SITUATION IN CUBA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200150028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 121
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: September 17, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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SIGNATURE
Remarks: This is the report of the hearings last
Monday by Senate Foreign Relations and
Armed Services on the Cuba question. At
page 40 you will note Chairman Russell's
question to Secretary Rusk concerning the
quality of the information we have about
Cuba.
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FORM NO. 7-q 7 Use previous editions (40)
? U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1961 0-587282
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as 1. -
SITUATION IN CUBA
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S.J. Res. 226, S.J. Res. 227, S. Con. Res. 92, S. Res. 388,
S. Res. 389, and S. Res. 390
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1962
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Armed Forces
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
59479 WASHINGTON : 1962
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOIIN SPARKMAN, Alabama
HUBERT II. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
HOMER E. CAPEIIART, Indiana
FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, Clerk
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CLAIR ENGLE, California
E. L. BARTLETT, Alaska
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
ROBERT C. BYRD. West Virginia
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts
MARGARET CTIASE SMITH, Maine
PRESCOTT BUSH, Connecticut
J. GLENN BEALL, Maryland
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
Note.-Sections of this hearing have been deleted in the interest
of national security and foreign policy. Deleted material is in-
dicated by the notation "[Deleted]".
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CONTENTS
Statement of- Page
Keating, Hon. Kenneth B., U.S. Senator from the State of New York- 6
Miller, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa------------ 75
Prouty, Hon. Winston L., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont__ 25
Rusk, Hon. Dean, Secretary of State; accompanied by Bundy,
William P., Office of International Security Affairs, Department
of Defense; and Chayes, Abram, Legal Adviser, Department of
State------------------------------------------------------- 30,64
Smathers, Hon. George A., U.S. Senator from the State of Florida-_ 52
Inserts:
Text of S.J. Res. 226-------------------------------------------
1
Text of S.J. Res. 227-------------------------------------------
2
Text of S. Con. Res. 92----------------------------------------
2
Text of S. Res. 388--------------------------------------------
3
Text of S. Res. 389--------------------------------------------
3
Text of S. Res. 390--------------------------------------------
4
Amendments proposed by Senator Scott to S. Res. 388-----------------
4
Cuba and Soviet Arms, reprint of article from New York Times, September
14,1962------------------------------------------
23
The Monroe Doctrine, reprint of article by George E. Sokolsky from the
Washington Post, September 17, 1962______________________________
24
State Department press release, September 18, 1962 -------------------
39
Address by the Honorable Chester Bowles, at the Golden Jubilee Con-
vention of Hadassah, in Pittsburgh, Pa., September 16, 1962 ----------
44
Instances of uses of U.S. Armed Forces abroad, 1798-1945- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
80
Appendixes:
A-The Monroe Doctrine (excerpts from President Monroe's mes-
sage to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823)____________________________
89
B-Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, September 2,
1947 ---------------------------------------------------
90
C-Final act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, serving as organ of consultation in application
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Punta
del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962____________________
94
D-Resolution 93, 10th Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Vene-
zuela-Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the
Political Integrity of the American States Against the Inter-
vention of International Communism_______________________
103
E-The Charter of the Organization of American States ------------
104
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SITUATION IN CUBA
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1962
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The committees met in joint session, pursuant to notice, at 10:30
a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B.
Russell (chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee) pre-
siding.
Present : Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Gore,
Church, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson, of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Senators Russell, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond,
Engle, Bartlett, Byrd (West Virginia), Bush, and Beall of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services.
Chairman RUSSELL. The committees will come to order.
Pursuant to the agreement reached by unanimous consent in the
Senate on Thursday last, the Committees on Armed Services and
Foreign Relations are meeting jointly this morning to consider several
resolutions relating to the Monroe Doctrine situation in Cuba and
Latin America. Some of the resolutions relate to conditions all over
the world.
Without objection copies of Senate Joint Resolution 226, Senate
Joint Resolution 227, Senate Concurrent Resolution 92, Senate Resolu-
tion 388, Senate Resolution 389, and Senate Resolution 390 will be
printed in the record at this point, as well as the amendments to
Senate Resolution 388 proposed by Senator Scott.
(The resolutions referred to follow:)
[S.J. Res. 22,61, 87th Cong., 2d sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Reaffirming the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and authorizing
and directing the President of the United States to take such action as is necessary to
prevent any violation thereof
Whereas there now exists in the Western Hemisphere a country whose govern-
ment, being intimately linked with the Sino-Soviet bloc, is under the control and
direction of the international Communist conspiracy ; and
Whereas on January 3, 1961, the President of the United States formally
terminated diplomatic and consular relations with the government of said
country, following a long series of harassments, baseless accusations, and villifi-
cations by its officials ; and
Whereas on February 3, 1962, the President of the United States formally pro-
claimed an embargo upon trade between the United States and said country in
accordance with the decisions of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Inter-
American System at Punta del Este, Uruguay ; and
Whereas recent developments in said country have given rise to concern over
the peace and safety of the United States and other peace-loving nations in the
Western Hemisphere; and
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2 SITUATION IN CUBA
Whereas the Principles of the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated by President James
Monroe in his annual message of December 2, 1823, are an expression of the in-
herent right of self-defense of the United States : Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is hereby
authorized and directed to take such action as is necessary to prevent any viola-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine.
[S.-T. Res. 227, 87th Cong., 2d sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing the President of the United States to employ the Armed
Forces of the United States in order to protect the peace and security of the United
States and the free world
Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all
other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all ; and
Whereas the governments of some nations, and some areas not recognized as
nations by the United States, are in fact dominated and controlled by other
governments that are members of the international Communist movement; and
Whereas an act of aggression committed by the government of any such domi-
nated and controlled nation or area might gravely endanger the peace and se-
curity of the United States and free world ; and
Whereas such an act of aggression should and will be recognized by the United
States as the act of the dominating and controlling government; and
Whereas in order to effectively protect the United States and its vital interests
throughout the world, swift and decisive use of the Armed Forces of the United
States by the President may be necessary : Therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in. Congress assembled, That in order to protect the peace and security of
the United States and the free world and in order to protect the vital interests
of the United States in any area of the world against acts of aggression com-
mitted by an unfriendly nation, or by the government of any nation or area
dominated and controlled by the international Communist movement, the Presi-
dent is hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he
deems necessary, this authority to include the taking of such other measures as
the President judges to be required or appropirate for the purpose of protecting
the peace and security of the free world and the vital interests of the United
States.
The authority granted by this joint resolution shall expire when the President
determines that the peace and security of the free world are reasonably assured,
and he shall so report to the Congress.
[S. Con. Res. 92, 87th Cong? 2d seas.]
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas President James .Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823,
declared to the Congress that we should consider any attempt on the part of
European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere
as dangerous to our peace and safety."
Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947, the parties agreed that "an armed attack
by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against
all the American states, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting
parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations."
Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at
Punta del Este in January 1962 unanimously declared : "The present Government
of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
has established a political, economic; and social system based on that doctrine,
and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, in-
cluding even the threat of military intervention in America on-the part of the
Soviet Union ;"
Whereas since 1958 the international Communist movement has increasingly
extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence :
Now, therefore, be it
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SITUATION IN CUBA 3
Resolved by the Senate (the house of Representatives concurring), That it is
the sense of the Congress that the President of the United States is supported
in his determination and possesses all necessary authority-
(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use
of arms, the Castro regime from exporting its aggressive purposes to any
part of this hemisphere by force or the threat of force;
(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported
offensive military base capable of endangering the United States Naval
Base at Guantanamo, free passage to the Panama Canal, United States
missile and space preparations or the security of this Nation and its
citizens ; and
(c) to work with other free citizens of this hemisphere and with freedom-
loving Cuban refugees to support the legitimate aspirations of the people
of Cuba for a return of self-determination.
IS. Res. 388, 57th Cong., 2d seas.]
RESOLUTION
Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823,
declared to the Congress that we should consider any attempt on the part of
European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety."
Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1047, the parties agreed that "an armed attack
by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against
all the American states, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting
parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations."
Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at
Punta del Este in January 1962 unanimously declared : "The present Govern-
ment of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine,
and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, in-
cluding even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the
Soviet Union";
Whereas since 1958 the international Communist movment has increasingly
extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence :
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United
States is supported in his determination and possesses all necessary authority-
(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use
of arms, the Castro regime from exporting its aggressive purposes: to any
part of this hemisphere by force or the threat of force ;
(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported of-
fensive military base capable of endangering the United States naval base
at Guantanamo, free passage to the Panama Canal, United States missile
and space preparations, or the security of this Nation and its citizens ; and
(c) to work with other free citizens of this hemisphere and with freedom-
loving Cuban refugees to support the legitimate aspirations of the people
of Cuba for a return to self-determination.
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that-
(a) the establishment in Cuba of a Soviet military base would represent
a direct and grave threat to the peace of the Americas which cannot be
tolerated ;
(h) the President should seek to have the Organ of Consultation under
the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance meet for the purpose
of agreeing upon measures to deal with the existing situation in Cuba as
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4 SITUATION IN CUBA
constituting a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a threat to the sov-
ereignty and political independence of the American states and endangering
the peace of America, as defined in the declaration of solidarity adopted in
1954 at Caracas ;
(c) the President should further, if in his judgment it is necessary, seek
consultation with the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
and
(d) the President should take such further action as he deems necessary
to prevent the establishment of a military base by any foreign power on the
soil of Cuba or of any of the other American Republics.
RESOLUTION
Resolved, That it is hereby declared to be the sense of the Senate that the
domination and control of the Republic of Cuba by the international Communist
movement jeopardizes the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere and
violates the basic right of the Cuban people to independence and self-determina-
tion.
It is further declared to be the sense of the Senate that the United States,
under the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, and article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations', has
the right and obligation to take all necessary actions, in cooperation with other
Western Hemisphere nations if possible, and unilaterally if necessary, to end
such domination and control and to restore the Republic of Cuba to a gov-
ernment of the people, by the people, and for the people.
AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY SENATOR SCOTT TO S. I{ES. 388 ON CUBA BY
SENATOR MANSFIELD, SEPTEMBER 17, 1962
t[Strike out words in brackets; add words In italic]
Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823,
declared to the Congress that we should consider any attempt on the part of
European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety."
Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack
by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against
all the American states, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting
parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations."
Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1917 the parties further agreed that "if the
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political inde-
pendence of any American state should be affected by an aggression which is not
an armed attack or by an extracontincntal or intracontinental conflict, or by any
other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of
Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which
must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victint of the aggression or, in
any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for
the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent."
Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties further agreed that "the meas-
ures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more
of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic
relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of
economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephone, and radio-
telephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force."
Whereas the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed in
Bogota in 19-118, states: "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or
the sovereignty or political independence of any American state should be
affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed
attack, or by an extracontinental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more
American states, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the
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SITUATION IN CUBA 5
peace of America, the American states, in furtherance of the principles of corn
tinental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and proce-
dures established in the special treaties on the subject."
Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at
Punta del Este in January 1962 unanimously declared : "The present Govern-
ment of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and
accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including
even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet
Union ;"
Whereas [since 1958] the international Communist movement has increasingly
extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence.
Whereas the Government of Cuba is now' a part of the international Communist
movement, defined by the Caracas Conference of 1.951, as of 'antidemocratic
nature and * * * interventionist tendency * * * incompatible with the concept
of the American freedom,"
Whereas the Declaration of Caracas condemned the activities of the inter-
national Communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs
and expressed the determination of the American states to take the necessary
measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of
international communism, acting in the interests of an alien despotism.
