MAN'S ROLE IN DYNA-SOAR FLIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 91
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1962
• Content Type: PAPER

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AWE ""Z7/N" C'OM P,JNJ'
NUMBER _ D2-80726
UNCLASSIFIED TITLE Man's Role in Dyna-Soar Flight
y: Arthur Murray -Manager, Hypersonic Crew Integration
MODEL NO. 620A CONTRACT NOAF33(657)-7132
ISSUE NO. ISSUED TO
CLASSIFIED TITLE
(STATE CLASSIFICATION)
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This report may be distributed to nonmilitary agencies not approved above subject to Boeing approval of each request.
NOTE: the LIMITED category may be checked only because of actual or potential patent, proprietary, ethical, or similar implications.
Z3 62-
PREPARED BY
ERVISED BY~ am 1 4',J'L_J - V -
SUP
SU
APPROVED BY,
CLASS. & DISTR.
APPROVED BY
RELIABILITY
APPROVAL .
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Page
1.0
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Purpose
1.2
Scope
1.3
Applicability
1.4
Authority
1.5
Participation
5
DS-0 22-101
AGENDA - MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS AND
OBSERVERS
R&D Program Objectives
DS-022-111
Features of Dyna-Soar Program
8
DS-022-186
Man's Role in Dyna-Soar Research System
9
DS-022-194
Pilot's Role in Dyna-Soar
10
DS-022-192
Effect of Pilot and Redundance
11
DS-022-191
Effect of Pilot and Redundancy
12
DS-022-199
Dyna-Soar Flight Control System
13
DS-022-207
Dyna-Soar Flight Control System
14
DS-022-190
The Pilot Contributes to Mission Success
15
DS-022-189
Example of Specific Pilot Action
16
DS-022-187
Example of Specific Pilot Action
17
DS-022-185
Example of Specific Pilot Action
18
DS-022-184
Specific Actions Pilot Can Take
19
DS-022-180
Potential Effect of Pilot and Redundancy
20
DS-022-198
Trends Demonstrated (Missile and Aircraft Projects)
21
DS-022-90
B-52 Air-Launch and Transport
23
DS-022-188
Manned Booster Considerations
24
DS-022-200
Influence of Man on Booster Design
25
DS-022-204
On-Board Countdown Role
26
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CONTENTS (Cont.)
Page
DS-022-203
Pilot Countdown Role
27
DS-022-202
Pilot Countdown Role (Cont.)
28
DS-022-173
Pilot's Role
29
DS-022-196
Advantages
30
DS-022-75
Altitude History Boost Acceleration
31
DS-012-59R1
Pilot Vibration Level versus Estimated Human Tolerance
32
DS-022-92R1
Escape from Pad
33
DS-022-201
Boost Control Regions
34
DS-022-206
Boost Pilot Control - Wind Profile
35
DS-022-208
Pilot Control During Boost - Typical Simulator Trace
36
DS-022-106R2
Once-Around Trajectory and Global Range
37
DS-022-195
Pilot Role in the Test Program
38
DS-022-86
Ion Sheath
39
DS-022-88
Effect of L/D on Range
40
DS-022-197
Energy Management
41
DS-022-95
Dyna-Soar Landing
42
D2-80726
ii
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APPENDIXES
Page
Appendix A (Backup to DS-022-101) R&D Program Objectives 43
Appendix B (Backup to DS-022-186) Some Relative Merits of Manned 46
versus Unmanned Dyna-Soar
Weapon System
Appendix C (Backup to DS-022-192) Redundant Systems and Pilot-in- 50
the-loop Aspects of all X-15
Flights
Appendix D (Backup to DS-022-198) Analysis of Individual Bomarc 52
Flights - Success Summary
Relationships -Actual versus
Expected Success for "Pilot
Controlled" Flights
Appendix E (Backup to DS-022-198) Effect of Redundancy plus Pilot- 56
in-the-loop
Appendix F (Backup to DS-022-198) Cost for Automation 59
Appendix G (Backup to DS-022-198) Flight Research Center Manned 60
Rocket Flight Study
Appendix H (Backup to DS-022-192) Detailed History - Redundant 68
Systems and Pilot-in-the-loop
Aspects for all X-15 Free Flights
Appendix I (Backup to DS-022-198) Effect of Redundancy plus Pilot- 87
in-the-loop
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FOREWORD
MAN'S ROLE IN DYNA-SOAR FLIGHT
FOR
BIOASTRONAUTICS PANEL OF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
ARTHUR MURRAY
MANAGER -HYPERSONIC CREW INTEGRATION
SEATTLE -FEBRUARY 21, 1962
The information in this document represents the philosophy of The Boeing Company
on the usefulness of man in general and a pilot in particular in the Dyna-Soar
system. This consistent piloted aspect of the orbital glider has been one of the
basic and firm Air Force ground rules on which the project has been conducted
under the direction of the Dyna-Soar System Program Office of the Aeronautical
Systems Division. The use of man in recent research flight projects, and his
inclusion in the very early planning stages of Dyna-Soar could be, and was,
predicated mainly on tradition, intuition, and supposition. The principal supposi-
tion required was as to the functional value of piloted versus automatic operation
in an orbital system. There is a growing body of opinion, which was evident at
the time of Commander Shepherd's and Captain V. Grissom's Mercury/Redstone
flights, and which tended to solidify upon Colonel John Glenn's successful Mercury/
Atlas orbital flight, to the effect that the requirement for man in space has been
adequately validated especially in those cases where a degree of flexibility is
required.
This presentation accepts man as a required and validated element of a flexible
return from orbit system which will maneuver to a selected landing point. This
material does not justify "why man in space? " It does show how he is used by the
Dyna-Soar designer to simplify systems, reduce costs, or improve operational
research reliability.
The effect of the concrete experiences encountered on missile projects (Regulus
and Bomarc), supersonic aircraft (F8U, F100), hypersonic aircraft (X-1, X-2
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FOREWORD (Cont)
and X-15), and Mercury experience are projected to the planned Dyna-Soar
mission. Mr. Murray's past experience as a research rocket aircraft pilot and
present responsibility for management of crew integration were used to select
areas of emphasis.
Due to the personal interest and concern of Mr. A. M. Johnston, Program
Manager, in the integration of the crew to Dyna-Soar, project engineering and
staff effort in this area is so widespread that individual acknowledgement of all
contributors would be difficult. However, recognition of the inputs of the follow-
ing Boeing Aero -Space Division personnel is made:
Mr. N. L. Krisberg, Chief, Technical Staff -General technical philosophy
Dr. Y. A. Yoler, Staff Engineering -Space Projects -Staff philosophy
Mr. R. R. Rotelli, Assistant Senior Project Engineer -Critique of project
inputs
Dr. R. Y. Walker, Staff Assistant Human Engineering -Time line analysis
Mr. L. R. Mason, Dyna-Soar Flight Technology Unit Chief, Mr. G. Dragseth,
Air Vehicle Stability and Control Supervisor and Mr. A. H. Lee,
Dyna-Soar Flight Control Supervisor -Stability characteristics,
flight control task, glider/booster simulation
Mr. R. G. Christensen, Section Head, System PD and Evaluation Section -
Manned booster consideration
Mr. T. K. Jones, Unit Chief, Reliability and Safety Unit -Safety implications
Mr. S. Howland, Acting Supervisor, Reliability Requirements and Status
Assessment Group -Safety and reliability considerations
Mr. T. R. Waddleton, Supervisor, Space and Research Systems -Use of man
during test
Mr. F. E. Woods, Staff Engineer, Test Technology Staff -Bomarc and
Minuteman experience
Mr. L. A. Perro, Supervisor, Test Control Equipment Design -Role of pilot
during countdown
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FOREWORD (Cont)
Acknowledgment is made of the contributions on the following individuals in the
areas of missile and high-performance jet and rocket aircraft projects.
Mr. Paul F. Bikle, Director NASA High Speed Flight Station, Edwards, Calif.
--Research aircraft philosophy
Mr. DeBeeler, Deputy Director NASA High Speed Flight Station, Edwards, Calif.
-Research aircraft philosophy
Messrs. J. Walker, J. B. McKay, and V. Horton, NASA High Speed Flight
Station -X-15 and Jet/Rocket aircraft experience
Messrs. G. Matranga, J. Gibbons, and V. Horton, NASA High Speed Flight
Station -X-15 and Jet/Rocket aircraft experience
Mr. D. G. Starkey, Chance Vought Aircraft Corporation -Regulus, F8U
experience
Mr. J. Wesesky, Flight Test Engineering Section AFFTC, Edwards, Calif. -
History of X-15 flights
Mr. R. Nagle, Flight Test Engineering Section AFFTC, Edwards, Calif. ---
History of X-15 flights
The information presented is current to the date of February 21, 1962.
D2-80726 3
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1.1 Purpose
This document records information conveyed during a briefing pre-
pared for and given to the Bioastronautics Panel of the Scientific
Advisory Board on the subject of the use of man in Dyna-Soar.
1.2 Scope
The information herein delineates the conceptual integration of man
(as a pilot) to Dyna-Soar. Material consists of reductions of the
charts used during the meeting. The charts were constructed to
summarize internal studies and discussions of project design and
staff support engineering, reliability, integration, and bioastronautics
groups which contributed to the evolution of the present Dyna-Soar
configuration.
The principal points elaborated upon over and above those quoted by
the charts are highlighted and detailed on the individual charts.
In accord with discussions with panel members, the related background
data from which these comments were evolved, along with a complete
definition of assumptions made, are documented.
1.3 Applicability
The material represents philosophy, design concepts, and a glider-
booster configuration as it existed at the time of the Seattle meeting.
It is not expected that the philosophy and concept will change materially.
Data emanating from related aircraft/missile projects and the glider
design itself is changing daily. It should be noted that it is not there-
fore intended to keep the document updated particularly in regard to
those items dependent upon detailed glider design data.
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1.4 Authority
The briefing of the Scientific Advisory Board was accomplished as
delineated by United States Air Force teletype.
The gathering of the background and supporting data has been accom-
plished in response to Scientific Advisory Board letter of April 23,
1962 to A. M. Johnston from L. D. Carlson (Chairman).
1.5 Participation
The attendees of the Bioastronautics Panel meeting, the Boeing
participants, and the agenda are shown in the succeeding section.
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AGENDA
AEROMEDICAL AND BIOSCIENCES PANEL
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
Visit to Boeing -February 21, 1962
Wednesday, February 21, 1962
9:00 Introduction to Boeing
9:20 Dyna-Soar Program and Progress Film
10:35 Refreshment Break
N. L. Krisberg
10:50 Man's Role and Operation in Dyna-Soar A. Murray
11:00 Applications of Bioastronautics to Dyna-Soar R. Y. Walker
System
11:15 Engineering Design Considerations for a
Manned System such as Dyna-Soar
(a) Cockpit design, displays, ejection seat,
survival equipment, etc.
(b) Vehicle environment system
11:45 Dyna-Soar Mockup Tour B. Hamlin
R. Shepherd
Simulator Operation
12:45 Transportation to BSRL
1:00 Luncheon - BSRL
1:55 Return to 2. 01 Building
2:00 Bioastronautics in General
2:30 Tour of Bioastronautics Laboratories
MEMBERS, CONSULTANTS,
Professor L. D. Carlson (Chairman)
Dr. R. F. Buchan
Dr. C. M. McDonnel
Dr. Frank Princi
Dr. B. M. Wagner
Dr. Stuart Bondurant
Dr. K. S. Lion
Dr. John Marbarger
Dr. L. M. Petterson
Brig. Gen. Don Flinkinger
Mr. C. L. Arnold
A. Murray
E. Kangas
F. W. Zuppe
G. Hollingsworth
F. W. Zuppe
R. H. Lowry
R. H. Lowry
Dr. Jessee Orlansky
Col. Carl Houghton
Col. Clyde Gasser
Mr. Donald Almy
Dr. A. W. Hetherington
Dr. Edwin Vail
Sqd. Leader John C. Henry
Maj. Arthur W. Kidder, Jr.
Mr. E. O. Berdahl
Capt. H. L. Bitter
Col. Randel
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? DEMONSTRATE PILOTED MANEUVERING
RE-ENTRY FROM ORBIT WITH CON-
VENTIONAL GLIDE LANDING AT
PRECISE LANDING SITE
+ LATHER RESEARCH DATA FOR ADVANCED
RE-ENTRY FROM ORBITAL FLIGHT
DESIGN FOR CONTROLLED LIFTING
EXPLORE FULL POTENTIAL OF PILOT
On the subject of man's role in Dyna-Soar we find that man has always had a role
in space. This has been true since the inception of Dr. Saenger's pre-World
War II thinking on space flight and the trans-Atlantic skip bomber proposal to the
German General Staff. It has been true of 1950-1957 United States studies such
as Bomi, Brass Bell, etc. It was true of the 1957 Industry Competitive Studies
that led to Dyna-Soar. In Dyna-Soar, the role of man results from the objectives
of the project.
