VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 31, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/11/06 CIA-RDP67B00446R000400010002-4
1476 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
ence table. The other side refused to
talk.
I spent some time in Vietnam this fall.
I talked to a good many troops because
went up into the forests and the jungles
where they were fighting. I can report to
you that the morale of those troops out
there, as far as I was able to ascertain it,
is better than the morale of some of the
people who are marching here and burn-
ing draft cards and holding sit-ins and
teach-ins here. The only complaint I
heard out there among these troops was,
"What is wrong with some of these people
back home? Yes, and what is wrong with
some Congressmen who are holding
forums for these people to air their views
making the North Vietnamese believe
that we do want to quit?" Some people
say, "Well, if we do not get out of there
Communist China is going to come in."
talked to a good many people in Hong
Kong, Bangkok and Vietnam itself and
almost universally they say that if we
make it perfectly clear to Peiping that if
they do come in that same afternoon
their atom-bomb-making complex will
disappear from the face of the earth,
then they will not come in. The reason
for that is these Chinese I talked to say--
and some of them visit Red China occa-
sionally?that the Chinese Communist
leaders believe and are planning on a 50-
year program to get enough atom bombs
to annihilate the rest of the world. They
will do anything to keep from having
their atom bomb apparatus immobilized.
They said. and I believe it is true, that if
we make it perfectly clear to Peiping that
the first time a Chinese soldier is found
engaged in combat that that atom bomb
complex will disappear?and we can
make it disappear with one Polaris mis-
sile?then they will think a long time
before coming in. If they do come in I
think we ought to use every weapon we
have to stop them in their tracks as Mr.
Truman had the courage to use the ulti-
mate weapon in the war against Japan
and thereby save 1 million American cas-
ualties. I do not advocate the use of any
terrible weapon lightly. I do not want to
see any noncombatants, women and chil-
dren, killed. However, as the Secretary
of State said last week, what is the differ-
ence between a bomb dropped from an
airplane which kills civilians and a bomb
delivered on a bicycle or in a Renault
which kills as high as 50 or 69 women and
children in Saigon. I cannot make the
distinction and I cannot get as upset as
some of the people do who seem to have
a double standard.
Their attitude is that it is not fair to
do anything to North Vietnam but it is
perfectly fair for North Vietnam to do
anything they want to do to the civilians
of South Vietnam.
I support the President in this and I
hope the card burners and the marchers
will also decide to close ranks and sup-
port the United States of America.
PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT
(Mr. FOLEY asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1
minute.)
rtniktlea
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, on Jan-
uary 27, I was unavoidably absent during
rollcall No. 3. Had I been present, I
would have voted "yea."
illLj
VIETNAM
(Mr. FOLEY asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, as an in-
dividual Member of the House of Rep-
resentatives I wrote to the President last
week and expressed my full :ripport in
the event he found it necessary to resume
the bombing of North Vietnam
As I stated in that letter it; is the
President, and he alone as Commander
in Chief who has the responsibility and
the right to make this momentous de-
cision. It is clear that the decision has
been made, after the most careful anal-
ysis of all the relevant facts at issue
and with the deepest resolution on his
part, not only to maintain the freedom
and the integrity of South Vietnam but
to seek every honorable means of restor-
ing peace in southeast Asia.
I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that the
President's action will have the support
of the overwhelming majority of the
American people of both parties here in
the Congress and throughout the
country.
PROBLEMS OF APPALACHIA
(Mr. PERKINS asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks in the
body of the RECORD and to include a news-
paper article.)
Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Speaker, the
problems of Appalachia have been of con-
cern to this Congress for some time and
we have taken a number of legislative
actions to assist that section as well as
other depressed areas. Therefore, I be-
lieve you will share my pleasure in know-
ing about one of the very fine arid hope-
ful things that is happening in my State
as a result of some of this legislation.
I refer specifically to the work experi-
ence and training program which was
started the winter of 1963-64 in 9 coun-
ties of Kentucky and is now operating in
19 counties. The Federal laws which
made this program possible are the 1962
amendments to the Social Security Act
and the Economic Opportunity Act of
1965. The program is designed to help
needy families become self-suporting and
is administered by the Welfare Admini-
stration of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare in cooperation
with the Kentucky Department of Eco-
nomic Security. This program has
built-in safeguards?including m:wit-sys-
tern appointed personnel?to assure that
its benefits reach those who need them
most and that it is operated in ways that
will help them most.
Today, I was notified by the Welfare
Administration that a grant of $13.4 mil-
lion has just been approved to enable the
nine counties, where the program started,
to carry it on for another year. The 10
other counties, which started later, are
still operating on their original grants.
January .'?i, 1966
I want to take just a few minutes of
your time to tell you why the approval
of this grant today was especially good
news to me, why I believe it will be
equally good news to you, and why I know
that to several thousand families in Ken-
tucky, it is not merely good news but
almost literally lifesaving news.
The people I am talking about live
where I live in the most remote hill sec-
tions of eastern Kentucky. Their plight
has been my chief concern since I have
been a Member of Congress, but every
legislative proposal designed to provide
programs of educational, employment,
economic development assistance for the
most part have been sidetracked and 133,-
passed until the very recent sessions cif
the Congress. The plight of people living
in these regions has been the focus of
nationwide attention thanks to the excel-
lent reportorial services of the New York
Times and the Louisville Courier Journcl
who went into these sections and ex-
posed the many, many families who were
living on the razoredge of starvation.
As I have said, I have been anxiously
concerned about the plight of these fami-
lies who could look forward to little more
than more hunger, more deprivation, and
more hopeless years of unemployment.
Regular grant-in-aid programs fashion-
ed for the Nation as a whole seem to
bypass and do little for this area. As a
consequence, I have worked actively for
national attention to the specific prob.
lems of the area through specific pro-
grams to cope with educational and eco-
nomic needs of this isolated region of
our Nation. A regions I might add,
which is vast in many natural resources
not yet developed.
Many of the mothers and fathers in
those families could not .read or write
and their children were growing up the
same way. You can not send ragged,
half-sick, half-starved children off to
school and even if you do, they are in no
shape to learn. Other factors contribute
to providing barriers to education not the
least of which is the deplorable lack of
roads.
For over 6,000 of the most desperate
of those families, the winter of 1966 is
very different from the winter of 1963
because of the work experience rind
training program. Unfortunately, that
change has often been described by a
phrase that distorts its real meaning?
"happy pappies." Yet in a literal sense,
the description is true. These men are
happy.
They are happy because their chil-
dren?some 23,000 of them?go off to
school every morning with a breakfast
under their belts and with shoes on
their feet and warm coats on their
backs. Most of these families still live
far below the poverty line of $3,000 a
year but now they at least have the bare
essentials.
They are happy because they know
that if anyone in the family is sick, he
will get attention?and many of them
can remember when loved ones suffered,
perhaps even died, for lack of such
attention.
But most of all, these fathers are
happy because they can look to a
G 004
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 1479
dump of unsightly debris, graveled the drive,
gathered and burned trash in one spot, and
built a wide unloading area. Formerly trucks
and cars did not have enough room to turn
after unloading trash at the dump.
Most of the jobs would have gone undone
or would have had to wait had it not been for
the program.
But in the long run, only time will tell
how successful the new program will be in
teaching participants to actually become
steady wage earners. The 24 who currently
have progressed to traneeships is not a large
percentage of the 171 on the program.
And always there is the possibility that a
private employer will be tempted to take ad-
vantage of the program to obtain free labor
for some menial task under the pretext of
teaching the worker specific work skills.
In the end much of the program's future
value to the public will depend on the alert-
ness of officials in finding worthwhile jobs
for the men, and citizens in calling attention
to jobs that need doing.
VIETNAM
(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and
was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker,
the President's announcement to resume
the bombing of North Vietnam is sym-
bolic of this Nations determination to
keep its commitment in southeast Asia.
President Johnson has kept all doors to
negotiations open in an effort to bring
about a peaceful settlement to the prob-
lems of South Vietnam. Yet the Com-
munist aggressors have both rejected and
maligned his repeated pleas for peace.
In the face of their unwillingness to dis-
cuss on any level the complex problems
which the world is faced with, President
Johnson has made the right decision.
During the lull in U.S. bombing the
Communists have been given the chance
to repair damage and replinish supplies
which had been destroyed by previous
American raids. The current U.S. ef-
forts should spare no military target of
strategic importance. I urge the Presi-
dent to render ineffective the vital North
Vietnamese supply port of Hiaphong.
The port of Haiphong should not be-
come a sanctuary as the Yalu River did in
North Korea. The port of Haiphong is
currently the main port of supply for the
aggressive forces of North Vietnam and
so long as it continues to be the conduit
of aggression, it should receive priority
consideration and be rendered inopera-
tive.
VIETNAM
(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I ap-
prove of this decision of the President to
resume the bombing, but I think it ought
to be given an assessment of actually
what it is. Despite all the leaks from
the White House during the past few
days about all the "To be or not to be"
soliloquizing going on down there, I do
not think it is anything that we should
go into emotional orbit about. The pro-
longed "Be kind to Hanoi week" which
stretched out to 5 weeks and 2 days aim-
No, 15-2
ply did not accomplish its objective. It
was a failure and it was time to stop it
and take another tack. And, now that
We are going to do so I think we should
also take realistic stock of the success or
failure of the bombing as it was carried
on up to the Christmas holidays. It was
suposed to, first, slow down the infiltra-
tion of North Vietnamese military units
into the South and, second, raise the
price of the war in the North to the point
where they would determine to cease
their aggressions. That bombing failed
utterly to accomplish either of those two
purposes. So the score so far is two
failures in a row and again I say it is
nothing to go into a state of euphoria
about as so much of this Presidential
adulation seems to indicate.
Instead we had better do some hard
thinking about what kind of bombing
we ought to be doing from here on out
to accomplish the objectives we have set
instead of failing to accomplish them.
If we are thinking about doing some-
thing which will discourage them from
doing the things the President, Secre-
tary McNamarra, and Secretary Rusk say
we are trying to discourage them from
doing, we should realistically admit that
the use of TNT bombs on targets we
have thus far selected has failed of its
purpose. A repetition of that kind of
action should not prove any more suc-
cessful in the future than it has been in
the past. I am not thinking in terms of
blowing up Hanoi and Haiphong or
using atom bombs, but I am thinking in
terms of using some intelligent analysis
to determine what kind of targets are
meaningful to those people and using
some creative imagination to determine
what kind of ammunition should be used
against those targets to succeed in
achieving our purpose. Both the targets
and the ammunition may turn out to be
quite unconventional. I shall say more
about them in the near future. The
point I want to make now is that if civil-
ians in Washington are going to insist
on running this war without paying any
attention to the advice of the military,
then they should start to make sense
about the way we fight it and stop mis-
managing it before they turn it into a
fiasco. They should stop fighting the
last war, which this one is not. They
should stop thinking about the war as a
conventional war which it is not and
start thinking about it as the unconven-
tional war it is. If they do so intelli-
gently and imaginatively, that will bring
us victory and we will not have to fight
forever to get it.
THE SPACE PROGRAM?MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 371)
The SPEAKER laid before the House
the following message from the Presi-
dent of the United States; which was
read, and, together with the accompany-
ing papers, referred to the Committee on
Science and Astronautics and ordered to
be printed with illustrations:
To the Congress of the United States:
The record of American accomplish-
ments in aeronautics and space during
1965 shows it to have been the most suc-
cessful year in our history.
More spacecraft were orbited than in
any previous year. Five manned Gem-
ini flights were successfully launched.
Our astronauts spent more hours in
space than were flown by all of our
manned spacecraft until 1965. Ten as-
tronauts logged a total of 1,297 hours, 42
minutes in space.
The five manned flights successfully
achieved included a walk in space, and
the first rendezvous between two manned
spacecraf is.
A scientific spacecraft completed a
325-million-mile, 228-day trip to Mars.
Mariner 4 thereby gave mankind its first
closeup view of another planet.
The Ranger series, begun in 1961,
reached its zenith with two trips to the
moon that yielded 13,000 closeup pic-
tures of that planet. The entire Ranger
series produced 17,000 photographs of
the moon's surface which are being
studied now by experts throughout the
world.
Equally inmortant were the contribu-
tions of our space program to life here
on earth. Launching of Early Bird, the
first commercial communication satellite
brought us measurably closer to the goal
of instantaneous communication between
all points on the globe. Research and de-
velopment in our space program con-
tinued to speed progress in medicine, in
weather prediction, in electronics?and,
indeed, in virtually every aspect of Amer-
ican science and technology.
As our space program continues, the
impact of its developments on everyday
life becomes daily more evident. It con-
tinues to stimulate our education, im-
prove our material well-being, and
broaden the horizons of knowledge. It is
also a powerful force for peace.
The space program of the United
States today is the largest effort ever un-
dertaken by any nation to advance the
frontiers of human knowledge. What we
are discovering and building today will
help solve many of the great problems
which an increasingly complex and
heavily populated world will face tomor-
row.
The year 1965?the year of Gemini,
Ranger, and Mariner?is a brilliant pref-
ace to the coming years of Apollo, sta-
tions in space, and voyages to the planets.
I have great pride and pleasure in trans-
mitting this remarkable record to the
Congress that, through its enthusiastic
support, has made possible.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 31, 1966.
FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION?
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC.
NO. 372)
The SPEAKER laid before the House
the following message from the Presi-
dent of the United States; which was
read and, together with the accompany-
ing papers, referred to the Committee on
Science and Astronautics and ordered to
be printed, with illustrations:
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18O CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
To the Congress of the United States:
I said in my state of the Union message
this year that, "We must change to mas-
ter change."
Failing that, this Nation will surely
become a casualty to the relentless tide
of history. For in assessing our pros-
pects, we must remember that mankind
faces not one but many possible futures.
Which future our children's children en-
joy?or endure?depends in large meas-
ure on our ability to adjust to the needs
of the times.
But change comes not of itself. Nei-
ther the requirement for change nor the
desire for change will see us through.
In a complex world?growing more com-
plex every year?only knowledge can
keep us apace.
We must achieve a better understand-
ing of our environment and our place in
that environment.
We must continue to unlock the secrets
of the earth below us, the sea around us,
and the heavens above us.
And we must intensify our search
into the very meaning of life itself.
ft is not too much to say that every
aspect of our lives will be affected by
the success of this effort. The military
and economic strength of our Nation, and
the health, the happiness, and the wel-
fare of our citizens all are profoundly
influenced by the limits?and potentiali-
ties?of our scientific program.
In the furtherance of this program, no
organization, agency or institution has
had a more profound or lasting influence
than the National Science Foundation.
The establishment of this Foundation by
the Congress, 15 years ago, was one of the
soundest investments this Nation ever
made.
In the field of basic research, many of
the major scientific breakthroughs of
our time would have been impossible?or
at the very least, much longer in com-
ing?had it not been for National Science
Foundation grants in the basic sciences.
In the field of education, it is enough
to say that more than half of all our high
school teachers have now received vital
refresher training through the Founda-
tion's education program.
In the classrooms, the Foundation has
played a major role in modernizing
scientific curricula to make them respon-
sive to our age.
And in a more recent activity, the
Foundation has launched a program to
strengthen the science departments of
many of our smaller universities
throughout the Nation by providing new
laboratories, modern equipment, and fel-
lowships to promising graduate students.
It should be emphasized that the role
of the National Science Foundation is to
aid, not to arbitrate. But through its
aid--akillf ally administered and intel-
ligently applied?it has brought Ameri-
can science to a new level of excellence.
This, the 15th Annual Report of the
National Science Foundation, reflects
another year of scientific growth and
progress, and I am pleased to commend
it to the attention of the Congress. It
mirrors the past and illuminates the fu-
ture.
It is the story of change?to master
change.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 1966.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE HON-
ORABLE OREN HARRIS
The SPEAKER laid before the House
the following communication from the
Honorable OREN HARRIS:
CONGRESS OF THE UN/TED STATE
HOUSE OF R3 TRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., Janua; 27, 1966.
Hon. JOHN W. MCCORMACK,
Speaker of the House of Repres ntativcs,
W ashing ton, D.C.
My DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I have the solemn
duty to inform you that I hal,c this day
transmitted to the Honorable Orval E. Fau-
bus, Governor of Arkansas, my resignation
as a Representative in the Coniress of the
United States from the Fourth District of
Arkansas, effective at the close of business
February 2, 1966.
Although I look forward to assuming a
new status in life as Federal judge of the
Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas,
it is with deep feeling that I leave the House
of Representatives. I am grateful for the
privilege of the association duriug my years
in this great institution. It has been a rich
and rewarding experience for Mn. Harris and
me, which we shall always cheri:h.
May the providence of God sustain you and
every Member throughout the ye.: rs ahead.
Humbly and gratefully. I remains always
Sincerely yours,
OREN 11.'qIRIS,
Member of Congress.
Enclosure.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATE:4,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTA IVES,
Washington, D.C., January 27, 1966.
HOD. ORVAL E. FAUDOS,
Governor, State of Arkansas,
Little Rock, Ark.
MY DEAR GOVERNOR: It is with mixed feel-
ings and a sense of pride that I hereby ten-
der to you my resignation as a Member of the
House of Representatives in the Congress
of the 'United States from the Fourth District
of Arkansas, effective at the clese of busi-
ness February 2, 1966. This is pursuant to
our understanding when I visited with you in
the hospital In Little Rock, De:icmber 21,
1965.
As you are aware. I will become 'U.S. dis-
trict judge for the Eastern and Western Dis-
tricts of Arkansas at 11 a.m. Thursday, Feb-
ruary 3, in my hometown, El Dorado, Ark.
I am humbly grateful for the special hon-
or and privilege of having served our State
and district in the Congress for these 25 years
and 1 month. It has been a joy to roe and
my family to have had the association dur-
ing these years, which we shall ever cherish.
I want to thank you for the courtesies you
have always extended to me, as well as the
cooperation in our efforts to serve the people
of our State of Arkansas.
With genuine respect and esteem, lam
Sincerely yours,
OREN HARRIS,
Member of Congress.
RESUMPTION OF BOMBING
IN NORTH VIETNAM
(Mr. CALLAWAY (at the request of
Mr. HALL) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
..........----"Arririrovedrdrftstea'strtf3eefllffIfrrCM*L
January 31, 1966
Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I com-
mend the President on his decision to
resume bombing over North Vietnam
feeling that under the circumstances,
this was the right and only choice to
make. This Nation sincerely warts
peace, but knows full well that appease-
ment is not the answer. Only throuoh
strength and firmness in the face of a ;-
gression can we truly achieve the peace
we seek, and therefore I am convne id
that this decision is a necessary and peal-
tive step toward winning the war. More-
over, this action is needed to back up the
efforts of our fighting men. I have long
said that in committing vast numbers of
troops to fight and die in Vietnam, we
are honor and duty bound to back them
up in every way we can. Let us hope that
this decision is only a first step towa
the full military backing needed to win
this war, and that it will be followed by a
further step?the closing of Haiphong--
that is so yital to victory in Asia.
No CUTRATE BENEFITS FOR OUR
VIETNAM VETERANS
(Mr. RANDALL asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and include extra-
neous matter.)
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, the
House Veterans' Affairs Committee faces
a large stack of bills that have been re-
cently introduced relating to proposed
benefits for what is improperly described
as our cold war veterans. In some re-
cent remarks on the floor of the How: e,
I urged upon the chairman and members
of that committee that the time had come
for more action and less talk both by the
committee and the Congress, to provide
too long delayed benefits for those who
are now serving in some hot spots of the
cold war.
Our Veterans' Affairs Committee has
a big job, if it does nothing more than
compare the provisions of more than 11'0
such bills already introduced in the 89th
Congress. Very few of these bills are
identical. They differ as to effectice
dates, eligibility, termination dates, and
the extent of benefits provided.
The several bills can be divided into
two general classes. First is a group of
bills that follow S. 9, sponsored by Sena-
tor Yanackaouax, which has already
passed the Senate and which would pro-
vide benefits for all veterans who serve
between January 31, 1955, and July 1,
1967, who have been released under con-
ditions other than dIshonorable and win
have served for a period of more than
130 days. Under this kind of bill, the
benefits for education and training would
be related to length of service. As a rule
of thumb, the formula for entitlement for
education and training would be 11/2 elay3
of schooling for each day served since
induction. In other words, 2 years of
service would earn the maximum of :36
months as a period of education or train-
ing to which an eligible veteran would be
entitled. Such a formula would seem to
be fair and equitable and even a lesser
formula which provides 1 day's education
-sr"
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 1481
for 1 day's service could not be the sub-
ject of strenuous objection.
Over in another category is a classifi-
cation of bills which generally follow
H.R. 1006 which provides only limited
benefits to persons serving in combat
zones after January 1, 1962. In other
words, benefits are limited under this
class of bills to those post-Korean vet-
erans who have served 90 days of active
duty in a combat zone. These proposals
are called the "hot spot" bills. The so-
called administration bills heretofore in-
troduced by request are described as lOw-
cost bills, in that they would limit the
cost to approximately $100 million for
the first year. The so-called high-priced
bills would require expenditures of up to
$275 million for the first year. These
would not be limited to education and
job training, but would include housing
benefits, hospital benefits, job counsel-
ing, placement rights, numerous other
readjustment benefits, including service-
connected compensation at wartime
rates, specially equipped automobiles for
those who have lost use of a limb, and
specially built homes designed for those
confined to a wheel chair.
As we observed at the beginning of
these remarks, it is the content or sub-
stance of these bills that is important
rather than any particular title that may
be affixed to any of them. Some are
called Combat Veterans Equalization
Benefits Act. Some are titled Cold War
Readjustment Assistance Act. Others
are called Vietnam Era Veterans Read-
justment Act. But, again, the name or
title is not nearly so important as the
provisions contained for eligibility and
the range of benefits granted.
Mr. Speaker, I do not think very much
argument is needed to underscore the
necessity that some sort of veterans
benefit bill for those now serving should
receive early approval. It should be a
bill which will contain comprehensive
veteran benefits. These thousands upon
thousands of our young Americans who
are subject to compulsory draft have
been required to interrupt their civilian
pursuits. They should receive benefits
comparable to those received by veterans
of World War II and the Korean conflict.
Yet, since January 31, 1955, which was
the cutoff date for eligibility under the
Korean GI bill, about the only assistance
the Federal Government has offered
these post-Korean veterans is unemploy-
ment compensation.
It is high time to right this inequitable
situation. Those who now serve in our
Armed Forces are being called upon to
share a disproportionate burden of citi-
zenship. While they serve, others near
their age go on preparing for occupa-
tional and professional careers. Enact-
ment of a bill providing for some benefits
is nothing more or less than an act of
justice toward those who are sacrificing
civilian gain for military duty.
Opponents abject to the cost. Those
who argue for a slowdown in domestic
spending contend that no new programs
should be begun, yielding high priority to
funding for Vietnam. Yet these same
persons forget that the cost of an edu-
cation and training program for today's
servicemen should properly be viewed as
just one of the necessary costs of the
current war. While on the subject of
the costs, there is a temptation to con-
sider such cost as an outlay that may
never be returned rather than an in-
vestment that will yield big returns. It
is true the original GI bill involved an
outlay of over $15 billion, yet it has since
been proven that this bill actually "cost"
the taxpayers nothing. It has been
demonstrated that it generated over $20
billion of new income and that those
who were educated, according to the
Census Bureau estimates, are now paying
an extra $1 billion a year in Federal in-
come taxes because of added earnings
directly traceable to their education
made possible by the GI bill.
On the 20th anniversary of the orig-
inal GI bill, which was called the Serv-
icemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,
statistics show this bill helped produce
460,000 engineers, 360,000 teachers, 197,-
000 in the health field, and 150,000 scien-
tists, as well as 699,000 in business ad-
ministration and 2,500,000 skilled crafts-
men in the trades and industrial pursuits.
If the figure of $1 billion a year in
new or additional income taxes paid be-
cause of the GI bill is correct, then on
the 20th anniversary of the bill, this
would mean $20 billion in new income
from the 7.8 million veterans who re-
ceived benefits of some kind.
Mr. Speaker, it is my intention to pre-
pare for immediate introduction a bill
which contains a range of benefits com-
parable to those provided for World
War II and Korean veterans. My bill
will propose more liberal eligibility pro-
visions than the combat or hot-spot bills,
with an effective date nearer the Korean
cutoff than most that have been thus far
submitted.
While it is understandable that greater
benefits should be provided for those
serving in "hot spots," it is very disap-
pointing that a program should be lim-
ited only to such veterans as the admin-
istration measure would propose. Re-
member, these young men had no con-
trol or choice over the area to which they
were assigned. Remember also we plan
to spend several billion more dollars on
our race to the moon. We have already
allocated over $11/2 billion for the anti-
poverty program. It has been an-
nounced we plan to continue our costly
foreign aid program. Then why is it
we cannot find a way to provide gen-
erous benefits to these young men who
are sent to support our foreign policy
and respect for our flag.
The question might well be asked, Is
it not wiser to spend national funds to
help a man receive an education than it
is to give him a relief check later as an
untrained and uneducated person who
cannot find a job? The burden of mili-
tary service does not fall on all alike.
The very least a grateful nation can do,
In my judgment, for these young vet-
erans who have lost time from their nor-
mal lives in order to serve their country,
is to provide benefits that they may equip
themselves to reenter the mainstream of
life and live as -Americans should?free,
productive, and self-supporting.
This Congress must meet its respon-
sibility to our returning veterans as
earlier Congresses have done. The time
has come for less talk and more action.
Now is the time to get on with the job
of passing a good GI bill. Above all, let
us pass a bill that is not a cutrate piece
of legislation, watered down by admin-
istration proposals to omit home or farm
loan provisions and omit also on-the-job
or on-the-farm training provisions.
May there be no radical departure from
the time-hondred philosophy expressed
in the previous GI bills which provided
generous benefits for a man's willingness
to put his life on the line for his Nation.
FEDERAL ACTION NEEDED TO
CRACK DOWN ON HIGHWAY
DEATHS
The SPEAKER. Under previous or-
der of the House, the gentleman from
New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized
for 10 minutes.
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, it was
my privilege to serve for 7 years as chair-
man of the New York State Joint Legis-
lative Committee on Motor Vehicle
Safety, and I am heartened to see that
the programs we initiated then, such as
the driver education program, have
served as models for many other States
But there is a clear need for Federal
action in this area, too, and if we want
to make the 89th Congress a truly his-
toric session, we must enact legislation
to eliminate the carnage on our high-
ways.
There is a definite need for a Federal
role here, for if ever there was an in-
terstate instrument it is the automobile.
Clearly, action at the national level is
needed to effectively supplement State
efforts. I have introduced legislation
to provide a comprehensive Federal pro-
gram to attack the mass murder on our
roads which claims the lives of 1,000
Americans every week. And I urge my
colleagues to join in solving this appal-
ling and ever mounting problem.
My bill, H.R. 9629, is a broad measure
designed to provide the States with the
Federal assistance they require. The
bill establishes a traffic safety center
in the Department of Commerce and
assigns it the responsibility for coordi-
nating all Federal and State efforts
toward mitigating traffic accidents. It
provides incentives for States to estab-
lish and improve motor vehicle inspec-
tion and driver education programs;
promotes research and development nec-
essary for the production of safer cars;
and lays the groundwork for standardiz-
ing minimum safety requirements, traffic
control devices, accident reporting and
driver licensing. In addition, the bill
would create an Advisory Council on
Highway Traffic Safety, consisting of ex-
perts in the field, to assist in drafting of
national standards.
This legislation is a companion bill to
S. 2231, introduced in the Senate by Sen-
ator RisicoFF?a great leader in the
cause of traffic safety?and cosponsored
by Senators BARTLETT, LONG Of Missouri,
MONDALE and TYDINGS. I think that the
need for Federal action in this area,
which we have recognized and advocated,
has been clearly corroborated by the in-
tensive investigation of the American
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1482 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE
Trial Lawyers' Association. I can highly
commend to my colleagues, and to all
who are concerned with this problem, the
Association's excellent study, "Stop Mur-
der by Motor," which was just released
this month. I salute the Association's
President, Mr. Joseph K nner, for this
outstanding example- of public service,
in this critical area. And I strongly
urge the House Public Works Committee
and the Senate Commerce Committee to
schedule early hearings on this im-
portant legislation.
One simply cannot exaggerate the
havoc and the human misery wrought
by traffic accidents. More Americans
have been killed on our highways in the
last 25 years-1,510,000?than have died
in all the wars from the Revolution un
to Vietnam-605,000. In 1964 alone, 1.7
million Americans were injured in traffic
accidents--precisely the same number as
the total hospital beds in the entire
United States. Latest statistics show
that last year's deaths on U.S. highways
totaled over 50,000. These ever-grow-
ing figures are outrageous, but they are
starkly realistic and something must be
done about it. The time for bold and
forward-looking action is long overdue,
and we must not lose any time in making
an all-out attack on the highway death
toll.
The National Highway Traffic Safety
Center, which my bill seeks to establish,
would work with the States in develop-
ing adequate standards of vehicle safety,
strict licensing and inspection require-
ments, and driver education programs
for secondary schools. In 1962-63, only
60 percent of our public schools offered
driver education programs, and only 24
States provided financial support to these
programs. When one considers that
about 8,000 children of secondary school
age reach driving age daily, I think it be--
comes clear that a more determined ef-
fort is required to afford them the in-
struction they need and deserve.
In addition, the Federal Government
must take the lead in establishing uni-
form safety standards for automobiles,
as it has for airplanes and trains. The
recent contribution of $10 million by the
auto industry, to the Highway Safety Re-.
search Institute at the University of
Michigan, evidences its recognition of
the fact that more work needs to be done
in the promotion of motor vehicle safety.
Senator GAYLORD NELSON has observed
that 87 percent of all accidents occur at,
speeds of 35 miles per hour and below,
and that countless lives could be saved
each year if cars were equipped with
such modest devices as collapsible steer-
ing columns, shoulder harnesses, and
doors which would remain closed in a
crash. Senator NELSON has long and
actively sponsored legislation to promote
the production of safer cars, and I be-
lieve that his bills, too, represent the
kind of responsible, progressive action
which is needed at the Federal level.
Mr. Speaker, there is obviously no
panacean solution to this grievous prob-
lem, but a number of excellent measures
have been introduced in this Congress,
all of which take cognizance of the need
for imaginatively conceived and vigor-
ously implemented Federal action. The
;.*r _?.
Fur 1i
need for Federal action is clear beyond
doubt; the nature of this action may re-
quire more precise delineation. I believe,
however, that my bill and those intro-
duced in the Senate, go a long way to-
ward defining the role which the Federal
Government should be playing, and are
specific and thoughtful enough to war-
rant the immediate attention of the ap-
propria committees.
VIETNAM?LET US CLOSE THE
CREDIBILITY GAP
The SPEAKER. Under previous
order of the House, the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] is recognized for
20 minutes.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, leaks from
the White House?the principal source
of information these past weeks on de-
velopments in Vietnam?indicated last
week that the administration planned to
return to the policy of bombing selected
targets in North Vietnam. Tho public
relations campaign for this reversal of
policy got underway with a conference
at the White House between administra-
tion policymakers and leaders of the Con-
gress followed by the announcement
from anonymous informed sources that
most congressional leaders "are taking
a harder position than when they went
home aftcr the last session."
Some reports suggest that American
troop strength in Vietnam will be more
than doubled and could exceed by 60 per-
cent or more the number of troops sent
by this Nation to Korea.
Mr. Speaker, I worry?as do our col-
leagues on both sides of the ais1---about
the conduct of this tragic war in Viet-
nam--about the unexplained shifts of
policy, the starting and stopping of
bombing in the North, the failure to
make any real progress after the com-
mitment of 200,000 American troojps, the
uncertainty about our objectives, the
failure to divulge information which
those who sacrifice in this war have a
right to be told, and the gap between
what they are told and reality.
After the decision was made to escalate
this war on the ground, along with others
of both major parties, I have made pub-
lic suggestions such as a Kennedy-type
quarantine of North Vietnam. My pur-
pose, whenever I have made such policy
suggestions, has been to urge a course
that would safeguard the freedom and
independence of South Vietnam with a
minimum loss of American lives. No one
can argue against a policy that would
value the lives of our gallant servicemen
so highly that not one soldier, not one
sailor, nor one airman would be unneces-
sarily sacrificed. I hope and pray that
the administration will seek to minimize
American casualties in southeast Asia.
On this point serious doubts have been
expressed by responsible public spokes-
men. For example, former Air Force
Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis LeMay, on
October 22, 1965, is reported to have
said that U.S. actions in Vietnam up to
that time "were getting people killed who
Should not be killed." More recently, re-
liable newsmen on the scene in South
Vietnam have been reporting that the
cessation of air attacks on the North has
DFAS 7
January 31, 1966
given the enemy the opportunity to in-
crease and strengthen significantly the
forces against which American troops
will be fighting.
One columnist, Joseph Alsop, writing
from Saigon in a column published on
January 26, 1966, in the Washing ton
Post, reports:
The pause for the peace offensive has al-
lowed all the worst damage to be repaired,
new defenses to be moved into place, and
huge forward stockages to be built up for
added pressure on the south. Thus most
of the fruits of the hard effort or the last
8 months have now been thrown away.
Worse still, however, has been what meg
be called the morale loss in the north. It 1'3
a truism that just as the South Vietnamese
build their hopes on confidence in America's
strength of will, so the North Vietnanacce
build all their hopes on the belief that Amer-
ica lacks the strength of will to survive the
present test, Every Vietnamese expert in
the service of the U.S. Government agrees
on this point.
Every sign indicates that the peace offen-
sive has strongly bolstered this North Viet-
namese belief that they can count on vic-
tory in the end, because the United tSates
is basically weak willed.
Their main response to the peace offensive
has been to push into South Vietnam, with
much aid from the bombing pause, more
and more of 'North Vietnamese regular troops
So many are now present in the South that
they add up to a major invasion.
When the country is at war with 200,000
troops in the field, the only serious consid-
eration should be the gains and losses in
the war. And as far as the war is con-
cerned, the balance sheet shows no gain and
much loss.
The Secretary of Defense has acknowl-
edged the serious military loss for the
United States and South Vietnam result-
ing from the removal of any effective
military Pressure on North Vietnam. He
asserts, however, that "these military
penalties are a small cost to pay because
the United f3tates is achieving the goal. of
showing the world that we want peace."
He does not tell us in specific terms
what the gains and benefits have been so
that we can judge whether they are in
fact adequate compensation for increased
American casualties. They have not
been enough to lead any additional na-
tions?even among our SEATO allies?
to send a division or even a company to
fight with American and South Vietna-
mese troops. These gains have not cut
off the flow of goods carried on ships fly-
ing the flags of our allies to North Viet-
nam. What concretely have we gained
by the so-called peace offensive? What
fore7gn nation that opposed the policy of
the United States before the peace offen-
sive is now ready to endorse it?
Mr. Speaker, all Americans earnestly,
ardently want peace. There are no war-
hawks here. The warhawks are in Ha-
noi, Peiping, and Moscow. To attain
peace without abject surrender of South
Vietnam to the Communists, our enemies
must want peace. Any reading of the
latest Mansfield report would convince
one that Hanoi and Peiping do not want
peace now except under terms similar to
the Laos agreement.
Although the Constitution expressly
confers on the Congress the power to de-
004 4
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 1483
clare war and although this Nation is in
fact at war?as the President has said?
the Congress today finds itself unable to
provide even useful advice to the admin-
istration because it does not know enough
of the facts needed to form valid judg-
ments.
For 2 years, the press has been predict-
ing a great debate in Congress on Viet-
nam. There has been none. Epithets
such as "McNamara's war," "hawks,"
and "doves" have been heard in the Con-
gress, but little calm and reasoned de-
bate. The debate, such as it is, has gone
on in teach-ins and demonstrations,
often by uninformed people substituting
publicity gimmicks for logic.
It is time for this long-deferred debate
to get underway in the Congress. Now,
as policy is again changed, is the appro-
priate hour.
Mr. Speaker, the debate will be con-
structive and informed only if it is be-
gun with a full report from the President
clearly and specifically stating the Na-
tion's current objectives in Vietnam, re-
viewing the conduct of the war so far,
and presenting the facts which argue for
and against the various courses of policy
now open to the Nation in Vietnam.
Perhaps the debate should be stimulated
by a new congresisonal resolution on
Vietnam.
The need for a report from the Presi-
dent to the Nation is clear to anyone
who has read the report on Vietnam by
a group of 'U.S. Senators headed by the
distinguished majority leader of that
body. This group made its tour of south-
east Asia and conducted its study at the
request of the President. Its report to
the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate has been issued under the title,
"The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance
and the Shadow."
Senator MANSFIELD, who has made
several earlier trips to Vietnam, thought-
fully included in this report as an ap-
pendix the report which he and another
group of Senators made after completing
a similar mission 3 years ago.
This latest Mansfield report has re-
ceived much attention in the press. Its
conclusions have been characterized
rightly as grim. It concludes by report-
ing:
The situation, as it now appears, offers
only the very slim prospect of a just set-
tlement by negotiations or the alternative
prospect of a continuance of the conflict in
the direction of a general war on the Asian
mainland.
It offers little hope of a satisfactory
peace by negotiations and finds "the
only visible alternative" to be "the indefi-
nite expansion and intensification of the
war which will require continuous in-
troduction of additional U.S. forces."
I am surprised that this somber assess-
ment has not stirred more alarm than
it has. I am equally surprised that the
administration has expressed no opinion
on the conclusions of this report. If it
Is an accurate assessment, I cannot un-
derstand the failure of the administra-
tion to alert the Nation to these grave
dangers before they were reported by
Senator MANSFIELD'S delegation. If it
is an inaccurate assessment, it is incum-
bent on the administration to correct its
errors.
The Mansfield report, if ,sound in its
conclusions, is a -more stinging indict-
ment of the administration than any
which I have encountered.
A comparison of this latest Mansfield
report with its predecessor of 3 years ago
indicates that substantial Communist
gains took place between the start of 1963
and early 1965. On February 25, 1963,
Senator MANSFIELD offered this appraisal
of the outlook in South Vietnam:
Success was predicted to the group almost
without exception by responsible Americans
and Vietnamese, in terms of a year or two
hence. The word "success" is not easy to de-
fine in a situation such as exists in South
Vietnam. n would mean, at the least, a
reduction of the guerrillas to the point where
they would no longer be a serious threat to
the stability of the Republic. If that point
is reached, road and rail communications
would once again become reasonably safe.
Local officials would no longer live in con-
stant fear of assassination. Rice and other
major commodities would again move in vol-
ume to the cities. Development throughout
the nation would be feasible. In short, the
situation in South Vietnam would become
roughly similar to that which eventually
emerged in Malaya, and it is significant that
a good deal of the present planning in South
Vietnam is based upon the Malayan experi-
ence.