Now therefore be it resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that the President
of the United States is supported in his determination and [possesses all necessary
authority] in addition to his authority as Chief Executive, is specifically au-
thorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems
necessary-
(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of
arms, the Castro regime from exporting its aggressive purposes to any part of
this hemisphere by force or the threat of force ;
(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported offensive
military base capable of endangering the United States Naval Base at Guan-
tanamo, free passage to the Panama Canal, United States missile and space
preparations or the security of this Nation and its citizens ; [and]
(c) to work with other free citizens of this hemisphere and with freedom-
loving Cuban refugees to support the legitimate aspirations of the people of
Cuba for a return to self-determination ; and
(d) to use such measures as may be necessary to halt, impede or counter the
buildup of Cuba with Communist arms ae a Communist military base, including
the use of economic and military boycott and blockade.
Chairman PRUSS]SLL. With a combined membership as large as that of
these two committees sitting jointly the seating arrangements are most
difficult to coordinate. At times there are vacancies, some Senators
can't be present at all times, and Senators are scattered around the
table if an effort is made to seat them according to seniority. There-
fore, with the indulgence of all concerned, the Chair would propose to
the two committees that Senators be seated on a first come, first served
basis during this hearing.
It would seem desirable to print a cleared version of the testimony
that will be given to the committees as promptly as is practical, and we,
therefore, ask the cooperation of the Departments of Defense and State
in indicating security information that should be deleted from the
printed record.
The Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, and the Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for International ecurity Affairs, Mr. William P.
Bundy, are present to give the. views of the executive branch on these
resolutions. Before they testify, however, we have two Members of
the Senate, who wish to testify, the junior Senator from New York, Mr.
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Keating, and the junior. Senator from Vermont, Mr. Prouty, have both
indicated their desire to give us their views on these resolutions.
Senator Sparkman, do you have anything you wish to say before we
proceed?
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't, have anything
to add to that.
I might just remind the committees that under the motion by which
these resolutions were sent to the committees, we are ordered to report
back not later than noon Thursday. My understanding is that this
subject then immediately becomes the pending business.
Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is correct. And with a committee
of this size, it will take some time to coordinate the views, perhaps
vote on differences of opinion. We should move as expeditiously as
possible.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. May I add just one more word with
respect to expedition. Secretary Rusk has a 2 o'clock meeting before
the Appropriation Committee and he hopes we will finish these hear-
ings, at least his part of it, by 2 o'clock.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Keating, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH B. KEATING, A U.S!. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator ICEATZNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before these two distin-
guished committees. I commend the committees for theresponsible
manner in which they have initiated these public hearings on all of
the resolutions with regard to U.S. policy toward Cuba.
I turn specifically to these resolutions.
Some, undoubtedly seek to give the President additional power.
Whether or not that is desirable will be one of the considerations
before you. The resolution introduced by the senior Senator from
Connecticut, Senator Bush and myself, however, Senate Resolution
390, does not anywhere refer to the President of the United States but
instead -expresses the sense of the Congress in this matter.
It is not like the resolution of the distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana, our majority leader, which specifically declares that-
The President of the United States is supported in his determination and
possesses all necessary authority to undertake certain specific measures.
I respectfully submit that it might be more 31, propriate for the
Senate to limit itself to an expression of the sense the Congress and
not to attempt to read the mind of the President.
I also believe it is desirable to refer very strongly in the text of the
resolution to the present infringement on the rights of the Cuban
people to national independence and self-determination, an infringe-
ment which is the direct result of the alien imperialistic military and
political base which the Soviet Union and Castro have created on
the island of Cuba.
The resolution introduced by Senator Bush and myself makes.
this reference very decisively.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 7
DISTINCTION BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE BUILDUPS
There is one other aspect of the resolution of the distinguished
Senator from Montana which reflects an earlier statement. by the
President which, in my judgment, may be questionable. It is said,
and repeatedly emphasized, that the present buildup in Cuba is a
defensive one, and that only if such a buildup becomes offensive will
we take action.
In my judgment this distinction between an offensive and defen-
sive military buildup is dangerous and unrealistic. Who is to judge
whether a gun or a tank or torpedo boat or a MIG fighter is intended
for offensive or defensive purposes ?
Certainly with regard to missiles it is my understanding that a
missile launching facility for short-range ground-to-air missiles may
be transformed in a, very short time into a facility for intermediate
range ground-to-ground missiles.
Thirdly, as Mr. Hanson Baldwin has pointed out, and he is cer-
tainly a responsible and by no means an alarmist, expert on military
policy, the present buildup in Cuba when finally completed will pro-
vide a strong base, for any future offensive actions.
At what point can we determine that this progressive buildup has
passed the point of defensive capability and acquired an offensive
value? I think it might be helpful, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask
that at the conclusion of my remarks this very fine analysis by Mr.
Hanson Baldwin be incorporated in the record.
Chairman RUSSELL. That matter will appear at the conclusion of
the Senator from New York's remarks.
Senator KEATING. Fourthly, it is the whole history of Communist
expansion that infiltration and subversion are used as effectively as
overt aggression to overcome free governments. We can't possibly
protect the security of the Western Hemisphere if we limit our re-
sponse to cases of obvious aggression. Our hesitancy in dealing with
Cuba, in my judgment, already has served to weaken the resolve of
many Western Hemisphere leaders to combat castroism in their own
lands.
Certainly we must not wait for open aggression before taking
further steps against this regime.
I don't, want to occupy the time of these committees in criticism
of some of the statements that have been made to date by various
representatives of the Government. I would rather use this oppor-
tunity to recommend a constructive course of action which can be
taken by the United States without undertaking a military invasion
of Cuba.
Let me make it very clear that I certainly do not under present
circumstances advocate an invasion of Cuba.
But there are a number of steps which I believe are imperative.
First and foremost, I have recommended a formal meeting of the
members of the Organization of American States. I was delighted
to learn on September 5 that Secretary of State Rusk did hold an in-
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8 SITUATION IN CUBA
formal meeting with the ambassadors of the Latin American nations
and at that time proposed that an informal meeting be held at a later
time.
Every possible attempt should be made at such a meeting to agree
on a number of common measures to isolate the Cuban dictator from
the rest of the hemisphere.
-Secondly, and also on the agenda should be an honest, an objective
evaluation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine in my judg-
ment must not be allowed to die. It is difficult to improve on the
wisdom, the common sense of the words of President Monroe and I
quote one sentence when he said in 1823
It is impossible that the allied powers-
meaning certain European powers-
should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without
endangering our peace and hapiness nor can anyone believe that our southern
brethren-
meaning, Mr. Chairman, the Latin American nations-
if left to themselves-
Chairman RUSSELL. From the kindly tone employed, I assumed it.
Senator IKEArING (continuing) :
would adopt it of their own accord.
Now, President Monroe's words apply to the present case. He
recognized that quite possibly a form of government might be forced
upon a state in the Western Hemisphere by reason of the superior
power of one of the European nations.
He did not leave it to the tool of the alien power, in this case Castro,
to decide whether this condition should be allowed. The Cuban peo-
ple never would have adopted the Communist tyranny under which
they are now ruled if they were not deceived in the same way many
Americans were deceived by the nature and character of castroism.
It would be very useful for the Organization of American States
to express its recognition of the tyranny under which the Cuban peo-
ple now suffer, and its determination to take whatever steps are neces-
sary to liberate the Cuban people from Communist control.
It would be most effective if the OAS declared Castro an outlaw
regime and recognized a Cuban Government-in-iexile which met certain
conditions as the true repersentative of the Cuban people.
Up until. now the OAS has deliberately dodged such issues but they
cannot be dodged forever.
If the OAS refuses to meet this situation honestly and fearlessly
the United States will have no alternative but to take whatever uni-
lateral action is necessary in our national interest.
A consensus for action is most desirable but we can never join in a
consensus for inaction.
Thirdly, the United States should call for an immediate meeting of
NATO ministers in which the United States should mince no words.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 9
It is absolutely ridiculous and must be unacceptable to the United
States that NATO and other free world nations supply shipping to
the Soviet Union to create a military base in Cuba.
It is intolerable that at a time when American reservists are put on
the alert to defend West Berlin, among other purposes, that West
German ships should be chartered to the Soviet Union for the trans-
port of strategic equipment to any Communist country in this hemi-
sphere.
It is intolerable for the Canadian Government to permit the flight
of Soviet planes over Canada in order to supply additional equipment
to Cuba. It is intolerable that in addition the Canadian Government
should supply pilot observers or guides for the flight of light bombers
to be added to the Cuban Air Force or transport planes.
It is intolerable that the Government of Greece, which was rescued
from Communist guerrilla warfare and aided by the Marshall plan,
and by the Truman doctrine, should provide both shipping and refuel-
ing facilities for Russian cargo vessels on their way to Cuba.
It is, in fact, intolerable for any NATO nation to permit the use of
vessels flying its flag to transfer Russian equipment with a direct or
indirect military potential to the Cuban Government.
The present tendency of the NATO governor .nits t,> carry on trading
and in particular ship chartering activities with the Soviet Union in
its efforts to supply Cuba may be the result of the inability of the
United States to work for a more effective policy of export controls
within the NATO community. Our Government never appears to
have recognized this as a matter of urgency ; that is, over a period of
many, many years they have not recognized the urgent problem here.
In the programing and administration of our aid program, we will
have to take into consideration this new element, the use of shipping of
NATO nations for Soviet purposes.
The goal for which we should be striving in our foreign policy, and
in these resolutions, is the complete isolation of Cuba, the quarantine
of the Castro government from political influence and economic im-
pact in Latin America and throughout the world, not only because
the interest of the United States is involved but also because the Cuban
people are themselves being deprived of the right of self-determina-
tion ? and self-government.
Mr. Chairman, if I may digress very briefly, it is my conviction
that the people of the United States have the right to know the facts
about Cuba. I don't believe that the responsible members of these
committees would characterize as jingoism or as war mongering or as
alarmism or rashness a critical discussion of the situation which exists
in the first Western Hemisphere country to fall under the control of
international communism. I have confidence in the President of the
United States, and I am much encouraged by his most recent ex-
pressions on this subject, but that is no reason for foreclosing discussion
of the course of events in Cuba.
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10 SITUATION IN CUBA
. I reject completely the suggestion which has been made by some
that the only role the Senate can play in shaping our foreign rela-
tions is to express our faith in the President of the United States.
Bipartisanship is essential in our foreign affairs but bipartisanship
is premised on an opportunity to discuss and consider alternatives
before the decision is made. And this kind of discussion is impos-
sible unless a maximum amount of information is made available to
the American people.
Any concealment of the facts, any encouragement of a blind and
uninformed confidence in policies which may be misguided even
though well intentioned are not in the best interests or in the tradi-
tions of our Republic.
The framers of the Constitution certainly intended that the Senate
should do more than merely consider and perhaps change a word or
two in resolutions which the President might send up to Capitol Hill.
Of course, some of the activities undertaken by the United States-
many of those activities, may not, for security reasons, be publicly
discussed. But this is no justification for not fully disclosing the
activities of the Soviets in Cuba, the number of troops or technicians,
the types of equipment, the number of missile bases, the length of
time required to convert what are now called defensive missile in-
stallations into offensive ones, and similar information.
The Soviets obviously have this information, and 'there seems to
me no reason to keep it from the American public, and I hope that
questions along these lines will be considered during the testimony
of Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
The American people are entitled to know the facts. Only when
the full facts are not known is it possible-and I quote-
to play on the fears, the biases, the prejudices, and the emotions of the American
people, instead of dealing constructively with the issues.
In my judgment, therefore, Nye are not doing a service to the United
States or to the principles of representative government which we
all cherish if we tell the American people supply, "You do not need
to know the facts. All you need. 'to do is trust the President."
No President is omniscient. The very strength of the democratic
process is that out of widespread discussion comes intelligent criticism
and useful guidance.
In my judgment, I might, say, I won't quote it from my statement
but this point is made very well in the recent book, "The'Cuban Inva-
sion," by Ted Schultz and Carl Meyer.