The details of these objectives may be examined in the light of contractual state-
ments such as:
Program Objectives
Dyna-Soar Approach
System Design Objectives
Test System Objectives
System Design Requirements
and Test System Requirements
These are included as Appendix A.
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S ;-I
PACE TO AIRPORT . t F P ILO T' GHC I E
FROM
UNIQUE FEATURE "RETURN MEN AND MATERIAL
ONLY PILOTED MANEUVERABLE RE-ENTRY
PROGRAM IN FREE WORLD
These features are unique to the Dyna-Soar Program. They are incorporated in
the design in response to contractual statements and are being translated into
actual hardware.
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F F~~ F k F~ ? y F ?,~ ? 3 j ~ i ~ ~? 1#
CAPABILITY
J~N
K
#gi 9??~ ?: # y ~ ~ ~ a }fit ~y9~ '~i~ ~~~~~~~a#'~~y~ga~~~~;~~?kp~ ~E~ ~ ~'~~S 1
3 # ? 3 ; F ? h AT
't jc~9 F#7 x??Lys~ 9'
lF :?, ;__: F _ ~F FL t>.~
h HF
A N::
q c t c # ?F
# 5S?
10
UlG WE
13
li, C., CM ~1wwS~~~
5{'' F E'' F) F 33??xy9 # ~~~t.~Yi 3sL3 ~ E 3
See Appendix B for details of the role described by these 11 points.
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PILOT COMPLEMENTS CAPABI LITY OF LIFTING
AND MANEUVERABLE GLIDER
CORRIDOR EXPLORATION - 2
LIMITING FUNCTIONS
ALTER TEST PLANS
LANDING
PILOT AUGMENTS CONCEPTS OF REDUNDANCY
AND BACKUP SYSTEMS THROUGH
OBSERVATION
EVALUATION
JUDGEMENT
ACTION!
PILOT TESTS MANS VALUE IN POSSIBLE FUTURE 7
SmihMS
These elements are significant to the use of a man in Dyna-Soar.
D2-80726 10
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 MISSION SUCCESS -FREE-FLIGHT: PHASE
AED ON
ANALYSIS OF FLIGHT .DATA
I I i S CCE S
I 1 1 ICI PARTIAL SUCCESS 0
JMSS
ALT RN I I N SUCCESS 0
i RF+UEIY ONLY 1
TOTAL 22
18
.. ............................................... .
TED IN DAMAGE (REPAII ED
ON LANDING
The subject of how man should be used in space and space-type aircraft has been
of continuing interest to the Government and to industry. The Air Force Flight
Test Center has examined the results of a series of 40 X-15 flights. An explana-
tion of the ground rules under which the study was conducted is covered by AFFTC
letter to The Boeing Company (subject: "Redundant System and Pilot-in-the-Loop
Aspects of all X-15 Flights") and is included as Appendix C.
The individual detailed data from which the study was made is included verbatim
as Appendix H.
The results of the study have been summarized in the chart above.
It is significant that, as indicated by the column on the far right, no piloted
airplanes have been lost. Reading toward the left along the column of airplane
losses we may see the increasingly degraded effect on a research program from
elimination of the pilot and dual or emergency systems.
It can also be seen that neither the pilot nor dual systems alone are sufficient to
eliminate these potential losses. The best results come from use of a pilot with
adequate dual or emergency systems with which to work.
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X-15 - PRELAUNCH PHASE
ANALOGOUS TO FIRST- STAGE BOOST
EXCEPT RECOVERABLE & RECALLABLE
71 LAUNCH
ATT E M PTS
NO PILOT PILOT NO PIL it''
.........:........................
SINGLE SINGLE DUAL
SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
Such a great amount of difficulty was encountered in getting the X-15 to the point
of the 40 launches that it was decided to examine the prelaunch phase.
The analysis indicated that an appreciable improvement in mission success re-
sulted from use of a pilot and dual systems even under the relatively well con-
trolled phase prior to launch.
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MODES OF OPERATION
? MANUAL -DIRECT
? MANUAL-AUGMENTED (FIXED GAIN)
? MANUAL-AUGMENTED (ADAPTIVE)
? AUTOMATIC
Manual Direct-In the manual direct mode, pilot inputs are translated directly
into control surface movement through the electrical-hydraulic flight control
components.
This is the electro-hydraulic equivalent of WWI and II cable and pulley systems
with the inclusion of a ratio changer. In this mode, there is no augmentation and
the pilot alone copes with the natural stability of the glider, modulates excursions,
and applies a human "gain" based on his background of flight experience.
Manual Augmented (Fixed Gain) -In this mode, pilot inputs are transmitted
electrically and hydraulically to the flight control surfaces after being modulated
by a pilot-selected and pre-established amount of fixed gain from the adaptive
system. Simultaneously, and irrespective of pilot inputs, the basic airframe
aerodynamic stability characteristics are improved by the augmentation feature
that reduces short period oscillations.
Manual Augmented (Adaptive Gain) - Pilot inputs in this mode are again trans-
mitted electrically and hydraulically to the control surfaces and the glider control
surface motions and resulting maneuvers are modulated by an adaptive system.
By continuously sensing its output against its input, the adaptive system varies
its own gain to cope with the considerable change in stability of the glider. This
change occurs when a lifting body undergoes the transition from orbital velocity
to conventional landing speeds. Concurrently, the augmentation effect of the sys-
tem attenuates short-period glider oscillations.
Automatic - In this mode, the pilot makes no inputs whatsoever and the adaptive
control system of the glider responds automatically to the signals generated by
the Inertial Guidance System only.
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MODES OF OPERATION
MEDIUM
IItLOW
PILOTS GAIN
SELECTOR
RATE
GYRO
MANUAL- DIRECT
? MANUAL-AUGMENTED (ADAPTIVE)
? MANUAL-AUGMENTED(FIXED GAl N"
? AUTOMATIC
COMPEN-
SATION
VARIABLE
GAIN
ELEMENT
.? ................?...?.....
M- D
MAN. DIR.
TRIM
iI
DIRECT
AUGMENTED
G A I N
SELECTOR
REACTION
CONTROLS
AERODYNAMIC
CONTROLS
The concept of these four optional modes of operation available to the pilot may
be visualized by examination of the major elements of equipment that make up the
flight control system indicated above.
The equipment above the dotted line, from the Inertial Guidance System (IGS)
through to the reaction/aerodynamic and vector controls, is essentially a conven-
tional missile-type system and yields automatic control. The elements added
below the line, and the manual direct trim, yield the three additional modes, each
of which utilize the pilot-in-the-loop.
These modes give the pilot the wherewithal to carry out the actions dictated by
his judgement.
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T T ICI, CASE OF `Q IPMENT I AILURE .
? > T . FAIL REACTION t NT OL. LU 1 3OS I Nt UT
71
(N RAIN OF REACTION -CONT U I
# T S -+ U ' I 'AILED SYSTEM ALT R -ENT SLI H
~. f
U H.
''s`y'^ z 3 4 s" -MP^
ILA R' "GpE
~iL !I i Lid
GLIDER LOST
PL.A iNED MII I N
I- ArtTE R NATE
"NA +1IC PRESSUI I
One of the instances where use is made of the pilot is illustrated by a Boeing
simulator study in which runs were accomplished assuming a failed reaction
control valve.
For a "q" or dynamic pressure of 0 psf to 5 psf, reaction control is required to
recover the glider (and pilot). From 5 psf to 10 psf, a situation exists where,
on occasion, a re-entry can be safely made. Above 10 psf, aerodynamic pres-
sure is usually adequate.
Note that with a valve failure at boost burnout (less than 1 psf "q"), the glider
would be lost if on automatic flight. In these simulations the pilot switched to an
alternate mission that would have used considerably less fuel and saved the
glider.
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ENT
U1 XP>CT p fPENDITURE `O
Ofd R- ENTRY
DETERMINE THAT DESTINATION IS INAC SSI BL
STEER FOR AI_T> RNAT COURSE
RESULTt PI! . T' PRESENCE
LI ER SAVED
RL DATA RECOVERED
AUTt . SYSTE ACTIO
CONTINUE TO NEAP }} t R IN L ?
T NAT'1C ~. ANC NOT REACH IT.
PI T :T ON
This is another example in the use of the pilot where an unexpected situation is
encountered.
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TOF
TO V H
ICLE ,BI -AKUP
AV J UNSTABLE :F?REGI
INSTABILITY "IG...:.
}=F R I EXTENT
IIIIIIRENT, LOSS Q E I Lw.F:I T:E
S T,.:
FLU
UNEXPECTED STABILIT R 3 1 '4144 9
T II
CONTINUE!
ACTION
PROGRAMMED TEST
REGION Q
NT NUE `RO RAI M 1=
' AREA ,I AM E
I GSLEM AREA DEFINED
R;? BUIE-
KFU4 DATA ODT/U E1
, GUDER #?3. RECD ERE ;
>IGC T WHEN
D~? 3 I:,.3 f F r
IN
I ED REGIMES Of
oW
Experience with stability systems to date indicates this type of problem is likely
to be a persistent one.
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E E :
:NON ATASTR H
P
!
.
CO TINU
E'
OR C R CSC,!!
N.I
ICI LOT ACT`I ON
f ETECT FAILURE B COMPARISON WITH , P
I I IM ""DA "A OBTAINED
1 EATI R CH N CE CAF RECOVER'I NG??
This is another example of specific pilot action that is taken in the case of a
system malfunction.
SURVIVAL ? AND REACHIN .LAIIDI> IT>
LT I PR GI AM TO ENSURE VI I+ L '.
IM T U M TS, PERSONA OBSERVATIONS,
ATTEMPT TC LAND WITH AID OF G t ,s N D!
ESULT
IC FAI.U
DURING GLIDE
ACTION :
FLIGHT T3 STRUCTUR?
co: N TAGS' AT W I GIN G
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ALTER TEST PLAN IF IT THREATENS SAFETY OF VEHICLE
PE FOR 'ADDITI }NAL TEST TO PROBE PROBLEM AREAS
ACQ I tE SUBJECTIVE DATA
TET FAILED SYSTEMS AND SELECT ALTERNATE
NCREASEI VALUE OF DATA OBTAINED
INCREASED CHANCE OF MISSION SUCCESS
In summary, Dyna-Soar simulator studies and analysis indicate that the pilot can
be used very effectively.
In some cases his use so increases the predicted chance of mission success as to
make it worthwhile to consider elimination of unmanned orbital launches.
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BOMARC
(60 ATTEMPTS)
NO PILOT
SINGLE
PILOT
ONLY
DUAL
ONLY
PILOT AND
DUAL SYSTEM
MISSION SUCCESSES
26
34
30
51
ALTERNATE MISSION
0
1
0
7
TOTAL
26
35
30
58
AIRPLANES LOST
34
2
MINUTEMAN
{4 ATTEMPTS)
MISSION SUCCESSES
1
1
3
3
ALTERNATE MISSION
0
1
0
1
TOTAL
1
2
3
4
AIRPLANES LOST
3
2
1
0
The assumption was made that space, weight, and system design was such as to
permit installation of a cockpit and pertinent manned-type dual systems. It was
also assumed that the resulting craft would fly at the original altitude/velocity
combination.
The results have been summarized in terms of the effect of the trade-off of
pilot, and single and dual systems on mission success.
The end effect of considering a pilot with a dual system versus a missile with
only a single system may be seen by comparing the estimated airplanes lost.
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SYSTEM
X-15
BOMARC
BOMARC
MINUTEMAN
MERCURY
REGULUS
JET AIRCFT.
ROCKET AIRC1
NQ
SUC
CESS
SAVED
BY PILOT
DS SLIG
HTS REQ
COST FOR
FL'TS
NQ PILOT
] WITH
MISSIONS
A/C
PILOT
NO PILO
AUTOMAT.
%LOST
0)
40
55
83
95
100
18.5
31
200
167
51
82
87
87
19.2
35
262
60
43
85
94
94
I8.7
41
354
4
25
75
100
100
6
66
50
21.6
27
139
784
81
29
29
21
22
62
1000
66
995
27
139
61
89
30
185
The results of the independent interpretation of their own actual flight data by
government and industry agencies is summarized.
These independent studies, when applied to Dyna-Soar, agree fairly closely as to
the number of piloted flights required to attain 18 recoveries. Increased flights
would be required for attaining 18 flights unmanned.
The important point illustrated here by these unrelated projects is the trend
illustrated by the data rather than the exact numerical values. Based on the
assumption that Dyna-Soar experience will parallel that in the pertinent rocket-
research, jet aircraft, or missile project, the number of Dyna-Soar flights
required for unmanned attainment may be deduced.
X-15 Experience -If Dyna-Soar experience parallels the X-15 experience, the
use of the pilot is to save the 12. 5 flights that would be required if the Dyna-Soar
were unmanned. (As before, the detailed data from which these inferences were
drawn, is included in Appendices C, H, and I.)
Bomarc Experience - The detailed data on 167 flights from which the Bomarc
trends were obtained are included as Appendix D. The material analyzed includes
the entire flight experience from Sept. 1952 through June 30, 1961.