While such a situation would fall far short
of the development of a bastion in South
Vietnam, as the objective has been described
on occasion, it would, nevertheless, be ade-
quate to the survival of free Vietnam. It
would not necessarily permit any great re-
duction in U.S. aid to the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment for some years, but it would, at least,
allow for a substantial reduction in the di-
rect support which American forces are now
providing to Vietnamese defense.
Although the 1963 report expresses
some caution about the "rapid accom-
plishment" of these goals, they were
clearly in sight.
What a contrast is the 1966 report. It
describes the situation in South Vietnam
early in 1965 as "near desperate." It
goes on to say:
After the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem,
repeated coups had weakened the cohesive-
ness of the central authority and acted to
stimulate public disaffection and indifference
to the war. At the same time, there was a
greatly accelerated military drive by
strengthened Vietcong forces. Their control
expanded over large areas of the country, par-
ticularly in provinces adjacent to the western
borders. Communications and transporta-
tion between population center8 became in-
creasingly hazardous, except by Vietcong
sufferance. In short, a total collapse of the
Saigon government's authority appeared im-
minent in the early months of 1965.
At present, after the commitment of
200,000 American troops, the Mansfield
renort declares:
The overall control of the country remains
about the same as it was at the beginning
of 1965.
Mr. Speaker, I have called this Mans-
field report an indictment of the admin-
istration. For example, during the pe-
riod when the optimistic hopes of South
Vietnam were dashed and the situation
became desperate, there was no frank
statement from administration leaders
informing the public of the disaster.
The administration did not revise its
prediction of October 1963 that Ameri-
can troops would be withdrawn by the
end of 1965. The dominant theme of
Presidential utterances was that the
United States would not widen the war,
and would not send American troops to
do fighting that Asian troops should do.
The Secretary of State assured the public
that our plans "pointed the way to vic-
tory" and that there was "steady im-
provement" in South Vietnam.
In January 1965, when according to
the Mansfield group the Saigon govern-
ment was near "total collapse," the
President delivered his state of the Union
message assuring the Congress that
things had improved so much on the in-
ternational scene that "today we can
turn increased attention to the charac-
ter of American life."
Vietnam received only 140 words in
the 1965 state of the Union message, and
none of them had the tone of urgency.
This year the state of the Union mes-
sage, though wordier about Vietnam,
was again completely devoid of any in-
formation about the progress of the war.
In short, the administration has not
been candid with the American people.
When Ambassador Goldberg publicly
acknowledges that a "crisis of credibil-
ity" hampers the administration, it is
clear that something is seriously wrong
with the administration's public infor-
mation program. There is nothing
wrong, however, that candor will not
correct.
Let me suggest some of the questions
to which the administration should now
give frank answers:
First. What facts support Secretary
McNamara's recent statement, "We have
stopped losing the war"? When were
we losing it and when did the change
take place?
Second. How much, and in what ways,
did the bombing of North Vietnam be-
tween February and December of 1965
impede the military and economic ac-
tivity of the enemy?
Third. What is the balance sheet in
concrete terms of the peace offensive
and the bombing pause? What advan-
tages and what losses have resulted or
will result for the United States and
South Vietnam?
Fourth. To what degree are the mili-
tary and economic efforts of North Viet-
nam sustained by goods brought in by
sea? What flags do the ships involved
fly?
Fifth. Would the administration agree
to an end to hostilities on the basis of
an agreement like that which was
reached on Laos in 1962, giving Com-
munists a place in a coalition govern-
ment and a veto in the commission es-
tablished to supervise the execution of
the agreement?
Mr. Speaker, these are some of the
questions that cry to be answered pub-
licly and authoritatively. With this in-
formation the Congress and the public
could better judge the effectiveness and
wisdom of past administration policy and
aid the administration in moving wisely
in the future.
Unless there is a full report to the Na-
tion on Vietnam, the administration will
find it increasingly difficult to hold the
support and the confidence of the public.
VIETNAM PROBLEM
(Mr. WOLFF (at the request of Mr.
HITNGATE) was granted permission to ex-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE January 31, 1966
tend his remarks at this point in the REC-
ORD and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. WC)LFF. Mr. Speaker, this is a
sad day indeed.
The acknowledgement that all our ef-
forts toward peace have been of no avail,
and that a resumption of the bombing of
North Vietnam has been ordered, is a
serious blow to those of us who have
urged an exhaustive exploration of every
possible chance for negotiations.
However, at long last, we have overtly
moved toward the United Nations. This
has been the recommendation of many of
us in Congress. As recently as 2 weeks
ago many of my colleagues and I sent a
letter to the President urging him to put
this problem before the U.N. Now that
move has been made. Let us pray that
this international body will bring under-
standing from the chaos and that we will
see an end to the killing and wanton de-
struction wrought by this dreadful war.
Let us hope, as well, that all other im-
pediments to peace are swept aside and
that all parties to the war?Pecping,
Hanoi, the National Liberation Front,
and South Vietnam?are brought to the
peace table so that a lasting peace will
ensue. For this is what we seek?a peace
that will be secured by a mutual under-
standing that brute force and aggression
does not solve problems, but creates
them.
Never before in times of adversity has
there been as much divergence of opinion
within our citizenry. We must insure
that which we fought for in Vietnam--
true freedom?by enlisting the support of
all Americans in common purpose. I
speak for my constituency who truly seek
peace and are concerned lest even the
slightest avenue be overlooked.
As an individual Member of Congress,]:
have made three separate trips to Viet-
nam at my own expense to gather as fully
as possible the facts necessary to sustain
informed judgment and appraisal. I
have attended weekly briefings by State
and Defense Department officials and
joined with his Holiness Pope Paul in
calling for a Christmas truce. I have
been in constant touch with the Presi-
dent, urging that all efforts be extended
In exploring every possible avenue to
peace. I have in progress a survey of the
opinion of the residents of my district to
guide me in representing them before the
Congress. I have held four town meet-
ings so that the people in my district can
directly communicate their views to me.
There is no door closed between my con-
stituency and my office for residents to
articulate their views in guiding me.
This is the way it must be in a democ-
racy?and this same procedure must be
followed between our various branches of
Government to honestly interpret the
views of the people of this Nation.
I have made numerous appeals in Con-
gress and have joined my colleagues to
bring reason to bear before precipitous
action, just as today I am again calling
for a concurrence and full debate by the
House before further escalations are
made and that the 1934 resolution passed
by Congress is not a continuing mandate
but one that requires constant review
with changing circumstances and condi-
tions. For many, including myself, are
tml-RIPIRMISIMEMBINIIIIMIMPOWNIIIIMMI.-11.1,1,11-011.1trynTIMettrIfItyrRiet
not aware of the full facts involved in ar-
riving at decisions of the greatest im-
portance to our people.
I am gratified to learn from the Presi-
dent's statement that determined efforts
will continue to explore all possible roads
to peace.
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
(Mr. DADDARIO (at the request of
Mr. HUNGATE) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include els traneous
matter.) ?
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, during
the past 15 months, through its Subcom-
mittee on Science, Research, and Da-
velopment, the Science and Astronautics
Committee has conducted a review of the
National Science Foundation. That ac-
tivity has resulted in a report entitled
"The National Science Foundation: Its
Present and Future," which is now sub-
mitted to this body as a House report.
The main thrust of the report i.s sim-
ple. It is based on the premise that a
large portion of our Nation's welfare in
the future rests with science and tech-
nology?and that a more active and
stronger Foundation will be necessary if
we are to secure that welfare.
The report itself is relatively complex
and sophisticated, if for no other reason
than that it is dealing with complex and
sophisticated matters. Hence, it at-
tempts to describe some of the back-
ground of government-science relation-
ships and to highlight the current extent
and nature of these relationships as a
basis for its rationale. Indeed, our sub-
committee spent months in studying
these facets before it ever began hear-
ings, and the hearings in turn were car-
ried on over a period of 7 week;.
This is the first general legislative re-
view of the National Science Foundation
since it was founded more than 15 years
ago. It is natural that within that pe-
riod, during a time when there bas been
more concentrated scientific growth than
in any other period of our history,
changes have occurred which demand
our attention and compel us to close
examination and recommendations in
keeping with the shifting scene.
There can be no doubt about the im-
portance of the National Science Foun-
dation in a world which looks to us for
leadership. The Vice Presidcnt, the
Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREV, placed
this in a most succinct perspective the
other day when he addressed the Com-
mittee's Panel on Science and Technol-
ogy. He pointed out that the exporta-
tion of knowledge and know-how was as
important as the exportation of capital
in relieving the critical needs of the
the world. This is a proposition with
which few will argue.
We believe that this report contains
important suggestions for strengthening
the National Science Foundation so that
it may fulfill its unique role in the de-
velopment and growth of knowledge.
We face a challenge in too many fields to
enumerate where only knowledge can
provide solutions.
I commend this report to my col-
leagues for their study.
INDEPENDENT BANKERS OPPOSE
GRAB BY CHASE MANHATTAN
BANK TO FURTHER CENTRALIZE
BANKING IN NEW YORK STATE
AND FURTHER WEAKEN THE
DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
(Mr. PATMAN (at the request of Mr.
HUNGATE) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, what with
a half dozen or more giant banks in New
York with assets exceeding $1 billion, as
well as a long history of holding company
operations, it is not inaccurate to say that
banking in the State of New York is tend-
ing more and more toward superconcen-
tration and eventual monopoly.
By at least two separate rulings from.
his Office, Comptroller of the Currency
Saxon has given permission for Chase
Manhattan Bank, NA., a $11 billion
financial behemoth, to acquire the stock
of the Liberty National Bank & Trust Co.,
of Buffalo, itself with assets of over one-
third of a billion dollars.
The Independent Bankers Association
of America is opposing this shocking and
disturbing move by Chase in the hopes
that independent banking and free com-
petition may not be further eroded in
New York State.
Following is the association's brief in
opposition to Chase Manhattan's appli-
cation under the New York holding com-
pany law:
NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT?
APPLICATION OF CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,
NA., PURSUANT TO SECTION 142(1) (b) OF
TITE BANKING LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK FOR PRIOR APPROVAL, TO ACQUIRE AT
LEAST 80 PERCENT OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF
LIBERTY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COM-
PANY OF BUFFALO?BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
APPLICATION BY INDEPENDENT BANKERS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
To the Banking Board of the State of New
York:
The Independent Bankers Association of
America appreciates this opportunity ex-
tended by your chairman, Mr. Prank Wine, to
present its views in this brief in opposition to
this application. The association has a mem-
bership of more than 6,300 banks, including
107 in New York State.
In its 35 years of existence, the IBAA has
stood for the preservation of competition In
banking and against the devises which lead
to concentration in banking.
Our association and the Independent Bank-
ers Association of the 12th Federal Reserve
District were active in securing enactment
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
The IBAA opposes the acquisition pro-
posed in this application became if approved
it could become a pattern for expansion of
the power of large banks not only in N(.'W
York State but throughout the country.
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
Section 142(1) (f) states among other fac-
tors, that "the banking board shall take into
consideration * * * primarily, the public in-
terest and the needs and convenience there-
of." This factor would appear to exhort the
board to view this proposal in the light of
its impact upon banking customers, not
merely the interest of the banks involved;
in the light of the impact upon the economy
of a repetition of such proposals, not merely
the effect these may have on the banking
structure of the future.
The proposal in this application concerns
two national banks and Involves a device
7Bee,4,46
00
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 1489
ever, interest rates are too high and loans too
restrictive. We are fully in support of the
efforts of Congressman WRIGHT PATMAN,
chairman of the House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee, to draft legislation to give
Congress a voice in monetary policy now in
almost complete control of the Federal Re-
serve Board.
PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST
IN I'LREST RATE INCREASES
(Mr. PATMAN (at the request of Mr.
lItiNcArE) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
REnOals and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, Federal
Reserve Board's action raising interest
rates on December 3 shocked the entire
Nation.
The people were appalled at the ability
of a bare majority of the Federal Reserve
to completely thumb its nose at the Presi-
dent and to take action to slow down or
destroy much of the Great Society pro-
gram.
Much of the dismay and deep concern
over the Federal Reserve's arrogant ac-
tion was reflected in the Nation's press.
Many columnists spoke out eloquently
against the action. In particular, I
commend to my colleagues the following
articles from the Washington Post and
the New York Times:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 12,
19651
litEn INDEPENDF.NCE WORRIED .7.F .K.
(By Hobart Rowen)
At the Democratic Convention in Los An-
geles in 1960, one question that worried can-
didate John F. Ketinedy's advisers was how
can we handle Federal Reserve Chairman
William Me.Chesney Martin if he balks at the
New Frontier program?
tnasmuch as the Eisenhower years had
been dominated by Martin's tight money
policy, the Kennedy men assumed that some
drastic measures might be in order.
With the brashness of Inexperience, some
of the Kennedy "rnalia" suggested that Mar-
tin be fired, outright. Bt others in the brain
trust evolved a more complicated and the-
oretically more practical plan for a super co-
ordinating committee, similar to the Na-
eional Security Council, which would estab-
lish a uniform economic policy.
When publicized, the plan agitated the
banking and business communities. But
Mr, Kennedy abandoned this awkward
scheme for the simple reason that Martin
not try to run a course independent of
the White :House. Like Mr. Kennedy's own
economic advisers, Martin was concerned by
eavy unemployment and idle plants.
And while he never fostered a money
policy as easy as Representative WR/GHT
Parmasi would have desired he didn't return
to the automatic tight money posture of the
Eisenhower days. So no club was needed,
and Martin joined amiably with three other
key presidential advisers in what has become
known as the "qundriad."
All of this is relevant because the divided
eciirse that Mr. Kennedy's advisers feared in
lee? has finally come to pass-5 years later?
under President Johnson, The President,
,isoligh mindful of economic factors that
hld an inflationary potential, doesn't think
the time has come to pat on tile brakes.
;stertin, on the other hand, convinced by
the opposite analysis, hns moved to tighten
Hirmey, so as to head off inflationary prices
"before they have become full blown and the
damage has been done."
The upshot is that a coordinated monetary
and fiscal policy, so successful since 1961. is
shattered?for the moment, anyway.
No one yet knows what really will hap-
pen, because much will depend on just how
much credit the Federal Reserve feeds into
the banking system.
The Fed can tighten up the supply of
money by selling securities on the open mar-
ket. That drains money from the banks?
money they otherwise could lend.
The Fed, on the other hand, can increase
the money supply by buying securities, thus
pumping cash into the banks.
When the Fed raised the discount rate
last weekend it underscored this part of
Its announcement: "'The action contemplates,
however, the continued provision of addi-
tional reserves to the banking system, in
amounts sufficient to meet seasonal preseures
as well as the credit needs of an expo riding
economy without promoting inflationary
pressures,"
This has been confusing to some people.
H the Fed's game is to slow down the
economy, why does it raise interest rates on
the one hand, but insist that it will provide
additional reserves? It seems, at first Mush,
to be a meaningless exercise in which the
amount of money remains the same?bat at
higher coet to everyone, to the pleasure of
no one but the banks.
The rationale of the majority at the Fed is
that the higher rate will choke off mine
marginal plans for business expansion. But
in view of the escalating Vietnam war, the
relatively small increase in the cost of bor-
rowing isn't likely to deter many business-
men.
A spot check of economists in Washington
doesn't suggest that the new forecast for
skyrocketing plant and equipment spending
next year will be seriously affected by higher
interest rates.
One possible explanation for the seeming
paradox is that bank reserves will nor. in
reality be as ample as the Fed has promised.
The level of additional credit needed for "an
expanding economy" will probably be less
by Martin's definition than it would be by
the administration's definition.
This is the problem that the President
will have to consider as he resumes the 5-
year-old search for ways to box Martin in.
I suggest hi:3 best route is through a gradual
realine:ment of the Federal Reserve struc-
ture.
Be might, for example, recall the 1961
recommendation of the highly respected
Commission on Money and Credit, which
suggested cutting the number of FRB Gov-
ernors from seven to five, and limiting the
term of each from 14 to 10 years, with one
expiring every odd-numbered year. This
would give a President a steady stream of
his own appointments to the Board.
The 2-year gap which now exists between
the beginning of a presidential term and
the 4-year term of the FRB Chairman should
also be eliminated. (Martin himself agrees
that it was only a legislative accident that
failed to synchronize these terms.) What-
ever the mechanics, Ways must be found to
coordinate the role of the central bank with
the rest of the Government. Any other
course makes no sense.
[From the New York Times, Dec. 13, 19651
WHAT ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE?
(By /VI. J. Rossant)
If past performance is a guide, the Join t
Economic Committee's new investigation of
Federal Reserve-Administration relations will
get bogged down debating the pros and cone
of the latest policy decision of the money
managers, neglecting the far more impor-
tant Issue of whether the latter should be
making their decisions independently.
Money, of course, cannot manage itself; so
the critical question is who should do the
managing. At the moment the independent
Federal Reserve has both critics and defend-
ers. There are some who disagree with what
the money managers did but, like Voltaire,
defend its right to have done it. There are
others who think it did the right thing but
deplore its acting unilaterally.
ROLE OF THE MANAGERS
The champions of independence for the
Federal Reserve argue that this is the only
way to insure sound policy. Encouraged by
Its decision to part company at long last
with the Johnson administration, they point
out that continued coordination would clear-
ly have been unsound. In this view, the
money managers must be like judges, isolated
from politicians and political pressures in
carrying out their responsibilities.
The Federal Reserve is a creation of Con-
gress, but it has the right to act independ-
ently of both the legislative and executive
branches, Yet its control over the Nation's
money supply?Its ability to create or ex-
tinguish credit?is so powerful an economic
weapon that it may well be too important to
be left to the money managers.
This was not the case in the days when
the Federal Reserve was first established.
Then it was responsible only for price stabili-
zation. Then too the executive branch took
the view that it had no business interfering
with the vagaries of the business cycle.
Today, the Federal Reserve is committed
to promote full employment and economic
expansion in addition to price stability.
What is more, the White House has respon-
sibility, as well as formidable weapons of its
own, for maintaining prosperity. so there
is a strong case for integrating the flexible
restraint of monetary policy with the blunter
weapons of fiscal policy.
Some critics in fact call for complete coor-
dination. They do not think that the Fed-
eral Reserve should be considered as a su-
preme court of economic policy, with what
amounts to a veto power over the party in
power. Instead, they argue that the Presi-
dent, who is charged with formulating overall
economic policy and is answerable to the
electorate, must not be thwarted by a small
group of men shielded from the public.
During his long reign as head of the Fed-
eral Reserve, William McChesney Martin, Jr.,
has generally been prepared to compromise,
aware that the adoption of too independent a
position, might endanger his freedom of ac-
tion. He has often sounded as if he were at
odds with the President, but his bark has
been far worse than his bite. In failing to
act as independently as he talked, Mr. Martin
has guaranteed his own survival?and that
of the Federal Reserve. And precisely be-
cause he has been accommodating, it is prob-
able that his present failing out of step, while
dramatic, may be only temporary.
THE BANK'S POWER
Even if it is, and even if it was the right
thing to do, the Federal Reserve has demon-
strated that it has the means to throw a
monkey wrench into the plans of the White
House. Many who are not on the Johnson
administration's side, question whether such
freedom is desirable in a democracy.
The most potent argument against giving
increased authority to the executive branch is
that it would encourage inflation as it did
after World War II, when the money man-
agers increased the money supply at the
behest of the Treasury.
But the Federal Reserve then was under no
compulsion to do so. It could have refused
to cooperate, as it finally did. Indeed there
seems to be a far greater risk of swinging
from defiance to subservience under its pres-
ent status than if the Federal Reserve had a
closer relationship with the White House?
by permitting the President to choose his
own chairman and by setting up an economic
general staff with a place for the Federal
Reserve.
,seaetes,eese *011,',11 AM* 10 OM ,1104,40,40 '004110.110191IMP4' q5,14111600 MOM, MV.1.0*4.11.04,11Pnvomi womti,r miNo ntimonoW101...witemarmmna
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1490
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE January 31, 1966
POLITICAL CONTROL
With such an arrangement, the money
managers might be less inclined to disruptive
talk and more to effective action. If they
were a recognized part of an economic gen-
eral staff, they might be more successful in
making their presence felt in the inner circle
of policymaking.
Some authorities believe that political con-
trol might result in greater freedom for the
Federal Reserve as well as smoother coordi-
nation of economic policies. But if It did
not, if limiting its independence resulted in
mere subservience on the part of the Federal
Reserve and unsound policies for the econ-
omy, the Nation's voters would at least be
able to fix the blame.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 7,
1965)
THE PEP JUMPS TILE Gust
By raising the discount rate in advance of
a scheduled meeting of the Government's
policymaking quadriad, the Federal Re-
serve Board has underscored the danger of
investing power over monetary policy in an
independent agency.
There are legitimate grounds for differences
of opinion over the need for less stimulative
policies, as Treasury Secretary Fowler
pointed out in his New Orleans speech. But
inflationary pressures can be combatted by
fiscal as well as monetary measures. What
the Fed has done with its gun-jumping deci-
sion, taken in advance of a thorough analysis
of next year's budget, is to deprive the ad-
ministration of the freedom that it requires
in order to conduct an effective economic
policy.
If one could accept at face value the
Board's claim that it win continue to supply
the banking system with sufficient reserves
to meet the needs of an expanding economy,
the boost in the discount rate and the up-
ward drift of interest rates in the money
markets might not be so serious. But the
day-to-day implementation of Fed policy Is
in the hands of the Federal Open Market
Committee (POMC), a body that includes
five presidents of the District Federal Reserve
banks as well as the seven Governors of the
Federal Reserve Board. Since the bank presi-
dents are insulated from the authority of
both Congress and the White House, the
FOMC is free to pursue restrictive policies
that may be sharply at variance with the
aims of the administration.
President Johnson will be able to redress
the balance on the Federal Reserve Board
when the term of Vice Chairman Balderston
expires in January, and a second opportunity
will come in 2 years with the expiration of
the partial term of Governor Daane. But
these moves may not affect the unbridled
power of the FOMC.
If Congress is to discharge its constitu-
tional responsibility for controlling the
money supply, if monetary policies are to be
coordinated with the other economic policies
of the Federal Government, the following
reforms will be needed. The term of the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
should be made coterminous with that of the
President, a proposal that has been endorsed
by Chairman Martin. The inordinately long,
14-year terms of the Governors should be re-
duced to 5. And, finally, responsiveness to
the wishes of the electorate should be insured
by limiting the membership of the FOMC to
the seven appointed Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board.
Congress would never entertain the notion
of delegating its fiscal power to an independ-
ent agency, and by the same logic it should
not surrender its control over the money sup-
ply. Power over monetary policy, for better
or worse, should be invested with the incum-
ment administration. The Board's action,
the end of which is not yet in sight, exposes
the pitfalls of an anomalous system in which
the Presidents' ability to shape economic
policy is sharply attenuated.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 8,
1965]
FOXES IN L.B.J.'s HENHOUSE
(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)
Soon after Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded
to the Presidency, he received this private
advice from one of his most influential ad-
visers: No domestic problem will be tougher
than controlling Bill Martin.
The full impact of this prophecy fell last
weekend like a sledgehammer.
The decision of the Federal Reserve Board,
under Chairman William McChesney Martin,
to boost interest rates was President John-
son's worst political setback. Not only does
further tightening of money threaten eco-
nomic expansion, but the bold defiance of
his wishes is a severe blow to the President's
prestige.
This question then arises: Why could a
President who tamed Congress, big labor and
big business not tame Martin?
The answer: The cherished independence
of the Federal Reserve Bank is all but un-
assailable. Moreover, Treasury Secretary
Henry H. Fowler's year-long strategy of ap-
peasing Martin by avoiding an open rupture
all these months was perhaps less successful
than a frontal assault on the Fed.
The Federal Reserve Board?acting as the
national bankers' bank?is a deviation in the
otherwise symmetrical American system.
Martin, a nonpolitician with rigidly orthodox
economic views, need not heed the advice of
the White House.
But Martin does have his own constitu-
ency: The Nation's commercial bankers?or
more specifically, the New York banking
community. Martin has privately informed
administration officials of the increasing
pressure on him to tighten credit. Its
source: Big bankers, obsessed with the bug-
aboo of inflation.
This banker's mentality was aggressively
articulated to Martin by Alfred Hayes, pres-
ident of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Financial insiders regard Hayes?not
Martin?as the grey eminence of the interest
rate hike. And Hayes, an unabashed tight-
money man, is concerned first with bank-
ing?not the overall economic results of
higher interest rates, such as a possible rise
in unemployment.
The Manhattan bankers' influence over the
Fed is direct control over Washington's de-
cision affecting their own pocketbook. In
the opinion of one L.B.J. adviser, this means
the foxes are guarding the henhouse.
Nevertheless, despite Martin's clear legal
power, it may be argued that administration
strategy in dealing with Martin only em-
boldened him.
From the time he took over at the Treasury
last March, Fowler took the soft approach.
Last spring he tacitly acquiesced in Martin's
reduction of bank free reserves?money held
in excess of money loaned out (thus tighten-
ing the money supply). Treasury officials
privately told Democratic Senators they had
no intention of interfering with the Fed's
regulation of the money supply.
As recently as his November 8 appearance
at the Economic Club of New York City,
Fowler defended?to ringing applause of the
conservative-oriented audience?the Fed's in-
dependence and noted that he had been
criticized by Democratic Senators for that
stand.
All the while, Fowler privately urged Mar-
tin to postpone any decision on interest
rates until the President's budget was re-
leased early next year. By that time, Mr.
Johnson would be able to change the ideo-
logical complexion of the Reserve Board by
filling a vacancy coming up January 1.
Martin apparently decided early last week
to defy the President and Treasury. Al-
though specifically asked to call the President
before such action, he did not call. Rather,
he was determined to raise interest rates be-
fore a scheduled meeting at the LBJ Ranch
last Monday so that he would not have to
say "no" to the President's personal appeal.
As a result, Martin informed Fowler last
Friday morning at the White House that lie
had made up his mind. It was too late to
stop him. The Federal Reserve Board voted
the increase that afternoon.
Some critics of Martin hold that since
there was no conceiviable way for the Presi-
dent or Fowler to stop the Fed's action, they
should have secretly agreed to the increase
effective early next year, thus avoiding the
political?though not the economic?defeat.
But that avoids the real issue. The Martin
affair again raises the question whether this
vital economic henhouse should be guarded
by the banking foxes of New York?or by the
public's elected officials.
111L" VIETNAM
(Mr. BROWN of California (at the
request of Mr. HUIsiGATE) was granted
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the REcoao and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr.
Speaker, the President has today an-
nounced the resumption of bombing of
North Vietnam. Many of my colleagues
have risen to praise this decision. The
leadership from both sides of the aisle
here in the House have pledged their sup-
port to the President. Some voices are
raised to call for more than just a re-
sumption of the bombing?they call for
a vast increase in the level of bombing,
for the hitting of Hanoi and Haiphong,
and for the use of more powerful non-
conventional weapons.
From all sides we hear it said that
"The pause was a failure?the other side
is not interested in peace." I do not wish
to debate this point at this time. But
those who are honest will admit that the
previous 11 months of bombing was a
failure. That 11-month period saw the
United States forced to multiply its
ground forces many times over merely to
hold its own in South Vietnam. That
11 months saw a substantial increase in
the fighting forces of the National Lib-
eration Front, both from infiltration
from the north and from local recruit-
ment in the south. That 11 months saw
a strengthening of the will to resist the
bombing in North Vietnam, and an in-
crease in the assistance coming from
other countries. More than anything
else, that 11 months saw the end of any
fiction that we were merely helping sup-
port and maintain a friendly govern-
ment, and made it clear that the United
States was waging an American war to
show the world that the American man-
date runs wherever the President of the
United States says it runs, including the
mainland of Asia.
To resume the bombing, after this 11
months of failure to achieve any con-
structive results with such a policy,
demonstrates again and more forcefully
the sterility of the U.S. position in
Vietnam.
I feel the deepest sorrow for the Presi-
dent, that he feels compelled within him-
self to take this course, for I know that
he would do what was right. I feel even
more sorrow for the American people,
and for the people of Vietnam. There
comes a point of no return in the course
of events, and we may well have reached
that point in Asia. We may now be com-
mitted to a course leading to the death of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 1491
millions and the destruction a any hope
for a new order of law and justice in the
world in our lifetimes.
I do not believe in the imminent arrival
of an ideal world. I do not think that
the time has come in human history
when force as an element in human rela-
tionships can be eliminated. But I know
as certainly as I know anything in this
life that the United States cannot achieve
any worthwhile goal from the course it
is pursuing in Vietnam. It can and will
bring untold suffering to all of Vietnam.
It can and probably will deny South Viet-
nam to communism, if it wishes to oc-
cupy that country with hundreds of
thousands of troops for generations to
come. It can and probably will spend
$50 or $100 billion to do these things-
billions that could be used to solve the
problems of this country and the world,
instead of making them worse.
And in doing these things we will
weaken democracy and strengthen the
totalitarian tendencies of our own so-
ciety, we will condemn American impe-
rialism in the eyes of all Asia, we will
strengthen the ideological power of com-
munism around the world, we will weaken
still further the ties of the western
alliance.
Mr. Speaker, for these reasons I can-
not join in the chorus of praise we have
heard here today for the President's de-
cision to resume the bombing of North
Vietnam. I think that he has made a
tragic mistake. And I think that time is
running out for the President to correct
the mistakes this country has made in
Vietnam over the past 15 years.
SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED
By unanimous consent, permission to
address the House, following the legisla-
tive program and any special orders
heretofore entered, was granted to:
Mr. LAIRD (at the request of Mr. HALL) ,
for 20 minutes, today, and to revise and
extend his remarks and include extrane-
ous matter.
Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr.
HALL) , for 25 minutes, on Wednesday,
February 2, 1966, and to revise and ex-
tend his remarks and include extraneous
matter.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
By unanimous consent, permission to
extend remarks in the Appendix of the
RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks
was granted to:
Mr. PERKINS.
Mr. RANDALL and to include extraneous
matter.
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. HALL) and to include extra-
neous matter:)
MT. PELLY.
Mr. RUMSFELD in two instances.
Mr. HOSMER in two instances.
Mr. YOUNGER in two instances.
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. HuNcATE) and to include
extraneous matter : )
MT. BECKWORTH.
Mr. MILLER in five instances.
Mr. PICKLE.
ADJOURNMENT
Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I move
that the House do now adjourn,
The motion was agreed to; accordingly
(at 12 o'clock and 41 minutes p.m.), the
House adjourned until tomorrow, Tues-
day, February 1, 1966, at 12 o'clock noon.
EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.
Under clause 2 of rule XKIV, executive
communications were taken from the
Speaker's table and referred as follows:
1956. A letter from the Assistant Secre-
tary for Congressional Relations, Department
of State, transmitting a communication rela-
tive to the sale of surplus agricultural com-
modities to the United Arab Republic, pur-
suant to section 107 of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of
19'54, as amended; to the Committee on Agri-
culture.
1957. A letter from the Chairman, Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
transmitting a report covering refunds and
credits of internal revenue taxes for the fis-
cal year ended June 30, 1963, pursuant to
section 6405 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 (H. Dec. No. 370); to the Committee
on Ways and Means and ordered to be
printed.
1958. A letter, from the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Properties and Instal-
lations, transmitting notification of the lo-
cation, nature, and estimated cost of an
additional facilities project to be under-
taken for the Marine Corps Reserve utilizing
authorization contained in section 701(2)
of Public Law 88-390, pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
2233a(1); to the Committee on Armed
Services.
1959. A letter from the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Properties and In-
stallations) transmitting a report on military
construction, Naval and Marine Corps Re-
serves construction authorization under Pub-
lic Law 89-188, pursuant to 10 U.S.C.
2233a (1) ; to the Committee on Armed
Services.
1960. A letter from the Under Secretary
of the Navy, transmitting a report on the
NROTC flight instruction program, pursuant
to section 2110(b) of title 10, United States
Code; to the Committee on Armed Services.
1961. A letter from the Director, Selective
Service System, transmitting the 15th an-
nual report for the fiscal year ended June
30, 1965, pursuant to section 10(g) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act,
as amended; to the Committee on Armed
Services.
1962. A letter from the Chairman pro
tempore of the District of Columbia Armory
Board, transmitting the eighth annual re-
port and financial statements of the Board's
operation of the District of Columbia Stadi-
um, and the 18th annual report and finan-
cial statements of the Board's operation of
the District of Columbia National Guard
Armory for the fiscal year ended June 30,
1965, pursuant to section 10 of the Armory
Board Act (Public Law No. 80-605) , as
amended, and section 10 of the District of
Columbia Stadium Act of 1957 (Public Law
No. 95-300), as amended; to the Committee
on the District of Columbia.
1963. A letter from the president and
chairman of the board, Potomac Electric
Power Co., transmitting a copy of their bal-
ance sheet as of December 31, 1965, pursuant
to 37 Stat. 979; to the Committee on Dis-
trict of Columbia.
1964. A letter from the Secretary of State,
transmitting the interim report of the Inter-
national Joint Commission, United States
and Canada, on the pollution of Lake Erie,
Lake Ontario, and the international sec-
tion of the St. Lawrence River; to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs.
1965. A letter from the Secretary of the
Export-Import Bank of Washington, trans-
mitting a report on the amount of Export-
Import Bank insurance and guarantees on
U.S. exports to Yugoslavia for the month of
December 1965, pursuant to title II of the
Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Ap-
propriation Act of 1966 and the presidential
detrimentation of February 4, 1964; to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
1966. A letter from the Administrator,
General Services Administration, transmit-
ting the annual report on the; activities and
progress for the fiscal year ended June 30,
1965; to the Committee on Government Op-
erations.
1967. A letter from the Chief Commis-
sioner of the Indian Claims Commission,
transmitting a report on the proceedings of
docket 12, Chief William Puller, et al., on
behalf and representing an identifiable group
of the Indians of California, known as the
Federated Indians of California, petitions V.
the United States of America, defendant, pur-
suant to provisions of section 21 of the In-
dian Claims Commission Act of August 13,
1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t) ; to the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
1968. A letter from the Chief Commis-
sioner of the Indian Claims Commission,
transmitting a report on the proceeding of
docket 162, The Yakima Tribe, petitioner v.
The United States of America, defendant,
pursuant to provisions of section 21 of the
Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13,
1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t) ; to the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
1969. A letter from the chief Commis-
sioner of the Indian Claims Commission,
transmitting a report on the proceeding of
docket 47-A, The Yakima Tribe of Indians,
petitioners v. The United States of America,
defendant, pursuant to provisions of section
21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of
August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C.
70t) ; to the Committee on Interior and In-
sular Affairs,
1970. A letter from the Chief Commis-
sioner of the Indian Claims Commission,
transmitting a report on the proceedings of
docket No. 124 and docket No. 67 (consoli-
dated) and docket Nos. 124, 314, and 337
consolidated therewith, intervenors docket
Nos. 15-D, 29-B, 89, 311, and 315, the Miami
Tribe of Oklahoma also known as the Miami
Tribe, and Harley T. Palmer, Frank C. Pooler
and David Leonard, as representatives of the
Miami Tribe and all of the members thereof,
petitioners v. The United States of America,
defendant, pursuant to provisions of section
21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of
August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; U.S.C. 70t);
to the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.
1971. A letter from the Chief Commis-
sioner of th3 Indian Claims Commission,
transmitting a report on proceedings of
docket 324, Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, peti-
tioners, v. The United States of America,
defendant, pursuant to provisions of section
21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of
August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 'lot);
to the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.
1972. A letter from the Chairman of the
Federal Maritime Commission, transmitting
a draft of proposed legislation entitled "To
Amend the Shipping Act, 1916"; to the Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
1973. A letter from the Chairman of the
Federal Maritime Commission, transmitting
ft draft of proposed legislation entitled "To
Amend the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933",
to permit the Commission to require the car-
riers in the offshore domestic trade to keep
uniform accounts and permit Commission
representatives to inspect the accounts and
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1492 CONGRESSIONAL
records of such carriers: to the Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
1974. A letter from the Postmaster Gen-
eral, transmitting a report on the estimated
amount of the losses or costs (or percentage
of costs) incurred by the postal service in the
Performance of public services during the
current fiscal year, pursuant to section 201
of Public Law 87-793, approved October 11,
1962; to the Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service.
1175. A letter from the Director, Admin-
istrative Office of the U.S. Courts, transmit-
ting a report on positions in grades GS-16,
17, and 18, pursuant to section 1105a of title
5 of the United States Code; to the (NMI-
mi ttce on Post Office and Civil Service.
1576. A letter from the Assistant Admin-
istrator for Legislative Affairs for the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration,
transmitting a report on positions established
during calendar year 1965, in accordance
with section 1581, title 10, United States
Code, pursuant to section 1582, title 10,
United States Code; to the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service.
PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS
Under clause 4 of rule OII, public
bills and resolutions were introduced and
severally referred as follows:
By Mr. BINGHAM:
11.1/. 12407. A bill to amend the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964 to authorize
certain grants to assure adequate commuter
service in urban areas, and for other pur-
poses; to the Committee on Banking and
Currency.
UM 12408. A bill to amend section 13a of
the Interstate Commerce Act, relating to the
discontinuance or change of certain opera-
tions or services of common carriers by rail,
044444411411144401MMAIMPIVRIVidliffiri4.14441$ IVINIMEXIIMPAPAIIMW41m444. for 44=44444444
Approved hor
RECORD --HOUSE
in order to require the Interstate Commerce
Commission to give full consideration to all
financial assistance available before permit-
ting any such discontinuance or change; to
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce.
By Mr, BROWN of California:
H.R. 12409. A bill to amend the Federal
Firearms Act; to the Committee on Ways and
Means.
By Mr. TEAGUE of Texas:
HR. 12410. A bill to enhance the benefits
of service in the Armed Forces of the United
States and further extend the benefits of
higher education by providing a broad pro-
gram of educational benefits for veterans of
service after January 31, 1955, a ad certain
members of the Armed Forces; and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs.
By Mr. FRIEDEL:
HR. 12411. A bill to amend the Public
Health Service Act to provide for the estab-
lishment of a National Eye Institute in the
National Institutes of Health; to the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
By Mr. ICHORD:
TI.R. 12412. A bill to authorize the release
of platinum from the national stockpile, and
for other purposes; to the Committee on
Armed Services.
By Mr. PERKINS:
H.R. 12413. A bill to amend Mt', 38 of the
United States Code to increase the rates of
pension payable to widows of veterans of
the Spanish-American War; to the Commit-
tee on Veterans' Affairs.
By Mr. BROWN of California:
11.11. 12414. A bill to enhance the benefits
of service in the Armed Forces of the United
States and further extend the benefits of
higher education by providing a broad pro-
gram of educational benefits for veterans of
service after January 31, 1955, and certain
members of the Armed Forces; and for oth-
4.4404 444,' *AMP
elease
emu' 4 IL R,
7B004
January 31, 1966
e-,.? purposes; to the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs.
