THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, MR MCCONE;

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200030-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

16200
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - 5E1\TATE September 16
reappraise his entire, position on the
treaty because of the one question which
I now raise.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President,
I doubt that any member of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations or any other
committee heard more of the testimony
than I did, with the sole exception of
the chairman of the committee, the Sen-
ator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT].
I believe that he perhaps. heard more
than any other member of the commit-
tee. I listened to the witnesses who came
before the committee. We did not merely
pass over` the question of blackout. We
did not pass over the other developments
of which the Senator has spoken. We
questioned the scientists and the mili-
tary experts' before us. I admit that
there was not a great deal of testimony
in open session on blackouts, because
when the time came for it, it was gener-
ally suggested that the discussion should
be carried on in executive session.
But the testimony is given in the hear-
ings after having been edited.
Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director of
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, testi-
fled before us, His testimony can be
found commencing on page 579. On page
581 he said:
A similar situation exists with respect to
what may be called the nuclear blackout
phenomena or the effect upon communica-
tions or radar of nuclear explosions in the
relatively high atmosphere. Again, the phe-
nomena is known, many excellent experi-
ments were conducted to study it during the
196 oversea operations, as well as earlier.
We are very far from being devoid of
knowledge as to the nature of the problems
involved. Limiting our knowledge in this
area, as we will also have to limit our knowl-
edge to that which we now have of other
electromagnetic phenomena associkted with
nuclear explosions, is one of the risks which
we would have to take.
To me, it does not appear to be a great
risk, and it will be a challenge to see the ex-
tent to which our scientists with the avail-
able information can examine it, theorize
upon it, and extend its applicability with
reasonable confidence.
The subject was discussed in the re-
port. On`page 15 Senators will find a
reference to it. We quoted from Dr.
Harold Brown's testimony as follows:
With respect to high-altitude tests carried
out for the purpose of determining the effects
of nuclear bursts on communications black-
out, radar blackout, and nuclear weapons
vulnerability, Soviet and United States ex-
perience appears to be comparable. Each
side has had about the same number of tests,
over yield ranges and altitude ranges which
are comparable though not identical.
Enough has been learned in the United
States to verify the existence, nature, and
rough dependence of blackout characteristics
on yield and altitude, although important
details still have not been explored. The
same is probably true in the Soviet Union.
Probably neither side understands the phe-
nomena sufficiently well to permit theoretical
extension with complete confidence to some
other altitudes, yields, and types of devices;
but we have., and presumably the Soviets also
have, enough information to enable us to
take steps to design around our uncertain-
ties.
That was the deliberate position of
one of the leading scientists in our, coun-
try. It was not a newspaper editor, pub-
lisher, or writer of newspaper articles
playing on the sensational angle of
things. That was the sworn testimony
of Dr. Harold Brown, who is one of the
outstanding nuclear scientists in the
world today.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Dr. Harold Brown
is the present Director of Defense, Re-
search, and Engineering of the Depart-
ment of Defense; is that not correct?
Mr. SPARKMAN, That is correct.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Does the Senator
recall the testimony of the science ad-
viser to President Eisenhower, Dr.
Kistiakowsky, as it relates to Dr. Harold
Brown?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I do. I made ref-
erence to it a while ago. I said that Dr.
Harold Brown was an outstanding scien-
tist and that Dr. Kistiakowsky would
recommend that we take in full faith
what Dr. Brown said.
Mr. HUMPHREY. In exact words Dr.
Kistiakowsky said :
I would therefore urge that the committee
give special weight to the testimony of Har-
old Brown, who, in my knowledge, is the only
witness so far heard who can speak with real
authority regarding the total ABM problem,
and the related developments in offensive
systems. He has access to all of the intelli-
gence regarding Soviet activities and all of
the expertise in the United States on our
future capabilities that relate to the problem.
It seems to me that If a U.S. Senator
is to judge the reliability and credibility
of testimony, under this type of reference
by one of the world's leading scientists, a
man recognized in the United States as
being one of the most able scientists in
the field of nuclear energy and physics,
Dr. Kistiakowsky, to accept the testimony
of Dr. Brown as compared, I say most
respectfully-
Mr. SPARKMAN. With a magazine
article.
Mr. HUMPHREY. With a magazine
article, even from an outstanding maga-
zine.
I asked the Senator from South Caro-
lina if I could see the article. The article
is not at :all conclusive. I should like to
read the article, if the Senator will be
kind enough to permit me to do so.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President,
the Senator has. not seen the article.
This is an editorial based on the article.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator was
looking at the editorial. Let us see what
the editorial says. The editorial is not
nearly as conclusive and definitive as is
the Senator from South Carolina. It
reads, in part:
The possibility of Soviet development of
such an ABM system based on high-yield
testing that the United States has not
matched is not in itself a reason for rejection
of the treaty.
Perhaps I ought to repeat that.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I think it bears re-
peating. People should remember that
statement.
Mr. HUMPHREY (reading) :
The possibility of Soviet development of
such an ABM system based on high-yield
testing that the United States has not
matched is not in itself a reason for re-
jection of the treaty.
I continue to read from the editorial:
There are alternatives that may be ac-
ceptable risks, such as increased procure-
ment of Polaris submarines.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I was about to men-
tion that as a part of the system as to
which there is no breakdown.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from
South Carolina was talking about the
effects of-high-yield explosions on Min-
uteman missiles and on our silos, yet
one of the great developments of our
missile capability today-really, the
secret weapon, if one can call a weapon
a secret weapon-the weapon the Soviet
Union has not matched at all, is the
Polaris submarine missile system. We
are producing Polaris submarines at the
rate of one a month. Each Polaris sub-
marine carries 16 tubes. Each one of
those Polaris missiles which comes out
of each of the 16 tubes will "lay low" a
city of the size of Moscow-will "rub it
out."
I often wonder exactly how much ex-
plosive power would satisfy the U.S.
Senate. We have reached unbelievable
megaton ranges. The bigger the mega-
ton range the greater the demand for
some kind of acceptable risk.
I am of the opinion that the testimony
by Dr. Harold Brown and by Dr. York,
both of whom have had most enviable
records in highest positions of this Gov-
ernment in the field of research, should
be accorded considerable weight by the
Senate. It should carry even greater
weight than testimony given by a gen-
eral. A general uses weapons. Scien-
tists make them, measure them, and
know what they are about.
With one or two exceptions, scientists
who have responsibility for nuclear
weapons favor the treaty. I submit that
when one is trying to make a value judg-
ment on evidence by the military and
scientific experts, any measurement one
uses on the treaty will support the treaty,
because of all the generals and military
men who have spoken out, as the distin-
guished chairman of the committee has
pointed out-I think there were 14 whose
voices were heard-only 2 spoke in op-
position to the treaty.
I believe that there were only two or
three scientists who testified in opposi-
tion to the treaty.
When scientists of the quality of Dr.
Kistiakowsky, Dr. York, Dr. Harold
Brown, Dr. Bradberry, and others testify
in favor of the treaty, I do not think
we can reject that testimony on the basis
of even the best of articles, whether it
be published in Missiles and Rockets, or
Fortune, or any other magazine. I do
not care what magazine it is.
.Mr. THURMOND. Madam President,
will the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I will yield in a
moment.
Since we are speaking of generals who
have been heard, I should like to know
whether the Senator from Minnesota
agrees with me in the contention that
although there are hundreds of generals
who serve, under our governmental sys-
tem the military authorities who are
charged by law with the responsibility
of advising us on military matters-
strategy, security, and things such as
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CONGRESSIONAL iECORD -- SENATE
Mr. THURMOND. I do not know
whether General Taylor has forgotten,
or what has happened, but I say that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff haveunanimously
approved a military requirement for a
high-yield warhead, one for manned
bombers and one for missiles, but that
the requirement has not been approved
at the civilian level. If the Senator from
Alabama will go to the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee and he will
contact Mr. Kendall, chid counsel, he
will find such a statement- In the testi-
mony.
This testimony is, of course, classified,
but it is there nevertheless, If possible,
I am going to get it declassified so the
Senate and the public can have full
access to this vital information, espec-
ially in view of the point raised here
today by the Senator from Alabama in
reading from the unclassified hearings
of the Foreign Relations Committee.
We have been handicapped by not be-
ing able to bring all the testimony to the
Senate, because that testimony is not
printed in the hearings of the Prepared-
ness Subcommittee, because most of it is
highly classified.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President,
the committee having jurisdiction of the
treaty and handling the hearings is the
Committee on Foreign Relations. We
have brought the hearings here, and we
brought them in a way that is present-
able, readable, and clear to the Senator.
The hearings have been edited, so far as
secret or classified material is concerned.
The testimony includes that of several
persons who are supposed to speak for
the defense and security of our coun-
try-the scientists; the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Sea-
borg; the Director of the CIA Mr
Cone ? ae p scientists an a vis-
e, ee oo the President of the United States.
We heard the testimony of all those per-
sons, who under the law, are supposed
to speak.
As regards the printed hearings, Sena-
tors do not have to go to the committee
or anywhere else for-the testimony, al-
though a few items are retained as con-
fidential in the committee files. Any
Senator can go right downstairs to the
committee room and can be shown the
secret testimony.
I refer particularly to the testimony
of Mr. McCone, Director of the Central
Intelligence enc I also refer the
y testimon 01 .Northrop; and I also
refer to the secret testimopy of General
Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Madam President, many questions
which have been asked by the Senator
from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] have been
brought up in the course of this debate.
I should like to refer now to the first and
second questions; there are 16 alto-
gether.
We have discussed one, and had just
started our discussion of the second.
The second one is whether we are
reasonably confident and secure in the
.knowledge that our ballistic missile re-
taliatory second strike force will survive
and operate in a nuclear environment.
Certainly there is no controversy with
reference to that. I believe everyone
admits that we do have'sufficient power
to enable us to make a retaliatory strike
that would be destructive to any enemy
that might attack us.
Mr. THURMOND, Madam President,
will the Senator from Alabama yield on
that point?
Mr. SPARKMAN; Yes, I am glad to
yield.
Mr. THURMOND. Has the Senator
from Alabama seen the issue of Missiles
and Rockets, dated, September 14-last
Saturday?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I have not yet seen
that issue.
Mr. THURMOND, This magazine
contains an article' and an editorial on
this very question. I hold the editorial
in my hand. It reads in part as follows:
Tile article on page 14 of this issue prob-
ably is the most important published by this
magazine since its founding. It brings out
into the open the critical and highly classi-
fied problem which has been at the heart of
the opposition to the nuclear test ban treaty
by many nuclear scientists and high-ranking
Air Force officers. The fact is that the
Soviets may have fou&id the answer to their
antiballistic missile problem by attaining
the ability to render U.S. missiles inopera-
tion.al in their silos.
The possibility is more than a threat to
the effectiveness of U.S. missile forces. If
true, it threatens to negate the whole deter-
rent -posture of this Nation by making pos-
sible enemy deactivation of the heart of
US. nuclear strength.
Then the editorial points out the dan-
gers. In other words, if through the
tests the Communists have conducted in
1961 and 1962, they have gained tech-
nical knowledge that will enable them
to drop a bomb, inasmuch as we have
said we will not make the first strike,
what if they should make the first strike,
and if this knowledge has enabled them
to drop a bomb that will produce an
electromagnetic phenomenon--if we
want to call it an electric current-that
will blow out the fuses on our missiles,
or will fuse the wires in our missiles and
thus prevent them', taking off or would
render ineffective much of the guidance
systems, so we never would be able to
get them out of the silos properly and
on their way to the target. Then the
question which would naturally arise is,
where would we be? That is a possi-
bility that our military people, I can
state, are deeply concerned about; and
that is the information that has been
gained in the recent tests by the Soviets.
If they did gain sufficient knowledge to
be able to make our missiles inert or in-
operable in the silo, and since Secretary
McNamara is "phasing out" our bomb-
ers-so that soon we shall not have any
bombers, and if, therefore, we do not
have any bombers{ and if our missiles
are made inert and inoperative, where
will America be?
I question statengents which state un-
equivocally that we will be able to make
a second strike. 4 should like to have
the Senator explain how we shall be
able to make a second strike if a missile
or missiles are dropped over here by the
Soviets will destroy the electronic sys-
tems of our missile. If the Soviets have
gained this knowledge and can manu-
facture such a weapon, they will do that
161-99
or threaten to do that; and then where
will we be?
The only answer to that question that
I know is that we shall have to test in
the atmosphere to gain the requisite
knowledge to prepare the installations
and equipment necessary in order to pro-
tect the missiles. Otherwise we may
find ourselves in a helpless condition,
That again brings to the forefront the
need for atmospheric testing. That is
no phony objection raised to the treaty.
.It is a direct reality. It is a reality that
has been pointed out by the magazine
Missiles and Rockets, an engineering
magazine whose editors feel that the
treaty is an extremely dangerous instru-
ment because of the very fact I have
mentioned. If the Communists are able
to drop a bomb in our country and to
neutralize our missiles, we shall not be
able to send our missiles over to Russia
to strike their targets in retaliation, and
we shall not, have the necessary knowl-
edge with which to insulate the missiles
and pursue a course which, might provide
protection for them..
What other course can we pursue to
protect our Nation than to test in the
atmosphere? That is the only way in
which we can get the information.
If the Senator from Alabama can
answer or explain away that question, I
would certainly like to hear him do so.
The military people--and. I have talked
to them-and some of the scientists are
deeply concerned about this question.
If the Senator will read the classified
testimony given before the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee again, I be-
lieve it will be of great interest to him.
We are handicapped in not being ;able
to bring to the Senate classifiednlforima-
tion which the people of our country
ought to hear so that they could
truly know the dangers involved with
regard to the very vita]' point that I
am now making. If the people of
America knew all of the information,
and if they knew the jeopardy in which
we would place our country by stopping
atmospheric testing when we should go
ahead as fast as we can in order to at-
tempt to protect these missiles--because
we will be dependent upon them-in may
judgment there would be no doubt as
to the answer of theAmerican people to
the question.
I would be pleased to have the Senator
from Alabama read that classified testi-
mony, and after he reads the testimony
that was given before the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee, I would be
further pleased if he would come back
and express himself.