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TRENDS DEMONSTRATED -Missile and Aircraft Projects (Cont.)
Mercury Experience - Data on the Mercury program was supplied by
Mr. Showberry, Mercury Operations, NASA Space Task Group, Langley Air
Force Base, Virginia, 11 July 1961.
Regulus-F8U Experience - Comparative data on 784 Regulus flights versus F8U
experience was obtained from Chance Vought Aircraft Report E8R-11707 "Manned
vs. Unmanned Vehicle, a comparison of" by D. G. Starkey, 19 September 1958.
Supplemental data on the results from the first 100 Regulus flights was also
obtained from D. G. Starkey and is included as Appendix E.
Jet Aircraft and Rocket Aircraft Experience - For assumptions and ground rules
see material as extracted from NASA Flight Research Center Investigation of
1000 Jet Aircraft and 190 Rocket Aircraft Flights. NASA-FRC letter of August
9, 1960 to Commander ARDC, Attn: Mr. T. J. Keating, Subject: "Flight
Research Center Manned Rocket Flight Study" from Paul F. Bikle, Director.
This has been included as Appendix G.
Summary -Effect of Redundancy + Pilot-in-the-Loop - detailed data is included
as Appendix I.
A noteworthy use of the Dyna-Soar pilot is the elimination of the hardware costs
associated with unmanned operation. The cost estimate is defined in Appendix
D. It covers op the costs of gliders and booster airframes consumed and
excludes the cost of developing and qualifying the automatic system itself.
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The Dyna-Soar system during the air-launch phase resembles previous research
aircraft in that a "carrier" or "mother" aircraft is used to carry the glider aloft.
In another respect the Dyna-Soar is quite unlike previous research aircraft in
that following the air-launch phase a man will be operating a glider in conjunction
with a powerful booster.
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The combination of a glider with a booster has a large effect on the considerations
that must be weighed in arriving at an optimum amalgamation and trade-off of
manned aircraft and missile characteristics.
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STRUCTURAL CRITERIA HAVE BEEN I IODIFIED
PILOT WILL REPLACE SOME AUTOMATIC FUNCTIONS
? PILOT WILL ADD TO MALFUNCTION DETECTION CAPABILITY
LOAD RECOVERY CEILING MAY FORCE
ESCAPE ROCI ET!
USEFUL PAYLOAD DECREASED BY
HIGH ROUST DYNAMIC PRESSURE
? MALFUNCTION DETECTION SYSTEMS REQUIRED
? SEARCH AND RESCUE MAY DICTATE LOCATION
AND AZIMUTH OF LAUNCH
These are some of the items that were influenced by manned considerations.
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T-95 TEST INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM
T-93 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM, DYNAMIC
T-85 ACCESSORY POWER UNITS
GLIDER ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
GLIDER HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
T-75 GLIDER AERO SURFACE CONTROL SYSTEM,
DYNAMIC
T-60 AERO SURFACES TRIMMING
One of the contributions from the use of man in Dyna-Soar becomes noticeable
during countdown..
The pilot is assumed to enter the cockpit of the glider at T-97 (i. e. , 97 minutes
prior to launch).
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T-30 COCKPIT PRESSURE CHECK
T-12 ARM ABORT S SEPARATION SYSTEM
T-14. PILOT AERO SURFACE CONTROL SYSTEM
T-18 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM CONFIDENCE
COMMUNICATIONS TRACKING SUBSYSTEM
T-26 PI LCT- BOOSTt R FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
COMMUNICATIONS & TRACKING SUBSYSTEM
OPEN LOOP
T-10 RECORDERS CAMERAS
By T-30 the count has progressed to the point of the cockpit pressure check.
The flight control. systems of the booster and the glider reaction and aerodynamic
controls are checked as in the practice with conventional aircraft.
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T-4 VERIFY:
SECONDARY POWER O M t. TRACKI N
SERVICING FLIGHT CONTROLS
MECHANICAL PRIMARY GUIDANCE
ORDNANCE COCKPIT
TEST INSTRUMENTATION PI LOT
T-(EC) VERIFY UMBILICAL HATCH
"HOLD-GO" SWITCH TO "GO"
Final verification takes place at T-4.
A last-minute visual scan of the instrument panel is accomplished.
After T-3 seconds, launching is accomplished from the blockhouse.
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45 THRU T-O
PROBLEM: WHAT WILL THE PILOT CONTRIBUTE
FROM T-45 IHRU T-0 ?
GIVEN: 1.02-6909-2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
2.D2-80045 GCOE PERFORMANCE
REQUIREMENTS
RESULT: THE PILOT WILL PERFORM
END-TO-END FLIGHT READINESS
TESTS 9 TESTS ON PILOT
CONTROLS FASTER, EASIER,
SIMPLER THAN CAN AUTOMATIC
EQUIPMENT
These features of the pilot's role in the T-45 to T-0 area have emerged from the
examination of the countdown.
His role was assessed against the system as it existed.
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GCOE WILL BE DISCONNECTED
AT T-40 RESULTING IN
REDUCED RFI PROBLEMS
ELIMINATION OF GCOE INDUCED ABORTS
3. REDUCE UMBILICLE SIZE
GCOE 6.LC & M EQUIPMENT WILL BE
SIMPLER DUE TO PILOTS ABILITY TO
11. OBSERVE
EVALUATE
3 DECIDE
4. CONTROL
These advantages appeared to accrue from the use of the pilot during countdown.
They permitted a reduction in glider weight and reduced what would have been the
costs associated with full automatic checkout equipment.
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Z
0 4
3
JtD, 2
1 -
fit) I 3 4 5 6 7 8
TIME IN MINUTES
At the completion of the countdown, and after launch, the pilot operates in a
transverse "g" or acceleration environment.
It may be seen that the total acceleration launch stress is less than that already
encountered in the actual Mercury launches and the simulated launch aborts.
D2-80726 31
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ACCELERATION `
POWER .05
SPECTRAL
DENSITY op-
q2/ cPs
.002
.001
ESTIMATED HUMAN TOLERANCE
TO RANDOM VIBRATION
10 20 50 100 200 5
FREQUENCY-CPS
Coincident with acceleration, the pilot is exposed to a vibration field.
This vibration is induced by the anticipated exhaust characteristics of the Titan
III. Although higher than that of the Titan II, the Titan III vibration characteris-
tics are estimated to be within human tolerance. At one point the anticipated
vibration is closer to the human tolerance than we would like and action is being
taken to institute a greater margin.
D2-80726 32
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LOW
AIRSPEED
PULL
THROUGH
An abort system is included to facilitate escape during the launch operation and
orbit injection.
These abort conditions have been flown by use of an F5D at the NASA-FRC
Edwards, which was modified to the windshield visibility condition expected for
Dyna-Soar. The W/S and L/D characteristics of the F5D resemble those of the
Dyna-Soar closely enough to assess the abort landing situation.
No difficulty was encountered in making these landings.
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%-"=- W-111"", REGION
111111, \ -----_{ BURN OUT
Jf^
111/I \ /'2ND STAGE TIP-OVER
MANEUVER
STAGING
/ MA'( q AND WIND
SHEAR REGION
J INITIAL ROLL
~ AND TIP-OVER
RELATIVE VELOCITY
Simulator assessment has been made of the ability of the pilot to control the
Step I air vehicle during boost.
The more difficult or critical areas are shaded on the chart.
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(FIN 4 DIHEDRAL EFFECT
N /FLORIDA
3-AXES PILOTING TASK ? PITCH-OVER PROGRAM ` PITCH WIND
AVI DYNE WIND ? SIDE WIND
C ~/a ADS EXCEEDANCE) . ROLL-YAW COUPLING
VELOCITY-FPS,
O 100 200 3OO
In addition to the tip-over or pitch-control task, the pilot was confronted with a
wind problem.
The most severe wind case was assumed to be encountered in every boost mission.
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if POS..( RECOVERY BURNOUT
jC-ABORT (MDS) LIMITS
The effectiveness of the pilot to exercise control during these conditions may be
judged from examination of a typical simulator trace.
It was judged that the boost control task was no great problem during the fixed-
base simulation program. A better verification for this preliminary conclusion
can be gained from the results of the dynamic simulation on the NADC Johnsville
centrifuge scheduled for the 28 May-16 June 1962 period.
It should be noted that these conclusions will be only as valid as the closeness with
which the actual booster used in flight duplicates the characteristics assumed for
the simulator.
ABORT YEW STAGING
LIMITS LIMITS
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CAPE
r-SNI
SAN
SNIP,
PRETORIA
RANGE FROM CAPE CANAVERAL (NMI.)
JETTISON
TRANSITI
BOOST BURNOUT
LANDING
At the conclusion of the boost phase the pilot is used continuously during the
orbital phase.
A typical Cape Canaveral to Edwards Air Force Base ground path and altitude
plot is depicted. Variations, particularly in altitude or in angle of attack, are
being intensively studied to select the combination that will give the best com-
bination of data. acquisition and safety.
ON
PT ARGUCLLO,
SNIPS
Q
REGION OF HIGH
AERODYNAMIC HEATING
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--.-__..___--FLIGHT TIME
IMPROVED QUALITY & QUANTITY OF DATA
CONDUCTS TEST MANEUVERS
EVALUATES SYSTEM RESPONSE DURING FLIGHT
MODIFIES ENSUING MANEUVERS ACCORDINGLY
OPERATES AUXILIARY TEST EQUIPMENT
PROVIDES DATA REPORTING
INCREASED MISSION RELIABILITY
PROVIDES MISSION ALTERATION CAPABILITY
PROVIDES RELIABLE MEANS OF GLIDER RECOVERY
} - ....
PROVIDES PRIMARY CONTROL
PROVIDES PRIMARY NAVIGATION (TERMINAL LANDING SITE)
ALLOWS BACK-UP NAVIGATION (ORBIT & RE-ENTRY)
PROVIDES MALFUNCTION CORRECTION CAPABILITY
PERMITS GROUND-TO-AIR DATA LINK
(22)
ASSUMES RANGE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY (AFTER BOOST)
(I ) RECOVERY FROM FAILURE DURING BOOST
(2) LOCAL MALFUNCTION CORRECTION ONLY
A time line analysis was made of the use of the pilot loading during the total
mission.
It may be seen that the pilot is used to give flexibility, reliability, and the
advantages of on-the-spot decision making.
His use as a backup to the automatic or normal systems can be noted.
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One of the elements that must be more intensively evaluated for its effect on
future research or military systems is the ion sheath as existing at projected
Dyna-Soar flight levels.
The ability of the pilot to see through the ion sheath is of great significance to
use of backup attitude control or navigation systems that use the horizon or the
ground as a point of reference.
The effect of the ion sheath on communications places demands on data trans-
mission in particular.
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6 4 2 0 2 1 6
LATERAL RANGE 1000 NO.
One of the salient features of the design is the rather extensive longitudinal and
lateral range afforded by the maneuverability of the glider.
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RE-ENTRY & LANDING
To use the pilot to best advantage in his flexible and decision-making capability,
the attainability of selected landing sites is computed on-board and displayed to
the pilot.
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After the atmospheric re-entry is completed and the glider has reached the area
of the landing field, man is used to accomplish a manual landing.
In this final phase, man is used to effect the landing from his vantage point in the
cockpit. Reliability and cost studies indicate his use yields a distinct advantage
when compared to an automatic landing system.
After landing, the debriefing of the man is used to give immediate qualitative data
on occurrences during flight that may not have been instrumented for. These
comments, along with the recorded data, will be used to correct the design of this
and future space vehicles or to alter subsequent flight plans as appropriate.
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Appendix A
Backup to DS-022-101
R & D PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
Statement of Work 620A-62-2
Early attainment of piloted orbital flight
Provide piloted, maneuverable gliders and associated support equipment for the
conduct of flight testing in the hypersonic and orbital flight regimes to include:
Gathering of research data to solve design problems of controlled, lift-
ing re-entry from orbital flight
Demonstrate piloted, maneuvering re-entry and effect a conventional
landing; at a preselected landing site
The testing of vehicle equipments and exploration of man's functions in
space
Following successful orbital demonstration, to provide the capability for
quick exploitation of technological advances through future tests
Dyna-Soar Approach
The program objectives will be attained by adapting the Dyna-Soar piloted winged
body re-entry glider, initially designed under the Dyna-Soar Step I Program, for
launch into orbit by the Titan III-C Booster. Maximum exploitation will be made
of resources, experience, and knowledge now available.
Initial flight test of the piloted glider, air launched from a B-52, will be made
at Edwards Air Force Base to demonstrate low supersonic, transonic, and sub-
sonic flight and landing capabilities, operation of subsystems, and to conduct
pilot indoctrination. Subsequently, ground launch flights with the Titan III-C
Booster will be conducted at AFMTC. Orbital flights are planned for landing at
Edwards Air Force Base.
The principal features of this program are: (1) a piloted spacecraft with lifting
re-entry to provide maneuverability, low decelerations, a relatively wide flight
corridor during re-entry, and the capability of landing with a conventional
tangential landing at a preselected site; (2) man integrated into the system to
exploit man's capability.