By Mr. DORN:
HR. 12415. A bill to enhance the benefits
of service in the Armed Forces of the United
States and further extend the benefits ct
higher education by providing a broad pre-
gram of educational benefits for veterans
of service after January 31, 1955, and certain
members of the Armed Forces; and for ether
purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Af-
fairs.
By Mr. RONCALIO:
HM. 12416. A bill to enhance the benefits
of service in the Armed Forces of the Unitel
States and further extend the benefits of
higher education by providing a broad pro-
gram of educational benefits for veterans of
service after January 31, 1955, and certain
members of the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Veteran'
Affairs.
By Mr. MORTON:
H.J. Res. 817. Joint resolution to establish
an Atlantic Union delegation; to the Corn-
mittec on Foreign Affairs.
MEMORIALS
Under clause 4 of rule XXII,
390. The SPEAKER presented a memorial
of the Legislature of the State of Nevada,
relative to supporting the service men and
women in Vietnam, which was referred to
the Committee on Armed Services.
PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS
Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private
bills and resolutions were introduced and
severally referred as follows:
By Mr. COLLIER:
H.R. 12417. A bill for the relief of Ioannis
Kiriazis; to the Committee on the Judi..
ciary,
04MYCrtOttr2L4?"--
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Senate
MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1966
(Legislative day of Wednesday. January 26, 1966)
The Senate met at 10 o'clock a.m., on
the expiration of the recess, and was
called to order by the Acting President
pro tempore (Mr. METCALF) .
Rev. Edward B. Lewis, pastor, Capitol
Hill Methodist Church, Washington,
D.C., offered the following prayer:
Dear Lord of all, we recognize today
that the peace we seek for the world is
beyond our understanding. Thus, we
need Thy help.
We have not consistently followed the
path of peace. Now we find ourselves
with others in the world in the wilderness
of bewilderment in finding again that
path. We come to Thee in prayer asking
for light in darkness and courage in the
? principle of freedom and justice for all
men.
We pray for Thy guiding and staying
hand in the deliberations and decisions of
our President, his Cabinet, his advisers,
and especially this session of the Senate
of the United States on national and in-
ternational issues.
Give to our leaders hope that will keep
alive negotiations for peace, faith that
there is a way, and love for God and man-
kind that will clarify thinking and
decision.
We pray in the name of the Creator of
life and peace. Amen.
THE JOURNAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Journal
be considered as read and approved.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I object.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Objection is heard.
LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DUR-
ING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that there be a
morning hour, and that statements
therein be limited to 3 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Is there objection to the request
of the Senator from Montana?
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President? -
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Is there objection?*
THE JOURNAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
renew my request and ask unanimous
consent that the Journal be considered
as read and approved.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the SenatOr from Vermont yield, with-
out losing his right to the floor, so that
I may ask unanimous consent, with the
concurrence of the distinguished acting
minority leader, the Senator from Ne-
braska [Mr. Corms], to suggest a recess
until 10:30 o'clock, at which time the
Senator from Vermont would have the
floor.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I intended
to ask if I might proceed for 7 or 8 min-
utes for a discussion on current events
after the Senate reconvened. I make
that request.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, the Senator
from Vermont will have the floor for 7
or 8 minutes when the Senate recon-
venes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That will be for 7
or 8 minutes.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object?
Mr. MANSFIELD. We shall return
after the recess, because the Senator
from Vermont has the floor; then we
shall have a period for the transaction.
of routine business.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there objection to the request
of the Senator from Montana?
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object, may I ask the
distinguished majority leader what the
plans are for the remainder of the day?
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is planned to
have a period for the transaction of rou-
tine business, and then, if any Senator
wishes to speak on the Taft-Hartley Act,
section 14(b) , or any other subject, he
may do so. I anticipate that the session
will not be very long today.
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I thank
the distinguished majority leader. I am
thinking of the many employees in the
Capitol who may have difficulty getting
home this evening.
Mr. President, I withdraw my objection
to the request of the Senator from Mon-
tana.
Mr. ER'VIN. Mr. President, do I cor-
rectly understand that the request for
the morning hour is merely for the pur-
pose of making statements?
Mr. MANSFIELD. To have a morning
hour for the purpose of allowing Sena-
tors to make speeches, and matters of
that kind.
Mr. ERVIN. And that no motions will
be made?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is
correct.
ROBERT G. THOlVIPSON
Mr, HART. Mr. President, will the
distinguished Senator from Vermont
yield to me for a moment, to permit me
to insert an editorial in the RECORD?
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, without
losing my right to the floor, I am glad
to yield to the Senator from Michigan
for the purpose of inserting an editorial
in the RECORD.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an editorial entitled, "Be-
yond Death," published in yesterday's
Washington Post.
I underscore nothing in the editorial;
It speaks eloquently and to the point.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
BEYOND DEATH
When mortal men consider their own
frailty and folly, they may well conclude that
death ought to bring its own absolution for
even the sorriest of sins. The pursuit of
punishment beyond the grave is mere vin-
dictiveness. We think the majesty of the
United States is marred by the decision of
the Defense Department to forbid the inter-
ment of Robert G. Thompson's ashes in Ar-
lington National Cemetery.
Good men and bad men alike lie at rest
In Arlington. Men of every faith?and of
no faith?slumber there. In this cemetery,
created on the estate of Robert E. Lee, there
is, as indeed there should be, a Confederate
Monument, erected by the Daughters of the
Confederacy in honor of the South's dead
heroes?men who believed it honorable and
right to take up arms against the United
States. And there rests there, too, in hon-
ored glory?whether in life he had been
valiant or craven?an American soldier
known but to God.
Robert Thompson was a Communist when
he was inducted into the Armed Forces early
in the Second World War. He was a Com-
munist when he was awarded the Distin-
guished Service Cross for valor in the Pacific
and when he was honorably discharged from
service. He was a Communist when he died
last October. It can be said in his behalf
that he made no effort to conceal the fact.
It is true that in 1949, he and 10 other
Communist Party leaders were convicted un-
der the Smith Act and sentenced to 3 years
In prison and that he jumped bail and was
subsequently sentenced to an additional 4
years for criminal contempt. On the basis
of these sentences and the fact that a year
ago an Army regulation was adopted denying
burial in a national cemetery to anyone sen-
tenced by a Federal court to more than 5
years imprisonment, the Attorney General
has given the Defense Department a petti-
fogging legal justification for its act of empty
meanness. Thompson was punished in life;
there is no point to punishing him in death.
1493
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1494 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
RECESS UNTIL 10:30 O'CLOCK A.M.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
nOre. Does the Senator from Montana
renew his request for a recess?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
renew my request that the Senate stand
in recess until 10:30 o'clock a.m.
The motion was agreed to; and at 10
o'clock and 4 minutes a.m. the Senate
took a recess until 10:30 o'clock a.m.
today.
At 10 o'clock and 30 minutes am., on
the expiration of the recess, the Senate
reconvened, when called to order by the
Acting President pro tempore.
THE JOURNAL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Vermont yield to me
without losing his right to the floor?
Mr. AIKEN. Without losing my right
to the floor, I yield to the Senator from
Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, do
I correctly understand that the Journal
is considered as read and approved?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator is correct.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, do
I correctly understand that permission
has been granted that when the Senate
finishes its business today, it will stand in
recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morn-
ing?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
the Senator from Vermont will permit me
to do so, without losing his right to the
floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum,
the time for the quorum call not to ex-
ceed 2 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Will the Senator withhold that
request for a moment?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The Chair announces that the
unanimous-consent request for routine
business has now been granted without
objection.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem..
pore. Under the previous agreement,
the order for the quorum call is re-
scinded, and the Senator from Vermont
is recognized.
THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING
IN VIETNAM
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, President
Johnson has now directed a renewal and
possible increase in the bombing of North
Vietnam.
Under the constitutional and statutory
powers vested in the Presidency he has
authority to do this.
Even if 90 percent of the American
people were opposed, he would still have
this power.
Now that the decision has been made
to engage in an expanded military ac-
tion which may ultimately lead to a con-
filet of unprecedented and unlimited pro-
portions, we must spare no effort to avoid
defeat and to hold our losses to a mini-
mum.
Although the Communist countries ap-
parently gave little credence to the recent
peace offensive of the President, there is
no question in my mind that President
Johnson did earnestly desire to put an
end to the war in southeast Asia.
Any person in his position wants to
be liked and admired as well as to earn
a good spot in history.
He wants to be highly respected by the
rest of the world and, as President Eisen-
hower so ably demonstrated in 1953, the
surest way to popular acclaim is through
the restoration of peace.
President Eisenhower fur her en-
hanced his popularity and secured an
enviable place in history when he backed
Gen. Matthew Ridgway in Ins opposi-
tion to sending large numbers of U.S.
troops into Vietnam in an effort to make
secure that part of their colonial empire
for the French.
Since we now seem to have passed the
point of no return, we should take a good,
hard look at the situation as it is today.
The number of U.S. servicemen sup-
porting the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment has now increased to about 200,000,
will be doubled within the next few
months, and it will likely be redoubled
within the next year.
This figure is exclusive of the Navy and
other forces based at Guam, in the
Philippines, in Thailand, in Honolulu,
and elsewhere.
It is exclusive of the 16,000 to 18,000
South Korean troops engaged in the con-
flict.
Aside from the forces from South Ko-
rea and Australia, we can look for only
minor assistance from other countries in
our Vietnam efforts.
In fact, if South Korea is now being
infiltrated by Communist operators to
the extent recently indicated by Marine
Gen. Wallace Greene, it is unlikely that
we can look for any substantial increase
in our strength from that source.
Most of the land area in South Viet-
nam has come under Vietcong; control,
while U.S. bases are all virtually under a
state of siege?an unorthodox siege, it is
true, but, nevertheless, one effective
enough so that it is hardly safe to ven-
ture outside the fortified arms except in
force.
Our forces have to date suffered ap-
proximately 10,000 casualties.
Some who a year ago supported the de-
cision to bomb North Vietnam. now feel
that the reason this operation failed is
that it has not been vigorous enough.
They now insist that Hanoi and Hai-
phong Harbor and other than strictly
military targets be also bombed.
Some substantial and respected per-
sons have advocated the use of atom
bombs?small ones, that is The other
day a representative of a respected and
well-known national organization came
to my office to urge the use of atom bombs
in the Vietnam war. The demand that
we use atomic weapons will increase as
our casualty lists grow.
Regardless of the fact that an atom
bomb could not distinguish between bel-
ecI.gof-Releese-2,00?0101713@ar,e+ALR011'e7'
January 31, 1966
ligerents and nonbelligerents, is there
any reason to doubt that, should we use
the atomic weapon against North Viet-
nam, that the Communists would almost
at once retaliate by using the same type
of weapon against our air and military
bases in the south?
We should think long and hard before
resorting to nuclear weapons in south-
east Asia.
We are now at the point where we have
to deal with realities, not desires.
It is no longer possible for us unilater-
ally to call the shots.
It is not what might have been or what
ought to be that now concerns us. It is
what is.
As indicated by the Mansfield mission
report, there is "only the very slim pros-
pect of a just settlement by negotiations."
Since much of the world has regarded
the bombing of North Vietnam as "ag -
gression" by the United States and since
the assistance by the North Vietnamese
to the Vietcong in carrying out their
savage operations against the people of
South Vietnam have been minimized, I
believe that the President's peace offen-
sive was necessary even though its effec-
tiveness as a means for ending the war
may be questioned.
It seems to have convinced some na-
tions of the justice of our assistance to
South Vietnam, even though they are
unable or unwilling to assist us.
Who is making the decisions in south-
east Asia today? Is it Russia or China?
The reaction of Russia to the Presi-
dent's plea for peace has been particu-
larly disappointing.
From her attitude one might well con-
clude that Russia not only does not de-
sire peace but actually seeks to encourage
a greater war in southeast Asia, evidently
hoping that we will concentrate such a
large part of our Armed Forces there that
the defenses of democracy will be weak-
ened in other parts of the world.
Or is China undertaking to shape
events so that the two great nuclear
states will ultimately destroy each other,
leaving the Chinese Republic the domi-
nant power in world affairs?
Actually the tiny nation of North
Vietnam appears to be the catalyst
which is welding the two great Commu-
nist nations together for military
purposes.
I trust that those who make the de-
cisions for our country will hear in mind
that while the war of democracy versus
communism cannot be won in southeast
Asia, it can be lost there.
In fact, communism will not be de-
feated on the battlefield anyway except
on the battlefield of men's minds.
If any phase of the conflict between
these two ideologies must be fought with
arms, we should not let our enemies
choose the battleground.
From now on our No. 1 concern must
be the preservation of the United States
and its institutions.
There can be no halfhearted effort
In this respect.
Our people, regardless of whether or
not they support the acts of this admin-
istration, must be prepared for extraor-
dinary sacrifice.
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January 31, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the distin-
guished Senator from Vermont may
have as much time as he may desire, and
that the time be extended to allow other
Senators to participate in discussing this
most momentous speech.
Mr. AIKEN. I thank the majority
leader.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, this sac-
rifice will have to be paid in terms of
resources, freedom, and life itself.
There may be a chance that a world
nuclear war can be avoided.
There may be a chance that we may
escape the devastating effect of a gen-
eral land war in Asia, the kind of war
we are least likely to win.
We cannot proceed on the hope for
miracles, however, therefore, we must be
prepared for the worst?and without
delay.
President Johnson has asked for some
$13 billion with which to increase the
tempo of the war in Vietnam.
This $13 billion is only the first drop
in the bucket.
Commonsense and experience should
tell us that.
The President asks us to rescind the
tax cut on telephone charges and auto-
mobiles in order to help to meet this
cost.
It is ridiculous to expect that the in-
come from these recisions would even
begin to pay the cost of an escalated
war.
If President Johnson means busi-
ness?and I believe he does?he will ask
for the suspension of the General Tax
Reduction Act of 2 years ago.
He will ask to have the loopholes of
overgenerous deductions and special tax
privileges plugged.
And he will ask for such new taxes
as may be necessary.
There is no sense in waiting until after
election to recommend the inevitable.
Lives are more precious than votes.
Secretary of Defense McNamara asks
for an increase of 113,000 men in the
Armed Forces.
Whom does he think he is kidding?
Winning a guerrilla war requires a ra-
tio of 10 to 1 on the side of the law, and
the enemy already has 200,000 men in
the field.
The Secretary knows that an escalated
war will require universal conscription.
To wait until after election to an-
nounce this is just another attempt to lull
the people.
Besides increased taxation and con-
scription, we must be prepared to accept
the concentration of powers and restric-
tions on our liberties which inevitably
accompany any major war.
We must be prepared to accept these
controls for an indefinite number of
years.
Are we ready to accept a system of pri-
orities?price controls and wage con-
trols?
What about ration cards?
Are we prepared to control hoarding
which may already be underway?
No. 15-4
Are our shelters adequate to insure the
perpetuation of at least a part of our pop-
ulation in the event of a nuclear war?
Have we the facilities necessary for the
control of sabotage, subversion, riots,
and criminal law violations?
We do not like to contemplate these
things; yet they must be considered and
acted upon unless the danger is far less
than it now appears.
This time we cannot wait until catas-
trophe strikes.
So long as there is the slightest chance
for peace, we should pursue it, even while
preparing for the worst, but we must pre-
pare. .
Since the Vietnam war began to esca-
late rapidly 3 years ago, I have re-
peatedly tried to make clear my belief
that a major war would have disastrous
results for the United States either mili-
tarily or in the loss of personal liberty
at home.
Although I have at all times recog-
nized the responsibilities of the United
States to the people of South Vietnam, I
never for an instant regarded my vote
for the concurrent resolution of August
1964 as a vote to give the President au-
thority to wage war at will in southeast
Asia.
I opposed as strongly as I could the
start of a new war in North Vietnam.
And I believe the President has erred
In taking new steps which may lead to a
cataclysmic world conflict.
It appears, however, that my voice has
been ineffective and that the President
has decided to take such steps.
The most that is left to me now is the
hope that the President is right and that
I have been wrong.
If, through the renewed action for
which he assumes responsibility, the war
can be brought to a quick and satisfac-
tory ending, I will gladly admit the error
of my judgment and be among the first to
render him acclaim.
To this end, it is my purpose to support
his request for higher taxes and for such
controls over the American economy as
may seem necessary to hold our losses
to a minimum and to enhance the pros-
pects for ultimate victory.
To divide our Nation in this time of
crisis would be to court certain disaster.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. AIKEN. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Once again, the
distinguished Senator from Vermont has
performed a public service. I say "once
again" because that has been his forte
down through the years, regardless of the
issue which was being discussed.
There has been a good deal of refer-
ence in the press in late months to the
categories of the dove and the hawk.
Personally, I do not pay too much atten-
tion to those designations. What I think
the Senator from Vermont typifies and
personifies, if I may use the word, is the
owl. He is the wise man, the man who
looks ahead, the man who is unswerving
in his support of the United States, but
who is also aware of the dangers which
confront us in any given situation.
Before I comment on the distinguished
Senator's speech, I should like to read a
1495
statement which I made this morning be-
fore the Senate convened. The statement
reads as follows:
The President has weighed the arguments,
considered the alternatives, and made his de-
cision. He had counseled with the leader-
ship on a number of occasions on this matter
and requested our views, which were frank-
ly given and fairly considered by him.
On the basis of his constitutional responsi-
bility, the President has acted. He has my
sympathy and understanding, and I will do
my best to support him to the best of my
ability. I fully appreciate the difficulty and
the agony of the decisions which was his?
and his alone?to make.
I listened to a portion of his broadcast
to the people this morning, and I was
pleased and impressed with his statement
that he had instructed Ambassador Ar-
thur Goldberg, a real "owl," to take this
matter of peaceseeking to the U.N. Se-
curity Council. I applaud him for so
doing.
I was also impressed by his reference
to Pope Paul's appeal for neutral arbitra-
tion and his interest in the proposal of
the Holy Father.
I would suggest also that it could not
be out of tune at this time, or at any time,
to ask the two cochairmen of the Geneva
Convention the Soviet Union and the
United Kingdom?to try once again to
get together so that this agreement, this
meeting first set up in 1954, and then in
the Laotian crisis in 1962, this grouping
of States, be once again reconvened.
I know that this has had and still has
the full support of the present adminis-
tration.
The Senator from Vermont has men-
tioned something about the possibility of
nuclear activity. The very use of the
word "nuclear" makes me shudder, and I
hope that those who are in favor of the
use of such weapon?and unfortunately
there have been some who have so
stated?will not be taken too seriously,
because I do not believe such advocacy
represents the feelings of the adminis-
tration, of Congress, or the American
people, nor does it, for that matter, rep-
resent the feelings of the peoples of the
world.
Last week I also heard the figure "600,-
000 Americans in Vietnam" being used
by a Member of this body in an address
which he made before an audience in his
home State. Today the distinguished
Senator from Vermont [Mr. Arum] has
raised the figure to the vicinity of 800,-
000. I think he gave a very good break-
down of the number of Americans now in
Vietnam, the number of Americans be-
ing used by the 7th Fleet, the number
of Americans stationed in Thailand, and,
inferentially, at least, the number of
Americans on the way. He also pointed
out that when we fight a guerrilla war,
we must have a ratio in the vicinity of
10 to 1. I have seen figures as high as 15
to 1 and as low as 5 to 1. What the exact
figure is I do not believe anyone is in a
position to know at this time, because it
seems that the ratio differs with the cir-
cumstances and the needs requisite at
a particular moment.
The distinguished Senator from Ver-
mont also referred to other possibilities
inherent in an Asia land war. He men-
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1496 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tioned General Ridgway, one of the out-
standing soldiers in the history of this
country, a man who follows well in the
tradition of Gen. George Marshall. He
did not mention, however, General Mac-
Arthur, who is quoted as saying that the
only way to win is through victory, and
who also said what the difficulties would
be if we were engaged in a land war in
Aria.
should like to read a brief comment
ine de by General Ridgway when he was
ecnimander of the 8th Army in Korea
at the time the truce negotiations were
under way.
The American people must realize the need
for infinite patience. There will be no im-
mediate, final solution. The American peo-
ple must learn to accept a solution that
reflects reality. In the world of today we
must maintain an equilibrium of force so
that none of them become destructive. A
modus vivendi must be found for people who
were put on earth to live, and a way must be
found to enable them to exist side by side
without being at one another's throats. It
can be done.
May I take this occasion, if the Senator
will allow me to do so, to express my
wholehearted sympathy and support for
the efforts, covering 37 days, made by the
President of the United States to seek
an avenue or a door to the negotiating
table.
think T probably know Lyndon John-
son as well as any other Member of this
body knows him. I have been closely as-
sociated with him for 24 years. I know
how deeply concerned he is about Viet-
nam. I know the agonizing days and
nights he goes through. I know of his
intense desire to bring this most difficult
of all situations which has ever faced an
American President to some sort of hon-
orable conclusion.
believe that President Johnson faces
today, and has faced over the past sev-
eral months, difficulties far exceeding
those faced by President Wilson at the
Lime of the First World War, far exceed-
ing those faced by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt at the time of the Second
World War, and far exceeding those
faced by President Harry Truman at the
time of the Korean war.
This is a most serious situation, and
I applaud the President for the many
avenues he has sought and tried, for the
many doors on which he has knocked, for
the many times he has had conversa-
tions and conferences, for sending am-
bassadors over the world and for the
instructions which he gave to the am-
bassadors?all to try to bring this sit-
uation to the conference table so that a
satisfactory solution and conclusion
might be reached.
It is therefore no fault of the Presi-
dent, as the distinguished Senator from
Vermont has said, that these attempts
have failed over the past 37 days. He has
tried. He is concerned deeply. I do not
think it is so much a matter of his place
in history as it is a matter of finding a
way by which he can, under honorable
conditions, bring this most difficult con-
frontation to a satisfactory conclusion.
The American people must know the
truth. They must know the potential in-
volved in southeast Asia. They must be
Im.PIRIORIIIIMMMterter,111.01,9,,Mennw,
made to know all of its ramifications.
We in the Senate, regardless of our views,
whether we are called doves, hawks, or
owls, have a responsibility. That re-
sponsibility is being lived up to, and I am
sure it will be lived up to even more in the
future.
This is a grave time for the Nation, and
It is a grave time for the President, who,
under the Constitution, has this awesome
responsibility. He cannot shove the buck
to us. He knows that. He knows that,
in the final analysis, there L3 only one
man in this Republic who can make the
decision. He is subjected to that respon-
sibility as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Republic and as
President of the United States of
America.
I. repeat: So far as the Senator from
Montana is concerned, he will do his very
best to give the President of the United
States as much in the way of support as
he possibly can.
I thank and commend the distin-
guished Senator from Vermont for laying
out what he thinks should be done and
for making the Senate?both sides of the
Senate?more aware of the difficulties in-
herent in the situation which faces us
and by making it known, in his simple,
Logical manner, to the American people,
as well.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that there may be inserted at the appro-
priate point in the RECORD the statement
made by the President of the United
States today, a statement male by Sec-
retary Rusk at his news conference today,
and a letter to the President of the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council from Arthur
J. Goldberg, the American Ambassador to
the United Nations, requesting that an
urgent meeting of the Security Council
be called promptly to consider the situa-
tion in Vietnam.
There being no objection, the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY THE PRESTUENT
My fellow Americans, for 37 days, no
bombs fell on North Vietnam. During that
time we have made a most intense and de-
termined effort to enlist the help and sup-
port of all the world to persuade the govern-
ment in Hanoi that peace is better than war,
that talking is better than fightfig? and that
the road to peace is open. Our effort has
met with understanding aml support
throughout most of the world? but not in
Hanoi and Peiping. From those two capitals
have come only denunciation and rejection.
In these 37 days, the efforts ef our allies
have been rebuffed. The efforts of neutral
nations have come to nothing We have
sought without success to learn of any re-
sponse to efforts made by the governments of
Eastern Europe. There has been no answer
to the enlightened efforts of the Vatican.
Our own direct private approaches have been
in vain. The answer of Hanoi to all is the
answer that was published 3 days ago?they
persist in aggression, and they insist on the
surrender of South Vietnam to communism.
It is plain that there is no readiness to
talk?no readiness for peace?in that regime
today.
And what is plain in words is also plain in
acts. Throughout these 37 days?even at
moments of truce?there has been continued
violence against the people of South Viet-
nam, against their government, against their
soldiers, and against our own American
forces.
prI5Vetirlar"'"PM' St9"200fIlt
'LRDFT7
January 31, 1966
We do not regret the pause in the bombing.
We yield to none in our determination to
seek peace. We have given a full and decent
respect to the opinions of those who thought
that such a pause might give new hope for
peace. Some said 10 days might do it.
Others said 20. Now we have paused for
twice the time suggested by some who urged
it. Now the world knows more clearly than
ever before who insists on aggression aid
who works for peace.
The Vietnamese, American and allied
troops that are engaged in South Vietnam?
with increasing strength and increasing suc-
cess?want peace, I am sure, as much as any
of us here at home. But while there is no
peace, they are entitled to the full support
of American strength and American deter-
mination. We will give both.
As constitutional Commander in Chief I
have?as I must?given proper weight to the
judgment of those responsible for counsel-
ing with me: the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, my national security
adviser, and America's professional military
men represented by the Joint Chiefs of Stiff.
These advisers tell me that if continued im-
munity is given to all that supports North
Vietnam aggression, the cost in lives?Viet-
namese, American, and allied?will only be
greatly increased. In the light of the words
and actions of the government in Hanoi,
It is our clear duty to do what we can to limit
these costs.
So on this Monday morning in Vietnam, at
my direction?after consultation and agree-
ment with the Government of South Viet-
nam?U.S. aircraft have resumed action in
North Vietnam They struck lines of supply
which support the continuing movement of
men and arms against the people and Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam.
Our air strikes on North Vietnam from the
beginning, have been aimed at military Ix r-
gets and controlled with great care. These
who direct and supply the aggression have
no claim to immunity from military reply.
The end of the pause does not mean the
end of our own pursuit of peace. That pur-
suit will be as determined and unremittiog
as the pressure of our military strength on
the field of battle. In our continuing pur-
suit of peace, I have instructed Ambassador
Goldberg to ask for an immediate meeting of
the United Nations Security Council. He
will present a full report on the situation
In Vietnam and a resolution which can open
the way to the conference table. This report
and this resolution will be responsive to tae
spirit of the renewed appeal of Pope Paul;
that appear has our full sympathy.
I have asked Secretary Rusk to meet with
representatives of the press later this rnor a-
ing, to give to the country and to the world
a comprehensive account of the diplomatic
effort conducted in these last 5 weeks In our
continuing policy of peace and freedom for
South Vietnam.
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OE
JANUARY 31,19E16
(NomE.?The following is the State Depart-
ment's release of Secretary of State Dean
Rusk's news conference, which is authorized
for direct quotation:)
Secretary Rusx. Earlier this morning Pres-
ident Johnson confirmed that U.S. aircraft
have resumed action against the lines of com-
munication which support the continuing
movement of men and arms against the peo-
ple and Government of South Vietnam.
I wish ter summarize for you the unprece-
dented diplomatic effort of the past 40 days?
an effort aimed at peace?and the tragically
negative response from Hanoi. To under-
stand the full import of the past 40 days you
must recall the months and years of unre-
mitting effort by the United States and others
to achieve peace in southeast Asia.
Reet4
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January 31, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1497
We had no assurance at Christmas time
that a suspension of the bombing of North
Vietnam would move us closer to peace.
Hanoi had refused to come to the Security
Council of th United Nations in August 1964,
in response to an invitation initiated in the
Council by the Soviet Union. A call by 17
nonalined nations for negotiations without
preconditions had been harshly rejected by
Hanoi, as was President Johnson's call for
unconditional discussions at Baltimore last
April. A Commonwealth committee had been
rebuffed. The Secretary General of the U.N.
had not been permitted-to visit Hanoi and
Peiping. Suggestions by the President of
India were denounced. The machinery of
the Geneva conferences was parlyzed by
Hanoi's recalcitrance. Contacts with Hanoi
and Peiping had failed to disclose a serious
interest in peace. A pause in the bombing
last May had yielded only a polemical
rejection.
Nevertheless, the President decided, on the
advice of myself and his other senior ad-
visers, and in agreement with the Govern-
ment of Vietnam to extend the Christmas
pause for a further period. He did so be-
cause of America's strong preference for peace
in southeast Asia, a desire which takes into
full account the decades of suffering and
violence inflicted upon the people of Vietnam.
He did so because a number of governments,
including a number Of Communist govern-
ments, had insisted that a suspension of the
bombing would create a situation in which
the possibilities of peace could be greatly
Improved. He did so because there was un-
necessary confusion at home and abroad
about where the responsibility lies for the
absence of peace?or even of discussions or
negotiations about the possibility of peace.
Shortly after Christmas, therefore, we were
in touch with all the governments of the
world, more than 115 of them, as well as with
his Holiness the Pope, the Secretary General
of the United Nations, the North Atlantic
Council of NATO, the Organization of Amer-
ican States, the Organization of African
Unity, and the International Committee of
the Red Cross. Six special Presidential en-
voys visited 34 capitals and personal com-
munications from the President went to the
chiefs of government of many more.
Hanoi was informed at an early stage of
the suspension of the bombing. They were
told that no decision had been made regard-
ing a resumption of bombing and that if
Hanoi would reciprocate by making a serious
contribution toward peace, it would obvi-
ously have a favorable effect on the possi-
bility of further extending the suspension.
There was no ultimatum, in word or in fact,
but rather an invitation to move toward
peace. All governments were reminded of
the far-reaching suggestions which the
United States had made about the possibili-
ties of peace, suggestions which were sum-
marized in the so-called 14 points. It was
made clear that, as far as we were concerned,
there could be a conference, less formal dis-
cUssions, or private and tentative contacts
through the most discreet channels.
We know that many governments, includ-
ing Communist governments, were active
during this period and that our own direct
and indirect contacts were strongly rein-
forced from many capitals. We were in
touch with most governments several times
during this period.
It is with genuine regret that I must re-
port that the response has been negative,
harsh, and unyielding. Channels which had
been opened by us, one after the other,
yielded no move toward peace. Throughout
the period since Christmas, Hanoi and Peip-
ing denounced our efforts toward peace with
a continuing barrage of such epithets as
"fraud," "trick," "deceit," "swindle," "hoax,"
"farce." The negative attitudes of Hanoi and
the liberation front have been clarified in
the last few days in an unmistakable fash-
ion. Ho Chi Minh in letters addressed to a
number of heads of state stated: "If the
United States really wants peace it must rec-
ognize the NFL SV as the sole genuine rep-
resentative of the people of South Vietnam
and engage in negotiations with it." In a
statement released just yesterday, the front
itself said, "All negotiations with the U.S.
imperialists at this moment are entirely
useless if they still refuse to withdraw from
South Vietnam their troops and all kinds of
war materials."
But they made clear their negative view
by deeds as well as words throughout the
period of suspension of bombing. Infiltra-
tions of men and materials from the north
into South Vietnam continued at a high
level. Acts of violence in South Vietnam
itself continued with relatively minor fluc-
tuations at virtually the same record high
levels set in the last quarter of 1965. By
these acts they made it entirely clear that
their purpose remained what it has been
from the beginning?namely, to take over
South Vietnam by force.
It has been necessary, therefore, for us to
meet our responsibilities to our commit-
ments to South Vietnam and the South Viet-
namese people. I joined with other senior
advisers to the President to recommend to
him that he resume the necessary military
action to support the South Vietnamese and
allied forces and to meet the aggression from
the north.
This does not mean that, as far as we are
concerned, the search for peace will stop.
Far from it. The President told you this
morning that the matter is being presented
to the Security Council of the United Na-
tions. I will add that the other processes of
diplomacy will continue in full operation,
publicly and privately, directly and indi-
rectly, in order that any possibility of peace
can be explored and tested.
It is passible that one of the obstacles to
peace has been a failure on the part of Hanoi
to understand that the United States will in
fact meet its commitment. It is not easy
for a democracy such as ours to prevent such
a basic miscalculation on the part of a total-
itarian regime. If they are relying upon a
military victory in the south, they must
abandon that hope. If they are relying on
international opinion to divert the United
States from its commitment, they must rec-
ognize that the world community does not
support theiv aggression. If they are relying
upon domestic differences among us to save
their cause, they must understand that that
will not occur. The way to shorten this war
is to make it very clear to Hanoi that the
course upon which they are embarked is
futile and that if they are prepared to sit
down and talk like reasonable men, answers
can be found which will relieve both them-
selves and their brothers in the south-of the
violence of which there has been more than
enough.
JANUARY 31, 1966.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: -I have the honor to
request that an urgent meeting of the
Security Council be called promptly to con-
sider the situation in Vietnam.
As you know, the U.S. Government has,
time and time again, patiently and tirelessly
sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict
on the basis of unconditional negotiations
and the Geneva Accords of 1954. We have
done so both inside and outside the United
Nations.
In President Johnson's letter of July 28,
1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of
July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security
Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966,
to the secretary General, we appealed for
whatever help in ending the conflict the
Security Council and its members or any
other organ of the United Nations might be
able to give. We have also been in constant
touch with the Secretary General in order to
keep him fully informed and to seek his
counsel and assistance. A great number of
U.N. members, acting jointly or separately,
have with our earnest encouragement sought
to find a means of moving the conflict from
the battlefield to the conference table.
As you are also aware, because my Govern-
ment was advised by many others that a
pause in the bombing of North Vietnam
might contribute to the acceptance by its
government of our offer of unconditional
negtotiations, we did suspend bombing on
December 24 and continued that suspension
for some 37 days. At the same time, Presi-
dent Johnson dispatched several high-rank-
ing representatives to explain to His Holiness
the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of
government of a number of states our most
earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully
and promptly. Our views were set forth in
14 paints which were communicated to a
very large number of governments and later
published and which were summarized in the
third paragraph of my letter of January 1,
1966, to the Secretary General.
I should like to repeat that summary to
you as follows:
"That the United States is prepared for
discussions or negotiations without any
prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis
of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that
a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could
be envisaged and that a ceasefire might be
the first order of business in any discussions
or negotiations, that the United States re-
mains prepared to withdraw its forces from
South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is
in a position to determine its own future
without external interfrence, that the United
States desires no continuing military pres-
ence or bases in Vietnam, that the future
political structure in South Vietnam should
be determined by the South Vietnamese peo-
ple themselves through democratic proc-
esses, and that the question of the reuni-
fication of the two Vietnams should be de-
cided by the free decision of their two peo-
ples."
Subsequently, the President in his state
of the Union address on January 12 reit-
erated once again our willingness to consider
at a conference or in other negotiations any
proposals which might be put forward by
others. I am authorized to inform the Coun-
cil that these U.S. views were transmitted
both directly and indirectly to the Govern-
ment of North Vietnam and were received
by that Government.
Unhappily, there has been no affirmative
response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts
to bring the conflict to the negotiating table,
to which so many governments lent their
sympathy and assistance. Instead there have
been from Hanoi, and of course from Peiping
as well, merely the familiar charges that our
peace offensive, despite the prolonged bomb-
ing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swin-
dle" deserving no serious consideration. The
most recent response seemed to be that set
forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to
certain heads of state which was broadcast
from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter
President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his
unwillingness at this time to proceed with
unconditional negotiations; on the contrary,
he insisted on a number of preconditions
which would in effect require the United
States to accept Hanoi's solution before
negotiations had even begun. This is ob-
viously unacceptable.
Therefore, Mr. President, my Government
has concluded that it should now bring this
problem with all its implications for peace
formally before the Security Council. We
are mindful of the discussions over the past
months among the members of the Council
as to whether a formal meeting could use-
fully be held in the context of other efforts
then in train. We are also aware that it may
not be easy for the Council itself, in view
of all the obstacles, to take constructive ac-
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1498 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE January 31, 1966
tion on this question. We are firmly con-
vinced, however, that in light of its obliga-
tions under the charter to maintain inter-
national peace and security and the failure
so far of all efforts outside the United Na-
Lions to restore peace, the Council should ad-
dress itself urgently and positively to this
situation and exert its most vigorous en-
deavors and its immense prestige to finding
a prompt solution to it.
We hope that the members of the Security
Council will agree that our common dedica-
tion to peace and our common responsi-
bility for the future of mankind require no
less. In this connection, we are mindful of
tne renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope
only 2 days ago in which he suggested that
"an arbitration of the U.N. confined to neu-
tral nations might tomorrow?we would like
to hope even today?resolve this terrible
question."
Accept. Excellency, the assurance of my
highest consideration.
ATerHT.TE J. GOLDBERG.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I thank.
the Senator from Montana for his re-
marks. I repeat that I never questioned
the desire of the President to establish
peace in the world. Any President would
so desire. I am sure Lyndon Johnson is
no different in that respect from the
others.
I also appreciate the Senator's refer-
ence to Gen. Matthew Ridgway, who, I
believe, was Army Chief of Staff at the
time we went through a similar conflict
of opinion, and who he advised against
our sending large numbers of men to
southeast Asia to help the French.
[ well recall General Ridgway telling
me after a hearing one day that if we
sent 2 million men into the Vietnam area,
they would be swallowed up. Now con-
ditions are different from those in Korea,
where we had relatively nearby bases and
short supply lines. I do not believe that,
If the Soviet Union and the Chinese
worked hard in trying to find a location
for a showdown they could have found
one more disadvantageous to us than in
southeast Asia.
Again I thank the Senator from Mon-
tana for his statement.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. AIKEN. I yield to the Senator
from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. I am deeply moved, and
millions of Americans will be deeply
moved, by the outstanding speech the
Senator has just made in this body. It
is my hope that the Senator's speech will
be printed verbatim not only for the New
York Times, but across this Nation in
newspaper after newspaper.
Not only did we hear a historic speech
from the Senator from Vermont, but we
heard a historic speech from the major-
ity leader I Mr. MANSFIELD]. It, WO, must
receive very wide circulation among our
people, for, in my opinion, this has now
become an issue for the people. This is
an issue of which the American people
want war or peace. The people are en-
titled to know all the facts on both sides
of this historic controversy.
Mr. President, the Senator from Ver-
mont stated that he had taken a position
f or some time urging that we not get our-
selves involved in an escalation of the
war in Asia. He has said that he hoped
he was right and that if the President
NINIMPFFIPINIPMEIPPIRNIMF,R1.,f,,,MEr
pf5757ed or "g65?'
proved himself to be right he would be
the first to acclaim the President.
Let me say to the Senator from Ver-
mont that I, too, would acclaim the
President if his course of action leads to
peace. However, I do not believe that
escalating the war will produce peace. It
may produce a surrender, but not peace.
Then eventually the Asias will reorganize
and continue their war against us until
we too come to recognize that we can-
not maintain a dominating foothold in
Asia.
The Senator from Vermont has been
right in his position, but I say regret-
fully, but respectfully, that I believe my
President has been dead wrong in con-
ducting his Executive war in Asia and is
dead wrong in his announcement this
morning that he has ordered a renewing
of the bombing and of the inevitable es-
calating of the war.