He may change his opinion. If the
Senator from Alabama is completely ob-
jective on the treaty-I am not in-
sinuating that he is not but if he is
willing to change his mind when some-
thing of great significance and irnpor-
tance is brought out, I believe that the
Senator from Alabama might wish to
reappraise his position. If he will read
carefully the classified testimony in the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee on this question, if he will talk in
person with General Power and some of
the other experts, including General
Schriever and others, and if he will look
into the subject further, he may wish to
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1 9&63 CONGRESSIONAL RECORb SENATE 16201
that-are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, head- advice was given. Their advice waS In.' treaty was not in the best interest of the
ed by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs favor of the treaty. country.
of Staff; Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I believe the Senator from Alabama
M . H JMPHREY. The Senator is ob- will the Senator yield? said that his "boss" said he went along
viousiy correct. - Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President, with the treaty. General LeMay did go
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator spoke I appreciate the comments by the Sena- along with the treaty, but what did he
of 14 -generals, and of 2 being against tor from Minnesota in that regard. The say? He said he would probably have
the treaty. I do not remember, any gen- Senator referred to General Power as recommended against the treaty had it
eral testifying before our committee being opposed to the treaty. General still been in the proposal stage-this is,
against the treaty. I do not know where Power's superior said that he would the wpolitical aspects as told to take winto hich heconsideration
not
the Senator got his information. favor it. was
Mr. HUMPHREY. General Power is Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is qualified to assess.
against the treaty. correct. I wish to read two or three lines from
Mr, SPARKMAN. Did he testify be- Mr. SPARKMAN. Taking all military General Power's testimony, because I
fore our committee? and political factors into consideration, think it is important for the people of
Mr. HUMPHREY. He is one of the Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, America to know that this one com-
field commanders who were questioned. will the Senator yield? mander, who is responsible for protect-
Mr. SPARKMAN. By our committee? Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield to the Sena- ing this country, in delivering weapons
Mr. HUMPHREY. By the Joint Chiefs tor from South Carolina. on the enemy if an exchange begins,
of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Mr. THURMOND. We are all in said:
asked all_ the commanders in the field favor of the Polaris program. I have I feel that we have military superiority I
very
feel
strongly what they thought about the treaty, and supported the Polaris program vigorous- now, andn a world th at has beenatfreethis f has
if they had any views on it. As I recall, IT I expect to continue to do so, nuclear warfare. I have the lowest confi-
General Power, the head of SAC, spoke The Polaris submarine does not fire dence factor that we can and will maintain
against the treaty. One officer said that its missiles at once in a salvo. The Po- that military supef"lority under the test ban
he had no opinion, since he had not given lariS fires only one missile at a time. -treaty.
it what he thought was adequate con- Information published in the Wash- So he is very much concerned. He
sideration. All of the other command- ington Evening Star some time ago went even further in. the Preparedness
ers, as will be seen from' page 407 of 'the brought out that the Soviets have an Subcommittee. I cannot go into his
hearings, were for'the treaty. antiballistic missile system at a certain statement there.
The chairman of the committee asked city in Russia. Our intelligence reports We talk about the generals. I come
General LeMay a question in this regard. showed, according, to that article, that next to General Schriever. Who is Gen-
If I may, I will read it, for the informa- the antiballistic missile system at this eral Schriever? He has charge of the
tion of the Senate: particular city was capable of knocking development of these missiles. He has
The CHAIRMAN. General LeMay, do you down medium range missiles, that is, charge of the development of our Air
know whether or not the commanders in the those with a range of up to 1,200 miles; Force weapons systems. What did he
field, I believe they are referred to as unified and irange mthat is,
a range of up to missiles, 2,500 es miles; say? He told the subcommittee that
commanders in the field, such as those at those with intermediate
CINCLANT, Admiral Felt and other officers, there are definite military disadvantages
have been requested to give their personal and, under certain favorable conditions, to the treaty, and that as a military man
views on the acceptability of this test ban intercontinental ballistic missiles, that he felt he could protect the country bet-
treaty? Is, those which will go from 5,000 to ter without the treaty than with it.
General LEMAY. Yes, sir; the Joint Chiefs 7,000 miles. If we want to consider the treaty on
asked their views on it and they were for- If the Soviets continue to develop political grounds, then one must put it
warded, I think, without exception. th
tee how these c commandeers s inn the fieldfelt eir present antiballistic missile sys- on that basis if he is for the treaty. I say
The CHAIRMAN. Could you ill the emmitt tem. as they have already done, we can that one cannot consider it from a mili-
about this treaty? see that even with our Polaris system, tary standpoint and adopt it. It must be
11 General LEMAY. I can't list them all word which fires only one missile at a time, considered from the political aspect; that
for word. I think generally most of them we shall be in jeopardy. is, more weight must be given to political
were in favor of it. With regard to the various officers rather than military considerations.
The testimony then goes on to reveal who testified, General Power testified in There was another general- who came
that one withheld his comment and that the Preparedness Investigating Sub- before our committee.
General Power, for whom we have great committee. Much of his testimony is By the way, did not the Senator from
respect, was opposed to the treaty. Gen- classified. I cannot go into, all the de- Ohio request that General Power be
eral Power' is commander of the SAC tails. Again, I refer the distinguished heard by the Foreign Relations Commit-
operations. Senator. fromp Alabama to the classified tee, and was not that request refused?
- All the other, commanders, all those committee testimony and urge that he Mr. SPARKMAN. I cannot say. I
.who read Missiles and Rockets, all those read it. General Power said-and this will not say that he did or did not.
who consult, were for it. . is in the report of the Preparedness Sub- Mr. THURMOND. I am informed
It seems to me that is a reasonably committee-that, in his opinion, the that that is the case.
dence in support of the treaty is not in the best interest of the Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President,
goodibody of'evi
military aspects of the treaty. United States. That is General Power's will the Senator yield on that point? Let
I have constantly heard it said that statement. us get the record straight.
militarily the treaty involves unaccept- Who is General Power? General Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
able risks. If so, we had better remove Power is the man who is responsible for Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not believe
the field commanders, because this Sena- launching the missiles and the nuclear that the immediate superior of General
tor had to take advice from those field weapons, and other weapons, against Power, who is General LeMay, is any-
commanders. If the treaty involves un- the enemy. He is the one man in the body's lackey. I do not believe he lies
acceptable military risks, and these com- whole free world-not only the United dowmm and plays dead when somebody
manders say that the treaty is acceptable, States, but the whole free world-who says, "Take my view." He is a man of
something is wrong, and the Com- has a chance to try to save us and the conviction. He reported General Pow-
mander in Chief had better take a look rest of the free world. General Power is er's point of view. He also knew that
at what kind of commanders he has in the man who would send these missiles he had testified before the Preparedness
the field. I think the Commander iri through the air; he would send nuclear Subcommittee. General Power is an of-
Chief 'knows what kind of commanders weapons by manned bombers from dif- ficer in the line. He does not control
he has in the field. They are reliable, ferent points of the world; and he stated the country. He is under the command
experienced, able, competent command- to the Preparedness Investigating Sub- of General LeMay; and I think the
ers, Their advice was asked. Their committee, unequivocally, that this chairman of the committee will say un-
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16202 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16
der whose command he is. There is a coiittee hearings. All those who know while ago that I believe no member of the
Commander in Chief, after all. General Twining know, I think, that he is committee, except possibly the chairman,
Mr. THURMOND. I feel General Le- a very able and distinguished man. who was there practically all the time,
May knows in his heart that he did not Admiral Burke, former Chief of Naval heard more of the testimony than I did.
want the treaty, and that he would not Operations, was before the subcommit- I would put the Senator from Kansans in
have recommended it had it been in the tee, and Admiral Radford, former Chair- the same category, because he attend-
proposal stage. The chairman of our man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sub- ed regularly. I was impressed by the
subcommittee [Mr. STENNIS] pointed out mitted a statement which was included hearings. I was impressed by the fact
Friday that he did believe the Joint in the record of the hearings of the Sen- that these people were telling things as
Chiefs had their hearts in their subse- ate Foreign Relations Committee. they saw them and as they understood
quent testimony before our subcommit- At least five officers of general or flag the facts to be.
tee in which this time they gave qualified rank--General Power, General Schriever, Mr. CARLSON. The distinguished
endorsement based on political factors General Twining, Admiral Radford, and Senator from Alabama was present prat-
supposedly offsetting the military disad- Admiral Burke-testified against the tically all the time. I was not quite as
vantage they listed. treaty. We also received much valuable often in attendance as he was, but I did
Mr. HUMPHREY. I protest that ac- classified information from other rnili- attend most of the sessions.
cusation of General LeMay. General tary personnel in key and sensitive as- Mr. SPARKMAN, If the Senator
LeMay is a man of conviction and hon- signments. from Kansas was not present as often,
or. I do not think he would have come Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam President, he came very close to being there all the
before 3 committees and testified in will t1 a Senator yield? time. He was certainly present most of
behalf of the treaty-recognizing the , , Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to say the time. I do not believe I ever at-
limitations and risks, but at the same just a. wor on at comment. I have tended hearings that were fairer or more
time coming out for the treaty-unless said it. many times during the afternoon. adequate than these hearings.
he thought it was all right. These gen- I have been referring to the hearings be- Madam President, I am a lawyer. 1:
tlemen are men of conviction. Many of for the Foreign Relations Committee. practiced law before I came to Congress.
them In the past have resigned when i have drawn my citations from those i enjoyed practicing law. I was a court-
they disagreed with the civilian authori- hearings. They are what 'I consider to room lawyer. I know something about
ties. The Senator from Minnesota says be the official hearings. The Foreign preponderance of evidence. Of course
General LeMay would not tell an un- Relations Committee is the committee there were differences of opinion. Some
truth; he would not falsify the record; that has jurisdiction over treaties. It' of the experts saw things one way and
that he said what he believes; and that held hearings. some saw them in another way. When
belief is in the record. He said he sup- When. I speak of the various witnesses they started to draw conclusions, they
ported the treaty. The Senator can who appeared, I am speaking about wit- drew differing conclusions. Some of the
twist it and turn it inside out and outside nesses who appeared before that com- experts saw a risk involved where an-
in, but that is General Power's testimony mittee, and not some other committee other expert saw no risk involved. So it
on the treaty. at some other time, somewhere else. I went. However, when. we look at the
Mr. THURMOND. I do not twist and am referring to witnesses who appeared subject as a whole, and measure it from
-turn like the Senator from Minnesota. before the Foreign Relations Committee. the standpoint of preponderance of evi-
I am not accustomed to twisting and Our committee published notice of the dente, I must say that I have never seen
turning and using a lot of, gab like the hearing,,; before they were started. Any- a case develop that had greater prepon-
Senator from Minnesota. I am going to one could have replied. A bipartisan derance of evidence in :favor of a matter
mention facts and twist words as he subcommittee of the Foreign Relations than this one has in favor of ratification
has mine. Committee decided upon the witnesses of the treaty.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Madam Presi- to be called. I believe a logical course As the Senator from Minnesota has
dent- was followed. We called first the Sec- said, the military experts are the advis-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The retary of State. Then we took the testi- ers to the United States. The Chairman
Senator from Alabama has the floor. mony of the Secretary of Defense. Then of the Atomic Energy Commission heads
-Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President, we took the testimony of the Joint Chiefs the Commission that has jurisdiction
I have. been trying to be quite generous of Staff, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, over that awful power. I mean "awful"
in yielding. the head of the Atomic Energy Com- in the right sense. It has vast powers
Mr. THURMOND. I want to make mission, and the head of the Central In- and responsibilities. We also heard the
this point in reply- tel1ige1gL_Agency. We too the estl- head of the Central Intelligence pricy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does mony of ou nding scientists. We I wish mss resss again Fiat c owl E?Lirs
the Senator from Alabama yield to the called in Dr. Teller as an independent in the committee room are to be found
Senator from South Carolina? witness. transcripts of the testimony of Mr. 34
Mr. SPARKMAN.. Let us keep to one We heard Dr. York. We heard Dr. Cone. the head of the Centra In e
point at a time. I yield to the Senator Bradbury. We heard Dr. Foster. We gence'Agency; and any Senator who de-
from South Carolina. did not select witnesses who we felt were sires to do so may read the w o e, unax-
Mr. THURMOND. There was another either for or against the"treaty. We se- o r. c cone. die
general who testified, and that was Gen- lected witnesses who had knowledge and same is true o , His is
eral Twining. General Twining testified had policymaking responsibilities. perhaps among the most interesting of
very strongly against the treaty. He is Mr. CARLSON. Madam President, all the testimony given during the entire
a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will the Senator yield? hearing. It would give a lift to Members
of Staff. He is not now directly under Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. of the Senate to go downstairs and read
the gun, but he has been asked by the Mr. CARLSON. I merely wish to con- the testimony of Dr. Northrup.
Air Force to head a committee to study firm what the distinguished Senator has Mr. CARLSON. Madam President,
matters of this kind, and they have been said about the hearings. There were will the Senator yield?
studying this question. He has been 3 weeks of hearings. As one of the Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
briefed recently with the latest intelli- Senators who attended quite regularly,
gence. General Twining testified in a I wish to say that the distinguished Sen- Mr. CARLSON. The hearings would,
very magnificent manner and gave his ator from Alabama was one of the most have been much more voluminous had all
reasons, very strongly, as to Soviet supe- attentive at the hearings. He has just the testimony been printed.
riority in certain critical areas of nuclear stated that we did not try to select the Mr. SPARKMAN. Probably twice as
technology and capability and as to why witnesses. We heard testimony for and big.
this treaty should not be adopted. I can- against; the treaty. We have over a Mr. CARLSON. Much of the testi-
not go Into the reasons here because the thousand pages of testimony before us in mony was in executive session. If all of
Defense Department has his testimony the Senate. I feel that the hearings were it had been printed, hundreds of pages of
highly classified. Again I refer the Sen- very conclusive. additional testimony would. be before us.
ator from Alabama and other Senators Mr. SPARKMAN. I thank the Sena- Mr. SPARKMAN. Would not the
to the Preparedness Investigating Sub- tor. I appreciate his remarks. I said a Senator agree with me that it would
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1963 CONGRESS QIYA , ECQ,RP,__ .SENATE 16193
Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not have the Further than that, the United States there is no question about the position
figures before Me; but I am sure the would have difficulty in obtaining a taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is
Senator from South Carolina, has, and I place to test them, whereas Russia can in writing. It was made in highly classi-
am willing to concede that point, if he test a 150-megaton bomb in her Arctic fied hearings before the Preparedness
says it is so. It is highly repetitious. The region without having to clear a space Investigating Subcommittee.
figures are in the RECORD, , but I do not of 300, 400, or 500 miles, which would The experts have all agreed that the
have them before me now, be one of our handicaps. Soviets are ahead of the United States
Mr. I'HURMQND. In terms of weight However, Russia has tested larger in the development of an anti-ballistic-
and yield, is it not true that the Soviet bombs in the last 2 years, while our missile system. The Preparedness in-
Union has demonstrated clearly a supe- people did not feel it was necessary for vestigating Subcommittee has that testi-
rior performance in all yield classes above us to do so. mony before it.