System Design Objectives
Specific system design objectives are specified in the Dyna-Soar System Speci-
fication, Document ASNR-62-4, and include:
Demonstration of successful boost from Cape Canaveral, orbital flight, re-entry
and landing at Edwards AFB, with basic glider reusable for additional flights.
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Acquisition during boost, orbital flight, re-entry and landing at Edwards of sys-
tem development and research data measurements per flight from telemetry and
on-board recording.
System design for inherent pilot safety
Reliability goal of the Dyna-Soar air vehicle (glider/transition/booster) of 95% for
prelaunched checkout and countdown and 85% for flight.
Design with no significant differences in airborne systems between the unmanned
and piloted vehicles for those items critical to reliability and pilot safety.
Minimum change to the Dyna-Soar glider designed during the Step I program to
adapt it to the Titan III-C Booster for orbital flights.
Retention in the orbital glider of the payload capability inherent in the Step I
design.
Test System O_bjeectives
Development testing
Energy management systems
Exploration
Maximum heating regions
Safe limits of glider performance
Structural heating and loads
Stability and control
Energy management during re-entry
Evaluation
System Performance
Environmental characteristics
Degree of maneuverability and range variation
Performance limits and tolerances for controlled landings.
Acquisition
Data measurement
Demonstration
Piloted glider maneuverability during orbit and re-entry
Capability of man
Orbital and hypersonic flight regime
Control of a maneuverable orbital vehicle
Control during boost
Long range flight management functions
Effect conventional landing
Potential applications usefulness
Provide increased capability
Piloted in-flight control and management
Make decisions and take action in unusual situations
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System Design. Requirements
Communications and tracking
Air to ground, ground to air, air to air
Voice
Command
Beacon (rescue)
Real time data
Tracking acquisition
Tracking beacon
Guidance
Auto trajectory - lift off to beginning of landing
Abort trajectory steering commands
Inertial displays
Pilot manual control -normal trajectories to initial approach
Backup information
Re-entry with failed primary guidance system
Malfunction detection
Attitude information
Control during landing
Safety
Test Instrumentation System
Human Engineering
Reliability
Test System ]Etecjuirements
System requirements to be met
Orbital velocities
Air vehicle configuration
Piloted medium L/D glider
Transition section
Global missions
Test data and operational experience
Orbital and re-entry flight regimes
Evaluation of performance versus objectives
Air launch flights
Air launch and ground launch
Training
Simulation
Data reduction
Maintenance
D2-80726 45
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Appendix B
Backup to DS-022 -186
SOME RELATIVE MERITS OF MANNED VS. UNMANNED DYNA-SOAR
WEAPON SYSTEM
1. DECISION MAKING CAPABILITY
A. Manned System
A rapid and accurate decision-making capability is provided by
"on the spot" assessment of the situation by a trained observer.
This capability is a continuous function as the on-board observer
is in constant and direct contact with events requiring man-made
decisions.
B. Unmanned System
Assessment of the situation by trained observers on the ground
must necessarily await the receipt of relevant data that is avail-
able only when the glider is within range of a data acquisition
station. This data, unlike that which can be made directly avail-
able to the on-board observer, is subject to inaccuracies im-
posed by data conditioning, transmission, reception and relay,
processing and recording.
II. COMMAND CONTROL CAPABILITY (Quick Reaction Capability)
A. Manned System
An immediate and positive command control capability is pro-
vided. An on-board observer can initiate command control
inputs to vehicle subsystems or payload subsystems in immediate
reaction to observed conditions.
B. Unmanned System
Unprogrammed command control can be exercised only when the
vehicle is within range of ground stations having a command
control transmission capability. Additional equipment is re-
quired in the vehicle to provide verification to the ground that the
command control transmission has been received and acted upon.
III. DETERMINATION-OF VEHICLE AND PAYLOAD STATUS
A. Manned System
An onboard observer can rapidly and continually assess the gross
operational status of vehicle and payload subsystems to determine
capability to perform all or part of the mission.
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B. Unmanned System
Determination of vehicle and payload operational status on the
ground requires the transmission of relevent data to the ground
and the processing of this data by complex ground equipment.
IV. POST-LAUNCH CHANGES IN MISSION PLAN
A. Manned System
Post-launch changes in mission plan can be fed into the vehicle
and payload subsystems via ground to air voice instructions to
the on-board observer.
B. Unmanned System
The mission program or plan depends on predetermined programs
inserted into the subsystems prior to launch.
V. PAYLOAD REDUNDANCY
A. Manned System
An on-board observer can augment certain payload functions or
assume some payload functions in the event of payload subsystem
breakdowns.
B. Unmanned System
In the event of payload subsystem failure, unless redundant
subsystems are used, the entire mission can be a wasted effort.
VI. MISSION DATA REDUNDANCY
A. Manned System
Mission data available from subsystems can be verified by in-
formation from the on-board observer through the media of air
to ground voice and postflight debriefing.
B. Unmanned System
Ground analysis is dependent upon only automatically acquired
data.
VII. MISSION DATA AUGMENTATION
A. Manned System
An on-board observer possesses the capability to acquire data
of broad scope, either by intuition and judgment or by in-flight
interrogation and instructions from ground personnel.
B. Unmanned System
Data acquisition is limited by the capability designed into the
subsystems (black boxes).
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VIII. RECOVERY OF ON-BOARD PAYLOAD DATA
A. Manned System
Piloted re-entry increases the probability of recovering the
original on-board payload data. Pilot has capability for
maneuvering the glider to meet unforeseen or abnormal situa-
tions and can choose primary or alternate landing sites. In the
event of a catastrophic situation, the pilot can relay observed
mission data to the ground by voice.
B. Unmanned System
Glider control is limited to prelaunch inserted programs and
range limitations of ground control equipment. On-board origi-
nal data records are more subject to loss or damage.
IX. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MISSION DETAILS
A. Manned System
An on-board observer can optimize the gathering of mission data
by providing direct adjustment or control of payload subsystems.
Based on gross mission requirements, the observer serves as a
vernier controller.
B. Unmanned System
Adjustment or control of subsystems from the ground is a re-
mote step function process, limited by equipment design
capabilities.
X. SUBSYSTEM COMPLEXITY
A. Manned System
An. on-board observer is considered to be a general-purpose sub-
system with a general-purpose compute capability to store data
and analyze events. Less complexity in airborne and ground
supporting subsystem equipment is required if the airborne ob-
server assumes some of the subsystem functions.
B. Unmanned System
Subsystems designed to perform all functions required are
necessarily complex with attendant reliability problems.
XI. EARLY MISSION TERMINATION AND RECOVERY
A. Manned System
On pilot decision, return from orbit can be made from any point
because of the availability of pilot decision and inherent vehicle
maneuverability.
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]3. Unmanned System
An unmanned system is committed to mission termination based
on on-board programming and the availability of geographically
opportune ground command sites.
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Appendix C
Backup to DS-022-192
HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CENTER
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA
Redundant Systems and Pilot-in-the-Loop Aspects of All X-15 Flights
AFPR, TBC, Seattle, Washington
The Boeing Company
ATTN: Mr. T. K. Jones
Seattle, Washington
1. In accordance with agreements reached on 16 and 17 September 1961
among Mr. T. K. Jones of The Boeing Company, Mr. Hodapp of the Dyna-
Soar SPO, Mr. J. L. Wesesky and Mr. R. G. Nagel of the AFFTC, the
attached information will provide the necessary information on redundant
(or back-up) systems and pilot-in-the-loop aspects for all forty X-15 free
flights conducted to date. It is understood that this information will be com-
bined by The Boeing Company with similar studies conducted on other manned
and unmanned aerospace systems. It is further understood that this assimi-
lated information will subsequently be provided to the Dyna-Soar SPO to assist
that organization in justifying the benefits of redundant or back-up systems
and the necessity for pilot-in-the-loop for Dyna-Soar.
2. In addition to the forty X-15 free flights covered in the attached material
there have been thirty-one "no-launch" X-15 flights conducted to date; that is,
on each of these thirty-one flights difficulties arose after B-52/,K-15 mated
take-off which forced flight cancellation prior to X-15 launch from the B-52
carrier aircraft. Effort in the current study by the AFFTC has been concen-
trated on the X-15 free flights, so the short time available has not permitted
similar documentation of the "no-launch" flights. However, the study can be
extended to the X-15 "no-launch" flights in the near future if there is a require-
ment for this information. The attached "X-15 Flight Record" (Attachment 1)
lists all seventy-one X--15 flights to date in chronological order to show the
distribution of "free" and "no-launch" flights.
3. Development of the X-15 hardware requires some explanation for clari-
fication of the malfunctions shown in this study. The initial landing gear was
proven inadequate and required modification to sustain landing loads of piloted
flight. Design requirements of the landing gear for an automatic landing sys-
tem are not known and their effect neglected in this study. The ballistic con-
trol system (reaction control) has not been developed to date, though it has
not hindered the program since there have been no requirements on the
flights performed thus far. The inertial guidance system, providing attitude,
velocity, and altitude information to the pilot, has not performed satisfactorily.
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The early flights with the XLR-11 engines required attitude information only
while relying on the air data system and ground call-out for accurate velocity
and altitude. Hence the inertial system (stable platform) was not noted as a
malfunction except where the attitude system failed as well. Later flight
required removal of the nose boom, destroying the value of the air data. sys-
tem. Reliance on the inertial system was required for these flights and
hence malfunctions of the inertial computation are noted in the study.
4. For purposes of comparison in this study it has been assumed that un-
piloted X-15 flights could be performed using existing X-15 subsystems by
adding necessary autopilot and remote control functions. It is recognized
that the subsystems for an unpiloted vehicle would be designed according to
different criteria than those designed for piloted flight; thus a true compari-
son from the designer's viewpoint is difficult to make. Overall program
results, however, in terms of flights per calendar time and data return per
flight are considered valid comparisons.
2 ATTCH
1. X-15 Flight Record (4 copies)
2. Detailed History -Redundant
Sys & Pilot-in-the -Loop
Aspects for All X-15 Free
Flights, dtd 20 Sep 61 (4 copies)
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Appendix D
Backup for DS-?022-198 - 167 Bomarc Flights
Analysis of [ndividual Bomarc Flights
Success Summary Relationships
Actual vs. Expected Success for "Pilot Controlled" Flights
Total BOMARC flights (Sept. 1952 -June 30, 1961) 167
Successes (85 to 100%) *85
Partial Successes (25 to 85%) 62
Unsuccessful (Less than 25%) 20
Expected Flight Success for "Pilot Controlled" Flights
ccesses 137
S
u
Partial Successes
Unsuccessful
Basic assumptions:
1. Pilot replaces flight control and hydraulics systems.
2. Pilot has voice communication channel as auxiliary.
3. Pilot can override target seeker.
4. Pilot can control ramjets.
5. Aircraft can make second attack.
Possible reasons for disagreement on flight improvement:
Assumption 3: It was assumed that all Century-series fighters include target
seekers as integral and essential portions of the fire control equipment.
The seeker must therefore be operational for a successful mission.
Assumption 4: Ramjet events occur with great rapidity, and automatic control
is utilized. It may be doubtful for pilot control to do other than to
degrade ramjet performance.
Assumption 5: Because of the high speed, the aircraft turning radius is very
large, and considerable time would be required to make a second attack.
The usefulness of assuming a second attack may be questioned.
* For this study, this number assumes flights of 624-21 and Y-18 were
successful. Previously these two flights were downgraded to "Partial
successes" because of loss of data prior to interception.
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Expected Flight Improvement for "Pilot Controlled" Flights
Missile
No.
System
Responsible Nature of Problem
Expected
Improvement
Change
Block II
June -Sept. 19 53
623-3
F/C Hardover elevator
P to S
Block IIIA
Aug. 1954-July 1955
623-7
F/C Hardover elevator.
623-12
F/C Misaligned yaw rate gyro-
oscillations destroyed rudder.
Block IIIB
Feb. -July 1956
623-14
F/C Oscillations in roll and yaw.
P to S
623-17
T/S Internal lock-on precluded
target acquisition.
P to S
Block IVB
July 19 57 -Jan. 19 58
624-7
B/N Dest. Extraneous destruct signal
triggered destruct.
P to S
624-10
R/J Ramjet blowout -apparent
early Mach cut-in.
P to S
624-12
C/S No response to missile azimuth
heading commands.
P to S
624-13
C/S Delayed response to dive
command.
P to S
624-14
WCE Radar errors led to mis-
positioning.
P to S
Block IVC
Mar. --
Aug. 1958
624-17
R/J One engine did not go to rich
limit.
P to S
624-18
T/S Did not lock-on to available
target.
P to S
624-25
* S = Success,
F/C Yaw rate channel out.
P = Partial Success, U = Unsuccessful
U to S
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16XY
Aug. 19 58 -April 19 59
XY-3
C/C
Short circuit in C/C provided
pitch-down command.
U to P
XY-16
C/S
Premature dive.
P to S
XY-12
C/C
Stable platform drifted,
missile off course.