The majority leader spoke of his close
association with the President and his
great affection for him.
Let me say that I love the President
of the United States as an individual, as
a friend, and as a leader. But, I love my
country more.
In my judgment, the course of action
that my President is following in con-
nection with escalating the war in Asia,
is not in the best interests of my country,
for I share the view of the Senator from
Vermont that Asia, of all places, is no
place for us to become involved in a
massive war. If woe betake us and we
have to go into such a war, I believe such
a war is immoral, illegal, and unjusti-
fiable. I believe that war is unthinkable
forevermore. We should face the fact
that humanity cannot survive another
world war. I cannot share the hope,
because I believe that it is simply a false
hope, that we can obtain a peace by
making war in Asia.
Of course, I am pleased that the Presi-
dent has announced he is going to take
the issue to the Security Council. I am
sorry that at the same time he is going
to escalate the war.
want to see the resolution he is send-
ing to the Security Council. Taking it
to the Security Council, so far as it is
possible success is concerned, is depend-
ent upon what position we take in the
Security Council and what the resolution
proposes. The proposal to take' it to the
Security Council comes at least 21/2 years
late. But, better late than never.
I highly commend my Eb esident for
coming to the point of view that the
United States should go to the Security
Council. I have pleaded for that for a
long time past?many times. I have
been requested in the past by the White
House to prepare a series of proposed
resolutions and legal arguments in sup-
port of taking the issue to the United
Nations.
It is extremely unfortunate that at the
same time he has renewed the air raids
on North Vietnam, for this will make it
far more difficult for the U.N. to take
effective action than if the raids had
re:mained in suspension.
I close my remarks by stating that I
hope, when this matter is taken to the
Security Council, that we will make clear
to the Security Council that we do not
CM7
intend to let the issue rest there. If the
Security Council or any member thereof
decides to veto that resolution, then I
wish to say to my President this morn-
ing, that we should call for an extraor-
dinary session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations and lay the threat
to the peace of the world before it. What
we need in southeast Asia now are many
divisions of United Nations peacekeeping
forces, not warmaking forces. What we
need in southeast Asia is the drawing of a
good many neutral buffer zones across
South Vietnam that will seek to stop the
killing. What we need, of course, is to
make perfectly clear to the world that we
are ready to let the nations of the world
sit in judgment on this war and seek to
exercise the procedures called for in the
United Nations Charter in trying to end
it.
That is my plea. That is my prayer.
I hope that among the various alterna-
tives open to us that at least we will say
to the Security Council, "We are ask-
ing for a United Nations conference on
the war in southeast Asia, because under
the United Nations Charter there are a
great many procedures that the Security
Council can follow." The Security Coun-
cil could call for a United Nations con-
ference which would bring not only the
Security Council members, but all the
members of the United Nations into focus
on the problem and lay the matter before
that enlarged body. I would hope that
consideration would be given?although I
will go along with any proposal that
makes it possible for the United Nations
to take jurisdiction?to the possibility of
the Security Council, or the enlarged
group that I have just suggested, might
call for reconvening of the Geneva con-
ference. This would bring the Com-
munists into the picture. I know that
many do not like the thought of bringing
the Communists into the picture, but to
think of bombing them out of existence
is wishful thinking. They happen to be a
great power and force in Asia, and they
will continue to be a great force and
power in Asia, no matter what war efforts
the United States makes in Asia.
Under the canopy of the 'United
Nations, through a reconvened Geneva
conference, there could be offered some
hope of trying to bring reason to bear in
bringing to an end the immoral killing
that characterizes this war.
I close by saying that I do not accept
in full the observation of my majority
leader in regard to the power of the
President of the United States. I do not
believe that the President of the United
States, under the Constitution, has the
power to conduct this executive war in
Asia. He is conducting it, anyway. I
know that there are many in Congress
who would like to give him authority to
continue to conduct it. However, in my
judgment, the time has come to place a
check upon the President of the United
States in regard to conducting an execu-
tive war.
I believe that one of the salutary effects
of placing this issue before the United
Nations might be ending at long last
the unilateral action of the United States
in southeast Asia. Members of the
United Nations who signed the
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January 31, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Charter, as well as the United States,
should start living up to their obligations,
too. Let us pray and hope that the
President's belated decision to go to the
Security Council will lead to peace.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr.
President, will the Senator from Vermont
yield?
Mr. AIKEN. I am glad to yield to the
Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I com-
mend the Senator from Vermont for a
well-reasoned speech full of good judg-
ment, and I believe, timely admonition.
Apparently, his views have been and
are much the same as mine, because for
several years, ever since I visited Vietnam
some 5 years ago, I have felt that this
would be the worst place in the world
to fight communism. I believe that we
have to fight communism but, like the
Senator from Vermont, I believe that
much of this war has to be fought in
the hearts of people all over the world.
With our limited resources, both in man-
power and financially, we should not be
picking out an area to fight the Com-
munists where they have all the advan-
tages and we all the disadvantages, as
Is the case in Vietnam.
The administration has been totally
unrealistic on this war situation, and I
believe it has been something less than
frank with the American people in not
giving them all the information they are
entitled to have and in not telling them
all that we would have to encounter in
fighting a war in southeast Asia.
Approximately 2 years ago we were
advised by top officials of the adminis-
tration that the war would be over in a
few months. They should know better
than that, I believe that the public could
and should be told now at least some of
the real problems we face, certainly
better estimates as to the cost to the
United States and more of what is in-
volved in this war. The Communists
have a pretty good idea of what we will
need to win. Why cannot we tell our
people what the Communists already
know?
For example, the estimate of 600,000
troops we will need in southeast Asia is
a conservative one and is something that
our people should be told.
I agree with the Senater from Vermont
that Congress should appropriate the
money necessary to prosecute the war
and raise the necessary money through
taxation and other means, and fully sup-
port it in every way.
For myself, I see no alternative at this
time but to support the President in the
decision he has made?at least for the
tiine being.
Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator
from North Dakota for his kind remarks.
I join those who hope that the Presi-
dent's appeal to the United Nations may
be effective in promoting peace in south-
east Asia. We must not forget, however,
that Russia is a member of the Security
Council and that Russia has, apparently,
decided that southeast Asia is the best
place to have a showdown.
While I do not give up hope, I seri-
ously doubt that any appeal to the
United Nations will be effective. The
United Nations has had plenty of oppor-
tunity to take action, had it been per-
mitted to do so. I have no doubt that
90 percent of the members of the Gen-
eral Assembly would do all they possi-
bly could to effect peace in southeast
Asia, but it requires only one member of
the Security Council to block that
action.
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will my
colleague [Mr. AIKEN] yield to me?
Mr. AIKEN. I am very glad to yield to
my colleague.
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, during
his many years in the Senate, my senior
colleague has made many major contri-
butions to the national welfare. How-
ever, today, in my judgment, nothing
that he has accomplished in all that time
Is as important as the statement he has
just made. I commend him for it.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Vermont yield?
Mr. AIKEN. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Kentucky. I am ready
to yield the floor, but I yield to him at
this time.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, we are
indebted to the distinguished Senator
from Vermont for this plain and simple
way in which he has pointed out the
possible eventualities that may fall upon
this country by an escalation of the war.
I am one of those who believe that
the bombing should not have been re-
sumed, at least at present. I did not
make my statement upon some vague
hope?important as that may be?but I
had thought that the military forces
there would be able to meet any present
military situation?unless there were
large introductions of forces from North
Korea. Also, we know there is a supply
situation which limits our forces ability
for a time. I have believed that there
were at least additional weeks before the
security of our forces would be affected.
But the most important factor, was
whether resumption would lead to those
extensions of conflict of which the Sen-
ator spoke.
But the President has made his deci-
sion, and we appreciate his burdens and
his great responsibility. I join the Sen-
ator from Oregon in the statement he
made, as I did over a year ago, in appre-
ciation of the President's statement that
he would submit this issue to the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations.
We are acquainted with the reasons
against this course?the fear that the
Soviet Union would veto any resolution
and thus harden its position.
But, if there should be a veto in -the
Security Council, the issue could be re-
ferred to the General Assembly.
I know how difficult it would be to
secure action where the great powers
would be concerned. Nevertheless, this
Is a hopeful course that the President of
the United States will undertake and we
should support him in his effort to se-
cure action by the United Nations. The
Senator from Vermont has pointed out
the task that this country may have to
assume, and in doing this the Senator
from Vermont has rendered the country
a valuable service.
In conclusion, we are beginning to de-
bate issues which should have been un-
dertaken along time ago. We rely upon
1499
the Committee on Foreign Relations. I
said a year ago that the committee
should constantly consider this prob-
lem, and advise the Senate on the sub-
ject. We must work together in this
solemn cause to find an avenue toward
an honorable settlement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS
in the chair),. Is there further morn-
ing business?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I believe that the President had no
choice about resuming bombing and the
other efforts being made by this Nation
to assist South Vietnam.
This Nation is there because the Com-
munist aggressors are there. This is a
part of world struggle that has continued
since 1946, an effort by Communists to
subjugate by force everything they can
subjugate, an effort to take over every-
thing that they can take over.
They are not going to leave the anti-
Communists any area that borders on
Russia and China unless they believe we
have the force to hold them. They have
made that abundantly clear in place
after place. This is a part of that over-
all problem.
The Geneva accords were agreed to.
This Nation was not a party to it. We
knew about it. We were consulted about
It.
The Geneva accords were violated time
and time again by Communist aggression.
We did what we could to help
South Vietnam sustain itself. It was
faced with constant aggression to the
point where our naval vessels were in the
area and were attacked on the high seas
by torpedo boats of North Vietnam.
At that point we voted for a resolution.
We said that we approved measures
directing a strike back at aggression in
the area. We approved of such addi-
tional measures as the President might
deem necessary to resist aggression in
that area.
What did the President do? At that
time we struck back at the bases from
which the enemy vessels were operating
in the waters in the vicinity of North
Vietnam. That was an act of war. But
we did not start it. They did. We
struck back. We authorized the Presi-
dent to take such additional measures
as he deemed necesary.
Those people were sending down orga-
nized forces from North Vietnam and
South Vietnam. The President sent in
forces to help South Vietnam sustain
itself.
Reference has been made to the United
Nations. My understanding of the United
Nations Charter is that members of that
organization agree not to use force
against one another to settle interna-
tional problems, but they do not agree
not to use force when the other fellow
uses force on us.
Red China is not a signatory to the
United Nations Charter. They say that
.the United Nations has no right to be
consulted in this case. The government
in Hanoi is not a signatory to the United
Nations Charter. They will not abide by
a decision not to use force.
We are in a fight. One may call it what
he will, but acts of war are being com-
mitted by both sides against one another.
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1500 CONGRESSIONAL
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Louisiana may have as much time
as he deems necessary.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We hope to
limit that struggle and keep it within
bounds and we hope for a peaceful settle-
ment.
We will discover that when North Viet-
nam thinks they are in a position to de-
feat us before the entire world, with two
other Communist powers behind them.
They are not going to let us out of there,
short of defeating us, if they can.
When we are in a war we should fight
to win. That is what we have done in
the past in any fight when we wished to
prevail.
Any time one goes to the conference
table with the Communist powers they
are going to let it be known in a hurry
that they are not going to give victory at
the peace table that we cannot win on the
battlefield. This country cannot win, if
it cannot stand casualties, and blanches
at the sight of blood.
We have lost 1,500 men. They have
lost 30 times that many, at least. They
have a backward, primitive nation.
If we have arrived at the point where
our determination is so weak and our
support of the President is so little, that
we cannot stand with our President
against a small Communist power, then,
we had better get out of South Vietnam;
and not just Vietnam but all of Asia.
Every friendly leader in the area will
be in a foot race to get out if he has been
on our side; and the others will find some
way to accommodate themselves to the
Communist spirit.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a series of questions?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. When I com-
plete this thought I will be glad to yield
to the Senator from North Carolina.
If the United States cannot stand fast
against Communist aggression, does any-
one think that India is going to stand
against Communist China? Does any-
one think that Pakistan or Indonesia is
going to stand against Communist
China? Who is going to stand against
Communist China when they see that
they cannot count on the United States
to stand by with fortitude?
I yield to the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. ERVIN. I wish to ask the junior
Senator from Louisiana if this is not
true.
When all is said and done, and the
matter is faced with realism, there are
only three possible courses by which we
can put an end to the fighting in
Vietnam.
The first is negotiation. The second
is by winning the war. The third is by
withdrawing or surrendering.
Are there any other alternatives pos-
sible in the Vietnam situation?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator
did not put the question quite this way,
but I assume in the third possibility that
lie stated could include abject surrender
the surrendering of all equipment and
troops to them.
RECORD -- SENATE January 81, 1966
Mr. ERVIN. Is not withdrawal a
surrender?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. At least we
get some of the men home if we with-
draw.
Mr. ERVIN. When one withdraws
from the battlefield one surrenders the
battlefield to the enemy, does he not?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator
is correct.
Mr. ERVIN. Does the Senator from
Louisiana agree with the Senator from
North Carolina that the Prcsident has
done and is doing everything in his power
to obtain a settlement by negotiation and
thus far he has been unable to find any-
body willing to negotiate with him?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. He has done
exactly that.
Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator
from Louisiana agree with the Senator
from North Carolina that communism is
determined to extinguish the light of
liberty all over the face of the earth?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is my
opinion. If the Communists feel that
they can extinguish the lie ht of lib-
erty, they will do everything they can to
get rid of it. They are seeking by every
means to prevail. It is more than
an effort to win over the minds of men.
Any man who agrees with the philosophy
of the freedom and liberty of man is
likely to have his head cut off if he speaks
against his Government as some people
here speak against our Revert anent. We
have seen that in the Soviet Union and
Communist China. People who express
such -views against a Communist state
have their heads chopped off
Mr. ERVIN. Before putting to you
my next question I would like to make
this plain: If I had been running the
United States all by myself during re-
cent years, I would not have placed any
American servicemen in South Vietnam.
But the question confronting America at
this hour is not whether we should put
our servicemen in South Vietnam. They
are already there. Are we not in the
position which Grover Cleveland called
a condition and not a theory?
Mr. TONG of Louisiana. We are. We
have committed ourselves in Vietnam.
Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator
from Louisiana agree with me in the
proposition that if history teaches any-
thing, it teaches that even the most
righteous man cannot live in peace un-
less it pleases his wicked neighbor for
him to do so? Does not the Senator from
Louisiana agree with me in the proposi-
tion that if North Vietnam and those
who back North Vietnam would stop fur-
nishing men and weapons and equip-
ment, the war would cease?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I believe the
Senator is correct about that. He is
correct.
Mr. ERVIN. One more question. De-
spite our great admiration and our great
affection for Members of Congress, is it
not possibly true that the admirals and
generals who have spent their lives
studying war can make a more accurate
determination of what is advisable, not
only to win the war in South Vietnam,
but to protect the lives of American boys
who are already there?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. They can.
That has been their judgment..
Mr. ERVIN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. There has
been some talk about the difficulties of
fighting a war on the mainland of
China. I have heard that statement
put in many different ways. President
Eisenhower has been consulted about
this matter. My best understanding is
that he has repeated his statement of
support once again as to the wisdom of
the course we are pursuing there.
Furthermore, there is a difference in
marching an army off into China and
helping South Vietnam defend itself. I
recall that General MacArthur favored
holding South Korea, but not marching
an army into China itself.
If China should decide to go into
India and bring the people of India
under the domination of the Commu-
nist government of Peiping, it could be
said that in helping India we were be-
coming involved an mainland Asia. No
one has contended that we should not
have helped India or Pakistan to help
defend themselves if they were attacked
by the Soviet Union or some other Com-
munist power.
Our defense positions that we hold in
South Vietnam are every bit as defen-
sible, and in some respects much more
defensible, than those that we had when
we resisted China in Korea. We did
not fight a land war in China. To say
that we should not risk a war to resist
aggression, and help a friendly power in
Asia resist Communist aggression is
quite another thing.
It is always possible to find military
experts who would disagree, but the pre-
vailing view is that we can and should
help the people there to defend them-
selves from communism.
Our positions in South Vietnam are
excellent compared with those of our
adversaries. We are located where we
can haul in the materiel needed for our
troops. Our adversary has great diffi-
culty in getting in an adequate amount
for his needs. We can haul in large
quantities of supplies, as much as we
need to supply our troops.
Unless and until Red China and any
other Communist powers come to decide
that they really want to live in peaceful
circumstances with the United States?
and certainly Red China has not decided
that?neither has Hanoi?they are go-
ing to continue to probe our will, probe
our determination, test our zeal, and
test our unity by such activities as we
are confronted with in South Vietnam.
When they use force against us, the only
way to stop it is to use force in return.
That is what we have been doing.
It has been said that we cannot win,
or at least that our difficulties of win-
ning are insurmountable. Someone has
said that. it is necessary to have a .10-to-
1 advantage to wipe out the guerrilla
forces.
My underst.m,lirr;, of wPrfare is that
when two nations fight and one decides
that it will resort to guerrilla activity, it
requires great numbers to combat the
guerrillas. But the way to get a 10-to-1
majority in most wars is to keep fight-
ing and winning until the adversary has
less than a 10-to-1 ratio.
In the Civil War, when the South had
paid a tremendous price in casualties, it
2 1 D191571301,4415ROCTO
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January 31, 1966' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
was suggested the General Lee should
break his army up into guerrilla bands
and that their chances would be better
to win the war as a guerrilla effort.
Perhaps the war could have been carried
on on that basis, but with the war con-
tinuing and one adversary winning and
the other losing, there comes a time
when the side that is losing must decide
to quit.
With the dangers this Nation faces, I
say we have no hope to come out of this
situation in any honorable way other
than to fight it and win it. If we cannot
win it, we should at least make a genuine
effort to win. If I do say so, that leaves
a lot to be desired, so far as what the
Nation can do.
What can we do to help? In my judg-
ment, the best thing to do here is to unite
behind our Commander in Chief. He is
the one who has to bear the brunt of the
responsibility. He has to decide what
we will do. He must take the final step.
He must make the final plan for victory
or for the success our forces may achieve
while fighting on any battlefield.
It has been suggested that this Nation
appeal to the United Nations; that the
President request Ambassador Goldberg
to suggest that the United Nations look
into this matter. We shall find that that
will be a rather frustrating experience.
The Communist powers will be ready to
say every false thing that their vicious
tongues can utter against the United
States. They will call us every vicious
word and name that can be said about
us. If we are able to get any kind of
resolution to uphold us through the Se-
curity Council, in all probability the So-
viet Union will veto it. After 2 or 3 more
months of denunciation by a number of
large and small powers that are Commu-
nist or friendly to Communist powers,
eventually the General Assembly might
vote on the question. If any action at all
were taken that would favor our side, the
Communists would not respect it. They
would not abide by it. Once again, we
would be confronted with the fact that
we had a resolution from the General
Assembly, but Communist China is not
a member of the United Nations. Nei-
ther is the Hanoi government.
If the resolution is favorable to us
they would refuse to abide by such a
resolution. Then, we would be back
where we started. Who would do the
fighting? The situation would be as it
has always been: We would have to do
the fighting.
I applaud the President's determination
to make greater efforts and to use our
forces so as to make the side of anti-
communism prevail in South Vietnam.
I pray that we will prevail.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. I have been much inter-
ested in the Senator's spirited defense
of the administration. But at this time
I cannot understand why the adminis-
tration needs any defense. Certainly in
my remarks I emphasized the sincerity
of the President in desiring peace. I
called upon the American people to make
such sacrifices as may become necessary
to win the war or come as near winning
it as possible. So I do not see why the
President needs any defense.
I have expressed the hope that the
President's judgment would be right;
the hope that he has taken the right
course; and the hope that the war might
be ended satisfactorily within a short
time?perhaps not so quickly as Sec-
retary McNamara promised at one time,
when he said that most of our boys would
be home by Christmas. That was 2
years ago.
But the Senator from Louisiana made
one statement that bothered me some-
what.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not
undertaking to quarrel with the views
of the Senator from Vermont; I am
simply undertaking to state my own
views. I find some things in the Sena-
tor's speech with which I agree, and per-
haps some things with which I do not
agree. But other Senators have had
their say, and I am simply stating my
views. I am not seeking to take issue
with the Senator from Vermont.
Mr. AIKEN. I am not disagreeing. I
think taxes ought to be raised, according
to the President's request; but the Presi-
dent did not begin to go far enough in
order to wage war in any satisfactory
measure. ,
But what disturbed me a little were the
remarks of the Senator from Louisiana
that we have to defend democracy wher-
ever we find it in the world. He pointed
out India as one of the countries we
might be called upon to defend. I was
wondering whether the Senator, well in-
formed as he is on administration mat-
ters, could say whether there is any point
beyond which we would not go to defend
Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, In-
dia, the African countries, or any other
place where democracy might be threat-
ened? Is there any point beyond which
we would not go? '
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I do not
know the answer to that question. But
there is no place in Asia where it would
do us much goad to make a stand if we
were to pull out and leave after we had
committed ourselves, as we have in Viet-
nam. I do not believe the people would
trust us or count on us, feeling that they
could not count on the United States to
fulfill its commitments.
I should say that all such situations
would have to be judged by the circum-
stances of the particular case. I would
certainly hope that where such situations
arose, the United Nations could be help-
ful to us, just as it was in the difficulty
between India and Pakistan. So the situ-
ation does depend on circumstances.
Suppose the Communists decide that
they will try to take Berlin again, as they
decided sometime ago they would take it.
How far would we go?
President Kennedy said that we would
go as far as necessary, but we would not
let them take it. In this case, once we
are committed, I think we must continue,
if we can find a way to an honorable
peace, I would strongly favor following
such a course; but if not, we shall have
to fight unless we are willing to let the
Communists take over.
Mr. AIKEN. On the 2d of June 1964,
I took the position that the United States
1501
had an obligation to South Vietnam;
that we might have to station troops in
Thailand, provided Thailand wanted
them and would cooperate fully with
their own forces. But at the same
time, I questioned the advisability of un-
dertaking to police the whole world or to
escalate the war further. That is why I
asked whether there is a point beyond
which we cannot go.
In this case, I think perhaps we have
been mousetrapped into letting Russia
and China choose the arena for a major
showdown. I do not know for sure, how-
ever. Cuba would have been much
nearer to us. But Russia did not choose
to have a showdown in Cuba. It goes
without saying that if Russia was able to
put missiles in Cuba, she can put many
more in Vietnam without our knowing
about it.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I approve of
what was done with regard to taking the
missiles out of Cuba. I think the Sen-
ator will find I am on record as saying
that by not making a stronger effort to
furnish more military aid in the Bay of
Pigs invasion we made a mistake.
Mr. AIKEN. I hope, when the Presi-
dent has his tax bill before us, the Sen-
ator will support him in his request to
retain the tax on automobiles and phone
calls. I think what he is asking for will
be but a drop in the bucket compared to
what will be needed.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The budget
provides that twice as much will be
needed in 1967 in Vietnam as was needed
in 1966. That is provided in the Presi-
dent's message. It may be necessary to
do more than that. The President has
said that if more is needed, he will re-
quest what is necessary.
Mr. President, that concludes what I
have had to say. It seems to me we are
not going to get any peacekeeping force
in Vietnam to head off the Communist
aggressors. I have doubts that the
United Nations will make a useful con-
tribution to this matter. But since the
President has indicated he wishes to lay
the matter before the United Nations, he
is entitled to our support as our Com-
mander in Chief. I hope the President
may find a way to settle honorably the
controversy in which we find ourselves.
Until that time, we should fight to de-
feat the aggressors.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I was
pleased to hear the distinguished Sena-
tor from Louisiana finally conclude by
saying that, though he had previously
doubted the advisability and efficacy of
taking the issue to the United Nations,
nevertheless he intertained some hope
that it might be beneficial. I share in
that conclusion.
A basic and, I fear, grievous error has
been committed over a period of years in
step-by-step treatment of the difficulty
in Vietnam as if it were, and in permit-
ting it to become, an American war.
This violates the principle of collective
security.
In the principle and practice of col-
lective security, the free world may be
able to contain the surge of international
communism. Standing alone, it is ques-
tionable that the United States has the
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1502 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE January 31, 1966
power and the resources and the wisdom
so to do.
This is a serious hour in the United
States and in the world. I know there
will be those who will be critical of the
Senate in conducting what may appear
to some to be a divisive debate in this
hour. Senators have made errors of
judgment, but so have three Presidents.
So have the heads of our armed serv-
ices. Unfortunately, there has been a
plethora of mistakes, and in that all of
us have shared.
Where are we? The Communists have
us committed on a battlefield where we
suffer the greatest possible disadvan-
tages. They have us standing there vir-
tually alone. I hope that one objective
of the President's move with respect to
the United Nations is to enlist the aid
of the nations of the free world.
It was for the purpose of averting the
kind of catastrophe that now threatens
the world, or to mitigate a catastrophe,
or to mediate such a threat of catastro-
phe, that the United Nations was formed.
Mr. President, it is late. The hour is
very late, I fear. But let us hope it is not
too late.
Some people seem to regard Vietnam
as the end of the earth, or the center of
the earth.. It is neither.
The vital interests of the United States
can be found in many places, and in
many places they are greater than they
are in Vietnam. We can no more ex-
clude those other vital interests or ne-
glect them than we can afford to ignore
the threat to peace in Vietnam.
The important thing in this conflict
is not Vietnam, North or South; but,
rather, it is the equation among the
three leading world powers today.
The power struggle in the world in-
volves the vital interests of the United
States. Indeed, it involves the survival
of the humanity of the world.
Shall we pursue a course which prom-
ises one of two results?first, the healing
of the breach between Communist China
and Communist Russia, out of which we
have taken some hope in that there was
a fissure in the monolithic unity of inter-
national communism? Shall we pursue
a course which bogs the United States
down in a war with China, leaving Rus-
sia free to work her machinations in
Africa, in Latin America, in the Medi-
terranean, in Eastern Europe, or in
other places? Or shall the principal
thrust of our Government be to contain
the limits of this war within bounds
which we can reasonably hope will be
manageable, and enlist the offices of the
United Nations and other neutral pow-
ers and other great influences such as
Pone Paul, the intellectuals of the world,
all men of good will, to find a way to
smother this raging fire?
1. hope and believe that it is this latter
course which the President has chosen.
Mr. President, let us be candid and ac-
knowledge that there are many voices in
Washington today who say that it would
be easier to knock China out now than
it would be 10 years from now. I have
heard it frequently. I believe it is fair
to say that it is partly because of that
ng insistence that the Senate Foreign
notations Committee has come alive to
Trrrrkrr"67
Its public.. responsibility its constitutional
responsibility.
I was in the Congress after the end of
World War II, and I heard voices giving
the same message, voices from the iden-
tical. sources from which I hear them
now.
It will be better, they then said, to
knock out Russia now than to wait until
she has nuclear weapons. Fortunately,
we did not follow the advice of preven-
tive war then. There has been seine rap-
prochement between the Soviet Union
a:nd the United States; we arc not now
threatening to destroy each other, though
events have been marching step by step
as if inexorably to the point where a
world conflagration might ensue. Gad
forbid.
Let not, the extremists prevail. If the
extremists do not prevail, there is yet
hope for mankind to avoid a world war.
I have been deeply disturbed that it
has been dangerously near. I frequent-
ly hear the phrase used, "land war in
Asia." Mr. President, once this Nation
were committed to a war with China,
public opinion in this country would not
permit our men to be matched man to
man with the masses of China.
A war between the United Ftates and
China would quickly degenerate into a
nuclear war. That is my belief. It may
be that my view is in error, but feeling
as I do that the important thing involved
is the equation among the three great
powers and the danger of war between
those three great powers, I have risen to-
day to speak these thoughts.
The most hopeful event of today is
the reference of this matter to the United
Nations. I am not advised of the form
of the reference, or the manner of the
resoMtion, but it is a step in the right
direction that we take the matter there,
where the pressure of world opinion can ?
be focused.
I am not sure how helpful or how ef-
fective it will be, but it is the brightest
hope of the day.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, it had
not been my purpose to enter into de-
bate at this time. I feel that the words
of the President of the United States re-
quire careful study and consideration?
a:nd this will involve no criticism of any-
one for the fine contributions made in
this morning's discussion--but any Sen-
ator who has not heretofore prepared a
careful, considered, and extensive anal-
ysis of the situation cannot speak with
beneli.t to the Senate or the country.
The events of these days and of this pe-
riod must not to be treated by off-the-
cuff speeches.
It was my purpose, when the parlia-
mentary situation of the Senate per-
mitted, to make some observations about
the conduct of the war, commenting par-
ticularly on the lack of candor with
which Congress, the press, and the peo-
ple have been treated, and commenting
somewhat on the role played in all of
these harrowing operations by the Sec-
retary of Defense. This morning, I am
impelled to make only one observation,
a:nd that is occasioned by the words of
the President of the United States which
have been commented on with much the
same approach that I have, but so elo-
e1eau?r2t73071
quently and to the point, by the distin-
guished Senator from Tennessee tMr.
GORE].
Whatever else may be the situation,
whatever mistakes have been made in
the past, I, for one, am compelled to ob-
serve that if mistakes have been made,
Congress cannot divest itself from par-
ticipating in those mistakes, and that the
vote that we cast?and the Senator from
New Hampshire participated in voting at
that time--involves us with the Presi-
dent in the conduct of this. conflict, a
conflict from which we cannot retreat
with honor to ourselves, or safety to the
free-loving and peace-loving peoples of
the world at the present moment. I sup-
port the President's decision to resume
bombing. We can do no less as long as
there is an American boy fighting on the
ground in Vietnam.
However, the point in the President's
remarks this morning that I found par-
ticularly encouraging was the reference
of this matter to the United Nations. The
words he uttered in approving the posi-
tion taken by many, including His Holi-
ness, Pope Paul, insisting that solu-
tions of problems we are facing in south-
east Asia shall not be a unilateral solu-
tion.
I have never believed that the United
States could get to the conference table
and effect a unilateral peace at this time.
I doubt whether the President thought
so. I suspect that these long negotia-
tions and endeavors?this peace offen-
sive?has been largely for the purpose?a
purpose which I hope has been accom-
plished?of impressing the world with
the fact that this country desires peace
whatever the attitude of our enemies.
I regret that the comments on this
matter of participation by the United
Nations as an organization at this time
have, in most cases, been either too cyni-
cal or too hopeful. There are those who
continue to believe that the United Na-
tions in its present situation and under
its present handicaps has the power and
the influence to bring about peace any-
where.
There are those, on the other hand,
who persist, in the belief that because of
the handicaps and obstacles it faces, the
United Nations as a peacemaking and
peacekeeping organization is useless.
Such people believe we are only making
an idle gesture when we try to enlist the
United Nations.
The Senator from New Hampshire does
not adhere to either of those positions.
The Senator from New Hampshire feels
very strongly that the United States of
America has sufficient influence in the
world, and sufficient power, if it chose to
exert it, to make the United Nations or-
ganization face these problems.
The Senator from New Hampshire
feels that this country has been a1-
together too lenient, altogether too lack
ing in firmness of approach, in firm-
ness of utterance, in steadfastness of
purpose, in failing to demand that
the United Nations perform its func-
tions. When we begin to talk to the
United Nations in a way that indicates
to the membership of that Organization
we are saying what we mean and that wa
mean what we say, then and then onlo
'!"t
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January 31, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
will those nations within that organiza-
tion who are supposed to be?and at
heart I hope and believe are?on the side
of freedom, the side of law instead of
war, of peace instead of bloodshed, will
really begin to function.
Mr. President, I doubt whether they
are going to face that responsibility un-
til we face ours within the United Na-
tions.
Let me suggest one point, Mr. Presi-
dent?the only point that I have not
heard suggested in the discussions of the
situation in southeast Asia.
I agree with those who have said that
this must not be purely an American war.
So long as the nations of Asia can be
given the impression that it is the white
man fighting against the yellow man?
even though there may be some yellow
men on our side?just so long can it be
unjustly asserted that this is an Ameri-
can war, a war of American aggression
and imperialism, just so long will the
nations of Asia who, however they may
feel in their minds about communism and
the principles involved, in their hearts
will find their sympathy to be with their
own race, against the white man, who
has been exploiting them for so many
generations.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from New Hampshire yield at
that point?
Mr. COTTON. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. I commend the Senator
from. New Hampshire very highly for the
statement he is making. I dismiss the
comment about his remarks being off the
cuff. The Senator from New Hampshire
always speaks well extemporaneously;
and once again is making a valuable
contribution to this historic debate.
If the Senator from New Hampshire
will permit me to make one more com-
ment in reference to the United Nations,
I completely agree with the observation
that he has made about the United Na-
tions. Over and over again, I have
stated .for the past 21/2 years that I did
not know whether it would work, but
that we should try. I have stated, in
speech after speech, that we would place
the members of the United Nations in
the posture of finding whether they are
going to live up to their obligations un-
der the charter; but there has been no
justification, in my opinion, for their not
living up to our obligations. That is why
I have pleaded to carry out our obliga-
tions under the charter and take the is-
sue to the United Nations and make
clear, as the Senator has declared, that
they should live up to their obligations
and proceed with the peacekeeping pro-
cedures of the United Nations to stop
this war.
Mr. COTTON. I thank the Senator
from Oregon. I did not want to take too
much time in the morning hour for too
long remarks, but I wish to finish the
point I was about to make, that we should
avoid making this a unilateral war a war
conducted by the United States of Amer-
ica, with only token assistance or par-
ticipation by others, particularly the
Asiatics.
No. 15-5
But there is one point I have not heard
emphasized. This morning in the Sen-
ate we are prone to feel some gloom and
discouragement as to the prospect of an
early victory. Because of that we fail to
ask ourselves what happens if we win.
It is hard for the Senator from New
Hampshire to believe that after all the
billions of dollars we have invested in our
military organization and our national
defense, with all the talent, all the re-
sources, and all the power of this great
country, we cannot bring this war to a
successful conclusion. And I mean con-
ventional weapons; we must not resort to
nuclear weapons.
But even now, suppose we bring this
war to a successful conclusion, repel the
aggressors, and establish boundaries be-
tween North and South Vietnam, what
happens then?
Mr. President, we not only do not want
a unilateral war and a unilateral victory
by the United States over its foes; we do
not want a unilateral peace to be en-
forced by the United States alone. Even
if we take the most optimistic viewpoint
about the conclusion of hostilities in
southeast Asia, how many years would
our men be guarding the borders, as they
are today between North and South
Korea? How many years would they be
policing, and enforcing a successful, vic-
torious peace between North and South
Vietnam? That, too, we want to avoid.
The only way to avoid a unilateral war
and a unilateral peace, the only way not
to have it a purely American war and an
American enforced peace, is through the
concerted action of other nations; and
the United Nations, imperfect though it
may be, is the only instrument at hand
for such united action. We have re-
garded the United Nations?and I think
justifiably?with much disappointment.
It has performed some very constructive
functions in preserving the peace in many
countries, which those who are critical
of it are prone to forget. On the other
hand, we know that it has thus far
failed in preserving peace between the
two great protagonists in the world?
the free nations and the Communist bloc.
This is understandable with a Com-
munist veto in the Security Council and
many new and neutral nations in the
General Assembly.
Mr. President, we have been paying
far more than our share of the costs?
certainly the peacekeeping costs and, to
an extent, the regularly assessed dues
and costs of the United Nations. Mem-
bers of the Senate and Members of the
House, the press, and the people in many
sections of the country have been pro-
testing. I never go home to visit with
my people that someone does not ask,
"Why don't we make the other members
of the United Nations pay their dues?"
I have never failed to resist those
views. Instead, I have tried to explain
and to discourage the feelings of our citi-
zens who think we should insist on every
nation paying its just share in the United
Nations, or else have us get out and scut-
tle and let the United Nations go where
the League of Nations went. I count the
cost very low, even though we bridle a
1503
bit about paying more than our share.
I count the cost really low to contribute
what we are obliged to contribute to the
only organization in this world that is
organized for and dedicated to peace in-
stead of war, to justice, and to the pro-
tection of the weak against aggression.
Because the United Nations does not
practice the principle of one man, one
vote laid down by the Supreme Court in
our own country, the United Nations has
constantly been taking in the new, small,
emerging nations, each of which has the
same vote and the same power in the
General Assembly, at least, as does the
United States of America.
Year by year, we have seen looming
on the horizon certain events that some
of us gravely deplore. Year by year, the
best that our friendly United Nations
have felt that they could do for us in
many cases has been to abstain from
voting. Year by year, by a constantly
narrowing vote, we have been approach-
ing the time when into the United Na-
tions might be admitted, or invited, a
nation or nations that have never once
even professed, to say nothing of show-
ing by deed, their desire to maintain
peace in the world and to protect the
weak against aggression by the strong.
The time may come when that will hap-
pen. So far as the Senator from New
Hampshire is concerned, it will happen
after every effort has been made to pre-
vent it, because I cannot see how the
United Nations would ever be strength-
ened by admitting into its body nations
that will not even profess a desire to ful-
fill the peacekeeping functions of the
United Nations. However, it may hap-
pen; and when it does, we shall hear
across this country the greatest outcry
we have ever heard to have the United
States scuttle the United Nations and to
get out.
What has been said heretofore will be
a mild, mere whisper, compared to what
will be said then. Even though I have
raised my voice constantly against the
admission of Red China into the United
Nations, and shall continue to do so, I
am not prepared to say that in any con-
tingency that can be imagined I would
suggest our deserting the United Nations,
so long as-there is the slightest hope that
with our participation and assistance the
peace of the world may yet be main-
tained. If that hope should disappear,
the situation would be different. But so
long as it is certain that if we should
withdraw from the United Nations at any
time in the future, the United Nations
would be doomed?and that would be a
grave decision for this country to make?
with all those things looking us in the
face, the question of appealing to the
United Nations concerning the present
conflict in South Vietnam or southeast
Asia becomes almost minor, grave though
it is, explosive though it is, dangerous as
It is, and tragic as it is. It becomes al-
most minor, because the United States
has reached a point?and we should real-
ize it, and I commend the President for
speaking of it?where we must decide
whether we are acting firmly and aggres-
sively in insisting that the United Nations
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1504 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
be a functioning body for peace, and be
absolutely unyielding, and adamant in
the position we take.
For many years, the Senator from New
Hampshire. when he was a Member of
the House and later as a Member of the
Senate, voted for every foreign aid bill.
But for the past 4 years he has voted
against foreign aid bills, not because he
does not believe in foreign aid, but be-
cause he believes that foreign aid has
become improperly administered and im-
properly channeled. He believes we have
come to the end of the road in lavishly
and indiscriminately dishing out foreign
aid to a hundred nations.