approximately 15 megatons, a field in Mr. SPARKMAN. I appreciate the How can we ever catch up with the
which the United States has had no ex- statement made by the Senator from Soviets in the development of an anti-
perience since 1954? Vermont. ballistic-missile system, which has to be
Mr. SPARKMAN, That is all set forth Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that fired in the atmosphere, unless we can
in the figures we have placed in the, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have found that conduct tests in the atmosphere, in the
RECORD. I do not have them before me the Soviets are -ahead of the United type of environment which the anti-
at this time. I am sure the Senator from States in the development of an anti- ballistic-missile system will have, in my
South Carolina has the figures... ballistic-missile system? opinion, if it is called upon in the event
Mr. THURMOND. All the scientific Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not recall. I of an exchange?
witnesses were unanimous in expressing believe Secretary McNamara said that Mr. SPARKMAN. I feel that I have
uncertainty about the particular designs the Sovief Union could be reckoned as answered that question about three times.
employed by the Soviets. Is it not true being ahead of us in high-yield weap I believe this is a fair summarization of
that above one megaton, the Soviets con- ons. When it came to antiballistic mis- the testimony of all the witnesses-Sec-
ducted four times as many atmospheric siles, if I recall correctly, all the testi- retary- McNamara, the Chairman of the
tests in the period 1961-62 as did the mony was to the effect that the situa- Joint Chiefs of Staff and the staff mem- 4
United States in the same period? tion was virtually a standoff. Aside from bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,_=
. Mr. SPARKMAN. Those figures are that, I call attention to the fact that McCone and those closely connected
shown in the tables placed in the whatever the Joint Chiefs of Staff may with is activity. The testimony as a
RECORD. I do not have them before me have found, they have resolved their whole was to the effect that in consider
at this time. But if the Senator from doubts and differences in favor of the ing the antiballistic missile, they had to
South Carolina says his information ratification,of the treaty, and they rec- take into account the various things that
comes from those figures, I am willing ommenj to the Senate that it be rati- had to be done; and the development of
to accept it as being correct. fied. warheads was only one. The testimony
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that Mr. THURMOND. From a political was to the effect that we had developed
a large number of the U.S. tests have standpoint. They are taking into con- warheads and had an ample supply al-
been for the purpose of improving detec- sideration the political angle, also. ready on hand, and that the stocks need-
tion capabilities, and for peaceful uses Mr. SPARKMAN. Let us put it this ed with reference to guidance systems,
of nuclear explosions-that is, the Plow- way: They are taking into consideration and perhaps with reference to the ve-
share project? the interest and security of the United hile to carry them there, could be de-
Mr. SPARKMAN. I feel certain that States, from whatever angle they must veloped without any limitation whatso-
the Senator is again correctly quoting be considered, and have recommended ever, so far as the test ban treaty was
figures that have been placed in the the ratification of the treaty. concerned; and that, therefore, each and
RECORD. I have been reminded by the Mr. THURMOND. They have been every one recommended our approval of
distinguished Senator from Vermont told to take into consideration the polit- the treaty.
[Mr. AIKEN], who is not only a member ical aspects. Did they not state that Mr. THURMOND. The senator feels,
of the Committee on Foreign Relations there were military disadvantages to be then, that there will be no handicap to
but also a member of the Joint Commit- stressed? If one reads the statement by the development of our anti-ballistic-
tee on Atomic Energy, that the Soviet the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it sets forth missile system, although we would not be
Union was conducting tests, a great that to bring about world stability, it is allowed to test in the atmosphere, despite
number of which were in the same field necessary to take into, consideration the the fact that since these warheads have
in which the United States had con- political environment. been built and designed, the Soviets have
ducted tests years before. I am sure Mr. SPARKMAN. Does not the Sen- conducted their large-yield tests with
the Senator from South Carolina would ator believe that consideration should tremendous explosions? How does he
recognize that fact, would he not? be given to those factors? know that our warheads will meet that
Mr. AIKEN. Madam President, will Mr. THURMOND. That is all right; test?
the Senator from Alabama yield? but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were told Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me read from
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. to take the information that had been the statement of the Joint Chiefs which
Mr. AIKEN. The United States con- given to them by the State Department, has to do with the effects of the treaty
ducted tests with bombs of up to 15 and assume that it was correct, and then on the United States-U.S.S.R. balance
megatons, ,or possibly a little more, a take into consideration the political as- of military power.
number of years ago. I do not remem- pects as well as the military aspects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded
ber the year. If I had to guess, I would General LeMay said he was not an ex- that the United States would not be
say it was 1954. The Soviets conducted pert in the political field, but that he able to overtake the present advantage
many tests in the past few years with was ordered to take that aspect into which the U.S.S.R. probably has in the
similar-sized bombs, and also one or consideration. I shall cover that point high-yield weapons field, whereas the
two tests-I do not know exactly how more fully in a speech I expect to make Soviets, by underground- testing prob-
many-with bombs that were larger. I on this subject, probably tomorrow. But ably could retrieve in time any lead
believe the largest bomb they tested from a military standpoint, not a single which we may presently have in the
was about 60 megatons. one of the military men, as I recall, said low-yield tactical field. Both sides
The Senator may recall that when that the treaty was advantageous to could achieve an antiballistic missile,
the United States tested bombs of 15- this country, but one with less desirable characteris-
megaton power, the tests were con- On the ABM system- tics than would be the case if. additional
ducted in the belief that the same prin- Mr. SPARKMAN. Is the Senator atmospheric tests were conducted.
ciple would apply to larger bombs, and about to move to another subject? That applies to both sides. Of course
it was decided, rightly or wrongly, that Mr. THURMOND. No. We had been- there would be some handicap; but it
there was no need to test larger sized talking about the anti-ballistic-missile would apply to the U.S.S.R., just as well
bombs. system. With respect to that system, as. it would apply to the United States.
No. 146-9
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16194 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16
Mr. THURMOND. The treaty would only be explored and satisfied through the program, deliberately reached the deci-
freeze it at the point where we have medium of atmospheric And high altitude sion that they did not care to make high-
now developed it, would it not? nuclea:r testing. yield tests in the atmosphere.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. That report was agreed to by all of the We had decided that for our purposes
Mr. THURMOND. Who is ahead committee. a multiplicity of relatively smaller
now? Mr. SPARKMAN. From whom is the weapons was preferable to massive
Mr. SPARKMAN. I should have last sentence'iuoted? single-shot weapons.
stated the conclusion they reached as to Mr. THURMOND. That is the con- Mr. THURMOND. Did Dr. Teller
U.S. weapons capability; this Is the one elusion based on the facts presented to reach that decision?
which deals with the anti-ballistic-mis- us--- Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not recall Dr.
sile field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Mr. SPARKMAN. By whom? Teller's testimony on that particular
said: Mr. THURMOND. By the Joint point. I know that Dr. Teller testified
In the anti-ballistic-missile field, develop- Chiefs of Staff and by the other military before us that he had changed his mind.
ment of the U.S. system does nbt depend and scientific advisers who appeared be- from one period of time to another. I
upon atmospheric testing, and hence this fore us. do not know whether it was on that par-,
etreaty will not significantly influence any Mr. SPARKMAN. Who made the titular subject or not.
imbalance that may exist. statement? Mr. ELLENDER. Madam President,
That is not a political decision; it is a Mr. THURMOND. the Preparedness will the Senator yield?
military decision. That is a decision of Investigating Subcommittee. Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield to the Sen-
those whom Congress, by law, has des- Mr. SPARKMAN. This is its report? ator from Louisiana, who has been, on
ignated to be the military experts and Mr. THURMOND. Yes. his feet for a long time,
advisers for the security of the United Mr. SPARKMAN. But I have been Mr. ELLENDER. Madam President,
States. quoting from the statement of the Joint the Senator from South Carolina has
Mr.. THURMOND. The treaty will Chiefs of Staff. quoted from the committee interim re-
prohibit that development by both; but Mr. THURMOND. This statement port- on investigation of the prepared-
the Soviets are ahead now, and this was joined in by all seven members of ness program. I am sure that the same
freeze- the subcommittee. All seven members Chief of Staff who testified before the
Mr. SPARKMAN. The treaty does of the subcommittee agreed on the accu- Preparedness Investigating Subcommit?-
not say that. racy of the report; and the Joint Chiefs tee testified before the Committee on
Mr. THURMOND. I am giving the themselves have admitted, before this Foreign Relations.
Senator the statement of the Joint subcommittee, that the Soviets are ahead Mir. SPARKMAN. The chairman of
Chiefs of Staff. of us in the development of the antimis- the Joint Chiefs and each individual
Mr. SPARKMAN. I can read further sile system. The Senator can gQ to the chief, including General Shoup of the
from their statement. subcommittee and read the classified Marines.
Mr. THURMOND. In their state- testimony there for hirriself. Mr. ELLENDER. To show how the
ment to the Preparedness Subcommittee, Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President, preparedness committee itself was in
they admitted that the Soviets were instead of quoting from conclusions by doubt, I should like to read the last
ahead; and in their second statement, me or from conclusions by members of paragraph of their report:
when they came before us, the Joint the Committee on Foteign Relations, I Although we have concluded that there
Chiefs of Staff admitted that the Soviets wish to quote from the Joint Chiefs of will be i net ratified, mr wd i savantagehto stf
were ahead of us in the anti-ballistic- Staff themselves. They are the ones ththee treaty e other factors which, while not within
missile field, and that the treaty would Congress says should be the advisers to the scope of this report, are pertinent to a
tend to freeze their lead, and that the the United States on military and secu- final judgment on the treaty. Among these
only way we could ever overcome that rity matters. So I shall quote their own are matters related to international affairs,
would probably be by testing in the words; and I wish to make that clear. foreign policy, and relations with other
atmosphere. This testimony is to be found on page 273 countries. When these are taken into cork..
Today we may be in the lead, to a of the hearings of the Committee on For- sideration the question becomes one orr
certain extent, in testing underground; eign Relations. Madarh President, I wish weighing relative risks, and our hearings
but the treaty would partially overcome to call attention to the fact that, under provide ample evidence that the overall as-
sessment of the relative merits and demerits
that situation. But we can never over- the rules of the Senate,,the Committee on of the treaty is a, complex and difficult mat.-
come the lead that the Soviets now have, Foreign Relations has, jurisdiction over ter on which equally patriotic, informed,
unless we test in the atmosphere; and treaties. Our committee held hearings and dedicated persons may and. do disagree.
that fact is borne out on page 7 of the on the proposed treaty. We Invited In the final analysis, then, each individual
report of the Preparedness Subcommit- members of the Armed Services Commit- must reach his own judgment on the basis
tee, as follows: tee and members of the Joint Atomic En- of personal philosophy, past experience, cur-
An ABM system will be required to func- ergy Committee to sit with us, and they rent knowledge, and the relative weight
tion In the nuclear environment created did. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified which he assigns to the various factors-in-
both by its own defensive warhead explosions before our committee,' and I shall now volved.
and those of the attacking enemy. Under read from their statement, as found on Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes, I believe that
such circumstances it is important to be as page 273 of the hearings of the Commit- is a very fine and wise statement which
certain as possible that no element of the
system possesses unknown vulnerabilities to tee on Foreign Relations on the treaty, the committee made.
nuclear effects. All electronics components (b) In the anti-ballistic-missile field, devel- Mr. ELLENDER. That is why I sub-
of the ground arrays and missiles must func- opme:nt of the U.S. system, does not depend mit it. If the Preparedness Investigat-
tion; the missiles must be capable of oper- on atmospheric testing, and hence this treaty Ing Subcommittee had heard all of the
ating in the presence of nuclear, thermal, will not significantly inf Vence any imbalance witnesses who appeared before the Corn-
and blast effects; the warheads must be that may exist. mittee on Foreign Relations, had lis-
resistant to nuclear radiations. in is appar- I think that is as clear as it could be. tened to them carefully and made the
ent that unless a system of such complexity Mr. THURMOND. But will the Sena- same analysis as did the Foreign Rela-
there is tested will be in a its low level of operational confidence in environment, its tor read the preceding sentence, in which tions Committee in connection with. that
ability to perform the mission for which It they say the indication is that the report, it might have come to the same
was designed and produced. Many un- U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in conclusion as did the Committee on For.
knowns will arise in the course of the A13M the high-yield field? eign Relations.
development program which can only be Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly. I have Mr. SPARKMAN. The concluding
explored and satisfied through the medium seen that, and I have already read it. part of the report indicates that their
of atmospheric and high altitude nuclear However, again I ca attention to the views were reached purely from a mil.i-
testing. fact that the same members Of the Joint tart' standpoint.
I wish to repeat the last sentence; it is Chiefs of Staff testified that when we had Mr. ELLENDER. Exactly.
important: free and unlimited testing rights, the Mr. SPARKMAN. Arid yet in decid.-
Many unknowns will arise in the course of Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the ing the question from the military stand.-
the ADM development program which can scientists and others in charge of this point. it is important that the other
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 16192
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16
that Russia has available or that she
is likely to develop any time soon.
Mr. LAUSCHE. If and when that de-
velops, will it not follow that we may
change our attitude and may want to
throw bombs of higher yield into the air
than we have done heretofore?
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator will
recall that there was a mass of testi-
mony on that very score, and we were
told that such tests could be carried on
to a degree-perhaps not as high as 100
megatons. If I remember correctly, it
was testified that we could develop
bombs as high as 60 megations.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Fifty or sixty.
Mr. SPARKMAN, It is my recollec-
tion that we could develop bombs as high
as 60 megatons with the knowledge we
have, and by making certain tests
underground.
In that connection, let me quote some-
thing from. General LeMay that was
rather significant. This had to do with
the antiballistic missile. General LeMay
said:
I think both of us are going to develop
antimissile systems.
This testimony was taken in executive
session, and that part can be published,
but there is a deletion.
This was not before our committee;
it was before the Armed Services Com-
mittee. This testimony was given before
the treaty was signed. This was testi-
mony on military procurement authori-.
nations, in February. I quote from it,
leaving out the deletions, where confl-
dential information was given:
I think both of us are going to develop
antimissile systems and the first systems
that will evolve are going to be very ex-
pensive and only defend a small segment of
Russia, and the same thing applies to our
antimissiles.
I firmly believe that we can keep ahead of
them in our offensive systems so we can
penetrate anything that they can come up
with in an antiballistic missile system.