P to S
200AY-1
Jan. -April 1959
Y-21
T/S
Acquired cloud.
P to S
Y-29
WCE
Computer programming error
-off course.
P to S
Y-28
T/S
Antenna rate loop malfunctioned.
P to S
Y-37
WCE and B/N
Lost track and overshot target.
P to S
Y-30
C/S
Dive timer ran down early.
P to S
200AY-2
June-Oct. 1959
Y-24
C/S
Late dive.
P to S
Y-41
C/S
Azimuth control malfunctioned.
P to S
Y-44
C/S
Erroneous launch azimuth -
destroyed.
U to S
Y-43
F/C
Loss of damping signals.
U to S
Contractor Review Feb. -Aug. 1960
-6248
F/C
Instability in roll or yaw.
P to S
-6260
T/S
Antenna lost track-slewed
to stops.
P to S
-6258
C/S
Did not dive on command.
P to S
-6263
F/C
Erroneous azimuth heading.
U to S
-6944
Processing
Error in aligning C/C.
P to S
Category III Jan. 1961 - Present
-1938
F/C
Off course -destroyed.
U to S
-6964
WCE
Commands not acceptable.
P to S
-6947
WCE
Commands not acceptable.
P to S
-1951
C/S
Did not dive on command.
P to S
631- Block I May 1959-April 1960
631-2
R/J
Lean limit blowout.
P to S
631-3
R/J
Blowout, angle of attack.
P to S
631-4
R/J
Blowout, drop in fuel flow.
P to S
631-6
R/B
Roll bulkhead servovalve failed.
P to S
631-8
F/C
Mach servo failed.
U to S
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631- Block II April 1960 -Present
631-12
C/S
Radio frequency interference.
P to S
631-13
C/S
Radio frequency interference.
P to S
631-15
F/C
Erroneous launch heading -
destroyed.
U to S
631-20
WCE, C/S
Data link incompatibility.
P to S
631-18
T/S
Did not lock-on (small target)
P to S
631-17
T/S
Improper test point termination
P to S
631-24
T/S
Continuous false detections.
P to S
631-25
F/C
Surface effectiveness servo
malfunctioned.
P to S
631-28
T/S
Loss of lock-on, reorientation
of antenna.
P to S
631-30
T/S
Satisfactory flight - downgraded
for objectives.
P to S
631-29
T/S
Loss of lock-on, reorientation
of antenna.
P to S
631-32
WCE
Erroneous target height inputs.
P to S
IM-99B Cat. IX Jan. 1961 -Present
B-2
T/S or F/C
Erroneous guidance.
P to S
B-11
T/S
Did not lock-on to accessible
target.
P to S
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Appendix E
Backup to DS-022_1.98 - Regulus I Flights
EFFECT OF REDUNDANCY + PILOT-IN-THE -LOOP
First 100 Regulus Flig is
At the request of A. K. Murray of Boeing, D. R. Starkey of Chance Vought has
completed an analysis of the first 100 Regulus flights based on archive data. In
examining data from the archives, it was found that in these 100 flights there
were 15 (unintentional) early expenditures or failures resulting in complete loss
of the missile. The resulting success rate was found to be . 85. This was
achieved by having well-trained contractor personnel, advice of Engineering per-
sonnel well-versed in the design, manufacture, and qualification testing of the
equipment, close control which could be extended by the contractor in-house,
government furnishing of duplicate chase planes, etc.
It should be noted that in turning the missile over for Navy operation, the relia-
bility for the year of 1954 dropped to .69. This average of .69 was made up from
a . 59 success rate for ship-based launches, and . 79 for land-based launches. By
training Navy personnel and Chance Vought technical advice, average success
rate had increased to . 77 by 1955 and . 85 for 1956. The detailed data which fol-
lows on the 100 Regulus flights follows the same ground rules as were used for
preparing the 784 flight analysis; that is, it was estimated the pilot would be
aboard with suitable displays and airplane controls and there would be no redun-
dant systems. Again it was noted that the success rate for operational use with
trained personnel did not quite duplicate or come up to the success rate achieved
by the contractor during the development program.
The summary of the first 100 flights shows that of the 15 losses, 9 could have
been saved by having a pilot aboard and 2 additional could probably have been
saved by pilot aboard. To eliminate controversy we're considering that 9 only
rather than 11 could have been saved.
Contrasting Regulus (unmanned) flights with manned F8U flights, it was seen that
during the first 100 flights of the F8U only one aircraft was lost and this was
caused by structural failure which it is believed would have happened to the manned
or unmanned vehicle.
Tm"
Arthur Murray
A Murray/mj
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Page One
Summary of the following data indicates that of 15 losses experienced during the
first 100 Regulus flights, inclusion of a pilot would have saved 9 vehicles as
indicated by the asterisk.
* 1. After normal take-off, the stabilization system failed during climb. The
missile entered a steepening turn and crashed nose down and inverted.
Pilot could have saved the vehicle.
15. Missile was lost during let-down due to failure of the control system caused
by circuit malfunction. Missile entered a dive and did not pull out. Nor-
mally a pilot would be expected to save the vehicle from this type of loss.
However, it is not absolutely certain that the pilot's manual control inputs
would have by-passed the malfunctioning component. Not considered as a
"save" to eliminate controversy.
18. The hydraulic system malfunctioned during climb. It's possible that a pilot
might have saved the vehicle if a hand pump had been available. Since the
inclusion of a hand pump of this type is not necessarily standard procedure,
there is some question as to whether a pilot could have saved the vehicle.
Therefore, to eliminate controversy, this is presented as a loss that the
pilot would not have prevented.
* 22. Missile was lost during inbound turn because of weak control signal and
radio command interference. The pilot probably could have eliminated the
need to destruct the vehicle.
* 30. Low-altitude assault pass under Navy flight control. Vehicle could have
been saved by pilot operating a normal manual fuel selector.
36. The booster did not eject; therefore, the climb bias remained engaged.
This vehicle could not have been saved by the pilot.
38. Booster rocket ejection fitting failed to operate; did not eject. Vehicle
stalled on approach. Pilot may have been able to save the vehicle. Not
counted as a possible "save" to eliminate controversy.
* 39. No command control caused the loss of the vehicle. Lack of either chase
airplane or ground system signals permitted the vehicle to crash. A pilot
would have continued to fly.
46. Left booster fired 6 seconds after right. Thrust misalignment caused the
vehicle to describe an erratic path terminated by the fuselage and elevator
striking the lake bed. This could not have been saved by having a pilot
aboard.
* 52. Flight termination command inadvertently activated by ground crew. This
destruct system would not have been in a manned vehicle.
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Page Two
* 63. Following launch, hard-over nose-down signal was generated due to loss of
pitch reference. Missile struck the water nose low and was destroyed with-
out burning. Pilot could have saved this one.
* 68. The missile began to roll 7 minutes after take-off. Handing over control of
the missile from one remote system to another was not effective. The mis-
sile was lost in the transfer. A pilot aboard would have taken over.
* 77. Pitch oscillation developed in the Sperry climb control during the approach
phase of flight. The landing sequence operated early. Gear came down too
soon, and the combination caused the airplane to crash on approach. A
pilot would have saved the vehicle by eliminating the pitch oscillation and
delaying the extension of the gear to a more favorable time.
90. Left main gear failed to extend during approach; the missile cart-wheeled
on touch-down. The pilot would not have saved this vehicle.
* 91. The TROUNCE I decoder malfunctioned 1 hour and 20 minutes after launch.
Need for a decoder would have been eliminated by pilot.
* In analyzing the Regulus data from the first 100 flights, the Chance Vought
ground rule of "pilot + single system - (no redundancy)" was followed with
a projected success rate for manned flight of 94 percent.
** The pronounced improvement afforded by including the pilot and then giving
the pilot more tools to work with, i. e. , redundancy, is illustrated by the
pilot + redundancy success rate of 98 percent.
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Appendix F
Backup for DS-022-198
Cost for Automation
Delta cost does not include range and communication network for automatic
control system (SAGE or equivalent)
Unit Cost/flight = $15. 4 million (booster hardware consumed only)
Base flight quantity in all cases = 18
For example:
X-15 experience would indicate that 31 DS flights would be
required to accomplish 18 missions.
X-15 experience =
31
DS flights desired =
18
Flights =
13 x 15.4 =
200.2
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Appendix G
Backup to DS-022-198
N A T I O N A L
A E R O N A U T I C S
A N D S P A C E
ADMINISTRATION
FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER
SOX 273, EDWARDS, CALIFORNIA
CLw ,'oAO L-211I TWX: `DWA DS CM. 7)47
August 9, 1960
From: NASA Flight Research Center
Commander
Air Research and Development Command
Wright Air Development Division
Directorate of Systems Management
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio
Attention: Mr. T. J. Keating, Ass't Chief,
Dyna-Soar Engineering Office
Subject: Flight Research Center Manned Rocket Flight Study
Ref: VVADD letter to FRC, dated 6/14/60, jt/38109
1. In response to the request of the reference letter, the results of an
investigation of the Flight Research Center's manned rocket flights and incidents
encountered are enclosed along with the Flight Research Center's comments.
2. The Flight Research Center trusts the information and comments will
be useful in evaluating the role of man as an integral part of an aircraft control
system and in the preparation of your paper "What Price Man?"
Paul F. Bikle
Director
Enclosure
(1) Summary
JG/TFB:fhs
TAT
DEB
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FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER MANNED ROCKET FLIGHT STUDY
SUMMARY
A study of NACA-NASA manned rocket flights and the number and types of
incidents encountered in connection with the flights was made at the request of
Mr. T. J. Keating, Assistant Chief, Dyna-Soar Engineering Office, WADD. The
purpose of the study was to provide some statistical-type data on manned rocket
flight to aid in determining the value of using a human pilot as an integral part of
a rocket-aircraft: control system.
A total of 190 NACA-NASA manned rocket flights were studied. During
these flights., 84 incidents were experienced. Thirty-four of the incidents, or
approximately 18 percent of the flights investigated were serious enough that loss
of the aircraft could have resulted. The data compiled, although not necessarily
complete or 100-percent correct, are considered accurate enough to indicate the
trends and the percentage of incidents encountered. A summary of these flights
is shown in Table I. The individual flight tabulation from which Table I was de-
rived will be forwarded on request.
From this investigation and from the Flight Research Center's manned
rocket-flight experience, the FRC firmly believes that a human pilot should be
considered a necessary complement to a flight control system to obtain the
greatest reliability, versatility, and mission accomplishments. Two pilots at
this research center are experienced rocket pilots, one with 46 rocket powered
flights and the other with 30 rocket powered flights. Their thoughts on manned
versus unmanned vehicles are especially appropriate, since they have been sub-
jected to many of the inflight incidents previously described. Their comments
and the pilot's role in flight research are attached. Your attention is also called
to a paper presented at the ARS semiannual meeting of May 9-12, 1960, entitled,
"The Pilot's Contribution to Mission Reliability on the X-15 Program, " by James
R. Drake, which discusses the pilot's contributions as a servomechanism and
a programmer and considers his effect on vehicle reliability and weight.
From a similar investigation of 1, 000 research and support-type NASA
jet-aircraft flights (see Table IJ . 151, or approximately 15 percent, experienced
serious incidents. A comparison of rocket flights with jet flights indicates that
the percent of serious incidents occurring in rocket flight is not appreciably
greater than that encountered in research and support jet flights. However, it
should be pointed out that a comparison of this nature is somewhat compromised
because of the increased emphasis on top-quality maintenance and proper opera-
tion of rocket vehicle systems as opposed to the routine maintenance performed
on the jet aircraft.
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The flight data and pilot's notes on rocket flights performed by agencies
other than NASA were not complete enough to warrant an investigation of these
flights; however, available Air Force and contractor flight records are noted in
Table I, but were not used in compiling statistical data (except for the X-15).
Flights that were scheduled as glide flights only, those which were aborted be-
fore drop, or those on which the rocket airplane was intentionally jettisoned due
to an emergency from the carrier airplane were not included in compiling sta-
tistical data..
One such aircraft was lost by NASA when the rocket aircraft experienced
an explosion prior to planned launch. The pilot was able, with the help of the
crew of the carrier airplane, to climb into the bomb bay before jettison. On
another attempted rocket flight, the pilot of the rocket airplane decided to abort
the flight just prior to launch because of improper operation of the propellant-
pressurization system. Simultaneously, the propeller governor system of the
number 4 engine of the carrier airplane failed. The pilot of the carrier airplane
jettisoned the rocket airplane with the pilot aboard. The rocket pilot success-
fully jettisoned all rocket propellant and landed the airplane without further inci-
dent. The number 4 propeller subsequently broke away and passed through the
carrier airplane in the bomb-bay area where the rocket airplane is normally sus-
pended. The carrier airplane was landed successfully, although it was badly
damaged.
