MINUTES OF IAC MEETING 18 FEBRUARY 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000100120005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 18, 1949
• Content Type: MIN

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DIA review(s) completed.
MINUTES OF IAC MEETING - 18 FEBRUARY 19)49
GEN. WRIGHTt I want to apologize for the Director not being here. He
had to go for a few days. I understand the primary
business today is this questioncf the IAC's report on the Dulles Report,
Since that was circulateds however, General Irwin has asked that we discuss
a telegram from the Military Attache at Rome, I suggest we do that first,
Would you like to go ahead and discuss this?
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GEN. IRNFIN: I have one other cable, if you can spare the time, that
I would like some help on. This was received today from Huebner to the
Military Attache in Warsaw= OSD review
completed
"German language newspaper Berlin report now published world wide
states in effect that extensive Soviet Mil, Naval and Air activity
taking place in Baltic Sea and on Baltic Coast including large scale
secret troop movements at night with troop concentrations in Northern
Pommerania and Mecklenburg. Important we receive any information
you have in confirmation or denial plus your estimate. Also appreciate
summary recent troop movements Western Poland and across border, We
have some reports of troop movements in and out Rostock, Stettin and
Frankfurt/Oder but detailed study indicates shifting of classes 28 and
25 plus arrival some equipment rather than new-units. No concentration
Northern Mecklenburg discovered. Possible some sham effort will be
made to influence Scandinavian political thinking."
I wondered if anyone had anything that would bear on this particular thing
that would help us.
DR. ARMSTRONG: We have seen nothing that I know of, General,
GEN. IRiIN: We have had information that there was quite a lot of
movement and the arrival of M-21. tanks, We are working on our attaches in
all of the Curtain Countries, I have cabled them to pull their ears in and
cut their travel, But the affect of the action in Poland, Czechoslovakia$
Hungary, and Rumania as being curtailed areas, which all happened simulta-
neously to this,
GEN. TODD: On the negative side - a couple of days ago, I think from
Warsaw, there was a report that these 22 year old Russians are returning
to the Soviet Union on leave. You recall seeing that?
GEN. WRI GI- P I remember?
GEN. TODD: And it was evaluated A-1 by someone in the Embassy. I forgot
how many,
(EN. WRIGHT In connection with thatj, there was an indication the
class of '25 were only being given three weeks leave, where before they
were given months, or they were being held back entirely.
ADM. IN(LIS: New classes are being brought in.
GEN. I1 IN: The class of '28 are being held over. There are about
40 or 50,000 in the class of '28.
GEN. WRIGHT: That AP report stated there was a movement of 50,000
troops from the North down into the Soviet Zone, but that seemed to be
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cleared up. on the basis it was the same group that had been sent up for
winter maneuvers which had never taken place.
(EN. MIN: They are getting ready for spring maneuvers. They are
taking advantage of the weather.
GEN. WRIGHT: Another point on the negative side - the AP repeated
the same date from Paris and the people here seemed to feel that that was
a little more pressure with regard to the Atlantic Pact,
GEN. IRNIN: Of courses the reports from Paris or rather remote or
odd places appear exagerated,
ADM. INGZI6:. Is there something about movements in Finland?
GEN. WRIGHT: Yes.
GEN. IRTIN: It is rumored there are three divisions near the Finnish
Border., but that sounded like propaganda. In other words., it has been
verified in some remote places.
GEN. TODD: It originated in Sweden.
GEN, IRWIN: But is it a fact they can go into Finland because of
their Treaty - in North Finland?
CEN. WRIGHT:. I am not so sure about troops..
ADM. IN LIS: I think in a case of attack or threatened attack.
Aren't we about due for another review by CIA of the possibilities; of war?
I think about six months ago we all agreed that we would re-estimate the
possibilities of war from time to time and it seems to me the six months are
about up,
GEN. WRIGHT: How much times Admirals would you like to suggest for
your people to gather with ours and the rest of the agencies to do that?
ADM. INGLIS:: We haventt gotten very much information. I think the
Army has most of it. I think my people could be ready on short notice
by the middle of next week.
CAN. IROtiIN I think we have very little. that we had this morning in
our briefing indicated they had no major change,
GEN.WRIGHT: It is an advantage to have a meeting of the minds, of
everybody w1io is working on its That worked out pretty well on the last
one. Any suggestion on that?
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Ma . AIMTRONG The political aspects have undergone some change since
we last agreed, I think it would be very useful to have another roundup
and meeting of the minds,
N. IRVIIN:. How about next Friday?'
GEN. WRIGHT: Suppose I ask our people to coordinate the idea of
meeting next Friday some time with whoever you designate?'
GEN.IR!MIN: What do you want? Our individual estimates?
CEN. WRIGHT: Yess, but I think in addition to the individual estimates;
there ought to be the people there who can discuss them.
N. IMIN To coordinate the thing?
GEN. WRIGHT:. Yess, because there will be some little change.
GEN. CABELL: Hardly estimates., just bringing basic material in,
GEN. WRIGHT:: That is right and come out with the estimate of the group.
GEN. Z :&M,: Is there anything new since the last one?
GEN. TODD: We may be able to get some estimates from the field, I
mean from Moscow., Warsaw -
GEM. CABELL: I would suggest we don't ask them for estimates., but for
evidence.
GEN. TODD: Essential elements.
GEN, WRIGHT-. Is there any other new business to bring up before we
go into this Dulles Report? Park?
MR. ARMSTRONG: I have one other items, not an TAC,, but after the
meeting is concluded I would like to speak to the IAC members., but go
ahead with the business of the meeting.
