ANNIVERSARY OF 1962 CUBA RESOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2007/
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD sENAft
rather the conclusion reached before the
ban Ivaa:even 4?11Siderect
ali,?rt, we must see the 'treaty for
What it a VerY limited agreement. It
has two important advantages that out-
weigh the, to my Mind, hypothetical and
neVer siOcessfully proved disadfantages.
These are, first!, the end' to radioactive
fallout. Although this menace may in-
? deed be exaggerated, there seems -little
doubt that increased radioactivity in the
atmosphere could eventually have a se-
rious eteet. NO one can be certain that
? additional cancers Or birth deformities
have not resultid 'from higher levels of
fallout. The fact of the matter is that
as long as we do not know precisely what
causes a' birth deformity or what makes
-a Caneer grow,"it is the better part of
? wisdom to end the contamination of the
air that has, by Statistical study, at least,
Contributed to them.
Recent studies have very clearly pin-
pointed the increased incidence of child-
hood Cancer in cases of prebirth X-rays.
Although we do not know nearly asmuch
as we W6uld like to about birth deformi-
ties, and in fact about the 'Many and
subtle ways in which radiation Can affect
living a,nd future generations, the fact
rernains that no one has, been able to
show any benefits from a general in-
crease in radiation levels, and medical
studies are indicating, with increasing
Impact, the possible dangers.
So look upon this as the first basis
for support of the treaty.
Secondly, the treaty is important in
hampering?though not, of course, fully
preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapoms?atmospheric' testing on the
part of other nations. Although this
treaty clearly does not prevent other na-
tions frop proceeding if they are ready
to undertake underground tests the in-
Convenience and expense may well apply
a brake, a brake which would be in the
interest of the Soviet Union as well as
the United States. In short, the treaty
represents a limited effort to reduce what
has been one of the most conspicuous, if
perhaps not actually one of the most se-
rious, threats to world peace in the post-
war decade. It is a limited vehicle to
achieve a limited, but certainly desirable,
result.
For that reason, I believe it would be
a very Serious mistake to attach to the
treaty any of the reservations or under-
, -
standings that have been proposed to
date. there is, nothing I personally
would welcome more, and nothing I feel
would be more in the national 'interest
at this :time, than the withdrawal by
their sponsors of each and every one of
these reservations or understandings.
One 9.,f the.Understandings, for in-
stance, provides that U.S. participation
in, the treaty does not involve any degree
of recognition of the East German Gov-
erxiineht; What, about North Korea and
North Vitriarn, if they should ever desire
to acc'R ? What about Outer Mongo-
lia, which we do not recognize but which
has aCeeded? should they not also be-
,
specifically mentioned? To raise this
Issue formally as an understanding to
the treaty adds nothing substantive to
?Ur deterrninagons East Germany,
but it might well confuse the situation
with regard to other countries. And a
vote of rejection of such an understand-
ing would cloud the East German issue.
Another understanding, with regard
to U.S. right of withdrawal immediately
in the event of Soviet violation, has been
thoroughly clarified by the Secretary
of State. We would abrogate the treaty,
we have made itclear, if the Soviets
. ?
cheat.
Another understanding With regard to
peaceful nuclear explosions brings a
wholly new element into the actual
'treaty, and in my view could open a loop-
hole for Soviet and other testing that We
might later regret. In any case, in my
judgment, it deserves a lot more stud'Y
and attention before being incorporated
in this document:s-
The issu.e of use of nuclear weapons in
the case of armed. hostilities bas simi-
larly been clarified beyond doubt.
Also, the desire to insure that any and
all amendments to this treaty be sub-
mitted to the Senate is important and
worthwhile. Such a requirement is basic
constitutional law. The President and
Secretary of State have already assured
the Senate they would comply with such
a requirement. If the Senate voted to
add specific language to this treaty to
that end, it might seriously imply that
amendments could be made to other
treaties, in which such language does not
appear, without the advice and consent
of the Senate. If the Senate voted not
to add specific language, it would leave
the issue as regards this particular
treaty, up in the air. It is my hope,
therefore, that the assurances of the
President will be accepted and no effort
made to complicate the situation by such
an amendment of the resolution of rati-
fication. -
Every one of these points has been
answered satisfactorily time and again
by the President, the Secretary of State,
and the Secretary of Defense. To in-
clude them in the treaty would add noth-
ing but confusion and ill feeling for other
signatories. To vote not to include them
might leave these very questions up in
the air. It seems to me it would be very
unwise for the Senate to be put in the
position of having to vote on any of these
points, which to my mind are perfectly
clear now and would only be confused
by a Senate vote.
Another reservation recently intro-
duced would require that the treaty not
come into effect until all the delinquent
Soviet assessments to the United Na-
tions are paid: Nothing, it seems to me
could be more extraneous to the subject
matter of the treaty,? and in fact, no
More 'germane than would be a-feierVa:
tion postponing the effective date of the
treaty until the United States balances
its budget. Needless to say, I favor a
balanced budget for the United States,
and for the United Nations, and I favor
all nations paying their debts and obli-
gations, but I do not see what that really
has to do with a limited test ban agree-
ment.
Certainly we are right to be concerned
about Soviet delinquency, in We United
Nations and todo everything we appro-
priately can to encourage them to pay
)003-7
-
*6715
up. Soviet actions in this session of the
United Nations, including the question
of paying their share, will be a good test
of how much the Soviets really mean in
their new peace offensive. It will be a
good indication of what we can expect in
the future, but it is no test at all of the
validity of a ban on atmospheric nu-
clear explosions. It would be extremely
unfortunate if the Senate were to me-
ander down this byway and lose sight of
what we are really here to ratify and
secure. ?
Finally, with respect to the reservation
that Soviet Military personnel be re-
quired to- leave Cuba before the treaty
comes into effect, I doubt there is any
Member of Congress that has for so long
expressed greater concern than I have
over the Cuban situation. If I thought
such a reservation would encourage the
Soviets to withdraw from Cuba, I would
back it, but I am not such an optimist
as to believe that this is a constructive
move toward getting the Russians out
of the Caribbean.
They are going to leave Cuba, and
other points only when we make things
so tough for them, by economic and po-
litical and other pressures that it does
not pay them to remain there any
longer. We are not going to talk them
out of Cuba?any more than we talked
them out by passing a tough resolution
last September, a resolution to which the
Soviets paid no attention and which the
executive branch has largely ignored.
It is surprising to me that anyone in
this country expects mere negotiations
to get the Russians out of Cuba. It is
even more surprising that those who ad-
vocate this course?at least among my
constituents?are the same people who
warn that we cannot trust the Russians
in any treaty. If that is so, I do not see
any value whatsoever in bringing in ad-
ditional complication into the treaty
which we would not expect the Russians
to abide by and in which it would be a
lot harder to discover and confirm cheat-
ing than in some purely scientific area
such as nuclear fallout.
In my view, it would be a most serious
mistake for the Senate to accept any of
the unnecessary or extraneous proposals
that have been offered as additions to
the resolution of ratification.
With the clear understanding then
that this treaty is a limited commitment,
that it does not even bind the United
States to further negotiations of any
sort on any issue that we would not oth-
erwise wish to discuss, and that it is
interpreted by the United States in ac-
cordance with the points that are made
in the report of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, I support the treaty.
What the treaty provides is in our in-
terest and that of the whole free world.
What it does not provide, both good or
bad, should not be the object of present
decisions, and should not be brought
into the discussion to mislead or alarm
our citizens.
Mr. KUPHEI4. Mr. President, will the
Senator ileiti??,_ ?
Mr. rc.E_ &TING. I yield to the Sen-
ator from California.
Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator makes
an excelierit point in indicating to the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Senate that the treaty should be voted
up or down on its merits, with no ex-
traneous Inaterial being attached to it,
by way of reservations, which are printed
and are lying on our desks.
My recollection is that approximately
2 years ago the distinguished Senator
from New York was one Of the success-
ful sponsors of an amendment to Pend-
ing legislation with respect to interdict-
ing trade with Cuba. Cuba remaips a
problem. The question before the Sen-
ate is whether an agreenient to prohibit
testing by way of nuclear explosions, ex-
cept underground, is in the interest of
the American people and in the interest
of the people of the world.
I comenend the Senator for stressing
the fact that in his opinion, and in my
opinion, the treaty merits the support of
the Senate and of the people of this
country, but that no extraneous mate-
rial ought to be attached to it When the
Senate votes on it next Tuesday. I hope
it will vote overwhelmingly in favor of
it. I congratulate the Senator for the
Points he has znade.
Mr. KEATING. I thank the Senator
for his statement. It is extremely im-
portant not to complicate the situation
by attaching reservations or amend-
ments which might or might not re-
quire renegotiation, but certainly would
require notice to the other signatories to
the treaty.
People have written to me to ask,
"Why do you want to be for a treaty
that helps the Soviet Union?"
That is not the question. The ques-
tion is, Does it help the United States?
Does it help to prevent the continued
Pollution of the atmosphere? Does it
help to prevent the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons by other countries? Cer-
tainly its ratification is in the interest
of the people of both nations. If, inci-
dentally, it also helps the Soviet 'Union,
certainly we should not be against it for
that reason. I do not believe that the
fact that it provides incidental benefits
for the Soviet Union should be a basis
for opposing the treaty.
Mr. KUCIIEL. The Senator is correct.
Human beings, black or white, free or
slave, whether they live in America or on
the other side of the Iron Curtain,
breathe the same air.
Competent scientists who testified be-
fore the 'committee stated that at one
point in the testing of nuclear explo-
sions in the atmosphere the danger to
mankind becomes inevitable, regardless
of the level at which that point is
reached.
In my opinion, the Senator is also com-
pletely correct with respect to the prob-
lem of the proliferation of nuclear na-
tions, about which we read in the press
several Weeks ago. The Senator from
New York made some cornMents in the
Senate to the effect that the United Arab
Republic, having obtained some scien-
tific brainpower, was on its way to cre-
ating a rocket arsenal, one step away
from being a nuclear power in the Mid-
dle East. Think of the hazard to the
peace of the world that would opcur from
countries in the Middle East being nu-
clear powers. Such an event could
plunge the whole world into an abyss.
As the Senator from New York speaks
In support of the test ban treaty, on
which the Senate will vote next Tuesday,
what a wonderful thing it is that 100 na-
tions all arotind the globe, in every hemi-
sphere, have said, "We want to join in
this agreement."
The Senator's points are well taken.
In my judgment, he speaks with impec-
cable logic.
Mr. KEATING. I am grateful to the
Senator from California.
ANNIVERSARY OF 1962 CUBA
RESOLUTION
Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I
should like to refresh the memory of
Senators that today Marks an anniver-
sary. One year ago today the Senate
passed, with only one dissenting vote, a
resolution expressing the determination
of the Congress and the country with re-
gard to the presence of a Soviet military
establishment in Cuba. The resolution
was signed by the President on October
3, 1962.
The controlling language of the reso-
lution after the preamble provided as
follows?and I stress that it was adopted
with only one vote against it:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the United
States is determined--
(a) to prevent by whatever means may be
necessary including the use of arms, the
Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from ex-
tending, by force or the threat of force, its
aggressive or subversive activities to any part
of this hemisphere;
(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use
of an externally supported military capabil-
ity endangering the security of the United
States; and
(c) to work with the Organization of
American States alici with freedom-loving
Cubans to support the aspirations of the
Cuban people for self-determination.
We all remember that the resolution
was worded with great care. A number
of resolutions were introduced, but this
is the one that was adopted. It was
the expression of determination by the
United States in formal language stated
by Congress. ,
Now, a year later, the Marxist-Leninist
regime in Cuba has extended its sub-
versive activities to every corner of the
hemisphere and is working 24 hciurs a
day in the effort to overthrow existing
governments throughout Latin America.
That relates to paragraph (a) .
Although there is no threat to the ter-
ritory of the United States itself right
now, there is a very real threat to our
continued hemispheric security in the ef-
forts Castroist forces are making to over-
turn the Governments of Venezuela,
Peru, and Colombia and to infiltrate
through the Jagan regime in British
Guiana directly into Brazil. Surely the
threat to U.S. security is just as real and
a great deal closer than the threat in
South Vietnam, where we are spending
$1 V2 million a day to defeat communism.
As to paragraph (c), it is true that
the United States has worked with the
Organization of American States.
_
Instead of working with freedom-lov-
ing Cubans to achieve self-determination
September 20
for Cuba we have thwarted their efforts
at many points. A State Department
spokesman, in fact, recently told the
,American Legion Convention,. in Miami,
.that the Cuba question was basically
one that had to be solved by the
Cubans?ignoring the thousands of So-
viets in Cuba who are forcibly keeping
the Cubans from doing just that.
In short, not one point of this resolu-
tion, which was debated and favorably
reported by two Senate committees--the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on?Armed Services held joint
hearings?passed with near unanimous
approval by both Houses of C'ongress,
has been effectively implemented in the
last year. Today, I year from that time,
the resolution is virtually unimple-
mented, except for the fact that the
United States has been working with the
Organization of American States.
Meanwhile there is mounting evidence
of Latin American concern over the
Castro regime and over Castro's delib-
erate campaign to incite insurrection
and violence in other countries.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed, following my re-
marks, a series of newspaper articles
written by reliable reporters to docu-
ment this trend of the increase in the
inciting of insurrection and violence in
other Latin American countries. _
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the Recoaa
, (See. exhibit I.)
Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the
memories of some of us are short. The
resolution passed by the Senate exactly
a year ago today should serve to remind
us all of the very wide gap that still ex
ists between our objectives, our stated
policies, our adopted resolution, arid the
hard realities in Cuba. There is still, as
there was last fall, a pressing need to en-
force policies we have already eriu:neik
ated, before we find not only a COMMUk
nist Cuba, but also a Communist Guiana,
a Communist Haiti, a Communist Brazil,
a Communist Colombia, a Communist
Venezuela, or other Communist countries
on our very doorsteps.
Exnrarr 1
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 20,
1963]
PEAR OF MILITARY COTJP ALARMS VENEZUELANS
(By George Matanson)
CARACAS, September 19.?The threat of an
imminent military uprising hangs heavily
over Venezuela. People in the streets talk
of little ylse and Caracas publications are
expressing their concern with banner head-
lines.
Terrorist activity has mounted steadily in
recent weeks. The armed forces, angered
at the Government's apparent inability to
halt the attacks, is widely believed to be
planning to take matters into its own
hands.,
This view was bolstered today when the
pro-Castro terrorists attacked an American-
owned factory in downtown Caracas.
Six men armed with submachineguns,
who identified themselves as members of
the Armed Forces of National Liberation
(PALM, destroyed by fire the plant and
warehouses of the Du Pont Co. in an area
ringed by other business houses.
EIGHT ESCAPE PRISON
Earlier in the week the Government
proudly announced the capture of two FALN
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORO =SENATE 16717
leader% bill-this Was quickly offset by the
escape' ht? eight"-BAN' -figures from a maxi.
,XxIMIT? itelltitY prison; ?
174, 00:pax.e,.,t;Nit-hp." vith a- daring FALN
attempt on the life- of Venezuela's defense
?ster,4,?,:Wee-,,kiAgo; is said to have Infuri
ated the ,miUtaiy.
.recentif the arined fOrces had-stayed
. . ,
out of ?politics, hitt now they are thought
it) he egtisIdering steps to rid the country of
In, the process, it-is felt; they would take
Over the 0,,overnmelit.
Veneztrelan military officers have
held oeyeral elosel meetings. -After one of
these it was eorifirmeti that the MilitarY had
net With President- Betancourt. NeWspapere
-.
reported Betancourt had been given an u i-
inattun to act strongly against the terrorists
or aecept the consequence's. ? - -
The OOYernthent, admitted that, Betan-
court had conferred with the ofileers but
chily on "'routine inattera:" if also has Said
that Betancourt Will_ soon 'address_ the e0.11n:-
?'try, spelling out strict measures to? hold the
terrorists 41...Check- To date however, there
? , be been ,no speech.
iO panoss.
? Meanwhile, the illnister of Defense de-
? clared that there is no danger. Ne said that
, although the military had resolved to pro-
tect detnacratic_ processes, it would-take no
steps that Viretild- threaten' the upcoming
- election% :
? The statement Is being received with reser-
'Vatic.11% Pbserveral admit that many oflicera
Wish to remain outside political activities.
Ellt they feel that a group of younger officers
Isputting presSnrepn their suneriord to take
aet10n.. _,
It Is believed' Wit if the ,5cAL1'i, qiitkilliek
Its attacks on military installatidris, -the
.artited, forces Will Move.
'. 1.- UTP$cLAR" 'At'.
3Ovito lrjilalhd, aleading onlacidition pregr
=
FientIaV'candiclate7 said today that' Vene-
zuela is in, "a ,atatn of undeclared war," and
P Qd-: . ' -.
rt
. that 'the_ t reat of,, military uprising cannot
be oVellO
'Veneptekl. is t . ni
to , young .
g 4 democracy,?
Villalba,said ",We are only 5 years old in
- t ,,reapec _ and e have no,. tra _tions to
help carry ua ilirOngli this trying 'period."
viitoba, PO' heads the far-left Republi-
can Democratic 11i41on Party ,(URD); said "/
-.have called upon all political-parties, includ-
ing the Communists, to loin in signing a
? Mutual pact to condemn terrorism;" he said.
' But observers point out that it is, the Corn-
.1111111Iste who are ,the Prime Movers" behind
the terrorlirn. ,
, The Re4s hope to provoke a coup, a mili-
tary one Would, suffice,: after which the mod--
gates WOIlld be forced to join the extreme
lett to r,egeln, control. From here the rela-
tively small "extreine left wing Would move
from a tpsttion "O-1 infinenee to' Complete
[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 19631
LATIrTS AT U.N. DISTURBED AS CUBA tNCREA5ES
_
IgFrOat's ?To STia tavoi,r
(By lienry F.taymont)
Uisurza :NsriPwa,, Sentember 17.?
Latin Arnerigan d-elegates to the General As-
sembly are disturbedover what they describe
as a new impetus in Cuba's efforts to incite
a hemisplierewide Communist revorution.
The "belief is, that never before:has the
regime of Premier Fidel Castro been Co
blatant in promoting armed" uprieings in
Latin 41.tniFlean?Xpnntries float 'of WT-iich are
pblitically and socially restive.
The chip! Cuban delegate, Dr. -Carlos M.
? 1...echug.a, said in an iiitervievithat Dir. Castro
? aild other:lenclers,:pl. reCentfy spoke out in
favor of greater revolutionary militancy in
Latin America wete merely expressing their
No. 150 5
political beliefs; and 'surely there is no-law
against that."
WASHINGTON BOIAIGY BLK1WEG
The more aggressive tone of the Cuban
,statements, he contended, was "a direct re-
sult" of what he termed Washington's "poi-
icy of subversion and harassment" against
Cuba.
Many Latin American representatives here,
especially those from the nations of Central
America and the Caribbean area, which are
most exposed to Cuban propaganda, are
eager to determine if the new situation poses
any threat to their security that may require
collective action by the inter-American
system.
Daniel Oduber QuirOs, Foreign Minister of
Costa Rica, suggested that the heads of the
Latin American delegations meet during the
Assembly session to discuss Communist sub-
version and propaganda emanating from
Cuba.
One difficulty the inter-American system
has encountered in dealing with Cuba has
been the absence of substantial evidence that
Cuba was shipping arms to support insur-
,rectlonshi. other 144in ,American countries,
.tey, hdwever,
some dlproi?ats have 'be-
come conirinced" that the Organization. of
American States should take? more forceful
action to deal with Cuban subversion.
Juan Bautista de LaValle, Peruvian dele-
gate to the Organization of American States
and an international lurist, has been work-
ing- on a feria-lila tlial 'envialead ?collective
:sanctions agarnat the 'Castro regime for in-
citing and eitc?tiregifig -violerfce in other
eountries.
? "In criminal law a man who inspires some-
one else into committing ,a_ crime is as guilty
at' thepeTisOn" Whrffres -th ea
e wpon?'" the
Peruvian diplornat -Said recently: ""There is
no reason why this principle should-not apply
iii ternationarlaw govermnents mc ing
insurrection and violence in other countries."
Dr. Castro and his aids have been giving
unconcealed encouragement to rebel move-
ments .in Latin America, especially to the
pro-Communist underground in Venezuela,
the Armed Forces for National Liberation.
REBELS URGED TO CONTINUE
Ill a recent speech, the Cuban Premier
urged the Venezuelan rebels to continue their
struggle against the left-of-center govern-
ment of President -Romulo Betancourt. Me
said Cuba did nat need to shin 'them weapons
because they were imitating the tactics he
used to overthrow President Fulgeneio Ba-
tista?equipping his forces with weapons
seized from the regular army.
One Cubaii-e-tatenient that 'particularly
alarmed some Latin American diplomats was
in article by Maj. Eiriestis--GlieVara urging
other countries to engage in the same guer-
rilla tactics that proved successful in Cuba.
The 'article, Pia' appeared in the monthly
Cuba Socialist, was broadeast September 9
over the Peiping radio.
Its basic prernise was that U.S. efforts to
isolate Cuba had made other revolutions in
Latin America necessary. " ?
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept.
? 1.2631
CARACAS: TERROR STEP-UP TRACED
" (By Bertram B. Johansson)
The extent to Which Venezuelan Castro-
Communist terrorists have taken matters
intci their own hands is demonstrated by
their executing four of their own number
recently in disciplinary sessions in the hills.
The men were executed by the,pro-,,gom-
niinliat triatin-arrimitierirlia-s" aft& they ITC
tried to? desert, aecording to a fifth guerrilla:
who escapedand "repOrted theThie-cittioThd"to
officials at Barquisinieto.
A Venezuelan nevre--agency said the fifth
guerrilla told -authorities the four men were
" ? .,,..
lined "up before a firing squad in the moun-
tains of Lara State about 2 weeks ago.
The executions coincide with a marked
Increase in terroristic violence in several
areas of Venezuela, aimed at three targets:
1. The downfall of the Betancourt gov-
ernment before It leaves office constitution-
ally early next year.
2. Prevention of the December 1 presiden-
tial elections which would insure constitu-
tional succession in the Presidency for the
first time in decades.
PUBLICITY SOUGHT
3. Laying the groundwork for a develop-
ment of chaos in Venezuela in which, as in
Cuba, Communists would be ready to step in
or take advantage of any openings that might
develop toward a greater concentration of
power in Castro-Communist hands.
Within the past few days Castro-Commu-
nist fomenters of violence attacked the home
of a presidential guard captain, killing one
soldier and wounding another; attacked a
Maracaibo police post; and perpetrated two
bomb blasts at east coast oil pipelines.
Last week the terrorists catured Alfredo di
Stefano, an international soccer star, and
h-ehl-hirn for '56-hours before releasing him.
Through such stunts, stealing valuable
French paintings recently, and hijacking
ships, the terrorists seek to obtain maximum
publicity ,for their cause and to embarrass
Vehezuelan police forces.
? The problem of the Venezuelan police is
that they are not highly trained. Most of
them had to be changed when the Marcos
Perez Jimenez dictatorship fell, and it is only
in recent months that professional police in-
structors have been teaching Caracas police
in crime detection and prevention methods.
Leader of the Castro-Communist terrorists
has now been identified by the Interior Min-
istry as Maximo Canales, a Cuban Commu-
nist, who engineered the spectacular hijack-
ing of the Venezuelan freighter Ansocitegui
last February.
Venezuelan authorities consider the most
recent flurry of violence and terrorism as a
sign of desperation, but Caracas citizens are
concerned about the apparent ineffectiveness
of police to handle these political juvenile
delinquents.
[From the Panama City (Fla.) News, Aug.
21, 1963]
? THE MEANING or AGUILLA KEY
(By Seymour Freidin)
The arrogant Castro Cuban raid on a little
Bahama islet the other day was a ,dry run
for bigger combined operations to come.
It involves a future Soviet technique aimed
at all underdeveloped areas and tempting
soft apots.
_Actually, it is based on the most mammoth
intelligence program in history. Organized
carefully, plotted cogently, the Russian aim
is to pick off the immense potential in the
_markets of the underdeveloped world.
They cannot achieve?so they have ap-
parently, decided?dominance in these mar-
kets with the euphemism of competitive co-
existence. In short, their policymakers have
decided that the vast and cumbersome So-
viety heavy industrial machine cannot com-
pete with that of the United States. There-
fore, the answer is planned upheaval, di-
rected by highly skilled agents who build up
the apparatus for a takeover in a given ter-
ritory.
This is not the synthesis of some exile com-
mittee, Efffer and burdened pakehoingiaally
with no futures. It is the hard-headed
assessment, based Ph What they claim' are
in-dis-ktitabie--fa-ef,--litatiatic, and operation,
of important-Men-Who try to advise on the
course of Polley for-this government.
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Nobody, including the dedicated men in-
volved, can pretend to say whether their un-
emotional, surgical presentations can affect
the present course of U.S. policy. This is an
epoch, somewhat schizoid, in which the quest
for power accommodation with the Russians
has become obsessive. The plangent bells
of caution keep the pace, at least outwardly,
rather dignified and measured.
Soviet policy isn't deferred by our ap-
proach. It has been ina.de up and imple-
mented abroad for some time now. Let's get
down to a few cases, as the men who make
these assessments would say dryly. Take
the wretched episode at Aguilla Key. Castro
gunboats sealed off and invaded the heat-
seared British-administered islet.
Our planes watched. Under orders, they
did nothing. Onto Aguilla Key stormed a
landing party. Their comrades trained anti-
aircraft guns on watching U S. aircraft.
They even sent in a helicopter from one of
the little warships.
So, 19 exiles from Cuba were forcibly re-
patria.ted after a bald invasion of foreign
territory. The incident?so melancholy in
Its utter insensitivity to human dignity and
right--was Soviet conceived. The U.S.S.R.,
around the world, never ceases to try and
bring back citizens who fled and want no
More of the Soviet system.
The act at Aguilla Key, while successful
from the Soviet operational point of view,
was small potatoes. It proved one most use-
ful point, though, to the vast and recast
Soviet intelligence methods: that Cuba un-
der its present regime is of untold value as a
jurnping-off spot for Latin America.
The biggest, proportionately, Soviet intelli-
gence operation abroad is in Cuba today.
Access is easier and more direct, as a result,
with Soviet missions throughout Latin Amer-
ica. Every Russian mission in Latin America
today is headed by a highly experienced in-
telligence officer.
The grim, old joke that the chauffeur in a
Russian Embassy really ran the show has
long since been interred with Stalin. In-
stead of using intelligence agents in covert
and lower echelon levels, deliberate Soviet
decision has placed them in No. 1 spots.
And not just in Latin America. This, is
now true in most of Asia and Africa. The
objective is the same: seizing by subversion
the regimes and, thereby, the markets of new
countries. An underground apparatus and
disaffected, ambitious politicians are all pay-
dirt in the targets marked out by Soviet
policy.
Some ultrasophisticated people may say,
loftily, that it doesn't sound very new. Well,
it is and had better be recognized, because
the Russians never before used intelligence
operations on such a high level to strike for
a given objective.
Maybe this remark from a highly gifted
man, who holds glittering Credentials, has a
little impact:
"It's a life-and-death competition for the
markets," he said, dry-smoking a filter ciga-
rette. "There ought to be a lot more said
about it. But that's not up to me."
Obviously, it's up to the top to see and
shed some light on this deadly phase of co-
existence.
[From the Christian Science Monitor,
Aug. 6, 19631
JAGAN CALLS CONFERENCE TURNING POINT -
(By Bertram B. Johansson)
British Guiana's Prime Minister Cheddi
Jagan, with a wide-ranging amblvalenee, is
warning Britain his colony must soon obtain
independence?or else.
The self-admitted Marxist Prime Minister
told a press conference this past weekend
that the territory conference expected to be
held in London in October?where British
Guiana independence may be considered?
will determine whether the colony goes "a
la Khrushchev, a la Mao Tse-tung, a la
Castro, or .a la Jagan."
CVBAN INCLUDED
Prime Minister Jagan is already showing a
great attachment for Cuba's Premier Fidel
Castro, who last week said the duty of rev-
olutionaries is to 'make" revolution all over
Latin America.
Mr. Jagan told a press conference in
Georgetown Saturday it was unrealistic for
West Indian leaders to think of Caribbean
unity without including Cuba, the biggest
--country in the region. "Such a large area
cannot be ignored for long," he said.
On July 24, the Jagan government bor-
rowed $1,700,000 from the Guiana Import-
Export Corp., a business concern which
recently has done a brisk trade with Cuba
and other Communist countries.
Government officials, according to Reuters,
refused to comment on the purpose of the
loan, as have officers of the corporation,
which is dominated by Marxist Prime Minis-
ter jagan's People's Progressive Party.