We have been weak kneed and irreso-
lute. The State Department, I know,
has many explanations. I have heard
some of them. I suppose that some of
the distinguished members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, too, have
many answers to this charge. But I say
that so long as we are so yielding, so long
as we lack the firmness to stand up for
our rights and stop trying to buy our
peace, stop trying to bribe people, and to
stop trying to ingratiate ourselves with
people?until we stand up and speak with
a clarion voice in the world, we shall con-
tinue to be spending American lives not
only in southeast Asia, but all across the
world. So long as we are willing to fight
these battles single handed, so long as
we are willing to finance and to pay the
price of' giving, giving, and giving to na-
tions, regardless of their willingness to
stand with us, we shall appeal in vain
to our friends in the U.N. The idea that
there is something narrow, something
selfish, something un-Christian about
saying that we will not give aid to a na-
tion until it proves and demonstrates by
deeds, not words, that it stands on the
side of peace and on the side of freedom
and self-determination on the part of the
weak peoples of the world, is dead wrong
The situation has reached the point
where other nations have come to regard
the support of this country militarily,
financially, spiritually, and in every other
way, as an inherent right, and we have
permitted that concept to stand.
Mr. President, the real ray of hope in
what the President says is the indication
that he intends to put real pressure on
the United Nations to get off of its knees
and stand on its feet and become an im-
portant factor and force for peace in the
world.
I hope he means that. I hope he
means that from this hour the American
people can look to the President for that
kind of leadership. I have the very
m:eatest respect and deepest affection
Mr the President resulting from the
years that we were associated with him
in the floor of this Senate.
T. must say very frankly, for these are
not times to mince words, that I have a
high regard and respect for the Secre-
tary of State, but I do not want to see the
Sccretary of State and the State Depart-
ment waging this war.
I must add that in all of my 19 years
that I have served in the Congress there
has not been a single Cabinet officer, Re-
publican or Democrat, in whom I have
not had confidence, even though I dis-
agreed with them.
pilov1.011.140 NOMPORIMAROW......01110.7137757
FOr
There has not been a single one I
could not trust until we began to suffer
under the ministrations of Secretary
McNamara. I cannot speak of him with
the same confidence and the same re-
spect that I can speak of the Secretary
of State.
I believe that the resignation of Secre-
tary :McNamara would do more toward
winning this war and strengthening our
defense posture than the addition of
400,000 men in South Vietnam.
But the President is the Commander
in Chief. I pray to God that his refer-
ence to the United Nations, the demand
that the United Nations assert itself, is
not a mere pious hope, but that it rep-
resents a firm determination with re-
spect to the United Nations, of which we
are not only a part but the part that
makes it go, that he intends to require
action by that body as the price of our
continued support.
This war must cease to be an Ameri-
can war. The peace that follows must
not be an American peace, to be enforced
unilaterally by this country and having
frontiers in Asia patrolled by American
boys.
That is the ardent hope of this Sen-
ator.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COTTON. I yield to the Senator
from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President. I wish
to say by way of comment on this great
speech by the Senator from New Hamp-
shire that my reaction is amen and hal-
lelujah at the same time. It is a speech
that has been long overdue on the floor
of the Senate. I congratulate the Sen-
ator.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there may be inserted in the
RECORD a transcript of the CBS news
forum yesterday afternoon on the sub-
ject of "Vietnam Perspective?The Con-
gress and the War," which was partici-
pated in by Senators CLARK, MORSE,
1VItrNaT, and STENNIS, and Representative
BOGGS,.
There being no objection, the tran-
script was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE?THE CONGRESS AND
THE WAR
(As broadcast over the CBS televit ion net-
work Sunday, January 30, 1966)
Guests: Senators JOSEPH CLARK, Democrat, of
Pennsylvania; 'WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of
Oregon; KARL E. MUNDT, Republican, of
South Dakota; JOHN STENNIS, Democrat, of
Mississippi, Representative HALE BOGGS,
Democrat, of Louisiana.
CBS new correspondent: Eric Sevareid.
ANNOUNCER. In its continuing special cov-
erage of the conflict in Vietnam, CBS News
presents "Vietnam Perspective, the Congress
and the War." And to lead the discussion,
here is CBS News Correspondent Eric Seva-
reici.
Mr. SEVAREID. Good afternoon.
The United States now has a quarter-mil-
lion soldiers, sailors, and airmen in and near
the divided land called Vietnam. More ma-
rines have just landed. We are in a major
war if not a great one. Since Christmas Eve,
no American bombs have fallen on North
Vietnam which the Government of Lyndon B.
Johnson regards as the real motivating
source, the real headquarters of the attempt
to take over all of Vietnam.
January 31, 1966
This bombing pause was to give the Hanoi
regime time to think about peace negotia-
tions, we hoped. The President says the
enemy has not responded and Ho Chi Minh's
statement of yesterday does appear to be a
rather flat refusal.
Here in Washington there is a general con-
viction that we are now about to resume
bombing North Vietnam and there is a feel-
ing, strong if somewhat vague, that this will
mean the casting of the die, no turning
back, and that anything could then hap-
pen?perhaps military victory, perhaps the
beginning of peace talks, perhaps eventually
War with China itself.
The bombing pause also gave the Congress
of the United States time to think, and in
the last few days many second thoughts have
been expressed. Even the President's legal
authority for making war in Vietnam is ques-
tioned by some. The long-awaited great
debate in Congress about this war apparently
has started.
In the next hour and a half the lines and
the texture of that debate will, we should
think, be reflected by what is said around
this table by six Members of the Congress,
men who represent at least roughly the full
spectrum of thought on Capitol Hill.
Let me say at this point that this city of
Washington and its surroundings are covered
by the heaviest snowdrifts in many years
and these men have come to this city today
by tow car, police car, and on foot to keep
this engagement.
Let me introduce them around the table.
First, Senator JOHN STENNIS, of Mississippi,
ranking member of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee,
Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, member
of the Foreign Relations Committee, perhaps
the Senate's most outspoken opponent of
our Vietnam policy.
Representative HALE Boccs, of Louisiana,
the Democratic whip in the House.
Senator Mau. MUNDT, of South Dakota,
member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator JOSEPH CLARK, of Pennsylvania,
also a member of that committee.
Representative GERALD FORD, the Repub-
lican leader in the House was to have been
here. He ma,y yet make it. He is coming
from the snowdrifts of Virginia. If he does
make it, there will be a chair for him.
Well, gentlemen, however we got into this
war and under whatever commitments and
authorizations, the immediate question in
most people's minds seems to be how we go
about it from here on out.
A few responsible Americans say we should
simply get out of Vietnam. Some argue for
a holding defensive action from the bases we
already have there. Others want us to pur-
sue an active, hard-hitting battle by all pos-
sible means including the bombing of North
Vietnam again.
I would like to start this part of the dis-
cussion as to what we are to do now with
Senators STENNIS and MORSE.
Senator STENNIS.
Senator STENNIS. When we first sent troops
Into Vietnam in 1954 I strenuously opposed
the movement on the Senate floor because I
thought it might lead to war and that we
would be in there and have to fight it alone.
But regardless of the original situation, the
wisdom of going in at all, we are there now
and I have reached the painful conclusion
and I have lived closely with this the last
2 years as chairman of the Preparedne:8
Subcommittee, I have reached the painful
conclusion that we must see it through. We
must fight it through if necessary to a min,
tary victory or to honorable peace terms.
Now, we have already put the American
flag in issue. We have committed our boys.
The flag and our men have been fired on.
Blood has been lost. Over 1,800 men have
been killed. Our honor and our prestige are
both at stake. And that is why I say even
though costly it may be. and however far we
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1505
may have to go, to back off now would be
more costly and would cost us more in the
long run in additional uprisings, outbreaks
in Asia, in South America, even in Europe
Itself, and perhaps in Africa.
Now, it has become clear to me that the
Communists in Asia have firmly decided to
make this war a test, a test of our military
power, how much will we have to use it,
and more than that, a test of our national
purpose and our will to win.
They believe, I think, that a long, grinding,
hard war on the ground will drain away our
willpower and that we will finally withdraw;
our way to easy peace, largely on their terms.
So I think now we must make a national
decision that it is our purpose to win and
then set about to do the things that are
necessary for that victory, and, of course, I
think that will include applying military
force to break this stalement we are in now
where we can't possibly win without more
force.
We must strengthen our forces and move
forward, and that means we are driven to
resumption of bombing of targets in North
Vietnam as a necessary part of the support of
our men that are already on the battlefield.
That includes powerplants and petroleum
supplies, fuel supplies, ports, harbors, and I
think on that point that after the President
as Commander in Chief has made the de-
cision as to whether or not we resume the
bombing?I think we should?then the mili-
tary, professional military men can well select
the targets and that we in the Congress
should not worry about that.
I believe that if we do not proceed along
this line, we can expect a continued stale-
mate, a long, long, bloody, unbearable war
that could last for 10 or 15 years, and also
that would bleed us and bleed us and that Is
the Communist line, their hope.
As I said, if we don't make it here, we will
have to make it elsewhere in many places.
Mr. SEVAREID. Thank you, Senator STENNIS.
Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon.
Senator MORSE. Well, as my very much re-
spected friend, JOHN STENNIS, knows, I think
he was completely right in 1954. I shared his
view that it was a mistake to go in. We
should not be in there. And I think it is
still a mistake, and I think he is wrong now
in advocating that we escalate this war and
for the reasons that I will give briefly now
and expand them later.
First, I want to say that I am perfectly
willing to rest my entire case upon the re-
port of the Mansfield committee, the com-
mittee composed of Senator MANSFIELD, our
majority leader, Senator MUSKIE, of Maine,
Senator INOUYE, of Hawaii, Senator AIKEN,
who is the dean of the Republicans in the
Senate, and Senator BOGGS, of Delaware, the
report that they made after they came back
from their Asian tour entitled "The Vietnam
Conflict, the Substance and the Shadow."
And you find in this report many warnings
to the American people in opposition to the
major thesis that my good friend from
Mississippi has just sought to defend. But?.
and I wish that the American press would
start printing that report in installments so
that the American people can see it, for the
facts of this report have got to get out to the
American people if we are going to avoid the
slaughter, in my judgments, of tens upon
tens of thousands of American boys in Asia
for the next many years. Because you are
not going to end the war in Asia by forcing
the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to a
surrender table. A surrender table will never
be a peace table.
The major thesis I want to defend this
afternoon is that we are without a scintilla
of international law right to follow the course
of action that we are following in Vietnam.
Sad for me to say it, but the American people
must face the ugly reality. We are an inter-
natioanl outlaw in South Vietnam. We have
no right under the U.N. Charter. We have
no right under the Geneva Accords to be in
there. We stand in violation of one section
of the Geneva accords after another.
Let me take, for example, our setting up
the puppet government in South Vietnam.
The Geneva accords didn't provide for two
governments in Vietnam. It provided for
two military zones, one in the north and one
in the south, to which the French military
forces repaired; provided for a 2-year period
for elections in South Vietnam, to call for
the unification of the area, to provide for
free elections on the part of the Vietnamese
people. Who stopped it? Our country
stopped it. We took a Vietnamese exile out
of New York City and Washington, D.C., by
the name of Diem. We financed him, we
militarized him, we set him up as a puppet
government in South Vietnam in clear vio-
lation of the literal language of the Vietnam
accords,
I am at a complete loss to understand
why we would violate those accords al-
though at the time we didn't sign them, al-
though we said we would accept them as
principles of international law. The sad,
ugly reality in that chapter is going to be
written against us in the history of inter-
national law. It is the United States that
from the very beginning was really the major
aggressor in South Vietnam.
Next, may I say that I have here 13 articles
of the United Nations Charter which in my
judgment we stand in violation of as far as
carrying out our obligations there. What is
my remedy? Not to get out. I agree you
can't get out but bring others in. If we
just try to get out because of what we have
done in South Vietnam, there would be the
greatest blood bath I think in human his-
tory, but what we need to do is to bring
others in on a peacekeeping basis and not a
warmaking basis.
So I applaud again, although I had advo-
cated the use of the United Nations, I ap-
plaud the Pope's suggestion that this matter
be submitted to the United Nations for ar-
bitration. That is one of the outs and one
of these articles I point out will provide for
that.
But I close these opening remarks by say-
ing in my judgment let the American people
face the fact that if you think you can win a
war in Vietnam that will not lead to a mas-
sive war in all of Asia, you are mistaken, and
you are going to have to keep hundreds of
thousands of American troops over there for
decades to police Asia if you try it.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, I want to turn to
Representative HALE BOGGS, of Louisiana.
Are you this pessimistic about it?
Mr. BOGGS. Well, Eric, remember, I saw you
the night that I returned and I was not
pessimistic then and I am less pessimistic
now.
Let me say that I am in total and com-
plete disagreement with Senator MORSE,,
Senator MORSE is consistent in that he was
one of the two U.S. Senators who voted
against the Vietnam resolution of 1964. His
position has not changed, it is not different.
I would say, however, that what he advo-
cates would lead to only one thing as it was
described in a very thoughtful editorial in
the Washington Post this morning entitled
"Unconditional Surrender."
Now, one doesn't become an expert by go-
ing to a country and spending a few days, a
few weeks or an unlimited period of time,
but I think one does acquire a feel that he
doesn't have unless he does go.
I discovered several things in Vietnam.
No. 1, our position is only now being felt
there. In order to judge our posture, I tried
to put myself in the shoes of the other man,
look at it from the point of view of Hanoi,
of Peiping, and as I see it, their situation is
much different from what it was 6 months
ago.
We keep referring to 1954 and the years in
between. Actually, however, we have only
had power in Vietnam since last summer
when we started moving troops in.
At that time there is no question about
the fact that that war was being lost. Vil-
lage after village was being subjected by the
Vietcong. The only really secure area in all
of South Vietnam was Saigon.
Today the situation is quite different. It
is different in a great many ways. The peo-
ple have hope. I think they know what they
are confronted with. There is an American
presence, and I might say further, Eric, that
that presence has had a profound impact
elsewhere in the area.
Here on the wall?I don't know whether
our viewers can see it or not?is a map of
the world. Vietnam cannot be disassoci-
ated from the rest of the world any more ?
than Greece and Turkey could be disassoci-
ated with the rest of the world after World
War II, and the same arguments that Sena-
tor MORSE makes with respect to Vietnam
were made with respect to Greece and Tur-
key after World War II. And the impact in
the other areas is already being felt, particu-
larly in areas like Indonesia where just a year
ago the Communists practically had control
and where today that control has been sub-
stantially eliminated.
Mr. SEVAREID. Representative BOGGS, I
think later on in this program we want to
talk a good deal about this question of the
effect in other parts of the world and our
Whole posture in foreign policy in the world
as a whole because of this war.
Do I gather from what you are saying that
YOU would put the emphasis now on fighting,
not on an attempt to get peace negotiations?
Mr. BOGGS. I would subscribe to what Sen-
ator STENNIS said, that there are military
decisions that have to be made and these
must be made by the Commander in Chief,
the President of the United States, in con-
sultation with his military people.
There is emphasis on fighting, Eric. There
are 200,000 men there and the idea that we
can let those men stay there with one hand
tied behind their back is one that I don't
subscribe to. I think the effect would be that
the American people would not support that
type of action.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CLARK?
Senator CLARK. I find myself substantially
more in agreement with Senator MORSE than
with my good friends from Mississippi and
Louisiana. And in particular I rely a good
deal more on the Mansfield report than does
my good friend HALE Bos whose views
about the facts appear to be quite different
from the views of the five Senators.
Let me point out the last statement in the
Mansfield report. It is short.
"In short, such choices as may be open are
not simple choices. They are difficult and
painful choices. They are beset with many
imponderables. The situation offers only the
very slim prospect of a just settlement by
negotiations, or in the alternative prospect, a
continuation of the conflict in the general
direction of a war on the Asian mainland."
I am 100 percent opposed to putting the
prestige of the United States in a general
war on the Asian mainland where we are
going to be confronted by ground troops, so
many more in quantity than we, our chances
of success are minimal.
I support the military position of General
MacArthur who warned us against this, of
General Eisenhower, who refused to go to a
ground war on the land mass of Asia, of
General Gavin, of General Ridgway.
I think they are right and I think these
people who want to bring us into this war and
make it an American war when President
Kennedy told us that it was their war, the
Vietnamese people's war, they have to win it,
they have to lose it, we can help them with
material, with advisers, with money, but it
is their war.
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1506 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
ft has now become an Amerisan war and
if we follow the advice of Senator STENNIS, it
will become an almost completely American
war.
We had 10,000 people in South Vietnam,
according to the Mansfield report, 2 years
ago. We had 34,000 1 year ago. We have
almost 200,000 there now.
Senator STENNIS has been quoted, and he
can speak for himself, as saying we will need
at least 600,000 there. I think it is time to
stop, look and listen.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MUNDT, Of South
Dakota, you have been listening the last 15
minutes of this--
:ienator MUNDT. Eric, I think--
Mr. SEVAREID. Furrowing your forehead.
Now, what would you do at this point?
Senator Muwins I think what we have
heard here demonstrates what has been dis-
cussed around every coffee table around the
country, what we hear discussed in the
cloakrooms and the committee rooms of
Congress, and perhaps involves some of the
issues which we should be discussing on the
floor of the Senate.
Instead of repeal of 14(b) or some other
measure, it seems to me this is the biggest
and most important issue before the country.
And I have said in the Foreign Relations
Committee, and my colleagues have heard
me, and elsewhere that I think under our
system of government we should have the
maximum of consultation with Congress in
I,he formation of policy but a minimum of
consultation from the standpoint of battle
strategy, selection of military targets. That
has to be left to the Commander in Chief and
to his military commanders in the field.
I3ut we have been talking this afternoon
primarily about matters of policy which re-
solved, as opposed to simple language, is the
issue, do we move forward or do we move
out?
Now, there has been injected a third sug-
gestion by Senator MORSE that maybe we
can duck that issue by having it decided in
hew York by the United Nations, but it is
a little late for that when we have got over
200,000 American boys under gunfire in South
Vietnam. We have to consider their security
and their safety, and I am not sure what
kind of outcome you would get from a Un-
ited Nations debate up there, whether you
would jeopardize your security or make your
security better, but in all events, I would like
to see some kind of declaration of policy, and
believe WAYNE will agree on this point, sent
down from the White House to the Senate
and let us have a debate and resolve whether
or not our policy is to stay there and make
sure that we do not reward aggression or to
pull out, or if it is the will of the majority of
the Senate to send it to the United Nations,
:;0 be it.
WAYNE. I think you introduced yesterday,
if I remember right, a resolution which
would have the impact of doing this kind
of backward by rescinding the resolution to
which the President continues to allude,
which was a bit ambiguous concerning
policy.
Mr. SEVAREID. Now, gentlemen, you have
lalked--Senator STENNIS has talked about a
national decision. You have talked about
:1 declaration of policy. The President has
gone :;o far on the authority of that August
1964 joint resolution opposed by only two
men in the whole of the Congress, includ-
ing?one of the two was Senator MORSE?I
am not quite sure what your?
Senator MUNDT. May I suggest that that
resolution included a lot of other things ex-
cept declaration of policy. It was a bit
ambiguous.
Mr. SEVAREID. Yes. That was a resolution
that gave the President, as he interprets it,
the right to do what he has been doing in
terms of military action, the commitment
of American ground forces.
V111.1111111MINIIMPPRIAIIROVOMOIPIPAIMmm*A-MMAriplzverrillityr
How do we get to a point of another decla-
ration of policy? What ought it to be?
Senator MORSE, Erie, let me say first, as
KARL mentioned, the two resolutions I in-
troduced yesterday, one to provide for the
rescinding of the August 1964 resolution and
the resolution itself has a statement in it
that authorizes the Congress to rescind it if
it changes its mind. And I shall always be
proud to have my descendants read that I
didn't vote for it. But I also introduced a
resolution yesterday calling, upon the For-
eign Relations Committee to proceed with
an investigation and hearings on our Viet-
nam policy.
But basic to that, understand my position.
It is that the President ought to be propos-
ing a declaration of war if he wants to take
increasing thousands of American boys to
their death in Vietnam. I have si tggested
In the past that he ought to reread Woodrow
Wilson's great declaration of war message
of April 17, 1917, to the joint session of
Congress.
It is a good constitutional lesson set forth
in it for the President because Woodrow
Wilson pointed out that he was without con-
stitutional authority to make war in the ab-
sence of a declaration of war. And I have
suggested that President Johnson aught to
read Franklin Roosevelt's message following
Pearl Harbor asking for a declaration of war.
He recognized he couldn't make war without
a declaration.
So as Jon/sr and the rest of us around this
table know, it has been my consistent posi-
tion that no President, including Feesident
Johnson, has any constitutional right under
article I, section 8, of the Constitution to
lead a single America.n boy to his slaughter
in South Vietnam without a declaration of
war.
Again, I say, Mr. President, when are you
going to recommend it?
Mr. SEVAREID, Senator STENNIS,
Senator STENNIS. Well, first, with all de-
ference to Senator MORSE, I think it is really
tragic and unfortunate that he call this
position of the United States an interna-
tional outlaw and by inference put that
stigma on the men that are fighting over
there.
Senator MORSE. Not at all on the elan but
on you people that support it.
Senator STENNIS. All right. Now, :he idea
that we are there illegally, with deference
to you, I think it is ridiculous. We went
there to their aid at their request. It is
an old Biblical principle, come o'er into
Macedonia and help us.
Now, we want with that altruistic, friendly
spirit. We knew that the real issue there
was Asiatic communism because the guer-
rillas were literally cutting thos3 little
people to pieces.
My objection then was that we were going
in alone, but anyway, we went, we are there,
we are committed. Now debate is ell right.
like debate. But I think the time for talk
has about run out. We have been on this
policy for 12 years. A declaration of war
now?why, three Presidents of the United
States have participated in this policy as
have Congresses for 12 years. We appro-
priated money every one of those years.
Last year the issue was up on the floor in
an appropriation bill that I handled. No
one challenged an item in that bill to pay
for this war?billions of dollars.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I wanted to, if
I may, raise one point in connection with
what Senator STENNIS has said here.
Are these actions, the present actions of
President Johnson, do you feel in consistent
line with the commitments made by Presi-
dents Eisenhower and Kennedy?
Mr. Bones?
Mr. Iloccs. Yes. I think they are totally
inconsistent with the commitments made by
President Eisenhower and by President Ken-
January 31, 1966
nedy and with similar committments made
by President Truman when he was con-
fronted with Communist aggression in Korea.
Under our Constitution the President is
the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.
President Kennedy probably took the gravest
risk in the history of mankind when he de-
manded that the Soviets remove the missiles
from Cuba. Bre didn't wait for a declaration
from Congress. He had a clear and present
danger and he acted because of that clear
and present danger.
Now, having said that, let's set the record
straight. No President has conferred more
with Congress than has President Johnson.
He has had dozens of joint leadership meet-
ings at the White House with both the Re-
publican leadership and the Democratic
leadership. As late as a few days ago he had
20 Members of the Congress there, including
some who have been quoted here, and out ,3f
the 20, Democrats and Republicans, I think
I can say that 18 of them substantially
agreed with the problems confronting us Xri
southeast Asia,
Now, remember, Senator MORSE hasn't
changed his position one iota as far as I
know. He said what he said previously. He
is saying it again. I don't see any solution
to the problems as he presents--as he talks
about them, and it is very easy to use expres-
sions like "international outlaw." When you
go there and you recognize the terror that
the Vietcong has employed against innocent
people, slaughtering the mayors of the towns,
the intellectual leaders, teachers, professors,
doctors, the word "outlaw" would be best ap-
plied to that group rather than to the United
States of America.
Mr. SEVAREID. I want to hear from Senator
CLARK for a moment.
Senator CLARK. Again I find myself re-
luctantly in disagreement with my good
friend from Louisiana. I think President
Johnson's policy is quite inconsistent with
that of both General Eisenhower and of Pres-
ident Kennedy. General Eisenhower author-
ized the giving of a small amount of economic
aid during his term of office. President Ken-
nedy made it very clear, as I said a few
moments ago, that this is their war and not
our war.
I think we crossed the Rubicon to make it
our war rather than their war when last May
we authorized another $700 million for Viet-
nam. I made a rather extensive speech
pointing out that I thought this was a mis-
take but I voted for it in the end because I
felt the President should have the benefit of
the doubt.
There is no doubt to my mind that this
has now become our war and not theirs, that
the policy is inconsistent, that the action is
illegal. This is not to say that the action
of our vicious and terroristic opponents is
not illegal, too, because it is. Who broke the
Geneva accords first, we or they, is still a
subject of some debate.
I hope, my good friend JOHN STEN/yrs, that
there will be no effort made by the Armed
Services Committee to jam through a $12
billion appropriation with only 5 hours of
debate the way it was done the last time.
I don't think we have had a debate in any
depth in the Congress about this and I agree
in that regard with my friend, Senator
MUNDT.
Senator STENNIS. Senator, if I may say, I
invited debate. I handled the appropriations
bill last year for the Department of Defense,
the $700 million and the $1.7 billion, and
I invited debate at that time, and the second
bill that passed along in August or Septem-
ber, virtually no debate on that subject.
Senator CLARK, Senator
Senator STENNIS. That was wide open and
long thought. We are not going to try to
jam anything through.
Senator CLARK. Glad to hear it.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1507
Mr. BOGGS. Senator CLARK keeps referring
to me in his disagreement with me, and I
must say that?
Senator CLARK. That is because you were
Just speaking.
Mr. BOGGS. I must say when he describes
this as an American war that I must re-
spectfully disagree with him. It so happens
that the description is not proper. There
are over 600,000 South Vietnamese troops
armed and carrying on the major part of the
defense of South Vietnam. That is what it
is. It is a defense of their country. There
are 20,000 or more South Koreans there.
There are Australians, a division, or two.
Well?
Senator CLARK. Fifteen hundred men.
Mr. BOGGS. Well, there will be more. New
Zealand is there.
Senator CLARK. Two hundred and fifty.
Mr. Boocs. And there are other commit-
ments being made by other people through-
out the world. It is not an American war
but it is an Amreican commitment and we
intend to live up to it.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, all of you here,
except Senator MORSE, voted for that resolu-
tion of August 1964 which the President
cites as his authorization for this kind of
war. Why is it that it is only now that this
is coming under question? Is the Congress
changing its mind?
Senator Minmr. I don't think it is coming
under question only now really. This was
tied in with different conditions. It was
not as clear cut as I would like to have
had it been. I think we concern ourselves
a little too much about whether or not there
are any inconsistencies between what John-
son is doing and Eisenhower was doing and
Kennedy doing. I don't think they are in-
consistent. They are vastly different. Ei-
senhower went in with an economic com-
mitment, as Senator CLARK pointed out, and
that only. I think a total of two Americans
died over there in accidents during the entire
Eisenhower administration.
Mr. BOGGS. Senator, if you will yield?
Senator MUNDT. Just a minute. When
Senator Kennedy came along, he put in some
troops. Now President Johnson is putting
in arms. Conditions are different. That
doesn't mean that it is an inconsistency. It
was moving in the direction of this whole
thing, and I do not believe that the President
should send down a declaration of war but
he should send down a declaration of policy
when 15 Senators claim they were confused
and didn't quite understand what they were
voting for, that it was too ambiguous
and?
Mr. SEVAREID. I wonder if we could?
Senator MUNDT. I think we should at least
be clear enough what the policy is and let
us vote on it.
Mr. SEVAREID. I think Senator STENNIS?
Senator STENNIS. Mr. President, I don't
think it is important to go back into this
but we sent 200 Air Force mechanics in uni-
form into South Vietnam as early as May
1954, and that is when I first objected on
the floor and we were promised that they
would be withdrawn.
Senator CLARK. You are right.
Senator STENNIS. Within 6 months they
were withdrawn, but 800 more or 400 more
were sent in. That is the beginning of our
military participation which has continued
since that time.
Now, those things are all moot, though,
now. We are in there. We are committed.
This policy is a continuation, slow, gradual
continuation.
Mr. BOGGS. Well, now, let's address again
to Senator Mufmr's statement about policy
and why we are there. Now, President John-
son made an address, I thought a memorable
address, at Johns Hopkins University in April
last year, 1965. He spelled out in great de-
tail why we were there. And, as a matter
of fact, he invited the Communists?the
Communists said they had to have uncondi-
tional negotiations and he said, let's have
unconditional negotiations, and they said,
well, you have got to stop bombing. So we
stopped bombing in May for a week or so.
They said, oh, well, that is not long enough.
So for 38 days, now, there have been no
bombs dropped on any target in North Viet-
nam and the reason this debate is going on
now, Eric, is because the question is right
before us as to whether or not bombing will
start again. That is why this debate is hap-
pening. And the issues are exactly the same
now as they were then except for one very
significant difference. For 38 days this Gov-
ernment has sought by every honorable
means to bring up Hanoi to the conference
table, to negotiate, as the President said,
unconditionally.
Not only has the?not only the President
sought that but Governor Harriman, Am-
bassador Lodge has gone to 30 capitals. Am-
bassador Goldberg has gone everywhere. The
Holy Father, Pope Paul, has called for nego-
tiations, and yet Hanoi says, as I cited a min-
ute ago, the only negotiation is with the Viet-
cong and you let them take over the country.
That is the issue.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we are going to
come back to this in a moment. I will have
to interrupt for about 1 minute or less to let
our stations have a word. So now a pause
for station identification.
Mr. SEVAREID. Now back to "Vietnam Per-
spective, the Congress and the War."
Before we leave the subject of what we
ought to do in this fight in Asia, in the imme-
diate future, I would like to get?cover one
point we really have not covered and that is
what we do about the Vietcong itself, or the
National Liberation Front.
Are we leaving some stone toward peace
unturned here by not giving them some kind
of recognition?
Senator Molise
Senator MORSE. Well, I want to comment
on that and reply to JOIIN, but I will take
that point first.
Of course, Brother BOGGS here has talked
about the President's Johns Hopkins speech,
but unconditional discussion, but he didn't
offer unconditional discussion except seman-
tically because his Johns Hopkins speech ex-
cluded direct negotiations with the Vietcong,
and let's face it, the Vietcong has the most
powerful enemy force in South Vietnam.
They control over 75 percent of the land area.
They control most of the?the majority of
the people, and yet we have up until just
recently wanted to exclude them from nego-
tiations. The President has said they can
come in with the North Vietnamese but they
happen to be the most powerful force in
Vietnam.
But now I want to say this to JOHN. I can
well understand how he would take the posi-
tion?many that share his view take the
position?we mustn't talk about all these
violations of treaties by the United States
with the American people. The American
people mustn't be told- the ugly facts about
what our Government has been doing. And,
of course, the German people weren't told
either before the rise of Hitler. And I want
to state, the American people as they listen
to me on this telecast this afternoon, you
and you alone own American foreign policy,
not the President of the United States. All
this talk and this debate about the President
being the Commander in Chief does not
justify the Commander in Chief taking
American boys to their death in South Viet-
nam without a declaration of war or with-
out living up to our United Nations
commitments.
And so I ask again, Mr. President, why
don't you take it to the United Nations
Security Council?
And what is our Ambassador's alibi?
Arthur Goldberg has been saying as his be-
hind the scenes discussions indicate the
members of the Security Council don't want
it to be taken, before the United Nations.
What has that got to do with our treaty
obligations? I want to put them on the spot.
I want to put France and Russia on the spot
in the Security Council and take my coun-
try off. I want to get a resolution before
the Security Council calling for arbitration
as Pope Paul has asked for, calling for the
matter to be referred to the General As-
sembly, calling for a United Nations take-
over for peacekeeping purposes.
The sad fact is our country is fighting a
unilateral conducted war in Asia that is go-
ing to lead us, I fear, into a massive war, and
you, the people, have to stop it. And you
know how you can stop it. Make clear to
your President, make clear to your Senators
and your Congressmen, that you want to
stop, that you want to use all the procedures
of international law available to you, and
then if they don't want to do it, then exer-
cise your precious right as free men and
women and beat them at the polls starting
in 1966 and 1968.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MORSE, I didn't ex-
pect to go on this long with that, but in view
of that rather lengthy and fervent speech, I
think a very brief rejoinder from Senator
STENNIS might be in order.
enator MORSE. Well, I am pretty well?
Senator STENNIS. Just this. Just this.
On the United Nations referral, again there
is nothing illegal or unlawful that these men
we have sent forth to fight have done or that
their Government has done, and referral of
this matter to the United Nations?if you
have a plan, Senator, or anyone has a plan
that can be put to them for a matter of their
approval and use a device to get something
that has already been agreed on, that would
be all right, but to defer to them for a solu-
tion would be giving them a problem that
they cannot solve. We are going to have
to?
Senator MORSE. Why do you say that?
Senator STENNIS. We are going to have to
put up the men and the money to win this
war and we had better go on and do it under
our command and those that are fighting
with us. I am not willing to turn it over to
anyone.
Senator MORSE. JOHN, what you are say-
Senator STENNIS. STENNIS. Because we are having
to carry the load already.
Senator MORSE. What you are saying is we
should tear up, just as though it is a scrap
of paper, this charter that we signed.
Senator STENNIS. NO. NO.
Senator MORSE. This calls for exactly the
procedure that I am calling for and you can't
erase the indelible language of the charter.
Senator STEN/sus. The United Nations?
Senator MORSE. Article we have been defy-
ing.
Senator STENNIS. Intervene and doesn't
want to have anything to do with it and?
(Stimultaneous conversations.)
Senator STENNIS. Doesn't want to have
anything to do with it and we would be---
Senator MORSE. We have a duty to
Senator STENNIS. Jumping out of the fry-
ing pan into the fire.
Senator Mos. We have a duty to lay it
before them. That is what the charter says.
You are violating the law. You don't like
to have me call us an outlaw Nation but we
are as long as we tear up that charter as a
scrap of paper as far as our failure to keep
our obligations.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. BOGGS.
Mr. BOGGS. Senator Mos E has again made
some rather remarkable statements. In one
of them he compared our actions to the ac-
tions of Hitler prior to World War II, which
to me is an astonishing thing for anyone to
say.
Senator MORSE. That is not what I said.
Mr. BOGGS. Well, that is the way I?
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1508 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
Senator &loam The facts are being kept
From the American people as Hitler kept the
facts from the German people,
Mr. 13ocos. Well--
Senator MORSE. The people don't know
what is going on--
Mr. Boeos, Well, I say to you that that is
enirue, that the analogy is outrageous, and
it in a surprising statement for anyone to
make, particularly a IJ.S. Senator, The truth
cif the matter is that no President, no admire.
iatrittion, has tried harder to inform the
American people. Dean Rusk_ Secretary of
has meat a week before various corn-
edifies in. the Congress in the last few days.
The President le ae, had meeting after meeting
et the 'White Hou.se with Republicans and
ilemonrats alike, and, as far as support is
interned n.t home. I am perfectly willing,
nanator, to my case to the polls come
next November.
senator Monara You are gating to have to.
Mr. BOGGS. And, stand?well, you bet, and
I am lookinge?T will stand right on what I
nft'i.i;iying here today. And incidentally, the
people of the United. States, if the polls mean
anything, support the policy of the Govern-
ment by an overwhelming Ina.jority.
The President is carrying an an astonish
g, balance between naked Communist
iat nese agrersairon and he has done that with
a use of minimum American forces, and he
has maintin aid the support of the American
Now, I would Say the statements calling
the United_ States an outlaw, comparing us
Ii Hitler, these things really help Hanoi.
The,/ certeeinly don't help anybody in
America.
Me. SF:vary-in_ Gentlemen, li want to, if I
;ienater Monies. If I may reply to that, a
leipicel smear, I am always welcome to-
Vln
---
SEvAREM. CAD. We come back to that a
Ii lalater?
eletedor ii eat' T want to say to Congress-
man tionos the Communists are not going
in determine my course of action. I want
to say that the American people are en-
titled to the facts and if he thinks the
American, people are getting the facts, I have
a whole serms of secret documents I would
like to have this administration make public.
would like to have them make public the
iellireath report made for President Ken-
tainy before the---
Mr. SEVAREm. Gentlemen, we are getting
into something that none of us will have the
opportunity to pursue because we don't know
itie premise of the documents you are talk-
ing about.
nenator Moasut, T. am asking to have them
made public, that is all.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, we are not going to
he able to do it on this program.
would like to- --
,aenatior Mouse. would say in answer to
Brother liOGcs that We are in yl; getting the
ivir Bones, Well, you haven't---
kir ;hi:cation. If I may for a few minutes
turn this disetiesion around, at least one
corner, wars don't just happen on battle-
fields or nomewnere else. This war is, if it
lkies on, going to affect every family and
everybody's foritine in this country. at, borne.
I think maybe an ought to talk a little :about
prospective price of this war. Our ability
and our willingness to pay it. We have had
taw budget, we have had the economic mes-
aage now, am sore you all have a lot of
thoughts about that. And I think the Con-
crccS will be expressing its views on the cost
01 this war in many specific votes for many
mouths to conic.
would like to hear now?I think starting
perhaps with Senator MUNDT, of South
lialvotit?are we going to have guns and but-
ter or guns or butter, or what, Senator?
Senator Muivnr. Well, I guess I am stand-
ing in for JERRY FORD on, that because that
was not the topic assigned to me. but I am
very glad to respond to it, Eric, because I
don't believe that we can have guns and-but-
ter with equal emphasis on botls without
something or somebody being sacrificed, and
I am afraid it is going to be the war effort,
and I don't see anything wrong ab till; having
a little general sacrifice among citizens gen-
erally when we are in a war, and we all agree
on that around this table.
You cal; it a major ',Aar. I it is a
major we, We are in. it whetM r it is de-
clared or undeclared.. The boy who is fight-
ing and daiing is just as deal am, is in just
as muala peril regardless of the, mine of the
operation.
Since We are having this great einatest in
which we all share in the victory ce ell suffer
from the defeat, I think the President should
also insiat on some sacrifices ft fin people
generally, that there should be a cutback
in these domestic programs which are not
essential as of the moment.
Let's take slum clearance, con ieivably a
very sound, and desirable program, but we
have had alums as long as we have had cities
and I don't think we should do anything to
detract from the importance of getting this
Viettameese thing solved satisfacterily with
an enduring and enforcing peace
We Filiouldn't do anything in tern it of mak-
ing it "run,: er for the people who are al home.
That is what I had in mind when I say, Mr.
Bones, that there should be a dccleration of
I read the Baltimore speech. It was satis-
factory to me. I understand A.:Hit:I think
that conditions should change. The war has
gotten bigger and he ought to naive clear
what our policies and programs aad, objec-
tives in Vietnam. are and what the relation-
ship of the civilian population is to this war,
llar. Bocce, Well, you ean't----
Senator ialuanyr. I think we loss support
when you say this is such a war, we 'an fight
it with one hand and spread goodies out
among the people with the other.
Mr. Illocies. All I can say. Senator ft. and I
know that you--
Senator Metrynr. That was not in :ha Balti-
more speech.