GEN. WRIGHT: Dr. Colby?
DR. COLBY: Nos, nothing.
GEN. CABELL: No,
GEN. TODD: Noy sir.
GEN. IMIN: No.
.ADM. INGLIS: No.
GEN. WRIGHT: This draft of the IA.C Report on the Dulles Report is one
of three of the reports that will be sent in::
this one., the IAC; the
individual reports from the agencies; and the report from CIA. So this
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actually is an IAC matter and not a CIA. matter. This particular draft
was worked out with the Standing Committee. If there are no objections we
will go down each paragraph and those that are approved by everybody can
be made the final one and any suggestions you want to make as we go along
we can put them in.
MR, ARMSTRONG: Before taking this up, I would like to explain the
procedure that the Department has adopted as to its comments on the report,,
other than the IAC passages. The Department takes the position that the
proper medium to the NSC is through the Secretary himself and he proposes
to do it that way rather than to transmit them through the Director (of
Central Intelligence). In order not to let it appear that that would have
the purpose of concealing our views on the thing, I can say that our
position will be generally favorable to the report and will constitute
an endorsement of it in most of its aspects. There will be very few places
where we will take exception. We feel the Report is a very competent and
objective one and should receive very serious consideration by the NSC. We
think that the time for it to be implemented is now, right away, and the
Department is going to indicate every desire to cooperate fully in implementa-
tion of the Report. Our comments will be submitted to the NSC by the
Secretary.
(EN. WRICHT: Paragraph 1 of the draft. Has anyone a change they would
like to make in that?'
ADM. IN(LIS: The Navy thinks this whole comment is somewhat watered
down, that it doesn't amount to much. I am not at all enthusiastic about
it. I think the only item in here that is positive and constructive is
paragraph 5. The rest are "no objections," or "it is a @Dod idea, It or
"agrees," or something. We agree with the obvious like we all agree we
would like to have good weather. I think it is a pretty sad piece of work
myself.
(EN. WWRIGHT: I think that is a reflection of the Report. It is the
obvious to the obvious. Would you go along with the Standing Committee
working on another draft?
ADM. INGEIS: I think they have spent enough time on it myself
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Ira' R, ARMSTRONG: I would like to move the deletion of paragraph 2.
GEN. WRIGHT * Can we finish up with 1?
ADM. INGLIS: That is just a general comment.
(EN. WRICHT All right.
ADM. INGLIS: I might come back to paragraph 1,
MR. ARMSTRONG: I don't think paragraph 2 applies to the IAC, It
occurs in a point in the Report where the IAC hasn't been mentioned or
brought in. It is the relations between the Director and the two Secre-
taries, It does not seem to us that it is a matter for IAC comment,
CEN. WRI GH T: Admiral Inglis?
ADM. INCIS:. I have no feeling one way or another about paragraph 2.
I will vote with the majority.
(EN. IPJUN:: I agree with Mr. Armstrong., it is not an lAC matter.
All he has to do is trot over there.
(EN. WRIGHT: When he is with the entire Security Council.
(EN. IMIN: He is free to take things up with them.
(EN. 'WRIGHT: Dr. Colby?
DR. COIBYr. I think so too. In fact I was a little in doubt about it
when I read the Report itself,
(EN. TODD: I agree with Mr, Armstrong,
(EN. CABELLz I think that is perfectly all right. We are expected
to make some conmzent, at least,, on the obvious without attempting to go on
record feeling that it is not yet close enough. Couldn't we just say that
we agree with the necessity of having close relations with the Director and
the two principal Secretaries?
MR. ARMSTRONG: Isn't that a matter for the individual agency to comment
on rather than the TAC?
(EN. CABELL: Aren't we commenting on whether it is agreeable to have
a close relationship with those two particular agencies without stating
whether he is presently close enough or not?
ADMM. 1NGLIS: He should have close relationship with all of them.
(EN. CABELL But rather than just duck the issues I would suggest
that approach.
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MR. ARMSTRONG:. That is the basic theory of the paper to comment
upon those recommendations affecting the IAC, so there are a lot of other
things in the Report that the IAC could very well endorse and affirm,
CEN. CABELL: I should think that the relationship between the
Director and the Secretary of Defense and State is of concern to the IAC.
MR. ARMSTRONG: I think it should be, but that would be a different
type of continent,
(EN. WRIGHT: You don't hold a strong feeling on that? The majority
thinks it has no real purpose.
CEN. CABELL: If the majority feels that way, I will go along.
GEN. TODD: We all realize particularly the comment means he will have
closer liaison with the Offices of the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense and I believe because the Secretaries themselves can determine,
usually regulate. the degree of liaison with the Director, and in that case
if it does mean that, it is rather meaningless as far as the Office of the
Secretary of Defense is concerned because he has no intelligence agency
within his Office, I was rather suprised when I saw it in the Dulles
Report.
LIEN. II7N It doesn't make sense because it is not the Director
making it, I agree with Mr. Armstrong. And when it comes to the Secretary
of Defense, he hasn't any intelligence agency, he cones to the individual
agencies,
ADM. INGLIS: Does the Director chiefly depend on the Secretaries of
State and Defense or do they chiefly depend on the Director?
CEN. WRI GHT: You are agreeable to drop out this paragraph?
CEN. IRA'IIN: Absolutely.
(EN. WRI C iT :: Paragraph 3?
MR. ARMSTRONG: I suggest a language change. In substitution: strike
out tta good idea to have" and insert "concurs in the recommendation that the
FBI" and strike out "as" and insert "should be a member of the TAC as" and
strike out "recommended" and insert "stated."