Sir Ralph Grey, British Guiana Governor,
inspected the balance sheets of the corpora-
tion to ascertain its financial position after
the Jagan government ignored his suggestion
it first await possible British Government
aid
SOVIET GOODS IMPORTED
During the recent 11-week general strike
staged by the Labor Confederaticin against a
bill Mr. Jagan was trying to push through
Parliament, the Prime Minister began im-
porting Soviet oil from Cuba, on Soviet tank-
ers, and Cuban rice. Much propaganda was
made about the commodities saving British
Guiana from chaos.
During the strike, two Cuban student or-
ganizers, of the type that have been deported
from several Latin American countries, were
extremely active In the Georgetown area
among student groups.
Just as the strike was ending, 18 more
Cubans, identified as aviation experts and
technicians arrived to render what was
termed assistance to widen activity of Brit-
ish Guiana Airways, which is alleged to have
one 7-passenger plane.
There is concern in Washington circles
about the possibility British Guiana may
become a sluice gate for Castroite subversive
traffic into South America and the rest of
the hemisphere.
Havana radio has announced British
Guiana has given landing rights to Cuban
planes The announcement followed shortly
after the United States had complained to
Britain about Cuban planes unloading po-
tential subversive agents in the British-
owned Grand Cayman Islands, 200 miles
south of Cuba, for transfer to other air-
lines proceeding to Latin American points.
[From the New York Times, July 27, 1983]
CASTRO PLEDGES SOVIET STJPPORT FOR REVOLTS
IN LATIN AMERICA
HAVANA, July 26.?Premier Fidel Castro
called today for Cuban-style revolutions in
Latin America.
"What has happened in Cuba could hap-
pen exactly the same way in many Latin
American countries," he told a mass rally in
Havana on the 10th anniversary of the at-
tack on the Mowcada Barracks that ulti-
mately put him into power in 1959.
He asserted that "all peoples who do what
Cuba has done will have the support of the
Soviet Union and " Socialist [Communist]
countries."
"Mare and better things which have been
done in Cuba, can be done in Latin America,"
he added. "A million workers and peasants
look to Cuba for hope and encouragement."
PEACE IS RULED OUT
Premier Castro asserted that Latin Ameri-
can revolutionaries insisted that "revolution
could not be made by peaceful means."
He stressed that the way to revolution
Septembe7?20
"will not be opened by itself" and that revo-
lutionaries themselves must open the way.
"Revolutionaries must not only learn
theory," he advised. The Cuban. leader at-
tacked the United States-sponsored Alliance
for Progress program of aid to Latin America,
calling it "an aggressive instrument against
Cuba destined to fail from the beginning."
He mentioned insistently Argentina, Peru,
Colombia, and Guatemala as countries ripe
for revolution. He described as a farce the
recent election In Argentina and sent "a fra-
ternal message of admiration to Venezuelan
patriots who are fighting against reaction."
Dr. Castro called President Romulo Betan-
court of Venezuela "an imperialistic puppet"
and predicted victory for the pro-Castro
forces in Venezuela "sooner or later, as in
Algeria."
He proclaimed also "our fraternal salute"
for pro-Castro groups in Guatemala.
However, Dr. Castro denied?as he has in
the past?that Cuba was exporting its revo-
lution.
In the case of Venezuela, he asserted,
"when patriots needed money and arms they
took them away from the soldiers and im-
perialists."
He added that ideas cannot be stopped and
that Cuba was a "source of light for Latin
American Indians and peasants."
UNITED STATES ACCUSED OF RENEGING
MIAMI, July 26.?Premier Fidel Castro
charged today that the United States, had
reneged in the deal to obtain the freedom of
the Bay of Pigs invasion prisoners.
"We accuse the American Government of
not complying with its agreement and that
it owes us $10 million," the Cuban Premier
told a mass rally in Havana.
Dr. Castro said in a broadcast heard here
that the price agreed upon for the more than
1,000 prisoners taken in the 1961 invasion
was $53 million but that only $43 million in
goods had been paid.
The final installment was delivered to
Cuba last month by the American Red Cross.
The U.S. Government approved the deal but
slid not sponsor it.
[From the Citizens Committee for a Free
Cuba, July 20, 1963 (Free Cuba News) ]
COLOMBIA RIVALS VENEZUELA AS CASTRO
TARGET
Colombia appears to be rivaling Venezuela
as an embattled target of Castro-Communist
subversion, judging by increasing guerrilla
activity in that Andean country.
On July 15, a group of Colombians who
had recently returned from indoctrination
courses in Cuba launched guerrilla attacks
at Jamundi and El Cerrito, Department of
Valle. A Colombian Army patrol engaged
the guerrillas, killed five and wounded two,
and confiscated considerable material of a
revealing character.
Included in the confiscated matter were
"Che" Guevara's guerrilla warfare manual;
S mimeographed "10- Commandments of
Guerrilla Warfare" abbreviated from the
manual; instructions for making bombs
capable of destroying bridges and trains;
and a rubber stamp with the legend, "Chief
of Staff of the Revolutionary-Army. Victory
or Death." Also found were Cuban news-
papers; Colombian pro-Castro magazines; a
book called "We Organize the Revolution in
Colombia," by the Communist Party head,
Gilberto Viera White; and maps of western
Colombia and other regions (where new
guerrilla actions are evidently planned ).
. [From the Christian Science Monitor,
July 12, 1963]
CUBAN FRICTIONS RUB UNITED STATES, BRITAIN
(By Bertram B. Johanssort)
There is a fascinating bit of byplay in the
Caribbean involving United States-British
relations.
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CONGRESSIONAL 1qCO 4NA:a 16719
- ? .
-Cuban out iersives and British Guiana are
'Iwo Pointe- of friction.
The 'United States -Wednesday asked Brit-
ain publicly to stop allowing "potential sub-
versives' fr9M. Cub.a to land 9n W40 Cay-
? man Island, a British island north of Culls.
Richard I. Phillips, State Department press
officer, said some 15 to 20 persons had landed
in Grand Cayman in three Soviet-made Ilyh-
shin, planes, and immediately transferred to
other lines, taking them to points in the Ca-
ribbean and Central America,
The British Government Thursday con-
ceded that Fidel Castro'a Cuba, may be using
the British-owned Island to get subversives
into Latin American countries, and said au-
thorities were investigating.
ruitOSE CLOUDED
? , ?
It is cliftlC1,11,t StI this stage to determine
whether the United, States made, the Grand
Cayman announcement to chide the British
in public for alleged laxity with Cuban "sub-
versives," Or simply to demonstrate that U.S.
intelligence services were well aware of the
illOyeInent,ot, subversives around the. Crib-
bean,
The issues W9Uld appear to boil down to
,
U.S. Impatience with Britain over issues Of
? Mar/dsm apt ceinrauniain in. the Caribbean.
? The U.S. announcement followed' by only
a few days the earlier statement that the
Kennedy administration was refusing fi-
nancial aid to UarJilst Prime lvilnister. Ched-
- di Jaganin British Guiana on South Airier-
noahmi coast, sandwiched between
Veneziwla, Dutch Guiana and Brazil.
? ? ? -LEADEES CONSUWED
,
On Thursday in London, the Daily Herald,
a Labor _riewspaper, declared that President
Kennedy' "is not being helpful over British
Guiana. If .th, British GovernMenf takes
their line friorn_him, the same mistakes will
be Made in this strife-torn colony that the
Americans Made in Cuba.
"British -Guiana. desperately needs foreign
aid. Only America is in a position to give
It on a naaisiire scale. She has refused," the
Daily Herald continued.
"Why? Because the Americans suspect that
Dr. Jagan; the Premier of British Guiana,
Is following bastro's example and drifting
into the Communist camp. But the best
way to make sure that the drift goes on is
to leave British Guiana to stew in her own
juice. If the West will not help, the Com-
ranilists will. It is as simple as that," the
Daily -Herald
CONTRASTING MOVES
? Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth
and Colonial Secretary, is in British Guiana
now, conferring with government and op-
position leaders. Ue waited before going there
until the 89-day general strike concluded last
Week,
? Two weeks ago, the diplomatie correspond-
.
ent of. The. Times (London) wrote, in its
June issue, apparently after a Foreign
Office_ briefing,that "it is understood that '
. .
the U.S. Government has been urging the
British Government to suspend the consti-
'tutor), under which British Guiana enjoys
internal self-government and revert to direct
colonial government, while British ministers
are asking for a substantial increase in eco-
nomic aid for British Guiana from the United
States. ?
. "The critical situation in _British, Guiana,
Which, according to several reports, is on the
brink of civil war, has arisen from the strike."
. , ?
[From the Christian Science Monitor: June
20, 1963]
ic#,Fp4B2.2.Ap#s.W.gSTER11, 11744V," ,
(35! Bertrain B. Johansson)
"Premier ?P'idel .Uastro's warning to the
French and, Brittall not to allow thely, Carib-
bean Islands to be., used for Cuban,. exile at-
tack bases is being weighed in Washington
?.
_
in the light of a new cockiness the Cuban
leader has shown since his Soviet visit.
While there is a tendency to discount his
remarks as mere bravado?they were made
June 18 at the dedication of a new ffeet of
Soviet and Other fialling_ vessels at Car-
denas?there are indications the Cuban lead-
er is broadening his attack on imperialism to
include countries other than the United
States.
Premier Castro referred to reports that
Cuban exiles allegedly were negotiating with
Pr?dent de Gaulle of France for deploying
from French islands in the Caribbean. lie
warned that he would seek whatever means
necessary to defend Cuba. This was taken
to mean further Soviet' aid.
?
rpirriszi DZrou.s?
There have been reports, also, that French-
speaking Haitian exiles have offered to join
forces with Cru-ban exiles in destroying the
Dilvalier dictatorship and then taking on
Cuba, using Haiti as a base.
Ever since the Cuban leader's return from
his 40-day trip in the Soviet 'anion, he has
displayed new confidence In his "secure"
position.
His June 4 radio and television interview
in Havana, texts of which are not available,
are most revealing of this confidence of
complete Soviet backing, his assertion that
Cuba was the victor In the October 1962,
missile confrontation, his conviction of the
economic superiority of the Socialist camp,
and his high impression of Premier Khru-
shchev as a political and economic genius.
Referring to the possibility of talks with
the United States to "normalize" Cuban-
United States relations, Premier Castro says
he will accept no preconditions to the talks
but would set several himself, because, after
all, he asserted, the United States was the
loser in October and November.
"They [the United States] prepared sub-
versions," he said in his June 4 interviews,
"and we combated them. We crushed them.
They prepared counterrevolutionary bands
supplied with arsenals of weapons; and we
put them out of action. They prepared in-
vasions, and they have been obliged to pay a
modest indemnity for all that [in the pris-
oner exchange].
SOVIET IMPRESSIONS
'They Persisted in their plans for aggres-
sion, and they found themselves onthe brink
a destruction as a result. Discredit, head-
aches, and no*" hundreds of millions in cur-
rency [in higher sugar prices that must be
paid by Americans] as a result of their ag-
gressions against us.
"Is their policy not bankrupt? Yes, it
is. Who failed? They have. Who won? We
have won. Ah. The defeated are going to
impose conditions on the victors. What a
Premier Castro, engaged in constructing a
monolithic Communist Party in Cuba, was
impressed with the unity which the party
instilled in the Soviet Union.
He was impressed with Soviet subways and
said "I know the New York subway, and real-
ly it does not even approach the Kiev sub-
way."
ON PEACEFUL SIDE
He was impressed with Soviet development
of its "immense resources of Siberia. But,"
he adds, "theY are not developing it as the
United States West was developed?by cow-
boys, shots, dead people, assaults, and dead
Indians. No, they are developing with ex-
traordinary order. These are not people
killing others, but closely united and or-
ganized."
Psenaler Castro_ observed that organization
in Cuba Waa An Nig ."tiDdaler,fitage,"
Asked about what conditions might be
like when all political revolutions were fin-
ished, Premier Castro told his interviewersL,
"At times I wonder wh.a I Wod,like,te
If I were not ?a revolutionary, or even while
being a revolutionary, what I would like to
be. I would like to be an investigator [or
researcher]. Why? Because one can revo-
lutionlze,IlatUre, and to a small degree create
a variety of plants, animals, anything in the
field, of agriculture, and also in the field of
physics and chemistry. A perpetual revolu-
tion Must be waged by man in all mat-
ters. * * ?"
For Premier Nikita S. KhrustIchev, the
Cuban Premier reserved special praise.
He said he had a, "magnificent impression"
of him.
FERWNAL VIEW
"In reality," said Premier Castro, "Com-
rade Na.rnalackey ?dedicated an amount' of
'tithe o,us that cap be said Were the full 40
days we were there [in the Soviet Union].
? ? ? His was a special attention, affection-
ate toward our entire delegation. ? * * The
thing that impressed me most was the ex-
traordinarily human character of Comrade
Khrushohev. ? * ? He has an extraordinary
Mental energy, and a complete, complete,
cOntlete, mental lucidity. He is without
doubt one of the most brilliant intellects
that I have ever known. That is the opinion
I formed after entire days spent conversing
and discussing with him. * ? ? He showed
a great preoccupation for all the problems
Connected with today's situation, the do-
niefftic tasks in the Soviet Union, the na-
tional problems, and politics and the inter-
national Communist movement. I can say
that I saw Khrushchev really preoccupied,
really worried about all the problems related
to the problems of the unity of the Socialist
camp ? * * great leader and a serious ad-
versary of imperialism.
[From the Miami (Fla.) News, June 3, 19621
CUBA SHIPS ARMS FOR LATIN REVOLTS
(By Hal Hendrix)
Communist Cuba has established a secret
weapons arsenal in Matanzas Province and
is exporting surplus U.S. arms from it to
guerrilla forces in Central and South Amer-
ica, President Kennedy has been advised in a
hard intelligence report.
Weeks of probing, including undetected
cloak-and-dagger surveillance of one recent
shipment of weapons smuggled from Cuba
into Nicaragua, went into preparation of the
report, the Miami News learned yesterday.
The highly classified document, written
especially for President Kennedy, pinpointed
clandestine movements of rifles, pistols, and
automatic weapons and ammunition from
four Cuban dispersal centers to nine Latin
American nations?Nicaragua, Honduras,
Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador,
Paraguay, and Bolivia.
Accompanying the smuggled arms have
been hundreds of copies of a manual written
by Maj. Ernesto (Che) Guevara, entitled "La
Guerra de Guerrillas," a handbook on Com-
munist-style guerrilla warfare.
The Argentine-born Guevara is a key strat-
egist for international communism in Cuba.
The presidential intelligence report noted
that the arsenal in Matanzas was set up last
February on orders of Guevara.
Its sole mission was to serve as a collection
center and reconditioning depot for surplus
U.S.-made weapons in Cuba, and shipping
point for Latin American subversion.
Since the depot-arsenal began operations
nearly all the U.S.-made weapons and am-
munition Fidel Castro Inherited from the
Batista regime have' been moved into the
facility for reconditioning and packing for
shipment to pro-Castro elements abroad.
ALSO GET BRIT/SH,, DOMINICAN GUNS
Along with the U.S. armaments, the Castro
forces have _rounded up all available weap-
? ons . of Dzitlsil manufacture and rifles from
Alrk QriSippAl?armslopory in the Do-
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lninican Republic and processed them
?through the closely guarded arsenal.
Batista's armed forces operated almost en-
tirely with U.S.-made weapons. During
Castro's 2-year hit-and-run guerrilla war
against the Batista forces, most of his rebel
arms also carne from the United States.
When the Batista regime was toppled, his
weapons warehouses are reported to have
contained about 9,000 M-1 Garand rifles,
2,500 Thompson submachineguns, 1,500
carbines, 8,000 automatic pistols (.45 caliber) ,
1,000 Dominican San Cristobal rifles and a
relatively small number of British Enfield
rifles.
Cuba got the U.S. weapons under hemis-
pheric mutual defense pacts, supervised by
the Inter-American Defense Board,
The United States formerly maintained a
military mission in Cuba to instruct the
armed forces in uses of the armaments. The
mission was withdrawn at Castro's request
shortly after he came to power in Jan-
uary 1959.
Until Castro received large shipments of
rifles from Belgium in 1959 and subsequent
heavy supplies of Soviet bloc arms, particu-
larly automatic weapons from Czechoslo-
vakia, the U.S. weapons that fell in is
hands were used by his armed forces and
early militia units.
Cuba's military muscle now has been
standardized with all Soviet and Czech fire-
power, functioning under a Czech-style
table of organization created late last year
with the guidance of an imported Spanish-
born Communist military strategist, "Gen."
Enrique Lister. '
NEXT TO ARSENAL FOR INSPECTION
Upon completion of the standardization,
Castro and Guevara ordered all "foreign"
weapons delivered to the new Matanzas Ar-
senal for "repairs, inspection, and storage."
The word "foreign" in Cuba today is syn-
onymous with the United States.
The storage phase of the directive has been
brief, according to the intelligence findings.
From the arsenal-depot the revitalized
U.S. Weapons are shipped directly to other
Latin America points or moved first to
terminals in Havana, Cienfuegos and Santi-
ago.
Oceangoing launches are the principal
means of transportation for the weapons
destined for Castro's subversive agent.
Some have gone by air.
Shipments usually are small, sometimes
packed carefully among general cargo and
hidden between bags of exported sugars
U.S. Navy destroyers and destroyer es-
corts still maintain an arms smuggling pa-
trol off the Caribbean coast of Central Amer-
ica.
Some of Castro's smuggling boats are
known to have eluded the patrol. A few oth-
ers have been allowed to "escape" for sur-
veillance purposes.
Last month U.S. intelligence agents ob-
served one .shipment of. U.S. weapons from
Cuba secreted into a secluded Pacific coast
area of Nicaragua.
A. Cuban ship in the 3,500-ton class, work-
ing its way down Mexican west coast ports
with general cargo, one dark night slipped
into the Gulf of Fonesca, g deepwater
harbor which touches the coasts of Hon-
duras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
Three small motorboats drifted alongside
the Cuban ship and boxes were lowered into
them. The shipments weighed close to a ton.
Each small boat eased away bearing loads
weighing between 600 and 700 pounds.
Manning the small unlighted boats were
fishermen from the tiny Salvadorean island
of Meanguera, where the Cuban packages
were hidden until colleagues set up transfer
of the weapons to the Nicaraguan coastal
town of Chinandega.
Once in Chinandega the shipment was
taken over by about 20 men who smuggled
it into the mountains for distribution to
peasant supporters.
Intelligence sources learned that this par-
ticular shipment, typical of others reaching
the Central American area from the Matan-
zas Arsenal, was about 100 U.S. M-1 rifles, a
small number of .45-caliber automatic pistols
and subma,chineguns, a substantial number
of boxes of .30- and .45-caliber ammunition,
and an undetermined number of cases of
grenades.
In Central America, as elsewhere along the
Castro subversion path, the idea appears to
be that the U.S.-made weapons provide an
almost perfect cover from detection by Latin
American authorities.
Smuggling of Cuba's Czech-made arms
would be a certain giveaway to the source of
supply.
On the Caribbean side of the Central
American coastline, the report notes that the
most probable relay point for the Cuban
smuggling is a tiny key near the island of
Cozumel, just south of the eastern tip of
Mexico's Yucatan peninsula.
PERT/ INFILTRATED WITH SMALL ARMS
U.S. intelligence also has gathered informa-
tion about clandestine shipments of small
arms into Peru recently by way of Bolivia
and Brazil smuggling networks.
Close study is being given to reports reach-
ing the intelligence analysts that occasional
small arms shipments are being delivered by
Soviet bloc ships putting in at Mexican,
Colombian, Ecuadoran and Brazilian ports
and at Georgetown, British Guiana, after
sailing from Havana.
So far there has not been a hard confirma-
tion of the Soviet involvement.
The violent but short-lived rebellion
against the Venezuelan Government of
President Romulo Betancourt last month at
Carupano was linked to Castro's spreading
subversion operations.
It is believed by Venezuelan and United
States intelligence that the weapons used by
the pro-Castro-Communist forces against the
Betancourt regime probably came from the
Matanzas arsenal. The anti-Betancourt
forces were well stocked with U.S.-made
weapons.
Guerrilla forces operating in southern and
eastern Venezuela also are believed to have
been supplied with armaments from Castro's
"surplus" stockpile.
Some of the weapons are said to have been
smuggled into Venezuela from Cuba by way
of British Guiana, whose Premier Cheddi ,Ja-
gan is an ardent supporter of Castro and
Communist Cuba.
Also linked to the Cuban arms exporting
activities are guerrilla fighters harassing
the backlands of Colombia.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, May
31, 19631
CASTRO THESIS: REDS TUG AMERICAS
(By Bertram B. Johansson)
An increasing Communist threat to Latin
America is ominously indicated as an end
result of Premier Fidel Castro's visit to the
Soviet Union, now coming to a close.
Texts of speeches and communiques now
available disclose specifically how the two
Communist countries intend to support so-
called national liberation movements in
Latin America.
An examination of Premier Castro's
speeches in the Soviet Union indicates he
has been completely won over to the thesis,
If he had not been before, that communism
is in the ascendancy in the world today and
that capitalism's decay is inevitable.
Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev,
dilating on. the theme, promised military
weapons to such "liberation" movements.
In his May 23 speech in Moscow, the So-
viet Premier said that "the Soviet Union
and all socialist countries see their interna-
tional duty in rendering all-out support and
comprehensive help to the national libera-
tion movement.
ATTEMPTS REPORTED
"What does it mean to render help to the
national liberation movement?" Premier
Khrushchev asks proceeding then to answer
his own question.
"It means, first of all, to struggle against
the- interference of imperialism in the in-
ternal affairs of peoples of the liberated
countries, to lend all-out support, including
supply of arms, to the peoples who are -waging
a just struggle against the foreign. yoke.
Second, it means to oppose any. form of neo-
colonialism, to help the peoples of the young
states develop the economy of their coun-
tries, to lend all-out support to these coun-
tries in the international arena."
As an indication this has already begun,
there have been three reports by correspond:-
ents on the scene in the Dominican Republic
of insistent and persistent attempts by
Communists to infiltrate the democratically
oriented government of President Bosch.
One correspondent asserts that some of
these attempts may, indeed, have already
succeeded, though others report that right-
ists have been supporting Communist strikes
and then charging the Bosch government
has been too tolerant of such strikes.
STRIKE CALLED
In Peru this month, a group of young
revolutionaries, including Javier Heraud
Perez, a promising poet from a wealthy
family, who had all been trained in Cuba
in subversive guerrilla techniques, infiltrated
back into Peru with weapons, funds, and
guerrilla supplies.
When they attempted to shoot their way
through a hotel lobby in the jungle village
of Puerto Maldonado near the Bolivian bor-
der, two were killed and the others captured
and killed in the next few days.
In British Guiana where Marxist Prime
Minister Cheddi Jagan has attempted to
rush through legislation giving the govern-
ment the power to choose labor unions that
would negotiate with employers, democrati-
cally oriented labor unions have caned a
general strike which now enters its seventh
week.
PRISONER ESCAPES
Thus far, Prime Minister Jagan has shown
no signs of yielding on the issue. Garbage
has begun to pile up in the streets of George-
town, the mails are going awry, foodstuffs
are in short supply, and the British Ma-
rines are on hand to head off torrid riots
such as occurred there last year.
In Caracas, Venezuela, where Communist
terrorists have carried on a campaign to
destroy confidence in the Betancourt gov-
ernment, another instance of what police
have to deal with occurred Tuesday.
Winston Bermudez Machado, a pro-Com-
munist student, held for stealing 3500,000
worth of French impressionist paintings
from a French Government exhibit in Ca-
racas, obtained permission to enter a court-
house bathroom, before his trial, disguised
himself there as a woman, and camly walked
out past his guards to freedom.
' [From the Christian Science Monitor,
Mar. 8, 1963]
CASTRO STIRS REVOLUTION
HAVANA.---Cuba's leaders are predicting
that all Latin America will fall under the
red banner of communism before long. For
one, they believe the days of President Betan-
court of Venezuela are numbered.
But their course of action has run into
resistance from other Latin-American Com-
munists who prefer peaceful coexistence for
the moment.
In the words of the Cuban leaders, the
times call for action, not theories. As Pre-
mier Fidel Castro's newspaper Revolucien
put it:
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"The'situation in the hemisphere) is not
for sitting to ruminate brilliant concepts, but
to make revolutions."
AOPTON URGED --
. _
It. was "commenting on a speech by Pre-
Mier Casti-o, urging more action and less talk
in the drive for revolution. He also asked
his admirers' to "cre-ate subjective conditions"
which would trigger the upheavals in Latin
America, Which he feels is ripe for them.
MarxiscLeidiiist 'theoreticians claim the
working Classes' of a nation will eventually
overthrow their exploiters and establish a
dictatorsh:IP of the proletariat. These creeds
were developed in the days of the European
industrial rev-ohition, giving little or no
thought to Latin America.
There being no large proletariat in Latin
America, the shortest-way to a Red future is
revolution, Cuban leaders feel.
..
_ iii:riMOrrwr ASSAILED
Most followers Of Premier Castro appear
confident President Betancourt soon will fall.
The armed forays of the "National Liberation
Front" of Venezuela are prominently fea-
tured in the Havana press. The reader is
left wondering what keeps President Betan-
court in power.
Deputy Premier Raul Castro has said "the
Cuban revolution is the revolution of 200
illion Latin Americans."
What Quba is doing to export revolution
In Latin America was indicated in a state-
ment by John A. McCone, head of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, made public in
Washington last week. Mr. McCone said
from 1,000 to 1,500 went to Cuba in 1962 for
training as guerrillas and more went this
year. Mr. McCone said most came from
Venezuela, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Argen-
tina, and Bolivia.
Many Western diplomats believe the Cuban
leaders have told Communist parties in Latin
America:- either -share Havana's revolution
view and- count on Cuban support or fall
back oh Pearroaar - coexistence and lose Pre-
mier Castle's favor.
Premier Casifro-has already censured some
unnamed- P-artieg who ignored his "Second
Declaration of Havana," a document de-
scribed as the "Castro-Coriimunist manifesto
of the Americas."
A diplomat illustrated it this way; "The
future of the Chban revolution depends on
the fact that Cuba, 'first socialist country in
the Americas, doe's not becoriie the last one.'"
.?
_op:Tx:ton fmcno&T_ED
Another one said that although voicing ad-
miration for his Movement, not many Latin
American Communist Parties feel like follow-
- ing the Castro example. They prefer to live
in peaceful coexistence with other parties,
frequently forming "popular fronts."
? It was noted last week that while Brazilian
Peasant League leader, Francisco JuliAo, said
? there was "no other exit but armed struggle"
? in Latin America, Luis Prestes, secretary of
Brazil's Communist Party, also in Havana at
the time, chos--,' to remain silent.
..-, A V .,,,T
---.,En ANARCHISTS
Said a visiting Communist: "Since Stalin's
death the Comniunist Parties in the Ameri-
- cas have worked to attain a political respec-
tability. Most have been successful. Why
change now?" -
He mentioned the Venezuelan cale, saying
the Communists there stood in danger of
being outlawed because of their identifica-
tion with terrorists. He added quickly: "The
Venezuelan party is not really Communist
hilt anarchist. It lacks leadership."
?Prsinier Casty') was at dads with the So-
'Viet tram]; ori1he handling of the Cuban
. crisis'. The Russians could now he trying to
avoid a-cbllision on a question which could
be discussed further on. -
POOnInunists Obey Mosco*, and-With their
'40 years of experience in political matters
Will not follow blindly Havana's ism,' said a
viettips South American lawyer. -
..
[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, Jan, 13,
1963]
HALT GUERRILLAS, HONDURAS ASKED
MANAGUA" NICARAGUA ?The Government of
_
Nicaragua has infornially- 'Called called on
Honduras to eliminate what it described as a
Castro guerrilla force there awaiting a chance
to invade.
Nicaragua made no formal demand, but the
statement reminded Honduras of its obliga-
tion. The communique said the Castro
groups are distributing antigovernment pro-
paganda in Nicaragua and using a small
plane to sabotage canefields in Carazo
Province.
Meanwhile, the head of the political party
opposing the government criticized U.S. sup-
port of dictators such as President Luis So-
moza, of Nicaragua.
Dr. Fernando Aguero said such support is
partly to blame for the leftist inclinations of
many university students.
Earlier this week, the Inter-American Hu-
man Rights Commission of the Organization
of American States issued a statement which
said it deplores Nicaragua's refusal to let the -
commission meet there this month.
The commission message added that it in-
tended to determine whether human rights
are being violated in Nicaragua, and that it
particularly would keep an eye on the Febru-
ary elections.
[From Cuban Newsletter]
Castro is sending arms to the frontier re-
gions of Brazil and Venezuela, for delivery
to Red guerrillas, according to Scripps-How-
ard Editor Richard Boyce. The dispatch,
datelined Georgetown, British Guiana, said
18 known airfields were receiving the hard-
ware from Cuba, and many more are scat-
tered in recondite jungle areas. American
submachineguns, issued to Batista forces in
1958, showed up in the recent disturbances
in British Guiana. They could only come
from Cuba. This is precisely what President
Kennedy said that the United States would
?
not' tolerate in the hemisphere. But there
he is, tolerating.
