenty-five of these cases.
Only three of the fifty-four decisions were
reversed by the Supreme Court. One was
vacated,
In all, the decisions In which Judge Cars- Federal Reporter, 2d series
well Joined have prevailed as sound law in Volume:
92.6 percent of the cases.
This data clearly establishes the creden-
tials of Judge Carswell to sit as an highly
competent member of any higher court. It
definitely proves his capacity and experience
to serve as an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
The list of decisions in which Judge Cars-
well participated on the appellate bench,
while he was a District Judge, is as follows:
Federal Reporter-2d series
Volume: Page
286 46
286 72
266 742
287 252
287 623
301 630
304
304
304
305
305
307
307
307
308
309
809
310
310_
310
310
310
310
311
311
311
311
312
312
313
813
314
317
340
340
340
? 351
351
351
351
351
351
351
351
351
351
351
351
352
352
353
353
355
364
1 876
881
158
934
790
802
894
724
1
397
11
53
66
77
82
328
291
'429
3437
3438
134
207
187
3
85
295
707
1 708
2 708
278
304
384
455
456
468
470
489
609
611
671
'p52
69
76
485
585
2 543
1 829
First case.
'Second case.
'Subsequently reversed.
Subsequently vacated.
An analysis of Fifth Circuit appellate deci-
sions published in the Federal Reporter, sec-
ond series, from volumes 415 through 420,
discloses, at least, 10i decisions which Judge
Carswell has joined in since he became a
judge on the court of appeals. The decisions
include cases in which Judge Carswell wrote
the court's opinions. These cases are as
follows:
1970
Page
415 325
415 743
415 766
415 773
415 1 1007
415 1012
415 1017
415 1115
415 1129
415 21377
416 10
416 18
416 379
416 407
416 412
416 441
416 451
416 914
416 917
416 949
416 968
416 2972
416 1042
416 1077
416 1235
416 1246
416 '1257
416 1332
416 1333
417 94
417 135
417 198
417 218
417 296
417 303
417 329
417 518
417 628
417 629
417 633
417 838
417 845
417 848
417 1042
417 1134
418 134
418 '238
18 306
48 405
41 417
41 441
418 206
418 275
418 439
418- 482
418 1093
418 560
418 549
418 847
418 849
41 873
41 1112
48 1 1250
8 1305
419 10
419 30
419 91
419 122
419 152
419 223
419 381
419 128
419 149
419 1209
419 384
419 572
419 (11 cases) 1211
419 1806
419 1310
419 1312
419 1325
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