(EN. WRIGHT: Is that satisfactory to you, Admiral?
ADM. INGLIS: I don't care.
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DR. COLBY: Yes,
CHN. CABELL: Yes.
C,N. TODD Yes.
(EN. IRNIN: Yes,
GEN. WRI GHT t Paragraph 1.. Park?
MR. ARMSTRONG: No,comriient,
(EN. WRICITt Your comment is that at least your working committee is.
.ADM. INGLIS: Yes,
DR. COLBY: I have not seen a dissenting comment.
(EN. WRIGHT: That will be the Navy's own answer and not pertinent,
AJX,M. INGLIS: The gist of our comment is that the IA.C is not soundly
conceived? The composition is all right, but not its charter.
(EN. WRIGHT: As written now., General Irwin., is it all right with you?
(EN. fl IN: Yes.
(EN. CABELL: I would like to see the comments. Maybe Admiral Inglis
has got something there. Maybe he might convince me by his comments,
(EN. WRIGHT: You can go back to the minutes of the other IAC.Meetings
and pick them out.
ADM. INGLIS: I can show you a draft which has not yet been sighed.
I think it pretty well gives our position, but the general ideais that we
don't think that the TAChas sufficient authority or sufficient responsi-
bility.at present. That its charter is strictly as an advisory committee
which the Director of Central Intelligence can accept or reject the advice
as he sees fit and he is not even obligateda and often does not submit the
views of the IAC to the Security Council,
LIEN. CABELL: Are you suggesting that the Law be changed?
ADM. INGEIS: No,. but that NSCID No. 1 be changed., and we have prepared
in first draft form a new NSCID No. 1.
(EN. TODD:: Wouldn't it be desirable to have an IAC agreement on all
of these agreements if possible and have the balance of the TAG support
your suggestion, rather statement, to that effect.
ADM. INC;i;IS: I have understood that some effort has been tried by
the Standing Committee and no agreement can be agreed to.
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CAPT. OCKER-. It was mentioned., but not enthusiastically discussed.
(EN. WRIGif :. With that explanation,, is it satisfactory to leave the
paragraph as written?
(EN. CABELL: Yes, but I kind of like the idea that when we have a
joint report that we have all the comments in at one time as a matter of
principle so that eventually this body should be called upon to comment
upon their comment.
AI)MMM. fl GGIS: You sees State Department isn't doing it that way.
They are sending theirs in through their Secretary., which technically bars
this Committee from those comments.
MR. ARMSTRONG: That is on the non-IAC items,
GEN. IRt iIN: Mr. Forrestal's Office came donor to see me -
GEN. TODD: You are not making additional comments as pertain to the
GEN. IiIN The Secretary of Defense's Office came down to see me
and asked me how we were going to coordinate our comments - comment
through the IAG or through the Secretaries. That was a pretty good question
at that.
ADM. INGLIS: That is the trouble, We get all fouled up.
GEN. I1 1IN: My comments are in here. If the Secretary of the Army
wants them, I will send the same. Of course,, he may not agree.
MR. ARMSTRONG:, Isn't it true that if these comments are adopted by
the SAC we will be rewritting NSCID No. 1 anyway, to incorporate the changes
in NSCID No. 1 that would be called for by these comments in a draft to go
forward, possibly with the N~vyts version as a parallel?
(EN. V LIGHT : What you have to have then,., in effect., is unanimous
agreement on the Navy's idea., or you would have to have., maybe., an additional
non-agreement attached here as an appendix and again it would appear in an
original paper. It would seem better to me administratively to go along
with the Navy's dissent and let them put in their proposition as a separate
paper. If it was understood that everybody would adopt the Navy's plan
and idea' then it would be attached as an appendix. That would take some
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would agree.
DR. COLBY: It implies that all the rest disagree with the dissent.
GEN. C.ABEIL : That we haven't seen.
ADTM. INGLIS: I will be very happy to provide any member of the
Committee with our paper, either in the present forms or in its final forms
or both.
GEN. CABELL: I might like to buy part of it,
ADM. INGLIS: I can't produce the copies now,., but I can within 21
hours.
GEN. TODD: It seems to me the reader would be at a loss to know how
the members of the IAC were going to participate more actively under the
terms of the present NSCID directives but it doesn't say how it is going to
be achieved.
ADM. INGLIS: That is the gist of our recommendation. It beats all
around the bush. It speaks of better coordination and a greater measure
of responsibility,, but never comes down to brass tacks where the responsi-
bility parallels the authority.
GEN. IRWIN: Did you propose,., Admiral? that the TAC should report to
the National Security Council rather than through the Director?
ADM. INGLIS: If you don't mind my answering in a different way - we
proposes in effects this body have its name changed from Intelligence
Advisory Committee to Intd1ligence Coordinating Committee and, in a few
words, that expresses our concept of the term or reference to this Committee.
GEN. CABELL: What would be the statutory authority?
ADM.. INGLIS: It would stem from the National Security Council, There
is nothing in the statute that prohibits that, It doesn't mention the
ZAC or ICC or otherwise.
GEN. CABELL: It authorizes the Director to create such a body, to
have such advisors as he may need to haves or M rds to that effect,
GEN. WRIGHT: That does not appear in the Law,
CAPT. OCKER: That is in NSCID No, 1. That is where it all comes
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ADM. INGLIS: We had a row on that with the legal people in CIA.