TRIBUTE TO SENATOR KEATING
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. KEATING. I yield.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I congratu-
late the distinguished junior Senator
from New 'York for his clear, c-on?cise
statement in support of the ratification
of the treaty.
I also wish to congratulate him on the
anniversary, today, of the passage by
Congress of the joint resolution on Cuba.
We are all aware of the- diligence and
persistence with which the junior Sena-
tor from New York pursued this subject
until the purpose was accomplished.
I also wish to commend him? for ably
filling the role of Chaplain yesterday
morning, when he opened the Senate
with prayer. The Senator from New
York is an outstanding and worthwhile
statesman.
Mr. KEATING. I am most grateful to
my dear colleague for his kind remarks.
They mean much to me.
-there was a 'relaxation, and an attempt
was made to discourage ships of the free
world from trading with Cuba. I must
suggest rt has been a serious attempt,
with some progress Made on the part of
the administration, the Department of
State, and the President. In many cases,
the contracts for delivery had previously
been made, and the ships were making
deliveries.
The United States has notified the gov-
ernments of the free world which allow
their ships to enter Cuba that those ships
would not be allowed to enter American
ports and discharge or load American
cargo.
This has had an effect on some nations
and on some of the ships that had been
entering Cuba. However, it does not
affect all of them, because in many cases
the ships do not come, or do not care to
come, to United States ports. Some na-
tions have joined with the United States
in the attempt to discourage shipping to
Cuba, and there has been a gradual en-
closure of maritime activities into and
out of the island by the nations of the
free world, although not sufficient, so far
as I personally am concerned, in accord-
ance with my views. In all fairness,
however. I must say that some progress
has been made.
In many cases, the nations involved
have little or no control over the ships
that may be flying their flags. Some-
time a ship may fly the flag of Panama,
of Greece, or of another country, yet
never touch any of the ports of the coun-
try whose flag they fly or the country
in which the ship is registered. So there
are complexities.
However, I am hopeful that the na-
tions of the free world will continue their
efforts to discourage such shipping to
the point where there will be a complete
economic blockade, with perhaps only
the rare exception of a shipment of medi-
cal supplies or similar shipments.
Some of the unions and union leaders,
'whom I mentioned in previous remarks
concerning agreements that have been
made for future relations in the mari-
time industry, have been urging their
fellow workers in other parts of the world
not to load ships destined for Cuba.
There have been some memorable exam-
ples of refusal to load such ships.
Nevertheless, the practice is still occur-
ring.
Occasionally, I have placed in the
RECoRD, when the information has been
made available to me, lists of ships from
the free world that have been plying
into and out of Cuba. I have listed the
names of the ships, their gross tonnage,
and the flags they fly. This information
has been supplied not only for the benefit
of Congress and the American people,
but also for the benefit of representatives
of those countries in-Washington. Our
hope has been that much more might be
done to improve the situation than is
being done.
Today I wish to place in the RECORD
a list of free world and Polish-flag ships
that have entered and departed from
Cuba since January 1, 1963. The list
contains the names of the ships, their
tonnage, and their flag registry.
FOREIGN SHIPMENTS TO CUBA
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I
have spoken several times since the be-
ginning of this session of Congress about
our problems in this hemisphere as they
relate to shipments to the island of Cuba.
At one time, the U.S. Government en-
forced a strong blockade, following the
October 1962, incident with Cuba. Then
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1.6722 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
The total number of ships, of all flags,
' is 175. Great Britain leads the field with
53. Greek-flag ships are right behind,
with 52. Ships flying the Lebanese flag
are not far behind, their number being
31.
Italian-flag ships numbered 10, Polish-
flag ships 8, Yugoslavia ships 6, Nor-
wegian-flag ships 5, Spanish-flag ships
3, Moroccan-flag slaps 2; Swedish-flag
ships 2, Finnish-flag ships 1, French-flag
ships 1, and Japanese-flag ships 1.
Thus it can be seen that flags flying
the British, Greek, and Lebanese flags
account for more than 90 percent of all
the ships that are trading with the Com-
munist country of Cuba.
I ask unanimous consent that the
statement entitled "List of Free World
and Polish Flag Vessels Arriving in Cuba
Since January 1, 1983," be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
merit was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
From Department of Commerce, Maritime
Administration, Report No, 16]
Lim. or FBEE WORLD- AND POLISH-FLAG %TES-
BESS ABEIVING LW CUBA SINCE JANUARY 1,
1963
.45xciTolv 1. Pursuant to the national secu-
rity ittion memorandum No. 220, dated Feb-
ruary 5, 1983, addressed to the Secretary of
State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secre-
tary . of Agriculture; the Secretary of
Commerce; the Administrator, Agency for
International Development; and the Admin-
istrator, General Services Administration,
concerning U.S. Government shipments by
foreign-Sag vessels in the Cuban trade, the
Maritime Administration is making available
to the appropriate Departments the follow-
ing list of vessels which have arrived in.Cuba
since January 1, 1963; based on information
received through September 6, 1963,, exclu-
sive of those, vessels that called at Cuba on
U.S. Government-approved noncommercial
voyages and those listed in section 2:
Flag of registry and name of ship
Gross
tonnage
Total, all flags (175 ships) _ 1, 391, 901
British (53 ships) 490, 2'73
Ardgem
Ardmore
Ardrowan
Arlington Court
AtheIcrown. (tanker)
Athelduke (tanker)
Athelmere (tanker)
AtheLmonarch (tanker)
Athelsultan (tanker)
Avisfaitla_
Baxtergate
Cedar Hill
Chipbee
Dairen 1
East Breeze
Fir Hill
Grosvenor Mariner
Hazelrnoor
Ho Fung
Inchstaffa
Ivy Fair (now Cosmo Trader)
ICirriemoor
Linkmoor
London Confidence (tanker)
London Glory (tanker)
London Harmony (tanker)
London Independence (tanker) _
London Majesty (tanker)
London Pride (tanker)
London Spirit (tanker)1
London Splendour (tanker)
Footnotes at end of table.
6.981
4, 664
7, 300
9, 662
11, 149
9, 089
7, 524
11, 182
9, 149
7, 868
8,813
7, 156
7, 271
4, 939
8, 708
7, 119
7, 026
7, 907
7, 121
5.255
7, 201
5, 923
8, 236
21, 699
10, 081
13, 157
22, 643
12, 132
10, 776
10,176
16, 195
Flag of registry and name of ship-Continued
Gross
British-Continued tonnage
London Valour (tanker)1 16, 268
London Victory (tanker) 12, 132
Lord Gladstone 11, 299
Maratha Enterprise 7, 168
Oceantramp_ 6, 185
Oceantravel 10, 477
Overseas Explorer (tanker) 16, 267
Overseas Pioneer (tanker) 16, 267
Redbrook 7, 388
Sh ienfoon 7, 127
Sllverforce
8,058
Silverlake
8, 058
Stanwear 1
8, 108
Suva Breeze
4,970
Thames Breeze
'7, 878
Tuise Hill
7, 120
Vercharmian
7, 265
Vergmont
7, 381
West Breeze
8,718
Yungfutary
5.388
Yunglutaton
5, 414
Zela M.
7,237
Greek (52 ships)
403,577
Aegaion
7.239
Agios Therapon ,
5,817
Akastos
7,331
Aldebaran ?,(tanker)
12, 897
Alice IL..
7, 189
Americana
7, 104
Anacreon
7, 359
Antonia
5, 171
Apulian
9,744
Armathia
7. 091
Athanassios X
7,216
Barbarism
7, 084
Calliopi Michalos
7, 249
Capetan Petros
7, 291
Despoina
5, 006
Efcharis
7, 249
Eftychia
7, 223
Embassy
8,418
Everest
7, 031
Flora Mr
'1, 244
Galini
7, 266
Gloria
7, 128
Hydrates III
5,239
Istros II
7, 275
Katingo
7, 349
Kostis 1
7,264
Kyra Hariklia
0.888
Maria de Lourdes._
7,219
Marla Santa
7,217
Maria Theresa_
7, 245
Maroudio _
7,369
Mastro-Stellios II_
7,282
Nicholaos Frangistas
7, 199
North Empress
10, 904
North -Queen
8.341
Parnit
3,929
Pantanassa
7, 131
Paxoi
7, 144
Penelope
6, 712
Perseus (tanker)
15,852
Polaris
9, 603
Pollux
9, 956
Poly xeni
7, 143
Propontis
'7, 128
lledestos
5,911
Seirios
7, 239
Sirius (tanker)
16,241
Stylianos N. Vlassopulos__.
7, 244
Timios Stavros
5, 269
Tina
7,362
Vassilild (tanker),
10, 507
Western Trader_____.?-*
9, 268
Lebanese (31 ships)
_
209,222
Aiolos U
7,256
Akarnas. _
7, 285
Alaska
6,989
Anthas
7.044
Antonis
6,259
Areti 1
'7, 176
Astir _
5, 324
Aristefs
6, 995
September *40'
Flag of registry and name of ship--Continued
Gross
Lebanese--Continued tonnage
Carnation 4,884
Dimos 7, 187
Giorgos Tsaldroglou 7, 240
Granikos 7, 292
Ilena_ 5,925
Ioannis Aspiotis 7, 297
Kalliopi D. Lemos 15, 103
Malou 7, 145
Mantric 7, 255
IVIersinidi 6, 782
Mousse_ 6,984
Noelle 7,251
Noemi 7.070
Olga 7. 199
Panagos '7, 133
Parmarina 6, 721
Razani 7, 253
St. Anthony 5,349
St. Nicholas 7.165
San John_ 5, 172
San Spyridon '7,260
Tertric 7,045
Vassiliki 7, 192
Italian (10 ships) 71.816
-----
Achille 6, 950
Airone 6, 969
Annalisa 2, 479
Arenella 7, 183
Aspromonte 1 7, 154
Cannaregio 7, 184
Linda Giovanna (tanker) 9,985
Nazareno 7, 175
San Nicola (tanker) 12,461
Santa Lucia 1 9, 278
Italian (10 ships) 76, 816
Baltyk 11, 963
Bialystok '7,173
Bytom 5,967
Chopin 6, 987
Chorzow 7, 237
Kopalnia Miechowice 7, 223
Kopalnia. Siemianowice 7, 165
Plast 3, 184
Yugoslav (6 ships) 42,810
Bar 7, 233
Cavtat 7, 266
Cetinje '7,200
Dugi Otok 6,997
Promina 6, 960
Trebisnjica '7,145
Norwegian (5 ships) 54, 502
Kongsgaard (tanker) 19, 999
Lovdal (tanker) 12, 764
Ole Bratt 5, 252
Polyclipper (tanker) 11. 737
Tine (now Jezrell) 4.760
Spanish (3 ships)
6.664
Castillo Ampudia 3,566
Sierra Madre 999
Sierra Maria 999
Moroccan (2 ships) 19,140
----------
Atlas 10, 392
Toubkal 8, 748
Swedish (2 ships) 14, 295
Dagmar 6,490
Atlantic Friend____. 7, 805
Finnish (1 ship) : Valny (tanker) _
French (1 ship) : Circe'
Japanese (1 ship) : Meishun Maru
11, 691
2.874
8,647
'Added to report No. 15 appearing 1:0 the
Federal Register issue of August 30, 1963.
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-
963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
Sic. 2. In accordance with the provisions
of national security action memorandum No.
220 of February 5, 1963;111e following vessels.
which called at Cuba after January 1, 1963,
have re,acquired-eligibili4y to carry U.S. Gov-
eriniera-financOd -cargo& from the United
States by virtue of the persons Who control
the vessels having given satisfactory certifi-
cation, and assurance that no ships Under
their control will, thenceforth, he employed
In the Cuba trade so long as it remains the
policy of the U.S. Government to discourage
such trade:
(a) Since last report: None.
(b) Previous reports:
Flag of registry:
British
Danish
German (West) 1
Greek
Norwegian
SEC. 3. The ships listed in sections 1 and
2 have made the following number of trips
to Cuba in 1963, based on information re-
ceived through September 6, 1963:
Number
of ships
2
1
16723
_
not more than 75 widely-scattered pages
are devoted to reasons why we should
appfove this treaty. All the rest deal
with refuting, examining, explaining
away, and delineating the many disad-
vantages that could accrue to this co1l-
1 try. This fact alone is quite significant.
1 We have had no problem of finding out
what the treaty does not do; the problem
has been in pinpointing just what it does
do.
Here is my list of the things its pro-
ponents say it does:
First. The treaty will help contain the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Second. The treaty will help slow
down the arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Third. The treaty will ease tension in
the world and create a better atmosphere
that would be conducive to the estab-
lishment of peace, in contrast to a nu-
clear war; or?as stated differently by
some proponents, but essentially the
same thing?the treaty will open up new
paths toward future agreements between
the free world and the Communist world.
Fourth. The treaty must be approved
by the Senate, because its rejection at
this point would cause world opinion to
turn violently against the United States.
"It is practically impossible to find this
reason Stated in plain language by any
backers of the treaty. But, in my opin-
ion, it is one of the most important of all
the threads which run throughout all the
proponents' thinking.
Fifth. The treaty will reduce the ra-
dioactive pollution of the planet.
Mr. President, let us examine, one by
one, the five points-put forward by the
proponents.
I ask my colleagues to bear in mind
that each time I shall quote a statement
in regard to these five points, it will be
a statement made by a proponent of the
treaty. If I had wanted to refute these
five points, I could have found many
statements to do that. I could have
turned to what the distinguished senior
Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]
has said. As the highly respected and
eminently capable chairman of the
-Armed Services Committee for many
years, his opinion in U.S. military mat-
ters is seldom challenged. Or I could
have quoted another great Senator,
the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr.
SrEmus], who, as chairman of the Pre-
paredness Investigating Subcommittee,
has for many months been holding hear-
ings on the whole realm of a test ban
treaty. Also, I could have leaned on the
many sound statements made by a mem-
ber of my own political party, the Senator
from Arizona [Mr. GOLD WATER], who, as
a major general in the Air Force Reserve,
is also knowledgeable in such matters.
I did not do this.
My intent is to be as objective as pos-
sible. So I turned to the testimony of
high-ranking officials, competent scien-
tists, and dedicated military leaders who,
I knew, favored this test ban treaty.
I wanted to see what they thought the
treaty really would do?what they listed
on the "pro" side of the ledger. I shall
now proceed to state what some of these
proponents say in reference to the five
things the treaty is purported to do:
Flag of registry
Number of trips
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
... .. .. ..
5
8
8
17
13
15
14
11
1
Lebanese
4
1
6
8
2
8
8
17
8
12
9
17
8
6
3
I
Norwegian
2
4
1
2
1
2
Italian
1
1
2
3
2
2
1
Yugoslav
2
2
1
1
1
1
Spanish
2
1
1
Danish
Finnish
1
Frengh...
1
'German (Val) ?
Japanese
1
Moroccan
1
1
Swedish
1
Subtotal
Polish_
12
2
19
1
29
1
37
2
44
2
43
2
45
1
27
1
3
Grapd total
14
20
30
39
46
45
46
28
3
Total
92
78
90
12
13
8
4
1
1
4
3
259
12
271
_
Nor.?Trip totals in this section exceed
ship totals in sections 1 and 2 because some
of the .ships made more thart one trip to
Cuba. .
Dated: September 10, 1963.
GEORGE R. Gairraxg;
Acting Deputy Maritime Administrator.
rf".
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The Senate resumed the consideratio
o Exectitive M (88th cong, 1st sess.) ,
the treaty banning nuclear weapon testa
in the atmosphere, in outer _space, and
Underwater.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, IVIr. Presi-
dent, I rise today to take myself out of
the ranks of the "uncommitted," with
reference to the question of Senate ap-
proval of the test ban treaty, and to
? 811110AnCe that I intend to vote "nay" on
? this question.
I take this position with great reluc-
tance, because I have sincerely hoped
that in good conscience I could support
the treaty. No one is more eager than
I for aselaxatiim of word tensions and
for a stap?howcver srnallz.--toward peace
with honor. And I would gladly vote
for approval of this treaty if it provided
for adequate inspection..
,
EVQ.11 though the vote, as always, will
be determined by the yeas and nays,
the 0914;its and the uncertainties and the
hopes and the prayers do not lend them-
selves to a clearcut decision. All we can
hope for is that the weight of the deci-
sion will best be borne by each Senator
as his own conscience dictates, Even
though this issue divides 1.1s, our ,common
objective is an enduring peace. .
-,'er gtere th 9 14 a week the senate has
? been paged m.dehate on the question
of Senate apprlOvai of this treaty?per-
haps the most important and far-reach-
ing question to be before this ,body since
World War IL: Both the proponents
and the opponents of the treaity have
4
been heard; many speeches have been
made, and many pledges, either for or
against the treaty, have been given.
Many Senators who have taken the
Senate floor to speak either for or against
the treaty have eminently more knowl-
edge than I have about the present mili-
tary posture of our country, how it com-
pares with that of the Soviet Union, and
the effect the treaty could have on its
future.
Not having served on any Senate com-
mittee which dealt directly with the
treaty, I found myself in a position com-
parable in many ways to that of a lay-
man who would be called upon to make
a decision as to how to cast his vote. To
compensate for this, I have done what
I am sure all other Senators have done?
read all the testimony available to me;
spoken at length with men such as Am-
bassador Averell Harriman, an avid sup-
porter of treaty; and talked as much as
possible with men such as Dr. Edward
Teller, a dedicated and sincere opponent
of the treaty in its present form.
Because I always like to approach a
problem positively, I began making a
list of all the reasons why this country
should, with the advice And consent of
the Senate, become a party to this treaty.
That was?and still is?an almost im-
possible job, although not for the reason
some may think?namely, that the list
is long and involved with many ex-
planations. On the contrary, the list
is extremely short; and the advantages
involved almost defy definition in plain
English, and are qualified time after
time. For the most part, even those who
espouse these reasons seem to have grave
doubts about their credibility.
My list was gleaned primarily from
the testimony given before the Foreign
Relations Committee. Incidentally, I
would venture to guess that out of some
1010 pages of testimony and statements,
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16724 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
The first argument gf the proponents
is that the treaty wilr help contain the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, let us examine the rec-
ord.
?peeretary Rusk said:
We cannot guarantee it. Most of the coun-
tries with the capacity and the incentive to
develop nuclear weapons over the next dec-
ade or so have already announced that they
will accept the self-denying ordinanee of the
treaty. These countries do not include, by
the way, mainland China or France.
Mr. Rusk was evidently not completely
convinced.
Secretary McNamara said:
The treaty does not cover the subject of
proliferation. That is clear. The treaty re-
lates to nuclear tests and certain prohibited
environments.
If the treaty does not cover the sub-
ject of proliferation of nuclear weapons,
how could it even begin to deal effeo-
tively -with this problem?
General LeMay said, in answer to a
question about what influence the treaty
would have on the stoppage of 'a prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons:
I think it possibly would, among the
countries that have no serious programs on
them. I don't think it is going to stop the
Chinese from going on with their program.
Certainly it is not going to stop the French
from going on with their program.
So I believe this interpretation to be
something less than wholehearted sup-
port on a most significant point.
Other articulate proponents of the
treaty have said they believed. the role
of the treaty in inhibiting proliferation
has been generally overestimated. They
have pointed out that most of the coun-
tries who,,have signed the test ban have
neither the capacity nor the desire to de-
velop nuclear weapons.
My conclusion on this point had to be
that if, indeed, the treaty would have
any effect on the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons, such an effect would
be so small as to be almost negligible?
so small that the proponents had not
been able to support the statement be-
yond reatonable doubt.
The second argument of the propo-
nents is that the treaty will help slow
down the arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, if that is true, this in-
deed would be an admirable objective.
Secretary Rusk said:
This treaty itself does not reduce weapons
In being or prevent their further production.
This treaty is aimed only' at the question
of nuclear explosions. I regret Myself that
it has not been possible to make greater
headway in some actual physical- disarma-
ment measures consistent with our own
security.
But this treaty is not a step In that di-
rection?this treaty is not itself dealing with
that problem. It may turn, out -to be one
small step that opens up some possibili-
ties in this field but that has not yet become
apparent.
Secretary McNamara said, in almost
the same breath when he was talking
about more money for defense and the
continued military preparedness of our
country:
This treaty ? ? ? will not reduce the
existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It
will not halt the production of nuclear
weapons. It Will not prevent qualitative
weapons improvement of many kinds.
The testimony on this point leaves
little more than a slender hope.
The third argument of tie proponents
is that the treaty will ease tensfon in
the world and create a better atmosphere
that would be conducive to the estab-
lishment of peace in contrast to a nu-
clear war; or, stated differently by some
proponents, this treaty will open up new
paths toward future agreements between
the pee world and the Communist world.
Secretary Rusk, this Nation's highest
ranking diplomat, said:
If it should work to reduce those tensions,
as I think that it well might, and if it makes
it possible to consider additional points of
agreement carefully considered and thought-
fully worked out on both sides, then I think
that there could be a reduction in the real
danger of nuelear war. BUt I do want to
say, sir, that we are not over the divide on
this, and anything that we say on this could
be wrong tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.
Again, later in his testimony, he said:
But I might have misled the committee a
little bit in my earlier remarks, because
when I said that I thought they [the Rus-
sians] were ready to explore the possibility
of agreement on other points, that still is
subject to the great reservation: On what
terms.
And I must say that I do not see ahead of
us in the immediate future agreements on
some of these major and dangerous Issues
on terms that -could really be agreed by the
two sides ? ? la
The gap is very wide.
General LeMay, in answer to whether
or not we would be closer to or further
from nuclear war if the treaty were not
ratified, said:
I don't think we are any farther or any
closer to a nuclear war with or without the
test ban treaty.
Later, the general continued:
If it leads to additional steps to reduce
tension, then I think you would have to say
that we withdraw from the possibilities of
war.
But in itself alone, I don't think it is
enough of weight to say it has changed the
situation at all.
Again, I find the testimony hanging on
a thread of hope.
We do not create the tensions. The
Soviets do. They have taken not even
one small step to relax tensions. It is
even possible that, under the treaty, ten-
sions might be increased rather than
diminished. Are we not pledged to con-
tinue the perfection of our weapons sys-
tem under limitations imposed on us by
the treaty?not knowing when or where
other signers?or nonsigners?will, by
their deceit or aggression, force us to
withdraw?
The fourth point of the proponents is
as follows: This treaty must be ratified
by the Senate because its rejection at
this point would cause world opinion to
turn violently against the United States.
Secretary Rusk said:
I think there would be very great regret
If this treaty were to collapse.
But, on the other hand, where we are
dealing with a security matter that goes to
the life of our own country, I do not believe
September 20
that world opinion can play a decisive role.
We must do what has to be done, and I be-
lieve that the rest of the world will under-
stand. ? * ?
I think that there would be general un-
derstanding, even if with great regret, there
would be general understanding if we came
to the conclusion that this treaty was not
working and that our security required us
to resume testing.
General Wheeler, in response to a
question as to whether or not his deci-
sion to back the treaty had been influ-
enced by the fact the treaty had already
been signed, said:
It undoubtedly introduces a new factor.
CM the other hand, insofar as affecting the
overall military security of the United
States, it has no bearing whatsoever. And
the primary concern of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is to point out dangers to our security--
those which are acceptable, and those which
are not.
In later testimony; he took a slightly
different tack:
I would agree that world opinion has built
up to the point where there would be very
sizable political implications if the United
States were to dash these hopes. I am not
prePared to say exactly what the effect of
those political implications or the political
effect would be, but I do not think it would
be good.
General LeMay had a somewhat dif-
ferent opinion about 'the importance of
what the rest of the world thought re-
garding ratification. This evidently had
colored his own ultimate decision on the
test ban treaty. At this point, so that it
cannot be said that I am quoting the
general out of context in any way, I
would like to repeat a dialog between
him and the able Senator from South
Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] :
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mx. Chair-
man.
General LeMay, Senator GOLDWATER asked
a question similar to one I propounded in
the Preparedness Subcommittee. That is
this: If the proposed treaty had not already
been signed, but was being considered in a
proposal stage, would you recommend that
the United States sign the treaty?
General LEMAY. I haven't given any
thought to the subject. Senator. I maid I
would?I thought I would not be in favor of
it. But I wouldn't even want to give an
unqualifieff "No" until I spent some time on
It. Certainly this was a factor that influ-
enced me in recommending that we ratify it.
How much weight I would give to it?I would
want to spend a considerable amount of
time on this, and I have not done so.
Senator THURMOND. I believe your answer
In the subcommittee, and I quote, was this:
"I think that if we were in a proposal stage
that I would not recommend?that I would
recommend against it."
That is correct, is it not?
General LEMAY. I think I would. That is
correct.
I do not like the suggestion of outside
pressures. My feelings on this are ex-
pressed for me much better than 1 my-
self can do by a recent column written
by David Lawrence entitled "Too Late
for Senate To Advise."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have this article included in the
RECORD at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL 13.E.COR,
!From the Evening Star, Washington, D.C.
..(kus - 0 1963j
Too LArz rOcarzarz To ADV=
Approved For !Release 2007/01/20cIALADP66
iSS,- w
v La re c
, _
The cepAtitution gays the President "shall
have power, by and with the advice and
consent Of MO Senate, to Make treaties."
There is no evidence that the text of the
limited Unclear_ test ban treaty signed in
Moscow recently was ever submitted in ad-
vance to the Senate so that it eould tender
its adviCe before the document was signed.
There_ is no evidence, either, that the text
was sliown to all the members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff before It was initialed and
then signed at Moscow. Gen. Curtis LeMay,
Chief of the U.S. Air Force, told a Senate
-conifinttee usterday, that "I think I would
have been Against" the treaty if it had not
already been signed. He added that "the fact
-that It rigs. beep signed had an effect on
Me, yes," 'because "there might be some po-
litical disadvantage if we don't ratify it."
? This frar* observatti indicates clearly
that, once the signature of the executive
' branch of the Government has been affixed
? to it treaty, there itreally no opportunity to
render at/74.M The Senate, for instance, can
only ratify or reject._ There is no chance to
? amend or inwlify the terms except by a new
negotiation, which, of course, is difficult and
ten impractical.
Bo Senator- HaRay OoLowArza, of Arizona,
Republican, was right in his speech last
Priciay. night at the University of Wisconsin
When he Characterized the support of the
Joint Chiefs_ for the nuclear treaty as a
political evaluation, ?He said: _
"And What they (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
have to say, and have said, mustbe weighed
Independent of the political decision which
guided the formal statement of the Joint
Chiefs. Why do I say that a political de-
Cision giided that Statement? Aren't the
Joint Chieftsupposed to be free of political
pressure? I .supinit, in a.nswer, the summa-
tion of their own report. It flatly says:
'There are military disadvantages to the
treaty.' )3'ut they conclude by saying that
'the risks inherent in. this treaty can be ac-
cepted in order to _seek the important gains
WhiCh, may beachieved through a stabiliza-
tion of_ International selations fuati a move
toward .a peaceful environment in which to
seek resohltiOn of our differences.' .
"The mention of risks, I say, Is a con-
scientious military evaluation. The decision
that the risks...are acceptable is not. It is an
echo of a State Department evaluation and
not of one that ...necessarily sounds very
deeply the real evaluations of our profes-
sional railitari men,"
The Oftichtl Staternent of the. Joint Chiefs
of Staff says pointedly that the risks inherent
in the treaty an be accepted "if adequate
safeguards are established." Now the de-
bate has begun as to what the "safeguards"
- ere argi Where the responsibility for provid-
ing them is to be placed. General LeMay
testined that po one Ilas said as yet what
, safeguards would he provided. Two Senate
committees have asked._ that the administra-
tion provide a "bill of particulars."
HerlatOr RICHARD RUSSELL, of Georgia,
Chairman Of the Armed Services Committee,
also asked the ,_claiefs of the Army, the Navy,
ahlt the 444i1le corps whether they would
have. apProved the treaty "in the absence
of these safeguards," and each replied that
he on. not ,have done so, In answer to a
question from Senator Boulusz HICKEN-
? 1,00i'ER, of Iowa, Republican, General LeMay
eld that, "If you automatically cut off the
political factors, there are net disadvantages
from a military standpoint" to the United
-4tate,s _
e fhe Jpinthiefs are reported to
have been fippt Informed in a general way
from time to time about the course of the
No. 159 6
T-
SENATE
, test ban negotiations, General LeMay testi-
fied that he wa.S.Slarprised at the administra-
tion's speed in hastening the final agreement
-toward the end. As for voicing objections,
General LeMay declared that once the pact
was initialed or about to be, he doubted very
much "that any of us would have gone to
the President at that stage of the game."
Secretary of State Rusk, at a news confer-
ence last Friday, was asked whether there
wasn't "an unresolved difference in this
Government" on the treaty, and he replied:
"I'm not sure that I would call such a
difference unresolved. After all, the execu-
tive branch is headed by the President of the
United States."