In my judgment, full information and public discussion are right
now even more the responsibility of the American people, and in my
judgment, any who have tried to prevent or suppress such discussions
are doing a discredit to the American people and the Congress, and
when I say "discussions" I mean constructive discussions, and I, there-
fore, particularly wish to commend the chairman. and the, members of
these two committees, and the minority and majority leaders of the
Senate who have arranged for these joint meetings and made it pos-
sible for the American people to have a public-a presentation, I
thought it would be open hearings, and a full discussion of the issues
that are involved in the present Soviet military buildup in Cuba,
and to give those of us who -feel so deeply about this matter an op-
portunity to be heard.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 11
Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator Keating.
Senator KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. All the members of these committees and of the
Senate know how concerned you have been about this situation. You
have discussed it on a number of occasions.
I was interested in your condemnation, to me entirely justified, of
the use of NATO nation ships and shipping. I was greatly concerned
to hear that some shipping from other countries such as Liberia,
where American-owned shipping uses that flag for purposes of con-
venience, has been utilized.
I assume your condemnation goes across the board to that?
Senator KEATING. It certainly does, definitely.
Chairman RUSSELL. Just one other question.
AT WHAT POINT SHOULD TIIE UNITED STATES ACT UNILATERALLY?
In your resolution, the one that, you and Senator Bush are sponsor-
ing jointly, you say we have the right and obligation to take all neces-
sary actions in cooperation with other Western Hemisphere nations,
if possible, and unilaterally, if necessary, to end such domination.
Can you help the committee with any standard for determining
when we have exhausted the possibility of getting cooperation from
the other nations of this hemisphere?
Senator KEATING. Well, I think that is an Executive decision pri-
marily. I think very prompt action should be taken to try to get the
cooperation of the other Latin American nations.
We did not get out of the Punta del Este conference or in other
ways, as much as we, I believe, had reason to expect.
I have the impression that some of the things which we have long
been telling them about the buildup of the Communist base in the
Western Hemisphere, they certainly will now have good reason to
know definitely. It is my hope that some of them will be more inclined
to take concerted action with us now than they were before.
Now, as far as the time when we must conclude that we are going
to act unilaterally and what that action should be, I don't think can
be said at the moment beyond this, that I consider this a matter of the
utmost urgency, and that the time should be short.
Chairman RUSSELL. From your statement, I assume you think the
first step that should be taken, when all other efforts to get cooperation
fail, is a, quarantine-the blockade of the island?
Senator KEATING. I think that again is an Executive decision at
this time. First, I don't think we have reached that point.
Chairman RUSSELL. I understood you thought that was justified in
the course of your statement?
Senator KEATING. I think if we get no cooperation from either our
NATO or our other Allies in action, I think that that is the first step we
would have to consider.
I don't think I can say at this time positively that that is a step we
should take. I think we must consider that, if we get no cooperation
on hemispheric action, and if our representations to the Soviet Union
and other Communist countries are of no avail, and they continue to
ship in military material and personnel.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?
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Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. At what pointin a blockade, in your
opinion, does it become an act of wax?
Senator KEATING. Well, as I have looked into it, there are, there
have been many instances where blockades have been instituted which
have not led to war, and have not been construed as an act of war.
Curiously enough, contrary to our own domestic law, as I read the
history of blockade and I haven't by any means exhausted it, the
legality of a blockade to a large extent depends on its effectiveness.
In my judgment, a blockade, if we were joined by our allies, Latin
America, and/or NATO allies, preferably NATO allies in this area,
would be-effective, and in my judgment, could be done without being
an act of war.
However, I think the longer, Senator Sparkman, that we delay,
if we are ever going to do anything about the building of a Commu-
nist base in this hemisphere, my judgment is that the longer we delay
the more serious becomes the likelihood that positive action would
lead to war.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I want to ask you one other question.
Do you have information that makes you rather positive that the
missile bases there now can be converted readily?
Senator KEATING. My information is they can.
Acting Chairman. SPARKMAN. I hope we may have some evidence
on that from the military because it has been my understanding that
they are not readily convertible. I hope we can clear that point up.
Senator KEATING. I would very much appreciate it if you would
.get that.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I think a lot would depend on the
convertibility of those missile bases.
Senator KLATING. I think that is a very important point and my
information is that they are readily convertible into launching fa-
cilities for intermediate-range missiles, not long-range missiles.,
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. No.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. Any member of the Armed Services Committee
have any questions?
Senator Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. I think, Senator Keating, on your missile
base change, it would apply to tactical-range missiles, and they would
have the capability_of hitting the southern part of the United States.
I wanted to ask you, are you aware of any note that the President
or the State Department has sent to Premier Khrushchev objecting
to the sending-of supplies to Cuba? - -
Senator KEATING. No, I am not.
Senator GOLDWATER. Would you think that this would be one of
the preferable first steps that should be taken ?
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Senator KEATING. I assume that such step has already been taken.
I can't conceive of it not having been taken. I just don't know of
such a note. If it has not been sent, it ought to be sent today in my
judgment.
Senator GOLDWATER. I haven't heard of it.
Senator KEATING. I don't know. I just assume it has been done.
It certainly should be if it hasn't in my judgment.
Senator GOLDWATER. One other question, and this is not intended
to be critical, but if I recall the language the President used the other
day it was that substantially Cuba, was not a threat to anyone as yet.
I wonder if you would agree that. these supplies constituted a definite
threat to those Cubans who might like. to revolt., against Castro. These
supplies have bolstered his police force and his army to, the extent
that he could probably prevent. any uprising by native Cubans.
Senator KEATING. I certainly do. I can't believe that the building
of this base 100 miles from us is not a threat, meaning by that, no one.
I believe, contends that. Castro or his Soviet masters intend to invade
the United States from Cuba, but I just can't feel that this is not a
threat.
I have sensed, and I don't want these remarks to apply to the Presi-
dent, but I have sensed a feeling in Government circles which disturbs
me. I read yesterday, as perhaps some of you gentlemen did, a front-
page story in the New York Times, and I don't have it here, but it
makes the absolutely astounding statement that a highly placed official
in the Government said that the situation in Cuba was no worse now
than it was a year ago.
Well, no wonder he didn't want his name used. I just, can't conceive
of that kind of information being put out. I think that the President
will be supported in whatever strong action he feels we must take, and
I think it is unfortunate to have statements like that made, even by
unidentified Government officials. It could be a reporter's assumption,
but I am assuming the good faith of the reporter.
Senator GGLDWATER. That is all.
Chairman RUSSELL. Does any member of the Foreign Relations
Committee have any questions?
Senator Wiley?
Senator ""7ILE, Y. Yes.
Senator, my understanding of what you have said is this : That the
Russians haven't just shipped arms to Cuba, they have taken over
Cuba, is that right?
Senator KEATING. In my judgment that is what it amounts to. Cuba
is now a Russian base, and Castro is a complete puppet. If he doesn't
do exactly what they want him to do they will take him out and put
somebody else in.
There are a couple of other figures in the Cuban Government who
have been closer to the Soviet Union than has Castro and I wouldn't
be surprised to, see tomorrow morning that Mr. Castro was out and
one of these other figures had taken his place.
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14 SITUATION IN CUBA
I think it is completely dominated now by the Soviet Union.
Senator WILLY. Do you differentiate between a situation in which
the Kremlin has shipped arms for Castro, and a situation in which
the Kremlin has taken over Cuba. Do you discriminate between
the two?
Senator KEATING. I think both have been done. I think part of it
was to bolster up a Communist regime in Cuba and to make it look
better, and, of course, the shipment of Soviet oil to Cuba has been
the only thing that hasn't caused Cuba to collapse completely
economically, to shut every factory and everything else.
If they had not had the Soviet oil carried in some instances, Mr.
Chairman, by NATO ships, they would have collapsed. The economy
would have completely collapsed before this. It couldn't go on.
It would have been bad for the Soviet Union to see a Communist
regime collapse, and I think it is, in part, to help bolster up the
Cuban regime, the Castro regime, but I think coupled with that is a
desire to establish a Soviet base in the Western Hemisphere.
Senator WILrY. We have shipped a lot of arms to countries sur-
rounding Russia, but we have never gone in and made them an
American base, have we, although we do have bases within striking
distance of Russia?
Senator KEATING. We have bases but we have never tried to
dominate the Governments of any of the countries where we have
bases or to impose our form of government upon them.
Senator WILEY. Then that is the basic reason that you feel that there
has been a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and there has been some-
thing that has affected the security of this country?
Senator KEATING. I believe so.
I do not accept the thesis that it is not a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine for one government to invite another European power in.
Think where that would lead us to. Here is a government set up by
force, the Castro government which came in by a revolution. If you
accept that thesis, all that has to happen is a coup d'etat in Haiti or
Bolivia or some other country. You now have Monroe Doctrine
minus one. You then would have Monroe Doctrine minus two or
three. Then pretty soon like the 10 little Indians, they would all fall
and you would have nothing for the Monroe Doctrine to apply to
except the United States.
President Monroe, in enunciation of that doctrine, referred to the
fact he knew our southern brethren might have imposed upon them
from the outside ideologies in the form of government that they
didn't want and this was intended to protect them against it.
We have an obligation to the Cuban people here under the Monroe
Doctrine, in my judgment.
Senator WILEY. I think I understand fully your position, and it is
this : Had there been arms shipped in and only that, there would have
been no violation of the Monroe Doctrine; but since, as a matter
of fact, the Russians have sent men and experts and have virtually
taken possession of Cuba, that action has violated the doctrine; is
that it?
Senator KEATING. Well, the doctrine has been violated, in my
judgment.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 15
Now, how much less than what they have done could have been
done without violation of the doctrine, I would rather not be pinned
down on now. But what they have done, has in my judgment been
a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
Senator WILEY. Thank you.
Chairman RUSSELL. Any member of the Armed Services Coinmit-
tee have any questions?
Any member of the Foreign Relations Committee?
Senator Iliekenlooper?
IMPACT ON OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OF MAINTENANCE OF
CASTRO REGIME
Senator IIICIKENLOorER. Senator Keating, I would like to get your
views because of your extended interest in this matter. I would like
to get your views about the psychological and practical impact upon
the other Latin American countries and the dissident elements in
those countries as a result of the maintenance of the Castro regime
in Cuba and its apparent strengthening. In other words, what do
you think is the impact in other Latin American countries of Castro
getting away with what he does ?
Senator ITCEATING. I answer that question with a good deal of
deference being put by you in your position on the Latin American
Subcommittee.
My own opinion is
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I am asking for your opinion because of
.your interest in this matter.
Senator KEATING. My own opinion is that we can't afford to let
Castro get away with this among other reasons, for the sake of our
standing with other Latin American Republics.
If we allow him to succeed in this, and he has just about done so
today, in establishing a base, we have got to take some action in order
to show our strength with the other Latin American nations.
Senator HICI{ENLOOrER. Do you see any significance in the taking
of American-owned property in Brazil, which has been done-and
apparently they are getting away with it, or will-and the proposed
confiscation of American property in Honduras right now under the
legislation which they passed, and the extension of that type of action
in other Latin American countries?
Senator KEATING. I am confident if we do not act here with regard
to this Castro situation we will see a great many such instances in
Latin America.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you see any contract in the leasing of
ships by our allies for bringing Iron Curtain supplies into Cuba and
our refusal to aid our allies; the Dutch, who were trying to send some
troops to West New Guinea to protect their rights. We refused to
assist them in any way-even feed them or gas their planes, as some
of the others did-when they were only trying to send soldiers and
people to protect their own interests.
Do you see any inconsistencies in that kind of a, program?
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Senator KEATING. I have been very critical of the shipment of
strategic goods by our allies and the nations we have helped and who
have helped us, in all candor, but I think we have had a right to take
a firmer position than we have about the shipment of strategic goods
to Iron Curtain countries and specifically to Cuba.