They said the Law doesn't direct it. We think because the Law doesn't
prohibit its we could do it. We still stand by that interpretation of the
Law, We felt that the National Security Council has sufficient authority
to organize and charter such a group as this to have some responsibility
and some authority rather than act in a purely advisory capacity which the
Director is free to accept or reject. That view was not accepted by the
Directory or by the National Security Councils and that is the reason we
are now operating under the present charter. And to my mind from that stems
the criticism from which this Report is made and we thought it was timely
to raise the issue again.
GEN. WRIGHT:: The point is, the Director has always held., and the
Security Council agreed by issuing the Directive, that if the IAC became
the coordinating group., then the Director of Central Intelligence becomes
a secretariat for the IAC. That is the opposite side. In the interest of
making this an agreed report, I suggest we take the paragraph which has
this disagreement and eliminate it. It doesn't seem much to me as it is,
GEN. CABELL: Isn't that actually one of the principal points of the
Dulles-Jackson Report?
CEN. GHT: Yes., but it will appear in the Navy-Army-State-Air
reports. In other words this is only one of many papers that is going in
on this Report.
IM. ARITSTRONG: I think it should remain in, It is a cardinal issue
and the NSC is entitled to know there is disagreement on the present
arrangement of the IAC?
CEN. CABELL: I still think it would be helpful if we had the benefit
of the dissenting opinion before we act.
ADM. IN GLIS: I'll be happy to send a copy of this to you in its
present form almost immediately, I can't give it to you now. The matter
was discussed at some length in the Standing Committee.
CAPT. OCKER: Not at great length. It was brought up and I expressed
my views generally, but we felt the matter would be too lengthy and in the
minutes of the Standing Committee meeting we left it as a matter for this
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Conmattee, The continents are,, more or less., as they are written there., and
the individual comments by the agencies about what their thoughts were,
MN, WRIGHT.- I make the suggestion we go by this paragraph 4 and
wait until Admiral Inglis gets a copy of his proposal to you. And as a
result of that you send in a proposed rewording of paragraph 4., which
ought to be fixed so that the Standing Committee., when it is brought in.,
will all agree to it.
I:1R. ARMSTRONG: Yes,
ADM. INCLIS: Yes, I have just been informed that advance copies of
our comments have been furnished.
CEN. CABELL:
AD1. IN CLIS :
(EN. 1 RIGH T:
CEN. CABELLI
(EN. WRIGHT,.
ADM. INC ,IS
Which I now have in my hand.
I don't want anyone to think we are holding out on them.,
Is that agreed - to leave that paragraph out?
Yes.
After they have read this.
Does anyone else want a copy of our continents?
PAR. ARMSTRONG:. If we dontt have any. I am informed we do not have it.
CEN. WRIGHI' : We will go to paragraph 5.
M.R. ARMSTRONG: Again I suggest a rewording. I don't know whether
this would be an improvement. It seems to me that was a little lacking.
Strike out the paragraph and substitute the following:
"The IAC does~not agree with the recommendation as to its
membership contained in paragraph 6 on page 63., which would omit the
JIG and AEC as regular members. In addition to adding the FBI., the
IAC believes the JIG and AEC should continue as regular members,'
(EVERYONE CONCURRED)
CEN. WRIGHT: Paragraph 6.
CEN. IRWIN: What does the word "reconstituted" mean here?
(EN. WRIGHT: I think that is a repetition of the word used in the
Report. "As reconstituted."
CEN. IR'1]N: They wanted to omit.,in the Report., the JIG and AEC so
you had better make it clear,
CEN. CABELL: Isn't that redundant here?
CEN. WRIGHT: As far as this draft is concerned,
CEN. IRiIN : They want to omit two and add ones,
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ADM. INGLIS: There again we don't know whether it means a change of
membership or charter. That gives more or less, if possibly less, authority
to this Committee.
(EN. IETMIN: I think the word "reconstitutedit -
(EN. CABELL: It is a quote there.
(EN. WRI GH T: It is a quote all the way through,
MR. ARMSTRONG: Leave the word out and run dots along,
(EN. CABELL: Write the rest of the sentence without it,
(EN. WRIGHT: How about putting it in bracketsle
(EN. IRWIN. Put a line of dots and omit the word,
ADMM. INCLIS: We again take objection to assuming any responsibility
over which we have no authority.
DR. COLBY:. Do you thinks Admirals if you included that sentence here -
ADM. INGLIS: That was our idea. A new charter as well as a new list
of members, if that is what they mean. We would agree there should be
collective responsibility, but only contingent on collective authority,
The other members of the Standing Committee didn't agree with our interpreta-
tion of the word "reconstituted." They said it applied only to the term
"membership."
(EN. CABELL: Any reconstitution proposed in the way of charter change?
ADM INCLIS.* No. That is what is wrong with the Report. It has a lot
of fancy words and I don't know what they mean.
GEN. WRIGHT: Wells is it agreeable to leave that in by striking out
the word "reconstituted" and indicating by dots that a mrd has been left
ADM. INCLIS: I would have to dissent unless there was some qualifica-
tion. I would agree if it were added that authority was invested in the
Committee,
(EN. IRtIN: I would like to ask you a question. It probably covers
your trouble. Suppose we do make a collective report and I dissent? You
put in the report and you are under no obligation to include my minority
report. CIA has a right to object to an opinion?,
(EN. WRIGHT: The rejections however, is noted and the reason for it
is written right in. Tna cI:rRFT
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MR, ARMSTRONG: Your dissent must accompany the majority report.
ADM. IN GLIS: It must. That iss where we have been consulted. It
is a general practice., but I believe the Director is quite sensitive about
that and insists he doesn't have to unless he wants to,
GEN. CABELL: Isn't it provided for in NSCID No. 1? This dissent must
be forwarded,
CAPT. OCKER: A dissent must be indicated,.