This is tantamount to saying that, despite
the military expertness of the members of
the Joint Chiefs in their respective fields,
they can be and are overruled by the Presi-
dent and by his civilian advisers who _can
place political experimentalism in interna-
tional affairs above the necessary safeguards
against nuclear advances by an adversary
state.
The Senate is today presented with a
"take it or leave it" proposition. The upper
House of Congress, which is a joint partner
with the President in treatymaking, wasn't
afforded an opportunity to give its advice
before the treaty was signed. Now the treaty
will have to be ratified, or else the Senate
will be placed In the position of taking full
responsibility for the consequences in the
field of diplomacy. If, on the other hand,
Russia chooses to cheat or abrogate?as Gen-
eral LeMay says might happen?it will be
too. late to argue about political factors or
net military disadvantages of a treaty which
may have put the United States behind in
the nucelar-arms race.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. The next
point of the proponents is as follows:
This treaty will reduce the radioactive
pollution of the planet.
This consideration weights heavily on
my mind and conscience. This is the
real purpose of the test ban treaty, at
least as far as our country and the free
world is concerned.
Mr. President, I want the record clear
on this one point. For many years I
have been concerned about the question
of fallout, as have people all over the
world. One thought I have always had
in mind is this: It is bad enough that we
might possibly endanger the lives of our
own future generations here in America
with our atmospheric nuclear testing,
but what is worse is the fact that we, at
the same time, could be endangering the
lives of future generations in other coun-
tries which have no control over what
the United States does. Somehow, this
has never seemed quite fair to me, and it
still does not seem equitable.
This is quite a consideration to weigh
on any pair of scales?even if itis being
balanced against all the risks involved
in our entering into this test ban treaty.
I agree that the most compelling argu-
ment of the proponents is this conten-
tion that radioactive fallout will be re-
duced by the treaty. With six grand-
children under 7 years of age, how could
I fail to be moved by this argument? I
readily admit a deep and abiding con- s
cern on this issue.
1tyf_ .211e rpzenLatign?usx-,anci_ it_is
very grave?is is.
In order to obtain a temporary relief
from fallout, are we jeopardizing theS
16725
perfection of a weapons system that will
pre-vent the surprise attack?
Are we jeopardizing the perfection of
a weapons system that all the world will
recognize as one which could survive
such an attack to retaliate with the com-
plete annihilation of our attacker?
The essence of the Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee interim report
is very significant. It is:
No safeguards can provide the benefits of
testing where testing Is not permitted, nor
can they assure that this Nation will ac-
quire the highest quality weapons systems
of which it is capable when the means for
achieving that objective are denied.
Mr. President, on Wednesday of last
week, after we had listened to the dis-
tinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRK-
SEN] make a most persuasive and, as al-
ways, eloquent speech, in favor of rati-
fication, the Senat*Or from Nebraska [Mr.
CrixTis] posed this question to the Sen-
ator from Illinois:
The Senator asked, would "it not be
possible for another Senator to attend
the same meetings, hear the sam(testi-
mony, read the same documents, possess
an equal sincerity of purpose, and yet ar-
rive at a different conclusion from that
reached by" another Senator?
The distinguished Senator from Illi-
nois answered thusly:
Absolutely. That is what makes the world
the great world that it is. We can listen to
testimony, come to different conclusions
about it, and do so honestly and sincerely.
During this week, a great deal of the
debate here in the Senate has centered
on this one situation?that two Senators
can take the same facts and come up
with opposite conclusions. The positions
taken by the seven members of the Pre-
paredness Investigating Subcommittee
are examples of this situation. Three of
those seven Senators have declared
against the treaty; three others have de-
clared in favor of it; and if my facts are
still accurate, the seventh is still un-
committed.
In all the testimony that has been
heard and in all the speeches that have
been made?
First. No responsible official has based
his recommendations on the view that
basic Soviet purposes have changed. To
the contrary, we have heard constant
references to statements by Khrushchev
that he will bury us, and even the Presi-
dent has warned that this treaty should
in no way make us think that the goal
of communism has changed.
Genuine fear has been expressed that
the so-called rift between the Soviet Un-
ion and Red China may be, by and large,
a hoax. As our beloved minority leader
said earlier when the treaty was first ini-
tialed in Moscow, "What has IChrushchey
done besides smile?" He has not with-
drawn his troops from Cuba; he has not
relaxed the Berlin situation; he has not
made concessions toward free elections in
atellite countries like Hungary and
Poland.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I yield to the
enator from Wyoming.
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16726
Mr. SIMPSON. I should like to ask Mr. SIMPSON. I have arrived at the
the distinguished Senator from Idaho a same conclusion. It seems fantastic
question with respect to the so-called rift that we should disregard the entire his-
between the Soviet Union and China, tory of military preparedness and mili-
which may be a hoax, to Which he has tary containment of the Communist
addressed himself in his last remark. threat to the whole world, in a matter
The Senator said, referring to Khru- of such importance as this, by suddenly
shchev: deciding that the political advantages
He has not withdrawn his troops from outweigh the military advantages. To
Cuba; he has not relaxed the Berlin situa- me that is arriving at the wrong con-
tion: he has not made concessions toward elusion. How does the Senator feel
free elections hi satellite cotmtries like Hun- about it?
could not agree more With my distin-
guished friend. I have arrived at the
same conclusion.
Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. Presi-
dent, I continue my remarks.
Third. No responsible official has
rested the case for the treaty on a belief
that the Soviet Government can be
trusted. Senator after Senator has
taken the floor to point out the number
of times treaties with the Soviet Union
have been broken by the Soviets when it
best served their purposes to do so.
How can anyone believe that, in this
one isolated instance, the Soviet Union
can be trusted to keep its word?
Are we not all, deep down in our
hearts, approaching this treaty with one
thought in mind?the treaty will only be
in effect until the time comes when the
Russians find it to their advantage to
break it? Is there really a man in this
Senate Chamber who does not feel that
then, can a victory for the Communists it will be the Ruksians?in their own
be at the same time victory for the good time?who will finally abrogate this
United States? I do not think it can. treaty? And when they do, what will
Second. No responSible official has dis- be our military posture at that time?
Plated the view that in the future, as in Fourth. Secretary of Defense McNa-
the past, our national security will de- mara and the Joint Chiefs have testified
Vend on, among other things, a favor- that the balance of military power is in.
able military Position. And with whom our favor at the present time. This is
does the responsibility lie for assuring the consensus. Would we have it any
this Nation a favorable military posi- other way?
tion? Would we ever put our Nation in the
a Not with Russia; not with Great Brit- Position of being second to Russia?or
Ain; not with any other country in the second to any other nation?in military
world. If we are to maintain a favor- power? Or would we ever even put our
able military position, it is the responsi- Nation in a position where this could
bility of only our Government and our possibly happen? I do not think that,
COuntry. If we do not look after our- knowingly, any of us would.
SelVes, surely none of us, in our weakest Pearl Harbors do not happen to na-
tir most optimistic momentS, would ex- lion which are prepared.
pect anyone else to look Out for us. Pearl Harbors do not happen to na-
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the tions which are vigilant.
Senator yield? Pearl Harbors happen to nations which
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I am happy have allowed themselves to be lulled into
to yield again to the Senator from Wy- a false conmlacency.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September 20
Joint Chiefs are on record as seeing net
military disadvantages?but in the long
run none so serious as to render the
treaty unacceptable.
How disadvantageous does a disadvan-
tage have to be before it is "unaccept-
able"?
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I am happy
to yield to the distinguished Senator
from Georgia.
Mr. RUSSELL. I shall be compelled
to leave the Chamber soon. If the Sen-
ator will permit, I wish to extend to him
my hearty commendations on his de-
cision and on his very able explanation
of his reasons for reaching that de-
cision.
It takes a high degree of moral and
political courage to breast the stampede
which is taking place in this country
today, led by practically all the leaders
of both political parties who are na-
tionally known.
It not only is led by those officials and
former officials whose names are recog-
nized in every household, but it has the
support of most of the commentators,
columnists, and newspaper editorialists
of the great metropolitan press.
I share the Senator's feeling when he
says he hopes events will prove that he
is in error. I hope and pray that the
future will show that I have been in
error in taking the position that has
placed me with the small group with
which the Senator from Idaho has
alined himself today.
I could not but be concernevith the
fact that yesterday in the United Nations
Mr. Gromyko again brought forth his
program for disarmament, with self-in-
spection, reducing and finally abolishing
all nuclear weapons, without suggesting
any way of inspection to establish per-
formance. The Russians have not
changed their position. We become ex-
hausted and gradually accept theirs.
It is sad to reflect that in 1946 we had
a complete monopoly in atomic material
and nuclear weapons, and we offered all
of those weapons, the results of all of
the great expenditures we had incurred
in their production into the bands of an
international agency, if the other nations
of the earth would agree not to make
atomic weapons and would agree to a
system of inspection.
Seventeen years later, we have not only
caning. Time was on Mir side then. The 18 lost our monopoly but the Senate is con-
Mr. SIMPSON. I invite the attention months required to tool up our great sidering a treaty that would tie our
Of the Senator from Idaho to the fact industrial plants to an all-out war effort hands to achieve equality that surrenders
that we have depended upon our m111- will not be available to us in this modern any pretense of inspection within the
tary strength, throughout all the years aae. confines of our potential enemy that has
Since the inception of what I call the ' already surpassed us in mlialy aspects
"united Slave States of Russia." We
have shrunk to 18 minutes or less. of the development of nuclear weapons,
More than likely, this 18 months will
have depended on our mllitary superior- and sets the stage for the final tragedy
It is a good thing?it is a vital thing? of disarmament by agreement without
alty' and our military experts to keep us
that both opponents and proponents of any inspection, and depending; alone on
tree from communism and to prevent
this treaty, almost down to the very man, the good faith of nations to monitor
:the domination of the world by commu-
nisM: a have chosen to warn us of that newly themselves.
Does the Senator feel that the treaty recognized state known as "euphoria," It is a sad commentary on the states-
would do that in the light of the testi- Fifth. When we come to the question manship of this country that within
racalY by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of what effects the treaty will have on these few years we have fanen from a
,many others that there are military dis- the future balance of military power? complete monopoly to the point where
Advantages involved in it? I repeat: on the future balance of mili- we now see a national stampede to ac-
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho-. I wish I could tary power?there we enter a more con- cept a treaty that does not even provide
. say that believe- the ffeaty offers that troversial area. Secretary McNamara for any inspection, but gives to our only
: solace and that protection, but I regret assures us that nothing in the treaty will dangerous potential enemy, the only na-
that I cannot say it about this treaty. shift the present balance. However, the tion we have to fear, and freezes for it,
gary and Poland. Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I agree. I
Is it not true, in spite of all this, that
Russia has maintained its aggressiveness,
even in the form of this treaty?
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. It has. It
has increased tension, rather than re-
lieved it.
Mr. SIMPSON. Does the Senator
agree that the Russian Government has
kept its aggressiveness and has not lost
any of its activity with the people of the
world, so far as the image of Russia is
concerned?
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I fully agree
with my distinguished colleague. I
thank him for his question.
Mr. President, we are talking about
Khrushchev.
What has he done?
He has boasted to his friend Tito
that this treaty is a victory-for the Com-
munists. Perhaps we are entering a new
era of togetherness, but the goals of
cOMmunism have not changed. How,
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CONGitESSIONAI, ? SEN 16727
In a sense, this is a unique speech. 'When lie said that he hoped he was
read it, and I listened to every word.. wrong. I join him and the Senator from
It is a convincing speech. It is a clear Idaho in that hope. I believe that the
demonstration of the qualities of mind Senator from Idaho and I are undoubt-
-and character of the Senator from Idaho edly two of the closest personal friends
in approaching this question with one in the Senate. I join in the prayerful
paramount desire, and that is to arrive hope that we are entirely mistaken. It
at the right answer, would be little solace to us if we were
I congratulate the Senator on the posi- proved to be right, because no history
tion he has taken and his position on may survive to record our being right.
the vote on the treaty. I think he has I would not want to be recorded right
resolved all doubts in favor of the United under those circumstances. I hope we
States. He is right. He should be corn- are wrong. I share the misgivings of the
mended for it. I question nobody else's Senator from Idaho, and I share his fear
motives, but that is the only question at of entering into a treaty into which no
stake in this whole proceeding_ What
Is best for our own country?
I congratulate the Senator on his
statement.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I thank the
Senator. His words are more than I de-
serve. His own remarks at an earlier
time have been a most constructive fea-
ture of the debate on this issue.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield? -
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I yield to the
-Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. SIMPSON. I wish to associate
myself with the remarks of the distin-
guished Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
exams]. The speech of the Senator
from Idaho is one of the outstanding
speeches that have been delivered in the
Senate during this debate.
We have been told by the military that
we have a so-called second-strike con-
cept in America and have rested secure
in this knowledge over the years. As the
Senator so ably pointed out, we are com-
mitted to no aggreSsion and to not mak-
ing the first strike, ourselves. We have
been told for many years, under the tute-
lage of the military, which has protected
us from the threat of communism
abroad, that we have had a second-
strike capability. In other words, if Rus-
sia should loose upon us nuclear weap-
ons, we would counterattack and hit
before she could deliver a second strike,
and we could annihilate her before she
could get in a second strike, and have
enough left over to annihilate Red China,
too.
Does the Senator believe that under its ratification.
this treaty we are jeopardizing the sec- In this connection, I wish also to corn-
ond-strike concept? mend the able Senator from Ohio [Mr.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I fully agree LAUSCHE], a member of the Committee
with the Senator that we are jeopardiz- on Foreign Relations, which reported the
ing the second-strike concept. treaty. The Senator from Ohio has
I think there is a danger about which listened to the debate and has studied
the record carefully. After reading the
196:9'
, -
the advantages that nation has over us,
and enables that ngition to carry on pro-
grams to Overcomethe slight advantages
we have over it in the area of tactical
Weapons.
I hope and pray that the Senator from
Idaho and the Senator from Georgia are
completely in error; but my study of
history, my knowledge of human nature;
and what / know about the aims of in-
ternational 'communism, all lead me to
the sorrowful conclusion that the minor-
ity in this body today will be proved to
be right in the future.
I cominend the Senator for his fine
statement. ?
- Mr, JORDAN of Idaho. I thank the
eminent and distinguished Senator, the
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
Inittee, a than Who no doubt commands
as high a regard as any Member of this
-body, if not a higher regard. I am
Pleased indeed to have the Senator's
gracious remarks. I am in full accord
with the statement he has just made and
with the very ebtfiprehensive argument
be presented on the floor of the Senate
several days ago.
,
- _ 111 SUMMARY
In siinutary--gind anything I would
say -at this time wouldbe an anticlimax
after listening to the very fine statement
of the senior genator from Georgia?I
wish to sair that in the scales of global
,affairs, our Nation must function with
certain pOlitical handicaps which are
widely acclaimed throughout the world:
First. We will not strike the first blow.
. pecond: We do.' not break treaties for
expediency. -
' Third. It is well known to other na-
tions that ours IS an open-Society. On
the contrary, the Iron Curtain protects
a closed society.
To counterbalance these political
handicaps, I must conclude:
First. teat 'bans or armament reduc-
tion n.egotiations 'can only be acceptable
to us under full inspection guarantees.
Second. Without full inspection our
best chance for survival as a Nation is to
maintain a competent weapons superi-
ority and a national determination to
annihilate any 'aggressor who dares to
strike the first blow. - - -
Third. This military competence and
this national will must be understood by
-
all the world. This message must go out
to them loud and unmistakably clear.
I h onlyhoe and pray that, with
the passage of time, the doubts and ap-
prehensions that impel me to vote "No" I did not speak in my prepared address.
testimony, he has concluded, since the
on this treaty will prove to be groundless There is the danger that the first strike ? '
reporting of the treaty by the Committee
and unwarranted. might be of such a nature as to immo- on Foreign Relations, that the treaty is
lVfr. CuttTIS. Mr. President, will the bilize our ability to retaliate, not in the best interests of the Nation,
distinguished Senator from Idaho yield? Mr. SIMPSON. The Senator is en- and yesterday made on excellent address
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I yield to the tirely correct. Does the Senator recall opposing its -ratification.
Senator from Nebraska.
< . reading an article published in "Rockets Both the Senator from Idaho and the
. and Missiles," wherein experts revealed Senator from Ohio are objective, learned
Mr. CURTIS.- I want to say to the
Senator from Idaho that never in my to us that the so-called electromagnetic scholars. I am sure their position is well
almost 25 years in the Congress of the
pulse or EMP could paralyze or deacti- worth noting by Members of the Senate.
United States have I heard a better and vate all of our Minutemen and Titan and
other missiles in one massive strike? Their addresses are well worth reading
More reasoned -speech. The Senator has by Senators. I especially commend a
approached this matter objectively and
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I recall the reading of the addresses by Senators who
with an operi mind. He has quoted the article. It was so frightening that I did did not hear them delivered. Tpese ad-
, teatinaoriy_ of tile proponents in a light not feel competent to enter into a dis- dresses are logical and practical and con-
tat iS Tair to them and that truly re- cussion in that scientific field. tam n much wisdom.
fleets their statements and he has con- Mr. SIMPSON. I was interested in the Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I
eluded not to support the treaty. remark of the Senator from Georgia support and will vote for ratification of
safeguards have been written.
The Senator knows that the preamble
to the treaty calls for total demobiliza-
tion or disarmament. That statement
is contained in the preamble itself.
I am discouraged by the prospect of
our entering into such a treaty, with no
safeguards of the kind that should be
written into it.
I commend the Senator for the very
able address he has delivered. He has
not challenged the right of any other
Senator to disagree with him He and
I are in the minority, as the Senator
from Georgia has said. I share the Sen-
ator's misgivings, and I again compli-
ment him on the ringing warning has
has delivered to the people of America.
Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. I thank the
distinguished Senator from Wyoming for
his statement and for the contribution he
has made to the debate in two excellent
speeches against the ratification of the
treaty.
Mr. THURMOND subsequently said:
Mr. President, I wish to commend the
able Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN]
for the outstanding address he has de-
livered on the nuclear test ban treaty.
The Senator from Idaho has a pene-
trating mind. He has listened carefully
to the debate. He has spoken with op-
ponents and proponents of the treaty
and has been classed in the so-called un-
committed group.
After much consideration and careful
deliberation, he has concluded that the
treaty is not in the best interests of this
Nation and has decided to vote against
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16728 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD---- SENATE
this treaty as one small step towar
fulfillment of a universal hope for even
ual arms control and, peace.
This hope has been nourished by lead
ers of both parties through two admin
istrations.
This hope was expressed in both 196
party platforms.
As stated in the Democratic platform
"A fragile power balance sustained b
mutual nuclear terror does not?const
hate peace."
Our platform declared it a primal
task "to develop responsible propose
that will help break the deadlock on arm
control," and that "such proposals shoul
include means for ending nuclear test
under workable safeguards."
Scientists advise us that atmospheri
surface, and underwater tests?whic
are those tests included in the treaty?
can now readily be detected.
The Republican platform states spe
cifically, and I quote:
We advocate an early agreement by al
nations to forego nuclear tests in the atmos
phere, and the suspension of other tests a
verification techniques permit.
Failure to ratify the treaty would, as
the Baltimore Evening Sun stated Mon
day in a lead editorial "be a repudiatio
of hope that it is within the power o
this generation to bring about a limi
talon or control of armaments."
Mr. President, such hope does exist.
Eighty-five nations have to date signed
the treaty. Three of these nations, th
United States, Great Britain, and Sovie
Russia are nuclear powers. Eighty-two
of the nations do not have nuclear weap-
ons and have no expectation of becoming
nuclear powers. Yet these 82 nations
have the hope, and they must also have
faith, that the 3 nations which do
have vast arsenals of nuclear weapons
either in inventory or available, will
abide to the provisions of the treaty, at
least during the immediate future.
Otherwise there would have been no
reason for them to sign the treaty. The
treaty itself, as long as it is observed, will
bring a respite from the fears and dread
that will increasingly afflict the peoples
of the world if atmospheric and under-
water testing are continued.
Two nations which have not signed the
treaty have aspirations to become nu-
clear powers, Red China and France.
France already has made a small begin-
ning in the field. Red China has not yet of the Armed Services Pre aredn
vestigating ,$ubcommittee. I have stud-
ied all of the President's messages, and
have followed the speeches Senators
f have made and the debate on this very,
very important matter.
While I have long advocated a mora-
torium on atmospheric nuclear testing,
and while I have been favorably inclined
toward the treaty from the time when it
was first negotiated, I have withheld
final judgment until I have carefully
studied all the evidence and all the views
of our Nation's most knowledgeable
persons.
In arriving at my decision, I have been
mpei led by one paramount considera-
ion, and one consideration only: Is this
reaty in the best interests of America?
Many factors?military, diplomatic,
conomic, scientific, sociological, med-
d it would impel France to expedite her
t- nuclear program for what she would con-
sider self-protection,
- Further atmospheric testing by any
- nation will inevitably add to the danger-
ous pollution and add to the cumulative
0 threat against the health of peoples
throughout the world. Underwater nu-
clear explosions pose a similar threat to
y pollution of the oceans.
I- A nuclear war, we are told, could ex-
terminate the human race.
w Unchecked nuclear testing
Is time bring about humanity's
s cide.
d Mr. President, I shall vote for ratifi-
s cation of this treaty as a step to uphold
our Nation's just influence on the world.
C, I waited to digest every bit of testi-
h mony before speaking on this matter bt-
fore committees.
I wanted to be sure that this would not
- in any way weaken our defense, now or
in the future.
We need to be the strongest military
- power in the world?this is our great
s weapon against communism.
Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I regret
very much that I was not present in the
- Chamber to hear the entire speech of the
n distinguished Senator from Idaho [Mr.
f JORDAN] who spoke against approval of
- the test ban treaty. I was able to hear
only the conclusion of his remarks. I
felt that it was very well reasoned..
Although I have some misgivings about
e the test ban treaty, I do not have as
t many misgivings about it as does the
distinguished and able Senator from
Idaho; and I will vote for approval of
the treaty.
I hope that the many misgivings of the
Senator from Idaho will not materialize;
for, if they do, we may find ourselves in
, serious difficulty.
Although I disagree with the distin-
guished and able Senator from Idaho, I
respect him for his very sincere stand
and for the excellent reasons he has ad-
vanced for the position he has taken.
Mr. President, for the past few weeks
I have carefully studied all aspects of the
treaty suspending thermonuclear testing
in the atmosphere, in outer space, and
underwater.
I have read carefully the extensive
testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee, and also the Committee's re-
port,. I have also read the interim report
ess In-
could in
slow sui-
achieved a nuclear device.
Red China and France have isolated
themselves from the world accord in ap-
proving this initial step in the cause o
peace; from the consensus of world-opin-
ion.
The United States will be similarly
isolated if this treaty is not ratified.
inev-ltaoly the good relations which
we have developed throughout the free
world, in diplomacy, in trade, in edu-
cational and economic development,
would in some degree be replaced by
misgiVings and apprehension.
Our failure to agree to this treaty
could not Vat provide an incentive to our
principal competitor in the nuclear field t
to resume testing. It would further speed t
Red China's effort to develop nuclear
weapons of her own, and in my opinion e
September 20
ical, and others?enter into the decision
as to what constitues the best interests
of America. After evaluating all these
factors and after weighing their relative
importance, each Senator must rendes
his own judgment and must make his
own decision in the light of his knowl-
edge, his own experience, and his back-
ground.
As a representative of our Nation's
mid-Pacific Island State, whose people
are, perhaps more than the citizens of
any other State, acutely sensitive to the
frightening. dangers of nuclear holocaust
and the increase of radioactive fallout,
I have long been deeply concerned that
means be devised to halt atmospheric
and underwater nuclear tests.
It was in the Pacific basin, in 1945,
that two atomic bombs were dropped?
the first, on the inhabitants of the city
of Hiroshima; the second, on Nagasaki.
Because of our geographical proximity
to, and our close cultural relationships
with, the people of these two cities, the
swath of destruction and the terrible
toll of lives caused by these two atomic
bombs left an indelible imprint on the
people of Hawaii.
Since then, more than 100 thermonu-
clear devices have been tested near
Hawaii. Between 1946 and 1962, in the
Bikini, Eniwetok, Johnston, and Christ-
mas Island areas, the United States con-
ducted a series of 92 thermonuclear ex-
plosions in the atmosphere and 6 ther-
monuclear explosions under water. In
addition, between 1953 and 1958 the
British tested 21 thermonuclear de-
vices?all of them in the atmosphere?in
their South Pacific proving grounds. Al-
together, 118 thermonuclear devices
were tested in the air or under water
between 1946 and 1962, in the South Pa-
cific area near Hawaii.
As a result of these Pacific tests and
tests conducted by other nations during
the same time, worldwide radioactive
fallout has increased.
During the 1954 experimental high-
yield detonations, when a 15-megaton
device was exploded on the ground at the
Bikini testsite, unexpected shifts in the
Pacific wind patters caused heavy radio-
active fallout to irradiate the inhabited
Marshall Island atolls, just a few hun-
dred miles downwind from the detona-
tion. Two hundred and sixty-seven Mar-
shallese were seriously injured by nearly
fatal doses of radiation exposure. For-
tunately, all 267 survived, although the
long-term ill effects will not be known
for several generations.
But 23 fishermen aboard the Japanese
fishing trawler Lucky Dragon were not so
fortunate. The vessel accidentally sailed
within 100 miles of the thermonuclear
explosion. As a result of the heavy fall-
out which blanketed the vessel, all 23 of
the Japanese fishermen suffered serious
injuries, and were hospitalized. One
fisherman died as a result of irradiation.
The 1954 test resulted in other eco-
nomic and social dislocations, First, the
injured Marshallese could not be re-
turned to their home islands until radia-
tion subsided?over 3 years later. Sec-
ond, the Japanese seafood market sof
fered a sharp depression, after it became
known that 16,500 pounds of tuna and
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199-3 CO
shark aboard the ,Lucky Dragon had been
exposed to radioactive fallout.
Then, on August 1, 1958, the first high-
altitude America,n test of a missile carry-
ing a thermonuclear warhead of undis-
closed megaton range was launched from
the Johnston Island area, just 800 miles
east southeast of Honolulu, Detonated
at night, without forewarning or prean-
nouncetneht, the missile exploded in a
fireball so intense and brilliant that it
alarmed and thoroughly frightened the
people of Hawaii, when it bathed the en-
tire State in light as bright as daylight.
During the United States 1962 test
series, on July 0, Hawaii was again
bathed in awesome light, when a 110,-
000-pound Thor booster rocket, with a
thermonuclear warhead capable of an
explosive force of between 1 and 2 mil-
lion tons of TNT was launched, at night,
from Johnston Island.
In addition to ;these detonations, the
Russians have been test-firing their long-
range Missiles into the Pacific. Some of
these missiles, launched from the area
of the Aral Sea, near Iran, landed in an
impact area southwest of Honolulu?
only 1,200 miles away.
The destruction of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the thermonuclear tests con-
ducted at our back door, the Marshallese
and Lucky_Dragon fallout casualties, the
two fireball explosions bathing Hawaii, in
the night, in awesome nuclear light, the
Soviet test-firing of missiles into the
Pacific, and the increase in radioactive
fallout in our atmosphere?all these have
Made the people of Hawaii acutely sensi-
tive to the dangers of radioactive fallout,
and have given them an understanding
Of the vast, destructive power of ther-
Monuclear explosions.
We in Hawaii also know that, with
Our vital and strategic military instal-
lations at pearl Harbor Naval Base and
Shipyard, Schofield Barracks, Hickam
Field, Kaneohe Air Base, and with many
other military establishments, Hawaii?
like nany other 'important areas else-
where in the United States?is a-primary
target for enemy missiles with thermo-
nuclear *arIA'ads.
Acutely sensitive as we are to these
dangers, *e in Hawaii are also acutely
mindful that American superiority in
thermonuclear weapons and delivery
systems has successfully deterred nu-
clear war. I am Confident that the peo-
ple of Hawaii strongly support the
President and the Congress in their de-
termination to Maintain nuclear supe-
riority.
Nevertheless, it is most natural that
the people of Hawaii, like their fellow
Americans everywhere, desire a lessening
of radioactiVe fallout', and hope that,
someday, mankind will be delivered from
the threat of a nuclear holocaust.
Mr. President (Mr. MCGOVERN in the
chair), it is clear to all that this limited
teSt tll'ea,tY will not lessen the clanger
'of UjidleAr, wax:. t ut it is also clear that
this united test 1ntreaty will lessen
radioactive fallout.
According to the Atomic Energy Corn-
?mission and the Federal- Radiation
Council, radioactive fallout is composed
Oi three primary chemical elements--
13trontium 90; a deadly radioactive ele-
,
NGR-ESSIONAL WORD ?sRNA
ment, which is highly, injurious to bone
and bone marrow; cesium 137, another
fallout product, which can cause serious
genetic damage; and iodine 131, a radio-
active element which attacks the
thyroid.
