SENATOR MCCARTHY'S RESOLU-TION ON THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000600170089-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: January 26, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600170089-7
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Javtuarti 6, 1966
His column which appeared in this Out of a hat. It is a formula for liquidating
morning's Washington Post, entitled a mistake, for ending a war that cannot be
"Well, What Can He Do?" is illustrative won at any tolerable price, for cutting our
of the enlightened character of his com- losses before they escalate into bankruptcy,
and for listening to commonsense rather
ments. than to war whoops and tomtoms.
I ask unanimous consent that this col- Because we are neither omniscient nor om-
umn be printed at the conclusion of my nipotent, we, even we Americans, cannot al-
remarks. ways win. But I cannot help feeling in my
There being no objection, the article bones that a display of commonsense by a
proud and imperious nation would be a good
d in the RECORD
int
d
d t
b
,
e pr
e
ere
o
was or
as follows' moral investment for the future.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 25, ---1'~
1966] SENATOR McCARTHY'S RESOLU-
TODAY AND TOMORROW: WELL, WHAT. CAN HE TION ON THE CIA
Do?
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on
(By Walter Lippmann)
Monday
210) offered a
The reason, why the peace offensive failed Senator (S. Res. MCCARTHY
is most cogently revealed in the Mansfield Senate resolution (SS. Res. providing
report on the state of the war. Mr. Johnson for "a full and complete study with re-
has been trying to obtain by propaganda spect to the effects of the operations
the victory which he has not been able to and activities of the Central Intelligence
obtain on the battlefield-that Is to say, the Agency upon the foreign relations of the
acceptance in the whole of South Vietnam United States." Under the resolution,
of a government which has lost control of a this task would be undertaken by the
very large part of South Vietnam. The peace Foreign Relations Committee or an au-
offensive was bound to fail, and the grave thorized subcommittee, and report would
decisions which the President hoped to cir-
curnvent and avoid are now before him. be made by January 31, 1966.
If he is to make these decisions wisely, he On Sunday the Washington Post pre-
must recognize that in international politics sented an editorial commenting on the
peace settlements are possible only as and McCarthy proposal and his intention to
when they reflect the real balance of power. offer the resolution. The editorial lifts
In the World War, for example, Churchill and up and comments on the point that the
Roosevelt had to settle with Stalin for a CIA has attained very great importance
Soviet political frontier in the midst of Ger-
many and of Europe. That is where the "as a factor in the formulation and
Red army had arrived when the peace nego- execution of foreign policy."
tiations began. The same principle will hold As the editorial notes, the question
in Vietnam. There will be no settlement whose study is called for does not deal
until the terms of peace reflect the military with the more controversial question of
reality. whether or not the CIA should be in-
The President will be disappointed again volved in formulating or carrying out
and again as long as he and Secretary Rusk foreign policy, but with "the effects of
ask for a settlement which in effect demands
that the defeat of the Saigon forces be its operations" on our foreign relations.
transmuted at the conference table Into a This is a proper sphere for concern
victory for the Saigon forces. Nor should of the Foreign Relations Committee.
he indulge in any illusion that the informed The area marked out by the resolution
opinion of mankind really thinks as Secretary is not in conflict with that which is pres-
Rusk talks merely because American envoys ently under jurisdiction of Armed Serv-
have been politely and sympathetically re- ices and Appropriations Subcommittees,
ceived in so many capitals. This, too, the Washington Post editorial
What then should the President do? It is
often said by the President's supporters that points out.
his critics propose no alternative to what he I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
Is doing. If that was ever true, it is no longer dent, that the item to which I have re-
true today. It IS not true since the Mans- ferred may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL
field report and since the Gavin statement. RECORD.