Now, I must say, the Senator spoke of the Dutch; the Dutch, last
year, have increased their shipments to Cuba from 8,200,000 to
10,900,000, and SYMINGTON. 10,900,000 what?
Senator KEATING. Dollars. And they are not as bad as Canada,
which is the worst of all of our allies in this regard. Canada has in-
creased trade with Cuba, but that trade is not in food and medicines,
things of that kind. It is in industrial equipment., in oil and other
things that are needed.
Senator HIcic-ENr.ooPEu. That brings to my mind the fact that
Canadians sold the Red Chinese a whole lot of wheat, and we let them
have the machinery to unload it over there. I am wondering about
the consistency of activities here.
Senator KEATING. I am afraid that in the future the people will
look back at some of the things we have done-acid I say this in a
completely unpartisan way, because many of these things have gone
on for a great number of years-they will look back at some of these
things and wonder what we were up to.
Senator IIciiENLOOrEu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELT. Senator Morse, have you any questions?
Senator MousE. Senator Keating, has the President, to your knowl-
edge, expressed a desire that the Keating resolution or any of the
,resolutions before the committee be passed by the Senate?
Senator KEATING. No, not to my knowledge.
I assume. that because of the similarity in language at his press
conference with what was contained in the Mansfield resolution that
that had his blessing but that is just an assumption. It is not based'
on any knowledge.
Senator Mousii. Do you think that the Senate, under the advice and
consent clause of the Constitution, has any obligation to give the
President its advice in regard to a delicate matter that involves the
critical foreign relations problems of the country and might put him
in a position where he would find himself in conflict with the Senate
and the House?
Senator KEATING. One of my objections, Senator Morse, to the
wording of the Mansfield resolution, is that it seems to me that it
does that.
Of course
Senator TIIURMOND. Senator, would you wait just a minute? I
can't hear you.
Senator KEATING. Of course, it does it to a large extent by saying
that the Congress agrees with what is in the mind of the President.
One of my objections to it is that I don't think we should read his
mind; I do think it is desirable for the Congress, as the representative,
of the people, to make clear something about its position with regard
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to the Cuba situation, not as an effort to give advice to the Presi-
dent, and one of the merits, it seems to me, of the resolution intro-
duced by Senator Bush and myself is that it in no way refers to the
President.
I would prefer not to see a reference to the President because
certainly we shouldn't tie his hands.
One of the things in the Mansfield resolution, which seems to me
questionable, is that it delineates just exactly the things which seem
to be objectionable, the creation or use of an externally offensive, mili-
tary base capable of endangering the U.S. Naval Base at Guantan-
amo, and the present passage of the Panama Canal, U.S. missile and
space preparations or the security of this Nation or its citizens.
Now, at the other extreme, it seems to me we shouldn't say to him
if one of these things is done you must act-in the final analysis I
believe I agree with the Senator's thesis that it is the President's
responsibility, and he must exercise it.
But I think it is highly desirable for the Congress to take some
action in this field, and I believe the American people rather expect
that.
Senator MoRsn. Senator, isn't it really a matter of semantics be-
tween your resolution and the Mansfield resolution in this matter of
directing the President in the field of foreign policy. Your resolu-
tion urges that we try to get joint action with our southern neigh-
bors, and if we don't get it you say :
Unilaterally, if necessary, to end such domination and control and to restore
the Republic of Cuba to a government of the people, for the people, and by the
people.
Is that not a clear direction by the Congress? It causes me to sup-
plement that question with a corollary question: Would you detail
for these committees what you would have the President do by way
of unilateral action, if necessary, according to the thesis of your
resolution?
Senator KEATING. To answer the first part of your question, I don't
think it is a direction to the President. It is similar to the problem
we have had so often before us before, in the foreign aid bills, for
instance, that the President would be directed to shut off aid unless
certain things were done.
Now, in general, we have not adopted that. We have, on a number
of occasions, adopted a sense of Congress resolution to the effect that
it was our feeling that if certain things were not done, aid should be
cut off or priorities should be set up or some similar language.
A sense of Congress resolution is quite different, as the Senator
knows, from a direction to the President.
WITAT RIND OP UNILATERAL ACTION IS RECOMMENDED?
To answer the second part of the Senator's question, I would answer
it much as I did the question of Senator Russell: The decision as to.
the unilateral action which should be taken is the President's decision,
and he will. be backed up in that, I am. sure, by the Congress.
I don't think-I think it might be a little presumptuous for me
to indicate what I would do as a President. I have already dis-
cussed one of the steps which I feel would be necessary if we can't
get any cooperation from any of our allies.
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I don't believe we can permit this buildup to continue in Cuba.
Senator MORSE. I might very quickly comment that. if you express
the sense and opinion of Congress that the President take unilateral
action, if necessary, to end such domination and control, you are
giving direction to the President, but you are not particularizing
in that direction what kind of unilateral action he should take. I
would like to have you outline for this committee what kind of uni-
lateral action not within the realm of force the President can take
if he doesn't have the cooperation of our Latin American allies and
our NATO allies?
Senator KEATING. I think it might be within the realm of force.
Senator MORSE. Give me something that wouldn't be in the realm
of force ?
Senator KEATING. I do not think it is appropriate in a resolution
to try to spell out what that unilateral action should be. I think
we could not go properly further than to say that we seek by -every
means possible to get our allies to cooperate but if they will not co-
operate we must take some action on our own.
Senator MORSE. I couldn't disagree with you more.
Suppose you can't get the cooperation and you say the President
should take unilateral action, and you send out to the American
people the word that we have said to the Presidency "You must act
unilaterally by what action is necessary to end such domination or con-
trol." Don't you think you have a duty to tell the American people
what is going to confront them if we follow the- recommendation that
you want the Congress to adopt?
BLOCKADE DISCUSSED
Let's take the blockade. Do you think Her Majesty's Government
would ever recognize a U.S. blockade of a British ship on the high
Seas? Do you know of any time she, has?
Senator KEATING. Well now, the Senator has a great facility for
putting two questions into one.
Senator MoRsE. Divide your answer, then.
Senator KEATING. To answer your first one first : I do not think we
should set forth the specific action in such resolution which we should
take, and I refer to the words of President Kennedy on April 20, 19611
when he said :
If the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against
outside Communist penetration then I want it clearly understood that this Gov-
ernment will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are the
security of our own Nation. -
Now, that statement is just as good today as it was then, and the
President did not then, and probably for good reason, point out just
exactly what the Government would do on its own if we did not have
cooperation from our neighbors.
. Now, the answer to the second part of the Senator's question, I think
that the Government of England, Her Majesty's Government, could
be persuaded if it reaches the point where that becomes necessary, I
believe that they could be persuaded not to permit-to cooperate with
us in the efforts on our part to prevent the establishment of a Com-
munist base in this hemisphere.
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I feel sure that we would cooperate with them to avoid Ireland, for
instance, being made a Communist base. They would expect us to,
and I think that they would cooperate with us if we could convince
them that is what is happening in Cuba.
Senator MoRsE. Are you familiar with the fact that the British
Government has historically opposed blockades and interference with
the right of Great Britain to send her ships on the;high seas?
Senator KEATING. That is right.; and Great Britain has also im-
posed blockades in a number of instances in history and successfully
done so without a war.
Senator MORSE. Do you think Canada would recognize the U.S.
blockade of Cuba?
Senator KEATING. I think it is very likely that Canada would co-
operate-would take much the same position as Britain.
Senator MORSE. Would you impose the blockade first and then ask
that they cooperate?
Senator KEATING. Well now, the Senator is, I fear, endeavoring
to put into my mouth the idea that I favor a blockade tomorrow morn-
ing.
I want it made very clear that there are a great many steps which
I think should be taken before any blockade should be imposed and I
think that we should talk about the specifics of a blockade after these
other situations have been all exhausted if we found that we haven't
succeeded in it.
Senator MORSE. Let me make my question very clear. If allied co-
operation is not forthcoming, I want to know what you propose to do
by way of unilateral action on the part of the United States to end
such domination and control of a Communist Cuba. I speak very
frankly by telling you that this resolution of yours is an interesting
exercise in semantics. It really says, when all is said and done, that
if we can't get the cooperation then we are going to use force against
Cuba. I think you ought to tell the American people whether or not
that is what your position is.
Senator KEATING. I am not opposed to force if that is in the final
analysis what has to be done to prevent a Russian Communist base
from being strengthened in the Western Hemisphere in Cuba and
other nations in the Western Hemisphere.
Senator MORSE. Why don't you offer a declaration of war against
Cuba?
Senator KEATING. Now, that is just the point. The Senator is a
very clever advocate and very successful in trying to make someone
else's views quite different from those that are actually being
expressed.
I know that those who oppose doing anything in Cuba always talk
about war as the only possibility. I think we have got to do some-
thing in Cuba and in that regard I am completely at variance with the
distinguished Senator from Oregon.
Senator MORSE. You say you would be, perfectly willing if neces-
sary, to use force. Aren't you saying that you would favor unilateral
forceful action on the part of the United States to make war against
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20 SITUATION IN CUBA
Cuba even though our allies in NATO and in Latin America might
be against us?
Senator KEATING. I don't think that we should even talk about mak-
ing war against Cuba at this point.
Senator MORSE. I think it is embedded in your resolution.
Senator KEATING. I disagree with the Senator.
Senator MORSE. I know you disagree, but that is what unilateral
action is bound to be if it is forceful action.
Senator KEATING. I know the Senator's viewpoint. He is satis-
fied to sit back and do nothing about Cuba, and I mean
Senator MORSE. Of course, the Senator couldn't be more mistaken.
I mean no disrespect in talking about putting language in people's
mouths. The Senator from Oregon just happens to think you ought
to follow international law and not turn our Nation into an outlaw
Nation. That is the difference, between us.
Do you think England has the right under international maritime
law-much as I deplore it and I agree with your deprecation of it-
to send their ships in Havana Harbor if they want to-much as I
deplore it, and I agree with your deprecation of it? Are you going
to take that international law right away from Great Britain?
Senator KEATING. They have the right at the present time.
Senator MORSE. Certainly they have. All the other countries that are
sending goods in there have that right, don't they, just as we have the
right to send goods into Turkey. We would fight to retain that right
and I would advocate that we fight to retain that right.
Senator KEATING. We have the right to send ships in there. Any
other nation has at the present time. No question about that.
Senator MORSE. Would you be willing to submit this whole ques-
tion of the action that we might advocate in regard to international
maritime law to either the World Court or some other branch of
the United Nations in order to determine our right to impose a
blockade under these circumstances?
Senator KEATING. I would be very hesitant to, as those bodies are
now set up. But I would not make a positive negative answer to the
Senator.
Senator MORSE. You speak about the Monroe Doctrine.
Do you think the Monroe Doctrine has been modified by any of the
treaties.that we have entered into with our Latin American allies
since 1823?
Senator KEATING. I don't think that the Monroe Doctrine, which
was enunciated by President Monroe and is not embedded in our law,
and is simply a doctrine and nothing more can be modified by treaties.
Perhaps the interpretation which we should put upon it when we refer
to it, would have some modification in the later discussions we had and
treaties we entered into with our Latin American neighbors.
Senator MORSE. Do you disagree that one of the reasons-not a
controlling reason, but a good diplomatic reason-for the Rio Treaty
and the Caracas Declaration was to meet objections that our Latin
American allies had to the unilateral enunciation by the United States
of a Monroe Doctrine without their consent and approval?
Senator KEATING. Well, I know that that was one of the factors
in the minds of some of the Latin American countries. I think that
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if we had envisioned what has taken place here we might have been
more hesitant in ratifying some of these treaties which we have entered
into.
Senator MoRsE. Do you agree with me that it would be very helpful
if the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States
would meet and join in a new pronouncement of a Monroe Doctrine
involving their participation in it and would use that as a basis for
taking our case to the rest of the world?