Figures released by the Atomic Energy
Commission, the federal Radiation
Council, the U.S. Weather Bureau, and
the Agriculture Department, who have
conducted joint studies of radioactive
fallout, estimate that the fallout levels
of these produCts of thermonuclear fis-
sion would increase about 90 percent
over 1963 levels by 195, if thermonuclear
testing were continued at 1962 rates.
The same Federal agencies have esti-
mated that the accumulated deposition
of strontium 90 in -Hawaii is now well
over 100 millicuries per square mile. A
millicurie is a measurement showing the
degree of human exposure to beta and
gamma radiation. The deposition of
cesium 137 in Hawaii is about 170 milli-
curies per square mile. These figures
are far above the natural levels for Ha-
waii but are not considered dangerous
by experts in the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. They show, however, that
Hawaii is one of the prime fallout areas
in the world. They also reflect a steep
escalation of radiation fallout since the
1962 American tests and the heavy Rus-
sian testing of many high-yield thermo-
nuclear devices in 1961 and 1962.
The precise level at which fallout ra-
diation is injurious to human life is a
question not yet settled. Studies are
still being conducted by scientists the
world over to determine whether or not
the threshold of injury to human life
can be pinpointed.
The noted scientists who prepared the
1962 report of the United Nations Scien-
tific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation expressed their deep appre-
hension of the somatic and genetic dam-
age growing out of the fallout from tests
already conducted. The overwhelming
weight of the world's scientific opinion
has also expressed this deep concern.
These scientists point out that the
devastating effects of fallout on human
life "may not be fully manifested for
several decades in the case of somatic
disease, and for many generations in the
case of genetic damage.?
Dr. Herman J. Miller, winner of the
Nobel Prize in 1946 or discovering that
X-rays cause changes in our genes, has
figured that the fallout radiation re-
sulting from aboveground testing of a
single 100-megaton bomb would be like-
ly to induce more than 100,000 cases Of
leukemia, bone cancer, and? other fatal
illnesses to the present world population
and a million harmful mutations in the
next generation.
If this were true, it would be a stag-
gering toll, especially considering that it
does not even take into account the
threat of damage to the genetic integrity
of the human lamily,through...the_gen-
erations to come. - -
The possibility that susrienSion Of at-
mospheric thermonuclee:r testing would
greatly diminish this hazard renders
ratification of the treaty an affirmative
gain of the most significant consequences
to the human race.
Tg 16729
Apart from genetic considerations, the
reduction of radioactive fallout from the
suspension of atmospheric thermonu-
clear testing would still render ratifica-
4011 of the treaty an affirmative gain,
since we1CI3Owlrom our experiences with
the casualties ,of Hiroshima, Nagasaki,
the,. Marshall Jslands and the Lucky
Dragon that an overdose of radioactive
fallout is harmful to human health.
I have no illusions about the limita-
tions and risks of the treaty. Nor have
I any illusions as to the trustworthiness
of its chief cosigner, the Soviet Union,
whose long history of treaty violations
hardly evokes our faith and trust. Our
approach to the Soviet Union is imbued
with caution, wariness and watchfulness.
The treaty is not a panacea to the
problems of the cold war. It will not
patch up American-Soviet differences.
It will no;, end the threat of Communist
aggression. It will not necessarily usher
In a new era of lasting world peace.
It will not even bring about a com-
plete cessation of atmospheric or under-
water thermonuclear testing. Nonsigna-
tory nations such as France will not be
bound by the treaty. Under the terms of
the treaty, underground testing is per-
mitted and is expected to continue.
The weight of military, scientific, and
diplomatic authority, balancing the risks
against the benefits to be gained from the
treaty, favors ratification. Some mili-
tary authorities have urged strong safe-
guards so as to render the military risk
acceptable.
Senate ratification of the treaty will
not, we are assured, bring on a euphoric
relaxation of our defensive strength and
our vigilance.
Our Nation's Commander in Chief, the
President, has issued a list of safeguards
to protect America against the risks in-
volved in the treaty.
Our "posture of readiness" will be
maintained and indeed strengthened.
We will carry forward a vigorous pro-
gram of underground testing and con-
tinue to maintain strong weapons labo-
ratories.
The United States would withdraw
from the treaty if our interests are seri-
ously jeopardized.
Our detection facilities for possible
clandestine violations of the treaty will
be "expanded and improved."
The treaty does not alter our relation-
ship with regimes we do not recognize.
It "in no way limits the authority of
the Commander in Chief to use nuclear
weapons of the defense of the United
States and its allies" if the situation so
required.
We will "take all the? necessary steps
to safeguard our national security," in-
cluding the resumption of atmospheric
testing, if the treaty is violated.
These safeguards, we are assured, will
render acceptable the risks that first, the
alleged Soviet lead in knowledge of radia-
tion and blackout effects on communica-
tions and rnisifie control -systems may be
widened; second, our lead in tactical nu-
clear weapon technology may be wiped
out by the Soviets; third, we will not
have a chance to test the effectiveness of
an antimissile defense system we may
develop; and fourth, the Soviets may
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 20
have superior know-how to immobilize
the delivery capability of our missile sites
and systems.
I aro satisfied that, in the light of all
these firm assurances, America's defense
posture and military strength will be
maintained and our security safe-
guarded.
With these assurances, I support the
treaty because I believe it will help safe-
guard the people of the world against
harmful radioactive fallout.
I support the treaty because it forbids
the testing of thermonuclear devices in
the atmosphere, in outer space, and un-
der water.
I support the treaty because, on bal-
anCe, it is good for my country, good
for my State, and good for all the people
of the world.
This is surely a far cry from settling
East-West tensions. But to me, it may
be a tentative first step to the easing of
world tensions. Though it dces nothing
to inhibit the manufacture of thermonu-
clear, weapons, the treaty is an impera-
tive preliminary step without which we
could not go on to anything else.
The limited test ban is in a sense an
experiment in trust which might produce
sufficient mutual confidence to lead
eventually to a total ban on all forms of
thermonuclear testing with adequate in-
spection and other safeguards, and we
hope some day to a limitation of the
thermonuclear arms race.
Because I believe the treaty will les-
sen thermonuclear radioactive fallout
and May prove to be a faint step toward
the road to peace for the common good
of the world, I am willing to give it that
chance.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
commend the able Senator from Hawaii
for a fine and forceful presentation. He
has made one of the best, most concise
presentations heard during the course of
the debate.
Mr. FONG. I thank the Senator from
Alabama.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that fur-
ther proceedings under the quorum call
may be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING Otee'ICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, when the nuclear test ban treaty
was ordered favorably reported to the
Senate by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on August 29, I cast the single
vote against reporting the treaty'.
I do not want my lone vote at that
time nor my subsequent expressions on
the subject to convey any sense of disre-
spect for the other members of the For-
eign Relations Committee.
On the contrary, I have the greatest
admiration for my fellow committee
members. I feel privileged to serve on
this important committee with truly out-
standing Members of the Senate under
the distinguished leadership of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas [Mr. Fonearona]. I
believe the decisions of the committee
members in favor of this treaty have
been motivated, without exception, by
deep and sincere convictions that what
they have done is right. However, my
respect for their position does not alter
the course I feel I must take.
This is a decision that could spell our
doom. If that is overly pesimistic, then
et me go a step further and say that this
Is one of a very few mistakes which al-
most certainly would mean the end of
our independence as a nation, the end
of freedom as we have known it, and the
end of the lives of most of us.
To show the problem, it is necessary for
me to work from certain assumptions to
their conclusions.
Suppose that the Soviets in their last
series of tests were able to assure them-
selves that they have the information
necessary to mount an attack on this
country which could destroy much of our
offensive capabilities and so disorganize
our retaliatory power that better than 80
percent of our offensive power could
never be hurled at our opponent.
Suppose that our adversary has ac-
quired the information which would en-
able him to devise and construct almost
foolproof defenses against our bombers
and our missiles.
Suppose further that he knows that we
do not have the information, the knowl-
edge that we need to offer more than
moderately effective resistance to his at-
tack and that we are badly lacking in the
means to penetrate his defenses, as a re-
sult of our inability to test our offensive
weapons against the kind of defenses
that they will encounter.
We know that our adversary plans to
control and dominate this planet.
Then suppose our adversary signed a
treaty with us which would preclude us
from testing our radar against the black-
outs which would result from atomic ex-
plosions created by our own defensive
missiles as well as those created by our
enemy's missiles.
Suppose the treaty would prevent us
from determining what the atomic ex-
plosions would do to our communications
on which our continued defense as well
as much of our retaliation would depend.
Let us suppose further that our adver-
sary had learned hoarhe could prevent
us from striking back from our missiles
presently resting in hardened sites, pos-
sibly by blasting the area near the sites
sufficiently close with atomic weapons.
Let us suppose that our adversary
could effectively predict the positions of a
substantial portion of our Polaris sub-
marines, and depend upon limiting the
damage to be expected from such sub-
marine missiles as he could not destroy
.in home ports or elsewhere.
Then would not the following course
be logical: First, he would develop his
weapons and produce them in large num-
bers. This would take several years.
Second, he would break the test ban to
be sure that they worked. Third, he
would embark upon a course of inter-
national conduct which would compel us
to gradually surrender to his overwhelm-
ing poWer or start a war which we could
not hope to win if we permited him to
strike first. In the latter event, would
he not plan to strike you the moment, he
concluded that we had elected that we
would rather take our chances fighting
than surrender?
It is my judgment that each of the
assumptions that I have made cannot be
dismissed. Some of them are already
true. Others are reasonable probabili-
ties.
Thus far, this Nation has been safe
because it has been so strong that it
could face any showdown with a confi-
dence that we could rain so much more
destruction upon an enemy than he could
hurl at us that only a madman would
persist in engaging our Nation in an
allout war.
This overwhelming pre ponderanc e
has preserved large and small nations
in the era which we choose to call the
Pax America, or the era of world peace
protected by 'America. Since Nagasaki,
atomic weapons have not been used for
purposes of warfare. They have been
used only to maintain peace and as a
threat to potential aggressors. .
But the balance is shifting. The So-
viets have gone ahead in space. They
are abreast of us in atomic weapons.
Under the proposed treaty, the Soviets
could continue underground testing in
areas of relatively small nuclear explo-
sions where we feel we are ahead. We
would be barred from testing in the high-
yield ranges where they are ahead.
We fear that the Russians have
learned much that we do not know in
testing atomic weapons and the effects
of explosions on the radar, the communi-
cations, and the warheads themselves
which would be a part of an intercon-
tinental ballistic missile system on the
one hand and as the various components
of an effective defensive antiballistic
missile on the other hand.
If this should prove true, then time is
running out on us rapidly. If Russia is
ahead of us in the knowledge necessary
for both the offense and the defense of
tomorrow, then this treaty may prove to
be national suicide.
Under this treaty, America will be pre-
vented from building an efficient missile
defense. It is said that we can design
? around our areas of ignorance. This IS
like planning to kill elephants with sticks
because a treaty prevents us from devel-
oping an elephant gun.
Under this treaty, America will be pre-
vented from developing weapons as large
as the Soviets'. It is said that we do not
need them. That is like saying that we
do not need large cannons, because two
smaller shells can do what one large one
will do.
Under this treaty, we will be prevented
from testing weapons that we already
have in inventory, weapons that may
prove to be billions of dollars of goose
feathers so far as our offensive power is
concerned.
Let it be remembered that during the
first year of World War II the Americans
were fighting with torpedoes that would
not work, while the Japanese were fight-
ing with torpedoes that did work. They
sank most of our Pacific Fleet with tor-
pedoes that had been tested against
ships, while we bounced harmlessly
against Japanese hulls torpedoes that
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CONQIIESSIONAL RECOAD? SENATE 16731
had
LTen tested only under simillated test
runs.
if I may be pardoned a personal exam-
ple, this Senator would not be here today
if a projectile fired by a large Nazi rail-
road guni had not failed to explode.
' For all we tnow, 75 percent of our bal-
listic missile power may prove to be duds
for the reason of a minor adjustment
Which wotild, be discovered under a live
test. When wejatify this treaty, we tie
our hands and bind ourselves not to con-
duct the tests which would prove that our
Weapons either work or do not work. As
a Matter of fact, it is criminal folly to
-enter into this treaty without at least
testing, the missiles already in inventory.
Surely our adversary has done at least
that muqh.
When we ratify this treaty we bind
mirselves to a code of moral conduct by
which Our adversary will not abide.
That we ,will not cheat is clgar from our
reeord. That the adversary .will cheat ci
Is as obv1ous as the fact that a cat will n
Seratch, 'We Will be in a contest with P
One hand tied behind us. _ P
Why do we do these things?
The best I can make of it is that this g
kind of thing results froM impractical, 1
Well-meaping people?some of them o
-magnificently educated. There are many f
sincere patriotic and religious people P
whose hearts instantly surge to the H
thought that We May someday capture a
the COniMunists with Christian love and
forebearance, other lands there are t,
many ore such Christians in their "G
graves who 11014rithed the same hope. It t
is Communist teaching that this element w
-of devotion to the glory of God and the w
good Of Mankind is one of the weak _
10 percent, and that increase will gr
ually decay and dissipate itself. F
thermore, the nuclear devices are
coming much cleaner.
A real danger to America, I regre
say, can be those people in the Disar
ment Agency and elsewhere in Gove
ment and out of Government who bell
genuinely in disarmament, either p
tially or totally, on a unilateral ba
When I voted for the Disarmam
Agency, I did not fully realize the d
ger.
A man like William Foster is a ha
headed, practical person, but his vie
are necessarily affected by the o
worlders, Quakers, and "peace-at-an
price" tyl5es who gravitate toward su
an agency. If these people cannot ma
an impression on Bill Foster, then th
will impress at least some persons in t
Senate, the House, the White House, t
great universities, the press, or at so
ther point where they may influence o
ational decisions. I fear that these pe
le are making headway in all,sof the
laces?the Congress, the White Hou
he universities, the press. The Pent
on can properly be expected to be t
ast bastion to fall prey to the siren so
f disarmament, but the key to th
ortress is held at the White House. T
resident is the Commander-in-Chie
e makes and breaks both the civilia
nd the brass who run the Pentagon.
Now the so-called military support
his treaty should be measured again
he facts of life. The defense policy
he United States is set by the Presider'
ith the advice of the Security Counci
ith the advice of the Joint Chiefs o
taff, with the advice of the Members o
ad- mixed, the decision is not theirs to de-
ur- cide. In the closeness of his fireside,
be- an officer on active duty will sometimes
give a confidential friend an answer
t to which utterly devastates the logic of the
ma- executive decision; however, he will not
rn- do that in public.
eve Those whom the President chooses for
ar- his Chiefs of Staff have always appeared
to me to move from a sense of duty to
ent support the President's decision as their
an- own once he has made it. In fact, it
has always appeared to me that this was
rd- the unwritten code of general officers.
WS Now when Curtis LeMay stated that
ne- he would not have recommended signing
Y- this test ban treaty, it seemed to me as
ch one who has been on committees hear-
ke ing such men testify for 15 years, that
ey General LeMay was going as far as the
he rules of the game would permit even
he with the so-called clearance that had
me been granted by the executive.
ur When General Power, Chief of the
o- Strategic Air Command, General Le-
se May's choice for the Chief's old job, said
se, that he would not advise ratification of
a- a treaty signed by the President, he was
he all but turning in his uniform and offer-
ng ing to sacrifice himself for national sur-
at vival as he saw it. That. is what this
he testimony- meant to me, regardless of
f. what kind of clearance this man was
ns supposed to have.
Before anyone leaps to the conclusion
of that General LeMay adviaes this treaty,
st let him note that the Secretary of the
of Air Force cancelled the Secretary's ac-
t, ceptance at a mere social event given by
1, the Air Force Association out of resent-
f ment that the Association had resolved
points among capitalists which Commu-
nists Must never overlook an opportunity
to exploit,
There.are People who like to think that
the CominUnist leaders at heart are not
a lot different from our own leaders.
The principal difference is that Com-
munist leaders will not abide by the re- The decisions in Korea not to use
Sults Of a free election; our difference atomic weapons, not to bomb beyond the
therefore becomes irreconciliable. No Yalu, not to engage in hot pursuit of en-
Other ansiVer remains except war or emy planes, not to bomb near the
the Congress Congress or whomever he may choose
to consult, but, in the last analysis, by
the President.
The President may, and frequently
does, make decisions that are a disad-
vantage militarily when he believes that
other advantages should prevail
stalemate until 0,23e can overthrow th
other by subversion Or revolution unles
With time there can be a gradual ac
ceptance of the views of one by the other
Some of our best People are convince
that the Russian Communist leader
Want peace, The Soviets do in fact wani
peace on terms which surrender th
world to their absolute control. No othe
tern-is will _suffice.
Many of our people are worried abou
pollution in the atmosphere. This wor
ried me greatly until I learned that
have been _exposed to radiation all my
life as a result ,of cosmic rays, mineral
deposits, X-rays, phosphorescent wrist-
Watches, television tubes, and other such
devices,
If a person is hying in Denver, he is
eXposed to 70 percent more radiation
than at yvItaLingtgon, In the State of
Kerala, India, people are exposed to
1,00 percent more radiation than in
Washington, and nobody ever thought
Much about it.
The explosions of nuclear devices by
411 nations have increased radiation by
sian
border, not to nse troops of Chiang
? Kai-shek, to dismiss General MacArthur,
? were all debatable, to say the least, from
the military point of view.
?
It should be noted that concerning our
strategy in Korea hardly a word of criti-
cism?none comes to my mind?came to
Lt the surface from an officer on active duty,
? save General MacArthur himself who
was being relieved of command and who
felt such deep resentment and disagree-
t ment that he was willing to risk court
- martial if the President had dared to go
I so far with a popular national idol.
When General MacArthur closed his
speech before the joint session of Con-
gress, there was not a -dry eye in the
.military, yet not a responsible officer in
charge of the Military Establishment
rose to criticize the President nor the
restraints that had been imposed upon
General MacArthur.
In the thousands of pages of testimony
that occurred during the investigation,
the Joint Chiefs backed the President
implicitly and other officers were no more
critical than merely to point out that,
when military and political decisions Are
eneral Power recommended and as
General LeMay said he would have rec-
ommended except for the fact that the
executive had already approved the
treaty.
No, the fact is that for these officers
to have gone any farther against this
treaty would have required that they
consider offering their resignations first,
no matter what kind of clearance they
were supposed to have had.
If this Nation should perish, it will be
because we will not listen to these men
who have gone as far as their positions
and circumstances will permit to advise
us to rely upon the best weapons we can
acquire and to let nothing prevent us
from being best in weaponry if we care
to survive.
In the past these men have advised
that we proceed with missiles while
others were dragging their feet. They
have advised even faster, better aircraft,
better equipment. Had we listened to
them, we would have been in far better
shape to face every crisis from the first
Berlin blockade to the Cuban threat
today.
Some years ago, I served on the Select
Committee on Disarmament and on the
Disarmament Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee of Foreign Relations. These were
forerunners to the Disarmament Agency,
and, in some respects, forerunners of this
treaty. Let me say that my colleague,
the Senator from Minnesota [Mr.
HUMPHREY], is as devoted a patriot as
any man in this Chamber, although our
views on this treaty are as different as
night and clay. He was chairman of
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16732 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 20
that select committee and that subcom-
mittee. ,
When we were serving on the Disarma-
ment Committee, the Joint Chiefs told us
that, if we wanted to disarm, we should
arm first because their resources had
been cut back until they had nothing
that they could afford to give up. This
was under the Eisenhower administra-
tion.
Subsequently, we did proceed to arm
this ctruntry under President Kennedy.
Today we are in position to talk disarma-
ment because we are very strong. But
we should not talk disarmament without
foolproof inspection. Until our adver-
sary is ready to disarm and let us inspect
to see for ourselves, we should continue
to build and maintain great strength.
This is the only way that we will ever
have an honorable peace with freedom.
However long it takes, this we must in-
sist upon.
Now. Mr. President, one of the biggest
dangers in this treaty, in my opinion,
is the fact that Red China is not bound
by it. t think that the distinguished
Senator from Georgia IMr. BUSsELL)
and many others have Indicated their
great apprehension over this fact.
All have indicated the fear that in
years to come Russia will use Chinese
territory to conduct clandestine tests in
the atmosphere. It is all too easy for
some to discount this possibility at this
Particular time because of the alleged
poor relations between Russia and China.
But who is to say that these relations
might not take a very sudden turn for
the better?just as they took a sudden
turn for the worse during these past
3 or 4 months. Who is to say that Mao
Tse-tung, who is well into his seventies,
might not die the very next week after
nekt and that his successor might not
bring China back under Russia's wing.
Or who is to say that in any number of
ways China and Russia might not sud-
denly become true allies once more?
even under their present leadership.
I remember only too well, Mr. Presi-
dent, the conclusion on this very sub-
ject reached only 3 or 4 years ago by the
Subcommittee on Disarmament of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I
arid Several others who are still members
of the Foreign Relations Committee
served on that subcommittee, which in
a number of ways led us to establish the
present Disarmament Agency.
For some time we studied the matter
of nuclear test bans and came up with
numerous conclusions on this subject
and others-
Einring_that period, in August 1953-5
years ago?my friend from Minnesota
brought to us a document warning that
no disarmament agreement- with Rus-
sia would be In this Nation's interest un-
les e subscribed to fully by Communist
China The possibility of Communist
perftdY by way 'of using China as a tool
or 45 Volfer for a Russian operation was
specifically spelled out In the subcom-
tratee's report rt reads as follows:
dOilinitinist China is still a formidable
Military power and every indication is that
thlit power is being augmented. As the sub-
oarchnittee has evaluated events in the area
of China and within China itself which are
directly related to disarmament, it has con-
eluded that there is a real -possibility that
the exclusion of China from a first step dis-
armament agreement might provide the
Soviet Union a significant loophole through
which to evade such an agreement. Obvi-
ously, whether this loophole would exist
would depend on the nature of the agree-
ment. The subconunittee notes in this con-
nection that an agreement which involved
the suspension of nuclear weapons tests with
inapection and which did not include inspec-
tion in Communist China might present an
opportunity for evasions on the part of the
Soviet bloc. The United States must not
contemplate signing a disarmament agree-
ment which would permit its security to be
jeopardized. The subcommittee is of the
opinion, -therefore, that greater attention
must be paid to the question of including
Communist China in any disarmament
agreement which would provide for the sus-
pension of nuclear weapons tests with in-
spection.
This subcommittee included a number
of the Senators who voted to favorably
report this measure to the Senate.
Now we are presented a treaty that
drops the requirement of inspection. I
am advised that it will be impossible to
prove cheating under all circumstances,
even in Russia or at sea. For example,
when an explosion occurs in the south
Pacific, how will anyone know who cre-
ated that explosion at sea? No one ex-
cept those who were there would know.
The south Pacific is the high sea; it is
available to everyone. The treaty cer-
tainly does not block the cheating with
China as the cover.
If we make this treaty minus Inspec-
tion, I predict that we will never per-
suade Russia to agree to foolproof in-
spection in all other respects. This will
be the precedent. It will be said among
Communists that if we will agree to a
treaty so clearly against our security
interests as this one, we will eventually
seal off whatever chance we have of pre-
vailing on this earth by agreeing to dis-
arm under circumstances wherein our
adversary will remain armed to the
teeth.
In the Cuban crisis, only last year,
these selfsame ComMunista?in fact,
one of them also initialed this treaty?
lied to us about missiles in Cuba until
they were almost in position to blast us
from this planet with Cuba as the base
before we finally moved. Even now we
do not know whether the missiles are in
Cuba or not. The inspection to which
Russia agreed at the showdown never
came to pass because our leadership
softened Its resolve when the immediate
crisis passed.
I respect our 'President as a person,- a
former naval officer, -a former Senator,
and as an able Chief Executive. He says
that this treaty enables all people to be
free from fears of radioactive fallout. I
say that you had better be worried about
the fallout from' the bombs aimed at you
If you are lucky enough to escape the
blast, more than the infinitesimal
amount of radiation from tests con-
ducted under conditions carefully ar-
ranged to protect life and health. Inso-
far as this treaty frees you from fear, it
is a sense of false security.
Our President says this treaty fur-
nishes a small hope that war can be
averted. I say that this treaty dashes
that hope in that it will shift the relative
power of the two great protagonists in
favor of the one which refuses to re-
nounce world domination under police
state rule as the only answer.
This treaty will help to shift military
superiority from the law-abiding God-
fearing, peace-loving, truthtelling Gov-
ernment that is the United States.
This treaty will serve to retard the de-
velopment of our defenses and our
offensive power. This treaty will limit
but slightly the development of the mili-
tary might of our adversary arid he will
cheat whenever he finds the restraint to
be important.
This treaty will result in a stronger
Communist military power compared to
that of the United States and the free
world. This treaty will hasten the day
when Soviet Russia and Communist
China will be ready to risk war with us.
Many years ago, Patrick Henry said:
Gentlemen may cry peace, peace, but there
is no peace.-What is It that gentlemen wish?
What would they have? Is life so dear, or
peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the
price of chains and slavery? Forbid it,
Almighty God. I know not what course
others may take, but, as for me, give me
liberty, or give Me death.
Many of the arguments that have been
made for this treaty would place our
lives, our safety, our hope for better
health and cleaner air ahead of our love
of liberty. This treaty would do just
that. I do not care to survive to a day
when this Nation is no longer free, and
I am prepared to pay the price of a free
America whatever that price may be.
The price of preparedness is small in-
deed compared to the consequences of
defeat.
This treaty should be rejected and I
shall so vote.
Mr. 'THURMOND. Mr. :President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana, I yield.
Mr. THURMOND. I presume the
Senator from Louisiana has read in the
news today that Mr. Gromy:ko, the man
who initialed the treaty on behalf of the
U.S.S.R., the man who was at the White
House and talked to President Kennedy
last fall concerning the missiles in Cuba,
and denied there were any missiles
there, at the very time President Ken-
nedy had pictures in his desk showing
they were there, is now stating that he
wants to have a disarmament meeting
with the President in Moscow next year.
I presume the Senator read those news
accounts.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. What the
Russians have in mind for us, in my
judgment, is exactly what they had last
tine. Mr. Grornyko is going to meet the
President and propose that -the United
States and Russia both disarm, on a
self-inspection basis. That is a fine
proposal for one nation that does not
believe in truth to make to another na-
tion that does. If this country Made
such an agreement, we would be bound
to disarm. Mr. Gromyko went before
President Kennedy and said, "You can
depend on it, Mr. President, that there
are no Russian missiles in Cuba"?at
the very time the President had in his
desk pictures of missiles in Cuba. If we
do business with those people, and dis-
arm, all they have to do is lie to us that
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16733
they are disarming and in that way de- to defend this country in the event of man who in my judgment is the best au-
stroy our countrk. One thing can be atomic war?information that was not thority on the floor of the Senate on the
said for this treaty?we would not have made available to the Foreign Relations problem of defending America, the Sen-
to fear " war, because we would not be Committee?I have no doubt that the ator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I
able to fight if we wanted to. - Senator from Ohio would have voted just changed my mind. The Senator from
MOND 'The 'distinguished as I did If the Senator from Louisiana Georgia has been a member of the Armed
Senator has brought out the question of had had such information at that time,
?
disarmament. As President gennedy there would have been no doubt about
has said, this is the first step. W. Rusk his vote, whereas at the time he had
has also said it. Now it looks as though some doubt as to whether he should vote
Mr, Gromyko is getting ready to skip for or against the treaty.
several steps and go on to an agreement Mr. THURMOND. I feel confident
on disarmament.
I commend the Senator for the pene-
trating attention and care he has given
to this question, and the soundness with
which he has approached it and arrived
at his conclusion. He is making a very
able and fine address, and I extend my
hearty commendations to him.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the
Senator. I appreciate his compliment.
I listened with _great interest to the
speech or the Senator from South Caro-
lina. The Senator brought to me much
good, solid thought, knowledge, and in-
formation that he had learned, both as
a general in the armed services and as
a member of the Armed Services Corn-
Mittee, when he 'spelled out, in chapter
and verse, Information that was not be-
fore the Foreign Relations Committee
when it Vbted on the question?not that
It would have' changed the votes, but the
information the senator had made avail-
able to rrie Made a compelling case as to
why the 'treaty -should not be ratified.
' I said so at the time.
r. 'TITURMOND. I thank the Sen-
ator. r congratulate him for his cour-
, age in being the only member of the
Foreign Relations Committee to vote
against rePOrling the treaty favorably
to the Senate floor. Since that time the
Senator from Ohio Mr: LAuSenE3 has
given earnest study and consideration
? to this matter, and I was pleased to learn
Yesterday that he has decided to vote
against the treaty. I likewise commend
him for his dedicated study and his cour-
a,ge in deciding to stand with our small
band of opponents.
Mr. LO of Louisiana. As the Sen-
ator wellInows, at the time the Foreign
Relations Committee met, it did not have
,available to it the information that was
presented to "the? Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee of the Committee
on Arm-ea Services. The Senator from
South Carolina is a member of the Pre-
paredness Investigating Subcommittee.
