ESTIMATES OF THE INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70S00385R000200190030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 21, 1967
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
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21 July 1967
SUBJECT . Estimates of the Infiltration of Supplies
and Personnel to North Vietnam
Attached is our response to your questions relating
to enemy logistics in the war in Vietnam.
Chief, Trade and Services Division
Distribution: (S-2408)
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/OER. /
1 - St/PR
1 - SAVA
1 - St/CS
1 - D/T
1 - T/SP
1 - T/TR
OER/T/SP;TRI (21 July 67)
ARMY review(s) completed.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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Infiltration of Personnel and Supplies into South Vietnam
I. Supplies
1. The major entry routes from North Vietnam into Laos for
trucks carrying supplies into the Panhandle are now the Mu Gia Pass
primarily and Route 137/912 secondarily. The road system is sup-
plemented by portering on trails and by river transportation on the
Se Bang Hieng from North Vietnam and by river transportation on the
Se Kong from Cambodia.
2. The overall volume of supplies delivered into the Panhandle
on these routes from North Vietnam and on the Se Kong from Cambodia
during the 1966-67 dry season probably exceeds the volume estimated
to have been delivered during the 1965-66 dry season. Some movement
of supplies will continue during the 1967 rainy season. We cannot
estimate with confidence the total delivered January to June 1967,
because of the lack of observations on Route 137/912. But taking
into account all available data, and the known improvements in the
road system, and truck sightings we estimate, after allowing for
losses in transit and for the requirements of the Communists in Laos,
that during the year beginning 1 October 1966 an average of over
40 tons a day will have been made available for stockpiling in
southern Laos or for subsequent delivery to the Communists in South
Vietnam. Over 30 of the 40 tons will have moved from North Vietnam
and the other 10 tons will have moved through Laos from Cambodia
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on the Se Kong and Route 110.
3. We estimate that most of the Class II, IV and V supplies
required by the Communist forces in South Vietnam from external
sources are delivered from North Vietnam through Laos. The tonnage
received by the Communists in South Vietnam from Cambodia through
Laos is mainly rice. (See paragraph 7. below, for the estimate of
logistic requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam.)
4. It is not possible to estimate the volume of supplies moved
across the DMZ in 1967. We do estimate that in 1966 the Communists
obtained at least 3,000 tons of rice from North Vietnam for use in
the DMZ area. Some of this rice may have entered Quang Tri from
the trails through Laos. In addition, NVA forces in Quang Tri are
almost exclusively dependent on external sources for supplies other
than food. VC forces in Quang Tri depend on external sources to
some extent also. The frequent movement of NVA forces in Quang Tri
province back and forth across the DMZ makes it impossible, how-
ever, to make a firm. estimate of the total logistical movements
across the DMZ.
5. Attempts to infiltrate supplies by sea have continued dur-
ing January through June 1967, but we do not have adequate intelli-
gence to assign quantities to the amount that may have been infil-
trated successfully. Supplies infiltrated by sea probably consist
mainly of weapons and ammunition and some medicine. The total
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volume infiltrated by sea is estimated to be small, however, com-
pared with the Communist requirements for supplies from external
sources.
6. We do not have an estimate of the total volume of supplies
delivered directly from Cambodia into South Vietnam in the first
half of 1967. In 1966 shipments of rice from Cambodia to Communist
forces in South Vietnam and Laos amounted to at least 20,000 tons.
Of this amount about 5,000 tons probably'were delivered on the Se
Kong into Laos some portion of which subsequently moved to South
Vietnam. We estimate that an average of 25 tons a day may be de-
livered to Laos on this route during this year of which an average
of 10 tons moves to South Vietnam. Deliveries of rice on other
routes directly into South Vietnam during 1967 appears to have de-
creased, however. This conclusion is based on the lack of report-
ing of the type received in 1966 regarding shipments and official
sales, the scarcity of rice in Cambodia, and the effort made this
year by the Cambodian government to control rice sales and to stop
rice smuggling. Deliveries of other types of supplies -- consist-
ing mainly of goods that can be purchased on the open market may have increased this year, but the overall volume remains small
compared to the quantity needed by the Communists.
7. As the following tabulation indicates, in mid-1967 about
one-fourth of the daily supply requirements for NVA and VC regular
and administrative support forces in South Vietnam was drawn from
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sources outside of South Vietnam (in short tons):
Total External
I (Food) 162 36
II and IV (Weapons, Quartermaster,
Engineer, Medical, Signal,
Chemical, etc.) 20 6
III (POL) Negl. Negl.
V (Ammunition) 10 9
Total 1922
There is a growing dependence on external sources for supplies, in-
cluding food. This is partly the result of the growing proportion
of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, especially since they
are generally deployed in food deficit areas, and partly because
of Allied denial efforts. VC guerrilla forces may require a very
small amount of external supplies, principally ammunition, but the
bulk of their supplies is obtained almost exclusively from local
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 y 4
1. USMACV estimates of NVA infiltration are given below.
Accepted
Possible
Total
1965
25,800
9,000
34,800
1966
53,500
28,500
82,000
1967
Jan
600
1,4QO
2,000
Feb
1,200
900
2,100
March
2,300
5,500
7,800
April
500
300
800
May
500
5,100
8,100
13,200
2. The above MACV estimates of NVA infiltration for the. period
January through June 1967 do not accurately reflect the number of
troops that have actually infiltrated into South Vietnam. There are
other gross indications that the number of troops infiltrated was
much higher.
3. The above estimates are incomplete because of the time that
elapses between the date a NVA group infiltrates and the date it is
"discovered" to the satisfaction of MACV. For example., the following
data illustrates changes in MACV reporting of January-June 1966 NVA
infiltration.
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II. Personnel Infiltration
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Date of Estimate Total Infiltration
July 1966 32,675
October 1966 53,302
December 1966 54,587
June 1967 54,400
As can be seen from the above, MACV's infiltration estimates require a
number of months to "firm up." This time lag -- about 3 months in the
above example -- has not remained the same since 1966. The increasing
share of replacement and filler; troops in total infiltration makes
rapid identification more difficult and has caused the current detection
period to extend beyond six months in many cases. Indeed, changes are
still being made in 1965 infiltration totals.
4. Of the 13,200 infiltrators carried by MACV for the first half
of 1967, 7,000 are believed to have crossed the DMZ. Nearly all of
the remainder traveled through Laos. A very small number of VIP
infiltrators. enter South Vietnam by sea infiltration from North Vietnam
or third countries.
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