Let me put it this way, senator. I think
we are relatively in the same ball park as
far as ability in antiballistic missile systems
is concerned.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President,
there is still great difficulty for me in
trying to reconcile what General LeMay
said about developing an antiballistic
missile system with what Dr. Brown said
in stating that he did not believe it could
be developed.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Dr. Brown takes
the attitude that penetration capability
is overriding. By the way, General Le-
Ma.v indicates +.ha+ +,,., if th
S +
e
that, is there?
e it
. LAUSCHE. Yes; I noticed that. Mr. SPARKMAN. I was not a member pounded by the Senator from Maine,
Mr.vLc
of the subcommittee. I would rather not which was the one I had started to take
Mr. SPARKMAN. We could build be called upon to interpret what the up when the Senator from South Caro-
anything to penetrate that they might subcommittee said. lina asked me to yield to him. So if he
develop. Mr. THURMOND. This is on page 7 will permit me to discuss it, we can have
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, of the subcommittee's report. a discussion about it later.
-will the Senator yield? Mr. SPARKMAN. In the testimony Mr. THURMOND. On the same
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield, before our commit ee, certain limits were point, about testing, someone has said
Mr. THURMOND. There is no ques- recognized; but, in spite of that fact we that we have learned as much about
tion that the Russians have developed were told that research and development testing as the Soviets, because we have
and have tested, in 1961 and 1962, and could be carried on, and that we did not tested more shots than have the Soviets.
have learned information from those need to do atmospheric testing in order Is it not true that above values of 10
test, is there? to carry on effectively. I would like to megatons, the Soviets conducted, in 1961
Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct. recall this again. and 1962, more than twice the number of
Mr. THURMOND. The question has Mr. McCone, who heads the central tests the United States ever conducted in
been raised as to whether we had learned Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense its entire history of testing?
A
as much in testing as had the Soviets, McNamara, every member of the Joint
because we tested more atmospheric Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Brown-who, I
shots. The United States has conducted think, will be admitted to be a man of
no experiments comparable in com- unusual competence in this field-are
plexity with those of the Soviet opera- aware of the same problems; yet they
tions. A disturbing number of U.S. high- support the treaty and say we ought to
altitude effects experiments which were ratify it.
conducted were compromised either by Mr. THURMOND. But the fact re-
considerations of unrelated, technical ob- mains that without testing in the atmos-
jectives of the test program, or by inade- phere, the United States will be unable
quate or faulty experiments, or opera- to acquire data on high altitude nuclear
tional inadequacies. weapons effects. Is this not important
That is true, is it not? because such data are necessary to the
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Russians car- design of antiballistic missile systems,
ried on a great many more tests during warheads, and radars?
that series than we did. We did not Mr. SPARKMAN. We were told time
carry on an equal number of tests. They and time again in the Foreign Relations
carried on high-altitude tests, and they Committee-and I believe we were told
carried on high-,yield tests that we did. this many times when the Senator from
not d 1, t
u
h
p ica e w
en we got around to
testing. I admit that.
Mr. THURMOND. The United States
would be unable to acquire data on high-
altitude nuclear weapons effects unless
it tests in the atmosphere, will it?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe it is only
fair to say that the preponderance of evi-
dence-practically all of it-before the
committee was to the effect that for the
purpose of developing an anti-ballistic-
missile missile-and I presume that is
what the Senator is aiming at, and also
the high-yield weapon-so far as devel-
oping an anti-ballistic-missile system
was concerned, we had all the infor-
mation that we needed so far as ef-
fects were concerned, and that what
we needed was the work that could be
carried on in laboratories relating to
guidance, selectivity-if I may use that
term, although I do not think that that
term was used-for trying to ferret out
real missiles instead of the decoys that
might be sent out, but that we did not
need to do any atmospheric testing in
order to study the problems concerned
with further development.
Mr. THURMOND. The Prepared-
ness Subcommittee in one of its findings,
No. 3, made this statement:
The United States will be unable to ac-
quire data on high altitude nuclear weapons
effects.
That means without atmospheric test-
ing.
All seven members of the Preparedness
Subcommittee agreed to the factual ac-
curacy of the report, even the two mem-
bers who will vote for ratification, the
distinguished Senator from Massachu-
setts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] and the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri [Mr.
SYMINGTON]. There is no question about
design, development, and manufacture of
warheads did not present a problem to
us, because we already had them; that
we had all the information we needed on
them, not only with reference to design,
but that we actually had them on hand.
Such further study of the problems con-
nected with that activity could be carried
on in laboratories and with a` limited
amount of underground testing.
Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator
mean that we now have the type of de-
sign of warhead that we need to pene-
trate the defenses of. the enemy?
Mr. SPARKMAN. In the committee
report, at the bottom of page 14, and
continuing on to page 15, we have this
brief statement:
But in any case, after considering all of
the testimony on this subject, the committee
agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
"in the antiballistic missile field, develop-
ment of the U.S. system does not depend on
atmospheric testing."
That categorical statement was made
time after time before our committee. I
think we have a right to rely upon it. I
do not believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would join in such a statement as that
if they did not believe it to be true.
Mr. THURMOND. My question was
not about the use of the ballistic missile.
I was asking about the design of the
warhead that is necessary to penetrate
the Soviet missile defense. How do we
know we have that design? How will
we ever know we have it until such a
warhead has been designed and has been
tested in the atmosphere in which it will
have to function when the time comes?
Mr. SPARKMAN. If I interpret the
Senator's question correctly, it is the
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 16191.
The secretary assured the commit- nuclear war will in all probability solve re Mr. SPrARK~N`a,tif I remember
with er cor-
tee-in his reply found on pages 968-969 all our problems. respect
of the printed hearings-that the Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, to the antiballistic missile was that the
amending procedures has no bearing on will. the Senator yield? best defense was a penetration of the
the recognition question. He also replied Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. other side, rather than trying to knock
that the East German regime is a party Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to go missiles out of the sky after they got
to 24 international conventions, and that back into the first chapter of the Sena- over our country.
the United States and West Germany tor's discussion. Mr. LAUSCHE. I was amazed by his
are both parties to 11 of these. . would Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. idea that the development of an anti-
i -:,. ,.U,. ,..,ae-+.,,,,a_ hall;.-Mr. missile was beyond the realm
note that all 11 of these treatises nave 11,11. L
been in effect for more than 10 years and ing of the Senator from Alabama that of achievement, but that the research.
do not imply recognition by us of East we have reliable knowledge concerning and development should go on because
Germany. These agreements, together the tests made by Red Russia with re- of the particular good that comes from
with East Germany's bilateral undertak- gard to the blackout impact, the weap- incidental discoveries that are made.
ings, are listed starting on page 969 of ons effects impact, and the technological I asked him, "Why do you think that
the printed hearings. knowledge possessed by Russia in all surrounding Leningrad in Red Russia is
It should also be noted that East Ger- fields? I refer especially to the Sena- installed a system of antiballastic
many has already acceded to the treaty tor's suggestion that the transcript of weapons?"
-
in Moscow. The process of its acces- Mr. McCone's testsrx oi~l be read. His had answer sold a was bill that of he goods to thought som~eKhru-
sion did not and will not require any fANI understand. body
official action by the United States even Mr. LAUSCHE. To repeat my ques- shI hhev.
ope so, but Khrushchev is not sold
hinting at recognition. The Soviet tion, is it the understa.xiding of the Sena-
Union sent a note advising the United for from Alabama that we have reliable a bill of goods with that ease.
States of the accession to the treaty in knowledge concerning first, the status of Still, I do not believe that the gi!es-
e
Moscow of East Germany and a number the development of antiballistic missiles tion e Iput, items? o we havthate these of other countries. The United States in Russia; second, the blackout impact konwwleedgdg in on
the affirmative" can
ernmente responded that since yit did not recognize upon weapons of ltkie high yield effects
bo b Mr. SPARKMAN. I agree with the . Let the East German regime as a govern- explosions; and fourth, the technical Send weapons, for consider . the igh-
ment, the United States could only take knowledge acquired',,
note of the fact that the authorities in Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me call the at- point everyone should keep in mind. At
that country had signed on in Moscow tention of the Senator to the quotation the time when we were testing, and the
and could not accept notice of East Ger- I gave from Dr. Harold Brown's testi- whole rlind whatsoever. to test, tere was
many's signature. Thus, the recognition moray. We will take high altitude black- no ban testing, ihn
those on o were the Atomic the military authorities, autho ities,
question remains unaffected by the out first. He said: we
treaty. With respect to high altitude blackout,
CONCLUSION the Chiefs say the Soviets have some data and those in charge of determining what
that we do not have. I would say yes, and course we should take, including our
Mr. Presesenn I have not resolved any we have some data they may not have. scientists, all deliberately reached the
S the questions raised by the senior decision that we did not want to test
Senator from Maine for I do not believe I do not think it is anywhere plain for high-yield weapons, because we did
they can at this time be resolved by that we necessarily know everything the for want to develop high-yield weapons;
facts but only by well-based opinions. Russians learned from those tests; but, not an to develop high-your asThe answers I have given here were se- on the other hand, I think sometimes we small-yield weapons. I rousre at call
lected from many answers that could are prone to emphasize what they may them small-yield wsapIns., because they i have been chosen, but having heard most have learned from them. There was have tremendous capon e auserthe-
relatively tremendous miac , but are wthe-
of the testimony and studied the record testimony on high altitude blackout by have
as best I could, these are the answers Mr. McCone. recommen a that that all yield. It was felt thhat such
that are sati?factory to me and will #s ,un~ owe read. I think it is quite ons s o of f s smallarger It was f t t much weap prove to be correct. reassuring. better for our purposes than were high-
. do not deny there are risks in this So So far as weapons effects are con- yield weapons.
.treaty. As the distinguished chairman cerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated So w is not a question of the Russians
of the Foreign Relations Committee said that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United having stepped out ahead of us with
in opening this debate: States in weapons effects knowledge their testin:the fact is that we did
There are, to be sure, risks in such an ap- derived from high yield nuclear explo- not want to tett and did not test when
e
proach. There is an element of trust in it, siions. But Dr. Brown said-and this we had the test and did do so. en
and we can b'e betrayed. But human life is indicates the difference of opinion which wecad it was someity t we did We
fraught with risks and the behavior of the arises on many of these questions: wd ant, and did not omt.
sane man is not the avoidance of all possible My interpretation of all the data indicates LAUSCHE. May I put a. further
danger, but the weighing of greater against that although they have done more high Mr.
- o r.
treaty, but they are lesser rather than greater Flo I minx: we wusu auuni, e11a.~ +~ 1. Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the
risks and the political opportunities outweigh not known to an absolute certainty. added
must bombbb, with thrown the into the added
the military risks. As George Kennan has Mr. LAUSCHE. To me it seems that 100-weightmegaton
written: "Whoever is not prepared to make we do not have the knowledge, and be-air,
'sacrifices and to accept risks in the military cause we do not have the knowledge we would the Senator from Alabama say
field should not lay claim to any serious de- draw the inference that they have not that, because of the propulsion devices
sire to see world problems settled by any made achievements in these fields. The developed by Red Russia, they are in a
of . means es t, ' I must say to the Sen- aimression of the Joint s the Senator from Alabama has stated, into the air than we arew a heavier bomb
Mr.P Peresid dennt,
ator from Maine that our national is that they have excelled us in certain Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe pit is gen-
safety and security are already in jeop- fields. I know Dr. Brown has taken a erally admitted that Red Russia, is ahead
ardy in a world that permits unlimited different position. of us at the moment in that respect, but
testing. Ratification of this limited test Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. that situation is only temporary. l: had
ban treaty in Itself will not make that Mr. LAUSCHE.' I put the question to the pleasure of seeing something being
situation more or less hazardous. If the him: "You do not believe that they de- developed for us recently, in my own
treaty works, however, it may over a veloped an antiballistic missile?!' and he home town., that I was told would tran-
period of time form the basis for further said, "Yes, that is my belief." I asked scend anything that the Russians have
agreements that may bring us peacefully him, "Why do you believe that?" His yet developed. I think it is well-known
'away from this point of jeopardy. If answer was, "Because I do not think it that the propulsion we are getting ready
the treaty does not work, then a future can be done." to utilize will go far beyond anything
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CONGRESSIONAL REGORI?,- SENATE 16191
The. Secretary assured the commit- nuclear war will in all probability solve Mr. SPARKMAN. If I remember cor-
tee-in his reply found on pages 968-969 all our problems.
of the printed hearings-that the Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, to rectly, r. Brown's with resect
the antiballistic missileewas that the
amending procedures has no bearing on will the Senator yield? best defense was a penetration of the
the recognition question. He also replied Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. other side, rather than trying to knock
that the East, Germaa regime is a party Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to go missiles out of the sky after they got
to 24 international conventions, and that back into the first chapter of the Sena- over our country.
the United States and West Germany tor's discussion. Mr. LAUSCHE. I was amazed by his
are both parties to 11 of these. I would Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. idea that the development of an anti-
note that all 11, of these treaties have Mr. LAUSCHE. Is it the understand- ballistic missile was beyond the realm
been in effect for more than 10 years and Ing of the Senator from Alabama that of achievement, but that the research
do not imply recognition by us of East we have reliable knowledge concerning and development should go on because
Germany. These agreements, together the tests made by Red Russia with re- of the particular good that comes from
with east Germany's bilateral undertak- gard to the blackout impact, the weap- incidental discoveries that are made.
ings, are listed starting on page 969 of ons effects impact, and the technological I asked him,. "Why do you think that
the printed hearings. knowledge possessed by Russia in all surrounding Leningrad in Red Russia is
It'should also be noted that East Ger- fields? I refer especially to the Sena- installed a system of antiballastic
many has already acceded to the treaty tor's suggestion that the transcript of weapons?"
in Moscow. The process of its acces- Mr. McCone's testimony be read. His answer was that he thought some-
sion did not and will not require any Mr. SPARKMAN. I understand. body had sold a bill of goods to Khru-
official action by the United States even Mr. LAUSCHE. To repeat my ques- shchev.
hinting at recognition. The Soviet tion, is it the understanding of the Sena- I hope so, but Khrushchev is not sold
Union sent a note advising the United. for from Alabama that we have reliable a bill of goods with that ease.