He is also a member of the Committee
that the Senator from Ohio would have
voted just as the Senator from Louisi-
ana said he would have voted if that in-
formation had been made available to
him. I regret that the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee acted before the Sena-
tor from Ohio and other members of the
committee had the opportunity to study
the report of the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee. I also believe that the Senator
from Ohio or another member of the
committee requested that General Power
be allowed to testify before the Foreign
Relations Committee, and that that re-
quest was denied.
I am sorry that General Power was not
permitted to appear before the commit-
tee, because he is the one man who would
have to press the button to have the
bombers take off and have the missiles
fired in the event an exchange should
occur. He has been giving a great deal
of attention to this subject as chairman
of the strategic targeting group. He is
an expert on nuclear weapons and an
expert oil planes, including bombers.
Merely because he is a military man in-
duces some people to feel that perhaps
he is not a scientist, and therefore should
not go into these matters, or that he
does not know anything about these sub-
jects. He does. General Power has giv-
en a great deal of attention and study
to these matters. No one could have
heard the testimony of General Power
before the Preparedness Subcommittee
and not be convinced that he knows what
he is talking about?that this dedicated
officer knows his job and the enemy we
face in the cold war.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I do not
know whether General Power requested
that he be heard before the Foreign Re-
lations Committee.
Mr. THURMOND. He did not request
that he be heard, but I believe the Sena-
tor from Ohio or another member of the
Foreign Relations Committee told me
that he had requested that General Pow-
er lae allowed to appear before the com-
Mittee.
Services Committee and the predecessor
committee from the day he came to the
Senate, probably 24 or 26 years ago.
Many consider him to be the best
qualified man to be President.
I supported him for President at the
Democratic Convention, but refused to
walk out of the convention when a ma-
jority of the Louisiana delegation wanted
to walk out, on the theory that we came
to support a Senator from Georgia, and
that we should remain and fight for him.
In the opinion of former President
Truman he was the best qualified man
to be President of the United States.
When he made the compelling case
against the treaty that he made, I was
left with no alternative but to vote to
reject the treaty, as he had said he was
left in no doubt about rejecting the
treaty, because it fails to protect the sur-
vival of this country.
The treaty could be the key to our
destruction, or our demise as an inde-
pendent nation. I cannot vote for it
knowing that that might be the result.
Mr. THURMOND. The announce-
ment by Mr. Gromyko, which was pub-
lished in the papers today, bears out the
prediction of the Senator from Louisiana,
the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RUSSELL], and other Senators that the
nuclear test ban treaty is the first step
to disarmament.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The prophet-
ic judgment of the Senator from Geor-
gia [Mr. RUSSELL] about the treaty being
a step that is in the wrong direction
from the standpoint of this Nation's in-
terest, included a prediction by the Sena-
tor from Georgia that some other nation,
among the community of nations, would
propose that now that we have agreed
to cease atmospheric testing and testing
In space and testing under water, we
should now agree to stop all underground
testing.
Today, within a week of when the
Senator from Georgia made his speech,
a delegate from Brazil in the United Na-
tions has proposed that the smaller na-
tions should take the lead in seeking to
make us agree that we will not do any
underground testing.
The Senator knows that Communist
China can serve as the testing ground
on Armed. for the Soviet Union. The only real
The Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHEI Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- argument between the Communists in
wanted to wail until the Armed Services dent, if I had had to vote for or against China and the Communists in Russia is
Committee, thrthigh its Preparedness In- the treaty when it was first brought to how better to destroy us. Communist
veStigating SUICernmittee, could give us the Senate and before I had heard the China say, "Let us use these weapons to
the informatiOn-lt now has made avail- witnesses, particularly before I had heard do it." Russia says, "No, let us not do
able. There is no doulitin-rny'hilnd that Dr. Teller on this subject, I would have it that way. If we use them, they might
If the Senator from Ohio Mir. LAUSCHE] voted for the treaty. I was prepared to use them back on us."
had had Snell information available to go along and approve the treaty, feeling The question is whether they should
him When members Of theForeign ReIa- that to do so would be in the interest of cheat, should lie, should deceive and
tions 'Committee' insisted- on -voting on my country. However, after I had heard force us to our knees in abject surrender
this matter, he 'would not-have -voted as what Dr. Teller had to say about it, after by any means short of destruction.
,4141. IT he hid 'had bplabitunity I had had made available to me the Those two nations do not disagree about
tn5 study thirinfOrmEiticiii, seine of it testimony of General Power, after I anything else. They can resolve their
which' was bas-e,d on the m
-oat -respon- could read what the Senator from South differences tomorrow if they wish to.
sible type of courage-oils- lestifriony by Carolina had developed on the subject, Russia could resume testing in Red
persons Who haVe a direct responsibility after I had heard the statement of the China if it wished to do so. The only
No, 150
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16734 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
difference between them is as to what
the best way is of destroying us.
Mr. THURMOND. Does not the Sen-
ator from Louisiana feel that the only
thing that has prevented a war with
Russia since World War II, in view of
her goal of world domination and en-
slavement, has been the overwhelming
nuclear power of the United States?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. It is my
judgment that that is what has main-
tained the peace. Some may disagree
with me, of course. They say the Rus-
sians do not want war. I am sure they do
not want war, provided it fits in with
their terms, which means that they
would dominate the world, including the
United States. There is no doubt in my
mind that it has been the nuclear deter-
rent of the United States which has been
maintaining the peace over the years
since World War II. Incidentally, Win-
ston Churchill, one of the greatest
statesmen of our time, at Fulton, Mo.,
made that statement a few years ago,
on the occasion of his visit to President
Truman.
Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Sen-
ator.
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President,
the Senate will soon act to fulfill an im-
portant constitutional responsibility
which it shares with the President of
the United States. We have been asked
by the President to approve ratification
?of the test ban treaty, and thus to share
with him this responsibility. The Con-
stitution requires, for the ratification of
any treaty, the advice of the Senate and
the consent of two-thirds of the Senators
who are present and voting. In a for-
mal sense, it ts the Members of the Sen-
ate who offer the advice to the Presi-
dent; but, in a broader sense, the Sen-
ate is the medium through which the
whole country should be expected to give
Its advice.
In the same manner, the vote of the
Senate will be the means by which the
country will give its consent.
Oftentimes, the advice given in regard
to a treaty is highly technical, and the
consent which is given involves a limited
or confined scientific or rational judg-
ment. But the advice and consent with
reference to this particular treaty in-
volve much more than that. They in-
volve our advice based on the general
judgment of the Senate and?if the Sen-
ate speaks for the country?the judg-
ment of the people of this country. So
our decision also involves a moral com-
mitment, in connection with which we
rely on the intellect and the will of
people of this land when we act either
to affirm or to reject the treaty?as a
result of which we shall be subject to
the interpretation of historical judgment
as to the movement of events in the year
1963.
Mr. President, neither advice nor the
consent of the Senate on matters as
serious as those involved in this test ban
treaty should be given lightly. The Sen-
ate has proceeded most cautiously and
most carefully. It has sought the ad-
vice of representatives of the President,
principally the Secretary of State. It
has sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and of other military experts.
It has sought the advice of former Presi-
dents and former public officials expe-
rienced in international affairs. It has
sought the advice of scientists and his-
torians, and has heard, from the general
public.
In considering the test ban treaty, the
Senate has conducted a thorough re-
view of our military policy and our for-
eign policy, and has considered both our
strength and our weaknesses. It has
examined carefully the language of the
treaty itself, and has attempted to weigh
the immediate implications and the im-
mediate significance of the treaty.
The Senate has also judged the treaty
against the background of history and
the movemnt of history, and has consid-
ered both the discouraging record of the
past and the risks and the uncertainties
of the future.
Most treaties are instruments of lim-
ited objective and also limited achieve-
ment. Sometimes their declared pur-
poses are relatively limited and almost
trivial. Sometimes their declared pur-
poses have expressed hopes beyond the
reasonable expectations of prudent men.
Some treaties have been formed and
drawn in good faith; and others have
been designed to deceive. Some treaties
have been signed and ratified as instru-
ments of mutual defense; others, as a
seal of mutual aggression. The record
of performance on treaties is as mixed as
the history of mankind.
This test ban treaty is one of limited
objectives. The heart of it is the agree-
ment that each of the parties will under-
take the following:
1. Prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry
out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or.
any other nuclear explosion at any place
under its jurisdiction or control;
(a) In the atmosphere, beyond its limits,
Including outer space, or underwater, in-
cluding territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) In any other environment if such ex-
plosion causes radioactive debris to be pre-
sent outside the territorial limits of the
State under whose jurisdiction or control
such explosion is conducted. It is under-
stood, in this connection, that the provisions
of this subparagraph are without prejudice
to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the
permanent banning of all nuclear test ex-
plosions, including all such explosions un-
derground, the conclusions of which, as the
parties have stated in the preamble to this
treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the parties to this treaty under-
takes furthermore to refrain from causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating
in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon
test explosion, or any other nuclear explo-
sion anywhere, which would take place in
any of the environments described, or have
the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.
The rest of the articles of the treaty
deal with procedures for ratification, the
admission of additional signatories, and
within?in article IV?the conditions
and terms under which,the parties may
repudiate and withdraw from the treaty
arrangement.
Some Senators have criticized the
treaty because it will not establish uni-
versal peace and full victory for the
United States and for the free world.
These are some of the questions that
have been asked about it:
September 20
First. Will the treaty get the Russian
troops out of Cuba?
Second. Will the treaty rid Cuba of
the despotism of Communist domina-
tion?
Third. Will the treaty stop the sabo-
tage in Venezuela?
Fourth. Will the treaty eliminate the
Communist subversion and espionage in
Peru and Ecuador?
Fifth. Will the treaty stop Communist
agitation in Africa?
Sixth. Will the treaty free any of the
people now enslaved in eastern European
countries? How many?
Seventh. Will the treaty tear down
the Berlin wall, so that more people May
express with their feet their antagonism
to Communist despotism?
Eighth. Will the treaty cause the So-
viets to abandon their espionage rings
in any free world nation?
Ninth. Will the treaty end the con-
stant irritations on the Korean truce
line, or prevent future killings of Ameri-
can troops?
Tenth. Will the treaty prevent the
shelling of Quemoy and Matsu in the
future?
Eleventh. Will the treaty cause the
Communists to cease their attacks on
non-Communists in Laos, or to mitigate
their efforts to take over that country?
Twelfth. Will the treaty cause the
North Vietnamese and the Chinese to
cease trying to take over Vietnam?
These are questions to which answers
have been demanded.
Obviously, the answers must be in the
negative. One could recite a long list of
other questions. Some persons would
seem to demand that the treaty somehow
solve all the problems which face the
United States, both at home and abroad.
This would be to demand much more of
this treaty?or any treaty?than anyone
has a right to demand.
Some Senators have charged that the
treaty is the first step in a series which
may lead to general and complete dis-
armament, involving total surrender of
the sovereignty of the United States,
This, too, of course, is to charge more
or to promise more or to prophesy more
than is warranted by the limited text
of the treaty itself.
In dealing with the test ban treaty,
we cannot act upon the fears and the
apprehensions of some Members of the
Senate or of any Member of the Senate,
because to do so would preclude action
by the Senate on this issue, as well as on
most of the other controversial issues
which come before this body.
We cannot act on the basis of the
prophecies?for many things said about
the treaty have been in the area of proph-
ecy, even though the speakers have
denied that they possess prophetic gifts.
The record of treaties in relation to
their stated objectives is a mixed one,
We cannot expect absolute certainty of
success, even with reference to the lim-
ited objectives set forth in this treaty.
On the other hand, we should not be
wholly pessimistic--by assuming that the
terms of the treaty will in no way be re-
spected or honored.
A treaty is an instrument of foreign
policy and?like all such instruments?
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CONGRESSIONAL-RECO-ft SNATE
It operates -without the full support of
power that can be used when the full sov-
ereignty of one's Country is being exer-
cised. .
The declarations of the administration
and the very record made in the course
of the Senate committees' inquiries have
demonstrated clearly that no one is be-
ing falsely optimistic about the possibil-
ities of 'the treaty. On the other hand,
the possible good that may come from
the treaty has not been exaggerated.
No pile can know with absolute cer-
tainty what interests motivated the So-
viet T,inion in signing the test ban treaty
M this time, although some have sug-
gested rather strongly what that motiva-
tion may be. We do not have any guar-
antee that the Soviet Union will not
break the treaty, even without cause, in
the futtire. We are not proceeding, how-
ever, as though we had these absolute
guarantees. There are no intentions on
the part of the United States to proceed
with any kind of unilateral disarmament,
once the treaty is signed. We have been
aseUred by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
although testing in tlip atniosphere
wallet -be useful in developing.' our mili-
tary power, the restrictions which the
treaty would Set up would not be such as
to prevent adequate development of our
defenses.
We retain our freedom to continue
Underground tests without violation of
the treaty, and we intend to pursue such
testing.
We, are free-.and are resolved to re-
Main prepared to do so?to resume nu-
clear, testing in the atmosphere if the
treat* is Violated.
We shall go On continuing to improve
our stern and methods for detecting all
kinds of nuclear testing, and to develop
our own anti-ballistic-missile program.
There is every reason to believe that
Our nuclear laboratory facilities will con-
tinue to develop and attract the best sci-
entists in the free world.
The treaty would ban certain forms of
testing but it will not outlaw use of nu-
clear weapons. It Involves no compro-
mise in the ideological war with commu-
nism, nor does it bear upon the general
cold war with communism, does it
bear directly upon the limited small wars
between Communists And anti-Commu-
nists that go on today.
It does not change the fact that both
we and the Soviet Union have a stockpile
of wielear weapons. It may prevent
some nations from entering the nuclear
arITIS race, but it has not yet been ac-
cepted by Frahm and Red China, the two
nations, which are pressing the hardest
in the effort to develop their own nuclear
weapons.
The treaty cannot properly be de-
scribed as a step forward, nor as a step
backward, but rather as a kind of halt.
It is enough to judge the treaty for
what it clearly it?an agreement to pro-
hibit nuclear weapons testing in the at-
mosphere, outer space and under water.
This is an achievement to be judged in
fts GIvri right. It may turn out to be the
first of many steps toward tl4p objectives
of peace and justice. Whether it will or
not remains unknown.
If the treaty is honored, in my opinion,
It should open the possibility of further
action to reduce the threat of nuclear
war or to limit the use of nuclear
weapons.
It is a fact- that agreements and un-
derstandings regarding poison gas seem
to have been successful in the 20th cen-
tury. In any case,-this destructive power
has not been used, whatever the reason
may be.
Leaving out all consideration of the
use of nuclear weapons in time of war,
the limited consideralion of the con-
tamination of the environment by radio-
active materials alone is one deserving
serious international attention.
The testing of nuclear weapons brings
risks to all the people of the world. The
uninvolved and uncommitted citizens of
the other nations, as well as those citi-
zens of the major powers producing and
controlling nuclear arms. It creates
risks not only for people living, but risks
for those who are yet unborn. The ef-
fects on the health of citizens and the
genetic effects of radioactive materials
are not fully known or understood. But
It is generally known and' accepted that
radioactive materials can cause a serious
hazard to health and to life.
Because the dangers both in war and
In peace arising from nuclear power are
great, we must be willing to take some
limited risks within prudential -limits.
This test ban treaty involves limited
risks. Its ratification is dictated by pru-
dent consideration. It should therefore
be ratified by the Senate.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the
debate on the test ban treaty has now
been in progress In the Senate for 2
weeks.
I have listened with utmost care to
the intense debate that has been waged
in the U.S. Senate over, whether or not
we should ratify the test ban treaty.
This treaty ratification has given me
great concern because Of, the, charges
and countercharges concerning the pos-
sible effect that this treaty might have
upon the security of our Nation. As in
most matters which have come before
this body, this treaty has received
neither unanimous approval nor objec-
tion by the Senate. As in most proposals
that I have faced in the Senate during
my 19 years of service, the contents of
this treaty are not unanimously accept-
able to me. There are weaknesses in the
treaty which I disapprove of but there
are many strong points?points upon
which the very future of civilized life
as wp know it on this planet may hinge.
We ought to realize that any amend-
ment to the treaty ?would necessitate ne-
gotiation of a new treaty by all of the 89
countries that have already signed the
treaty.
Whether we realize it or not, the test
ban treaty debate is one of three great
debates of our century. The first great
debate concerned the involvement of the
United States in the League of Nations.
The second great debate of the 20th cen-
tury concerned our participation in the
United Nations.
/ look back to the years following the
creation of the League of Nations, when
16735
the United States as the most powerful
nation on earth stood outside of the
League, voiceless and helpless to stop the
world from spinning recklessly into
-World War II, even after thousands of
Americans had died in World War I, the
war to end all wars. We were powerless-
ly isolated, because of the failure of the
U.S. Senate to endorse Woodrow Wil-
son's program to make the United States
a part of the League of Nations.
We saved no money; we saved no face;
and we saved no lives. We merely weak-
ened our Nation instead of providing it
with security as some Senators had
hoped. When World War II came, we
found ourselves again playing the role of
savior of the free world?a job we were
pitifully unprepared to do. -World War
II bitterly taught us the lessons of the
futility of isolation. As a result we be-
came a part of the United Nations, per-
haps reluctantly because of the possi-
bilities of losing our national identity in
a world organization. Again, in that
great debate, the security of our Nation
versus the hopes of peace became the
Issue. This fear of losing the identity of
the United States in the bigness of a
world organization still remains with
many of us, but we would not withdraw
the United States from the United Na-
tions, because there still remains the
hope that we can find lasting peace
through this organization.
Today, we distrust the Russians, and
rightfully so. However, we cannot mor-
ally permit this distrust to move us into
a new form of isolation. We recognize
Russia and the Communist world as the
arch enemy of democracy and freedom.
But we would smash into a thousand
pieces the hopes of humanity for peace if
we should reject this treaty. Our Nation
and the world cannot afford another
mistake like we made after World War I.
Mr. President, on the one hand there
is the threat of nuclear extinction for the
great mass of our people as well as our
enemy, and quite possibly the entire
world, if we reject this treaty and move
Into an unbridled nuclear armaments
race.
In this connection, there are also in-
creased hazards to the earth's popula-
tion, not only to people who are living to-
day but also to unborn generations.
-Medical science is practically unani-
mous in the opinion that additional ra-
diation from continued atmospheric nu-
clear testing will cause significant human
suffering as a result, with increased risks
of cancer and other physical deformities
and mental deficiencies. It has been es-
timated that 50,000 children, as of this
date,-will be born into the world with
gross mental or physical defects because
a)f the genetic damage of fallout from nu-
clear tests. These defects will include
such things as muscular dystrophy, can-
cer, blindness, dwarfism, and other major
deformities. Unlimited and continuous
nuclear testing in the atmosphere ob-
viously will increase these threats to our
civilization.
On the other hand, there is the possi-
bility, if this treaty is ratified, that our
onemies_wollid not act in .P.Pd faith and
'Would violate the treaty, possibly giving
them a military advantage over ns.
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167,36 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 20
These points constitute the very essence'
Of this debate. It has been stated by the
scientists that any nuclear test which
amounts to anything would be known a
few minutes thereafter. Little harm
could be done by at least entering into
the agreement at this time.
We must profit from the lessons and
experience our past has given us and ac-
cordingly our answer to the world must
be ratification of this treaty. If we reject
It now, we are saying that we have given
up all hope for peace and we are telling
the world it must look forward only to
an endless dark age of told war and ever-
threatening nuclear attack.
If possible, I should like to get rid
of the cold war?or at least a part of it.
I want nci accusing finger of history
pointing at this Senate and at me to
say that we failed humanity because we
? rejected this treaty. Our faith in our-
selves and in God Almighty must be
greater than this fear or there will never
be peace, and we shall never rid our-
selves of the cold war.
We have lived with the cold war and
within the shadow of H-bomb attacks
for nearly 20 years, fruitlessly edging
toward another world war. This treaty
essentially changes nothing except to
open the door of possibility for just and
lasting peace.
As a nation we must continue to be
prepared for any eventuality and to do
anything necessary to preserve our
? Nation.
? We must remain prepared at all times.
In this connection, we must accept the
word of our Joint Chiefs of Staff who
have stated that we will not be weak-
ened by the signing of this treaty.
In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Secretary of Defense have as-
sured the Nation that we would be pre-
pared to resume testing should the So-
viets violate the treaty, and 'they have
stated that the United States would be
Able to detect any violations having any
significance or any military 'Value. If
we cannot accept their authority on this
Subject, what can we depend upon in our
military setup? In all of this, we owe
It to the Creator of mankind and the
world to do everything in our power to
bring peace on earth. This treaty is
within our power. This treaty contains
the hopes for world peace and the way
to achieve this without sacrificing our
honor and freedom.
Mr. President, this is why I have no
other choice except to vote for the ratifi-
cation of this treaty. I do so without
fear and without apology. The world
must emerge from the night of distrust
and into the light of peace. I want the
United States of America to boldly and
fearlessly lead the way, by signing and
becoming a part of the peace treaty now
before the Senate.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I
commend the Senator for a clear, con-
cise, and positive statement. It is a
wonderful contribution. I commend the
Senator for it.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the Sena-
tor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I commend the
distinguished senior Senator from South
California for the speech he has made
this afternoon. It was to the point. I
think the Senator made his position
quite clear and quite understandable.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank both the
Senator from Alabama and the majority
leader for the remarks they have made.
After studying the problem, this is the
only way I can cast my vote
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the
Young Americans for Freedom, which is
one of the finest and most patriotic
organizations in the United States, has
presented to me, for the Senate, a peti-
tion which bears the names of about
15,000 people, from every State in the
Union, who are opposed to ratification of
the nuclear test ban treaty by the Senate.
I should just like to read what the
petition states:
Young Americans for Freedom, the Na-
tion's largest conservative youth organiza-
tion in the land, has presented this petition:
"Whereas the U.S.S.R. has broken 50 or
52 major treaties cr agreements with the
United States; and
"Whereas no scientific evidence has been
produced which assures the United States of
detecting nuclear tests in the atmosphere
by the U.S.S.R.; and
"Whereas history has recorded that dis-
armament proceedings by the United States
have encouraged the enemy to increase ag-
gression; and
"Whereas the treaty will maintain the
Communist U.S.S.R. superiority in the field
of multhnegaton weapons and antimissile
weapons; and
"Whereas any agreement between the So-
viet Union, Great Britain, and the United
States will imply our trust in the Com-
munist leadership, thus rendering our anti-
Communist efforts worthless; and
"Whereas scientific evidence concludes that
radioactive fallout from testing is not a
danger in the immediate or foreseeable fu-
ture: 'rheref ore be it
"Resolved, That the undersigned petition
the U.S. Senate to defeitt President Ken-
nedy's nuclear test ban treaty with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics."
FAlowing that petition are the names
of the various persons who signet, from
various States. As I have stated, there
are petitions signed by persons f rom
every State in the Nation.
I take this opportunity to commend
the Young Americans for Freedom for
their activity. in this connection. I had
the pleasure of addressing the Young
Americans for Freedom last spring.
There must have been 18,000 to 20,000
of them present in New York City at that
time.
It is most encouraging to find that
thousands of young people on our college
campuses and elsewhere are standing
so strongly for freedom and the preser-
vation of a national defense posture to
insure the maintenance of our freedoms
in this country. After all, Mr. President,
the future of our country belongs to our
young people of today.
I feel that this organization is render-
ing America a great service, and I am
proud that the high caliber membership
contained in the organization has seen
fit to oppose the nuclear test ban treaty,
even though it may not be the popular
thing to do, and even though the propa-
ganda of all the networks and most of
the news media in the United States?
not all, but most of them, and most of
the larger ones, are taking a contrary
position.
Again, I commend the Young Ameri-
cans for Freedom. I congratulate them
for the great service they are rendering
to our country; and I especially com-
mend them for obtaining this petition
against the nuclear test ban treaty.
. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, several
weeks ago, after the conclusion of the
hearings on the test ban treaty, I stated
that I intended to vote for its ratifica-
tion. The debate throughout the hear-
ings, which I attended, in the testimony,
and on the floor of the Senate has been
comprehensive and, it seems to me, has.
examined every argument that can be
adduced for or against the treaty. In
speaking today, I do not intend to dwell
In detail On these arguments but, rather,
state the conclusions which lead me to
vote for ratification of the treaty.
? I know that the treaty represents the
culmination of efforts that have been
made in various forms since World War
beginningjn a very broad way under
the adminiselttion of President Truman.
Under the administration of President;
Eisenhower negotiations were aimed di-
rectly toward a ban upon nuclear tests..
These efforts have been continued under
the administration of President Ken-,
nedy. The result of all these negotia-
tions and efforts is manifested in the
treaty before the Senate.
I am glad also that this effort has been
truly nonpartisan. The effort has been
made by Democratic and Republican ad-
Ministrations and Members of both par-
ties, and in particular, Senators who
serve on important committees,, such as
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.,
the Foreign Relations Committee, and
the Armed Services Committee, have
made great contributions.
The minority leader of the Senate,
Senator DnitcsEN, and the ranking mem-
ber of the Republican Party in the Sen-
ate, Senator AIKEN, have referred in.
their speeches favoring the treaty to the
provision of the Republican platform of
1960 expressing the position of the party
on this subject. This part of the plank
reads:
We are similarly ready to negotiate and
to institute realistic methods and safeguards
for disarmament, and for the suspension of
nuclear- tests. We advocate an early agree-
ment by all nations to forego nuclear tests
in the atmosphere, and the suspension of
other tests as verification techniques-pertnit.
We support the President in any decision he
may make to reevaluate the question of re-
sumption of underground nuclear explosions
testing, if the Geneva Conference fain to
produce a satisfactory agreement. We have
deep concern about the mounting nue:Lear
arms race. This concern leads us to seek
disarmament and nuclear agreeme:nts. And.
an equal concern to protect all peoples from
nuclear danger, leads us to insist that such
agreements have adequate safeguards.
I had the honor to serve as the chair-
Man of the subcommittee on foreign pol-
icy of the platform committee, at the 1960
onvention. Our subcommittee con-
sulted with leaders at the convention.. I
talked to Secretary of State Herter to
make certain that this plank represented
the policy of President Eisenhower's ad-
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1963
ministration. 'I consulted with President
,Eisenhower by telephone about certain of
its clauses. Our subcommittee then ap-
proved this section of the platform, and
It was adopted by the full platform corn-
.rnittee and the convention.
I point these facts out not to say that
the circumstances under Which we
- adopted our plank at Chicago in 1960
were the same as today, or that the
treaty before us is in exact accord, nor
to attempt to say what the Position of
President Eisenhower or former Secre-
tary ?of tate Herter would be on this
treaty?but simply to point out that the
administration of President Eisenhower
and the Republican Party had as their
policy negotiations toward a safeguarded
ban Oki nuclear testing.
? In examining the treaty, I felt that it
was my prime responsibility to determine
Its effect upon_ the security of our coun-
try. Even the fact that many nations
have acceded to the treaty cannot di-
minish this duty, for only the United
? States has the power to protect its people
and its free institutiOns.
Today I have no doubt that certain
risks attend the ratification of the treaty.
I do not believe that such risks can be
removed by reservations, understandings,
or interpretations of the treaty. The
risks lie either in the provisions of the
treaty itself or in external facts regard-
_
Ing the relative nuclear capabilities of
the United States and the Soviet Union.
There is a risk that the Soviet Union
? may breach the treaty by clandestine
:testing. If it does, the testimony has
indicated that any significant tests would
be discovered, The United States could
immediately abrogate the treaty, whether
the breach of the Soviet Union was di-
rect or indirect, through the agency of
'other countries,
Article IV provides that "if any extra-
ordinary events related to the subject
matter of this treaty" jeopardize the
supreme interest of this country, 'we
could withdraw after 3 months' notice.
I would go further. It is my belief that
If any event occurred which, in the
opinion of the President or Congress,
'threatened the security of the United
States, the United States would have
the right under international law, and
the duty under the obligation of self-de-
fense, to abrogate the treaty immediately on the basis of the testimony that they
- and take whatever steps might be neces- are?then I believe the true test of this
sary for our security. The chief risk of treaty lies ahead. For its true and ex-
plicit purpose, in my view, is that it looks
forward to two things. One is the ac-
complishment of further agreements
which will reduce the extension of the
nuclear arms race, such as an enforce-
able ban Qi1 Underground testing. This,
of course, would be the necessary step
along the route toward nuclear disarma-
ment by all countries. The second pur-
pose, it seems to me, is to create an at-
mosphere of some trust, in which the
United States and the Soviet lJnion can
, proceed toward the just settlement of
In response I point out that Dr. Harold issues which the Soviet Union has ere-
-Brown, the director of Defense Research ated, which cause our confrontation with
and Engineering for the Department of the Soviet Union, and produce the danger
Defense, and the leading scientific ad- of war. I need not name all of these sit-
viser in the present administration, who uations of confrontation, but two are ap-
stated that he has full access to all In- parent?Berlin and the presence of Sovi-
forMation?military and scientific? et troops n u a, De ,presence of
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, SENATE 16737
-; ?
testified categorically that our recent
tests provide information comparable to
that of the Soviet Union with respect to
communications blackout and anti-bal-
listic-missile systems.