Senator KEATING. I think it would be very helpful. I would not
like to see it put in the form of a treaty right now, because I have in
mind that at this time it would have encountered-it would encounter
a good deal of difficulty in the Senate of the United States.
But I think I would welcome an enunciation by our Latin American
neighbors of the importance of the Monroe Doctrine to them as well
as to the United States and a restatement of it if it did not take out
the essential parts that are in it now.
I would not want to concede on that.
Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I assume we are under a 10-minute
rule.
Chairman RussELL. We hadn't announced it but we had hoped to
give Secretary Rusk an opportunity to testify.
Senator MORSE. I will close now. I will insert in the record at this
point, I think, one of the best pieces on the Monroe Doctrine, and that
is Sokolsky's column in this morning's Washington Post.
Chairman RUSSELL. That will follow Senator Keating's testimony,
and I also have had called to my attention some amendments to the
Mansfield resolution proposed by Senator Scott that I should have had
printed in the record along with the others. Mr. Reporter, see that it
appears in the record with the others.
We thank you very much, Senator Keating.
Senator ERViN. I would like to ask the Senator one question.
My question is this : Do you agree with me on this proposition :
If the Monroe Doctrine has any vitality, does it not constitute a limita-
tion upon the doctrine of the freedom of the seas insofar as the Western
Hemisphere is concerned?
Senator KEATiNG. I think it does.
Senator ERVIN. That is all.
Senator GOLDWATER. I just want to call attention of Senator Morse
to a statement lie made in a speech on the floor the other day which
1 think puts Senator Morse and Senator Keating in much more agree-
ment than we might have gathered from this colloguy.
Commenting on the statement by Senator Javits, Senator Morse
said,
The Senator from New York has laid stress in his discussion this afternoon on
the importance of joint action in regard to Cuba. The position of the senior
Senator from Oregon is that that should be tried first. Then if the members
of the Organization of American States are not willing to defend freedom in the
Western Hemisphere they can be sure we will not stand idly by to see American
freedom go down.
As I understood Senator Keating's testimony that is precisely the
order which lie suggested, am I wrong?
Senator KEATING. Also the NATO, I think should be in there.
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22 SITUATION IN CUBA
UNILATERAL ACTION AND SOVEREIGN RIG-UTS
Senator GOLDwATER. I am just referring to the Organization of
American States because I heard the Senator repeatedly on this. I
never have heard him advocate unilateral action as the first action.
Senator MORSE. I won't dwell on it further except to say I think the
Bush-Keating resolution is very weak in this area of unilateral action
without particularizing.
I think that is where it is going to get us in trouble. We fought
the War of 1812 on freedom of the high seas. That is the position
we took. What do you suppose we would do if Soviet Russia tried to
put a blockade around Formosa?
Suppose one ship was sunk by a Russian submarine as it was trying
to get into Formosa. What would your reaction be? I don't like the
fact that a Communist nation has sovereign power, but it has sovereign
rights and you can't take that sovereign right away by unilateral
action on the part of the United States without, in my judgment,
getting in serious difficulty with your allies and in the United Nations.
You cannot follow a unilateral course of action toward Cuba unless
there is an aggressive course of action on the part of Cuba against our
international rights. That is the flag of warning I want to raise.
Senator GOLDWATER. The testimony and evidence bears out that
Senator Keating and Senator Bush have recommended that the Or-
ganization of American States be consulted and that unilateral action
be the last action.
Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry, I didn't understand the evidence of
the Senator.
'Senator GOLDWATER. The testimony and evidence that Senator
Keating has established regardless of how the resolution might read
is that the Organization of American States would be consulted first
on multilateral agreement and failing that unilateral agreement under
the act would be considered.
Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.
Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, as one who cannot be here this
afternoon because of some hearings set by the Preparedness Commit-
tee which are deemed important, I would like to express the very
strong hope, valuable as this colloquy is and it is very valuable, that
as soon as we can hear Senator Prouty, we could hear the Secretary,
at least in part.
This is going to be a rushed up affair anyway. Monday is nearly
gone, Thursday morning will be here and we have to put something
in writing.
Senator MORSE. I would like to suggest a procedural point. I sug-
gest that we hear Senator Prouty with the understanding we will
postpone to some other time any questions we wish to ask him. We
hear him and let him. make his statement and then hear Secretary Rusk.
Chairman RUSSELL. That would require unanimous consent.
Senator MORSE. I am just suggesting it informally.
Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.
Thank you, Senator Keating.
(The newspaper clippings referred to follow:)
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SITUATION IN CUBA 23
[New York Times, Sept. 14, 1962]
CUBA AND SovnET ARMS
(By Hanson W. Baldwin)
The Soviet warning Tuesday that a U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships
bound for Cuba would mean war may have political and military as well as
propaganda effects.
The statement may be calculated to appeal to Latin American and neutral
sentiment. But it also employs the familiar maneuver of the threat of force to
encourage the cautious or worried element in American public opinion and
Government and to restrict U.S. policy. The power objective seems plain: it is
the same one the Communists have followed since Dr. Fidel Castro took power
in Cuba-to discourage or postpone any strong American action while Premier
Castro strengthens his military and political position.
The U.S. economic embargo of Cuba has been ineffective in weakening Com-
munist military and political control there. Since the invasion attempt in April
1961, Premier Castro's military strength and political control have been greatly
strengthened by virtue of major Communist help.
At the time of the invasion Premier Castro had only nine operational military
aircraft, all propeller driven except three jet T-33 trainers. There were nu-
merous Czechoslovak and Soviet small arms, about 50 Russian tanks and self-
propelled guns, and some light field artillery and obsolescent antiaircraft guns.
About 200,000 men and women had been armed and roughly formed into a
people's militia, but most of these were undisciplined, virtually untrained armed
hordes. There was virtually no navy except for a few small and obsolete coastal
and patrol craft.
The core of the armed forces was grouped around 15,000 to 20,000 regular
army and militia units, which were adjudged more dependable than the masses
and were rather well trained.
The heavy supply of Communist equipment and advisers in the last 18 months,
particularly in the last summer, has changed this picture materially.
Today, Premier Castro probably has 60 to 75 Soviet jet fighters and fighter-
bombers, mostly Mig-17's and Mig-19's, with the pilots to fly them and the crews
to maintain them. In an unconfirmed report, a Cuban Air Force pilot who
defected to the United States last week said that the Soviet Union had delivered
200 Mig's to Cuba.
The strength of the militia, which fluctuates, is still estimated to total about
200,000 men, but it is far better trained and equipped. More important, the
strength of the regular units, the "hard core," has increased to at least 50,000;
some estimates are twice this figure.
Heavy and light equipment of all types has been supplied by the Communists.
An unknown number of light and medium tanks-possibly now totaling several
hundred-field artillery of light and medium calibers, some coastal defense guns,
antitank weapons, radio, radar and communications equipment, truck-mounted
rocket launchers, trucks, jeeps, and transportation and, most important, anti-
aircraft missiles, have greatly strengthened the combat capability of the Castro
forces.
The weak navy has been supplied with an unknown number of motor torpedo
boats, motor gunboats and patrol craft, some of them equipped, according to
President Kennedy, with surface-to-surface missile with a 15-mile range.
This mass of new equipment undoubtedly has not yet been assimilated ; the
Cubans have not learned how to use it effectively. But they are learning and
to aid them Premier Khrushchev has supplied an estimated 3,500 to 4,000 Com-
munist military personnel, in the form of administrative cadres, maintenance
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personnel, signal and communications groups, training cadres, groups,
advisers, technicians, and probably ?a few small combat crews or. cadres
for antiaircraft missiles andother new weapons.
There has been considerable debate in the Congress and the country about
whether such arms are "defensive," as the President said, or "offensive" in
character. The debate, militarily, has only limited meaning. There is no evi-
dence that the Cubans have yet emplaced missiles of a range to reach the United
States.
There is also no evidence that they have an amphibious capability or the
transport or naval shipping to export their military power to Latin America.
But nearly any weapon, as many debates at world disarmament conferences
have stressed, can be used offensively as well as defensively. And Cuba has
long had and has now greatly strengthened, her capability of exporting sub-
version, of sending small groups of well-armed men to neighboring islands or
countries to act as guerrilla cadres, to stimulate revolution, to start what Mr.
Khrushchev has called "wars of national liberation." And Premier Castro's
aircraft have ample range to reach Florida and neighboring Caribbean islands.
Of equal importance, the new weapons will, in time when the Cubans
have learned how to use them, tend to neutralize, or at least reduce the military
importance, of the U.S. Navy Base at Guantanamo and they will make a close
air and sea patrol of the Cuban coast more hazardous.
There is one 8,000-foot jet strip at Leeward Point at the Guantanamo Base.
Planes taking off from this strip fly over Cuban hills outside the base or skim
along the coast almost as soon as their wheels are up.
Antiaircraft missiles, even if they were only comparable to the obsolescent
Nike-Ajax 25-mile-range missile, could play havoc with aircraft operating from
this strip. Similarly, medium-range artillery emplaced in the hills around the
base could command the base itself and, more important, the naval anchorage
in the bay.
Also, the missile-equipped light craft, mounting antiship missile of 15-mile
range, and guns and antiaircraft missiles at key points along the Cuban coast
might, in time, make a tight U.S. blockade, or even a close-in patrol, expensive
or difficult.
The time has not yet arrived, and unless the Cubans are heavily reinforced
by skilled Soviet cadres, it will be some time before they achieve this capability.
But they are achieving it ; there is no doubt that Cuba is becoming much strong-
er militarily and that Communist political grip over Cuba, and. probably over
Premier Castro, has been greatly tightened.
This, in turn, means that flexibility of action and the choice of alternative
policies in dealing with Cuba are being progressively limited for the United
States.
[The Washington Post, Sept. 17, 10 21
THESE DAYS : THE MONROE DOCTRINE
(By George E. Sokolsky)
The Monroe Doctrine was neither a treaty nor an act of Congress. It was a
paragraph in an annual address, served unilaterally by President Monroe in
1823 and accepted by all nations. We were a young and weak nation in 1823
and afraid of no country.
The Monroe Doctrine arose i-i this manner: the Russians, on September 4,
1821, issued an imperial ukase extending the boundaries of the Russian claims
along the Pacific coast to the 51st parallel, which included part of the Oregon
Territory. Surrounding waters were closed to other countries. John Quincy
Adams, Secretary of State, rejected the Russian claims, saying: "* * * that we
should contest the right of Russia to any t^rritorial establishment on this con-
tinent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American
Continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."
This became the central point of the Monroe Doctrine. The Russians backed
down.
The Monroe Doctrine had no standing in international law until the Act of
Havana (1940), but it was as binding as the Ten Commandments. It had no
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sanction, to repeat, of treaty or act of Congress or acceptance by an interna-
tional congress, but no country questioned its authority.
On July 30, 1940, the Act of Havana was unanimously approved by the dele-
gates of 21 Republics of the Pan American Union. It provided that the American
Republics, collectively or individually, might take over and administer any Euro-
pean possession in the New World endangered by aggression from outside. Out
of this act grew the Organization of American States, which, in effect, took
over the functions of the Monroe Doctrine. Actually, the Act of Havana was the
first formal adoption of its principles by the Latin American countries although
they had all abided by the doctrine since 1823.
Chairman RussELL. Senator Prouty, we would be glad to hear your
views on this.
STATEMENT OF HON. WINSTON L. PROUTY, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator PI{OUTY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before the joint committee on a question which is vital to the
security of the United States.
I have no prepared statement, and I shall try to be as brief as
possible in order that Secretary Rusk may be heard.
However, may I make it clear at the outset of my remarks that I
appear not as a war hawk or warmonger but as one who sincerely
believes this country must take a different course if it is to survive
and prevail.