ADM. IN GLIS: He can distort it or misquote it. I am not accusing
him of having done that., but he has., I thinks made his position clear that
he can do whatever he pleases.
(EN. WRIGHT:: This may be the one. NSCID NO. 1:
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall., in making recommenda-
tions.or giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to
the intelligence activities of the various Departments and Agenciess
transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concur-
rence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; it ovided
that., when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the
National Military Establishment, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting
it to the National Security Council."
As far as I know that has been followed in each case.
(EN. CABELL: It is a case for the interpretation of concurrence and
non-concurrence.
CAPT. OCKER: The statement "I do concur" or "do not concur" are
included in the remarks which accompany that,
(EN.WRIGHT:. "Transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence
or non-concurrence."
ADM. INGLIS:. "Giving advice.," which is not the same as drafting an
estimate, As a matter of practice., these ORE's., I guess that is what they
are., coming out on special situation' other than what is sometimes called
spot intelligences will have a statement down below:
"Army$ Navy$ Airs
State concurs.," or so and so concurs and the dissent is included in the
back, But you will notice always in the Daily Summary and in the Special
spot reports issued casually from time to time that it is usually indicated
that the matter has not been referred to the Departments aY all, Now.,
perhaps those are things that should have and we have no control. It is
left to the decision of the Director whether he wants to or not. We were
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successful in having that statement made so the customers wouldn't be left
with the idea that we had endorsed something we hadn't even looked at. So
the CIA does state whether or not the other Departmental agencies concur.,
MR. ARMSTRONG: That goes to the question of uncoordinated intelligence
rather than recommendations and advice to the NSC, and the. Report is quite
specific in its attack on that problem. They have strongly recommended
against the continuation of that practice. So that if an estimate were to
be coordinated by the IAAC, I would suppose that the procedures called for
in NSCID No. 1 would have to apply to that in the same way as if it were
advice to the Council.
ADM. INGLI$: I don't believe there is anything in that directive
that speaks of estimates.
CAN. WRIGH T: Yes, in paragraph 5-.
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate National
Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Security
Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such
Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National Security Council
from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated shall
be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall carry
an agreed statement of substantial dissent.tt
ADM. INGLIS: What do you mean by agreed? What does agreed mean?
P.7R. CHILDS: Between the one that produces it in your shop and the ones
in our shop. Not 100% agreement. If there is a dissent then they agree
that that will go in.
ADM. INGLIS "An agreed statement of substantial dissent."
HR. CREEDS: That statement will be agreed to in that our fellows and
others that are working on it with your fellows cannot get 100% agreements
so the Navy takes a certain stand. Then the group agrees that the others
gill let it go in and the Navy will submit a dissent,
ADM. INGLIS: National Intelligence, is that the same as they are
talking about here?- These estimates?
GEN. WRIGHT: I think they mean the same,
ADM. INGLIS: You interpret, I suppose, the defined National Intelligence
to be these ORE Reports, but you don't interpret the Daily Summary to be
National Intelligence?
GEN. WRIGHT. No,
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ADM. INGLIS: I don't know whether they are talking about the kind of
intelligence that is contemplated in paragraph, or all of it,
GEN, WRIGHT. I don't either.
ADM. IN GLIB :: I am confused.
N. RIGHT: Now, practically, of course, the Director is always
faced with this situation - every paper that is put out here, if the time
element allows at all, is worked out with all the agencies and any dissent
is put in, when the agency wants the dissent put in. But if the President
or Secretary of Defense wants your opinion by 9:30 in the morning on so and
so, there just isn't time to do it that way and that is what we are running
into, It is not the desire of this Agency to circumvent the intelligence
products of the other agencies at all.
ADM. INGLIS . I don't know what all the shouting is about when they
are recommending something we already do, if you look at it in that light.
MR. ARMSTRONG: No, we don't as I read it,
ADM. fl GLIS: If you look upon these estimates, to use the words of the
Dulles Report, as being identical with National Intelligence, as used in
NSCID No. 1, they are recommending we do something we are already doing,
including reports like the Daily Summary. That is impractical to get
concurrence,
N. CABELL: Let us actually do vat theoretically is possible under
NSCID No. 1.
1M. ARvMSTRONG: If you look at the text of the Report on page 81, in
the preceding paragraph: "There should be created in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the
specialized intelligence product of the Departmental Agencies in order to
prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates," I think that would be
the antecedent for these estimates in the next paragraph. My understanding
of this, the purpose here was to require the IAC as a body of persons to
take more individual responsibility and to have a collective responsibility
for the coordinated intelligence estimates,
GEN.. WRIGHT: I think their idea is for you and Admiral Inglis and
General Irwin to sit around this table from nine in the morning until five
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at night and make up intelligence estimates.
AD,,. INGLIS: I have neither the time nor the competence to do it.
That is what I am afraid of.
CEN. CABELL Your point can be met if at the end of the present
paragraph 6 we added:: "For such estimates as have been referred to the
IkC ."
ADM,M. II4d( .,IS: Also get the words "responsibility and authority"
bracketed together, It is all right to give us responsibility, but we have
no authority.
(EN. CABELL:: Whichever reports are referred to you, which you have
responsibility for are the only ones which you can assume any responsibility
for.
ADM. INGLT5 You have the same idea' as expressing it, as putting a
tail on that sentence. "Assume collective responsibility commensurate
with their authority."
CEN. CABELL I think that is rather ambiguous. Say "for such reports
as have been referred to that body.",
ADAM. INGLIS:. That goes back to my views in paragraph 4, if they would
be accepted. I think we are spending a lot of time on this. Navy agrees,
to this,, subject to the expression of its views in connection with para-
graph 4.