States of the accession to the treaty in knowledge concerning first, the status of Still, I do not believe that the ques-
Moscowof East Germany and a number the development of antiballistic missiles tion which I put, "Do we have reliable
of other countries. The United States in Russia; second, the blackout impact knowledge on these items?" that can be
responded, by notifying the Soviet Gov- by high yield bombs; third, the effects answered in the affirmative. '
ernnient that since it did not recognize upon weapons of the high yield bomb Mr. SPARKMAN. I agree with the
the East German regime, as a govern- explosions; and fourth, the technical Senator. Let us consider the high-
ment, the United States could only take knowledge acquired? , yield weapons, for example. This is a
note of the fact that the authorities in Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me call the at- point everyone should keep in mind. At
that country had signed on in Moscow en ion of e Sena or to the quotation the time when we were testing, and the
and could not accept notice of East Ger- I gave from Dr. Harold Brown's testa- whole world was free to test, there was
many's signature. Thus, the recognition many. We will take high altitude black- no ban of any kind whatsoever. When
question remains unaffected by the out first. He said, we were testing, the military authorities,
treaty. With respect to high altitude blackout, those on the Atomic Energy Commission,
coiyCLUSiort the Chiefs say the Soviets have some data and those in charge of determining what
Mr. President, I have not resolved any that we do not have. I would say yes, and course we should take, including our
of the questions raised by the senior we have some data they may not have. scientists, all deliberately reached the
Senator. from Maine for I do not believe I do not think it is anywhere plain decision that we did not want to test
they can at this. time be resolved by that we necessarily know everything the for high-yield weapons, because we did
facts but only by well-based opinions. Russians learned from those tests; but, not want to develop high-yield weapons;
The answers I have given here were se- on the other hand, I think sometimes we that we preferred numerous relatively
lected from many answers that could
have been chosen, but having heard most
of the testimony and studied the record
as best I could,, these are the answers
that are satisfactory to me and will
prove to be. correct.
I do not deny there are risks in this
treaty.- As the distinguished chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee said
in opening this debate:
There are, to be sure, risks in such an ap-
proach. ''There is ap,element of trust in it,
and we can be betrayed. But human life is
fraught with risks and the behavior of the
sane znan is not the avoidance of all possible
danger, but the weighing of greater against
lesser risks and of risks against opportunities.
There are risks, in this nuclear test ban
treaty, but they are lesser rather than greater
risks:and the political opportunities outweigh
the military risks. As George Kennan has
written : "Whoever is not prepared to make
sacrifices ana to accept risks in the military
field should not lay claim to any serious de-
sire to see world problems settled by any
means short of war."
`Mr. President, I must say to the Sen-
ator from Maine that our national
safety and security are already in jeop-
ardy in a. world that permits unlimited
testing. Ratification of this limited test
ban treaty in itself. Will not make that
situation more or less. hazardous. If the
treat work, howgver, it may over a
lies od of ti ~. e, form. the basis for further
agreements Gnat may bring us peacefully
away from this point of jeopardy. If
the treaty does not ,work, then a future
have learned from them. There was
testimony on high altitude blackout by
Mr. McCone. recommended a at
testimony be read. I think it is quite
reassuring.
So far as weapons effects are con-
cerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated
that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United
States in weapons effects knowledge
derived from high yield nuclear explo-
sions. But Dr. Brown said-and this
indicates the difference of opinion which
arises on many of these questions:
My interpretation of all the data indicates
that although they have done more high
yield tests, they were not effects tests.
So I think we must admit that it is
not known to an absolute certainty.
Mr. LAUSCHE. To me it seems that
we do not have the knowledge, and be-
cause we do not have the knowledge we
draw the inference that they have not
made achievements in these fields. The
impression of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
as the Senator from Alabama has stated,
is that they have excelled us in certain
fields. I know Dr. Brown has taken a
different position.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I put the question to
him: "You do not believe that they de-
veloped an antiballistic missile?" and he
said, "Yes, that is my belief." I asked
him, "Why do you believe that?" His
answer was, "Because r do not think it
them small-yield weapons, because they
have tremendous impact, but, neverthe-
less, relatively speaking, they are weap-
ons of small yield. It was felt that such
weapons in. larger numbers were much
better for our purposes than were high-
yield weapons.
So it is not a question of the Russians
having stepped out ahead of us with
their testing; the fact is that we did
not want to test and did not test when
we had the opportunity to do so. We
decided it was something we did not
want, and did not test.
Mr. LAUSCHE. May I put a further
question?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the
100-megaton bomb, with the added
weight that must be thrown into the air,
would the Senator from Alabama say
that, because of the propulsion devices
developed by Red Russia, they are in a
better position to throw a heavier bomb
into the air than we are?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe it is gen-
erally admitted that Red Russia is ahead
of us at the moment in that respect, but
that situation is only temporary. I had
the pleasure of seeing something being
developed for us recently, in my own
home town, that I was told would tran-
scend anything that the Russians have
yet developed. I think it is well-known
that the propulsion we are getting ready
to utilize will go far, beyond anything
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16192
that Russia has available or that she
is likely to develop any time soon.
Mr. LAUSCHE. If and when that de-
velops, will it not follow that we may
change our attitude and may want to
throw bombs of higher yield into the air
than we have done heretofore?
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator will
recall that there was a mass of testi-
mony on that very scare, and we were
told that such tests could be carried on
to a degree-perhaps not as high as 100
megatons. If I remember correctly, it
was testified that we could develop
bombs as high as 60 megations.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Fifty or sixty.
Mr. SPARKMAN. It is my recollec-
tion that we could develop bbmbs as high
as 60 megatons with the knowledge we
have, and by making certain tests
underground.
-In that connection, let me quote some-
thing from General LeMay that was
rather significant. This had to do with
the antiballistic missile. General LeMay
said,
I think both of us are going to develop
antimissile systems.
This testimony was taken in executive
session, and that part can be published,
but there is a deletion.
This was not before our committee;
it was before the Armed Services Com-
mittee, This testimony was given before
the treaty was signed. This was testi-
mony on military procurement authori-
zations, in February. I quote from It,
leaving out the deletions, where confi-
dential information was given-
I think both of us are going to develop
antimissile systems and the first systems
that will evolve are going to be very ex-
pensive and only defend a small segment of
Russia, and the same thing applies to our
antimissiles.
I firmly believe that we can keep ahead of
them in our offensive systems so we can
penetrate anything that they can come up
with in an antiballistic missile system.
Let me put it this way, senator. I think
we are relatively in the same ball park as
far as ability in antiballistic missile systems
is concerned.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President,
there Is still great difficulty for me in
trying to reconcile what General LeMay
said about developing an antiballistic
missile system with what Dr. Brown said
in stating that he did not believe it could
be developed.
.. Mr. SPARKMAN. Dr. Brown takes
the attitude that penetration capability
is overriding. By the ways General Le-
May indicates that, too, if the Senator
will notice it.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Yes; I noticed that.
Mr. SPARKMAN. W e could build
anything to penetrate that they might
develop.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
Mr. THURMOND. There is no ques-
tion that the Russians have 'developed
and have tested, in 1961 and 1962, and
have learned information from those
test, is there?
Mr, SPARKMAN. That is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. The question has
been raised as to whether we had learned
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE September 16
as much In testing as had the Soviets,
because we tested more atmospheric
shots. The United States has conducted
no experiments comparable in com-
plexity with those of the Soviet opera-
tions. A disturbing number of U.S. high-
altitude effects experiments which were
conducted were compromised either by
considerations of unrelated, technical ob-
jectives of the test program, or by inade-
quate or faulty experiments, or opera-
tional inadequacies.
That is true, is it not?
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Russians car-
ried on a great many more tests during
that series than we did. We did not
carry on an equal number of tests. They
carried. on high-altitude tests, and they
carried. on high-yield tests that we did
not duplicate when we got around to
testing. I admit that.
Mr. THURMOND. The United States
would be unable to acquire data on high-
altitude nuclear weapons effects unless
It tests in the atmosphere, will it?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe it is only
fair to say that the preponderance of evi-
dence--practically all of it-before the
committee was to the 'effect that for the
purpose of developing; an anti-ballistic-
missile missile-and t presume that is
what the Senator is aiming at, and also
the high-yield weapon--so far as devel-
oping an anti-ballistic-missile system
was concerned, we had all the infor-
mation that we needed so far as ef-
fects were concerned, and that what
we needed was the work that could be
carried on in laboratories relating to
guidance, selectivity ,-if I may use that
terra, although I do not think that that
terra was used-for trying to ferret out
real. missiles instead of the decoys that
might be sent out, but that we did not
need to do any atmospheric testing in
order to study the iroblems concerned
with further development.
Mr. THURMONDi. The Prepared-
ness Subcommittee in one of its findings,
No. 3, made this statement:
The United States will be unable to ac-
quire data on high altitude nuclear weapons
effects.
That means without atmospheric test-
ing.
All seven members of the Preparedness
Subcommittee agreed to the factual ac-
curacy of the report, even the two mem-
bers who will vote for ratification, the
distinguished Senator from Massachu-
setts [Mr. SALTONST];LL] and the distin-
guished Senator fjom Missouri [Mr.
SYMINGTON]. There is no question about
that, is there?
Mr. SPARKMAN.': I was not a member
of the subcommittee'. I would rather not
be called upon to interpret what the
subcommittee said.
Mr. THURMONI7. This is on page 7
of the subcommittee's report.
Mr. SPARKMAN. In the testimony
before our committee, certain limits were
recognized; but, in spite of that fact we
were told that research and development
could be carried on and that we did not
need to do atmospheric testing in order
to carry on effectively. I would like to
,r(! 11 this again.
Cr. 1MMcCone, who heads the Central
Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, every member of the Joint
Chiefs .of Staff, and Dr. Brown-who, I
think, will be admitted to be a man. of
unusual competence in this field-are
aware of the same problems; yet they
support the treaty and say we ought to
ratify it.
Mr. THURMOND. But the fact re-
mains that without testing in the atmos-
phere, the United States will be unable
to acquire data on high altitude nuclear
weapons effects. Is this not important
because such data are necessary to the
design of antiballistic missile systems,
warheads, and radars?
Mr. SPARKMAN. We were told time
and time again in the Foreign Relations
Committee-and I believe we were told
this many times when the Senator from
South Carolina was present---that the
design, development, and manufacture of
warheads did riot present a problem to
us, because we already had them; that
we had all the information we needed on
them, not only with reference to design,
but that we actually had them on hand.
Such further study of the problems con-
nected with that activity could be carried
on in laboratories and with a limited
amount of underground testing.
Mr. THURMOND, Does the Senator
mean that we now have the type of de-
sign of warhead that we need to pene-
trate the defenses of the enemy?
Mr. SPARKMAN. In the committee
report, at the bottom of page 14, and
continuing on to page 15, we have this
brief statement:
But in any case, after considering all of
the testimony on this subject, the committee
agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Stall that
"in the antiballistic missile field, develop-
ment of the U.S. system does not depend on
atmospheric testing."
That categorical statement was made
time after time before our committee. I
think we have a right to rely upon it. I
do not believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would join in such a statement as that
if they did not believe it to be true.
Mr. THURMOND. My question was
not about the use of the ballistic missile.
I was asking about the design of the
warhead that is necessary to penetrate
the Soviet missile defense. How do we
know we have that design? How will
we ever know we have it until such a
warhead has been designed and has been
tested in the atmosphere in which it will
have to function when the time comes?
Mr. SPARKMAN. If I interpret the
Senator's question correctly, it is the
substance of the second question pro-
pounded by the Senator from Maine,
which was the one I had started to take
up when the Senator from South Caro-
lina asked me to yield to him. So if he
will permit me to discuss it, we can have
a discussion about it later.
Mr. THURMOND. On the same
point, about testing, someone has said
that we have learned as much about
testing as the Soviets, because we have
tested more shots than have the Soviets.
Is it not true that above values of 10
megatons, the Soviets conducted, in 1961
and 1962, more than twice the number of
tests the United States ever conducted in
its entire history of testing?
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16190 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ous nuclear weapons laboratory research and
development; the conduct of effective under-
ground testing of nuclear, weapons; the ex-
tention of the depth and breadth of the U.S.
detection and identification ' system directed
at clandestine experiments; and the real
readiness for effective testing in the atmos-
phere should the treaty be suddenly abro-
gated; that all of these things are completely
feasible both from a purely technical point
of view and from the point of view of the
management of the U.S. scientific effort.
To the extent that these things were pos-
sible under the terms of the 1958 mora-
torium, the Eisenhower administration found
it quite feasible to carry them out. The
weapons development program during that
period turned to extensive theoretical re-
search involving the wider use of modern
high-speed computers than had ever been
a part of the program before.
This resulted in, if anything, an improve-
ment in the effectiveness of the nuclear
weapons research effort. The laboratories re-
mained healthy, and far from shrivelling and
losing substance, they actually grew both in
the quantity and the quality of the work
done. during the period of the moratorium
than afterward.
There is no reason why this performance
should not be repeated. in the present con-
text which is less restraining because of the
continuing of underground testing.
In -concluding my testimony I want to
return to some general comments. Un-
doubtedly there are risks to our security
involved in the ratification of the proposed
treaty. But these risks, as other witnesses
and x have stated, can be minimized, if we
do not fall into a state of euphoria, using
Secretary McNamara's Word.
Eleventh. Will we be restrained from
ever 'determining feasibility, developing
and deploying any defense whatever
against ballistic missile attack?
Answer: To this question Secretary
McNamara answered, during the hear-
ings :
There has been some disagreement, I think,
as you know, in the Department, as to
whether we should or should not deploy an-
tiballistic missile systems.
The Chiefs, themselves, have been uncer-
tain about .that. And I know that in testi-
mony before the committees that you have
been a member of, you have heard both sides
of the argument. And I think the point to
emphasize at the moment is that I believe
none of us who, state that the system we
presently have developed-that is to say the
Nike Zeus-nor the system which is presently
under development-the Nike X-is an effec-
tive system in the sense that they can be
tguaranteed to protect our metropolitan cen-
ters against substantial damage from a po-
tential Soviet attack. We haven't reached
the end of the developmental process by any
means.
And it is to carry on that process that we
have asked the Congress to appropriate $450
million. I am .optimistic that we will con-
tinue .to make progress. Whether the prog-
ress will be-enough to warrant the, hugh ex-
penditures associated with such deployment,
I don't know. We estimate very roughly that
to protect perhaps 20-odd metropolitan cen-
ters, containing some 35 percent of the pop-
ulation, perhaps, would cost on the order of
$14 billion.
As to "tile effects of the treaty on ABM
development, the joint Chiefs, as well as
others stated:
In the antiballistic missile field, develop-
ment of the U.S. system does not depend on
atmospheric testing.
Twelfth: Will this treaty permit the
Soviet Union to achieve equality in the
low yield tactical weapons where it is
generally acknowledged that we have an
advantage and yet, preclude us from ever
achieving equality in the high yield
weapon where the Soviet Union is un-
questionably superior?
Answer. As I read an answer to an
earlier question, it is clear that we have
not in the past, and apparently do not
have at present, a military requirement
for a high yield weapon. As to the activ-
ity of the Soviets in the low yield tactical
weapons, Secretary McNamara put it
well, I believe, when he stated:
There is no question in my mind but that
without a test ban the Soviet would be able
to advance more rapidly and at a lesser cost
in the field of tactical weapon technology
than they will be under the test ban.