There are some of us in the Senate who genuinely feel that the
Reserve callup resolution falls far short of the expression of firm
will by Congress that is needed at this time. For acting in support
of our beliefs, we have been labeled by some newspaper reporters in
Washington as "warmongers."
These men, whose profession is founded on the bedrock of free
speech and differences of opinion, are not willing to extend to others
that same sincerity of motive they attribute to themselves.
This highly vocal segment of the press insisted that the resolutions
we were proposing to add to the Reserve callup resolution were in-
spired completely by political reasons.
In addition, ,,t Senator of the ITnited States, speaking on the Senate
floor, said much the same thing in language which was insulting, and
to say the least, inaccurate. Ile questioned the motives of all of us
who proposed amendments to the callup resolution.
Now I have been in politics long enough so that I think I am rela-
tively insensitive to political barbs whicri may be hurled against me,
but when my patriotism is impugned-when I am charged with play-
ing politics with the destiny or the security of my country, I find there
is kindled within me a deep fire of resentment which shall burn for a
long, long time.
Now having said that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to proceed di-
rectly to the purpose behind my appearance here today.
I have placed before the Senate a resolution -which represents the
view I think we should take toward the world crisis. It may be a
view shared by no other Senator. If this is true, so be it. I think
that the times are so critical that each Senator ought to speak Lip
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26 SITUATION IN CUBA
about what he thinks is best for America. Tragic to say, the old test
"What is good for the country" has become "What will the world
ever think of us." To be loved by other nations is fine, but to be
respected is more essential..
The heart and soul of my resolution, its foundation, its very vitals-
is the notion that we must take great risks now or face even greater
ones later on and that the greatest risk of all is to take no action at all.
I turn now to my resolution, to its purposes and its resolves.
First it is stated that the purpose of the United States in its relations
with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring
peace for all.
Second, it is declared that the governments of some nations; and
some areas not recognized as nations by the United States, are in
fact dominated and controlled by other governments that are mem-
bers of the international Communist movement.
Third, the resolution declares that an act of aggression committed
by the government of any such dominated and controlled nation might
gravely endanger the peace and security of the United States and the
free world.
It is further declared that such an act of aggression should be
recognized by the United States as the act of the dominating and
controlling government and that in order to effectively protect the
United States and its vital interests throughout the world, swift and
decisive use of the Armed Forces of United States by the Presi-
dent may be necessary.
I doubt that any Senator present will seriously challenge the pur-
poses in this resolution.
I turn now to the resolving portion of the resolution.
It is there stated that it is the resolve of Congress to protect
the vital interests of the United States in any area of the world
against acts of aggression committed by an unfriendly nation or by
the government of any nation dominated and controlled by the inter-
national Communist movement.
It is further resolved that the President shall have authority to
employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary
and shall have such other authority as he may require to protect
the peace and security of the free world and the vital interests of
the United States.
In short, Mr. Chairman, my resolution would authorize the Presi-
dent to use the Armed Forces of the free world whenever and wherever
he deems such action necessary in order to protect our security.
Senator GOLDWATER. The Armed Forces of the United States. Did
you say of the world ?
Senator PROUTY. Of the United States is what I intended to say.
My resolution takes no completely novel approach. It is founded
on at least two specific precedents, the Formosa resolution and the
Middle East resolution.
The first authorized the President to -employ the Armed Forces
of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose
of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed
attack. It further authorized him to take such measures as he judged
to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa
and the Pescadores.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 27
The Middle East resolution gave the President authority to use
Armed Forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting
assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by
international communism.
With respect to my own resolution, I was told by one Senator
that it did not go far enough because it did not specify a particular
area which shall be defended and a particular place where troops
might be utilized.
Another Senator stated that he thought my resolution went too far
because it authorizes the President to declare war whenever he deems
it necessary and in any part of the world.
There may well be some validity to both of these criticisms. Yet,
Mr. Chairman, I presented my approach because I sincerely felt that
the Reserve callup resolution was so meaningless and ineffective in a
military sense as to be virtually useless.
Furthermore, I could see very little psychological value in such a
resolution, because prior to its adoption the President already had
statutory authority to call up 1 million reserves.
Senator STENNIS. May I ask a question, which resolution did you
say ?
Senator PROUTY. I am referring to the Reserve callup resolution.
Senator STENNIS. Yes.
THREAT POSED BY SOVIET BELIEF THAT UNITED STATES WILL NOT FIGHT
Senator PROUTY. Mr. Chairman, I think the greatest threat to peace
today is a belief on the part of Russian leaders that the United States.
and perhaps the free world will not fight or resist in the event of a real
showdown.
Indeed, Joseph Alsop reports that Premier Khrushchev told Secre-
tary Udall that the United States would never fight. There has been
no confirmation or denial of this remark from Secretary Udall, and
I think we can assume that the quote is an accurate one. Certainly it
is in line with other statements made by the Russian leader.
I believe that this Kremlin appraisal of the weakness of our resolve
represents a danger far more grave than Cuba or the crisis in East
Berlin and East Germany, and I think we have to recognize that fact.
Certainly an article in this morning's Washington Post will
strengthen the Soviet leader's belief about our reluctance to take action
despite anything they might do.
I refer to a statement by 'Chester Bowles, President Kennedy's
Special Adviser on Latin, Asian, and African Affairs. Bowles was
reported yesterday to have said that a military or economic blockade
of Cuba could be the first step to a nuclear holocaust. At the mini-
mum, he said, it would result in a diplomatic debacle for the United
States, including condemnation as an aggressor by the United Nations.
For my own part, I am 'tired of our fawning and truckling to win
the love of nations whose policies would lead us into the, valley of our
own undoing. If we permit fear to warp our judgment or to blind us
to existing realities, then indeed we shall write the epitaph of liberty,
freedom, and the United States.
Now, certainly, Congress ought to make it clear that Mr. Bowles
was not stating a fact-a fact that will dominate U.S. policy. He was
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28 SITUATION IN CUBA
expressing an opinion which is not shared by those who believe that
we must take a position strong enough and firm enough to make the
Soviets realize that we mean business.
In contrast with the views of Chester Bowles, the same Washington
Post article quotes the Peruvian Ambassador as saying he presumes
a majority of Latin and South American nations would support the
United States if the latter concluded the security of the Western Hemi-
sphere required a Cuban blockade.
In addition to any remarks he may have made to Secretary Udall,
Mr. Khrushchev told Robert Frost that the United States is "too liberal
to fight." He suggested that we would simply sit "on one hand and
then the other."
Are we too liberal to fight? Are we so soft and concerned with
creature comforts that we will not even tolerate the thought of war?
I do not believe this to be the case.
Only a day or two after I had drafted my resolution and after it
had been proposed to the Congress, I read a column by Joseph Alsop
which expresses my convictions far better than I could do so myself.
I think it is generally conceded that Mr. Alsop has a reputation of be-
ing an objective reporter with sources of material more accurate than
those of some of his contemporaries.
According to his article, Mr. Khrushchev remarked to Secretary
Udall that the Europeans will be powerless to act without the United
States and that the United States will do nothing about it in the end.
As Mr. Alsop suggests, this is no laughing matter. He goes on to
say, and I quote :
The American policymakers believe that Vienna and post-Vienna increases in the
U.S. defense effort convinced Khrushchev that missteps at Berlin would lead to
a big war.
The Europeans, or at any rate, a good many of them, now believe the opposite.
Then he continues :
A Berlin test with East Berlin forces in the forefront, which is the kind seemingly
being prepared, will be a limited test at least in the first stage. These facts
suggest Khrushchev is merely uncertain that Mr. Kennedy really means to defend
Berlin, uncertain enough to gamble on the President's doing nothing but talk,
but also uncertain enough in the other direction to wish to keep some control
of events.
The question of how to remove Khrushchev's uncertainty is, therefore, urgent.
Reasonable behavior, keeping talking, endlessly professed willingness to negotiate
when there is nothing to negotiate, all these methods have been exhaustively tried
out.
And the last part of this article, I think, is most significant-
Maybe the time has come to get angry. For example, the recent outrageous
statement about Cuba and Berlin was technically unofficial. But perhaps the
time has come to think about throwing this kind of thing back in Khrushchev's
face, if it is ever said officially, in a way that can be thrown back as unaccept-
able and nonreceived.
My resolution does not specify the action that should be taken by
the President in any part of the world. It mentions no nation, nor
does it suggest or tell the President that he should send American
troops into Cuba or anywhere else in the world. It simply authorizes
him to use the Armed Forces and to take such other action as may be
necessary to protect the peace and security of the United States and
the free world.
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RESOLUTION PATTERNED ON FORMOSA AND MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTIONS
I have stated previously that the resolution was deliberately pat-
terned after the Formosa and Middle East resolutions which also
authorized the use of our Armed Forces for the protection of a vital
interest.
The President conducts our foreign policy and commands our
Defense Establishment and it is he who should decide the specifics
with regard to any action we take in a given area of the world. But
the hands of Congress are not tied, and I think we have to raise the
question as to how long we can allow a buildup of military strength
in Cuba without taking some action.
My resolution would take away nothing from the Chief Executive.
Rather it is designed to strengthen his hand-designed to give him
the authority he needs in dealing with the moves and maneuvers of the
Soviet Union. But after all, it is the No. 1 adversary with which
we are confronted at the present time.
I have a memorandum here with respect to the Latin American
treaties into which we have entered during the past several years.
On the basis of this memorandum, I have concluded that perhaps the
United States cannot take unilateral action in the Western Hemi-
sphere without violating some of these treaties.
Although I am not a lawyer or authority in the field of international
relations, I do believe that the time has come for us to find out what
the Monroe Doctrine means in terms of today's world and what flexi-
bility it affords the President for action.
Senator MORSE. I would certainly agree with you we can if our
own security is threatened.
Senator PROUTY. If we are attacked as I understand it.
Senator MORSE. The violation of our own security rights.
Senator PROUTY. There seems to be a complete difference of opin-
ion on that among some of the experts.
I don't profess to be one and -I will not take the time to put the
memorandum in the record now but I will make use of it later on.
I do earnestly hope, Mr. Chairman, that the joint committee will
bring forth a resolution which will be strong and meaningful. It
is highly desirable that it be of such a nature as will command sup-
port from all Members of Congress. I think the reported resolution
should bring sharply to focus the fact that the President of the
United States, the Congress of the United States, and the American
people are as dedicated to the preservation of American ideals and
objectives as the international Communists are to their destruction
and that any overt act of major significance by the Soviet Union or
any of its puppets will birng into action the armed might of the
United States and its entire productive resources.
We must so mark our course that Mr. Khrushchev knows and the
world knows that there will not be just strong words-but strong
words followed by strong decisions.
Like any other bully who utilizes threats and bluster, Mr. Khru-
shchev may well retreat if his bluff is called.
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It has been said, and rightly so, that we cannot conduct our foreign
policy on the principle of Sir Gallahad :
My strength is as the strength of 10, because my heart is pure.
The willingness to use power, if need be, will count for far more
in this world than virtuous intentions.
In closing, may I say that I would not endeavor to tell the President
of the United States what specific action he should take in any part of
the world. But I do believe it is time that we served notice on the
Soviet Union that while we do not seek conflict, we will not cower and
slink away at the very mention of it, and that, if necessary, we will
use our Armed Forces to protect our national security and that of the
freedom-loving nations around the world.
Acting Chairman SPARK MAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator MORSE. I want to say to my good friend from Vermont I
am sorry he resents my speech on the floor of the Senate so deeply.
I stand on that speech. I am sure there was no shoe there that would
fit his toes. If there isn't, then his toes shouldn't feel pinched.
Acting Chairman SrAL._IVrAN. Under the unanimous consent agree-
ment, we were going to suspend questioning of Senator Prouty until
we have a chance to hear from the Secretary.