(EN.. IRVIIN: Wouldn't it be incorrect to assume responsibility except
where specific dissent is stated. If you agreed with all the papers you
are willing to accept the responsibility.
ADM. INGLIS: I think the paper should say very specifically that you
agree with it., or that you don't agree with it. I don't think it should be
left to the imagination. If nothing is said then you agree.
(EN. CABELL:; Ia for one., wouldn't be concerned that somebody is going
to charge me with responsibility for a report which wasn't given to me to
review. So with, or without that escape clause I would feel safeguarded.
CEN. IR IN There is nothing that would indicate on the report that
you had discussed or approved it*
CEN,. WRIGHT-. Yes, the point here worth noting is that these est"~tes
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should be submitted for discussion and. approval by the reconstituted IAC.
That means., as we read it here? that everyone of these estimates., and which
have been worked on by your working committee., whether they agreed or dis-
agreed, should come up to this body for approval.
ADM. INCLIS: According to Mr, Armstrong they are different. They are
departmental estimates and must be thrown into the hopper. If that is the
meaning of sub paragraph 4., I an inclined to agree with you. It is a new
thought to me.
MR, ARMSTRONG:: I think their position here as taken in the light of
their recommendation that CIA discontinue departmental intelligence and
that., you see, would eliminate those reports to which you are referring.,
which are not coordinated other than in the type of research and reports
by agreement on mattersof common concern.
ADM. IN(,IS: Following paragraph 3: "specialized intelligence product
of the departmental agencies." I might have a specialized intelligence
product that would be so highly specialized that it would be absolutely
of no interest to any one else., yet if I follow that literally it has to
go to the IA.C and the IAC has to meet on it. Was that your idea?
I.M. ARMSTRONGL Nov only where two or more departmental specialized
estimates are involved in the preparation of what is defined as national
intelligence. Because under the concept of the Committee., the Dulles
Committee., CIA:., other than in the areas of common concern where they are
delegated responsibility for both operations and production of that kind of
intelligence., wouldn't produce departmental intelligence. As in our view:
their Daily Summary and many of their situation reports are today.
ADM. INC IS:: In other words., you go back to sub-paragraph 1: "there
has been confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated
national intelligence estimates and responsibility for miscellaneous
research and reporting activities. I am confused.
CAN. ARIGHT: If you accept the principle., when they say estimates they
mean all intelligence reports., CIA becomes an assembly area. You take
everybody's material and put it in a paraphrased version., then CIA, is an
assembly,, not a production Agency. To go back here to DCI 311 under normal
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procedures of handling these estimates it tells howthey are submitted to
the various agencies. "After receipt of all replies,.9 the CIA will publish
the statements of concurrence or substantial dissent with the final paper.
And as far as I know it has been done in every case, except on an emergency
paper. I don't know what they are driving at myself.
(EN. IRWIN: Let's say so.
ADM. INGLIS: Della it seems to me this is a very far reaching
recommendation that we have got hold of here. Now if we are going to decide
whether we are going to have the CIA. as a small brain trust which does nothing
but pass judgment on the departmental estimates., or whether we want to have
CIA the kind of an organization with a couple of thousand people producing
its own material from the ground up, its own intelligence from the ground
up with its own reference files, cross indexes$ etc. etc. - that is a big
question.
(EN. IRWIN: Go further than that - preclude the IAC from coming over
here.
ADIVI. INGLIS: Yet we are asked to concur with this procedure. I
didn't know it meant all that.
IvIR, ARMSTRONG: It has become clearer - the recommendation affecting
it. The recommendation is not separable from the other recommendations in
the report.,-'but they are based on the accomplishment of other changes that
affect internal organization in CIA and interdepartmental relations. I
wonder if it is too late to suggest that we drop the whole idea of IAC
comments on an agreed basis .
ADM. IN CLIS : I would go along with that,
M. AMASTRON G: Because you can't go into the consequences and
implications of some of these recommendations at least without having to
go back to the ones that affect CIA's organization.
(EN. IRJIN: Or to put it another way., it is not possible to make any
TAC comments unless it is determined what they meant in the Report?
NR. ARMSTRONG:: That affects it too.
GE-N. CABEIL: That applies to anyone not only the IAC.
(,N. WRI CHIT: But it does indicate the fact that the Dulles Report
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is not clear as to its intention. In other words, the wording - what does
''reconstituted" mean? Dropping out certain people or a new charter?
GEN. IRWIN:: And I still feel too this would completely bar you from
making estimates. Probably 80% you make are your own,.
ADM. INCLIS I think 80,x, or probably 100%.
(EN. IR'fIN: You have nothing the IAC doesn't pass on,, except when
you get a hot one?
(EN. 14RIGHT Your people do pass on it.
(EN. IR4"'IN: Yesp but we don't see it.
DIR. ARMSTRONG: We think 80% they make they shouldn't make because
it is strictly political.
CEN. VIRIGHT:. Again,., suppose The White House calls and we tell them
they will have to get a report from Mr. Armstrong. It is pretty hard to do,,
and that is where 80% of them start.
(EN. ItIIIN: Unless it was an extremely important one you wouldn't
have to assemble this group because you get your material from the several
departments,
CEN. CABELL:. What reports do they make that are not extremely
important?
(EN. IRWIN: I don't knowthe answer on that one,
TMMR. ARMSTRONG: The theory of the Dulles Committee is that they shouldn't
make any estimates except those that are truly national estimates other than
in the areas that are conceded to them as full control.