As mentioned previously, of the 190 NACA-NASA rocket flights investigated,
there were 84 flights in which an incident was experienced. These incidents are
further classified into serious (*) or minor (-) incidents as follows:
Serious incident (*) is any incident which, assuming an automatically con-
trolled vehicle, could cause loss of the aircraft:
Examples:
1. Loss of aircraft stability due to design inadequacy
(a) CNQ = 0
(b) Etc.
2. Loss of propulsion
3. Systems failure
(a) Control
(b) Guidance
(c) Etc.
4. Complete radio and/or telemetry failure.
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Minor incident (-) is any incident which affects the flight but does not
necessarily place the vehicle in jeopardy.
Examples:
1.
Incorrect fuel-gage indication
2.
Circuit breaker popping in flight
3.
Intermittent radio operation
4.
System malfunction
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Afterburner
Landing gear
Pressurization
Etc.
5.
Drag-chute malfunction
6.
Flight instrument inoperative or incorrect
7.
Improper engine operation
Note:
On several flights, one or more rocket chambers failed to fire.
In conjunction with the rocket flights, 1, 000 research and support jet-
aircraft flights were investigated. The individual data for each flight recorded
is available and may be obtained if desired. A summary of these flights is pre-
sented in Table II.
The following facts, opinions, and comments were developed from. the in-
vestigation of the 190 rocket and 1, 000 jet-aircraft NASA flights.
The Flight Research Center firmly believes that a human pilot should be
considered an integral component of a flight control system. The human operator
provides a capability for immediate evaluation and modification of the flight plan
or for a successful abort during any phase of the flight. Questionable flight re-
gimes are sensed by the pilot as they are encountered, and previous flight ex-
perience in regions of close proximity gives him the capability of avoiding disas-
trous penetrations into these areas. A pilot can often recognize problems before
they occur, evaluate problems as they occur, and take the best corrective action
to accomplish the mission or recover the aircraft.
A pilot contributes more than his visual sense to the success of a mission.
Pilots use senses such as hearing and touch to warn of impending trouble in tur-
bines, engines, hydraulic and pressurization systems, instruments, and acces-
sories. Aircraft have been saved because a pilot recognized the presence of an
electrical fire, through smell, and took corrective action or returned for an
emergency landing.
In research flying, the pilot is considered even more important to the
success of a mission, since the very nature of research flying implies approaches
and penetrations of unknown regions of flight. Unpredicted airplane motions have
been encountered during these penetrations and, in most cases, some technique
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of recovery has been used by the pilot which resulted in the recovery of the air-
plane. Examples of these unpredicted airplane motions are abrupt trim changes,
pitch-up, roll-coupling, tumbling, dutch roll, aileron reversal, and directional
divergence. Some of the recovery techniques used were not in keeping with
standard procedure or doctrine, but were resorted to after other methods failed.
Simple recovery techniques learned through experience, such as neutralizing
controls, reducing velocity, or changing altitude, have enabled pilots to save
many airplanes. Programing automatic control systems to effect nonstandard
recoveries is possible only with excessive complexity, if at all.
Until each aircraft component that can affect the success of a mission can
be considered 100-percent reliable, the pilot is a necessary complement to a
flight control system. To achieve 100-percent reliability would entail excessive
costs in design and component replacement.
The Flight Research Center is fully aware that some flight aborts occurred
because of pilot error or malfunctions of pilot support systems such as oxygen
or cabin pressurization systems; however, the FRC firmly believes that the ad-
vantages of using a human pilot as an integral component of a flight control sys-
tem outweigh the disadvantages.
John Gibbons
Aeronautical Research Engineer
Milton 0. Thompson
Aeronautical Research Pilot
Victor Horton
Aeronautical Research Engineer
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TABLE I
ROCKET AND ROCKET-JET FLIGHT SUMMARY
ACFT
NASA
USAF
NAVY USMC
DOUGLAS
BELL
NAA
TOTAL
X-1 #1
0
49
X-1 #2
50
1
X-1 A
14
1
20
X-1 B
15
8
4
X-1 E
26
0
X-2 #1
0
13
D-558-H #143
1
0
19
D-558-11 #144
69
1
6
5
D-558-II #145
39
2
5
7
X-1.5 #670
6
0
X-15 #671
0
0
2
9
Total Flights
207 +
94
+ 25
+ 10 +
7 +
18 +
1.1
372
Total Flights
Investigated
179 +
0
+ 0
+ 0 +
0 +
0 +
I1 -
190
Total Incidents
81
+
3 _
84
% Incidents
45. 3%
27.3%
Serious Incidents
32
+
2 =
34
% Serious
Incidents
17.9%
Minor Incidents
49
Total Aircraft
lost
1 (D
2
3
0
0
0
2 4
0
Aircraft Lost in
0
1.
0
0
0
1
0
Flight
Pilots Lost
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
*Definition of Serious and Minor Incidents for the purpose of this summary is defined
on page 3.
NOTES: 1 (X-1-A) Explosion in LOX tank of X-1A prior to drop, X-1A jettisoned
2 (X-1-D) Explosion in LOX tank of X-1D at low altitude during
^ettison prior to drop.
3 (X-2) Lost in flight after pilot separated escape capsule following
extreme aircraft gyrations.
4 (X-1-3) Explosion in LOX tank of X-1-3 during LOX jettison on
ground after aborted flight.
5 (X-2) Explosion in LOX tank of X-2 during systems check; airplane
and pilot lost.
D2-80726
65
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
TABLE II
JET AIRCRAFT FLIGHT SUMMARY
Aircraft
Total Flights
Total Research
Total Incidents
Serious
Minor
F-100A #778
262
1.39
63
1O
53
F-1000 #717
53
13
27
8
19
F-104A #734
94
81
24
9
15
F-104A #749
81
70
9
3
6
F-104A #961
139
130
68
43
25
F-104B #303
30
20
16
10
6
F-107A #120
41
41
17
1O
7
D-558-I#142
78
78
23
14
9
X-3 #892
24
24
10
3
7
X-4 #667
76
76
36
15
21.
X-5 #838
122
122
43
26
17
1000
795
336
151
185
Total Flights
Investigated
1000
Total Incidents
336
% Incidents
33.6%
* Serious Incidents
151
% Serious Incidents
15.1%
Minor Incidents
185
Total Aircraft
1
Lost
Total Pilots Lost
1
*Definition of Serious and Minor incidents for the purpose of this paper is defined on
p age 3.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
PILOT'S ROLE IN FLIGHT RESEARCH
The knowledge obtained from any research program is a direct function of the
number of parameters measured. In any conceivable data-gathering system
installed in a vehicle, there are some unrecorded parameters which can be quali-
tatively measured by the pilot. In addition, the pilot provides a means of expand-
ing on, interpreting, or correlating the recorded information to give a more
complete and meaningful report to the flight results. The argument that additional
expense of money and weight are involved when a pilot is provided for is some-
what mitigated by the saving of money and time when a vehicle is recovered by
pilot action. In the initial approach to a vehicle design in which a pilot is to be
included, more effort is devoted to reliability and safety. This shows up in the
later phases of the program in greater mission success as a result of concen-
trated effort to insure proper operation of a vehicle component or data system.
Some vehicles have been designed to use automatic systems but have been modi-
fied. to include a pilot monitor. This concept compromises both the automatic
system and the pilot in many ways and both are penalized in unanticipated situa-
tions and control capability. The pilot is required to analyze the severity of an
emergency and decide to override the automatic system without previous feel
for the problem and without full knowledge of the manner in which the situation
is deteriorating.
Inclusion of the pilot in the control loop at all times is desirable so that correc-
tive action, when required, can be initiated by the pilot, using cues obtained
during normal flight and early phases of a divergence, while the automatic por-
tion of the system (similar to an airplane three-axis damper) is accomplishing
the routine flight requirements.
Joseph Walker
Aeronautical Research Pilot
John B. McKay
Aeronautical Research Pilot
JW/JBMcK:fhs
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/04: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
- DETAILED HISTORY -
REDUNDANT SYSTEMS AND PILOT-IN-THE-LOOP ASPECTS FOR ALL X-15 FREE FLIGHTS
20 September 1961
Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
No. or Failure Action System Effect
Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or
Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back-
Mission Miss. ware Mission- Miss. ware up
1-1-5 1. Pitch SAS 1. Pilot made X
malfunction corrective con- P + R
prior to launch trol inputs.
& design defi-
ciencies, re-
sulting in flight
control oscil-
lation just
before landing.
2. Landing gear 2. No cor-
and structural rective act-
damage. ion in flights
2-1-3 1. Upper engine 1. No correc-
governor failure tive action on
resulting in fuel flights*
pump rupture and
fire.
2. Nose landing 2. No corrective
gear door damage. action on flights*
(*Post flight repair and redesign accomplished)
Cancellation of
X-15 launch if
no manual direct
control mode as
backup to aug-
mented mode.
No Pilot-In-
The-Loop
Cancellation
of X-15 launch,
or probable
loss of X-15
via crash on
landing if SAS
malfunction were
not detected
prior to launch.
Effect Symbols Keys X- Effect(s) of flight's most detrimental item(s).
0- Effect that would have been contributed by item
had the flight not been affected by other more
detrimental items.
Weighting
Factor
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure
2-2-6 1. SAS roll
damper failed
at launch.
2-3-9 _. Explosion
in lower engine
on start, result-
ing in fire and
extensive dam-
age in aft end of
X-15.
2. Fuselage
failure on land-
ing-severe
buckling aft of
cockpit.
3. SAS roll
damper failed at
launch, and failed
again in flight
after reset.
Corrective Redundant or Emergency
Action System Effect Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Result If
Completed
Planned
Mission
avail-subse- P + R
quently limited
roll inputs.
1. Pilot
attempted roll
SAS reset to no
1. Pilot shut down
engines, jettisoned
propellants and
made emergency
landing at alternate
landing site.
2. Repair and re-
design subsequent
to flight-failure due
to structural defici-
ency and heavy,
nose-high landing.
P+R
3. Pilot attempted 0
roll SAS reset to no
avail-subsequently
limited roll control
inputs.
Weighting
Factor
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency
Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup
X Certain loss of
X-15 if no manual
direct control mode
P + R as backup to aug-
mented mode. SAS
monitor channel
provided necessary
fail-safety to pre-
vent hard-over con-
P trol signal.
No Pilot-
in-the-Loop
Definite control
ability problems
and certain loss
of X-15.
Loss of X-15.
Pilot provided
extreme flexi-
bility commen-
surate with dras-
tically altered
flight require-
ments. Possible
loss of X-15;
pilot landed A/C
under abnormal
weight conditions
and without roll
damping.
0 Certain loss of
X-15 if no manual
direct control
mode as back-up
to augmented mode.
SAS monitor channel
provided necessary
fail-safety to pre-
vent hard-over con-
trol signal.
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Definite control-
lability problems
and certain loss
of X-15.
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Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency
No. or Failure Action System Effect
Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency
Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup
1-2-7 1. Moderate 1. Repeated x
stability and con- pilot control
trol problems due inputs to dampen P + H
to failed SAS oscillations. SAS
pitch damper, pitch failure not
annunciated to
pilot.
X Certain loss of
X-15 if no manual
direct control
mode as back-up
to augmented mode.
2-4-1 1. Cooling sys- 1. Pilot intro- X
tem deficient duced ram air in
prior to launch. lieu of continuing P + R
primary cooling saved
system operation, abort
2. Hydraulic 2. Pilot monitored
system #1 over- closely and allowed
pressurized on continued operation
start of APU #1 when #1 hydraulic
prior to launch. pressures came
back down to normal
in 5 seconds.
3. Nose landing 3. Repair and re-
gear bottomed out design subsequent
because strut not to flight. No cor-
fully pressurized rective action in
prior to landing. flight.
saved N/A
P and
abort
heat. Cancellation
of X-15 launch.
Possible cancellation
of X-15 launch via
automatic or monitor
cut-out.
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-
in-the-Loop
Certain loss of
control and result-
ant loss of X-15.
X* Probable equipment Possible equipment
and passenger over-and passenger over-
heat. Cancellation
of X-15 launch.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/081: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure
2-5-12 1. Pitch and roll
SAS failure on
#1
APU start and
pitch SAS failure
at jettison check
prior to launch.
2. Primary
launch mechan-
ism failed.
3. Upper engine
failed to start at
launch due to in-
adequate prime.
4. Upper engine
automatic shut-
down 220 sec.
after launch.
Lower engine
continued to
operate.
5. Damage to
L. H. landing
gear bungee.
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Corrective
Action
1. Pilot reset
SAS after cock-
pit instrument
and ground moni-
tor check in both
instances.
2. Successfully P - R
used emergency 0
launch system
actuated by B-52
pilot,
3. Pilot reset P - R
controls, allowed
time for adequate
prime while gliding,
and restarted engine.
4. Pilot tried
engine restarts to
no avail, so immedi-
ately altered flight
path drastically to
avoid exceeding glide
distance to landing
site.
5. Repair subsequent
to flight. No correc-
tive action in flight.
Redundant or Emergency
System Effect Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect
Completed
Planned
Mission
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
nate Hard- Planned hate Hard- or Emergency
Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup
saved
abort
saved
abort
launch and pos-
sible hazardous
X-15 hang-up on
B-52 pylon.