Mr. BeGCs, Eight. I know that tou are a
well-informed man and I have profound re-
spect for yeur knowledge, but the :President
has made a great many declaratims since
then. Only recently he went to ladepend-
ence. Mo., for an occasion honoring our
former President, President Truman, and
there he made another statement very simi-
lar to what he said. In Johns Hopkilla which
is the :Maple declaration that we are going to
resist--
Senator l?aritairr. ? ? ? finaudiblio.
Mr. 130C.C.;4. That we are going io resist
naked aggroision and we ere going to abide
by our commitments and that if we want
peace, all he would have to do to have peace
iii for Hanoi to stop aggression. The'. is what
our policy is, And it is bared on? -
Senator MUNDT. When he says it in Inde-
pendence he has to use the first peraindieu-
tar pronoun singular "I." When he says
"We," Congress?we can sumoort him, we
can support him, I ain sure, in thal kind of
program if we got a chance and did, some
sacrificing at home.
iii. BOGGS. just a few days ago, ad,iressing
a hundred intelligent boys and girls ','ho were
selected to come here by some foundation, he
again stated the position of our Goveenment.
Senakir MuNDT. I would rather have him
talk to the Congress than the Boy Scants.
Mr. SEVAEKM. Well, gentlemen. we ap-
parently are going to try----
Mr. Boons Excuse me just a min ,!te... He
met last week for 3 hours with the leaders of
Congress. .
bi7;76"\;6"Cf ri5f- "at.
January 3/,'1963
Senator MUNDT. That is 20 out of 531.
Mr. BOGGS. And I can't speak for the Pres-
ident of the United States, of course, but I
think I can say without fear of contradiction
that, No. 1, he has nothing to hide.
Senator MUNDT. I agree.
Mr. Bones. And No. 2, if it is necessary that
he restate our position, I am sure he will cl)
it.
Mr. SEVAIIETD, Gentlemen, I don't know
that we have ever before tried to finance is
major war on top of a booming economy, on
top of almost full employment, and on top or:
already high taxation. I want to turn to
Senator CLARK for a moment about this.
Can this be done? Are we going to get wage
and price controls, for example?
Senator CLARK, Well, I think the Presi-
dent's budget was a very skillful effort to
have us have both guns and butter. Of
course, the question is how many guns and,
how much butter.
If we were to adopt the policy which I have
advocated, which is in short the General
Gavin position, to hold strong enclaves in
South Vietnam, not to let anybody throw us
out, not to scuttle and run, but not to scsels
out and destroy an elusive enemy hiding in
elephant grass and jungle, I don't think we
are going to have to have as much more
money for guns as some of my belligerent
friends seem to believe.
Mr. SMIRCH). I think Senator STENNIS be-
lieves that would cost more in the long run.
Senator CLARK. Well, he may, and no
doubt in a moment he will have a chance to
tell us why.
I believe, however, that if we get to a
situation where, despite the objections of
people like myself, this war is escalated and
it becomes more and more expensive, then
we may have to choose between increasing
taxes on the well-to-do, on the wealthy, on
those living on inherited income, or in the
alternative, taking it out of the hides of the
poor, and I for one would be in favor of
raising more revenues to keep the Great
Society programs going as opposed to leav-
ing the present tax structure where it Ls,
which is pretty much lower than it has ever
been in any major war before.
Mr. Bones. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator
Senator
-
Senator MORSE. Well, I only want to say
on the guns and butter issue, you can't fight
a massive war in Asia and not eliminate a
large part of the expenditures that you plan
to raise the level of your domestic economy.
The President's budget message already
makes substantial cuts in the poverty pro-
gram, makes substantial cuts in public works
programs, makes substantial cuts already.
But what concerns me about this dis-
cussion is the failure to meet up to the fact
that we haven't got any support in Asia.
My colleagues around this table can't main-
tain any?can't mention a single major
country in Asia that is supporting, this op -
oration.
Listen to what the Mansfield report says,
and I till say I will rest my cue on. the
Mansfield report. Ile says:
"With a few exceptions, assistance has noi,
been and is not likely to be forthcoming for
the war effort in South Vietnam frain na-
tions other than the United States. On the
contrary, the longer the war continues at its
present pattern and the more it expands in
scope, the greater will become the strain
placed upon the relations of' the United
States with allies both in the Far East and
in Europe.
"And I just took a Senate delegation
through a 5-week tour of Asia and nowhere
in the 5 weeks did I find anything but Lip
service for our war in Asia, and in Hong Kong
we got a briefing that left no room for doubt
in my mind that if we escalate this war, we
give China no course but to come in."
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January 81, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1509
Mr. SEvAraza. That is exactly what I want
to get into in the latter part of this program
which I would like to come to in a few min-
utes, but I do think we ought to?people
ought to be told a little more about what
this war, if it continues, is going to mean
to families and?
Mr. Bocce. May I address myself to that
just a moment?
Mr. SEVAREID. I think Senator STENNIS has
asked for the floor.
Senator STENNIS. I will be brief on this.
I think the first priority business now is to
will this war. That is not only in money but
in sentiment and first priority in policy, not
only our Government but we ought to try to
convince our allies in Europe and in Asia,
too, that it is the first order of business with
us, and I think that trying to carry on all
the other programs almost at their top level
leads our would-be allies to believe that we
are not as serious about this thing as we
should, perhaps makes our enemies think
that we are on our way out after all.
I do think the President can quickly shift
his emphasis, though, even in a week's time
with reference to the funds.
Now, there is no trouble about getting
money appropriated. I think if it goes on
it will have to be on a large scale and that we
will have to have, well, it almost comes to
some kind of controls of strategic materials
and could come very rapidly, but certainly we
ought to emphasize the winning of the war
and say we are going to defer many of these
other programs.
Senator MORSE. John, you can't possibly
have a war without price controls and wage
controls and complete control of the econ-
omy. We had to do it in World War II and
this is going to get into that kind of a war.
Mr. SEVAREID. I want to ask Mr. BOGS?
Mr. Bows. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. SEVAREID. What he?
Mr. BOGGS. I think that in order to under-
stand this, we have to look at where we have
been and where we are.
Now, Senator MORSE referred to World War
II and we might refer to several other wars.
World War I, for instance. We had a gross
national product of about $40 billion in this
country, the base for conducting that war.
Mr. SEVAREID. World War I.
Mr. BOGGS. World War I. World War II,
which was an enormous operation, our gross
national product was still less than $100 bil-
lion. As a matter of fact, when Franklin
Roosevelt became President of the United
States, it was less than $50 billion but we
were in a gigantic depression.
In Korea the gross national product of this
country was about $280 billion. Today the
gross national product of this country ap-
proaches three-quarters of a trillion dollars.
It is about $700 billion. It is estimated that
it will be about $725 billion in this calendar
year.
The cost of Vietnam at the moment repre-
sents about 11/2 percent of that gross national
product.
Now, the base is so much greater that to
make the analogy between this situation and
some of the others is not entirely accurate.
So that I think we have to have all of those
facts before us.
As a matter of fact, last year alone the
gross national product of the United States
increased by $47 billion, which is the equiv-
alent of the entire gross national product of
India or the entire gross national product of
Canada, and it is more than the entire gross
national product of all nations on earth ex-
cept for three or four of them.
So the base that we operate from is a very
strong base indeed.
Senator CLARK. It is a great pleasure for me
to agree completely for once with my good
friend from Louisiana. I think the Presi-
dent's budget is realistic in the light of the
present situation which confronts us. I
think what Congressman BOGGS said about
our gross national product is pertinent. I
think we can have this war fought the way
I would like to see it fought and still have
the majority of the Great Society programs
go forward, and if that becomes unfeasible
because we are threatened with some infla-
tion, then in opposition to my good friend
from South Dakota, I would raise taxes in-
stead of striking out the Great Society
program.
Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I think the
President predicted a fiscal year deficit, 1967
fiscal year, of more than?of less than $2
billion.
Senator CLARK. Yes, but, Eric, that is on
a cash receipts and disbursements basis,
there was a surplus of $500 million.
Mr. SEVAREID. Does Senator MUNDT think
that such a prediction over an 18-month
period?
Senator MUNDT. Out in South Dakota
where I come from, a merchant doesn't try
to determine how successful he has been in
business by simply considering the amount
of cash he takes in. He always thinks about
the cash he takes out.
Now, as Congressman BOGGS talks about
this great national income, how it has been
accelerated, getting larger and larger, that is
true, but it is also true that in this whole
period we have engaged in so much deficit
spending that while the national income
has been getting larger, so has the national
debt.
Mr. BOGGS. No, it hasn't.
Senator MUNDT. Now at an alltime high.
Mr. BOGGS. No.
Senator MUNDT. Probably $325 billion, and
you will be trying to lead your troops down
the aisle of the House this year for another
extension of the debt limit, and you know
you will.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr.?
Senator MUNDT. Because of the fact we
are not trying to balance the budget?
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman?
Senator MUNDT. We are spending money
faster than we are taking it in.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, that just isn't
SO.
Senator MUNDT. Like the one-eyed mer-
chant.
Mr. BOGGS. It just isn't SO.
Senator MUNDT. Are you going to say that
you are not going to ask the Congress to
increase the debt limit this year?
Mr. BOGGS. Let me tell you why it is not
so. The debt ceiling at the end of World
War II was about $340 billion but we had a
gross national product of less than $250 bil-
lion?at that time less than $150 billion.
Today we have a debt ceiling or debt of about
$321 billion but we are making $720 billion.
So that our income is twice what we owe.
Now, let's leave it?even in South Dakota
they understand that, don't they?
Senator MuNor. Are you willing to tell the
American public today that you will not asit
for a debt increase limit this year?
Mr. Bones. No. I am not willing to say
that.
Senator MUNDT. Of course you are not,
because you are still engaging in deficit
spending.
Mr. BOGGS. No. I am not willing to say
that because I don't know?I want to say
this, that I associate myself with what JOHN
. STENNIS said. I think that whatever is re-
quired in South Vietnam must be provided
and I also associate myself With what Senator
CLARK said, that if it does require additional
revenues to finance some of these?the war
In Vietnam, and some of the essential pro-
grams?you know, it is easy to get confused
in terminology. Let us look at some of these
things. One of the biggest is education. I
just don't believe that any society where
education is a dominant fact in whether we
move ahead or not, that we can cut back on
that. I just don't think we can.
So that as I see it, we have to have a bal-
ance. We have to maintain a balance, but I
say to you, Mr. Moderator, that never has a
country been in this kind of a position before
in all of the history of mankind so far as
economic strength is concerned.
Senator MORSE. Can I?
Senator MUNDT. There seems to be -
Mr. SEVAREID. Wait a minute. Excuse me
1 second. You seem to be saying?are you
saying that we really can fight this growing
war in Asia without individuals in this coun-
try running much risk of a personal pinch
financially?
Mr. Bones. No, I am not saying that.
Senator MORSE. I want to make a couple
of comments very quickly. First, Congress-
man BOGGS' statement on education. As
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Education, let me say this administration
is planning to cut back on education and
drastically on education, and I shall oppose
it.
But I want to say that my difference with
JOE CLARK and with you, Congressman
Boccs, is that you are arguing from a premise
that your Vietnam situation is going to con-
tinue to stay within the budget estimate.
And what I am trying to get you to see is
that the Vietnam situation, once you resume
the bombing, is going to escalate into a ma-
jor war throughout Asia.
Mr. Boccs. Well, that is your premise.
Senator CLARK. I?
Senator MORSE. But I?
Mr. Boccs. That is not my premise.
Senator MORSE. I don't think there is any
way you can possibly avoid it and I heard
nothing in my trip to Asia that would justify
anybody believing that you are not going
to get an escalated war?
Mr. BOGGS. Well, I was there and?
Senator MORSE. Wait until you drop the
first bomb on China and you will see what
China is going to do.
May I say very quickly, Eric, you know
why they don't want a declaration of war?
They couldn't enforce that declaration of
war even against some of our allies. They
couldn't enforce it against Russia. You have
a declaration of war and one of the first
things you do then, you completely change
your international law relations overnight
with every noncombatant nation in the
world, and you drop a blockade around
North Vietnam?name the countries that will
respect the blockade. Of course, we can
start with Russia. She isn't going to respect
the blockade and the first Russian ship you
sink, you are in a war with Russia, and it
will be fought not in Asia but in New York
City, Washington, D.C., and everywhere else.
Mr. Bones. Eric, just to get the record
straight, I don't want to be on an hour and
a half program and not have my own position
stated and understood.
In the first place, I don't advocate war.
What I advocate I believe leads to peace
and I realize that I am in complete dis-
agreement with Senator MORSE because it is
my fundamental belief, based on whatever
knowledge one can gain from history as I
read it, that if we surrender, if we pull out,
If we accept the terms of Ho Chi Minh at
Peiping, there we will not have achieved
peace.
If we could achieve peace by doing that,
well, maybe it might be a rather cynical
thing to do, but maybe we could sacrifice
these people in South Vietnam. But in my
judgment, this would not bring peace.
I think we would have to stand somewhere
else and the escalation would come not on our
side but in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in
Thailand, in Australia, and ultimately we
would be confronted not with peace but with
world war III on the terms that Senator
MORSE described.
Mr. SEVAREID. Well, this is what I think,
gentlemen?we ought to spend the rest of
this program talking about it. Exactly the
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1510 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE January 31, 1966
kind of thing that you have just now
mentioned.
Senator Mutate. May I say?
Mr. SEVAREID. The affect on the future in
the world.
Senator MUNDT. May I say to Hale that he
has not only said something now with which
Senator CLARK agrees. He has said some-
thing with which I agree.
Mr. Boecs. Thank you.
Mr. SEVAREID. There are many questions,
many serious and grave questions, obviously
many of them of a speculative nature at this
point in this war about our overall foreign
policy and what is being done to it by this
war.
Does it, for example, intensify the so-
called cold war with Russia? Does it tend
to drive China and Russia closer together
or further apart? Does it weapon us po-
litically, militarily, in other parts of the
world? A lot of such questions.
Senator Morse?
Senator MORSE. May I say this in answer
to what I think was a clear implication of
Congressman BOGGS, that I am seeking a
settlement that Ho Chi Minh and Peiping
would approve of.
certainly am not, but I am also saying
that we haven't any unilateral right to de-
termine what that settlement should be
either. It ought to be determined by the
noncombatants acting through this charter,
and I am at a loss to understand how we can
meet in 1965 and forget 1945 so soon, because
we committed ourselves in this charter not
to resort to war and that is exactly what we
are doing, and what makes anyone think in
this administration or in the country that
we have either the resources or the man-
power to police the world?
And let us remember that we are the only
major power except for that rather weak
base that Great Britain has in Singapore
that is maintaining overseas military bases.
Now, all the other nations of the world
that tried it in Asia got driven out, and what
concerns me are the American boys 50 and
100 years?and girls, too-- from now. We
cannot police Asia. We have got to work
out in my judgment an international under-
standing whereby we will have the nations
lined up against the Communists to enforce
the peace by peacekeeping procedures.
That is what I am pleading for. And that
is why I think we ought to try Pope Paul's
suggestion of getting it into the United Na-
tions and proposing arbitration and see what
they do.
Mr. SEVERETD. Senator STENNIS, isn't this
war in a very long-range sense a step, an
effort, however, blundering and groping to get
some kind of balance of power to keep the
peace in Asia as it has been kept pretty well
for the last 20 years in Russia?
Now, do we feel that?I take it you feel
that this effort of ours is going to lead to-
ward that kind of stabilization to a degree
rather than that this effort in itself is going
to upset Asia into?knock it over into a third
world war.
Senator Saraners. Well, I think if we do
not carry it to a conclusion that is successful
that that is really the end of any stabilization
and any policy that we are interested in.
I believe it Is a total collapse.
Now, after we have carried it to a success-
fill conclusion, frankly, I think we have a
terrific problem ahead from our viewpoint
In getting things stabilized there so as to
hold in check this spread of Asiatic com.
munism, and frankly I don't think we are
going to be able to do it alone because we,
have only 6 percent of the population and.
7 percent of the land area and limited in our
manpower and our resources.
But certainly how it ought to collapse is
for us to fail to win this war. It is ab-
solutely essential. And from there on I
think further steps must be taken success-
fully to consolidate some kind of plan that
If Annmved Por
will be effective. I do not think the present
ones are. That will be effective toward stab-
ilizing that great area of the country. And
I don't say we would have to withdraw if we
don't get it, but we certainly would have to
reconsider the whole policy and move to a
new position.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MUNDT?
Senator MUNDT. Now getting to the topic
on which you asked me to discuss matters,
and. I am glad to be on it because this is now
looking ahead, the thing that has brought
my support of the administration's policies
in Vietnam and the thing that will continue
to bring it so long as I am convinced that
we are moving in that direction, is that I
firmly believe we decrease the likelihood of
global warfare and the nuclear warfare by
refusing to reward aggression in Vietnam and
refusing to accept defeat, and as long as this
administration policy follows that line, as
long as I think it moves in that direction, I
am going to continue to support the Presi-
dent, and I wish he would put it that clear-
ly to Congress. This is the thing which I
have been talking about, not a declaration
of war.
Who are you going to declare wae on? Rus-
sia and China and North Vietnam and the
North Liberation Front? Or do it on the
installment plan. That might move us in
the way of escalating the war that we are
all trying to hold out.
Now, you asked us to say something about
what this implies in terms of future rela-
tions with Russia and China, and I think
that the only way you can discuss that is to
try to conjecture as to where this war is go-
ing to go. Our relations with Russia and
China are going to be substantially differ-
ent if we don't accept defeat there than if
we do accept defeat. So much depends en-
tirely on the imponderables.
Is there going to be a spreading of differ-
ences between Russia and China? Are they
going to move toward each other? Nobody
can speak with accuracy on that. We can't
tell. Is there going to be any tendency on
the part of either Russia or China to dis-
continue their continuous aggression by mil-
itary tactics and by subversive activities?
Are they ever going to be content to let
little countries like Vietnam work things out
for themselves? What is going to be their
attitude on the nuclear bomb, the thing that
nobody talks about, Eric, but the thing that
is in the back of the minds of knowledgeable
people, this terrifying though, what is going
to be the relationship of the free world to
China once they get a delivery system for the
bombs they are building now?
We say we mustn't do this in Vietnam or
do that in Vietnam because of the reactions
of China. China isn't going to go away. In
4 or 5 years it is still going to have reactions,
and what are those reactions going to be if
she gets a delivery system for a whole ar-
senal of atomic bombs and continues her
hatred of everything sacred and everything
free and everything white and everything
American as she does now?
These are the imponderables.
Mr. Boccs. Let me recount a bit of history.
I was there during the week of the Cuban
crisis with the other congressional leaders
with President Kennedy and after Khru-
shchev had written his letter to the Presi-
dent saying that he would withdraw the mis-
siles, President Kennedy said almost in an
aside, he said, "The threat to world peace is
no longer dominant in Russia. It is now in
China." And the real test of what happens
to mankind is what transpires after China
obtains the hydrogen bomb.
About 2 years later I was back in the same
room in the White House with President
Johnson, most of the same people, and the
briefing was on that very subject, the fact
that China had exploded a nuclear device,
And the question was directed to Secretary
p0.eIsR
elease 2
McNamara?I can say this now because it
was published in the New York Times just a
few days ago?as to what the present danger
is, and the answer came back that there was
no real present danger but within 10 years,
assuming the continuation of militant, ag-
gressive communism in China and the de-
velopment of an adequate delivery system on
the part of the Chinese, the danger would
be real and very acute.
Well, now, I think, Senator, that that is
really what we are talking about and that
is what the debate is all about in Vietnam.
And I think that history is pretty much on
our side. I believe that much of this mili-
tancy was synonymous with the Soviets a
decade or two ago, and we stood firm in
Greece and Turkey and Berlin and in Cuba,
and now we are faced with the same situ-
ation as I see it in China and we must stand
firm again.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CLARK?
Senator CLARK. This is tile subject, Eric, to
which you asked me to address myself for
perhaps 3 minutes, and I should like to make
seven points.
The most important, indeed the vital mu.-
pect of our foreign policy in the foreseeable
future, will be our relations with Russia
and China. The Vietnamese war is really
only an incident in that overall relationship,
an unhappy, an unfortunate incident which
I hope we can terminate promptly with
honor.
I agree with Senator MUNDT. I don't want
to accept defeat. I am against it. I dis-
agree with Senator STENNIS that we could
fight a holy war against godless communism
to total victory in this kind of day and age.
Most wars end short of unconditional sur-
render. I hope this one will.
My second point is that if we could arrive
at a detente with the Soviet Union or with
the various matters with which we are now
in disagreement, wars of national liberation,
the German problem, nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons, disarmament, most of our
problems of peace would be solved, and this
to my way of thinking should be the major
objective of our foreign policy to deal with
those rough, tough, mean Russians in a way
which is to their self-interest, economic and
social, and to our self-interest.
I believe this is not impossible. I den't
think we are doing nearly enough on our
side to arrive at that result.
Third, the Russian-Chinese quarrel is se-
rious. We should do nothing to drive them
together. If we start bombing Hanoi, if we
start bombing Peiping, not only will we lose
Saigon but we will throw Russia into the
arms of a leering China and we will be in
very grave difficulty.
My fourth point is that China is still at
the belligerent stage of its revolution and
we must persuade China that they are not
going to win by undue belligerence, whether
it be by financing wars of national liberation
elsewhere or by achieving total victory over
South Vietnam and the Americans.
And my fifth point is that our diplomacy
should be adjusting itself to an overall effort
hopefully with the support of the Russians,
and the other Communist nations to per-
suade China that mutual and peaceful co-
existence is essential to her well-being as
well as to ours.
My sixth point is that world war III is
unthinkable, under no circumstances should
we allow the thought of a nuclear war, the
bombing of Peiping, the unleashing of au-
clear weapons in Vietnam or China to drag
us into a holocaust which would destroy our
civilization.
And finally, my seventh?in other words, I
am against preventive war now as I have been
since the end of World War II.
My seventh and last point is that Vietnam
makes all of this very difficult indeed and
we should do our best to come to an adjust-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1511
ment under which we have an honorable
peace, under which nobody throws us out but
so we can get back to the really important
matters of foreign policy which is our rela-
tions with Russia and China.
Senator MORSE. Eric, may I say I com-
pletely agree with the seven points that JOE
CLARK has just enunciated, but I want to
make a comment on KARL'S and Jonres talk
about aggression. It sounds like Dean Rusk.
Somebody ought to ask the question who is
aggressing?
Now, there isn't any doubt that the North
? Vietnamese have violated the Geneva accords.
But so has the United States, and from the
very beginning. And here is Vietnam?the
North Vietnamese say, "We are going to put
out of South Vietnam and help our brOthers,
the Vietcong, put out the United States,
which is in violation of the accord, and that
is the reality that Dean Rusk doesn't want
to face up to and I am afraid most of the
administration.
Well, wait until we get a judge on it. If
you ever get before the United Nations you
are going to get it judged on, but I want to
get that behind me, and I want to say that
a group of us had a meeting not so long ago
with the Russian Ambassador. I was invited
to it. And there is a lot of talk, you know,
in this country about bombing Hanoi and
we asked him, "What would be the position
of your government," and he said, of course,
if we bomb Hanoi we couldn't bomb Hanoi
without killing Russians and they, of course,
would go to the support of North Vietnam.
Then we asked him about bombing nuclear
bases in China, and he said, "What is the
date for that? Can you tell us when you
plan to do that?"
Then he made very clear, as I found
wherever I went in Asia, that if you move
into China, you are going to get involved
in a land war with China because you can
bomb her out as far as her cities and nuclear
installations are concerned, but you are go-
ing to have to meet her on the ground and
you are going to have to meet her with hun-
dreds of thousands of men, and that causes
me to say, Eric, what I said in the begin-
ning?that we are keeping from the American
people facts as were kept from the German
people, and we are.
Let the administration open the safe of
the Foreign Relations Committee, bring out
and let the American people see it before
they start dying by the hundreds of thou-
sands what the top military advisers of this
Government said about a land war in Asia,
and I want to say there is nothing that has
changed the situation.
You are not going to produce peace by a
land war in Asia. You are going to produce
peace by doing what JOHN STENNIS, I think,
clearly implied, getting some other nations
to line up with us to keep the peace, not
make war but keep the peace. And that is
why I supported for example, the United
Nations action on the Gaza strip, in the
Congo, and Cyprus, in Pakistan, and India.
It was all right for Arthur Goldberg to urge
the Security Council to take action on the
war between India and Pakistan. Why
doesn't my President say to Goldberg, "Get
up there and offer the same resolution for
United Nations take-over in South Vietnam."
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. BOGGS.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Moderator, Senator Morisn
has reiterated some statements that he made
earlier which I addressed myself to at that
time.
I would like to elaborate a bit, if I may,
on some of the very thought-provoking state-
ments made by Senator CLARK a moment ago.
One I think is a split between the two
types of communism, the Soviet brand and
the Chinese brand.
I think this is indeed a very real thing.
In every Communist Party on earth this
struggle is going on between the Chinese
No. 15-6
Communist and the Russian Communist.
The significant thing, I believe, JOE, IS what
the impact might be if we did withdraw from
Vietnam without, to use ,your very fine
phrase, "an honorable peace," because that
is what I want, too.
Senator CLARK. I think all six of us want
that.
Mr. BOGGS. Right.
Senator CLARK. Five of us.
Mr. BOGGS. In my judgment, unless we
achieve that, the Chinese type of communism
would become dominant on the earth and it
is a militant, aggressive type, and I think,
as I said earlier, that this would indeed lead
to world war III.
There is much evidence of this, Eric. Japan
is a good example. Japan has labored dili-
gently since the conclusion of World War II
to establish a viable democratic society and
has done remarkably well. Now, the impact
on Japan if the Chinese Communists be-
came dominant in the world in my judgment
would be very severe indeed.
So in our consideration, the consideration
of our Government, this clash between these
two branches in the Communist world is just
as important as anything else under
consideration.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. BOGGS, the Chinese at-
tempts to influence other countries, Latin
America, Africa, Indonesia, apparently have
been going backwards?
Mr. BOGGS. Yes.
Mr. SEVAREID. Not forward.
Mr. BOGGS. I think that is because we have
made our presence felt. I believe that had
we not had the presence that we now have
in Vietnam, that the movement would have
been forward rather than backward. And
if our presence fails there, believe me, you
will see it move forward in Latin America.
Mr. SEVAREID. Do you look at Asiatic com-
munism as a kind of monolithic force that
can be controlled from one headquarters,
be effective in many continents?
Mr. BOGGS. I look at the Chinese Commu-
nist leadership today very much like the
Russian Communist leadership under Stalin
and his group of people. I think it is old,
that it is doctrinaire, that it is inflexible.
I think?and I use the word "think" because
I don't know any more than anyone else
does?that as the young leadership comes
forward and the need for the development
of the country increases?industry, educa-
tion, public works, and so forth?that there
might very well be something similar happen-
ing in China that happened in Russia.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. MUNDT.
Senator MUNDT. Let me say in that regard
that I do hope that we don't bet too much
of America's future and too much of the
peace of the world on the assumption that
you have a great big cleavage between Rus-
sian and Chinese communism that is going
to break apart and serve us. There would
be a lot more persuasion on what Congress-
man Boass is saying if the Russians were
not putting SAM missiles in around Hanoi
killing American boys right now. Let us
hope the split develops but let's not develop?
and I am sure you don't intend to let it
develop?
Mr. BOGGS. No.
Senator MUNDT. On the assumption?this
is_
Mr. BOGGS. Of course not.
Senator MUNDT. Assumption, and it is so
rare that I agree with Senator WAYNE MORSE
in public, let me say I agree when he says
that he thinks we should try to get the allies
of the United States and all other free coun-
tries, whether allies or not, interested in
helping us find a solution to this Vietnamese
situation which avoids defeat and avoids re-
warding aggression, and there are specific
steps this administration should take, and
here is where I depart from the administra-
tion.
I had supported its program in Vietnam
except its weak diplomatic leadership, its
weak political leadership in international
capitals. I don't condemn it for not being
able to carry peace around like somebody
selling Fuller brushes from capital to capi-
tal, looking for a buyer. It was a noble ef-
fort. I still hope It succeeds. But I condemn
it because It fails to do anything about in-
ducing our allies, Britain and Norway and
Greece, to stop shipping supplies into the
Communists.
It is a horrible thing to think about Eng-
land, using British bottoms to carry British
supplies to North Vietnam to help the North
Vietnamese kill Australians, Canadian
wheat through Hong Kong. The same thing
holds true?we've got a club. We provide aid
to over a hundred countries in the world.
WAYNE MORSE and I have been trying to re-
duce it down to at least 70, I think we had
in our amendment, as a starting point. But
we are providing AID money, American tax-
payer money, if you please, to foreign coun-
tries who are helping the Communists in
Hanoi. And in China and in Russia. And
that is what I condemn, a failure to exert
important American leadership to try to con-
solidate some free world support behind our
effort in Vietnam.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Moderator?
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator STENNIS.
Senator STENNIS. May I make two points.
The time is about up. One is that this has
been a congressional debate, nationwide tele-
vision coverage. Doubtless some quotes
from it will be in the papers, even in Viet-
name, in Stars and Stripes.
I want to make this clear. In spite of a
sharp division in thought here around this
table, I have no doubt myself once the Presi-
dent considers all the alternatives and an-
nounces what his next move and step is go-
ing to be as Commander in Chief in this war,
that it will have very solid support here in
the Congress and throughout the Nation, I
really believe, and we will move forward as
one, almost. And I want the boys that are
in Vietnam and on their way there to clearly
understand that.
Now, No. 2, with reference to the future
in Asia. I have no solution there but I say
again if we back up and our present position
in this unfortunate situation now we are in,
I don't think we need to worry about our
- leadership in Asia after that. We won't have
any leadership. We will be relegated our-
selves to a secondary position and we will be
a follower. And I say this, that I wish that
the President could be more effective with
Our NATO allies and with our Asiatic allies,
and I don't know that he is to blame on that.
Perhaps this pause has been trying to rally
some support for that cause.
I am terribly disappointed. I think they
ought to be told that we absolutely cannot
further keep 250,000 men, for instance, in
Western Europe unless they can give us ac-
tive support now?if not in manpower?man-
power, certainly, with diplomatic support of
the very strongest kind. The same thing in
Asia. Japan, with all deference, has been
under our umbrella and I am glad she has,
but she could help.
Senator MORSE. I want to very quickly say
that I disagree with certain things that JOHN
has just said and Congressman Booss said
in his last comment. You will lose your
support in Asia if we continue to make war
in Asia and don't get others in to help us
keep the peace.
Congressman BOGGS thinks that you have
got to see this thing throughor we are going
to be in an impossible position in Asia. Well,
where are our Asian supports?Cambodia,
Burma, Indonesia, India, Pakistan? The
great nations of Asia are not with us in re-
gard to this matter?
Senator MUNDT. Korea is in it in a big way.
Senator MORSE. What?
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1512 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
Senator MUNDT. Korea is in it in a big way.
Senator MORSE. Korea is our military de-
pendency. So is Thailand, Thailand is our
sanctuary. Talk about secrecy. Some of you
didn't like to hear me mention it. Let this
administration tell what we have been doing
in Thailand, time and time again, setting up
our military base from which we are bombing
into North Vietnam.
Bat the point I want to make here is I
think you are overlooking what is going to
happen to Chinese communism, too. We
talk about 10 years from now on the assump-
tion that you are going to have the same kind
of monolithic communism In China 10 years
from now. Any of us think that we would
have the kind of changes in Russia that
happened the last 10 years? Ever think the
incentive motive would start getting into
Russian communism?
Now, these despicable Chinese Communist
leaders are old and are going to die soon,
and you watch out as the Chinese people
become more and more enlightened for a
change, not away from what we will call
communism, but away from the kind of com-
munism that these desperate men are ruling
in China at the present time.
And I think we make a mistake if we
build up a situation here where we take
the position that we are going to try to
dominate and control Asia because you will
turn the Asians against us.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman?Mr. Moder-
ator--first let me say that I thought the
statement made by Senator STENNIS was
most appropriate about supporting our
forces there. There is one thing that was
very gratifying to me when I was in Viet-
nam and that is that we have as fine an
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps as you will
lind anywhere. They are well motivated.
They are wonderful Americans in every
sense of the word.
There is one matter that I don't think has
been touched on adequately in this whole
hour and a half and that in my judgment
has been the impact of what the President
has attempted to do in the last 38 days.
Now, the reason we are having this dis-
cussion is because there is debate now as to
whether or not bombing should be resumed.
Brat it is well to understand that for 38 days
not a bomb has been dropped, and during
that period of time our Ambassadors?may-
be sonic of them have not been terribly ef-
fective, but I think men like Harriman and
Goldberg are very able men indeed?they
have made it crystal clear in my opinion
that the United States wants peace, that it
will negotiate unconditionally, and that we
have taken away this propaganda device
that the Communists have used, and they
can no longer say that we won't negotiate.
As a matter of fact, I quoted in the begin-
ning the editorial from the Washington Post
this morning entitled "Unconditional Sur-
render," and I think that has been a tre-
mendous gain on the part of this Govern-
ment in the capitals of the other nations on
earth.
Mr. SEVAREID. I wonder if we could go
back to what we started with here, which is
the question of resuming bombings. For
what it is worth, I would like to see if I
can get a yes or no answer from each of you
as to whether you think we ought again
now to bomb North Vietnam.
Senator STENNIS. Unquestionably, yes.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MUNDT?
Senator MIT/qDT. I think that is strictly a
military decision to be decided by the Com-
mander in Chief and the commanders iii the
held. I don't think Congressmen should
try to decide military strategy.
Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CLARK?
Senator Gamut. I think it is a political de-
cision which has to be made by the Presi-
dent of the United States only secondarily
d rnrizt
acting in his capacity as Commander in
Chief. I hope he will decide for political
reasons not to resume the bombilig at least
for the time being.
Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. BOGGS?
Mr. Bones. I agree substantially with what
Senator MUNDT has said, although my per-
sonal opinion is that bombing must be re-
sumed very soon.
Senator MORSE. It would be fatal for peace
in Asia, and may I say in regard to these
comments about who is supporting our boys
in South Vietnam, in my judgment the esca-
lation of this war is going to kill thousands
and thousands additional of those boys that
shouldn't be killed.
We ought to stop the escalation of the war,
and as I said, get other nations in there
quickly, or at least, try to, and that will?
Mr. lBoacs. How are you going to get them
in Senator?
Senator Mose. I have told you, by letting
Goldberg go to the United Nations tomorrow
and file a resolution and put it squarely up
to them.
Mr. SEVAREID. The pot is beginning to boil
again just as we have to shut off the boiler,
I am sorry to say. It has been a long period.
You have been articulate, decisive We are
very grateful you all could come.
I have very little to add except one or two
thoughts. I think perhaps this has been a
sample of the state of mind of the American
Congress aS a whole, a foretaste of what is
likely to come up there in the way of debate
for months ahead.
Congress is divided, in some measure, on
the justification of the war, by a large meas-
ure on how it should be conducted:: I am
sure about the size of the risk involved in
setting off world war III, and now 18 months
after our first engagement with the enemy in
the Tonkin Gulf, after nearly a year of
bombing in North Vietnam, serious and sus-
tained congressional discussion of the war
seems to be really just beginning.
Perhaps that is quite comprehensible. We
have arrived at our present condition in
Vietnam only step by unanticipated step.
There was no Pearl Harbor, no declaration of
war by them or by us.
Perhaps it is fair to say that Americans
as a whole have rather little collective mem-
ory of' this war.. They have trouble pro-
nouncing the names of the enemy. They
are not quite sure whom they are eupposed
to hate. And they are not at all clear what
the ultimate stakes might be.
So, sustained debate or events or both
could crystallize all this and bring it into
some focus. Many people here hope that
it will. The t will be hard to do, perhaps, un-
less the Congress is clear in its own mind as
to the war, its cause, conduct, identity of
the real enemy, the nature of the final goal
we seek, and we hope that the debate has
been part of that process.
This is Eric Sevareid in Waehington.
Good afternoon.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President, I congratu-
late the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
GoaE] for the words articulated prob-
ably better than I could express my
thoughts on this matter.
I applaud the President's excellent de-
cision to take the Vietnam problem to
the United Nations and I am glad that
his decision to renew the bombing of
North Vietnam is combined with this
effort to achieve a diplomatic resolution
of our strife.
At this point, I request unanimous con-
sent to insert in the REcoao, at the end
of my remarks, a copy of a speech I made
on November 8, 1965, to the St. Charles
Parent-Teacher Club of Providence, RI.,
in the course of which I advanced seven
e DP67
January 31, 1966
points or recommendations with regard
to Vietnam, the fifth of which was:
Let us make an even stronger effort to
turn this problem over to the United Na'
tions, as was Korea. To do so effectively, we
would have to agree, whether we liked it or
not, to abide by the results of the United
Nations collective judgment.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD
as follows:
REMARKS BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL RE-
GARDING VIETNAM, DELIVERED IN PROVIDENCE.
R.I., NOVEMBER 8, 1965
The problem of Vietnam continues to
exacerbate our national mood with more per-
sistance than any other foreign policy mat-
ter for a decade. As the draft calls mount,
our involvement, which in many ways seems
so distant, comes closer and closer to the
families of each of us. And as the draft
cards burn, the Nation is swept into an
ideological debate which becomes less and
less relevant with each irrational act.
My own concern with Vietnam is tied inti-
mately to my day-to-day work as a Senator,
and particularly as a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. It was Just
under 3 years ago that I accompanied
Senator MANSFIELD on a 40-day Presidential
fact-finding mission to Vietnam and other
countries on the periphery of Communist
China. The analysis which we made of the
basic weaknesses and problems confronting
South Vietnam have unfortunately held up
very well indeed.
It is against this background that I would
like to venture a few thoughts on Vietnam
today; in particular, to voice any hope that
the administration will continue on its course
of firmness and restraint, and to offer my
idea of a long-range resolution of our com-
mitment in that unhappy land.
At the outset, I wish to express my com-
plete support for President Johnson and my
general endorsement of the excellent way he
is conducting the affairs of his office. Few
Chief Executives in history have been faced
with such a rapidly shifting panorama of
events?both domestic and foreign?and even
fewer have had the good fortune to be able
to deal with history with such success as he
already has.
I have supported the bulk of the hard
and unpleasant decisions he has made in
Vietnam so far because I have been con-
vinced that he has had no clear alternative
to the course we have followed. Now, par-
ticularly, I support him in his restraint and
his opposition to those who wish an inordi-
nate escalation of our involvement in Viet-
nam. I hope the administration will sus-
tain an attitude of patience that can come
only from a true sense of history.
I believe before we can peer into the fu-
ture and sensibly plot our course in Vietnam,
we must first look at the past. One of our
most fatal weaknesses is to think of a par-
ticular moment as a time all by itself rather
than as simply a fleeting pause in the con-
tinuous stream of history. But, we must use
the moments given to us as moments not just
to act or, worse, to react, but to think ahead.
While we cannot change the course of his-
tory that has already run, our actions today
can alter the course of the stream of history
to come.