In other words, treaty or no treaty,
the Soviets, if they desired, could cut our
superiority in the low yield field-and in
all probability, maintain their superiority
in the very, very high yeld area because
it is an area in which we see no military
advantage.
I would also suggest reading Mr. Mc-
Cone's testimony on this point.
Thirteenth. To what extent can we.
satisfy, through underground testing, the
military and scientific requirements
which were to have been investigated by
atmospheric tests planned for next year?
Answer. Concerning this question
Dr. Harold Brown testified before- the
joint committees:
I cannot describe in individual detail the
tests in open session, but I can tell you what
kinds they were * * * the tests which are
planned, if atmospheric testing is resumed,
and for which preparations are being made,
include tests on the effects of surface shots
on hard sites.
They are large tests, hundreds of kilotons,
and, of course, would be easily detectable.
.They include tests on the effects of nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere on blackout,
and tests on the effects of nuclear explosions
on reentry vehicles.
Some of this information can be obtained
by underground tests but much of it cannot
and the information can be gotten better
from atmospheric tests. If the'atmospheric
tests are not conducted, we are going to go
ahead and design our systems so that these
uncertainties, which could be reduced with
atmospheric tests, are compensated for by
the design of the systems, and that is what
we would have planned to do anyway.
That way we will have to compensate for
slightly greater uncertainties. But there are
some uncertainties that we cannot compen-
sate for no matter how many atmospheric
nuclear tests were done.
Fourteenth, What is the human toler-
ance for radioactivity and what is the
truth about the danger of atmospheric
contamination, even at previous rates of
testing, in causing genetic damage and
leukemia to the living and yet-unborn?
Answer. There is, of course, no answer
here; only estimates which vary and the
conclusions which stem from them. As
Dr. Seaborg testified:
I do not think there is a scientist who
could tell you (how much contamination the
atmosphere can take before we will reach a
point of no return) with any authority, and
I, although I said earlier that I'felt that the
fallout up until now had not led to a serious
situation, I do feel that continued testing
would lead. to an amount of fallout that we
certainly should avoid, and it is a statistical
September 16
matter, of course, and that the fallout that
has been-that we have up until now-has
certainly led to some adverse health effect,
and presumably some genetic effects.
So it is just a matter of a balance of these
rather small numbers of people affected
against the necessity for testing in order to
maintain our defenses strong.
Fifteenth. What will be the effect of
ratification upon our Plowshare pro-
gram-a project designed to deepen har-
bors, dig tunnels and canals, or other-
wise cause beneficial changes to the
topography through controlled and con-
tained nuclear explosions?
Answers: Dr. Seaborg, in his testi-
mony before the committees, replied as
follows on the restraints imposed on the
Plowshare program if the treaty is rati-
fied:
Specifically, we feel that we could develop
the devices themselves which clearly can be
perfected by underground explosions, com-
pletely contained explosions, and we can
also develop a good deal of the excavation
technology through properly devised experi-
ments in which these explosives were used
for earthmoving purposes.
Also, some of the other experiments hav-
ing. to do with the development of oil re-
sources and water resources and so forth can
be carried out in completely contained un-
derground explosions.
President Kennedy in his September
10, 1963, letter to Senators MANSFIELD and
DIRKSEN, wrote :
The United States will diligently pursue
its programs for the further development of
nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by
underground tests within the terms of the
treaty, and as and when such developments
make possible constructive uses of atmos-
pheric nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses, the United States will seek interna-
tional agreement under the treaty to permit
such explosions.
Sixteenth. Will the participation of
East .Germany in this treaty constitute
even so much as a tacit, implied, or
suggestive recognition of that Commu-
nist regime, as a sovereign national en-
tity?
Answer: First, both the President and
the Secretary of State have publicly
stated on numerous occasions that this
Government has no intention of recog-
nizing the East German regime. Sec-
retary Rusk also testified to this effect
before the committees.
The Secretary's statement is amply
fortified by an opinion of the legal ad-
viser found on page 15 of the printed
hearings. The committee report, dis-
cussing this matter, states that this opin-
ion, together with these public state-
ments of high officials offers reassur-
ance "that the recognition question will
not be affected * * * by the treaty.
This, indeed, is the committee's under-
standing."
Thus, the understanding is clearly
spelled out in the committee report.. In
addition, a letter from Senator FUL-
BRIGHT to the Secretary of State, found
on page 968 of the printed hearings asks,
among other things, whether a legal
question affecting recognition arises
from the amending procedure of the
treaty and whether the United States
and West Germany are parties to any
international conventions in which East
Germany is also a party.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ground test within the meaning of article
1, section 1, subsection (a) of the treaty?
Answer. Secretary Rusk testified, and
it was made a part of the Committee on
Foreign Relations report that "obviously
this treaty permits a clear underground
test where the explosion Is. underground,
where the testing apparatus is based on
that phenomenon, and I would think that
we would not think it applied to a sur-
face explosion which was christened by a
few shovelfuls of dirt."
Secretary McNamara stated at the
hearings in answer to this exact ques-
tion that:
I think that it is clear the intent of the
parties is to limit tests to the underground
environment. And I think that by definition
It would be the intent of the experiment to
contain the force of the test under the sur-
face ar * * and furthermore, I am satisfied
that in the event of a test of the type we have
discussed--a weapon buried at a very low
depth, as I say, covered by a layer of dust-
is detonated under the guise of an under-
ground test, we would probably be aware of
that through our detection system, and X.
for one, would consider it contrary to the
intent of the treaty.
Focusing again on this same point, Dr.
Harold Brown made the definition more
precise when he stated:
I would view a test that put most of its
energy into the? atmosphere as an atmos-
pheric test and it would be detected as such.
Sixth. Do we possess the capability to
detect all nuclear detonations occurring
in the three environments prohibited by
the treaty?
Answer. The most reassuring answers
to this question are to be found in the
executive session le on y Mr. Mc-
r
nd Dr. Doyle Northrup of AN
oorrCe .'ethnical Applications Center, the
agency specifically charged with our
Government's monitoring program. I
doubt if any responsible official would
claim we could detect all nuclear explo-
sions in the three prohibited environ-
ments.
--Dr. Brown testified:
Underwater explosions of only a few pounds
of TNT equivalent can often be detected with
hydrophones thousands of miles away * * s.
Detections of tests In shallow coastal waters
and inland lakes could be done by seismic
means, but small tests in inland waters could
go unidentified-though they would be seis-
mically detected, because underwater tests
couple very well into the earth and produce
signals of enhanced coupling which is the
opposite of decoupling.
Our detection capacity for tests in deep
space is at present rather small in terms of
what we actually have deployed.
However, an effective ground-based detec-
tion system could be installed rapidly be-
cause the basic instrument development
work has been largely done, that is, the
equipment exists.
With the cooperation of the Western and
neutral nations, a worldwide group-based
system could be installed with the capabil-
ity of detecting an unshielded 10-kiloton test
at 1 million kilometers, and an unshielded
10-megaton test could be detected at 30 mil-
lion kilometers, which I think Sgcretary Mc-
Namara mentioned Is about 60 times the dis-
tance to the moon.
An' earth satellite system for detection of
deep space nuclear explosions 'is presently
under development (first launch scheduled
for September or October this year) and
could, be made fully operational within 3
years.
In the lower atmosphere, I can summarize
the situation quite simply by saying small
tests on or above the surface in the eSoviet
Union are likely to be detected if their yields
are in. the kiloton range.
Secretary McNamara, in discussing at-
mospheric tests admitted:
It Is more difficult to detect and identify
tests in certain bands of the atmosphere,
particularly in this band I am discussing-
say roughly from 6 to 20 miles-than it is
to detect tests in the low atmosphere.
Dr. Brown amplified this, stating:
In the band from 6 to about 20 miles,
the electromagnetic signal is suppressed
somewhat, and therefore you do not have
as many techniques, and therefore (detec-
tion) is somewhat more difficult. Debris
sampling is also harder to do, but it is not
impossible. So that even for tests at say 10 or
15 miles there is some chance of being able to
collect debris.
At a later point in the hearing, speak-
ing of this 6- to 20-mile band, Dr. Brown
stated that with an explosion of a kilo-
ton or more "an accoustic signal. will
probably be detectable from any test over
the U.S.S.R."
Above the 20 mile atmospheric limit,
Dr. Brown stated that detection was
easier since "you start getting back a
different kind-of electromagnetic signal.
You start getting effects on the iono-
sphere which cause phase shift and radio
signals which you can send through that
region. And, also, the higher it gets the
easier it is to see visually, as a matter of
fact."
I believe the record ij clear that neither
Secretary McNamara nor Dr. Brown tried
to indicate that all nuclear explosions
could be detected-in fact, I believe they
went out of their way and rightly so to
point out the detection risks. I repeat,
however, that anyone wanting sincerely
to consider a full answer to this question
musi; first read the testimony of Mr.
McCone and Dr. Northrup-testimony
which I consider reasslring on this point.
Seventh. Can any significant advances
in nuclear technolo be achieved by
clandestine- testing ii those three en-
vironments at yields which may possibly
be below our ability to detect?
Answer: As the Committee on Foreign
Relations' report pointed out:
The complex subject of clandestine test-
ing " * * was exhaustively discussed in the
prepared statements of becretary of Defense
McNamara and Dr. Brown, found respec-
tively on page 97 and 523 of the printed hear-
16189
plosion and an atmospheric burst det;--
onated close to the surface of the earth?
Answer: Using the above mentioned
definitions as to what constitutes an un.-?
derground test, it is apparent that
neither Secretary McNamara nor Dr.
Brown would be willing to accept a shat.--
low underground test-at least one which
releases energy into the atmosphere-as
anything but an atmospheric test-thus
the need to differentiate between the two
appears unnecessary. I have already
quoted Dr. Brown's testimony at one
point on our ability to detect such sur-
face tests. I will quote from a portion
of his prepared statement on this point
where he stated:
A third type of clandestine tests which
might be tried, is surface bursts or very
near surface bursts. These are very de-
tectable.
Ninth. Can we, in fact, maintain an
adequate readiness to test in those pro-
hibited environments in the event the
treaty should suddenly be abrogated?
Answer: Questioned on this point dur-
ing the Committee-on Foreign Relations
hearings, Dr. Seaborg testified:
Our plans are approximately as follows:
The time at which we would be able to make
our tests, of course, depends on the type of
tests, and I mentioned the three types in
my testimony, the proof tests, and the de-
velopmental tests and the effects tests.
We would propose to maintain a readiness
that would, make It possible Tor us, if we
desired, to make a proof test in a period of
perhaps a month and to make a develop-
ment test in a period as short as perhaps
S months, and an effects test in a period of
an order of 3 to 6 months.
Now, this would be a readiness posture,
and * * * these are the times that would
be required o= that we could have the capa-
bility of resuming tests of those various types
if we desired.
It. Isn't at all clear that we would neces-
sarily want to test that soon. After having
tested some 18 years, and having made hun-
dreds of tests, a matter of a few months
one way or the other isn't that critical.
I would only remind Senator SMITH
that as Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, it would be Dr. Seaborg"s
responsibility to supervise-the mainte-
nance of our testing capability.
Tenth: Will our scientific laboratories
and the interest of our scientists deters.-
orate under a treaty which permits only*
underground testing?
Answer: Again in answer to almost an
identical question at the hearings, Dr.
ngs- - Seaborg frankly testified:
To this question posed by Senator I think that there will be a problem In
SMI'rH, I offer this comment by the Joint keeping the laboratories going strong and
Chiefs: keeping a sufficient number of scientists to-
The dangers of detection and the cost and gether but this will be helped under this
'e
difficulty of testing in, outer space would test ban treaty because oyf the continuance
tend to impose severe restrictions upon such of underground testing . We didn't
clandestine testing. Other clandestine tests lose very many (scientists) before (during
in the atmosphereor underwater, depending the moratorium) and at that time we were
upon their size, would involve a fairly high not carrying on underground testing.
probability of detection by our conventional Asked if the AEC could keep topflight
intelligence or our atomic energy detection scientists with the test ban treaty in
system.. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff effect, Dr. Seaborg replied:
consider the resulting ;progress which the
Soviets might make cl ,ndestinely to be a Yes, I am confident of that.
relatively minor factor; in relation to the Dr- George Kistiakowsky, former Chief
overall present and probable balance of mill- Science Advisor to President Eisenhower
tary strength if adequate safeguards are
maintained- in meeting this question stated:
I would like to say, however, that if the
Eighth. Will we be able to differen- things particularly high-lighted by Senai;or
tiate between a shallow underground ex- Jnc:KSOx, namely the maintenance of a vigor-
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 ~a rove eIe 20061 38$R'0Q0T002 003
AA
16187
David . f~1 inton chairman; aG in n i n em f. ilio Serge. 1959 Nobel laureate,
atortessatemenare
4,?vu ._ 4 Ian
LeLorraine Albright, painter. physics.
.
wright and novelist
la
w
Sh
y
p
,
a
Lumber Co Irwin
an rn 'Wittc. president, Trans- Steve Allen, radio and television.. Sigmund Spaeth, musicologist.
Karen Arden, painter. Bella ewack, ur
c Tnvestment Corp. ianist. p playwright.
I..nccm.H-whet the Indus- Claudio Arrau, p_ yam sSnewack. playwright.
8u
a
trial leasers listed here tt king---J Tallulah Bankhead, actress. ;a- _J_
are not giver to'wlshfU_1 thinking. Edward Steichen, photographer and
Their call fora test ban treaty is based on 8 N. Behrmalniplayywright,novelist. painter.
the realities our clear ear world: John Steinbeek, 1962 Nobel laureate, lit-
l, Continued nuclear- testing holds far Pietro Beiluschl, FAIR, architect. ure.
greater risksfor this country than a test ban. Leonard Bernstein, conductor, New York erIsaac stern, violinist.
Continued testing would increase the Philharmonic Orchestra. Rex stout, novelist.
tempo of` the arm `s race and encourage the Dr. Kenneth E. - Boulding. economist and Joseph t, novelist.
violinist.
spread of nuclear arms to nonnuclear powers. social scientist. Edgar Tafel, architect.
increase the likelihood Of Catherine Drinker Bowen, novelist. Dr. Edward L. Tatum, 19b8 Nobel laureate,
This would vastly 1 Ray Bradbury, novelist and short-story
medicine and physiology.
War.