Senator Prouty, we invite you to stay with us.
Senator SanNNis. You made a very fine statement.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Secretary Rusk, go ahead.
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, please be seated.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF
STATE: ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, OFFICE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
AND ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Rusii. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. I assume you are familiar with the various reso-
lutions pending here and the questions that they raise. We will be
pleased to have you make such statement as you think would help the
committee or the two committees in arriving at a decision on these
resolutions.
Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sparkman,
and members of the committees.
Secretary McNamara is involved this morning with the Italian De-
fense Minister on some important negotiations that will help out'our
gold flow. Here ratted very, much he could not be here.
The Assistant Secretary, Mr. Bundy, is here, if it is not possible to
arrange for Secretary McNamara to be here.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have a formal opening statement. I should
like, however, if it is agreeable to the committees, to make some in-
formal comments on the matters before the Senate, before the Con-
gress, and to advert to certain points that have come up during the
course of this morning's discussion.
The executive branch does believe it would be valuable at the present
time if the Congress should see fit to pass a concurrent resolution which
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would reaffirm certain underlying policies of the United States as
they are brought to bear upon this present and a potential situation
in Cuba.
I would make the observation, sir, that such a resolution would be
helpful in direct relationship, direct proportion to the extent that it
can be relatively simple and that it could reflect a very agreement in
the Congress, rather than a resolution which might fail to get,. the:
overwhelming support of the Congress.
But if such a resolution could underline the elementary national
security interests of the United States as a nation, if it could also reaf-
firm, in strong terms, the commitments of the United States and other
members of this hemisphere to the special security arrangements
which exist in this hemisphere, and to take note of the fact or to ex-
press the sense of the Congress that threats to this hemisphere must
be met on both grounds, then 'I think that certain signals would go
out from the Congress which would be important.
SIGNAL TO MOSCOW IN RESOLUTION
I have first in mind, for example, the signals that this would give
to Moscow.
In the statement which the President made on September 4, there
was a paragraph there which was stated in terms of no evidence, but
a paragraph which was intended as a signal to Moscow.
Referring to organized combat forces in Cuba from any Soviet bloc
country, of military bases provided to Russia, of the violation of the
1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo, of the presence of offensive
ground-to-ground missiles or of other significant offensive capabilities
either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance.
Now, it is of some interest, although nothing on which we can place
any reliance, that in the Tass statement which came out on, the. 11th of
September, as one looks at the wording of that statement, which was
harsh, and in some respects belligerent, it went to some pains to indi-
cate that those particular elements were not involved in this Cuban
picture. That doesn't mean that they can't be, won't be. But it does
mean that the Soviets were sensitive to the fact that these were points
that were picked out as constituting a serious threat to the United
States of the sort that would raise, as the President stated it, the
gravest issues.
The insistence in the Tass statement that most of the help that had
been going to Cuba had been economic, the reference to the fact that
bases were not needed because they have missiles in the Soviet Union
that would reach the United States in any event, and the disclosure,
for the first time, to the Soviet people that arms assistance was, in
fact, going from the Soviet Union to Cuba, were interesting elements.
Indeed, there is some indication that this disclosure to. the Russian
people of arms shipped to Cuba caused considerable concern among
the Russian people themselves.
In any event it would be very important for us as a nation to get
the right signals to Moscow and Havana, about anything that would
appear to be a serious and clear and present danger in this hemisphere
to the security of this Nation or of this hemisphere.
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SIGNAL TO OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
I think a second signal that is important to confirm is to those other
countries, Particularly in the Caribbean area, who may feel that the
Cuban military buildup is in some sense a direct military threat to
them.
Again, in the President's statement of September 4, he had those
people in mind when lie tried to make it clear that these arms that
were going to Cuba were going to stay there, and we would take
whatever action is necessary to insure that they did stay there.
REAFFIRMING THE COMMITMENT TO TIIE SECURITY OF HEMISPHERE
It, is, I think, also possible in such a resolution to reaffirm soberly
our sense of the inter-American commitment to the security of the
hemisphere. [Deleted.]
We expect about October 2, about 2 weeks' time, to have an informal
meeting of the foreign ministers of the hemisphere. We do expect
to discuss there what further steps can be taken in the hemisphere with
respect to the Cuban question.
[Deleted.] On the assumption, Mr. Chairman, this is an execu-
tive session and I could be consulted if there were any intent to make
the record public.
Chairman RUSSELL. We intend to have this record sanitized and
printed. We would hope the State Department would be very frank
with us but we intend to authorize you and the Department of Defense
to go through it to eliminate any matter that might be detrimental.
Secretary RUSK. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. [Deleted.]
PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS TO DATE AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF
I think that as far as authorization or direction to the President is
concerned and the wording of that part of the resolution, whether the
sense of the Congress or an authorization, let me say, sir, that the
President, as Commander in Chief, does have very far-reaching
powers, and that there are certain actions which he would take under
existing public commitments, I am sure, which the. Congress would
approve of.
For example, on August 31 at a time when two small naval vessels
fired on U.S. Navy aircraft, it was declared publicly that in any such
incident in the future where U.S. aircraft and naval vessels are, fired
upon in international waters while in the peaceful performance of
their duties, the U.S. Armed Forces will employ all means necessary
for their own protection and will insure their free use of such waters.
We are conducting a close surveillance of the Caribbean area, and
we intend to enforce the right to conduct such surveillance, and this
itself could lead to certain incidents which would involve the use of the
Armed Forces of the United States.
Secondly, on general grounds, 'as well as specifically under the Sep-
tember 4 statement, it has been made clear that if the Cubans or the
Soviets in Cuba attempted to move arms illicitly into other Latin
American countries, or if any elements of armed forces embarked
from Cuba for any neighboring countries, that the Armed Forces of
the United States would be used to intercept such traffic.
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Of course, if there is an attack upon Guantanamo, the President
would move immediately with the forces necessary to repel that
attack and to take the necessary action.
But I want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, we do not consider that
the passage of a resolution at this particular time by the Congress in
any sense breaks the discourse or terminates the discourse between the
Executive and the Congress on this important situation.
I would think, for example, if a situation arose in which it were
necessary to make a major use of the U.S. Armed Forces against Cuba,
the consequences, certainly as far as Cuba is concerned and this coun-
try and the potential consequences in other places in the world, would
be so large and so significant that the President would be in close con-
sultation with the leadership of the Congress in connection with any
such move.
So that this resolution, a resolution at this time does not terminate
the Cuban question so far as the Congress is concerned.
It's something which both the Congress and the Executive would be
involved in over the weeks and months ahead.
QUESTION OF UNILATERAL ACTION
Now, on the question of how we proceed with various measures and
the question of taking action unilaterally,. by the United States, no
nation, certainly no great nation, can ever abandon its elementary
right of unilateral action if that becomes necessary for its own
security.
That is something which has been recognized in the U.N. Charter, it
is something which is implicit in the sovereignty of the Nation itself,
and it is a most central and elementary obligation of government in
any nation.
But I do believe, sir, that as a matter of procedure, we can say
something more than that about this business.
We do have strong commitments to try to proceed on a multilateral
basis where the security of the hemisphere is involved if we possibly
can.
I think we know from the attitude of many of the American States
that if circumstances arose which would make it necessary for us to
act directly against Cuba, that those circumstances themselves would
impel a great many of the Latin American States to support us in that
action. [Deleted.]
Similarly, with respect to our obligations in other parts of the
world. In a certain sense it is not possible any longer for the United
States to act strictly in unilateral terms. We have 42 allies, we are
engaged nose to nose with the Soviet Union right around the globe.
It is almost inconceivable that that engagement could become hot at
one point and not become hot at others, and at each of these points
we are necessarily involved with our allies.
Therefore, if we think that we can act unilaterally we have to recog-
nize that although we may take the action on our own decision, we
necessarily involve a good many others in the action, and I do not
believe, Mr. Chairman, that the circumstances which would justify to
the leadership of the Congress and to the President and to the Ameri-
can people, a direct military action against Cuba would be such as to
find us alone either in this hemisphere or in other parts of .the world.
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So, I think the question of unilateral action is, if I may say so,
somewhat more theoretical than practical, because we will have, I
am quite certain, others prepared to be with us when the circumstances
are clear that we have to move in our own defense and the defense of
this hemisphere.
I have not commented specifically on the texts of these various
resolutions. I would hope, however, that it would be possible for the
two Houses to find common language, which would commend itself to
the great majority of the Congress, and that action on these matters
could be taken reasonably promptly. I could go into other questions,.
Mr. Chairman, but I think I might pause here and take up the ques-
tions and comments which you and the committees may wish.
PRESENT STANDING OF MONROE DOCTRINE
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, is it the policy of the United
States now to consider the Monroe Doctrine discarded in favor of
the Organizations of American States, NATO, and the other multi-
lateral agreements that we have entered into all over the world?
Secretary RUSK. No.
Chairman RUSSELL, Is it discarded or strictly circumscribed?
Secretary Rush. Mr. Chairman, I think the proper answer to that
question would be that the Monroe Doctrine was once an important
instance of the assertion of the national security interests of the United
States. That national security interest still obtains, and the Monroe
Doctrine still is a part of our approach to our national security
interests here in this country and in this hemisphere.
But, in terms of carrying it out, I would say that we ought to
make the most strenuous effort to carry it out with the association
of those who have joined with us for the security of the hemisphere,
and I would put very high priority on solidarity of the hemisphere,
if possible, without ultimately surrendering in any way the elementary
character of our own national interest if it comes to that point.
So, I would say it has not been abandoned. The method of carry-
ing it out has been altered, perhaps both by circumstances and by
agreement, but it is still an elementary part of our own national
security interests.
Chairman RUSSELL, You think it is as fundamental then as the law
of self-defense is to the common. law ?
Secretary RUSK. Yes, Sir, I do.
Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might add that even the terms of the
Monroe Doctrine were not in any realistic sense a unilateral venture
in policy.
Had it not been for the quiet assurance that. the British Fleet was in
direct support of that policy, that policy might not have survived
as long as it did.
Chairman RUSSELL. That is true, but later on it was in a way
invoked against England itself.
Secretary Rusii. That is right.
Chairman RUSSELL. So while it was generated by some difficulties
we had with Russia we did refer to it and invoke it and threaten war
on England in support of the Monroe Doctrine and the British recog-
nized that. I have forgotten just when and where it was
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35
Senator ERVIN. Venezuela.
Secretary RusK. That is right; the Venezuelan boundary dispute.
Chairman RUSSELL. Cleveland was President.
NATURE AND EFFECT Or BLOCKADES
Is a military blockade still recognized as an act of war under inter-
national law?
Secretary RUSK. The Legal Adviser of the Department is here, and
you might wish to have a little more detail from -him than I am
perhaps able to give, but I would say this about blockades : that war
normally involves the application of a blockade, so we can say that
to start with.
Secondly, blockade is an act of force which, if not accepted by the
other side, would be interpreted and approached as an act of war.
Now, it is possible to declare what has been called a pacific blockade.
All that a pacific blockade is is an announcement by the blockading
party that these steps you are taking are all that. you have in mind.
If the other sides refuses to accept that measure; it is an act of force
which would be interpreted or could be interpreted as an act of war.
So that I would think, as far as the United States is concerned in
regard to Cuba, and given the involvement of the powers in that
situation, that if we decided to institute a blockade we would have to
accept the fact that we were using an act of force against the shipping
of other great powers.
Chairman RUSSELL. I am out of my field in discussing the niceties
of international law because I am not on the committees that deal
with it. I have read a great deal of history, however, and I re-
member that many people who were writing in the period criticized
Mr. Lincoln for using the word "blockade" against the Southern
States because that implied a recognition that they enjoyed a belliger-
ant status and it was one of the high hopes of the Confederacy to get
recognition from the British, which never did come, very fortunately.