In southeast Asia we find an area whose
most conspicuous unifying force since the
days of the Khmer Empire and the Le dynas-
ty was the rather loose administration of
France over Indochina. The people in the
area are of assorted religions and philoso-
phies, and varied ethnic strains and educa-
tion. The great power center in the area
is?and has been for 2,000 years?China, a
people with the oldest continuous civiliza-
tion in the world, but also a nation that has
444R.C100413041.1.
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January 31, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
continuously sought to dominate the coun-
tries on its periphery and which has always
been attracted by the rich Rice Bowl of 'In-
dochina. The history of southeast Asia is
replete with efforts of the Chinese to take
over those people and, often, they have suc-
ceeded for a period of time.
But the Chinese expansionist drives have
been limited in the past by their own tech-
nological
At this juncture in history we are faced
by a new China with new technology that
poses a virulent threat to the peace of the
world. Given a free rein, she might serve as
a powerful magnet to the still hungry masses
of the Far East.
Now, let us examine our present position.
It seems to me that we have at least tacitly
weighed and rejected two extreme alterna-
tives in recent months.
The first, which we wisely resisted, was
unilateral withdrawal. If we had pulled out,
the Communist North Vietnamese and their
Vietcong cohorts surely would have simply
rushed in to fill the ideological and military
vacuum which we left behind. Or worse,
the Communist Chinese might have been
tempted to score, at no cost, the great victory
they were denied in Korea.
The other extreme alternative was to esca-
late to full scale war and an American oc-
cupation of South Vietnam, committing if
need be all of our ultimate, weapons at
whatever risk of involving other big powers,
notably Communist China, and at whatever
risk of a nuclear confrontation with the
Soviet Union.
Happily, each of these harsh alternatives
was rejected. Between them, the Johnson
administration has fashioned a rather skill-
ful middle course, involving a very substan-
tial U.S. military commitment which has
decidedly stopped far short of indefinite
escalation.
It is a commitment which has been exer-
cised with wisdom and restraint and which,
by and large, has been directed at limited
objectives. There has not been a nuclear
escalation and the Chinese so far have not
seen fit to enter the fray. While victory in
the usual sense is by no means assured to
us, there have been a few signs that the tide
of battle may be swinging slowly in our
favor. I emphasize the word "may." We
have, at the least, established before the
world our credibility as an ally and our will-
ingness to stand by our commitments.
There is of course, the distinct possibility
that our involvement will drag on to a pro-
tracted war of 3, 5, or 10 or snore years, and
with that protraction could come risks of
further and further escalation of the con-
flict. We have only to remind ourselves of .
the terrible war we had to wage against a
similar foe in Korea where the tactical situ-
ation was much more to our favor because
the conflict was confined to a narrow penin-
sula surrounded by sea that was under our
control. There the land boundary separat-
ing South Korea from the Communists is
but 135 miles while the sea boundary is 712
nautical miles. In 'South Vietnam, unfor-
tunately, the land boundary to be defended
is 875 miles and the sea boundary 865 nauti-
cal miles. Thus the vulnerable land fron-
tier in South Vietnam is more than six times
longer than the Korean front. Another
measure of difficulty is the fact that last
year alone the South Vietnamese Army suf-
fered 25 percent more battle casualties pro-
portionately that we incurred during the
entire 3 years of the Korean conflict.
So, we continue to face extremely difficult
odds in Vietnam and we may at times be
sorely tempted to use means that will not
be appropriate to our objectives.
For example, I must say that I have already
at times wished we would use more restraint
with regard to the bombing of targets in
North Vietnam. I say this because I believe
that while our bombing may seem to be sue-
cessful in its immediate tactical objectives,
I believe it is counterproductive in its polit-
ical effects, in that it tends to strengthen
Communist unity and morale. And let us
remember that this is a political, not a tac-
tical war.
Also, when it comes to honoring commit-
ments to South Vietnam, we must remem-
ber that this is a two-way street. By this I
mean that just as we are in South Vietnam
because the government of those unhappy
people asked us to be there?so, if their
government asks us to depart, we should be
willing to depart.
But, if we are asked to stay?and I see no
sign that we won't be?we must accept the
fact that it could turn out to be a very long-
term commitment and that we may have
to stand fast and hard in South Vietnam over
an extended period of time.
This is especially apt to be the case be-
cause the Communists and particularly the
oriental Communists, have added a new
dimension to warfare, and that is time. Just
as Einstein added time as a fourth physical
dimension, so must time be added as a factor
to the total political warfare of today, par-
ticularly when such wars are masked under
the term "wars of liberation." And time
stretched out is a dimension with which we
Americans hate to work, just as it is a
dimension that the Communists like to use
freely.
We like neat, quick, clear answers. A
20-year war makes us shudder, but not our
enemies. They accept and seem to revel in
muddy answers and lifelong struggles.
As was once said of Mao Tse-tung in the
conduct of his successful revolution in
China, Hanoi and the Vietcong have been
trading time for space and cities for men.
But we must also recognize that the great-
est power in Asia, whether we like it or not,
is Communist mainland China, a position
that is emphasized by its acquisition of nu-
clear capability. If we peer into the future,
I think we must accept the premise that
China will play the dominant role there.
Our problem over the long haul is to make
sure that, while China may dominate its
immediate neighbors there?just as do we in
the Americas and as has every great nation
in history?she won't devour them. And,
this means holding the line at this stage of
Communist Chinese virulence and expansion
with all its emphasis upon atheism, material-
ism and hatred of the United States.
It seems to me that once the Communists
accept the fact that we are not leaving, that
we will not be impatient for quick victories
and that we have adopted their viewpoint
toward time?they will be deprived of the
keystone of their own strategy. And we, for
our part, will find that time works in our
favor, both from the short term and long
term viewpoints.
From the short-term viewpoint, our pa-
tience and implacibility may convince the
Communists to call off their troops and save
their energies for another day. They cer-
tainly should be eager to see us depart, for
our continued presence in southeast Asia
must be as galling to them as a Chinese
presence in Latin America would be to us.
From the long term viewpoint, I believe,
the passage of time itself contributes to the
internal distress and progressive dissolution
of the Communist system. This results from
the fact that communism as a system goes
against the basic natures of human beings;
there is thus constant internal pressure to
erode the system and with the passage of
time the erosion in fact changes the nature
of the system. We have already seen the
beginnings of the process demonstrated in
the European Communist nations, where the
achievement of material well-being has
sharpened the taste for more freedom and
dictated a relaxation of the controls on
which the system depends.
Our present problem in Asia, therefore, is
1513
to persist and stand fast, whatever the diffi-
culty, and confront the Communists on their
own terms. The world should heed Presi-
dent Johnson's pledge that we have a long-
term objective to restore peace and that we,
for our own part, do not intend to withdraw
until peace is restored.
We must also I believe be thinking beyond
military strategy. We should, in fact, for-
mulate and follow a systematic, step-by-step
plan not only for concluding the military
engagement but for securing the peace
which should follow. We must anticipate
the knotty problems of negotiating a viable
peace with ample provision for political sta-
bility and economic reconstruction. We
must especially see to the needs of the Viet-
namese people and make stringent guaran-
tees that no reprisals will be taken against
any of the South Vietnamese, who have
fought the Communists so bravely.
I submit we can do this by taking the
following seven steps:
First, in order to properly support all our
efforts, we must continue our military pres-
sure in South Vietnam on the Communists.
We can do this with the least expense to our
side by digging in at the coastal cities where
we command the air and the sea. At the
same time, we can militarily probe and ex-
pand the area under our control when we
wish and on our own terms in order to make
life miserable for the Vietcong. We should
do this in full acceptance of the possibility
of a long stay in Vietnam and hence take
such positions that our casualties and losses
will be held to the minimum possible.
While doing our best in the border areas to
interdict help coming from North Vietnam, I
believe in general that we should not esca-
late but rather should descalate our bomb-
ing of North Vietnam. And, when there is a
pause in our bombing there, it should be for
a matter of weeks, not days, if we are serious
in our hopes that such a pause might be pro-
ductive of any steps toward the conference
table or any reduction of Communist pres-
sures.
Secondly, and most important from both
tactical and political standpoints, I believe
our fighting load should be far more greatly
shared there with our Asian allies. By doing
this we could dispel the impression held by
so many Vietnamese that this is a white
man's colonial war. It would also help us to
get away from the present pattern where we
react violently if American soldiers are killed,
but gloss over the killing of 10, or even a
hundred times that number, of Vietnamese.
Let us make as our goal at least the match-
ing in numbers of American troops there by
our non-Vietnamese Asian allies. We are
presently a long way from such a goal since
the total number of allied Asian troops there
is a couple of thousand. This is only 3 per-
cent of our land forces alone in South Viet-
nam. Actually, there are probably several
times more American troops in South Viet-
nam than there are members of the Vietcong
born in North Vietnam. And there have
been no traces of Chinese in South Vietnam
and only a trace of the Chinese in North
Vietnam.
Third, let us engage, as President Johnson
has suggested, in a greater economic and
educational development program. In doing
this we should avoid a unilateral approach.
We should make far greater use of the United
Nations' technical asistance program in the
area, even though neither North nor South
Vietnam is a member of the United Nations.
We would again, be sharing the burden with
other nations. President Johnson's proposal
at Baltimore for a lower Mekong River devel-
opment project to be engaged in by all the
countries interested in the area is a fine one.
The Economic Commission on Asia and the
Far East (ECAFE) should be utilized to the
fullest in this connection as this would be
further effort in internationalizing our eco-
nomic efforts in southeast Asia. We should
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1514 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? - SENATE
move vigorously ahead with the proposed
Asian Development Bank.
At present, the number of American civil-
ians employed by AID and other agencies in
South Vietnam is '791. Yet, by contrast, the
present number of U.N. technical assistance
people in Vietnam is 23. I would like to see
these figures reversed and have '791 U.N. tech-
t heal assistance people there, preferably front
aiiiittic nations, and 23 of our Am people
merged amongst them.
Also, I believe our Peace Corps volunteers
,thould be in this area where they are so
acutely needed, and I hope that the Peace
slurps will be ready to send in a substantial
ilingent as soon as possible.
Hi, as Senator iVinsiSk start has sug-
gested, we should urge Great Britain and the
Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva Con-
rerence and seek a neutralization of both
Vietnam. Cambodia, and Laos, a neutraliza-
tion that would be 'fortified with ironclad
Lees.
relith. let ue make an even stronger effort
to turn this problem over to the United Na-
tions, as was Korea. teo do so effectively we
would have to agree, whether we liked it or
itot, to abide by the results of the United
Nations collective Judgment. in this connee-
don, Secretary General U Thant has been
:pressing for negotiations: it would be inter-
esting to see it he could come up with some
;ort of U.N. peacekeeping formula or force.
Sixth, we mutt accept the fact that no
imitter whether under Geneva Conference or
he United Nations auspices, we would have
talk and negotiate with whomever was at
the conference table, no matter whether that
table was convened by the cochairman of the
aitieva powers or the Secretary General.
This would inevitably mean we would have
at negotiate with the Vietcong.
'The question of dealing with the Vietcong
ei one that we will have to accept before we
itcsive at any final settlement. To make an
eetreme an in connection w/ Ha our own
.nevolation, no matter whether General
Washington's forces had woo or lost, the
British would have had to deal with Wash-
nigton and not with the Government of
fomace. This would have been true even
Lbough it was French gold that sustained our
troops in our [[evolution and there were more
Wrench troops than American at Yorktown.
the modern parallel, it seems quite clear
that we will have to deal eventually with
the Vietcong, even though they have been
eupported and decided by the Govern-
ment of North Vietnam?just as our own
American revolutionaries were supported by
France.
Dinned, the reattionship between the Viet-
mug and the North Vietnamese Government
so close that it is the northern government
which so far has stated the terms of settle-
ment. These terms were set [(wilt in a four-
part statement by the Premier of North Viet-
nam last Amii in response to President
Johnson's four-noint proposal made in his
:ipeech at johns Hopkins.
While there are considerable differences
iii the formal language used in each case, it
seems to me quite apparent that the two sets
iff proposals are by no means incompatible.
Both sides, for example, agree to the prin-
ciple of withdrawal of foreign military forces
and bases, although. the United States, of
course, stipulates that peace-must come first.
Both sides agree to the principle that all
of Vietnam. shall have independence,
sovereignty and self-rule, although the
United States makes it clear that South Viet-
naus shall have the clear right to remain
eriparated from North Vietnam.
Both sides appear to agree on the need to
let the people ot Vietnam resolve their prob-
lems without fear of retribution or inter-
[license, although we have made it clear that
lids must not preclude international
inspections.
UM* 11
drOVR
And finally, both sides appeax agreed an the
principle that the people of South Vietnam
should elect their own government and run
their own affairs, although I hasten to point
out that the Communists in this instance
have attached a crucial, and so :Ear us- accept-
able, condition.
'The crucial reservation is that self -rule in
South Vietnam shall be in accordance with
the problem laid down by the National
Liberation Front, which in effect is tilt' politi-
cal arm of the Vietcong. This politied pro-
gram, when analyzed combines a meui mix-
ture of double edged slogans and appeals to
motherhood with insulting expressions about
the United States. If the insults are re-
moved, the remaining points revolve around
questions of :semantics. "Progressive democ-
racy' means one thing to a Westerner and
another to a Communist.
My seventh and final point is that reinindless
of the obvious ambiguities and uncertainties,
we on our side must resolve to implement
President Johnson's suggestion of List July
and continuously emphasize our wieingness
to abide by the Geneva agreement al 1954,
accepting the results of fairly conducted
electiors as long as there was specifi: 'ally set
forth provisions for amnesty and se rety for
all in Vietnam, North and South. Setee the
government that might emerge as she end
result of such elections could devceop into
a nationalist Communist regime, 1:fi.e that
of Yugoslavia, there would have to be in-
cluded a plan for expatriation as political
refugees of any who wished to do so. Borneo
would, I believe, be the best site for such a
haven as it is Ooze, climatically sine lar and
would strenethen the anti-Communist com-
plexion and Government of Malaysia
Tile national government that would
emerge being composed of Vielinamsee, that
government would probably be as h stile as
it safely could towards the dread Chi raise oc-
topus, its historical enemy to the nor Lb . Be-
cause of this and also because of our :mai na-
tional interest, some sort of ironclad i;uaran-
tees for the safety and independenee of an
eventually rmnined Vietnam would have to
be undertaken by other nations, particularly
by the United States and the Soviet Union.
We must also face up to the fact that, from
the viewpollit of the flow of history, our mis-
sion in southeast Asia will prove MiDcult if
we conceive it as being to create South Viet-
nam in our image or to have it remar I forever
separated from North Vietnam. Jut as the
two Germanies will some day be ur Sled, so
will the two Vietnams. In toto, then, I be-
lieve our mission is to make sure Us tl; when
this happens, such a unified Vietnam will not
prove a threat to the peace of the world and
that our own South Vietnamese allies will not
Lie maltreated as the result of unifice don. If
these two steps are achieved, our American
national security will be adequally pro-
te-cted.
President Johnson's speeches at Jana Hop-
kins, San Francisco, and in Washir gton on
July 28, 1965, all open the way for such a
course.
But we must, I believe, a imo atwar keep in
our minds--and our opponents' minds?the
fact that eur long-range oblectite is to
.ichieve peace in the area and to avoli indefi-
nite maseive escalation of military operations
in southeast Asia.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, this propo-
sal is very similar to that advanced by
Pope Paul calling for arbitration by the
United Nations.
I congratulate the President on this
move and pray that they will reward
his efforts to achieve peace in southeast
Asia.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in view
of the developments over the weekend
and this morning with respect to the sit-
" AL Dr137' 4
January 31, 1966
uation in Vietnam, I should like to sug-
gest to the Senate seven points for peace.
First. The most important, indeed the
vital, aspect of our foreign policy for the
foreseeable future will be our relations
with Russia and China. The Vietnam
war is really only an incident in the over-
all relationship?an unfortunate incident
which I hope we can terminate promptly
with honor.
I do not propose to accept defeat in
Vietnam; neither do I believe we can
tight a successful war against commu-
nism :to total victory in that area, on that
terrain, so far away from home in this
day and age, without accepting unrea-
sonable risk of a worldwide nuclear
holocaust. Most wars end short of un -
conditional surrender. I hope this one
will, with an honorable negotiated settle-
ment.
Second. A detente with the Soviet Un-
ion on the various matters with respect
to which we are now in disagreement
would solve most of the difficulties of
bringing a just and lasting peace to the
world. If we could agree with the Rus-
sians on a policy of peaceful coexistends.
an end to wars of national liberation, a
solution to the Germany problem, a
treaty against the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test
ban treaty, a stay on the deployment of
anti-missile missiles and meaningful
progress on disarmament, we would have
gone a long way toward peace.
This should be the major objective of
our foreign policy: To get started as
quickly as possible on the complex and
difficult job of collective bargaining with
the rough, tough negotiators for the
Soviet Union, to achieve a result which
is to their economic and social self -
interest. as well as ours.
I do not believe this task is impossible;
but I also do not think our State Depart-
ment is doing nearly enough on our side
to arrive at that result.
Third. The Russian-Chinese quarrel is
serious. We should do nothing to drive
these Communist giants together. If we
start bombing Hanoi, if we start bomb-
ing Peiping, not only are we likely to lose
Saigon but we will throw Russia back
into the arms of Communist China and
be confronted again with a monolithic
and powerful adversary.
Fourth. China is still in the belliger-
ent stage of its revolution. The Rus-
sians have already learned that military
solutions to matters in disagreement
with the West cannot be successful; now
the Russians can help us get that me:3.-
sage across to China. And that means
China must learn that its attempt to
finance and support wars of national
liberation, as well as its encouragement
of Hanoi and the Vietcong to press for
total victory in South Vietnam, work
against China's long-range interests.
Fifth. Our diplomacy should turn
away from the matters which now pre-
occupy it to an overall effort to achieve
the support of the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European Communist nations
in an effort to persuade China that mu-
tual and peaceful coexistence is as es-
sential to her well being as to ours.
04
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1515
Sixth. World war III is unthinkable.
Under no circumstances should we even
contemplate a nuclear war. The bomb-
ing of Peiping, the use of tactical nu-
clear weapons in Vietnam or China, a
landing on the coast of North Vietnam or
of China involve an unacceptable risk
of a holocaust which would destroy
civilization. I am as strongly against
preventive war against China now as I
have been against preventive war against
the Soviet Union ever since the end of
World War II.
Seventh. Resumption of the bombing
of North Vietnam and escalation of the
war in South Vietnam through a policy
of search and destroy make the achieve-
ment of these major objectives of our
foreign policy difficult if not impossible.
I commend the President for his deter-
mination to continue to seek negotiations
under which we may obtain an honor-
able peace. I am delighted that he has
Instructed Ambassador Goldberg to pre-
sent a new initiative for peace to the
United Nations Security Council. I am
pleased that he is cooperating with Pope
Paul in his efforts to bring about arbi-
tration of the controversy. We must
terminate the war in Vietnam as promp-
ty as possible to get back to the first
priority of our foreign policy, which is
to improve our relations with Russia
and, with the cooperation of the Soviet
Union, present a united front against
the belligerence of the Chinese Com-
munists.
In this regard, with deep regret, I find
myself in some disagreement with the
able and much beloved Senator from
Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], whom I see in the
Chamber.
I would hope that he was unduly pessi-
mistic when he told the Senate this
morning that we are going to have a long,
hard war which will be difficult to termi-
nate short of an all-out war in southeast
Asia.
I know why he thinks that. I read
the report to which he was a party with
five Senators who went to Vietnam. The
report was prepared by the group of
which the majority leader was the chair-
man.
Nobody can tell what the future will
hold. The Senator from Vermont may
turn out to be right, but I would hope
there was enough initiative in our di-
plomacy, with the President at its head.
and that there will be more and more
initiative by the State Department than
we had in the last few years, so we can
find a solution to this matter before all
of those American boys will be killed,
who inevitably will get killed in an effort
to achieve total victory in southeast Asia.
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I
commend the Senator from Vermont for
having opened this discussion on the
floor of the Senate today. I was one of
the 15 Senators who signed the letter to
the President, urging him to delay the
resumption of bombing of North Viet-
nam.
The President has chosen to resume
bombing. I am of the same opinion that
I was at the time we sent the letter;
namely, that the military case for bomb-
ing had not been made nor had the dip-
lomatic case for bombing been made.
In any case, the decision on the part of
the President has been announced and,
as other Members of the Senate have in-
dicated, there will be full support by way
of authorizations and appropriations, I
am sure, so the method which has been
decided upon can be pursued as effec-
tively as possible.
I was pleased that at the same time
this announcement was made, the matter
of referring the conflict to the Security
Council was included. I think it would
have been more effective from the diplo-
matic viewpoint if the announcement
about referring it to the Security Coun-
cil had been made separately from the
announcement about resumption of
bombing; but, in any event, this is a
great step forward.
We have moved, with reference to the
United Nations, in recent years, as if it
had no real concern in the Western
World; as if it were an agency which
could deal with problems in Europe or
Asia: but that when it came to prob-
lems involving the United States or the
Western Hemisphere, somehow or other,
they should be settled outside the United
Nations.
Here we have indicated our confidence
in the United Nations by preparing to
take this most serious matter before the
United Nations itself.
I think the debate which has been
carried on on the floor of the Senate and
the interrogation of administration wit-
nesses before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee last week have been most helpful
by way of preparing, at least, for deci-
sions in this most critical area.
There has been a movement toward a
more realistic and objective judgment.
We have come to the knowledge that the
United States is directly involved in the
negotiations. Hanoi has publicly an-
nounced that it is one of the principals
in this dispute. I think we are on the
verge of acknowledging, too, that the
Vietcong are a real force in the war in
South Vietnam.
. I was interested in noting in the debate
that there was little or no reference to
the Tonkin Bay resolution. It is my
judgment that this resolution has less
bearing on this matter or discussion than
any other document. The President re-
ceived no additional grant of authority
when the resolution was adopted than
he had before it was adopted. He had
no more authority after it was passed
than he had before it was passed. I
think it does somewhat of a disservice
to the functions of the Senate to bring
that matter into the debate. I think it
tends to discount the power of the Presi-
dent in the resumption of the bombing.
I am hopeful that, as a result of the
experience we have had with that resolu-
tion, in the future when similar problems
may arise and similar dispositions may be
made, the Senate will be more prone to
adhere more closely to its traditions
under the Constitution and may move
away from a kind of foreign policy by
way of resolution. I hope it will go back
to the traditional practices and processes
under which the Senate has proceeded on
foreign policy matters, and take only
formal action, and that we will depend
more on the Constitution itself.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. I am very much inter-
ested in the comments of the Senator
from Minnesota, particularly toward the
last of his comments, dealing with the
resolution of August 1964.
Last Saturday I introduced a resolu-
tion to rescind that resolution. Accord-
ing to its provisions, it would be subject
to rescision at any time Congress saw
fit to rescind the prior resolution.
I also introduced another resolution
calling for public?and I stress the word
"public"?hearings on the whole situa-
tion involving the U.S. war in Vietnam.
I quite agree with the observation of
the Senator from Minnesota that Con-
gress ought to take another look at at-
tempts to transfer to the President cer-
tain powers that, in my judgment, under
the Constitution cannot be transferred
to him. That is why the Senator from
Alaska [Mr. GRIYENING], and I have been
rather lonely voices in the Senate, pro-
testing the resolution of August 1964.
But that is water over the dam.
Now we have to decide whether we are
going to take the American people fur-
ther down the road by Executive order.
Once again, from the floor of the Senate,
I warn the American people that we are
being led down the road away from a
constitutional 'form of government based
upon three coordinate and equal
branches of government and being made
to travel down the road of Executive
power.
History is replete with examples that
when the power of self-government is in
fact turned over to the Executive?I
care not under what form of govern-
ment?the loss of freedom develops.
I have introduced this resolution in the
interest of my country. The preservation
of our constitutional system of three
equal and coordinate branches of gov-
ernment is more important than the
powers which the President may seek to
add to Executive power.
Under this administration we have
traveled far down the road toward gov-
ernment by Executive power. That is
why I think the previous resolution ought
to be rescinded and the President ought
to come down before Congress and ask
for a declaration of war. When he does
come here it is my prediction that the
American people will repudiate him.
Mr. McCARTHY. As the Senator
knows, I too am concerned about our
constitutional responsibility in the Sen-
ate in the field of foreign policy and
about the need that there be a sharing
of that responsibility between the Senate
and the President.
The Constitution as drafted by the
Founders did not really set one branch
against the other, the executive against
the legislative, particularly the Senate;
but provided for a sharing of decisions.
At the time the Constitution was
drafted, it was assumed that there would
be a declaration of war and a treaty
which would settle that dispute. It was
assumed that there then would be a
period of stability of 10 or 20 or 30 years.
This is no longer the case. The fact
that history is different now does not pre-
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1516 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
elude the Senate from following those
procedures or establishing procedures so
it can, with the Executive, share its part
of the burden.
I am concerned over statements by
some Members of the Senate who say we
must trust the military with this prob-
lem, that this problem is one of military
action, and that we should not question
the generals, but trust them.
If we were to accept that philosophy as
a part of our foreign policy, we could
then proceed to a programing in the
State Department and eventually a
methodology by which the President
would determine the principles, and then
the principles would then determine the
kind of action we might take. We cannot
run such a risk.
In the past the Western nations have
been protected because of the lag that
has obtained between the time of the new
engagement and the invention of new
weapons. Weapons of the previous con
Wet were used. We have been saved be-
cause of the fact that we were fighting
with weapons of a previous war.
The danger in 1966 is that we will
tight with modern weapons, with result-
ing disaster.
'10 ask the Senate to trust the military,
as some have asked us to do, is to ask the
Senate to repudiate its duties under the
Constitution and its responsibilities un-
der the Consituion. I and many other
Senators do not intend to give up those
responsibilities.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the
Senator wilt permit the Chair to ask. Is
there further morning business? Do
Senators wish to speak in the morning
hour?
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, be-
[ore the distinguished Senator from
Rhode Island I Mr. PELL] begins his dis-
cussion on H.R. 77, I would like to make
a comment relative to the tenor of the
debate in the Senate Chamber today.
I am delighted that the Senator from
Vermont I Mr. AIKEN], the ranking Re-
publican in this body, and one of our
most senior Members, saw fit to launch
the debate on southeast Asia. He did so
with his usual calm and understanding,
with his full awareness of the potentiali-
ties of the situation that confronts us.
fie did so in his usual, wise, and con-
siderate manner. I am delighted that
the "owl" undertook to launch the de-
bate. I am delighted with the debate
that has taken place today, because there
were no personalities involved. It was
carried on in the traditions of the Senate.
I think this discussion was long over--
due, and it is to be hoped that we will
have more of such debate in the future.
Mr. HAR.T. Mr. President, the RECORD
earlier today will show I was present.
Having read my mail, if I did not say a
word as this debate closed I would be
ecolded by those at home who do know
the answers?and not all of these knowl-
edgeable persons are at home; some are
here.
Very frankly, I doubt I can contribute
anything that has not already been said.
I do wish that in this Congress as well
as in this country there would be a little
more willingness to be tentative. tenta,-
-,1*,,,001,4101011.1M10..
edfarRel
tive in our judgments of what the history
of the moment requires, tentative in our
judgment of the motives of others, both
those who speak and those who sit and
listen and think.
It is unfortunate that a Member of
1;h:is body feels he must rise and say some-
thing lest he be clobbered as forfeiting
responsibility. It takes no courage to get
up and speak for peace. I can think of
no shorter cut to popularity.
I think all of us hoped that the Presi-
dent would be able to arrive at a de-
cision that would avoid resumotion of
aerial bombing. Some have publicly
voiced that hope; others of us have ad-
vised him privately that we woald hope
that on all the facts?some of which we
cannot know?relevant to such judg-
ment, this course could be followed.
If I thought resumption of bombing
was merely the frustrated response of a
giant power like the United States which
says to a smaller country, ?Forward
march," and the country does n4:t march,
then I would rise in protest.
But I am convinced ? that there is no
man in this country or in this we rid more
anxious to see us get to a confer( ace table
under circumstances which will establish
conditions for a peace that is real, one
that will not come back to haunt our
children.
We could obtain a peace easily. We
could leave Vietnam?that would give us
peace?and in the lifetimes of most of
the Members of this body, it probably
would not make any difference, except
to reduce our taxes. But if it was mis-
read by others in the world it might have
enormous implications for our children.
Mr. President, I suppose that what 1
am really saying is that?as other Sena-
tors have voiced this morning? I am de-
lighted that the President has referred
this issue to the United Nations. Read
Ambassador Goldberg's message to the
Security Council President, please. But,
as others have cautioned, this is no short-
cut, either. The harshest note on which
this debate could close would be to sug-
gest that there are some problems in this
world that are never solved. But it is a
hard truth. We know it to be true in our
family life, and history tells us that it is
true with respect to the family i.e nations
and their problems.
There are some Ph. D.'s in listory in
the Senate. I am not one, but I have the
impression that we will find th is lesson
throughout history, especially in our re-
lations with the rest of the world, or the
nations' relations with other nations?
the lesson that for some problems no
answer really is at hand, no matter how
decently disposed are all parties.
For most of 300 years, the underlying
problem in European history was the
conflict between Christianity and the
Moslem world. It was a problem that
was never solved. This did not excuse
those living in a particular generation
from seeking to resolve, to compromise
or to modify it. But notwithstanding all
such efforts no one solved it, and it was
sort of absorbed by other problems?the
Renaissance, the age of discovery, the
machine age.
The relationship between thi . free so-
cieties and the less free societies is the
January 3 I , 19f.i6
problem which confronts us today, the
beginning point of which usually is
marked by the attitude that developed
in Russia about 1920. Conceivably this
relationship is one of of those problems
which never really is solved. I sus-
pect it is. And it is for this reason, I
suspect, also, that my children will find
Vietnams around the world in their life-
times, too; and finding them, I hope that
they will not say that their fathers could
have solved the problem merely by get-
ting up and making a speech. In our
search for intermediate solutions we
must not wonder whether someone else's
devotion to his country is any less than
our own just because he has trouble being
as convinced of the wisdom of our own
suggestion as we are; we must acknowl-
edge the necessarily tentative nature of
our own judgments.
As human beings, we are fallible, and
we will remain fallible, even if we talk
here for a month.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Michigan yield at
that point?
Mr. HART. I am glad to yield to the
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I
should like very much to associate my-
self with the remarks and observations
just made by the distinguished Senator
from Michigan [Mr. HART].
There is another part to this story
that should be told, for the benefit of the
American people.
As a member of the Subcommittee on
Appropriations for the Defense Depart-
ment, it has been my responsibility and
my opportunity to sit in at the recent
hearings that we have held with relation
to the $12 billion and some. $348 million
which is being asked to conduct whatever
needs to be done in the next fiscal year in
Vietnam.
I have been quite impressed with what
has been stated by the Senator from
Michigan this afternoon. I regret very
much that I was not in the Chamber
when other Senators spoke on this sub-
ject, but I was encouraged and very
much impressed by the attitude and the
statements made by Mr. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense, before that hear-
ing.
Many people do not know this, but,
here is a man who has been bandied
about around this country, who has been
accused of conducting what has been.
characterized as "McNamara's war.
Yet, at that very meeting there were
many responsible and sincere Members
of this body who were badgering the
Secretary of Defense?when I use the
word "badgering," I use it in the kind-
liest sense--to go the full limit and do
everything that was absolutely necessary'
in order to win the conflict in Vietnam.
And of course, that is appealing. That
sounds very fine. Who does not wish to
win? Yet this man sat there with the
calmness and the patience of Job, ex-
plaining that what we were trying to do
was to achieve a limited political goal
in Vietnam, and that in order to do it
we had to conduct a restrained offensive.
That is the policy of our Government--
a restrained offensive.
In other words, Mr. President.. what we
are trying to do is to avert that one net
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January 31, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1517
which will set off the trigger of an atomic
or a thermonuclear war that might burn
this entire world.
I would hope that in our anxiety to see
results, we are not going to commit that
one act of indiscretion, of injudicious-
ness, which might compel other nations
to possibly live up to their commit-
ments?whatever they may be?and in-
ject themselves into the fray, where they
do not belong, and touch off a nuclear or
thermonuclear holocaust. That is the
one thing that the administration is try-
ing to avert.
Now the question may be asked: If that
is the case, why did we resume bombing?
I have heard evidence on that ques-
tion, too. Since the cessation of the
bombing, there has been a terrific build-
up in South Vietnam, so much so that the
President of the United States, who is
responsible for the safety and security of
195,000 American soldiers who are com-
mitted there must now make a decision
on bombing. We will continue, as we did
in the past, not to try to overturn the
Hanoi government, not to commit that
one act which might compel Red China
and Russia to come into this conflict, but
at the same time make them understand
that they cannot win by violence, that
they cannot subject other peoples to their
will through violence, and that America
will open wide and keep open wide the
door to bring this issue from the battle-
field to the negotiating table.
That is all that the President of the
United States is trying to do, the one man
who has the power, the one man who has
the responsibility of making this decision.
Senators can sit here. They can de-
bate. They can say what they believe.
I daresay that if we are wrong on this
31st day of January 1966, we can come
into the Chamber tomorrow, the 1st day
of February 1966, and take another
guess.
But, the President of the United States
cannot have that second guess. He has
to be right. He has to do what is right
in the eyes of the world, and what is right
for the safety of those 195,000 American
soldiers now in Vietnam.
It is debatable whether we should have
gone into Vietnam when we did, in the
first place. But, the fact is that we are
there now, and that we are holding a bull
by the tail. We have such a divergence
of opinion in this body as to emphasize
the task of the man at 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue, and I wish to join my colleagues
In saying here, on the afternoon of Jan-
uary 31, 1966, that I pray to God that
Lyndon Johnson is right. I pray to God
that he will do the things that must be
done to bring this issue from the battle-
field to the negotiating table.
I thank the President, and I thank my
colleagues.
Mr. HART. I am very grateful for the
comments of the Senator from Rhode
Island. There is one aspect which this
debate should not belabor, and which
the Senator from Rhode Island wisely
mentioned at the end of his remarks:
Should we have been in Vietnam in the
first place?
Argument on this point can be raised
in a number of ways. But the over-
whelming fact of life is that we are now
there. It is like telling the pedestrian in
the middle of a 10-lane highway that he
should not be there. "Fine," he will say,
"but how do I get out?"
It is like a social worker telling the
troubled, abandoned mother of 13 chil-
dren, "You should not have had so large
a family; you should have seen me 13
years ago."
Let us not spin our wheels on what
might or should have been. The Presi-
dent cannot indulge in such luxury and
I think we should not. Much of value
has been spoken this morning and from
both sides of the aisle. Certainly no
comment will be of greater value than
the brief but eloquent observation by the
thoughtful majority leader, Mr. MANS-
FIELD. As we close this debate I want to
thank him and the distinguished Sen-
ator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] for set-
ting a theme which has encouraged
thoughtful comment.
DISTRICT OFFICIAL CRITICIZES
PROPOSED ABOLITION OF
SCHOOL MILK
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
have been inviting the attention of Sen-
ators to the sad effect of the cut by the
Budget Bureau in school milk funds ap-
propriated by Congress and to the pro-
posed elimination of most of the school
milk program.
No justification has been given for this
slash. It would not save a penny for
the taxpayer. It would simply deprive
schoolchildren of milk and increase the
excess stocks of the Commodity Credit
Corporation.
Without leaving Washington, any
Member of Congress can see the stupid-
ity of this action.
Here in the District of Columbia, of-
ficials have followed an excellent and
unique policy?alone of American major
cities?by providing totally free milk
daily to all elementary public schoolchil-
dren and to children in participating
private schools regardless of economic
need.
Mrs. Aleta Swingle, District schools
food service director, has called this ac-
tion a "tremendous loss to the District."
I ask unanimous consent that an arti-
cle in the Washington Star, reporting
Mrs. Swingle's reaction, be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SCHOOL AID RAPS PLAN To ABOLISH U.S.
MILK SUBSIDY
A cut in the Federal milk subsidy for
school children proposed in President John-
son's Department of Agriculture budget
would be a tremendous loss to the District,"
the District of Columbia school food service_
director said today.'
The President's budget proposes eliminat-
ing an average 3.19 cents per half-pint sub-
sidy on milk provided to all children regard-
less of need, and concentrating instead on
making totally free milk available to needy
children.
Mrs. Aleta E. Swingle, District schools food
service director, said if the elimination of
the subsidy is accepted by Congress, elemen-
tary school children in the District who do
not qualify because of need would probably
have to buy their milk at 5 cents a half pint.
The District has been unique among ma-
jor cities in providing totally free milk daily
to all elementary public school children and
to children in participating private schools,
regardless of economic need.
A free half pint has been provided for
about 20 years and this school year a sec-
ond half pint was provided, financed mainly
by Federal impact aid funds.
The District gets about 61 million from
the Federal subsidy, 6275,000 from District
funds and $200,000 from impact aid funds
for the milk program. At the junior and
senior high school level milk is also sub-
sidized, but children pay 2 cents a half pint.
111L1
BALL GIVES FIRST HISTORIC AND
GLOBAL JUSTIFICATION FOR
UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in
the view of foreign policy experts, the
speech by Under Secretary of State
George Ball yesterday on Vietnam is of
first-rank importance.
It is said that this speech by Under
Secretary Ball marks the first time the
Johnson administration has explained in
full detail its world view of why we are
in Vietnam.
The President has been an eloquent
and frequent defender of our policies in
Vietnam for many months.
But the Ball speech now puts the U.S.
involvement into full historic perspec-
tive.
In the administration's view as ex-
pressed by Ball, we are not simply in
Vietnam to repel local aggression, or to
stop a militant Communist regime. We
are in Vietnam "to prevent the Commu-
nists from upsetting the fragile balance
of power through force or the use of
force."
Ball sees the closest historic analogy
to our position in Vietnam in the 1947--
48 war in Greece, when the clear aggres-
sion of the Communists was decisively
and successfully met by the Truman ad-
ministration.
Secretary Ball documents the conten-
tion that Vietnam is not a civil war, but
clear aggression by North Vietnam.
Ball also emphasizes that if Commu-
nist China is allowed to move into Viet-
nam, it "would mean according to China
a status it had never been able to achieve
by its own efforts throughout the ages."
The Under Secretary also calls our at-
tention to the fact that Communist Rus-
sia has changed since the United States
and Europe "built a dam" to contain
Communist ambitions. Ball argues that,
given time, a containment policy in Asia,
holding back Chinese ambitions may
similarly bring "a peaceful relation with
the rest of the world."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this highly significant speech by
the Under Secretary of State be printed
at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE W. BALL,
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY ALUMNI Asso-
CIATI6N, EVANSTON, ILL., JANUARY 30, 1966
Sooner or later the time will come when
each of you will experience my sense of shock
when your generous invitation led me to
count up the years since I first became an
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1518 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE January 31, 1966
alumnus of Northwestern University. I took
my degree from the undergraduate school
in 1930. More than a third of a century has
passed since that time.