$. The test ban treaty will not threaten writer. Alice Toklas, novelist.
our ' national security` ' Under the treaty's Alexander Brailowsky, pianist. Louis Untermeyer, poet.
terms we ell resume `testing on 3 months' Marcel Breuer, FAIR, architect. Dr. Harold C. Urey, 1934 Nobel laureate.
notice if, for anyreasoh, the feel our security Alexander Brook, painter. chemistry.
threatened. --.Eugene Burdick, novelist. Van Doren, poet and short story
is Truman Capote, novelist and short-story Mark
e The treaty wile protect us and our chil writer.
writer. Dr. Carl Van Vechten, novelist.
leth from ex osufalto further and perhaps Prof. Owen Chamberlain, 1959 Nobel laU- Gore Vidal, playwright.
lethal radioec ive fallout. reate, physics. -11 The refor all oreate a better climate Paddy Cha efsk playwright. Dr. Selman A. Wakeman, 1952 Nobel lau-
on both sides fora 'slow-up in the arms race. Aaron Copland, composer. eate, medicine and physiology.
It is a first eful necessary step toward a Malcolm Cowley, president, National Insti- Dr. J. C. Warner, president, Carnegie In-
rational, peaceful ordering of our world. tute of Arts and Letters. stitute of Technology.
these realities make good sense to you. Cheryl Crawford, producer. Dr. James D. Watson, 1962 Nobel laureate,
let so. Say iy Senators. Say it by Russel Crouse, playwright. medicine and physiology.
le ter, it say it by wire. Charles C. Cunningham, director, Wads- Prof. Victor F. Weisskopf, physicist.
say it now. Edmund Wilson, essayist.
While they're making up their minds. worth Atheneum. Frederick J. Woodbridge, FAIR, architect.
Marcia Davenport, writer. William W. Wurster, FAIR, architect.
JamBan,es Adolph Dehn, painter. Bruno Zirato, orchestra manager.
Etiast zens Committee for a YoNuclear rk, York, N.Y., N
rtli Street., Rend'Harnoncourt, director, Museum of William Zorach
130
l$0
sculptor.
o
,
th cha 4, adsworrman. Modern Art.
J
Lamar Dodd, painter... TEXT OF STATEME T
'ONE HUNDRED AND THREE LEADERS IN S TH CAE. Helen Gahagan Douglas, actress. The call for a test ban treaty is
orld
'
E -
rVRE,
ART, MEDICINE, MUSIC, ARCHITEC
Melvyn Douglas, actor.
TER, MoTio' PICTURES, 'ELEVEN OF THEM
NOBEL LAUI'REATES, SUPPORT NUCLEAR TEST Samuel Engel, producer.
$A Ernest Fiene, painter.
Dr. James Franck, 1925 Nobel laureate,
One hunAred "an'd -'three di'stlii ii1shed physics.
leaders in literature; science, art, medicine, Maxwell Geismar, writer.
arChltecture,` -music, theater, motion pic- Percival Goodman, FAIA, architect. 11 tares, eleven of them Nobel Laureates, today Walter Gropius, FAIA, architect.
expressed support of the nuclear test ban . Victor O. Gruen, architect.
treaty as "a significant first step in arresting Judy Holliday, actress.
the present unlimited competition in nuclear Edward Hopper, painter.
Omer.., Fannie Hurst, novelist.
'Failure to ratify the treaty reduces al-
most to zero whatever chances Iflay now
exist for pr"evCnting the spread of nuclear
8a ons to country after country, with a
John Huston, director.
James Jones, novelist.
9V P
fectl as t 'danger of a chain reaction William Melvin Kelley, novelist.
corresponding
effect as the he nuclear fuse starts to ignite." Dr. Arthur Kornberg, 1959 Nobel
Mark Van' Doren, "distinguished American medicine and physiology.
poet, author, critic, and teacher, in behalf Olga (Mrs. Serge) Koussevitzky.
made the statement pub- Stanley J. Kunltz, poet.
signatories
f th
. Such as:
the realities of our nuclear w
1. Continued nuclear testing holds far
greater risks for us than a test ban.
2. Continued testing would increase the
tempo of the arms race and encourage the
spread of nuclear arms to non-nuclear pow-
ers. This would vastly increase the likeli-
hood of war.
3. The test ban treaty will not threaten
our national security. Under the treaty's
terms we can resume testing on a 3 months'
notice if, for any reason, we feel our security
is threatened.
4. The treaty will protect us and our
children from exposure to further and per-
haps lethal radio-active fallout.
5. The treaty will create a better climate
on both sides for a slow-up in the arms race.
It is a first and necessary step toward a ra-
tional, peaceful ordering of our world.
,
e
o
Dr Fritz Lipmann, 1953 Nobel laureate,
I sics, ion to the 11 Nobel Laureates medicine and physiology.
in physics, the cries , medicine and liters- Richard Lippold, sculptor.
the signatories included 39 writers, 16 Archibald MacLeish, poet and playwright.
painters and sculptors, 11 musicians, 12 Carson McCullers, novelist.
leaders in the theater and ,motion pictures, Frederic March, actor.
to architects, and 4 other scientists. Lenore Marshall, poet and novelist.
NobeI 'Laureates ` who signed the com- Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, architect.
luntcatfou were: Arthur Miller, playwright.
:.Prof, Owen 'Chamberlain, 1959 Nobel Lau- Pierre Monteux, conductor.
reate, hysics. Marianne Mobre,'pott.
Dr ypTaines 'Franck, 1925 Nobel Laureate, Robert Motherwell, painter.
physics. Dr. Hermann J. Muller, 1946 Nobel laureate,
l?r. Arthur Kornberg, 1959 Nobel Laureate, medicine and physiology.
Medicine"'and physiology. Lewis MumfOrf , Writer.
d F ritz d phyi 1953 Nobel Laureate, Robert Nathan, novelist.
, grid physiol ology. S. J. Perelman, playwright.
me II cin TT e s
Dr, #eic{r l J. Muller, 1946 Nobel Laure- Hobson Pittman, painter.
and physiology. Ralph Pomerance, architect.
ate rfle2fi
te
L
u
i f
rea
a
iio ysicstiriflio Segre, 1959 Nobel
, Samson Raphaelson, playwright.
physics '(With Dr: Chamberlain). Dr. Fritz Reiner, conductor, Chicago Sym-
,John Steinbeck, 1962 Nobel Laureate, liter-
phony orchestra.
ature " ? ` ` Elmer Rice, Playwright.
Tdi E I L Tatum, 1958 Nobel Laureate. Dr. Leo Rosten, short story writer.
e'1.
dicin and 'h'y"s3ology. Robert Ryan actor.
old.1934 Nobel Laureate, _ Samuel, writer. Maurice chemis a Larl Sandburg; poet. .
? jar; linen A. Nobel Lau- Dore Schary, playwright and producer.
reset, medicine and physiology. James S. Schramm, president, AmerLoan
Dr,.~ames . Watson, 1962 Nobel Laureate, F+nr3arattt)n of Arta.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Madam President,
on Monday last, , during the morning
hour, the distinguished senior Senator
from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], placed before
this body a series of questions relating
to the nuclear test ban treaty. A mem-
ber of the Armed Services Committee,
the Senator from Maine directed her at-
tention primarily on military security
aspects of the treaty and in doing so did
a capable job of focusing on questions
that have troubled many Members.
Since the Senator from Maine did not
direct her questions to any specific
source, I have taken it upon myself to
read through portions of the published
and classified hearings recently con-
cluded by the Committee on Foreign
Relations as well as the committee's 30-
page report in order to find some pos-
sible answers.
. By posing her -questions, our distin-
guished colleague has focused on one of
the most difficult problems facing the
Senate with regard to this treaty, for
there are no single, factual answers
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16188 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
September 16
available to most of the questions posed. we do not have. I Would say yes, and we the United States will maintain its ability to
There are only speculative answers,, but have some data that they may not have, survive a surprise attack with sufficient
answers with high probabilities, based in executive hearings, Mr. John Mc- power to destroy the Soviet Union.
on interpretation of available facts.
Final resolution of most of the Senator ,,,one Director of the Cen Intel That, I suggest, is a commitment to
~_
questions would come, I fear, only fro>fi's - A
'' 1C es a nuclear superiority and not nuclear par-
data collected after a a ffear, le nuclear and I would suggest to the Senator from ity.
war between the f States and the Maine [Mrs. SMrrE] and all my col- Fourth. Will the treaty, as claimed,
Soviet weeon, United leagues who share her desire for further prevent the proliferation of nuclear
With this as a background, I offer to information on this matter, that they weapons when France and Reel China
the senior Senator from Maine my an- read Mr. McCone's presentation in sup- refused to be bound and when under-
swers to her questions-Maine which port of this treaty. ground testing is sanctioned for all na-a have led me to support ratification of Madam President, the entire tran- tions whether they sign or not?
the treaty withoutany reservations, script of Mc one's testimony is Answer. I have been unable to find
mental or otwithout. available In a es of z~T' a col im3 ee. where Senator SMITH found that propo-
mental Has the Soviet Union, through though the testimony :is confidential, it is nents of the treatyhave claimed it would
its most recent atmosphere test seriesr , permissible for any Senator to go to the prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.
now achieved a nuclear ove committee room and read the transcript. It is interesting to note that Dr. Edward
the United States of a military or sci The second question posed by the Sen- Teller, in his appearance before the Com-
theific itedi8cane? ator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] was: Are mittee on Foreign Relations, said:
Madam President, I give an answer we reasonably confident and secure In The argument, the strongest argument,
which am President, ,n the an answer
from the knowledge that our ballistic missile my mind, for the treaty is to stop thread
the testimony of the experts. retaliatory second strike force will sur- of nuclear weapons. We have been worried
According to Secretary of Defense Me- vies and operate in a nuclear environ_ about such a spread for many yes?,ra, and
Namara: meat? rightfully so.
, the area of very large yield weapons the We know, today, that to country
Again I find an answer as best I can nuclear explosionsIt Is easy make
Soviets appear now to have some advantage from the testimony given before our , and that any cowitre
the area of nuclear to some committee during the course of the hear- that can explosion acquire
within nuclear year. Yetli can make
have the area tfted a device of l
60 megEThey ings? I quote Secretary McNamara, who climmed ed that this his treaty Yet has been
which we believe could be weaponized or testified as follows: claimed will stop prolife:ra-
turned into a weapon at about a hundred We know, and the Soviets know, that in the tion.
megatons. event of a surprise Soviet first strike, at least That claim, lodged in Dr. Teller's mind,
AS a weapon, the Secretary went on a substantial proportion of our Minuteman is not to be found in the :record of ad-know ation witnesses.
to say, the 100-megaton bomb, delivered thiatiti a PolE ris submarines at sea and many mWho made such a claim?
by missile, could be detonated at alti- strategic aircraft will survive. We can say In his letter to the Senate: of August 8,
tudes of 100,000 feet or more above cities with assurance, therefore, that even after a 1963, President Kennedy wrote:
to cause significant, thermal damage over Soviet: strike the total surviving U.B. strategic
hundreds of square miles. Or the 100- nuclear force will be large enough to destroy While it cannot nations weapon could be delivered wholly prevent the spread
the enemy, sing nuclear arms to nations not now 7tesses-
against hard site command posts buried With sng them, it prohibits assistance to aging regard to of war- In these in rock thousands of feet below. heads n a in learpen ironment im much signed b eman pothers by others; tit will be
As for our use of such a weapon, the testimony was received. .I would note it is thus an important openingwedge esters; ur
Secretary pointed out the Joint Chiefs one statement by Dr. Norris Bradbury, effort to "get the genie back in the bottle."
have held the position that smaller but Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Dean Rusk, in his statement before the
still vastly destructive weapons of the Laboratory, to the effect that throu
10-me
h C
t
g
ga
ommittee on Fi
on range arilitiln
oregn Relations said:
e mary more uderground testing, the can investigate The treaty will help contain the spread of
advantageous than the 100-megaton many of the effects of, nuclear detona- nuclear weapons. We cannot guarantee It.
weapon the Soviets may develop. tions on other nuclear warheads-iinfor- Most of the countries with the capacity and
The Secretary concluded by stating: matron which is useful in connection the incentive to develop nuclear weapons
I point out, therefore, that no consensus with the study and design of system re- over the next decade or so have already an.-
has ever been formed with regard to the quirenients for both offensive and defers- pounced that they will accept the self-deny..
wisdom of a 100-megaton versus a 50-mega- sive nuclear warheads and their delive do o not Intl cd , by the teewty. These countries
ton bomb, for this country and I could not
Systems. Much knowledge already ex- not cnclue by the way, mainland China
predict with any confidence whether we ists here, but much more can be found. or France.
vestment in the larger bomb even in the While this does not guarantee that they
would make,a significant improvement in- Wiit11 this question,! also I suggest a will never become nuclear powers, their re-
absence of the ny
proposed
treaty. reading of Mr. McCar1e's t stimony. nunciation of atmospheric testing will act
But I can state with lFrall confidence that Third. In seeking to slow Owh the as a deterrent by making it much more di@i-
the absence from our arsenal of a bomb arias race as a purported advantage of cult and expensive for them to develop nu..
greater than the one we can build under the this treaty, will we adopt nuclear parity clear weapons.
treaty will not impair the effectiveness of as the basis for deterring theremonu- Secretary McNamara said it in slightly
our strategic forces. clear war rather than nuclear superior-
There is another aspect of the high ity? torongee fashion when he said in answer
yield discussion outside the 100-megaton Answer. On the general theory of t stronger
question at the committee healingr
g:
weapon. "parity," I would cite General LeMay, The treaty does
That i not cover the subject of
The Joint Chiefs stated the U.S.S.R. who said we could not accept parity but proliferation. That is clear.
The is ahead of the United States "in weap- added:
ons effects knowledge derived from high No one is going to start a war unless they among treaty proponents the sunder-
yield nuclear explosions
." think they are going to wire. standing is that the treaty, though not
On that point however, Dr. Harold case aI i e vn,if It we e, w at ishto determine tperre.nt i irecto proliferation, Brown, D that poir of the Defense Depart- whether you have parity or not? , will act as a de-
ment's Office of Defense Research and
In other words, the proliferation. For his own
into
Engineering, disagreed and testified: parity or any state on these statements toments a Teller claim aim that that the read treaty
My interpretation of all the data, and it either side of it, could not be determined would prevent proliferation, a claim
is available to the Chiefs as well as to me, by actual warfare. which was easy to attack if one wanted
indicates that although they have done more As to the administration's attitude to- to find some reason to attack She treaty. mrTH's high yield tests those were no effects tests, ward parity, I cite Secretary McNa- Senator ti' line of quest nefollows
this p-
Their geography, and the associated ac- mara's statement: accurate line e thinking
tivity does not indicate to me that they are For even if the Soviets' fail to abide by which ap_
effects tests. this molly. ly stemmed from Dr. Teller's testi-
With respect to high altitude blackout, the cont ngen y r of Soviet testing in the prof ib doubtful Fifth. How is one to de, ne or interpret
Chiefs say the Soviets have some data that ited environments without being detected, that which shall constitute an under-
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, testified:
I attach very little importance to this,
frankly ? ? ? the whole very-high-yield
weapons field is one which has 'very little, if
any, military significance.