CEN. WRI C IT If they had included a list of such items that they
thought were improper for CIA, we would have firm ground to go on. There
is no indication here what they really mean.
(EN. IMIN:: If you let us talk 15 minutes more., you are going to
be out of a. job.
GEN. CABELL: What are you going to do as regards paragraph 3?
(EN. WRIGHT: Let me answer that another way. We have taken advantage
of what we could pick out, the concrete points and made a chart showing the
organization proposed by the Dulles Committee and having made the chart and
studied its then you don't have to worry too much about answering the
torments. The answer to your question - it is not too workable. Anything
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is workable,, but there is no saving,, no economy certainly' There is a loss
of efficiency and we propose to make our comments on the basis of such an
organization,
M. ARMSTRONG: I certainly would have to register an objection to
that statement,
CEN. CABELL: It kind of looks like if we take it out of context and
deal with the IAC aspects of this report separately, we are not having a true
point of departure in vat changes are contemplated by CIA.. We are sort of
working in a vacuum., which leads me to say that your suggestion has merit.
Not that we'd decline to comment,, but we'd wait until we see the comments
on the structure of CIA,, see what form it takes,
ADM. IN GLIS: I think that it is almost essential to have that because
as you said a minute ago it becomes more and more clear that it is so interwoven
that you can't comment on the IAC without commenting on the organization and
procedures and principles of operating of CIA itself*
MR. ARMSTRONG: I would move$ Mr. Chairman., that we address a letter
to the Executive Secretary in response to his request., to the general
effect that the IAC has considered the problem of commenting separately
but has found it is unable to do so because of the inseparability of the
recommendations affecting it from those affecting the organization of CIA.
end other matters. That the IAC will comment in the light of the comments
submitted by the departments and agencies., including the CIA.
(EN. WRI ( I T: You could do that. CIA, in view of that,., of course.,
would have to send a letter ourselves to the Executive Secretary to involve
the fact that we are to make a report as you have., separately. The original.
thought was that they would all go in at one time, Everybody agree to the
assumption to stop work on this and prepare a letter to the Execurive Secre-
tary explaining why such a report cannot be made until such time as the
intent or the draft of the report from the Central Intelligence Agency is
available?
(EVERYONE A CREED )
ADIM. IN C ,IS : Even though you get all of them,, I am not at all sure
you can restrict your comments to the IAC.
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MR. CHILDS: It would have to be included in the Navy report. You
would make reference to the IAC in your report and each one would have to,
MR. TRUEHEART The separate reports would be postponed until the CIA's;
comments were ready?
CiEN. WRIGHT: No. In order to fill this bill., the CIA. draft and the
draft of the various agencies too.
ADM. INCI,IS: I thought that was that was to close the door to any
effort at any time., now,, or any subsequent time to a coordinated IAC report.
MR. APdM.STRONG: I had in mind that we were kissing this to death and
each Agency will submit its comments on the IAC items as well as all others.
MR. CHILDS: Pertaining to the organization of CIA, if it wishes.
ADM. INCLIS: Anything in the Report they wish to comment on.
UR. CHILDS-. CIA and all the IAC would do the same thing,
CEN. TODD: It would seem to me that the National Security Council
would end up with a barrel of fish that they couldn't possibly segregate
or identify.
(EN. CABELL: Which was the purpose of the Dulles-Jackson Committee
to prevent.
GEN. TODD : I don't see hour they would deal with such a report.
MR. CIICLDS: when I was over there the other days, in the Executive
Secretary's Office, they were going to try to go through this and out of
each paragraph select the concept of that paragraph and say to the NSC
"do you approve of this concept"T You might try to select a few concepts
from these paragraphs as they are written, I haven't seen how they are
going to do it.
(EN. 'WiRI (ET : Would it be a matter of interest to consider,, inasmuch as
the Department of State is going to submit theirs through the Secretary of
State that the other interested agencies do theirs the same way.
ADM. INGLIS I will have to consult my Secretary on that.
CEN. IF~MIN: We don't know whether he will want it.
CEN. I RIC 1T : In making our report if we had the intentions of the
Departmentsof State., Army,, Navy,, and Air Force we would like to consider
them and get the parallel.
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ADAM. INGLIS:. What we are doing is preparing this continent which you
will see from the Navy very shortly. I intended it largely to be comments
on the TAC. In addition we are working on comments for our secretary.,
trying to brief this book and make something out of it. Whether he will
accept it or do anything about its I don't know,
GEN. WRIGHT: There is a possibility of two Navy reports on it?
ADP. INGLIS: You may get one signed by me} addressed to the Executive
Secretary and another one which the Secretary of the Navy will discuss with
the National Security Council. Or it may wind up that you won't get either
one of them.
GEN. WRIGHT: Would this be out of line., Park$ to submit to CIL a
copy of the report which you are going to send to the Security Council
through your Secretary?'
MR. Al IISTRONG: We have not reached that point of decision yet,,
because we haven't cleared any of this with the Secretary., except that
he will take the comments to the Council. What his wishes in that would
be - I wouldn't be very surprised if he makes our comments available to
you and to the other agencies.
CEN. CABELL: I was hoping to avoid having to write out a long winded
paper for my Secretary. It hasn't percolated down to me and I wasn't going
to raise the issue.. I would just like to close the door to further TAC
references in here, Frankly, I am at a loss to see what time and occasion
there would be for reopening it by this body. But I would just like to
assume an obligation to comment upon either this or the entire Report.
GEN. TODD:. Isn't he going to have to be in a position when the NSC
considers whatever responses he gets as a result?