Other leading scientists, such as Dr.
York and Dr. Kistiakov,rsky of President
Eisenhower's administration supported
Dr. Brown, and testified that the United
States possesses superior nuclear power
and can maintain this power.
I also heard the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
including General LeMay, in closed ses-
sion, hold that the risks were manageable
if we maintain our ,scientific a,r,id military
capabilities, and, while raising the
question of the risks, as they should do,
they approved the treaty.
President Kennedy, in his message to
the Senate on August 8, made this state-
ment:
According to a comprehensive report pre-
pared by the responsible agencies of govern-
ment for the National Security Council, the
tests conducted by both the Soviet Union
and the United States since President Eisen-
hower first proposed this kind of treaty in
1959 have not resulted in any substantial
alteration in the strategic balance.
I believe that the ultimate issue is
whether it is a greater risk not to take
this first step, whose chief purpose is to
secure settlements of the situations in the
world which create the danger of war,
and to break the cycle of the nuclear
arms race which overshadows the world,
and if not halted may destroy it. Presi-
dent Kennedy has called the treaty a first
Step toward agreements which would
tend to prevent the possibility of a nu-
clear war. President Eisenhower, in his
recent letter to the Foreign Relations
Committee, said:
But the greatest anticipated advantage is
the hope?almost universally held by the
earth's populations?that the consummation
and meticulous implementation of the
agreement might open the way to better re-
lations between the cold war opponents and,
by small steps, bring about enforceable
agreements for the reduction of the costly
armaments race and progress toward the rule
of law in the world. These promises and
these hopes represent the major portion of
advantages of the treaty.
If we agree that the risks which we
assume in ratifying this treaty are man-
ageable?and I have made up my mind
the treaty, as such witnesses as Dr. Teller
and General Power testified, and which
has been argued forcefully by respected
Members of the Senate, is that the Soviet
Union has acquired from recent testing
Information not available to the United
States, information which enables it to
develop an anti-ballistic-missile system,
or systems, which could neutralize our
cominunications and thus render useless
our "second strike," which is the deter-
rent against any Soviet nuclear aggres-
Soviet troops in Cuba is an extension of
the status quo which Khrushchev has
contended should be maintained in East-
ern Europe. It is the first extension of
Soviet force in the Western Hemisphere.
It gives authority to Castro's regime, and
support to subversion and aggression in
the hemisphere. Its danger will continue
until the Soviet military presence is
ended. ,
I give these examples to reinforce my
statement that the true test is ahead.
If the Soviet Union will not, after the
ratification of this treaty, make any ad-
vances toward a just settlement of these
situations of confrontation, such as Ber-
lin and Cuba, if it Will not come to any
agreement upon an enforceable ban on
underground testing, then our country
will have the duty to inquire again as to
the purposes of this treaty and whether
it benefits our security or the security of
the world. And after a reasonable time,
If no advances toward true settlements
are made, then I believe it would be the
duty of the United States to take what-
ever action our security demanded. We
cannot know whether these advances to-
ward settlements, toward nuclear dis-
armament, are possible unless we take
this first step.
Mr. President, risks are inherent in
the ratification of the treaty, but they
are risks which the President and most
of our military and scientific leaders,
charged with responsibility, have told
us categorically are manageable and are
less dangerous than the failure to ratify
the treaty.
As long as our issues with Russia re-
main unresolved, we shall have to live
in an armed state under the threat of
war. lare,kave never thought very much
about managing our own lives, our gov-
ernment, and our industrial economy
during a long period of such danger, for
we have never lived on the brink of a
thermonuclear war.
Our system is distinguished from that
of the Soviet Union, for we believe in a
moral order. We must maintain "tour
defenses, and we will protect at what-
ever cost necessary the security and free-
dom of our country.
I belieVe this is a first step. The Sen-
ate must make the determination wheth-
er tip risks, not wholly known, are as
great as the refusal to take the first
step?a step which may lead to other
agreements?a step which may lead to
ending the nuclear arms race. For the
nuclear arms race always holds the pos-
sibility of nuclear war, whether planned
or by mistake, in which there would be
no victor?only the destruction of man-
kind.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, this
morning I received from the Secretary of
Defense answers of the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense to the legal
questions I raised in the Senate on Sep-
tember 16, 1963, on the wording of the
nuclear test ban treaty. Because of their
striking similarity to answers of the
Legal Adviser of the State Department,
which I placed in the RECORD yesterday,
I shall not comment on these answers
of the chief legal officer of the Defense
Department but rather will observe that
the cornmepits Linage yesterday on the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 20
answers of the State Department's Legal
Adviser apply equally to these which I
now ask unanimous request be placed in
the body of the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the answers
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ANSWERS BY THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEITINTSE TO LEGAL QUES-
worm RAISED EY THE WORDING OF THE NU-
CLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Question I: Could a 'party to the treaty
carry out a nuclear explosion in the at-
mosphere above an uninhabited island not
claimed by it and justify its action Upon the
ground that the explosion did not occur at
a place under its jurisdiction or contral?
Answer: No. The words "at any place
Under its jurisdiction or control" in the
first paragraph of article I of the treaty
apply only to that paragraph and are nec-
essary as a legal matter since a party to the
treaty would have no authority to prohibit
or to prevent nuclear explosions at places
not under its jurisdiction or control and
accordingly would not be able to fulfill any
treaty obligation to prohibit or to prevent
nuclear explosions at such places. It should
be noted, however, that a party would be
construed temporarily to have control over
any place where it conducted a test, and
therefore paragraph 1 would proltbit a party
from conducting a test in the circumstances
hypothesized. In any event, the second
paragraph of article I prohibits a party, it-
self, from conducting a nuclear test in the
three environments anywhere.
Question 2: What nuclear explosions in
outer space are banned by this paragraph
in view of the fact that outer space, and
partinularly the more remote regions there-
of, is not considered to be within the juris-
diction or control of any nation? If Russia
explodes a nuclear device in outer space and
We claim that such action is prohibited by
this paragragh, are we placed in 4 position
Where we must simultaneously admit that
Russia has jurisdiction over or controls the
particular region of outer space in Which the
explosion occurs?
Answer: No. As was the case in ques-
tion 1, a party is prohibited by paragraph 2
from conducting tests in the three environ-
ments without regard to the question of
"jurisdiction or control," and by paragraph 1
by virtue of the temporary control.
Question 3: Would a nuclear explosion
Underwater in the middle of the Pacific
Ocean be barred by this paragraph in view
of the fact that the high seas are not con-
sidered by nations to be within the control
or jurisdiction of any particular nation?
Answer: Yes. Such a test would be barred
by article I for the reasons given in answers
land 2.
Question 4: Does the ban on "any other
nuclear explosion" prevent us from operate
frig atomic energy plants for the produc-
tion of electricity, the steamship Savannah,
or any attemic submarine, all of which are
operated by means of controlled atomic
explosions?
Answer: No. Atomic energy reactors, which
release energy slowly, do not produce a nu-
clear explosion within the meaning of the
treaty.
Question 5: Will we be branded as a vio-
lator of the treaty if we have an accidental
explosien at one of our atomic energy plants?
Answer: No. An accidental explosion of
one of our atomic energy plants would not
constitute a violation of the treaty; the treaty
is aimed at intentional acts.
Question 1: Does paragraph 2 apply to di-
rect acts of the parties or only to indirect
acts of the parties? For example, does it
apply to a nuclear explosion by Russia in
the atmosphere above Russian soil or is it
intended to apply only to such a situation
as a nuclear explosion by the Communist
Chinese regime in the atmosphere above
Ciaina which iscaused, encouraged, or par-
ticipated in by Russia?
Answer: Paragraph 2 of article I is in-
tended to bar a party from conducting tests
itself in the three environments (direct acts)
and from giving materials for use in nuclear
weapons, or information relating to their
design or manufacture to any other state
whether or not a party, if that state was en-
gaged in, or proposed to engage in, nuclear
weapons tests in the three environments (In-
direct acts).
Question 2: If paragraph 2 does apply to
direct acts of the parties, how do you resolve
the conflict between its provisions, which
are not limited by tbe phrase "at any place
under its jurisdiction or control," and the
provisions of paragraph 1, which are limited
by such phrase?
Answer: As shown by the answer to the
preceding questions, there is no conflict be-
tween the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2.
The two paragraphs overlap to some extent.
The words "jurisdiction or control" do not
limit paragraph 2 because paragraph 2 does
not impose an obligation to prohibit or to
prevent.
us
Question: If the United States decides to
withdraw from the treaty because it has ir-
refutable evidence that Russia has violated
It, would we not be compelled to wait 3
months before resuming nuclear testing un-
less we were willing to risk being branded
as treaty violators?
Answer: It is clear under international law
that the United States would not be com-
pelled by the treaty to wait 3 months before
resuming nuclear testing if Russia violates
the treaty.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, September 19, 1963.
Ron. MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR Sturm: As I explained to you
over the telephone last evening, I am ex-
tremely sorry that I did not see your letter of
September 10 relative to the 16 questions on
the test band and I am particularly sorry
that I did not see or sign the outgoing letter.
I agree with the answers to your questions
given by Secretary Rusk, and I am in full
agreement with the ;statements made by the
President in his letter to Senators MANSFIELD
and DnucsEx?some of which deal with mat-
ters raised by your questions. Nevertheless,
I would like to take this opportunity to offer
some further comment on a few of the ques-
tions which you posed on September 9.
Specifically, I refer to your questions 2, 9,
and 11.
Your second question WEA: "Are we reason-
ably confident and secure in the knowledge
that our ballistic missile retaliatory second
strike force will survive and operate in a
nuclear environment?" This is of course a
Very important matter. You have the infor-
mation concerning missile-site survivability
contained in my earlier remarks, referred to
by Secretary Rusk. I would like to add a few
comments on the ability of our missiles to
penetrate enemy defenses.
Present penetration capability, as you
know, depends-upon saturation of defenses?
upon numbers of weapons, decoy design,
salvo techniques, and nuclear technology.
The limited test ban Sreaty does not affect
the first three of these factors. It is relevant
only to the last of them. Ballistic missile
reentry vehicles and Warheads are susceptible
to both blast and radiation. The latter can
be tested sufficiently underground. Although
blast cannot' be tested underground, we have
Information from which to extrapolate blest
effect and, are able to build around uncer-
tainties. Furthermore, we have every rea-
son to believe that the Soviet Union has
had no more experience in the testing of rele-
vant blast effects than have we.
Because of the extremely large number of
U.S. missiles and penetration aids available
for saturating Soviet defense, I am confident
that, in any event, sufficient U.S. striking
power not only can survive attack but can
penetrate to destroy the Soviet Union.
In your ninth question, you asked: "Can
we, in fact, maintain an adequate readiness
to test in those prohibited environments in
the event the treaty should suddenly be
abrogated?" You are familiar with the testi-
mony on this point and, with Deputy Secre-
tary Oilpataie's letter to Senator RUSSELL, in
which he dealt with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff safeguard (c). I am convinced that
we can maintain a state of readiness such
that we will be ready to perform proof tests
within 2 months, development tests within
3 months, and (by a year from now) effects
tests within 6 months. We are, now, im-
proving test support facilities, which include
preparation and maintenance of off-conti-
nent support bases and test sites. We are
obtaining diagnostic aircraft, instrumented
ships and aircraft, weapon drop aircraft, and
sampler and other support aircraft; and we
are preparing operating bases on Johnston
Island and in the Hawaiian area. Also, the
Atomic Energy Commission and Department
of Defense test organization is being kept
strong and ready.
Your 11th question was: "Will we be
restrained from ever determining feasibility,
developing and deploying any defense what-
ever against ballistic missile attack?" In my
testimony, I addressed this point quite fully,
but two points are worth repeating: First,
we should bear in mind that, while an anti-
ballistic missile system might be very impor-
tant, it is unrealistic to expect any foresee-
able antiballistic missile system to be effec-
tive enough to save a nation from great harm
in the event it is attacked. Second, the non-
nuclear_ aspects (capacity for decoy discrim-
ination, traffic-handling capacity, reaction
speed, and missile performance) dominate
the problem of developing an effective_ anti-
ballistic missile system. The nuclear aspects
involved are warhead development and the
nuclear effects problems of self-kill and
blackout. The treaty, as you are aware, has
no bearing on the nonnuclear features. War-
head development can continue through
underground testing, and some of the impor-
tant questions of self-kill can also be re-
solved by underground testing. Questions
relating to blast, as in the case of incoming
warhead kill, referred to on the previous
page, cannot be solved by underground tests,
but we have information from which to ex-
trapolate blast effect and are able to build
around uncertainties. And atmospheric test-
ing would be needed to provide either tide
further understanding of the blackout phe-
nomenon?a phenomenon which has been
probed in different ways, with what I believe
to be comparable success, by both the United
States and U.S.S.R. We believe that our
latest atmospheric tests revealed the approx-
imate limits of the blackout problem. If the
antiballistic missile problems unaffected by
this treaty could be resolved, the uncertain-
ties caused by gaps in our understanding of
blackout could be circumvented through
conservative design. Those responsible for
the UB. antiballistic missile program believe
that the Nike?X system can be developed and
deployed without further atmospheric test-
ing. Moreover, it .is their judgment and the
judgment of those respensible for making
intelligence estimates on Soviet capabilities
that our efforts In developing an antiballistic
missile system are comparable, if not su-
perior, to those of the Soviets.
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL ItECOItto ? SENA-
,
superior scientific knowledge manifest-
ing itself in superior weapon design.
The treaty will still permit further quan-
titative deployment of weapons systems,
but its ratification will acknowledge So-
viet superiority in critically important
areaS of nuclear technology having mili-
tary qualitative significance
Question 4. The treaty will not pre-
vent the spread Secretary Rusk and Mr.
William Foster said-that a comprehen-
sive ban would prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons but it should have the
effect of retarding the rate at which
other nations, apart from France and
Red China, might have otherwise ac-
quired a nuclear capability.
Question 5. Secretary Rusk and Dr.
Brown would view an explosion which,
although within the legal letter of the
treaty, releases most of its energy into
the atmosphere as a treaty violation.
"Underground" has not been sufficiently
defined.
Questions 6 and 7. The worry here is
the fact that we cannot detect low kilo-
ton yields in the atmosphere. Accord-
ing to Dr. Teller, exposure of radars and
communications devices and other elec-
tronic gear could upset the nuclear bal-
ance, although these are nonnuclear de-
vices, in discovering ways to make them
operate efficiently in a nuclear environ-
ment, that is, overcoming blackout for
example.
Question 8. Question 8 is related to
the definition of underground. If, as is
contended, we will abrogate the treaty
upon detecting a test which, though shal-
lowly buried and the radioactivity from
which is confined to Soviet territorial
boundaries, then there would be no need
to differentiate. One can, however, vis-
ualize some heated arguments arising
over the contention by the Soviets that
they conformed to the letter of the treaty
in whatever they did. Differentiation
then, between shallow burial and atmos-
pheric, is important.
Question 9. One can accept the data
given as to time periods of readiness for
different types of tests. The question is
whether they are acceptable from the
standpoint of national security in the
face of another sudden abrogation by
the Soviets. We are told that this is a
large risk.
Question 10. Both laboratories and sci-
entists deteriorated tinder the mora-
torium for lack of any testing. If the
Other disadvantages inherent in the
Nor do thirlk that it is in the interest
of construCtive debate in which
rather than heat, igsongthrto resort in
ansWers griestidnib:Y iying that if
a Senator WM only lake the time' toread
the testimori$r of a 'witness" he' will find
the absolute truth. This is no more Con-
structive that to imply that a Senator's
thinking has been misled by the testi-
mony Of a witness, particulaily if the
party making the implication himself is
? relying upon opinion, as distinguished
from facts, :in offering his speculative
answers. _ ,
I am deeply appreciative of the
answers offered by Senator Sparkman,
. ?
Secretary Rusk, Secretary . MeNarnara,
and President Kennedy. They are help-
ful. But they do not rentove doubts.
They only partially answer questions?
they only partially resolve doubts. They
fall far short-of making an ironclad, air-
tight case 'ter ratification of the treats,.
They are no more 'convincing to me than
the arguiriefiti thtii far inade against
ratification a the treaty.
My more detailed Observations with-re-
spect to some, but not all of the ansWers
submitted to, the qu,estions follow.
Question t: We are eel-tali:1'6f the Rus-
sian advantake in the high-yield weapon.
Its possession bY the Russians is of mili-
tary significance to-the United States?
even though we still apparently cannot
decide whether we Ant them in our own
arsenal?in its impact upon increasing
even. mere' the unCertainties or susPeeted
vulnerabilities in our ballistic -thisile
systems?whether that of launch sites or
penetrating warheads over target. The
blast and thermal effects were lightly
touched upon but nothing was said of the
probable raaiation and electromagnetic
phenomena associated with such a high
nuclear yield. Dr.' troWn does not be-
lieve that the Soviet high-yield shots
were Instrumented for effects data but
one has to assume that Whatever knowl-
edge they gained a blast, thermal - and
radiation effects; it is 100 percent greater
than ours, and disparity will be per-
petuated once atmospheric testing is
denied to us by treaty ratification.
- Question 2. The survivability, of a sec-
ond strike force thiough "mix" or variety
of back-up systenti has merit. The the-
- cry is that -If the landbased missile force
should happen to be unexpectedly vul-
nerable to particular effects phenomena,
the Polaris system or the B-52's will not
Tet, eaeh has its Peculiar uncertainties treaty can be accepted, it would seem
and vulnerabilities whether in deploy- that permitted underground testing, if
? Ment of the system or in the operation vigorously implemented, should prevent
of the system. Warhead testing under deterioration in nuclear weapons re-
dynamic conditions of reentry s as fully
Important as electromagneticpulse test- Question 11. The discussion of an
ing for determining actual hardness of antiballistic missile defense has been
launch sites. In the absence of knowl- confined to systems of the Nike-Zeus and
edge of what one' is trying t6 'harden Nike-X type. It may well come to pass
- against, it seems that "designing around" in the years ahead that an effective bal-
the unknoWns is a catchy phrase which listic missile defense will take the form
has been given too' much prominence in of maintaining above one's country a
the debate. -highly charged atmosphere of rays
Question3. Nuclear superiority for de- emitted by enhanced radiation devices
terrence nits% be measured both quanti- which will exploit the vulnerabilities and
tatively_ld terms Of deployed weapons uncertainties in warhead design of pene-
. systems 'and' qualitatively in terms of trating reentry vehicles. Discrimination
No. /50-4
TE
16741
of warhead froth decoy, traffic handling,
reaction and radar blackout are prob-
lems which would be eliminated by this
concept and it is one of the unresolved
questions concerning the sophisticated
nature of the Soviets recent tests and
their sudden willingness to sign the
treaty.
Question 12. True, without a treaty,
the Soviets could overtake our alleged ad-
vantage in low yield weapons more read-
ily. The answers do not mention the
fact that the U.S. position in high yield
weapons and knowledge of their effects
Is committed to inferiority in compari-
son to the Soviets.
Question 13. The chart appearing on
page 6 of the Preparedness Subcommit-
tee's report, while more far reaching
than just next year's planned test, more
accurately answers the question.
Question 14. Elsewhere in the debate
other facts, figures, statistical studies and
opinion have appeared. The truth of the
matter is?we do not know. My question
was designed to emphasize in the debate
that the propagandized emotionalism on
this point is so highly exaggerated.
Question 15. Plowshare, despite claims
to the contrary, is generally pro-
hibited by the treaty and the administra-
tion has admitted that it must be negoti-
ated out. Senator SPARKMAN properly
introduced as part of his answer, Presi-
dent Kennedy's letter of September 10,
1963.
Question 16. The excerpt from the
testimony of Secretary Husk appearing
on page 7 of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee report and the State Department
answer are that the answer is no and
that even when asserting privileges of
participating and voting on amendments,
and so forth, we would reserve the right
to object.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President,
the proposed test ban treaty pending be-
fore the Senate is a remarkable docu-
ment; rernarkable not so much for what
it does, but for the questionable hopes
it may have aroused not only in this
country, but throughout the world.
At the outset, I want to point out that
this proposed treaty is the outgrowth of
some nuclear origins. I will try to point
out later how it is different from the pro-
posals of the Eisenhower administra-
tion?but in any event the speed with
which this document was accepted and
signed can well promote inquiry.
It is intriguing to consider why the
Russians, after 4 or 5 years of adamant
refusal to get down to business on any
serious discussion of the basic principles
involved in this proposed agreement,
suddenly, early this past summer appar-
ently, sent word that they were ready to
talk and we rushed a delegation to Mos-
cow, went through a few ceremonies,
obligingly inserted the ; antiplowshare
provision in the treaty and initialed It
with very little, if any, negotiation.
I sincerely regret that the President
has seen fit in effect to claim executive
privilege over the exchange of corre-
spondence between the United States
and the U.S.S.R. preliminary to the sign-
ing of this treaty. Under the Constitu-
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16742 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tion, the Senate is a coequal partner with
the President in the act of making a
treaty.
Even if it should be acknowledged that
the claim of executive privilege might
properly lie in some areas of executive-
congressional relations, certainly it can
not rationally be held to he in the field
of treaties, where surely the Senate' is
entitled to full access to all facts sur-
rounding the negotiation of a treaty, in-
cluding examination of pertinent docu-
ments, when called upon to carry out its
constitutional duty of giving or with-
holding consent to the ratification of
that treaty.
The very act of exercise of executive
privilege is bound to plant seeds of sus-
picion and mistrust in the mind of the
public and to affect public confidence.
I regret that the majority of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee chose not
to support the effort of members, includ-
ing myself, to obtain this information
regarding the test ban treaty in accord-
ance with the constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Senate.
Although the treaty prohibits nuclear
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space,
and under water, and this is significant,
the President of the United States found
it necessary, when he submitted the
treaty to the Senate, to emphasize what
the treaty does not do. He said:
It does not prohibit the United States and
the Soviet Union from engaging in all nu-
clear tests;
It will not halt the production or reduce
the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapon's;
It will not end the threat of nuclear war
or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons;
It cannot wholly prevent the spread of
nuclear arms to nations not now possessing
them;
And finally he said:
It does not assure world peace.
Mr. President, I emphasize these neg-
ative aspects of the treaty because in
the last 6 weeks the American people
have been overwhelmed with state-
ments, official and otherwise, which have
tended to blunt our critical faculties.
Compared to the things the treaty
does not do, its positive aspects are rath-
er thin. The treaty does, as the chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee stated recently, represent a small
step. However, I am not sure that I
agree with the distinguished chairman
that the step is a positive one in the
right direction. It does represent,
however, some break with the past; and,
as such, it may open possibilities in the
future?some favorable, some perhaps
unfavorable.
THE HAZARDS OF' ACCEPTANCE
Approval of this treaty by the U.S.
Senate will subject the security of this
Nation to political, scientific and mili-
tary hazards. Among the hazards
which must not be overlooked are the
following:
First. There is the hazard that the
Soviet Union, in its test series. of 1961
and 1962 may have gained knowledge to
enable the Soviet to make a great leap
forward, either in the development of
niultimegaton bombs or e creation of
an effective antiballistic missile system.
We do not know how much they may
have learned and it is possible that the
Soviet Union only seeks time to go into
production on devices of military poten-
tial that may ultimately give the Soviet
a preponderance of nuclear power.
Second. There is the hazard of clan-
destine testing. Although American de-
tection devices are extremely good, the
area of the Soviet is vast and techniques
for secret prohibited testing may make
it possible for the Soviet to increase its
nuclear competence without our knowl-
edge.
Third. There is the danger that the
Soviet Union will overtake the United
States in, nuclear developments by un-
derground testing which is permitted by
the treaty. There is no doubt but that
at the present time the United States
is ahead in the field of underground test-
ing, but since the Soviet will be permit-
ted to test in this environment, it may
be expected that in time they will learn
as much in this area as we now know.
Fourth. There is the danger of a vast
ruse. Suspicious as I always am of So-
viet declarations of intent, there is al-
ways the passibility that the Soviet
Union and Communist China have
agreed to disagree?each to pursue its
own path?the hard line by Peiping and
the soft line by Moscow?with the assur-
ance that when the time is right the
forces of international communism will
coalesce to .the everlasting detriment of
the free world. Certainly Soviet du-
plicity in the past gives us no reason in
precedent to' believe that the word of
Khrushchev is any more reliable than
the word of Stalin.
THE HAZARDS OF REJECTION
One must balance against the hazards
of accepting the treaty, the hazards of
rejection. Both are speculative. And in
the final analysis each Member of this
body must reach his own judgment as to
whether he believes the national security
of this Nation justifies acceptance of this
agreement.
First. One of the hazards of rejection
which bothers:, me greatly is the effect
which Senate rejection would have upon
our posture throughout the world. Once
the President authorized Under Secre-
tary of State Harriman to sign this
agreement on behalf of the United States
it became most difficult for the Senate
to express its independent judgment on
the treaty. Certainly, rejection of the
treaty at this point would dash the
hopes--many of them unjustified I be-
lieve?of the more than 90 nations which
have already indicated their willing-
ness to accept its terms.
Second. There is the hazard that re-
jection of this treaty might tend to heal
the rift which has opened between the
Chinese Communists and the Russian
Communists. If this rift is real, if it has
substance, then rejection of the treaty
might force Khrushchey to aline himself
once again with Peiping and one-third
of mankind would be drawn together in
support of international communism.
Third. A further hazard of rejection
might be a consequence of developments
within the Soviet Union itself. Undoubt-
edly, there are those in that society who
believe that the United States is not will-
ing to risk nuclear war to defend its in-
September 20
terest. We must not forget that it was
only last October that under the cloak
of a deliberate and calculated falsehood
IChrushchey himself was willing to chal-
lenge us in Cuba and remains ever ready
to exploit our weakness there. If K:hru-
shchev is not able to reach an agreement
now on a nuclear test ban treaty, one
result may well be to strengthen the
hands of the most extreme elements in
the Kremlin.
Fourth. There is a hazard that nuclear
weapons may be proliferated if we do not
accept this treaty. At least eight non-
nuclear powers now have the capacity to
develop weapons on their own. Rejection
of this treaty might invite them to do
so and thus multiply the chance of
planned or accidental precipitation of
nuclear exchanges. Certainly a rejec-
tion would necessitate the immediate re-
sumption of atmospheric tests by the nu-
clear powers.
Mr. President, I have given careful
consideration to the hazards that will
face this Nation if we approve the treaty
or if we reject it. On balance and in
view of the whole spectrum of circum-
stances, it seems to me that we have no
firm choices?that we must, even though
with misgivings, consent to the treaty.
I listened with greatest of care to the
many witnesses who appeared before the
joint conamittees holding hearings on
the treaty. It was apparent to me that
many of those witnesses were torn by
strong doubt. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint
Chiefs themselves, left me with the im-
pression that if the treaty were to be ac-
cepted or rejected solely upon the 'basis
of its military implications, that they
would have been forced to recommend its
rejection. When they took into account,
however, the political implications of the
treaty, they were willing to accept the
military dangers in the expectation of
receiving overall political benefits for the
United States.
I am consenting to the treaty, although
I am thoroughly convinced that the
Kremlin will breach it if such breach
seems to its advantage. As the moment
I believe the Kremlin finds certain ad-
vantages in the treaty, but we should be
under no misapprehension that this
treaty will be anything but a scrap of
paper at any moment it serves the inter-
est of the Soviet Union to so regard it.
The second concern I have about the
consequences of approving this treaty is
that I fear a gradual erosion of our de-
termination to maintain our defenses in 4
a state of readiness. In other words, we
could be lulled into a false feeling of se-
curity and let our guard down. This
Nation in the past has easily been lulled
into a sense of false security. Indeed,
our swings of public opinion are phe-
nomenal It is hard to believe that only
a year ago when the Russians put mis-
siles in Cuba and the Chinese Commu-
nists attacked India, we were concerned
that international communism might
make war inevitable. And yet today we
find in our country a wave of propagan-
da suggesting that we should have confi-
dence in the word of the very man who
put missiles in Cuba a year ago, de-
stroyed the test moratorium in 1951, and
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196$ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE 16743
refused to meet with Eisenhower a few
years earlier, shortly after he had come
to the Unite,a States allegedly to proffer
a hand of friendship
It is essential that: in subscribing to
this treaty we do so, maintaining our-
selves in a constant state of readiness to
renew tests, determined that we will con-
tinuously modernize our detection de-
vices, determined to keep our laboratories
in operation, and that we proceed with
an expanded program of underground
testing.