0 Pump cavitation
and failure, and
explosive ignition
(if no malfunction
safe engine con-
trols).
X X Unstable engine
combustion and
probable damage
(if no malfunction
safe engine con-
trols) .
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-
in-the-Loop
X-15 launch would
have been cancelled
unless remote SAS
reset capability
were provided (pre-
launch only).
Cancelled X-15
launch and possible
hazardous X-15
hang-up on B-52
pylon- (Note: B-52
pilot was in loop at
this point.)
Certain loss of X-15
unless an additional
control and guidance
capability were in-
cluded to effect altered
flight profile and land-
ing under nonnormal
conditions.
Certain loss of X-15
unless an additional
control and guidance
capability were in-
cluded to effect altered
flight profile and land-
ing under nonnormal
conditions.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency
No. or Failure Action System Effect
P and
abort
Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency
Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Backup
2-6-13 1. SAS roll 1. Pilot reset X
oll a
..ps_r trip -out upe,,.rs.
damper roll dampers.
on high roll
rates after launch.
1-3-8 1. External 1. Pilot started
B-52 power to #1 APU early to
X-15 radio failed check radio on
prior to launch, internal power-
found problem. 0
2. SAS roll trip- 2. Pilot reset
out 2 min. before roll channel.
launch.
3. Upper engine 3. Pilot reset
failed to start at controls. Allowed
launch due to in- time for reprime
adequate prime. made one unsuc-
cessful restart
attempt, reset again
and allowed more time
for adequate reprime
while gliding, and
finally restarted engine.
X-15. Sec roll
monitor channel
provided fail-
safety to prevent
hard-over control
signal.
Probable cancel-
lation on X-15
launch due to in-
ability to make
check-emergency
X-15 battery pro-
vided backup while
APU #1 being turned
on and loaded.
X X Turbopump pump
cavitation and fail-
ure, and explosive
ignition (if no mal-
function safe engine
controls).
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-
in-the-Loop
Loss of roll stability
augmentation, result-
ing in certain loss of
X-15.
Probable cancellation
of X-15 launch due to
uncertainty of radio
status.
Cancelled X-15 launch
unless remote SAS
reset capability were
provided (prelaunch
only) .
Certain loss of X-15
unless an additional
control and guidance
capability were included
to effect altered flight
profile and landing
under nonnormal con-
ditions.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure
1-3-5 (Cont.)
4. Inertial guid-
ance system was
completely inop-
erative.
5. X-15 subsys-
tems were not in
spec. at planned
launch point.
2-7-15 NONE
2-8-16 NONE
1-4-9 1. All SAS chan-
nels tripped out
at B-52 to X-15
power transfer.
2. Hydraulic
leak in #2 control
line of lower rud-
der actuator.
1-5-10 1. Hydraulic
leak in #2 supply
line of upper
rudder actuator.
Corrective Redundant or Emergency
Action System Effect
Completed
Planned
Mission
4. Air data sys- 0
tem and alternate
attitude indicator
served as back-
ups.
5. B-52/X-15
made 10 min. circle
while pilot monitored
cockpit gauges, re-
cycled subsystems
controls and assessed
all systems ready for
launch. Launch was
accomplished at
planned launch location
on 2nd pass.
1. Pilot successfully
reset all SAS channels.
2. Repaired subsequent X
to flight. #1 hydraulic
system provided neces-
sary redundancy. No
correction in flight.
1. Repaired subse- X
quent to flight. #1
hydraulic system pro-
vided necessary redun-
dancy. No correction
in flight.
Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Result If
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency
Miss, ware Mission Miss, ware Backup
0 saved
abort
Cancelled X-15
launch. On higher
performance mis-
sion IGS is firm
requirement.
X
saved
abort
Possible loss of
yaw control and
subsequent loss
of X-15.
Possible loss of
yaw control and
subsequent loss
of X-15.
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-
in-the-Loop
Cancelled X-15
launch unless
suitable backup
auto or remote
guidance system
provided.
Cancelled X-15
launch.
Cancellation of X-15
launch unless remote
SAS reset capability
was provided (pre-
launched only).
None -pilot unaware 1/2
of leak.
None -pilot unaware 1/2
of leak.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/09: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure
1-6-11 1. All SAS chan-
nels tripped out
when X-15 gener-
ators loaded
before launch.
2. SAS roll
damper monitor
channel failed at
launch and on high
roll inputs.
Corrective Redundant or Emergency
Action System Effect Pilot-in-the-Loop Effect Result If
1. Pilot imme-
diately reset all
SAS channel s.
2. Pilot attempted
to reset roll damp-
ers in each case.
Completed
Planned
Mission
3. Lower ventral 3. Pilot lowered
failed to jettison landing gear, which
on primary jet- actuated an emer-
tison command. gency jettison
mechanism.
1-7-12 1. Inertial guid-
ance system was
completely
inoperative.
2. Radio com-
munication with
X-15 was inter-
mittent and
"hashy" on pri-
mary antenna.
1. Air data system X
and alternate atti-
tude served as back-
2. Pilot switched X
to alternate an-
tenna, and radio
communication im-
proved considerably.
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency
Miss, ware Mission Miss, ware Backup
X*
avoid
abort
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-
in-the-Loop
X-15 launch would have
been cancelled unless
remote SAS reset capa-
bility were provided
(prelaunch only) .
In this case re- Fail-safe features re-
dundancy effect of quired for pilot safety
the fail-safe SAS would not be operating
roll monitor chan- for unpiloted flights;
nel was a detriment, thus this failure would
as the monitor chan-have been averted.
nel (not the working
channel) failed.
In this case X-15 N/A
would have landed
with lower ventral
attached, which
means ventral
would contact
ground before land-
ing gear, thus inflic-
ting extensive damage
to X-15.
Cancelled X-15 Cancelled X-15 launch
launch. On higher unless suitable backup
performance flights auto or remote guidance
IGS is firm req't. system provided.
Communication N/A
with pilot would
have proved un-
acceptable and
X-15 launch would
have been cancelled.
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure
1-7-12 3. Homing indi-
(cont.) cator was in-
operative.
1-8-13 1. All SAS
channels tripped-
out when X-15
generators were
loaded before
launch.
2. No ground-to-
X-15 radio com-
munication during
most of ascending
and early descend-
ing parts of flight.
Corrective
Action
3. Pilot headed
X-15 on basis of
ground radio calls
regarding radar
track.
1. Pilot immedi-
ately reset all
SAS channels.
Redundant or Emergency Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
System Effect
Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or No Pilot-
Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- In-The-
Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware up Loop
Possible erroneous Possible erroneous
heading and loss of heading and loss of
/C A/C 'Mess alternate
control system pro-
vided.
2. Pilot had to x
rely upon air-
borne instruments
and make necessary
compensations.
have been cancelled
unless remote SAS
reset capability
were provided (pre-
launch only).
No guidance infor- If inertial guidance
mation for pilot. system had been devel-
oped, a normal un-
X-15 would have piloted flight could
been lost. have been accomplished.
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Weighting
Factor
 Approved For Release 2007/05/0
Detailed History - X-15 Free Flights (Cont. )
Flight Type Problem Corrective
No. or Failure Action
Redundant or Emergency
Systems Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect
Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved
Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard-
Miss. Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware
2-9-18 1. Two reaction 1. Pilot observed X 1/2 Saved Abort X 1/2
control rockets this and switched
failed to shut off off the faulty re-
during prelaunch action control sys-
check when controls tem, leaving the
returned to neutral. other redundant
system on.
2. Severe SAS-
induced control
surface oscilla-
tions - one cycle
just before landing
& many cycles af-
ter landing.
1-9-17 1. LOX jettison
valve failed to
open after engine
shutdown.
2. Pilot stopped
post-landing
oscillations by
turning SAS off.
2. None. Engine
shutdown on LOX
exhaustion, so no
significant LOX
quantity left on
board to jettison.
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Result If
No Redundant or No Pilot-In-
Emergency The-Loop
Back-Up
Had this been a Cancellation of
high altitude flight, X-15 launch or
the flight would have if the failed open
been canceled ui,
if launch had oc-
curred, insuffi-
cient control au-
thority would
have been avail-
able to the pilot
at low q.
rocket had not
been detected, APU
& reaction control
fuel would have pro-
bably been depleted
before completion of
the mission, result-
ing in loss of the
X-15.
X N, 'A Possible structural
damage to X-15
after landing.
Weighting
Factor
 Approved For Release 2007/05/0
Detailed History-X-15 Free Flights (Cont.)
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure
Corrective
Action
1-11-21 1. LOX fill valve
leaked during
flight - called out
by chase pilot.
1-12-23 1. Inertial Guid-
ance System had
gross errors in
altitude, total
velocity and ver-
tical velocity data
both before and
after launch.
1-13-24 1. Complete engine
failure at initiation
of first turn after
approximately 150
secs. of powered
flight due to spur-
ious power supply
interruption.
1-14-27 1. Partial umbili-
cal disconnect dur-
ing B-52 takeoff
causing:
a) IGS to go into
inertial mode.
b) Failure of the
B-52/X-15 inter-
com system.
None -- chase
pilot monitored
leak until X-15
launch.
1. Pilot used
back-up sources
of altitude and
velocity data -
namely, pres-
sure instruments
and ground
radar call-out.
1. Unsuccessful
restart attempt.
Pilot flew opti-
mum glide return
to base and per-
formed successful
landing.
Redundant or Emergency
System Effect
Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect
Completed
Alter-
Saved
Completed
Alter-
Saved
No Redundancy
Planned
nate
Hard-
Planned
nate
Hard-
or Emergency
Mission
Miss.
ware
Mission
Miss.
ware
Back-Up
N/A
Cancellation of
X-15 launch.
Note: On higher
performance
X-15 flights
inertial altitude
and velocity data
will be firm req't.
a) Alternate sources X
of altitude and velocity
data were used. (ground-
radar, pressure in-
struments)
b) X-15/B-52 communi- X
cations performed on
UHF radio.
Cancellation of
X-15 launch.
Cancellation of
x-15 launch.
No Pilot-In
The-Loop
Assuming that
the IGS would
provide guidance
information direct-
ly to the control
system for the un-
piloted case, the
launch would have
been cancelled.
Certain loss of X-15
unless an additional
control and guidance
capability were in-
cluded to effect altered
flight profile and
landing under non-
normal conditions.
Cancellation of X-15
launch. (Refer to
flt. 1-12-23)
Weighting
Factor
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 Approved For Release 2007/05/08; CIA-RDP70BOO584ROO0200050001-7
Flight Type Problem
No. Or Failure
1-15-28 (NONE)
1-16-29 (NONE)
2-10-21 1. LN2 supply
valve for cock-
pit pressuriza-
tion and equip-
ment cooling
froze shut prior
to launch.
2. X-15 and
B-52 intercom
failed.
1-17-30 1. Lower engine
shut-down during
first turn after
approximately 155
secs. of powered
flight due to spur-
ious power supply
interruptions.
Corrective Redundant or Emergency
Action System Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
N/A
N/A
Completed
Planned
Mission
1. Pilot called for X
hold at 7 min. before
planned Launch. Pilot
changed cooling
modes to subject
valve to warm air
and thaw it. Valve
thawed and launch
occurred 20 min.
later on 3rd pass
over planned launch
location.
2. X-15 and B-52 X
crew continued flt.
by communicating
via UHF.
1. Pilot reset lower
engine circuit breaker
and performed suc-
cessful re-start of the
engine.
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- or Emergency
Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware Back-Up
N/A
N/A
Cancellation of
X-15 launch.
(Alternate cooling
mode and flexi-
bility of pilot con-
trol over pressuri-
zation and cooling
system provided
necessary emer-
gency back-up to
primary mode.)
Cancellation of
X-15 launch.
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-In-
The-Loop
N/A
N/A
Cancellation
of X-15
launch.
Inability to reset
circuit breaker and
re-start engine would
have resulted in certain
loss of X-15 unless an
additional control and
guidance capability were
included to effect altered
flight profile and landing
under non-normal
conditions.
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70BOO584ROO0200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/081: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Detailed History - X-15 Free Flights (Cont.)
Flight Type Problem Corrective
No. or Failure Action
2-11-22 1. One reaction con-1. Pilot observed
trol rocket exhaus- this and switched
ted raw fuel and off the faulty re-
would not shut action control sys-
completely off tem, leaving the
when controls re- other (redundant)
turned to neutral. system on.
1-18-31 1. One engine 1. Alternate flight
chamber could profile was flown
not be ignited. with 7 chambers op-
erating.
Redundant or Emergency
System Effect Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
Completed Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved Non Redundancy of
Planned nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back-
Mission Miss. ware Mission Miss. Hard Up
Had this been a
high altitude
flight, the flight
would have been
canceled without
the reaction con-
trols redundancy,
or had launch
occurred, insuf-
ficient low q con-
trol would have
resulted.
No Pilot-
In-The-
Loop
Concellation of
X-15 launch or,
if leak not de-
tected and launch
had been made, APU
and reaction control
fuel may have been
depleted, resulting
in loss of the X-15.