ADM. INGLIS: They are already seized with the problem. This memo
dated January 24 from the Executive Secretary to the National Security
Council enclosing the final report by the Survey Group was submitted to
the NSC for consideration.
NR. } E: I wonder if one way out is for you to table this matter
as far as the IAC is concerned until the comments of the several agencies
are submitted. Then each agency submit theirs through the Secretary to the
NSC and at that time reconsider what part can T sic'e ] WNFERPTu-the IAC.
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GEN. 'WRIGHT-. That doesn't quite suit your point,
(EN. CABELL: June, but not Mr. Armstrong's,
MR. AMISTRONG: I think it does,
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(EN. CABELL: That is the original proposal I thought I was voting
ADIM. 124GLIS: We can't positively guarantee that our respective
Secretaries will have their comments made available to the 7AC. I can't
promise it.
GEN. CABELL:: They don't make them available to us.
ADAM INGLIS:; We will probably draft them. I am perfectly willing to
circulate my own comments from my little spots but I can't promise the
Secretary will.
GEN. WRIGHT: Of course, it is possible just to table this matter of
submitting the IAG report regardless of when it will be reopened agains.
We could follow up by writing a letter to the Executive Secretary.
MAR. CHILDS: Tell him we couldn't get an agree report, so will get
individual reports.
(EN. CABELL: Not an inability to get an agreed reports, but a report
that we are concerned with.. I would hate to have it noted that the reason
we are not submitting a report is because we are doing a lot of wrangling
.round this table.,
MR. AB11STR0NG: That wouldn't be the case.
(SEN. 1 ,RIGHT: We can, of courses write to the Executive Secretary that
it has not been possible to submit a report by the IAC due to the inability
to clarify certain parts of the Dulles Report as to their meaning and intent.
ADM. fdGLIS: I read the letter from Mr. Souers to the Director and
we are not under any obligation to submit a coordinated report. "The
Director of Central Intelligence is being requested by the Council for
his recommendations, together with the individual views of the appropriate
members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee." We are not required to do
any coordinating at all.
GEN. CABELL: I would like a. thorough investigation, but I can't do it
until I see what CIA is going to put in their report.
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(EN. MIME-. I don't see why we have to send a letter. The desire
of the TAG members is to refrain from commenting in view of the fact that
the individual reports will cover the ground and that a report submitted no
which does not take cognizance of the CIA.report, cannot be a good sound
report. That is the intent, is it not?
MR. CHILDS: I don't think we have to write them a letter, we can just
telephone them.
(EN. I1~4'~IN: I don't think you can mention the individual reports.
MRy Secretary hasn't said anything to me yet.
(EN. CABELL:: If you can figure a way to get out of it you had
better do it.
CEN. IRHIN: I probably will,, but I can't commit myself here. In
other words, it practically invites us to make comments for the Director of
Central Intelligence. If we don't want to there are no obligations,
AM I. IN CLIS : You can at least say "no comment." But you have to
say something. I am talking to you as a member of the IAC.
(EN. IRVifN: I don't want to comment as a member of the TAC.
GEN. CABEIL: I an not able to comment intelligently until I see the
comments of the CI1 Director,
ADA.. IN GLIS: You have got to make some response to this.
CEN. MICETr Is it understood now that we are tabling this, and
Mr. Childs will get the word back to Mr. uouers, until such time as the
01k report is forthcoming, no such report as this can be made?
ADIM. ING[IS: I don't see why we have to tell Souers. I think you
tell him nothing until you draft your comments and then we draft ours and
then you toss it into Souers' lap.
GEN. TODD: This 25 February paper won't call for the information or
the views of the IAC. It won't reflect your views as CIA, IAC, or
individuals.
(EN. 1RICHT: I think individual, not IAC.
COL. TREACY: We are ready to give them to him where we see it to be
appropriate.
(EN. IRWIN: I see no obligation to put it in as an IAC.
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MR. AR1.4MSTRONG: Not IA.C as a body. Table the matter so far as the
Executive Secretary is concerned on the ground of the inseparability of
the recommendations affecting the IAC from the report as a whole,
CEN. CABELL: Inability at this time.
ADM. IN(,IS: The Executive Secretary has never directed that we
restrict our comments to the IAC.
MR. ARMSTRONG: That was our interpretation.
ADM. INC ,IS: We got ourselves into that in our discussion at the last
meeting that we would make an effort to coordinate the comments of all the
members of the IAC and those which pertain to the IAC, but it was just an
agreement among this committee. It is not required by this directive as
I read it.
C,EN. I1 fl : I think I will submit my individual comment. I will put
it up to my Secretary,
(EN. CABELL: I will have the same trouble in submitting an individual
comment until I see the color of the eyes of the CIA..
(EN. WRIGHT-. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may take
the position that he wouldn't like to write his comments until he sees the
Agencies' comments passed through us before it goes directly to the Security
Council.
MR. ARMSTRONG: I can't give you an unequivocal answer, I assure you
it is my desire that our comments be circulated.
CEN. 'RIGHT : The Director may take the stand he can t t write. his
report until he does have the comments of the agencies.
CEN. CABELL:: I spoke first.
ADM. INGLIS You can have mine within 24 hours.
CEN. 14 RIGHT: Anything else?
MR. CHILDS- Why can't we get the individual comments of the members:
of the IAC and let everybody see them, Circulate them, Then the Director
can write a comment on their comments apart from his CIA one. It is hard
to divide them up between internal and general IAC matters.
MR. ARMSTRONG: And we will want to write a comment on his comment.
(EN. WRIGHT: Well, shall we adjourn?
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