'Mat period of more than one-third of a
century has been a fortunate time in which
to live, an exciting time of change and fer-
ment?particularly for an American. For
during that third of a century our country
ceased to be a voice offstage and moved to
the center of world affairs.
When I received my first degree from
Northwestern University many Americans
pretended that the rest of the world did not
exist. We were still bemused by isolationism
as we had been ever since we rejected the
League of Nations in the early twenties. We
were self-centered and self-deluding--so
much so that when we faced the spectacle
of the Western World in flames from Hitler's
lunatic ambitions, many Americans quite
solemnly contended that this was none of
our affair.
But history has forced us to grow up. We
have faced the harsh realities of danger and
responsibility?and acquitted ourselves
with honor and courage, as befits a great
Power.
For we are indubitably a great power to-
day--a very different country from what we
were in 1930?a wiser, more mature, and more
responsible country. Our economy is four
times as large?our role in world affairs many
times as great.
Most of the western European nations--
which in the thirties controlled vast areas
of the globe?are today largely preoccupied
with their own affairs. Today we garrison
the distant outposts of the world, not in sup-
port of colonial interests, but in fulfillment
of world responsibilities. Six hundred thou-
sand of our countrymen are in uniform over-
seas. We are providing some form of eco-
nomic assistance to more than 95 countries.
And an America once determined to keep out
of entangling alliances now has more than
40 allies on five continents.
Today also we are lighting a shooting war
in a country that until recently for most
Americans was only an exotic place-name on
the map of a distant continent.
Our engagement in Vietnam is but one
aspect of the world role we are playing. But
because we arc spending both lives and re-
sources in that faraway land because the is-
sue being decided profoundly affects our for-
tunes and our future, I should like to talk
with you today about how we got there and
why we must stay.
'ffile beginning of wisdom with regard to
Vietnam is to recognize that what Americans
are fighting for in the jungles and rice
paddies of that unhappy land is not a local
conflict, an isolated war that has meaning
only for one part of the world.
We can properly understand the struggle
in Vietnam only if we recognize it for what
ii; is, part of a vast and continuing struggle
in which we have been engaged for more
than two decades.
like most of the conflicts that have plagued
the world in recent years, the conflict in Viet-
nam is a product of the great shifts and
changes triggered by the Second World War.
Out of the war, two continentwide powers
emerged, the United States and the Soviet
Union. The colonial systems through which
the nations of Western Europe had governed
more than a third of the people of the world
were, one by one, dismantled. The Soviet
Union under Stalin embarked on a reckless
coarse of seeking to extend Communist
power. An Iron Curtain was erected to en-
close large areas of the globe. At the same
time, man was learning to harness the power
of the exploding sun, and technology made
mockery of time and distance.
The result of these vast changes?com-
pressed within the breathless span of two
decades?was to bring about a drastic rear-
rangement of the power structure of the
world.
This rearrangement of power has resulted
in a very uneasy equilibrium of forces.
For even while the new national boundaries
Were still being marked on the map, the
Soviet Union under Stalin exploited the con-
fusion to push out the perimeter of its
power and influence in an effort to extend
the outer limits of Communist domination
by force or the threat of force.
This process threatened the freedom of the
world. It had to be checked and checked
quickly. By launching the Marshell plan to
restore economic vitality to the nations of
Western Europe and by forming NATO?a
powerful Western alliance reinforced by U.S.
resources and military power?America and
the free nations of Europe built a dam to
hold back the further encroachment of Com-
munist ambitions.
This decisive action succeeded brilliantly.
NATO, created in 1949, stopped tile spread
of communism over Western Europe and
the northern Mediterranean. But the world
was given no time to relax. The victory of
the Chinese Communists in that same year
posed a new threat of Communist expan-
sion against an Asia in ferment. Just as
the Western World had mobilized its resist-
ance against Communist force in Europe,
WO had to create an effective counterforce
in the Far East if Communist domination
were not to spread like a lava flow over the
whole area.
Tile first test came quickly in Korea.
There the United Nations forces?predomi-
nantly American?stopped the drive of
Communist North Korea, supported by ma-
teriel front the Soviet Union. It stopped a
vast Chinese Army that followed. It brought
to a halt the Communist drive to push out
the line that had been drawn and to estab-
lish Communist control over the whole
Korean peninsula.
The Korean war was fought from a central
conviction?that the best hope for freedom
and security in the world depended on
maintaining the Integrity of the postwar
arrangements. Stability could be achieved
only by making sure that the Communist
world did not expand by destroying those
arrangements by force and threat?and
thus upsetting the precarious power balance
between the two sides of the Iron Curtain.
It was this conviction that led to our firm
stand in Korea. It was this conviction that
led America, in the years immedLltely after
Korea, to build a barrier around the whole
periphery of the Communist world by en-
couraging in the creation of a series of alli-
ances and commitments from the eastern
edge of the NATO area to the Pe cific.
The SEATO treaty that was signed in
1954 was part of that barrier, that structure
of alliances. It was ratified by the Senate
by a vote of 82 to 1.
Under that treaty and its protocol, the
United States and other treaty partners gave
their joint and several pledges to guarantee
existing boundaries--including the line of
demarcation between North and South Viet-
nam established when the French relin-
quished their control over Indochina.
Since then three Presidents have reinforced
that guarantee by further commitments
given directly to the Republic of Vietnam.
And on August 10, 1964, the Senate by a vote
of 88 to 2 and the House by a vote of 416 to 0
adopted a joint resolution declaring their
support for these commitments.
Today we are living up to those commit-
ments by helping South Vietnam, defend
itself from the onslaught of Communist
force?just as we helped Iran in 1946, Greece
and Turkey in 1947, Formosa and Korea in
1950, and Berlin since 1948.
The bloody encounters in the highlands
around Pleiku and the rice paddies of the
Mekong Delta are thus in a real sense battles
2
and skirmishes in a continuing war to pre-
vent one Communist power after another
from violating internationally recognized
boundary lines fixing the outer limits of
Communist dominion.
When we think of Vietnam, we think of
Korea. In Vietnam, as in Korea, the Com-
munists in one part of a divided country
lying on the periphery of China have sought.
by force to gain dominion over the whole.
But in terms; of tactics on the ground Greece'
Is a closer analogy. For there, 20 years ago.
as in South Vietnam today, the Communists
sought to achieve their purpose by what is
known in their lexicon as a war of national
liberation.
They chose this method of aggression botl-,
in Greece and Vietnam because tactics of ter--
ror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion
give a great advantage to a disciplined ann
ruthless minority, particularly where, as in
those two countries, the physical terrain
made concealment easy and impeded the use
of heavy weapons.
But the Communists also have a more
subtle reason for favoring this type of ag-
gression. It creates in any situation an ele-
ment of confusion, a sense of ambiguity that
can, they hope, so disturb and divide free
men as to prevent them from making com-
mon cause against it.
This ambiguity is the central point of de-
bate in the discussions that have surrounded
the South Vietnam problem. Is the war in
South Vietnam an external aggression from
the North, or is it an indigenous revolt?
This is a question that Americans quite
properly ask?and one to which they deserve
a satisfactory answer. It is a question which
we who have official responsibilities have
necessarily probed in great depth. For if the
Vietnam war were merely what the Commu-
nists say it is, an indigenous rebellion, then
the United States would have no business
taking sides in the conflict and helping one
side to defeat the other by force of arms.
The evidence on the character of the Viet-
nam war is voluminous. Its rneaning se-ems
clear enough: The North Vietnamese re-
gime in Hanoi systemically created the Viet-
cong forces; it provides their equipment; it
mounted the guerrilla war?and it controls
that war from Hanoi on a day-to-day basis.
The evidence shows clearly enough that--
at the time of French withdrawal?when
Vietnam was divided in the settlement of
1954, the Communist regime in Hanoi never
Intended that South Vietnam should de-
velop in freedom. Many Communists fight-
ing with the Viet Minh army were directed
to stay in the south, to cache away their
arms, and ter do everything possible to under-
mine the South Vietnamese Government.
Others-80,000 in all?were ordered to the
north for training in the North Vie Lnaincse
Army.
The evidence is clear enough also that the
Communist rulers of the north resorted t3
guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam only
when the success of the South Vietnam Gov-
ernment persuaded them that they could net
achieve their designs by subversion alone.
In September 1960, the Lao Donn Party- -
the Communist Party in North Vietnam---
held its third party congress in Hanoi. That
congress called for the creation of a front
organization to undertake the subversion
of South Vietnam. Within 2 or 3 months
thereafter, the National Liberation Frost
was established to provide a political facade
for the conduct of an active guerrilla war.
Beginning early that year the Hanoi regime
began to infiltrate across the demarcation
line the disciplined Communists whom the
party had ordered north at the time of the
settlement. In the intervening period since
1954 those men had been trained in the arts
of proselytizing, sabotage and subversion.
Now they were ordered to conscript young
men from the villages by force or persuasion
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
and to form cadres around which guerrilla
units could be built.
Beginning over a year ago, the Communists
apparently exhausted their reservoir of
southerners who had gone north. Since then
the greater number of men infiltrated into
the south have been native-born North
Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has be-
gun to infiltrate elements of the North Viet-
namese Army in increasing larger numbers.
Today, there is evidence that nine regiments
of regular North Vietnamese forces are fight-
ing in organized units in the south.
I mention these facts?which are familiar
enough to most of you?because they are
fundamental to our policy with regard to
Vietnam. These facts, it seems to us, make
it clear beyond question that the war in
South Vietnam has few of the attributes of
an indigenous revolt. It is a cynical and
systematic aggression by the North Viet-
namese regime against the people of South
Vietnam. It is one further chapter in the
long and brutal chronicle of Communist ef-
forts to extend the periphery of Communist
power by force and terror.
This point is at the heart of our determi-
nation to stay the course in the bloody con-
test now underway in South Vietnam. It
also necessarily shapes our position with re-
gard to negotiations.
The President, Secretary Rusk, and all
spokesmen for the administration have stated
again and again that the United States is
prepared to join in unconditional discus-
sions of the Vietnamese problem in an effort
to bring about a satisfactory political solu-
tion. But so far the regime in Hanoi has
refused to come to the bargaining table
except on the basis of quite unacceptable
conditions. One among several such condi-
tions, but one that has been widely de-
bated in the United States, is that we must
recognize the National Liberation Front as
the representative, indeed, as the sole repre-
sentative, of the South Vietnamese people.
Yet to recognize the National Liberation
Front in such a capacity would do violence
to the truth and betray the very people
whose liberty we are fighting to secure. The
National Liberation Front is not a political
entity expressing the will of the people of
South Vietnam?or any substantial element
of the South Vietnamese population. It is a
facade fabricated by the Hanoi regime to
confuse the issue and elaborate the myth
of an indigenous revolt.
History is not obscure on this matter. As
I noted earlier, the creation of the front was
announced by the North Vietnam Commu-
nist Party?the Lao Dong Party?in 1960,
soon after the North Vietnam military leader,
General Giap announced that: "The north
is the revoluntionary base for the whole
country." But the Hanoi regime, while ap-
plauding its creation, has taken little pains
to give the ?front even the appearance of
authenticity.
The individuals proclaimed as the leaders
of the front are not personalities widely
known to the South Vietnamese people?
or, indeed, to many members of the Vietcong.
They are not revolutionary heroes or na-
tional figures. They have little meaning to
the ordinary Vietcong soldier who fights
and dies in the jungles and rice paddies.
Instead, the names he carries into battle
are those of "Uncle Ho," Ho Chi Minh, the
President of the North Vietnamese regime,
and General Giap, its military hero. When
Vietcong prisoners are asked during interro-
gation whether they are members of the
National Liberation Front, they customarily
reply that they owe allegiance to the Lao
Dong?the Communist Party of North Viet-
nam?which is the equivalent of the Hanoi
Communist regime.
The front, then, is unmistakably what its
name implies, a Communist front organiza-
No. 15-.---7
tion created to Mask the activities of Hanoi
and to further the illusion of an indigenous
revolt.
The name of the organization was care-
fully chosen. It bears the same name as the
National Liberation Front of Algeria. But
there the resemblance ends, for the Algerian
front did, in fact, represent a substantial part
of the Algerian population. It played a
major role in an insurgency that was clearly
an indigenous movement and not an aggres-
sion imposed from outside.
The Algerian Front, moreover, commanded
the respect and, indeed, the obedience of
the people. When It called a strike, the
city of Algiers virtually closed down. By
contrast, the front in Vietnam has shown its
fictional character by revealing its own im-
potence. On two occasions, it has called for
a general strike. These calls have been to-
tally ignored by the people of South Viet-
nam.
The Algerian front was a vital force in the
Algerian community. It secured the overt
allegiance of the old, established Moslem
groups and leaders. As the revolt progressed,
Moslems serving in the Algerian Assembly
and even in the French Parliament an-
nounced their support for the front.
But the front in Vietnam has utterly failed
in its efforts to attract the adherence of any
established group within the society?wheth-
er Buddhist, Christian, or any of the sects
that form substantial elements in Viet-
namese life.
Quite clearly, the people of South Vietnam,
if they are aware of the front at all, know
it for what it is: the political cover for a
North Vietnamese effort to take over the
south?in practical effect, the southern arm
of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.
To be sure, the Vietcong military forces in-
clude a number of indigenous southerners
under northern control. Neither the United
States nor the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment has ever questioned that fact. But the
composition of the Vietcong military forces
is not the issue when one discusses the role
of the front. The issue is whether the front
has any color of claim as a political entity
to represent these indigenous elements.
The evidence makes clear that it does not.
It is purely and simply a factitious organiza-
tion created by Hanoi to reinforce a fiction.
To recognize it as the representative of the
South Vietnamese population would be to
give legitimacy to that fiction.
The true party in interest on the enemy
side?the entity that has launched the attack
on the South Vietnamese Government for its
own purposes, the entity that has created,
controlled, and supplied the fighting forces
of the Vietcong from the beginning?is the
North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi. And
it is failure of that regime to come to the
bargaining table that has so far frustrated
every effort to move the problem of South
Vietnam from a military to a political
solution.
In spite of these clear realities, we have
not taken, nor de we take, an obdurate or
unreasoning attitude with regard to the
front. The President said in his state of the
Union message, "We will meet at any con-
ference table, we will discuss any proposals-
4 points, or 14, or 40?and we will consider
the views of any group" and that, of course,
includes the front along with other groups.
As the President has also said, this false
issue of the front would never prove an insur-
mountable problem if Hanoi were prepared
for serious negotiations. But we cannot, to
advance the political objectives of the Com-
munist regime in Hanoi, give legitimacy to a
spurious organization as though it spoke for
the people of South Vietnam.
A European friend once critically observed
that Americans have "a sense of mission but
1519
no sense of history." That accusation is, I
think, without warrant.
We do have a sense of history and it is that
which enables us to view the war in South
Vietnam for what it is. We Americans know
that it is not, as I have said earlier, a local
conflict; it is part of a continuing struggle
to prevent the Communists from upsetting
the fragile balance of power through force or
the threat of force.
To succeed in that struggle we must resist
every Communist effort to destroy by aggres-
sion the boundaries and demarcation lines
established by the postwar arrangements.
We cannot pick and choose among these
boundaries. We cannot defend Berlin and
yield Korea. We cannot recognize one com-
mitment and repudiate another without tear-
ing and weakening the entire structure on
which the world's security depends.
Some thoughtful critics of our Vietnamese
policy both in Europe and America challenge
this. They maintain that the West should
not undertake to defend the integrity of all
lines of demarcation even though they may
be underwritten in formal treaties. They
contend that many of these lines are unna-
tural since they do not conform to the geo-
political realities as they see them. They
contend in particular that?since the passing
of colonialism?the Western powers have no
business mixing in the affairs of the Asian
mainland. They imply that, regardless of our
commitments, we should not try to prevent
Red China from establishing its hegemony
over the east Asian landmass south of the
Soviet Union.
Proponents of this view advance two prin-
cipal arguments to support their thesis.
They contend that the very weight of Chinese
power, its vast population, and its consequent
ability to mobilize immense mass armise en-
titles it to recognition as the controlling force
of southeast Asia.
As a second reason for acknowledging the
Chinese hegemony, they contend that for
centuries China has maintained a dominant
cultural and political influence throughout
the area.
They claim, therefore, that southeast Asia
lies within the Chinese sphere of influence
and that we should let the Chinese redraw
the lines of demarcation to suit themselves
without regard to the wishes of the southeast
Asian people.
This argument, it seems to me, does not
provide an acceptable basis for U.S. policy.
The assertion that China through hun-
dreds of years of history has held sway over
southeast Asia is simply not accurate. Suc-
cessive Chinese Empires sought by force to
establish such sway, but they never succeeded
in doing so, except in certain sectors for lim-
ited periods. For the people of southeast
Asia have, over the centuries, shown an ob-
stinat e insistence on shaping their own
destiny which the Chinese have not been able
to overcome.
To adopt the sphere of influence approach
now advocated would, therefore, not mean
allowing history to repeat itself. It would
mean acoording to China a status it had
never been able to achieve by its own efforts
throughout the ages. It would mean sen-
tencing the people of southeast Asia against
their will to indefinite servitude behind the
Bamboo Curtain. And it would mean turn-
ing our back on the principles that have
formed the basis of Western policy in the
whole postwar era.
Nor can one seriously insist that geograph-
ical propinquity establishes the Chinese
right to dominate. At a time when man can
circle the earth in 90 minutes, there is little
to support such a literal commitment to 19th-
century geopolitics. It is a dubious policy
that would permit the accidents of geography
to deprive peoples of their right to determine
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1520 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
their own future free from external force.,
The logic of that policy has dark implica-
tions. It would rationalize the greed of great
powers. It would imperil the prospects for
developing and maintaining an equilibrium
of power in the world.
The principles of the United Nations Char-
ter are doctrinally more in tune with the
aspirations of 20th-century man.
This does not mean, however, that the
political shape of the world should be re-
garded as frozen in an intractable pattern;
that the boundaries established by the post-
war arrangements are necessarily sacrosanct
and immutable. Indeed, some of the lines of
demarcation drawn after the Second World
War were explicitly provisional and were to
be finally determined in political settlements
yet to come. This was true in Germany, in
Korea and In South Vietnam as well.
But those settlements have not yet been
achieved, and we cannot permit their resolu-
tion to be pre-empted by force. This is the
1.3.Slle in Vietnam. This is what we are fight-
ing for. This is why we are there.
We have no ambition to stay there any
longer than is necessary. We have made
repeatedly clear that the United States seeks
no territory in southeast Asia. We wish no
military bases. We do not desire to destroy
the regime in Hanoi or to remake it in a
Western pattern. The United States will not
retain American forces in South Vietnam
once peace is assured. The countries of
southeast Asia can be nonalined or neu-
tral, depending on the will of the people.
We support free elections in South Vietnam
as soon as violence has been eliminated and
the South Vietnamese people can vote with-
out intimidation. We look forward to free
elections? and we will accept the result as a
democratic people are accustomed to do. Yet
we have little doubt about the outcome, for
we are confident that the South ,Vietnamese
who have fought hard for their freedom will
not be the first people to give up that free-
dom to communism in a free exercise of
self-determination.
Whether the peoples of the two parts of
Vietnam will wish to unite is again for them
to decide as soon as they are in a position to
do so freely. Like other options, that of re-
unification must be preserved.
In the long run our hopes for the people
of South Vietnam reflect our hopes for peo-
ple everywhere. What we seek is a world
living in peace and freedom, a world in
which the cold war, with its tensions and
conflicts, can recede into history. We are
seeking to build a world in which men and
nations will recognize and act upon a
strongly shared interest in peace and in in-
ternational cooperation for the common
good.
We should not despair of these objectives
even though at the moment they seem rather
unreal and Idealistic. For we would make a
mistake to regard the cold war as a perma-
nent phenomenon. After all, it was less
than two decades ago that Winston Church-
ill first announced in Fulton, Mo., that "From
Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adri-
atic an Iron Curtain has descended across
the continent." And two decades are only
a moment in the long sweep of history.
leering the intervening years major
changes have taken place on both sides of
the Iron Curtain. A schism has developed
within the Communist world. The Soviet
Union has become the second greatest in-
dustrial power. The Soviet people have be-
gun to acquire a stake in the status quo,
and after the missile crisis of 1962 the So-
viet Union has come face to face with the
realities of power and destruction in the
nuclear age and has recognized the awesome
fact that in the 20th century a war between
great powers is a war without victory for
anyone.
,10.41.011.101111111.01111...111.1M
The changes taking place within the So-
viet Union and among the nations of Eastern
Europe are at once a reality and a promise.
Over time?and in a world of rapid and
pervasive change the measurement of time
is difficult indeed?we may look forward to a
comparable development within Com:munist
China, a maturing process that will deflect
the policies of Peiping from bellicose actions
to a peaceful relation with the rest of the
world.
After all, it is not the American purpose
simply to preserve the status quo. That was
not our history and that is not our destiny.
What we want to preserve is the freedom of
choice for the peoples of the world. We will
take our chances on that.
.4.:00.169111111111?1??
WAR ON FAMINE
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, to-
day's issue of the Washington Daily News
carries a fine editorial "The War on
:Famine" discussing my proposal to use
America's productive capacity to alle-
viate hunger in the world.
I am especially pleased that the News
studied the proposal carefully and com-
ments on my suggestion of a Farmers'
Corps to help food-deficit countries in-
crease their own production by using
the varied tools and methods we have de-
veloped in this country.
The editor is right when he concludes
that all our agricultural pro du.ctivity
could not stave off the world famine
ahead?that we also must combine food
assistance with know-how to stimulate
production by the hungry nations them-
selves.
Our food can also be used to encourage
population control measures and speed
this second method of averting a food
and population crisis.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
dent, to have the Daily News editorial
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
Jan. 31, 19661
THE WAR ON FAMINE
Vietnam overshadows other issues at this
time but Congress later in the session must
come to grips with the combined problem of
mounting hunger in the underdeveloped
world plus a costly and wasteful agricultural
policy here at home.
Our food-for-peace program in the words
of Senator GEORGE MoGovEmsr, of south Da-
kota, is "an ingenious combination of self-
interest arid idealism." Self-intereat because
It avoids storage charges on vast surpluses,
Idealism because it promotes the comfort-
ing feeling that we are relieving hunger
abroad.
But our surpluses are diminishing. The
wheat stockpile has been reduced [Tom 1,245
million bushels in the 1957-61 period to
something more than BOO million bushels as
of today. A reserve of sonaething over a half-
billion bushels--a year's domestic consump-
tion--is considered essential to national
security.
Senator McGovziol has legislation before
Congress completely changing the shape of
the farm-subsidy program. In brief he
would take the wraps off production, have
the Government buy the increased surpluses
over national needs and give the food away
abroad. He figures this wouldn't cost any
more than present subsidies which are
designed to hold down production.
/ CM-
January 31, 1966
But even Senator MCGOVERN would admit,
we think, that even top U.S. agricultural
production could not feed the hungry
world--couldn't even stave off the coming
world famine which soon is to be caused by
the overproduction of human beings plus
the underproduction of food. And even, if
we could produce the food, there aren't
enough ships to carry it.
Then there is the book by two American
agronomists, William and Paul Paddock,
urging that foreign aid concentrate on in-
creasing food production?instead of steel
mills?in the "Hungry Nations." They hold
that our gifts of food do a disservice to the
recipient nations by encouraging population
growth which cannot be sustained.
We think there is a lot to this argument,
though there is not even a remote chance
that the United States will withhold f ood
from famine areas in any effort to regulate
populations. And even if birth control pro-
grams succeed beyond the wildest dreams,
they cannot work fast enough to stave off
disaster.
There may be at least a partial solution, it
seems to us, in one of Senator McGovEriN's
propositions. He would set up an American
organization along the lines of the Peace
Corps, composed of retired farmers and
other experts in modern agricultural meth-
ods who would be willing to serve abroad for
limited periods, teaching agricultural
science.
Senator MCGOVERN is from a farm State.
He was President Kennedy's food for peace
administrator. He sees, as the hope for the
world's hungry peoples, fertilizers, pesticides.
;better tools, improved irrigation methods.
hybrid seeds, farm-to-market roads, rural
education. His arguments make a great
deal of sense, as they concern both foreign
aid and the domestic economy. They
should get serious study before the end of
this sec, of Congress.
E PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON
T'HE TRAGIC WAR IN VIETNAM
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, the President has made his
decision. In this time of crisis, he will
have the support of Americans as he
seeks an end to the tragic war in Viet-.
nam. I welcome especially his announce-
merit of new initiatives in the United
Nations.
But obviously the resumption of bomb-
ing in the North is not a policy. And we
should not delude ourselves that it offefs
a painless method of winning the war.
Our objectives in Vietnam can be
gained only by what we do in the South?
by what we do to show the people of that;
unhappy land that there is a difference?
that this is their war?that the defeat of
the Vietcong will lead to a better life for
themselves and for their children.
And there are many indications that
we have not yet even begun to develop it
program to make these objectives a re-
ality. Just as an example, the Washing--
ton Star reported, on January 24:
In Long An, one of Vietnam's most fertile
provinces, more than 85 percent of the peas.
ant population are tenants. This land-
ownership pattern may help explain why,
despite a tremendous cost in lives and ma-
terial, the war in Long An is no closer to
being won that it was several years ago.
*
(Yet) the rice-rich heartland of the Saigon
region and the upper Mekong Delta, linked
together by Long An, remains the prize for
which the war is being fought. Here, in less
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January 31, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
than 14 provinces, live almost two-thirds of
the 15 million South Vietnamese * *
American military and civilian advisers agree
there are more Vietcong than a year ago.
Most Important in Long An, however, gov-
ernment and the mass of peasantry still seem
to be on opposing sides.
? ? ? ? ?
.Land is of such paramount importance
here that the Vietcong allow only the land-
less or very poor farmers to command guer-
rilla units or qualify as party members. The
provincial government's social order is the
exact reverse. Most of the military officers,
civil servants, and community leaders come
from the landowning gentry.
In the delta, out of 1.2 million farms, only
260,000 are owner-operated * * *. Some
3,000 rich Saigon families still are the big
landowners.
And the day before, the Washington
Post told us:
The village chief, a 35-year-old former
Army officer named Do Hun Minh * * * ex-
plained through an interpreter that only
four village youngsters since the year 1950
have been in high school. No youngster in
the village has ever attended college. "The
Vietnamese Government continues to sup-
port an exclusive educational system in a
revolutionary war," says (Richard) Burn-
ham (the U.S. aid mission province repre-
sentative). "All this is the preservation of
privilege. It is madness and until it Is
changed most of our efforts will be mar-
ginal." Those other efforts * * * are con-
siderable. USOM pumps about half a mil-
lion dollars a year into Bienhoa (province),
arranging for medical teams and technical
assistance, and building dams, schoolrooms,
a potable water system, an orphanage, three
fish markets, two electricity systems.
But knowledgable Americans here say that
the Vietcong still offer the only outlet for a
bright boy, from the villages. The static
nature of Sondong assures that there is no
legitimate route out of the rice paddy. The
rural children cannot be officers, administra-
tors, or district chiefs.
To such conditions, military action in
the South or in the North is no answer.
? Military action is needed to allow social
reform to take place. But if American
soldiers are to fight and die to buy time
for the Government of South Vietnam,
that time must be used.
It is absolutely urgent that we now act
to institute new programs of education,
land reform, public health, political par-
ticipation?and that we act to insure
honest administration. In my judgment
the development and implementation of
such a program would offer far more
promise of achieving our aims in Viet-
nam than any other steps we could
take?including the bombing of the
North.
As I have emphasized repeatedly, and
I state again, our military effort will
mean nothing if it is not followed by a
successful pacification effort which in-
spires the people of South Vietnam.
But we have not yet made the effort
necessary.
We are spending far more on military
efforts than on all the education, land
reform, and welfare programs which
might convince a young South Vietna-
mese that his future is not best served by
the Communists.
And the best talent and brains in our
Government are focussed far more on
military action than they are on pro-
grams which might help the people of
South Vietnam?and in the long run,
help our effort as well.
This imbalance must change.
For if we regard bombing as the answer
in Vietnam?we are headed straight for
disaster. In the past, bombing has not
proved a decisive weapon against a rural
economy?or against a guerrilla army.
And the temptation will now be to
argue that if limited bombing does not
produce a solution, that further bombing,
more extended military action, is the
answer. The danger is that the decision
to resume may become the first in a series
of steps on a road from which there is
no turning back?a road which leads to
catastrophe for all mankind. That can-
not be permitted to happen.
As we move into this new phase of the
war, the President will need the support
and encouragement of the American peo-
ple. To be effective, however, both the
Congress and the citizens of this country
will have to be kept fully informed about
the actions of the United States and the
developments in Vietnam.
I believe he will have this support even
where there might be some differences
of emphasis or policy. This should be
clearly understood in both Hanoi and
Peiping.
MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT
Messages in writing from the President
of the United States were communicated
to the Senate by Mr. Ratchford, one of
his secretaries.
REPORT OF NATIONAL SCIENCE
FOUNDATION?MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 372)
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before
the Senate the following message from
the President of the United States,
which, with the accompanying report,
was referred to the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare:
To the Congress of the United States:
I said in my state of the Union message
this year that, "We must change to mas-
ter change."
Failing that, this Nation will surely
become a casualty to the relentless tide
of history. For in assessing our pros-
pects, we must remember that mankind
faces not one but many possible futures.
Which future our children's children en-
joy?or endure?depends in large meas-
ure on our ability to adjust to the needs
of the times.
But change comes not of itself. Nei-
ther the requirement for change nor the
desire for change will see us through. In
a complex world?growing more complex
every year?only knowledge can keep us
apace.
We must achieve a better understand-
ing of our environment and our place in
that environment.
We must continue to unlock the secrets
of the earth below us, the sea around us,
and the heavens above us.
And we must intensify our search into
the very meaning of life itself.
It is not too much to say that every
aspect of our lives will be affected by the
success of this effort. The military and
1521
economic strength of our Nation, and the
health, the happiness, and the welfare
of our citizens all are profoundly influ-
enced by the limits?and potentialities?.
of our scientific program.
In the furtherance of this program, no
organization, agency, or institution has
had a more profound or lasting influence
than the National Science Foundation.
The establishment of this Foundation by
the Congress, 15 years ago, was one of the
soundest investments this Nation ever
made.
In the field of basic research, many of
the major scientific breakthroughs of our
time would have been impossible?or at
the very least, much longer in coming?
had it not been for National Science
Foundation grants in the basic sciences.
In the field of education, it is enough
to say that more than half of all our high
school teachers have now received vital
refresher training through the Founda-
tion's education program.
In the classrooms, the Foundation has
played a major role in modernizing sci-
entific curricula to make them responsive
to our age.
And in a more recent activity, the
Foundation has launched a program to
strengthen the science departments of
many of our smaller universities
throughout the Nation by providing new
laboratories, modern equipment, and fel-
lowships to promising graduate students.
It should be emphasized that the role
of the National Science Foundation is
to aid, not to arbitrate. But through its
aid?skillfully administered and intelli-
gently applied?it has brought American
science to a new level of excellence.
This, the 15th Annual Report of the
National Science Foundation, reflects
another year of scientific growth and
progress, and I am pleased to commend
it to the attention of the Congress. It
mirrorsdihe past and illuminates the
future.
It is the story of change?to master
change.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 1966,
REPORT ON AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ACTIVITIES ? MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC.
NO. 371)
The PRESIDING OroviCER laid be-
fore the Senate the following message
from the President of the United States,
which, with the accompanying report,
was referred to the Committee on Aero-
nautical and Space Sciences:
To the Congress of the United States:
The record of American accomplish-
ments in aeronautics and space during
1965 shows it to have been the most suc-
cessful year in our history.
More spacecraft were orbited than in
any previous year. Five manned Gemini
flights were successfully launched.
Our astronauts spent more hours in
space than were flown by all of our
manned spacecraft until 1965. Ten as-
tronauts logged a total of 1,297 hours 42
minutes in space.
The five manned flights successfully
achieved included a walk in space, and
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1522 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
the first rendezvous between two manned
spacecrafts.
A scientific spacecraft completed a 325-
million-mile, 228-day trip to Mars.
Mariner 4 thereby gave mankind its first
closeup view of another planet.
The Ranger series, begun in 1961,
reached its zenith with two trips to the
moon that yielded 13,000 closeup pic-
tures of that planet. The entire Ranger
aeries produced 17,000 photographs of
the moon's surface which are being
studied now be experts throughout the
world.
Equally important were the contribu-
tions of our space program to life here on
earth. Launching of Early Bird, the first
commercial communication satellite
brought us measurably closer to the goal
of instantaneous communication between
all points on the globe. Research and de-
velopment in our space program con-
tinued to speed progress in medicine, in
weather prediction, in electronics--and,
indeed, in virtually every aspect of Amer-
ican science and technology.
As our space program continues, the
impact of its developments on everyday
life becomes daily more evident. It con-
tholes Lo stimulate our education, irn-
prove our material well-being, and
broaden the horizons of knowledge. It is
also a powerful force for peace.
The space program of the United
States today is the largest effort ever
undertaken by any nation to advance the
frontiers of human knowledge. What we
are discovering and building today will
help solve many of the great problems
which an increasingly complex and
heavily populated world will face tomor-
row.
'the year 1965?the year of Gemini,
Ranger, and Mariner?is a brilliant pref-
ace to the coming years of Apollo, sta-
tions in space and voyages to the planets.
I have great pride and pleasure in trans-
mitting this remarkable record to the
Congress that, through its enthusiastic
support, has made possible.
LYNDON. B. JOHNSON.
THE W NI PE HOUSE, January 31, 1966.
^
EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED
As in executive session,
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate messages from the Presi-
dent of the United States submitting
sundry nominations, which were referred
IA) the appropriate committees.
( For :nominations tins day received, see
the end of Senate proceedings.)
Z,DER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLARK
in the chair). Is there further morning
business?
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I have a
short speech on section 14 (b) .
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
there further morning business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
urther morning business? if there is no
further morning business, morning busi-
ness is closed; and, under the unanimous
consent agreement, the Chair lays before
the Senate the pending questions.
OA.
ect
PROPOSED REPEAL OF SECTION
14(b) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT, AS AMENDED
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the motion of the Senator from Mon-
tana [Mr. MANSFIELD I that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of the bill
(HR. 77) to repeal section 141b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amend-
ed, and section 703(b) of the Labor-
Management Reporting Act of 1959 and
to amend the first proviso of section 8
(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President, the ques-
tion presently before the Senate is
whether it will proceed to the considera-
tion of FIR. 77, a bill which would repeal
section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Let us look at the record.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 laid
down ceratin standards for a national
policy toward union security clauses in
collective bargaining agreements. It
prohibits the closed shop in all industries
in or affecting interstate commerce. It
allows labor and management to nego-
tiate agreements for what is known as
the union shop--anyone may be hired,
but all must join the union and remain
in good standing after 30 days 1.4 employ-
ment, at least until the termination of
the contract. It allows another lesser
form of union security agreement, the
agency shop which does not require any-
one to join a union, but does require as
a condition of employment, that employ-
ees pay to the union amounts equivalent
to the initiation fee and duos paid by
union members.
The union shop, then, or eome lesser
.form of it negotiated by labor and man-
agement, was adopted as national policy
because of its consistency with the gen-
eral policy toward labor originally estab-
lished by the Wagner Act. This policy
was to grant recognition to a rngle union
only, in each plant, company, or other
unit, for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining. Basically, Congress wished to
avoid the disruptions of dual unionism,
and establish single jurisdictaons in dis-
tinct crafts or separate shops.
In return, the union was Inquired by
law to 'bargain collectively, without dis-
crimination, for all employees in the
unit. Every employee, whether a mem-
ber of the union, or not, was entitled to
the gains obtained by collective bargain-
ing
These are fine sounding words?logi-
cal, orderly, consistent?words express-
ing national policy, single unionism, ex-
clusive jurisdictions, collective bargain-
ing for the benefit of all.
Section 14(b) is the not-too-well hid-
den joker in the deck..
National policy was nicely reaffirmed,
and then someone left the barn door
open, to allow State policy to supersede
that of the Federal Government.
Section 14(b) states:
.Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring memberrAnp in a la-
bor organization as a condition of employ-
ment in any State or Territory io which such
execution or application is prohibited by
State el' Territorial law,
stos200011.11t
January 31, 1966
Section 14(b) allows the States and
territories to modify our national labor
policy if they choose to do so, in the di-
rection of further limiting negotiated
agreements requiring union membership.
Basically, 14(b) is the opening wedpe
to denigrate organized labor. It has
become a symbol; to organized labor it 'is
the first true "gut" issue in years which,
if not resolved favorably, could bring
about a national right-to-work law; and
to the fanatics of the right wing, it is
the shining symbol of a false freedom.
On the surface, there is the Natil,mal
Right To Work Committee, founded in
1955 by E. S. Dillard and Fred Hartley,
a coauthor of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Under the surface are the disrupthig
whiapers of the ignorant and ill-in-
formed, the bigots and hatemongers.
Tne battlelines are clearly' drawn.
With this blight, 14(b) off the statute
Infolss, we can direct our efforts toward
progressive causes. The repeal of 14(h)
will not bring back the closed shop, as
some darkly hint, for that is specifically
declared illegal in Taft-Hartley. The
repeal of :14(b) will bring us back to our
established national policy with respect
to union security contracts, a policy we
witlessly departed from in 1947.
Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz
in his excellent book entitled "Labor and
Public Interest," stated with regard to
right-to-work laws that he "used to ask
my labor law classes a series of questions
at the opening session of the course."
One question was:
Are you in favor of or opposed to he t-
to-work laws?
Two out of three said they favored
such laws. Then a later question was
worded this way:
If an employer and a majority of his em-
ployees agree with respect to whether all
employees should or should not become
members of the union, should the govern-
ment interfere, by law, with that decision?
Two-thirds of the class said they
would oppose such a law.
Education apparently is the key to
understanding.
I believe that the Senate should have
the opportunity to vote on this issue. I
believe that we should put an end to
the delaying tactics of those who oppose
repeal. If declare myself firmly in su...p-
port of repeal, and will support every
effort to gain that objective.
RECESS UNTIL 10 O'CLOCK A M.
TOMORROW
Mr. HART. Mr. President, if there is
no further business to come before the
Senate at this time, I move, pursuant
to the order previously entered, that the
Senate stand in recess until 10 o'clock
a.m. tomorrow.
The motion was agreed to; and nit 1
o'clock and 6 minutes p.m.) the Senate
took a recess, under the order previously
entered, until tomorrow, Tuesday, Fab-
ruary 1, 1966, at 10 o'clock a.m.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by he
Senate January 31 (legislative day of
January 26) , 1966:
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