The President should reduce his war aims,
which today are impossibly high in the light There being no objection, the editorial
of the conditions described in the Mansfield was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
report. He should alter his strategy along as follows:
the lines proposed by General Gavin, making [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 23,
it a holding operation pending the eventual 1966]
negotiation of a political settlement. Coxesrss AND CIA
The Mansfield report shows that Mr. Rusk's Senator EUGeNE MCCARTHY has announced
objective-the rule of General Ky or his suc- that he intends to seek Senate authoriza-
cessor over the whole of South Vietnam-is tion for an investigation of the impact of
unattainable no matter how much the war is the CIA on U.S. foreign policy. The mecha-
escalated. The burden of disproving the nism for this would be a new subcommittee
conclusions of the Mansfield report is on of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
those who have been proved wrong about the on the CIA or-should the Senate prefer-a
escalation of last summer, on those who are broader select committee. This is not the
now asking for another escalation in order first attempt to bring the CIA under con-
to redeem their failure, on those who want gressional surveillance. At the time of his
to redouble the stakes in order to recoup their death, the late Brien McMahon had indi-
losses. cated his intention to work for Joint Con-
If the Mansfield report contains the truth gressional Committee on CentralaIntelligence
of the matter, it follows inevitably that our as a followup to his successful fight to estab-
war aims should be reduced and our strategy Ilsh the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
revised. We should put aside the hopeless Majority Leader MANSFIELD and his 34 co-
task of searching out and destroying the sponsors envisaged just such a joint com-
Vietcong, and we should take our stand, as mlttee in their ill-fated 1956 resolution; and
Claneral Gavin advises, on a holding opera- Senator McCAnTIY himself has kept the is-
tion in the coastal cities, sue alive since. But the present move is
This is not a policy for & glorious victory unprecedented in its sharp focus on the im-
or for some kind of dazzling political portance of the CIA as a factor in the formu-
triumph. It is no trick for pulling rabbits lation and execution of foreign policy.
There can be little doubt that the institu-
tionalized growth of the int :lligence arm of
our Government during the cold war years
has impinged to a very great extent on what
has traditionally been the , xciusive sphere
of the State Department. Tie CIA's experts
in Saigon or Santo Domingr assess many of
the same matters that pre.' -upy embassy
political officers, and its operatives necessar-
ily stir up dark waters that a diplomat might
prefer to leave undisturbed. While on paper
the CIA answers to the Ambssador in a for-
eign capital, in case after c se the tail has
wagged the dog. President Kennedy's Execu-
tive order of May 1961, reailirming the au-
thority of the Ambassador, hLs had relatively
little practical meaning.
Senator MCCARTHY does not enter directly
into the controversy over whether or not the
new power of the CIA is a desirable and in-
deed unavoidable response to a new kind of
global political contest. His concern appears
to be primarily that this power be made sub-
ject to congressional restr ints-and that
the committees of Congress resting with for-
eign policy have a central pl:,ce in overseeing
the CIA.
The establishment of the proposed sub-
committee would be a desirable first step
indicating a recognition by Congress that the
Foreign Relations Committ, o has a proper
Interest in the affairs of the CIA. Both the
Armed Services and Appropr ations Commit-
tees have long had subcommittees on the
CIA, and these bodies nov hold informal
joint meetings with CIA offie-ials at irregular
intervals In which the F:,reign Relations
Committee should be given . voice. Beyond
this, the work of the new aibcommittee in
examining the record of the CIA could be a
valuable guide for future congressional ac-
tion, though it should be self-evident that
this examination would have to be conducted
under ground rules not normally acceptable
to Congress.
REPORT ON SOUTH AMERICA-
TRIBUTE TO JACK HOOD VAUGHN
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Presddent, last No-
vember, during the interim, the distin-
guished Senator from Indiana [Mr.
BAYI3] and I made an extensive tour of
South America. We visied four coun-
tries-Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile-and in each one we sought in-
formation on the economy, the people,
and the government. Also, we sought
to check on the effectivei ess of our pro-
grams involving Latin America, seeking
guidance on matters which will be com-
ing before the Senate. -
Among the highlights of our 3-week
trip, as far as I am cons eited, were our
visits with the Peace Corps volunteers
and the opportunity to watch them
working among the people of Latin
America in the fields and villages and in
the crowded slum sections of some of
the cities. I was deeply impressed by
the dedication, the intelligence, and the
ability of these American 3 who are serv-
ing the cause of humanity in faraway
places. The Peace Cori-s volunteers, I
discovered, are in close contact with the
people, are trusted and respected, and
have a real feeling of the conditions in
the countries where they serve.
Before making the South American
trip, I was briefed by Jack Rood Vaughn,
who then served as Asst: tent Secretary
of State for Inter-snleri?-,3'1 Affairs and
U.S. Coordinator of th ~ Alliance for
Progress. Mr. Vaughn is a talented and
Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP71 B00364R000600170089-7