Possible loss of
X-15 due to in-
stability to accom-
plish the alternate
mission with an
unpiloted system.
Weighting
Factor
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/ : CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Detailed History -X-15 Free Flights (Cont. )
Flight Type Problem
No. or Failure _
Corrective
Action
2-12-23 1. An automatic
malfunction shut-
down of the
(XLR99) engine
occurred on the
first of 2 planned
manual shutdown
restart cycles.
2. One reaction
control rocket
stuck open after
postlaunch ac-
tuation when con-
trols returned to
neutral.
1-19-32 None
1-20-35 None
1-21-36 None
2-13-26 None
1. Pilot recycled
iue controls,
eng--
reprimed and ob-
tained satisfactory
engine restart on
2nd attempt. In this
process pilot made
considerable alter-
ation to planned
flight profile.
2. Pilot made
quick test of
reaction controls
to check A/C re-
action response
and then shutoff
both systems to
prevent loss of
fuel.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Redundant or Emergency
System Effect
Completed Alter- Saved
Planned nate Hard-
Mission Miss. ware
Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
Completed Alter-
Planned nate
Mission Miss.
Saved No Redundancy or
Hard- Emergency Back-
ware Up
X Hazardous XLR99
engine occurrence.
(Auto malfunction
shutdown system
protected against
undetermined haz-
ardous condition
in start sequence).
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
No Pilot-
In-The-
Loop
Certain loss of
X-15 unless an
additional control
and guidance capa-
bility were in-
cluded to effect
altered flight
profile and landing
under non-normal
conditions.
Depletion or partial
depletion of reaction
control and APU fuel
due to nondetection
of leak and no correct-
ive capability without
pilot. Possible loss
of the X-15 would
have resulted.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Weighting
Factor
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/(I8 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
Detailed History -X-15 Free Flights (Cont. )
Flight Type Problem
No. Fail~_,--
2-14-28 1. Engine shut-
down on first
start attempt due
to intermittent
fire switch.
2. Cockpit pres-
surization and
cooling malfunc-
tion prior to
launch.
3. Structural
vibration en-
countered dur-
ing re-entry -
sustained by
SAS.
Corrective Redundant or Emergency Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect
Action System Effect
Completed
Planned
Mission
1. Pilot reset
engine reprimed,
restarted engine
and made minor
necessary alter-
ations to the flight
plan to reach in-
tended flight goals.
2. Pilot recycled
controls several
times and success-
fully cleared the
problem prior to
launch.
3. Pilot reduced
pitch and yaw
damper gains
causing vibration
to stop after
approximately
30 seconds.
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard-
Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware
No Redundancy or No Pilot-
1r-Emergency Back- The-Loop
Up
X X N/A
X X N/A
Weighting
Factor
Certain loss of
X-15 unless an
additional control
and guidance capa-
bility is included
to effect altered
flight profile and
landing under non-
normal conditions
and at remote
location.
Probable cancelled
launch due to in-
ability to cycle heat
and vent controls
and correct problem.
Inability to lower
gain settings would
have resulted in
sustained continuous
vibration throughout
remainder of flight
and probable major
structural damage
and loss of X-15.
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/0 : CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
Flight Type Problem
No. .,r =- e
Corrective Redundant or Emergency
Action System Effect
Completed
Planned
Mission
2-14-28 4. Stopwatch in
(Cont.) cockpit reading 4
seconds ahead
of actual burning
time.
2-15-29 1. Automalfunc-
tion shutdown of
the XLR99 engine
immediately fol-
lowing launch.
2. SAS pitch
channel tripped
out at final en-
gine shutdown
to failure in the
SAS pitch gain
selector switch.
4. Pilot recog- X
nized difference
between prime
and backup timing,
analyzed situation
to determine which
was correct, and
shutdown engine
on ground time
callout.
1. Pilot reset X
engine controls,
reprimed engine
system while
gliding, accom-
plished success-
ful engine restart,
and made neces-
sary control inputs
to arrive at same
powered flight pro-
file and points as
planned.
2. Pilot reset SAS X
pitch channel after
quickly assessing
system status.
Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect
Result If
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back-
Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware up
Early engine shut-
down would have
resulted in less
performance than
expected resulting
in an alternate
mission profile.
X Hazardous XLR99
engine occurrence.
(Auto malfunction
shutdown system
protected against
undetermined
hazardous condition
in start sequence).
No Pilot-In-
The-Loop
Certain loss of
X-15 unless addi-
tional control and
guidance capa-
bility were in-
cluded to effect
altered flight
profile and landing
under non-normal
conditions and at
remote location.
X Certain loss of Definite controll-
X-15 if no manual ability problems
direct control and certain loss
made as backup of the X-15.
to augmented mode.
SAS monitor channel
provided necessary
fail-safety to pre-
vent hard-over
control signal.
Weighting
Factor
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05108: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency
No. or Failure Action System Effect
Completed Alter- Saved
Planned nate Hard-
Mission Miss. ware
2-15-29 3. Partial cabin 3. Pilot's pres- X
(Cont.) pressurization sure suit inflated saved
failure one min- and maintained pilot
ute after engine proper pilot
shutdown. environment.
4. inertial alti- 4. Pilot refer- X
tude data was enced other forms
grossly in error. of flight data -
namely ground
radar call-out,
pressure instru-
ments (air data
system), and
other flight para-
meters from
inertial data.
5. Stopwatch in Pilot recognized X
cockpit read 9 difference between
sec. ahead of prime and backup
actual burning timing, analyzed
time. situation to deter-
mine which was
correct, and shut
down engine on
ground time callout.
Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or
Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- No Pilot-In-
Mission Miss. ware LIP The-Loop
The pilot's pres- N/A
sure suit provided
necessary emer-
gency backup with-
out which pilot would
have been incapa-
citated and X-15 lost.
Canceled X-15 Canceled X-15
launch. On higher launch unless
performance mis- suitable back-
sion good IGS data up auto or remote
is firm req't. guidance system
provided.
Early engine shut- N/A
down would have
resulted in less
performance than
expected, thus
resulting in an
alternate mission
profile.
Weighting
Factor
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/081: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency
No. or Failure Action System Effect
Completed Alter- Saved
Planned nate Hard-
Mission miss. ware
2-16-31 1. Pitch-roll 1. Roll damper X
SAS malfunction reset, pitch
at launch. damper could
not be reset.
2. Stop watch 2. Pilot used X
in cockpit failed ground time
to operate. callouts to ac-
complish de-
sired flight
profile.
3. Partial cabin 3. Pilots pres- X
pressurization sure suit inflated
failure after and maintained
engine shutdown. proper pilot
environment.
2-17-33 1. Partial cabin 1. Pilots pres- X
pressurization sure suit inflated
failure during and maintained
powered X-15 proper pilot
climb. environment.
Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
Completed Alter Saved No Redundancy or
Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back- No Pilot-In-
Mission Miss. ware Up
X Certain loss of Definite control-
X-15 if no manual lability problems
direct control mode and certain loss
as backup to aug- of X-15.
mented mode. SAS
monitor channel
provided fail-
safety to prevent
hard-over control
signal.
A less accurate N/A
flight profile
would have re-
sulted if time
backup were not
provided and IGS
or radar values
were used.
Certain loss of N/A, except
X-15 due to in- incapacitation of
capacitation of passenger, if any.
pilot exposed to
adverse
environment.
Certain loss of N/A, except
X-15 due to in- incapacitation of
capacitation of passenger, if any.
pilot exposed to
adverse
environment.
Weighting
Factor
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
Flight Type Problem Corrective Redundant or Emergency
No. or Failure Action System, Effect Pilot -L-The -Loop Effect
Completed Alter- Saved Completed
Planned nate Hard- Planned
Mission Miss. ware Mission
1-22-37 1. X-15 launch 1. Launch oc-
switch malfunc- curred after
tion. pilot recycled
switch several
times.
2. Partial cabin 2. Pilot's pres- X
pressurization sure suit inflated
failure after and maintained
engine shutdown. proper pilot
environment.
2-18-34 1. APU #2 be- 1. Pilot made 0
came inoperative successful APU
at 1. 5 min. before restart and re-
scheduled launch loaded #2 gen-
due to an apparent erators in time
control or valve to continue with
intermittency. launch only 1 min.
behind schedule.
Alter- Saved No Redundancy or
nate Hard- Emergency Back-
Miss. ware up
Certain loss of
X-15 due to inca-
pacitation of pilot
exposed to adverse
environment.
Probable cancel-
lation of X-15
launch without
APU redundancy
B-52 power would
have been required
before single APU
restart could have
been attempted.
Planned launch
point would have
been exceeded, and
successful launch
on 2nd pass would
be very marginal.
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Weighting
Factor
No Pilot-In-
The -Loop
N/A (B-52 back-
up launch pro-
visions would have
been reverted to).
N/A except inca-
pacitation of
passenger, if any.
Cancellations of 1/2
X-15 launch. APLT
could not be re-
started nor genera-
tor reloaded re-
motely. X-15, un-
piloted or not, would
not be launched with-
out benefit of capa-
city of both APU's
as required to com-
plete a full-blown
mission.
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix H
Backup to DS-022-192
Detailed History-X-15 Free Flights (Cont.)
Flight Type Problem
No. or F , 1.
Corrective Redundant or Emergency
Action System Effect
Completed
Planned
Mission
2-18-34 2. Engine fuel
(Cont.) inlet pressure
dropped below
minimum opera-
ting limit, as
indicated by
warning light
and cockpit fuel
line pressure
gauge.
2. Pilot throttled
engine back from
100% to 50% thrust
to decrease pres-
sure drop in the
fuel feed line. The
engine fuel inlet
pressure rose to
acceptable opera-
ting value. Pilot
eased throttle up
to 75% thrust and
observed no decay
in fuel inlet pres-
sure. Pilot then
made necessary
alterations to the
flight plan to ap-
proach same
powered flight pro-
file goals as planned.
Pilot-In-The-Loop Effect Result If
Alter- Saved Completed Alter- Saved No Redundancy or
nate Hard- Planned nate Hard- Emergency Back-
Miss. ware Mission Miss. ware up
X X Malfunction de-
tection and warn-
ing function of
engine low fuel
inlet pressure
light/gage pre-
vented probable
loss of X-15 due
to in-flight fire/
explosion or pre-
mature engine
shutdown upon
chamber burn-
through.
No Pilot-In-
The-Loop
Probable loss of
X-15 due to in-
flight fire/explo-
sion upon chamber
burn-through or
due to premature
engine shutdown
upon malfunction
detection or cham-
ber burn-through,
unless an additional
control and guidance
capability were in-
cluded to effect al-
tered flight profile
and landing under
non-normal condi-
tions at a remote
location.
Weighting
Factor
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7
 Approved For Release 2007/05/08 :CIA-R DP70B00584R000200050001-7
Appendix I
Backup to DS-022-198
Cost for
Automation
SYSTEM
TOTAL
FLIGHTS
WITHOU
T PILOT
WITH
PILOT
LOST
MISSIONS
SAV
D
LOST
ACFT.
SAVED
DYN
T
A-SOAR FL
O COMPLE
IGHTS REQ
TE 18 MISSI
UIRED
ONS
SUC
CESS
ACFT
. LOST
SUC
CESS
ALT.
MISSION
T
OTAL
ACFT
. LOST
E
PILOT
LO
BY
PILOT
CA
SE I
CA
SE II
No. F
suc
R
suc
No. F
`
No
N
200.2
X-15
40
22
55
suc
16
40
.
33
83
o.
6
No.
39
97.5
No.
0
0
95
100
Pilot
18.5
No Pilot
31
Pilot
21.6
No Pilot
37
262.0
Bomarc
167
85
51
82
49
137
82
19
156
___
i o0.5
o.o
d7
87
19.2
35
22.6
43
I
I
351.0
Bomarc
60
26
43
34
57
51
85
7
58
96.5
2
3.3
94
94
18.7
41
22
51
Minuteman
4
1
25
3
75
3
i5
1
4
100
0
0
100
100
13.v.0
Mercur
6
4
66
I
I
5
i
83
21.6
27
62.3
Regulus'
784
632
81
152
19
676
6ifi
86
108
14
29
29
21.0
22
F61:
32,761
32
:39.0
Jet Aircraft
1.000
664
66
151
15
1
99.5
27
165.0
Rocket Acft.
116/190
61
34/190
is
2/372
5
89
30
F
X
15 R
Regulus (1st flights)
F
suc
100
100
85
859
85
85
15
15
15
15
94
98
94
98
94
98
94
98
6
2
6
2
60
87
60
87
19.2
18.4
21.2
21.2
=
cr
-
Additional Flights Required for Automation. Additional F = 18
suc 4U
suc F
suc
Floss
Case I - Assume Data is comparable to Dysa-Soar Air Vehicle
Case D-Assume Data is comparable to Dyna-Soar Glider. Booster
Approved For Release 2007/05/08: CIA-RDP70B00584R000200050001-7