As part of this charge, it is argued
that we are ahead in the testing of
smaller nuclear weapons of the type
which could be tested underground
under the treaty, and that the Soviets
would be free to catch up with us on
this type of testing. Without the treaty,
of course, the Soviets can test either
underground or in other environments
in an effort to catch up with us in this
area. Along this line, Secretary Mc-
Namara had this to say:
But, by limiting Soviet testing to the
underground environment, where testing is
more difficult and more expensive and where
the United States has substantially more
experience, we can at least retard Soviet
progress and thereby prolong the duratibn
of our technological superiority.
In connection with the secretary's ob-
Servation that our own underground
tests will be moving right along, it should
be noted that, due to our greater exper-
ience in this environment, we should be
progressing more rapidly than the
Soviets.
Another similar attack against the
treaty is that it would prevent us from
testing and developing our antiballistic
missile program. Dr. Harold Brown, Di-
rector of Defense, Research, and En-
ginering for the Department of Defense,
testified:
The . best present judgment is that our
ABM development efforts are comparable in
magnitude and success with those of the
Soviets. Any deployed system which the
Soviets are likely to have now or in the
near future does not appear to be as effective,
almost certainly not more effective than
Nike-Zeus.
Secretary McNamara added another
telling answer to. this argument, when he
testified:
One important point stands out in con-
nection with the antiballistic missile: The
ABM problem is dominated by factors unre-
lated to the treaty-by reaction speed, missile
performance, that is, the rate of acceleration
of the intercepted missile, traffic handling
capacity, and capacity for decoy discrimina-
tion. A fuller understanding of the black-
out phenomenon-which would result from
tests prohibited by the treaty-might at most
permit some reduction in the number of
ABM radars required per ABM site.
Thus, with or without a test ban, we could
proceed with the development of an ABM
system.
Initially, one of the strongest argu-
ments against the treaty was the danger
of euphoria, the danger that our Govern-
ment and our people, after ratification
of the treaty, would assume that the cold
war is over and that the efforts and sac-
riflces which we have been making dur-
ing the long period of tension are no
longer necessary. 'However, all admin-
istration spokesmen who testified before
our committee displayed an awareness
that the treaty by itself does not solve
all our problems of international rela-
tions and defense and that it will still be
necessary to "keep our guard up" and to
take certain steps to avoid falling behind
our potential enemies in weapons devel-
opment. The President, in his message
transmitting the treaty, sounded the
right note when he said:
This treaty is not a substitute for, and
does not diminish the need for, continued
Western and American military strength to
meet all contingencies. It will not prevent
us from building all the strength that we
need; and it is not a justification for uni-
laterally cutting our defensive strength at
this time. Our choice is not between a lim-
ited treaty and effective strategic strength-
we need and can have both.
The strongest possible assurance is
given in a letter of August 23, 1963, to
Chairman RUSSELL from Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric that
the executive branch is firmly committed
to and will vigorously support the safe-
guards which will be vitally needed
whether or not this treaty is ratified. In
that letter, Undersecretary Gilpatric dis-
cusses all that is being done and will
continue to be done, as follows:
First safeguard: The conduct of com-
prehensive, aggressive, and continuing
underground nuclear test programs de-
signed to add to our knowledge and im-
prove our weapons in all areas of sig-
nificance to our military posture for the
future.
Second safeguard: The maintenance
of modern nuclear laboratory facilities
and programs in theoretical and explor-
atory nuclear technology which will at-
tract, retain, and insure the continued
application of our human scientific re-
sources to these programs on which con-
tinued progress in nuclear technology
depends.
Third safeguard: The maintenance of
the facilities and resources necessary to
institute, promptly, nuclear tests in the
atmosphere should they be deemed es-
sential to our national security or should
the treaty or any of its terms be abrogat-
ed by the Soviet Union.
Fourth safeguard: The improvement
of our capability, within feasible and
practical limits, to monitor the terms
of the treaty, to detect violations, and to
maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet
nuclear activity, capabilities, and
achievements.
It appears to me that very few of
our countrymen have been carried'. away
by their enthusiasm for the treaty and
its possibilities. On the contrary, I have
observed that most Senators-and it
seems most of the American people, cer-
tainly most of the people who write to
me-look on this treaty with a skeptical
and questioning eye. Rather than this
treaty encouraging a relaxation of the
defense effort, it seems there is more
talk of keeping our guard up and on the
ready at this time, than there has been
since the days of Quemoy-Matsu.
Accordingly, I regard the danger of
euphoria as more imaginary than real,
as applying more to the theoretical re-
action of a large number of hypothetical
people than to the actual reaction of
the American people, constituted as we
are and thinking as we do.
Closely related to the fear of euphoria
is the fear of planned surprise abroga-
tion of the treaty by our potential ene-
mies.
16215
The argument is that the Soviets may
be luring us into this treaty with the in-
tention of suddenly violating or abrogat-
ing it by means of a quick series of tests
which will give them a commanding lead
before we can initiate tests of our own,
If we follow through on the safeguards
discussed in Undersecretary Gilpatric's
letter and the President's letter as read
by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRK-
SENI, as we almost certainly would, we
would be in as good a position as the
Soviets to resume testing in that event,
and we should not fall behind to any sig-
nificant degree.
In addition, it seems that we have
learned our lesson from the sudden re-
sumption of Soviet tests in 1961 which
caught us unprepared, and we would not
be as likely to make that mistake again.
On this fear, Dr. Brown said at the
hearings:
So, I think providing we are ready, a sud-
den abrogation' of a treaty need not concern
us greatly.
Another witness, Dr. George B. Kistia-
kowsky, professor of physical chemistry
at Harvard University and former Spe-
cial Assistant to President Eisenhower.
for Science and Technology, testified as
follows on this point:
It would be a rather stupid maneuver on
the part of the Soviets to break the treaty
by abrogating and starting to test right away,
whereas they have the full right under the
treaty to abrogate, wait 3 months and then
test.
The political disadvantages, bad odor of
what they have done, will persist, and the
technical gains of making certain atmos-
pheric tests 3 months earlier are so infinitesi-
mal that it just doesn't make any sense to
me.
Finally, when all other arguments fail,
the treaty's opponents fall back upon
the argument that there is only one rea-
son why the Soviets would agree now to
a treaty which they have rejected in the
past, and that is that they must be con-
vinced that under present circumstances
it works to their advantage and to our
disadvantage. Undoubtedly, they must
be convinced that it works to their ad-
vantage, but it does not necessarily fol-
low that it works to our disadvantage or
that they think that it does. Nations
which enter into treaties usually recog-
nize that it is to their mutual advantage
to do so. Of course, we cannot know for
certain what is in the minds of Soviet
leaders in agreeing to this treaty, but
we can readily see a number of reasons
why enlightened self-interest might lead
them to do so.
First. They are just as interested as
we in preventing contamination of the
air which we all must breathe and of the
earth from which we all draw our suste-
nance. They are in as great danger of
radioactive fallout as are we.
Second. They are no more desirous
than we of being wiped out in a nuclear
holocaust.. They do not believe any more
than we that anyone would win after
a nuclear exchange. It would be a con-
flict which all would lose. Thus, they
may recognize this treaty as one step
toward control by mankind of the mon-
ster it has created.
V
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1
16216 CONGRESSIONAL RE~ORD - SENATE September 16'
Third. There is good evidence that the the Bight address... Th$s amendment is There are some military people, some
people under Soviet domination are be- not germane to this treaty. It is clear scientists, and some Senators who have
coming more and more dissatisfied with that if it were added to this treaty, it expressed beliefs that the risks out-
-their low standard of living and are de- would not result in the removal of the weigh the benefits from the treaty.
manding more consumer goods. Per- Russian troops and weapons from Cuba, We can have the greatest respect, as
haps there is a hope among their leaders but it would result in ,a defeat of this does the Senator from Florida, for the
that the treaty will make it possible to treaty. able Senators who are opposing ratifica??
shift some of their means of production For, obviously, it would require rene- tion, and for a military man such as Gen.
away from this highly expensive weap- gotiation of the treaty after some 91 Thomas S, Power and a scientist such
ons production to that of consumer nations have signed i . It is evident as Dr. Edward H. Teller, both of whom
goods. that the Soviet Union, ad probably oth- have opposed it.
Fourth. There is evidence that the rift er nations-possibly Great Britain, Italy, But we should also have great respect
between the U.S.S.R. and China is gen- West Germany and others-would not for the competence in this field of the
uine, and they may feel that the treaty agree to this.reservatiort and that its re- Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Sec-
helps them in their growing competition suit, in practical effect, !would be merely retary of Defense Robert McNamara,
with their great Communist rival. to kill the treaty without serving any Director of the CIA John McCone, who
Fifth. They understand the danger of useful purpose whatever in decreasing used ssis an ecre a off" e ii
proliferation. They see that they would the use of Cuba as a Soviet military base or an who under the revrous -.
benefit, as would we, from the resulting or eliminating the Cast regime in Cuba.
~ mm s rain wasZ~iarrma =M-
discouragement of other nations from So, Mr. President, I ]relieve any_ Sen- is Ened rgy Commission n. Particularly
developing nuclear weapons. ator can consistently ahd logically vote should we have respeci1 for those men
Now, Mr. President, as the evidence of against the amendment of the Senator chiefly responsible for the Nation's se-
the desirability of U.S. approval of the from Arizona and at thejsame time share curity, the Joint Chiefs of Stan'.
treaty piles up, the opponents shift from with the Senator his ccneern over con- Mr. President, during World War II,
a head-on atack of the treaty to the- ditions now existing in, Cuba and work I had the honor of serving in the UU.S,
oblique to the enfilade. Opposition from with him and others in ,ways and means Marine Corps. During the long, arduous,
the flank, it is sometimes called. They of bringing about the downfall of Fidel and sometimes sad days, I developed a
call these reservations and clarifications. Castro and the returning of freedom to" deep and abiding respect for the courage
One of the most dangerous of these is Cuba. and.dedication of the leaders of the U.S.
the one offered by the able and distin- In searching his heart and conscience Marine Corps.
guished junior Senator from Arizona, for the right decision on this momentous
which would provide that the treaty issue each Senator must! decide what our I ptheculave admired the neflefier, ry of would not go into effect until the Nation's goals should be! and which road and the SHe a marine officer,
U.S.S.R. has removed its troops and offers the least risk and best hope to- Nation's 's Shoup.
highest houp. deco co hasrationrforived this
weapons from Cuba and arrapgements ward reaching those goals. for heroism
have been made for international in- If our objective should be to make cer- combat, the was apio in Medali;ed of
spection within Cuba to confirm such tain that more millions df Russians than Honor. Shoup was apo CO -
removal. millions of Americans would be killed in de nd re of the Marine Corp p b by Presi-
I believe-it is a fair and truthful state- a future nuclear war, glen perhaps we dent Eisenhower. He sits with the Joint
ment, Mr. President, that no one has might come to the conclusion that the Chiefs of Staff. He appeared with other
been more concerned than the junior least risk would be to allow the present chiefs before our committee and in be-
Senator from Florida over the Com- nuclear arms race to continue unchecked. half of the treaty. His ity is olid go
munist takeover of Cuba. However, I submit that that is not the unquestioned; his as very is solid gold.
I believe I was the first Member of the goal which most Senators and most; of When he said he was very much in favor
Congress to warn of the deteriorating the American people are pursuing, for I to say that hat c carried being initialed
much wei, I w frank
situation in Cuba and of the danger am sure that most of u recognize that to say much weight with one,
Castro's movement presented to the se- that road leads to the most frightful- But he and others whose judgment we
curity of the Western Hemisphere. can respect on a matter of this impor-
the mast egregious-consequences for
In those days, the Senator from Florida human life on this Planet. tance have unreservedly come out for
was abused by some of the press and by As I interpret our wishes, our hopes, the treaty, as have the former Com-
some of his colleagues for his warnings. and our fears, the goal v hich most of us mander in Chief of Allied Forces in
After Castro's seizure of power, the Sen- earnestly seek is-the continuation of our Europe, the former, President of the
ator from Florida called upon the ad- free American way of 14e with a mini- United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
ministration then in power to adopt a mum of possibility of wholesale nuclear former President Harry S. Truman, and
firmer policy against the tyranny which -slaughter and the destruction of our- a host of others much too long to outline
was enslaving Cuba, and continued to selves and other peoples.' here.
urge the new administration to the same The treaty's proponents have recog- This is too important an issue to be
effect. nized throughout that there are risks in considered on partisan grounds. And I
I believe I was the first to call for cut- this treaty. Risks are ;unavoidable in am proud of Senators again, for always,
ting off all trade with Cuba. any step in international relations we on matters of such gravity and conse-
I have been rather critical of the lack take in the dangerous times in which we quence as this treaty, there is no room
of a strong and affirmative policy live. for political considerations. That is
against Castro's Cuba during the present However, the risks in 'the treaty have why we find such Senators as the dis-
administration, although I cheered the been reduced to a minimum by the care- tinguished and courageous minority
strong stand taken by the President dur- ful planning and negotiation which pre- leader [Mr. D1RKSENI, the ranking
ing the fall of 1962, which resulted in a ceded it. in seeking the goal which I minority member of the Armed Services
splendid, bloodless victory for our way believe we are seeking, the risks of rati- Committee [Mr. SALTONSTALLI, the sen-
of life and for freedom everywhere, fying the treaty are much less than the for Senator from Vermont CMr?. AIKEN],
I have continued to urge recognition risks of rejecting it. and others all supporting this test ban
of a Cuban Government in exile and It would not disarm Us. It does not treaty in the interest of their country.
other more positive steps looking toward compromise us. It does' not lessen our Mr. President, all life is a risk, and
a free, independent, democratic Cuba. commitment to preserve our freedom and those who seek to risk nothing, achieve
So, the amendment of the Senator that of other nations who: seek our assist- nothing.
from Arizona is one that strikes a sym- ante. But our signing does Indicate to The ratification of this treaty is a
pathetic chord within me. It is one that the remainder of the world that we rec- calculated risk, and one I believe we
under almost any other circumstances I ognize the United States and the Soviet must take, for it offers the greatest hope
would support, for the Senator is indeed Union have created a; "Frankenstein and the least risk toward the achieve-
ringing a bell. monster" which must becontrolled, and ment of the supreme national objectives
But, Mr. President, I respectfully sub- that we are willing to take a small step in the minds and hearts of American
mit that the bell he is ringing is not at with the Soviets toward controlling it. people.
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