,A great __deal of misinformation has
been bandied about concerning this three
environment test ban treaty. One fre-
quent statement is that it is the same
proposal which was submitted by Presi-
dent Eisenhower during his administra-
tion and which was endorsed by the Re-
publican Party in its platform of 060.
This 18 definitely not true, Even without
considering the changp of circumstances
and Of the relative position of the world
powers concerning nuclear technology
between the date of the proposal of the
Eisenhower administration and the pres-
ent, the proposals are dissimilar.
To mention some,ef the differences, the
Eisenhower proposal did not take into its
purview nuclear testing in outer space
Where techniques had not been developed
to permit verification of violations; nor
did that aclzninistration propose to en-
able the Seviet 'Union_ to veto each and
every project by the United States or any
other treaty-signatory for the peaceful
use of atomic devices ,for such purposes
as diverting hurricanes, digging chan-
nels and canals; in other words, the
plowshare program.
Again, the Republican platform in
1960 stated:
We are similarly ready to negotiate and to
institute realistic methods and safeguards
for disarmament and for the suspension of
nuclear tests. We advocate an early agree-
ment by all nations to forgo nuclear tests
In the atmosphere, under the suspension of
other tests as verification techniques permit.
We support the President in any decision he
may make to reevaluate the question Of re-
sumption of underground nuclear explosives
testing if. the Geneva Conference fails to
produce a satisfactory agreement. We have
deep concern about the mounting nuclear
arms race. This ,concern leads us to seek
disarmament and nucle_ar agreements. And
An equal concern to protect all peoples from
nuclear danger leads us to insist that such
agreements have adequate safeguards.
The present treaty bans nuclear
weapon tests in outer space, an environ-
ment in which verification will be very
difficult because, notwithstanding anti-
cipated and programed improvements in
our verification system, the system will
still possess both detection and identifi-
? cation thresholds below which clandes-
tine testing will be possible with low
probability of detection. Furthermore,
the draft of, the limited test ban treaty
tabled in Geneva, August 27, 1962, by the
.V.P.ItettS,14akexes1 United Kingdom dele-
gations prohiMted only nuclear weapon
'tests and would have permitted explo-
sion of nuclear devices for peaceful pur-
poses; however, the present treaty, by
-prohibiting all nuclear explosions in the
three environments, prohibits in per-
petuity?unless amended?and amend-
inent would require the unanimous con-
sent of the three major originating
powers, which would give the Russians a
veto over any amendment which might
be proposed to the treaty?many peace-
. ..,
ful uses of nuclear explosive devices
where any radioactive debris can escape
to another nation. TlUis, if the treaty is
ratified, nuclear devices can be used only
for the pursuit of war and death, and
only in a most limited way for peaceful
purposes.
Although I am worried about the ex-
tension' of the test ban intii environ-
ments in which we have limited verifi-
cation capability at this time, I have
great confidence in the ability of our
scientists and technicians to develop ex-
peditiously systems which will prevent
significant clandestine testing. How-
ever. I have very serious misgivings
about the long-run Wisdom of agreeing
to prohibit in perpetuity the most prom-
ising use of explosion of nuclear devices
for peaceful purposes, which will fore-
close the plowshare program. I am con-
vinced that, if Russia really wants a
treaty, then continued and persistent
negotiation would have achieved an
agreement which would have permitted
peaceful use of "clean" nuclear explosive
devices subject to reasonable controls,
such as prior notice to the treaty signa-
tories and opportunity for observation,
enabling science to explore fully the ex-
citing potentials of this nuclear age and
enabling the world to exploit fully its
economic and humanitarian possibilities.
The failure to provide for this is in my
opinion the greatest demonstrable de-
fect of the treaty.
Ar,vIes AND CcasTSENT
I should like now to discuss for a
moment the question of advice and con-
sent in connection with the treaty.
In recent years, Mr. President, we
have witnessed a gradual erosion of an
important article of the Constitution?
article 2, section 2. That section provides
that the President shall have:
Power, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the _Senate, to make treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present
concw.
Thus, it appears to be clear that the
President has no "power" to make
treaties prior to Senate action and it
would therefore follow that he has no
power to bind us in advance of authoriz-
ation by the Senate.
However, as in the proposed test ban
treaty now before us, we find that, from
a practical standpoint, the President ne-
gotiates proposed treaties, and then sub-
mits them to the Senate for its advice
and consent. Up to this point the docu-
ment is no more than a tentative execu-
tive agreement. ?
? I submit that this procedure involves
seeking the "consent" of the Senate, but
It does not technically carry out the con-
Stitutional mandate to obtain the "ad-
vice" of the Senate. It is difficult indeed,
if not impracticable, to advise after the
act, especially under the circumstances
which we face now when we have en-
couraged some 96 nations to sign the
proposal before we have finalized it under
our constitutional process.
As a practical matter, when the Presi-
dent or one of his sagents signa a solemn
instrument such as that now before us,
it becomes most difficult for the Senate
to do anything but gir its consent, espe-
cially under the pressures of domestic
and worldwide propaganda that-. have
been built up. The Senate in the case
now before us is not' being asked to give
its advice. The Senate as a practical
matter can only consent to this treaty,
or reject it.
There was a time when Presidents seri-
ously sought-the "advice? of the Sen-
ate prior to the negotiation of treaties.
This stihj ea is discussed in the Foreign
Relations Committee report in 1946 on
acceptance of the Compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the International Court?Senate
Report No. 1835, 79th Congress 2d ses-
sion.
At that time the constitutional ques-
tion was raised as to Whether?and I
quote from the report:
It is proper procedure to obtain the advice
and consent of the Senate prior to deposit
of the declaration by the President.
The answer of the committee, which
deserves the most careful consideration,
is as follows:
With respect to the second issue, the an-
swer may be found in the Constitution itself,
Article 2, section 2, provides that the Presi-
dent shall have "power, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur.? It is evident that the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate is equally
effective whether given before, during, or
After the conclusion of the treaty. In fact,
President Washintgon approached the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent prior to the
negotiation of treaties, and this practice was
followed on occasion by other Presidents.
While the practice of prior consultations-with
the Senate fell into disuse after 1816, a re-
cent precedent may be found in the conven-
tion of 1927, extending the General Claims
Commission, United States and Mexico, of
1923. The treaty was signed on August 16,
1927, pursuant to a Senate resolution of Feb-
ruary 17, 1927. A similar example is the con-
vention of 1929, again extending the life of
the Commission. The convention was signed
on August 17, 1929, pursuant to the Senate
resolution of May 25, 1929.
I suggest, Mr. President, that the kinds
of hazards involved in the negotiation
and signing of treaties on such important
subjects as that now before us makes it
vitally important for the Senate, the
President, and the scholars of this Nation
to explore once again the feasibility of
obtaining the advice and consent of the
Senate prior to the signature of import-
ant treaties.
It is not enough for the executive
branch of this Government to come to
the Senate with general drafts, of trea-
ties, and occasional consultations. The
Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Relations in particular need to partici-
pate more actively in the negotiations
? as they near the point of consummation.
It is my recollection that at the time
the North Atlantic Treaty was being ne-
gotiated the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations had opportunity to go over semi-
final drafts, argcle by article, and that
as a. result, of that Meticulous work a
number of drafting changes were made
in the treaty. The same was true with
respect to the peace treaty with Japan.
I cannot help but believe that had the
,pending treaty been submitted to the
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CONGRESSIONAL' RECORD ? SENATE
Close scrutiny ,and unhurried dissection
by the Committee on Foreign Relations
prior to its finalization by the Executive,
we would not now be cOnfronted with
such ambiguous language as that which
has created serious doubts as to whether
the treaty may prohibit the use of nu-
clear weapons in the event of hostilities
and other serious questions which have
been stated.
I believe the executive branch should
take clear warning from the questions
that have been raised during considera-
tion of this treaty. It Must rethink its
approach to the Senate in connection
with any future negotiations looking to-
ward any limitation upon the defensive
arrnaments of this country. I seriously
doubt if the necessary two-thirds vote
Could be obtained for another treaty on
this general subject if such treaty were
negotiated in haste and submitted to the
Senate on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
somewhat in the fashion of this treaty
and the situation in which we find our-
,
SelVes.
There is no reason in law or in our
Constitution why the Senate should not
be asked formally to give its advice and
consent to a draft treaty prior to the
signing cerenionies,' Subh a practice in
the case of our most important treaties
may on occasion in the future save the
President not only from the embarrass-
ment of repudiation?as happened in the
case of the Treaty of Versailles?but it
would protect this Nation from situations
such as that with which we are now con-
fronted?situations in Which the mili-
tary, scientific, and political judgments
of _the Senate are in danger of being
Warped by the argument that all we can
do is to advise and consent to ratification,
or we will be repudiating the President,
embarrassing the Nation, and compro-
mising our leaders*.
In the last analysis, we probably find
ourselves in a pOSition where we must
accept this treaty with a certain degree
of cautious hope, but at the same time
with the determination and increased
vigilance for our own security and that
of the free world. The treaty itself pro-
vides no steps for the creation of in-
creased posture for peace or for dimin-
ishing the threat of war. I am not
greatly worried about the suggestions
that the treaty may bar us from using
atomic Weapons in case our SecuritY is
acUtely threatened, because I think it is
inherent in tie sovereign rights of na-
tions to use whatever means are avail-
able for their protection in time of great
danger. The administrative branch of
our Government and the legislative
branch are both committed to this phi-
losophy irrevocably. By the same token
so Is the gremlin.
I have little patience with the argu-
ment that we must make this treaty or
that we must take various other steps
to establish our devotion to the cause of
'peace and freedom.
The whole record of the United States
Is one of continuous devotion of life and
treasure to the cause of peace and free-
dom in the world. We gave much in
World War I and it was our strength
and sacrifice that preserved free institu-
tions in Europe and protected them else-
where. We asked nothing from that
victory except a Peaceful world.
We led in the ' disarmament confer-
ences of the 1920s; we constantly gave
our good offices inthe interest of settling
international disputes. The life and
treasure which we expended in World
War II and the More than $100 billion
--of our substance Which we have poured
out since to help troubled and groping
nations reestablish themselves or move
toward the forms of freedom surely can
not be forgotten Or disregarded.
Following World War II, when we
were the sole pasessor of the atomic
bomb and the means of production, we
did what no other country, to my knowl-
edge, has done in the history of the
world?we offered to turn over to the
United Nations all atomic weapons,
atomic materials and the means of proc-
essing them for international control,
provided other countries would do the
same. This was generally referred to
as the Baruch Plan. I say this was
unique because I know of no other time
in history when a nation possessing the
means and the weapons to conquer any
or all other nations on earth, voluntarily
offered to give uP this exclusive means
in the interest of civilization and peace.
We have constantly conferred, at-
tempted to negotiate and put forward
countless fair and equitable proposals
that would diminish the chances of war.
We have proved over and over our
sympathy with and devotion to peace
and human betterment.
On the other hand the Kremlin has
constantly blocked every effort and re-
fused every realistic offer that would
promote peace with reasonable and mu-
tual safeguards. Is it any wonder then
that we want proof of good will by deeds
on the part of international communism,
and that we fear new promises which
can, and no doubt will be, broken with
the same cavalier attitude that we have
seen so frequently in the past? It can-
not be argued persuasively that Pre-
inter Khrushchev is different from Stalin,
because both hate been instruments of
international connmunism and it is the
voice of international communism that
speaks through them, and it is the phi-
losophy of international communism
which they implement and not the per-
sonal philosophy of either of them or
any one man.
If the policy of international commu-
nism says break the agreement, the pre-
viously given wbrd of the individual
means nothing.
There are many ways in which inter-
national communism could by deeds
show its good faith. The Kremlin could
keep its agreement for free elections in
the Iron Curtain countries; it could re-
store freedom tp the Latvian States,
which it aggressively took over not much
more than a year after it had made
solemn treaty agreements to respect
their sovereignty and freedom.
The Kremlin itould remove its heel of
conquest from East Germany and by ac-
tion remove thei threats to Berlin and
the peace of Furdpe.
The Kremlin could cease its false
propaganda and active' subversive
threats in Africa, Latin America, and
other areas of the world.
September 20
If the Kremlin really believed in the
basic rights of the people it could with-
draw from the ;arena of international
conquest and devote its energies and
resources toward the betterment of the
Russian people.
They know that we would welcome,
with rejoicing, news of this kind that
would bring proof through deeds that
they were sincere in their protestations
for peace, but it is in the light of past
experiences that we must examine our
course and future and that we must ex-
plore and determine the vigilance which
we must exercise. The world knows
that we have no designs hostile to any
other country, but I think the world also
knows that until international commu-
nism alters it adamant course away from
world dominion and by action adopts
policies of genuine consideration and
respect for the rights of others, that our
own security and that of the free nations
of the world must regrettably depend
upon superior strength and realism.
In closing I wish to recite a little story
which was written to me the other day
in a leter by a constituent from Iowa.
He said that in dealing with the Russians
we should always keep in mind the story
of the hunter and the bear.
The hunter went to the woods one
day; and deep in the woods he saw a bear
approaching. The hunter raised his
gun and aimed it at the bear. The bear
suddenly stopped and said, "Wait, hunt-
er. What do you want? We will nego-
tiate." The hunter said, "I want a fur
coat." The bear said, "Good. I want
a good meal. Let us negotiate." So
they sat down and negotiated; and,
after a while, the bear walked away.
The hunter had his fur coat and the bear
had a good meal.
In our dealings with the Russians in
the past too often the bear has walked
away with a good meal and we have had
a fur coat of sorts. It is a situation
caused by naivete which should not be
permitted to exist very long. We should
beat in mind that we are dealing with a
ruthless, expert group of manipulators
to whom morals as we apply them do not
appeal and by whom they are not ac-
cepted.
We must bear in mind that our inter-
ests and those of the free world still must
rely on our constant ability to defend
ourselves and the interests of freedom
under all circumstances. In accepting
this treaty we must recall that it is the
deeds which May follow which will de-
tretnine whether the treaty has a modi-
cum of sincerity on the part of the Krem-
lin or whether it is a sham and a subter-
fuge.
I shall vote for the treaty because I
think the alternative of refusal :is less
acceptable under all the circumstances.
I shall vote for the treaty notwith en-
tlinsiasm but because, on balance, and
with "eternal vigilance"?which is still
the price of liberty--I think it can create
another opportunity under which future
'deeds may produce the arena for steps
toward peace, which we-all so earnestly
desire.
Mt. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
aalt unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD at this point a statement
by the executive branch concerning ex-
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORto -SENATE
ecative branch ' consultations with the Between March 5 and March 12, 1963, the
Senate on a liniited nuclear test ban. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held
There being no objection, the state- hearings on developments in technical capa-
bilities for detecting and identifying nuclear
ment was ordered to be printed in the
. weapons tests (Project Vela). During the
RECORD, as follows:
course of these hearings, 'U.S. detection
STATEMENT OF TkIE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON and identification capabilities relative to
- CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SENATE ON A nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer
LIMITER. NUCLEAR TEST BAN, SEPTEMBER space, and underwater, in addition to under-
16, 1963 ' ground, were discussed in detail. The Au-
The Senate's advice concerning a three- gust 27, 1962, proposal for a limited treaty
environment test 'ban treaty was sought on was also referred to and its status discussed.
repeated occasions before the treaty no be- Officials of various executive branch agencies
fore the Senate was signed by Secretary including Mr. Foster and Dr. Franklin A.
Rusk. Consultations between members of Long of the Arms Control and Disarmament
the executive branch and the Senate oc- Agency, Mr. Jack P. Ruins, Director of the
?curred in a variety of forms, including for- Department of Defense Advanced Research
Mal committee hearings, personal visits, Projects Agency, and Maj. Gen. A. W. Betts,
written correspondence, telephone calls, and Director of the Division of Military Applica-
breakfast briefings.
tion of the Atomic Energy Commission, as
The present nuclear test ban treaty had well as numerous other Government and
its genesis in the United States-United non-Government technical witnesses, testi-
Kingdom propbsal of August 27, 1962, for a
ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere,
outer space, and underwater. This proposal
was substantially the same as that contained
in the treaty now before the Senate.
Hearings at which a three-environment
ban was discussed with appropriate commit-
tees of the Senate, have occurred on frequent
occasions beginning prior to the August
27, 1962, proposals. Mr. William C. Foster,
Director ,of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency appeared on July 23, 1962, be-
fore the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
and on July 25, 1062, before the Disarma-
ment Subcommittee of the Committee on
Foreign Relations te dismiss the status of the
nuclear test? ban negotiations )hen being
conducted in Geneva at the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Conference.
The Senate's advice was sought from the
_outset. As stated by Mr. Foster to the Dis-
armament subcommittee: '
"The purpose of this meeting with you,
Mr. Chairman, is to put before you before
the decision has been inade some of the al-
ternatives which are being considered for
recomMendation to the President for his de-
cision. And that decision has not yet been
taken."
Mr. Foster outlined four possible positions
to both committees. One of these positions
was to draft a treaty banning nuclear tests
in the atmosphere, outer space and under-
water. Members of the committees discussed
the advantages and disadvantages of this
proposal with Mr. Foster at some length.
On August 2, 1962, Ambassador Arthur H.
Dean, U.S. representative to the Geneva
Disafmainent Conference, accompanied by
Mr. Foster appeared before the Joint Com-
mittee on Atornfe Energy and the Disarma-
ment Subcommittee of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. The purpose of these
appearances was to inform the committees
'about the contents of Ambassador Dean's
Instructions regarding the nuclear test ban
prior to his return to the negotiations at
Geneva. Both the comprehensive test ban
proposals and those for a ban on tests in time still had not been agreed, and the out-
the atmosphere, outer space and underwater standing differences, as well as the nature
were discussed. and effect of the agreed parts of the text,
On September 17, 1962, the Preparedness were pointed out and discussed.
Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed On August 5, 1963, following initialing of
Services Committee initiated a series of hear- the text of the treaty on July 26 and prior
fags focused on the nuclear test ban. On to signature of the treaty in Moscow by
that day, Mr. Foster and Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interne- accompanied by Mr. Foster, appeared before
tonal Security Affairs appeared before the a joint session of the Armed Services, For-
subcommittee. On September 18, discussions sign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy
with Mr. Foster continued and on September Committees. The purpose of this appear-
19 the subcommittee heard testimony from ance was to receive the advice of the mem-
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. hers present before the treaty was signed.
During the course of this series of hear- Thus, the views of the Senate were formal-
? lugs a wide range of arms control and dis- ly solicited prior to reaching a decision with-
armament matters were discussed, including in the executive branch concerning the
the status Of tile August 27, 1962, proPesal predecessor proposal of the present treaty
for .a limited Unclear test ban: of August 27, 1962. The appropriate corn-
tied during these hearings.
On March 11, 1963, the status of the test
ban negotiations, including a ban on tests
in the atmosphere, outer space and under-
water, was discussed with the Disarmament
Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign
Relations by Secretary Rusk accompanied by
Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
On May 7, 1963, hearings on the nuclear
test ban before the Preparedness Investi-
gating Subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee were resumed with the appear-
ance of Mr. Foster. During succeeding
months a long list of military and technical
witnesses appeared before the subcommittee
including representatives of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, the Atomic
Energy Commission, the Defense Atomic
Support Agency, the Air Force Technical
Application Center, the AEC Weapons Labo-
ratories, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
initial focus of these, hearings was upon the
U.S. proposal for a comprehensive treaty
banning all nuclear weapons tests. How-
ever, repeated discussions of a limited test
ban were included, and the focus of the in-
vestigation was shifted to the limited treaty
once it had been initiated in Moscow.
As previously indicated, the specific series
of negotiations, which finally achieved
agreement on the limited treaty now be-
fore the Senate, began in Moscow on July 15,
1963. Key Members of the Senate were ad-
vised informally of the status of the nego-
tiations and asked for advice during their
course. On July 23 and 24, 1963, Secre-
tary Rusk, accompanied by Mr. Foster, ap-
peared before the Armed Services, the For-
eign Relations, and the Joint Atomic Energy
Committees to report on the status of the
negotiations and secure the advice of these
present on the draft as it then stood. These
hearings occurred prior to the initialing of
the treaty by Under Secretary Harriman in
Moscow on July 25. The draft treaty which
was discussed with the committees at that
16745
mittees were also consulted before the
treaty was initiated and before it was signed.
In addition to formal hearings, numerous
informal contacts with various Senators and
their staffs on the subject of the nuclear
test ban negotiations in general and a three-
environment ban in particular have occurred.
A particular effort has been made to keep
Senators who were members of the commit-
tees having an interest in arms control mat-
ters fully informed. In addition to individ-
ual contacts, a series of breakfasts specifical-
ly to discuss arms control and nuclear test
ban matters were held. All members of
the Armed Services, Foreign Relations and
Joint Atomic Energy Committees were in-
vited to attend one or more of these break-
fast briefings. The views of Senators who
have expressed an interest in the subject
have also been sought on an informal basis.
The only possible conclusion from the
foregoing is that the advice of the Senate
was repeatedly sought by the executive
branch before and during the course of the
negotiations which culminated in the treaty
before the Senate.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY,
SEPTEMBER 23, 1963, AT 10 A.M.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is
there further business to come before the
Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further business'?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
not, I move that the Senate stand in
adjournment until 10 o'clock on Monday
morning next, in accordance with the
unanimous-consent agreement entered
into.on Wednesday, September 18, 1963.
The motion was agreed to; and (at 4
o'clock and 29 minutes p.m.) the Senate
adjourned, in executive session, under
the order of Wednesday, September 18,
1963, until Monday, September 23, 1963,
at 10 o'clock am.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate, September 20, 1963:
IN THE MARINE CORPS
The following-named officers of the Marine
Corps for temporary appointment to the
grade of lieutenant colonel, subject to quali-
fication therefor as provided by law:
Barton, LeRoy C. Maloney, John H.
Carlson, William C. Wilder, Charles S.
Culp, William E. Harrison, Joseph B.
McKitrick, Rodney D. Glenn, Jack
Morris, Roger A. Kerr, Melvyn H.
Shanks, William, Jr. Pomeroy, William D.
Fraser, Robert M., Jr. Von Der Heyde, Henry
A. F., Jr.
Beer, William J.
Hickman, Edwin L? Jr.
Nelson, Arthur A., Jr.
Hart, Lawrence P.
Selleck, Lawrence M.,
Jr.
McPherson, Gordon D.
Stott, Harry D.
Heflin, Bruce A.
Beal, Samuel G.
Cook, Bertram E., Jr.
Christopher, Willard N.
Ksycewski, Casimir C.
Boulware, John C.
Evans, Robert C.
Reese, Robert V.
Harris, William D.
Tunnell, Robert J., Jr.
Van Dalsem, Robert R.
Salser, Charles A.
King, Robert, Jr.
Fine, Dail D.
Bryant, William W.
Poppa, Chester J.
Cobb, Thomas L.
Kirkland, John W.
Dempster, Donald R.
Heywood, Ralph A.
Rixey, Palmer H.
Persac, Walter L.
Oltmer, Lavern J.
Stoneman, Russel H.
Keller, Gordon H., Jr.
Millette, Eugene
Van Campen, Hiel L.
Lewis, Robert, Jr.
Landrum, James, Jr.
Taub, Samuel, Jr.
McArthur, Raymond
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16746
Dillon, James W.
Kelly, Walter C.
Hall, Clifford D.
Hoch, Kurt L.
Haynes, Albert B., Jr.
Burch, Carrol B.
Metcalfe, Robert B.
Shelby, Alfred C., Jr.
Bonds, William E.
Hunter, Glenn R.
Warm, Char Jr.
Usher, Edward G.
Dayvault, Nevin E.
Fox, Jean T.
Hance, Lilburn L.
Rumble, G-erould
Jr.
Weber, Raymond J.
Pates, Bruce A., Jr. -
Groorne, Roland C.
Cunard, Earl M., Jr.
Novak, Anthony "
Crowley, John
Anthony, William S.
Roberts, Clyde R.
Frendh, Mary D.
Unger, William T.
RiggS, Thomas W.
Stone, Earnest H., Jr,
? Walker, Emerson A.
Ziegler, Paul E.
Leeseberg, Phillip K.
Johnson, Corbin J.
Brierton, Thomas J., Jr
CONGRESSION RECORD ? SENATE September 20, 1963
Terry, John M., Jr.
Chambers, George G., J:
Little, Eldon Li, Jr.
Whitehead, Arthur T.
Gecirge, Marshall 'E.
McClanahan, Paul G.
Wilson, James J.
Molaberry, Dale M.
Watek? "Henry
? Kenneth E.
Hilf; Twyman R.
? Robert L.
Bums, Edwin A.
Holier, Louis S., Jr.
Kane, Douglas T.
Mitchell, John F.
Carrubb_a, Harry D.
Schoen, James R.
Baker, Edward S., Jr.
Butner, John C., HI
Spicer, Raymond B.
Dowd, John J., Jr.
Mosher, Charles M.
Rann, Louis A.
Peck, William H.
Westcott, Charles T.
Kletzker, Robert L.
Meyers. George F.
Cummings, James M.
Esalinger, Dean E.
Dzialo, Edward W.
Porter, Robert H.,, Jr.
Overmyer, Gerald D.
Geiger, Edward D. Jr.
.11afres, James M.
,
Lahr, Robert J. Worley, Kermit M. Ludwig, Verb e E.
Hagerty, Patrick T. Owens, Thurman Owens, Owen L.
Wildey, Robert L.
Coffman, John W.
Wessel, Wallace
regley, James E.
Stowers, Robert M.
Corn, Clifford D.
Grier, Samuel L.
Witkowski, Henry J.
Leidy, Alfred L.
McCain, Gene M.
Brent, Joseph M.
Miller, Richard R.
Harris, William A.
Marusak. Andrevi
V., Jr.
Wilson, Harold B.
Stephenson, Charles
R., in
Gilman, Donald E.
Blaha, Herbert J.
Patton, William C.
Moak, Stanley T.
Rapp, David A.
Walker, William I'.
Hargett, Ernest Ct
Powell, David D.
Clark, Allen B.
Lewis, Elmer M., .
Cashman, James L.
Breckinridge, Jamas
Walden, Denzil E.
Keith, John H., Jr.
Johnson, Russell E.
Dindinger, Jack W.
Jones, Edward H.
Roothoff, John J.
Merrill, George A.
Hicks, Norman W.
Harmon, Autrey B.
Smith, Robert A.
Winn, Robert D.
Dresbach, Earl C., Jr.
Dillard, Jack N.
Harris, Robert G.
Killian, Edwin W.
Morin, Donald E.
Miles, Jack L.
Wood, Ralph C.
Spencer, Donald E?
Johnston, Howard J.
Jones, David G.
Green, Melvin K.
Badger, Guy 0.
Russ, Donald M.
Selvitelle, Benjamin
B., Jr.
Thomas, John C.
Deming, Edmund G.,
?Jr.
Warshawer, Alan j.
Mader, John F.
Dixon:Frank L? Jr.
T. Kleppsattel, F. M., Jr.
Critchett, Edward W.
May, Donald L.
Buchanan, Fitzhugh
L., Jr.
Meeker, Ermine L.
Wachter, John A.
Showalter, Charles E.
Stephens, Reuel W.,
Jr.
Eschholz, Theodore S.
Coon, Elvin R., Jr.
Hilimer, Donald F.
Rump, William S.
Beverly, Arthur C.
Reese, Howard E.
McNicholas, Robert J.
Baeriswyl, Louis, Jr.
Taylor, Roma T., Jr.
Macklin, William H.
Webb, Lewis R.
McClelland, William
Hickman, William T.
Flood, James H. A.
Selmyhr, Garlen L.
Martin, Lee D.
Iilyth, Charles W.
Montague, Paul B.
A.
Coffman, Raymond
P., Jr.
Wilson, Robert H.
Eastman, Robert E.
Edwards, Roy J.
Woodruff, Paden
E., Jr.
Ives, Merton Et.
Peabody, Clifford J.
Rogers, Harry L., Jr.
Hall, William D.
Markham, Edward
J.Jr.
Richards, Wayne E.
Meyer, Edward B.
Parrott, Robett E.
Arford, Jack 0.
Plaskett, William, Jr.
McCarty, Stewart
B., Jr.
Discus, William
A., Jr.
Robert
T., Jr.
Hecker, James S.
The following-named ,officers of the Marine
Corps for permanent appointment to the
grade of lieutenant colonel, subject to quali-
fication therefor as provided by law :
Amos, Raymond L. Yezierski, Peter P.
Valentour, James V. Leach, Robert D.
Wahrer, Maurice S. Li ndfelt, Hakim E.
Stamps, Clyde IL
Keenan, Lawrence W.
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Mr. Elder 7D5 617
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SIGNATURE
Remarks: Attached are excerpts from the
Congressional Record of 19 September
containing the continuation of debate on
the nuclear test ban treaty. We have not
identified any references to the Agency or
the Director* houguer.,,,-.);ekt-rrtay Wildrto
hasce_them-ayailabla.-
AA4Atel
7#14,4? --'-. ";