I have been greatly concerned about one thing that runs through
all of these resolutions and is implicit in them' I am well aware
that the President of the United States has on more than 100 occa-
sions utilized our Armed Forces on foreign soil without the approval
of Congress.
I think you were in the State Department when that documentation
was prepared. It is very interesting; I haven't seen it for years.
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.
Chairman RUSSELL. But I don't like the implications of one line of
Senate Concurrent Resolution 92 on page 2, line 3, where is says :
The President of the United States is supported in his determination and
possesses. all necessary authority to prevent by whatever means may be neces-
sary, including the use of arms.
That is a clear delegation of the congressional power to declare
war
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, I can't follow you,
is this Senate Concurrent Resolution 92?
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Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes; it is in there. It is in both.
Chairman RUSSELL. Look at the resolving clause itself in both of
them.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Chairman RussEELL. Page 2, line 3. Now, that implies that, the
President possesses the authority to declare war and I don't think
we ough to resolve that question here in this resolution or raise that
constitutional question.
Why wouldn't it be preferable to use the same language we did in
the Formosa resolution that the President of the United States be
and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the
United States that he deem necessary, and so forth. To effectuate
these purposes. Congress has gradually been lapsing into a secondary
position but couldn't we accomplish the same purpose by authorizing
the President to do these things instead of just stating that he has
the authority to declare war, to engage in war?
Secretary RusK. Mr. Chairman
Chairman RUSSELL. Wouldn't that support him more strongly for
us to say that he is hereby authorized ?
Secretary RUSK. It seems to me that quite apart from the language,
the President and the congressional leadership would certainly, in
the absence of an overwhelming attack by the other side, be in con-
sultation about the necessary actions to be taken.
I would have to check the record on this, but my recollection is,
Mr. Chairman, that at the time of the Korean attack, the President
did consult with congressional leaders and it was the view of the
congressional leaders that the Congress should not be asked for a
resolution on authorization, and in that situation, the powers of the
President were fully relied upon to undertake the resistance in. Korea.
I would suppose that
Chairman RUSSELL. That was done through the use of the United
Nations, though, was it not-which we don't have in this case?
In Korea we depended on discharging our treaty obligations under
the United Nations with respect to Korea which put it in a somewhat
different position.
Secretary Rusii. Yes, sir. I would need to consult with my own
colleagues very carefully and with the President about trying today
to rule as far as I can see on the President's powers.
Now, under the R-io treaty, for example, you have a similar si.tua-
tion to that of the United Nations Charter, and I would hope that
before the bill is marked up that there is a clear desire on the part
of the committees to include language of that sort that I have an
opportunity to discuss the constitutional question with the President.
Chairman RUSSELL. If you will pardon an aside, we would have
been saved a great deal of trouble if congressional approval had been
requested the morning after we put that pathetic battalion in Korea
because it would have been granted unanimously and we wouldn't
have had a political issue that has been going around ever since then.
I feel very strongly it is preferable to say he is authorized instead
of that he possesses all the necessary authority.
I don't think it could have the slightest effect on any action he
could take.
Acting Chairman SrARKMAN. May I interrupt at this point?
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, indeed.
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Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. We might ponder this suggestion
which has been handed to me.
Change the resolve part to read as follows:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United
States should use all appropriate means, (a) to prevent the Castro regime-
and so forth.
In other words, cut out this language right here.
Senator JACKSON. Why confine it to Castro ?
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. That just happens to be the wording
in this resolution. To get around the point that you are making, in
line 2 of the resolving clause, strike out "be supported in his determina-
tion and possesses all necessary authority," and instead say, "should
use all appropriate means," to do these different things.
Chairman RUSSELL. That is a matter of semantics.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. It is something for us to think of.
Chairman RUSSELL. Appropriate means or he is hereby authorized.
I like the authorization better because it is more definite and direct,
and it reflects a. feeling of the Congress, a determination of the Con-
gress not to let this cancer consume nations of the Western
Hemisphere.
I yield to the Senator from Washington.
Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me there are two parts
to this problem.
One is, of course, the President can send all kinds of signals by his
statements and declarations. I think what we seek here is a signal
from the Congress that it is unequivocal, clear, firm, and determined;
is it not?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct.
Senator JACKSON. Where we get lost is where we get into semantics
and so on, and I think Chairman Russell's suggestion is a sound one
here, where we authorize the use of the Armed Forces which is as
clear a. signal, at least it was clear in the Formosa Straits when it
happened and they got the signal and got the message and I think
that is our mission and nothing else.
Chairman RUSSELL. It removes any debate over the constitution-
ality caused by the statement he possesses the necessary authority.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate my-
self with your thoughts on that matter.
Senator TIIURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate my
thinking with yours on this point, too.
Senator HlcxiNLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I want to raise these ques-
tions now.
PLATT AMENDMENT AND THE MONROiR DOCTRINE
I don't like the declarations in the Mansfield amendment. I don't
think they necessarily go to the points at issue. I would like to ask
the Secretary what the situation is with regard to the Platt amend-
ment on Cuba that was adopted a good many years ago and abrogated
in 1934?
It runs in my mind that the Platt amendment said that we reserved
the right to go into Cuba at any time that either our interests or the
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independence of the Cuban Government was endangered. I ask, are
you prepared to discuss that at the moment.
Secretary Rusic. I could not discuss it in detail, but the essence of
the problem as you suggested, Senator, would authorize the United
States or rather the United States retains the right
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. Retained the right.
Secretary Push. To intervene in Cuba to insure, in effect, a republi-
can form of government.
Senator HICIiENLOOpER. That is right.
Secretary RUSK. And in 1934, as a consequence of the discussions
in connection with the good neighbor policy, that was eliminated,
but the Guantanamo base aspects of the earlier treaty with Cuba were
retained.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. I hadn't concluded, Senator.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry.
Go right ahead.
Chairman RUSSELL, I hadn't concluded.
I had feared that the Monroe Doctrine was a casualty along with the
Platt amendment, of the good neighbor policy and OAS and that is
the reason I asked the Secretary that specific question.
DIPLOMATIC PRESENTATIONS TO NATO AND OAS MEMBERS
Mr. Secretary, I think that the members of this committee would like
to know just what steps are being taken to mobilize public opinion
among the NATO countries, they were brought in here today, and
among the Organization of American States.
I raised a question the other day about American-owned ships under
the Liberian flag engaged in commerce with Cuba. I have a copy of
the Liberian regulations here and they already have a regulation that
reads as follows :
In accordance with the national interests of Liberia it shall be unlawful with-
out the approval in writing of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs of Liberia,
or any one of his authorized agents, to sell, charter, lease, or deliver any vessel
documented under the laws of Liberia for the carriage, either directly or indi-
rectly, of arms, ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy material, petro-
leum, transportation materials of any strategic value, and items useful in the
production of arms, implements of war to or from the Union of Socialist Re-
publics, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Albania, Rumania, the Soviet zone of Germany, North Korea, North Vietnam,
and Manchuria.
While I believe you said only four Liberian ships were involved, any
time we can stop one we can increase the pressure on the Cubans and
the Russian Communist masters there.
What progress are we making with our diplomatic efforts?
Secretary RusK. We have taken up the question with other govern-
ments in NATO. [Deleted.]
Also I think it is correct to say we have been very strongly sup-
ported in those efforts by the known concern of the public opinion here
and the Congress with respect to NATO-flag ships and I suspect the
very fact they have accepted the preoccupation of the American
people with this issue has greatly reinforced and helped our diplo-
matic effort.
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39?
Now, the principal difficulty about this is that so far as we can learn,
practically no ships are chartered for the Cuba trade. They are
chartered on a barn bottom, long-term basis, maybe some of them
running as far as 5 years, to, say, the Soviet Union. .
If these ships, for some reason, were to be drawn out of the Cuba
trade but remained chartered to the Soviet Union, then the Soviet
bloc would divert its shipping into the Cuba trade and use these char-
tered ships for intra-bloc shipping; so this is immediately involved
with the problem. of almost. a total economic break with the Soviet
bloc and Western Europe. [Deleted.]
Since July, since these shipments to Cuba have greatly stepped up
the problem and the concern about it, this question has not been di-
rectly related yet to the contingency planning with respect to Berlin.
[Deleted.]
You perhaps saw the press report that an Italian ship did not sail
today because its crew would not take it into the Cuban trade.
SI111'S INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE
In other words, this idea is making some headway. I would add,
however, two things which are not fully helpful, but help to this ex-
tent : We have not yet been able to determine that any NATO-flag
ship is involved in arms and munitions of war so far as Cuba is con-
cerned, and secondly, we have not found any American-owned ships
under Liberian or Panamanian charter engaged in the Cuban trade.
In other words, we are trying to close in on this from every
direction.
Chairman RUSSELL. You mean in the Cuban 'trade or carrying arms
and ammunition?
Secretary RUSK. No, in the Cuban trade, American-owned ships
under the Liberian flag.
Chairman RUSSELL. I had read in the press where ships both under
Panamanian and Liberian registry had gone into the Cuban trade.
Secretary RUSK. We inquired into that some time ago and our best
information now is there is no American-owned ship under Liberian
or Panamanian flag engaged in that trade. [Deleted.]
STIFFENING LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CUBA
Chairman RUSSELL. This may have to come out of the record, too,
but I assume you have been in consultation from time to time with the
representatives of the other nations of this hemisphere on this subject?
Secretary RUSK. Yes, we have, sir. And I will be meeting the fore-
eign ministers at. the end of this month to take up with them what
further steps beyond Punta del Este we could take with a solid ma-
jority of the hemisphere.
(The following information was subsequently furnished:)
[Department of State- for the press, Sept. 18,.196'2, No. 566]
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF AMERICAN REPUI3ICS TO MEET INFORMALLY
The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics have been generally receptive
to the suggestion which Secretary Rusk made on September 5, through the Latin
American Ambassadors in Washington, that they hold an informal meeting to
exchange views on subjects of mutual interest.
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On the basis of the Secretary's consultations with his colleagues, and taking
into account the wishes and convenience of the largest number, the Secretary
has issued invitations to them to meet informally in Washington on October 2
and 3. The Secretary hopes that the dates chosen will make it possible for most
of his colleagues to come. In addition to the Foreign Ministers, the Secretary
General of the OAS has been invited to attend.
The meeting will be informal. It will provide the opportunity to exchange
views. The sessions will be closed. There will be no formal agenda, voting,
official minutes, or resolutions. We expect that the situation in Cuba and other
subjects of mutual interest will be discussed.
Chairman RussELL. Do any of them seem to be more impressed now
with the danger of the situation in Cuba than they were at the time of
Punta del Este?
Have you made any progress?
Secretary RUSK. There has been some change in opinion which was
the trend followed at Punta del Este. [Deleted.]
So we are hopeful there that some further movement can in fact
be reported and some further action be taken.
Chairman RUSSELL. What do you think about the quality of the in-
formation we have about what is really taking place inside Cuba. We
have been deceived in that area before, we were before the invasion,
and I just wondered if we have improved our means of getting infor-
mation in Cuba on which we could risk the security of this country.
Secretary Rush. I think that this varies somewhat with the type
of information.
In connection with such things as missile sites, for example, the
ground-to-air antiaircraft missiles, we do have very firm information
indeed. [Deleted.]
Chairman RUSSELL. You mean as to the nature and the capacity of
the sites?
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir : I think we have very good information
on that. [Deleted.]
In terms of political information, we do need to get more than we
do. [Deleted.]
We do not have as much information as we should like about the
political attitudes and the effect upon the Cuban people of the string-
ences which they have been facing in the last several months, and to
an increasing degree. [Deleted.]
On a strictly military side, I think we have quite firm information
on the specific elements of armaments that are going into there.
Chairman RUSSELL. I don't like to get too deeply in this, because I
realize it is a, sensitive area.
On what do you base your conclusions that there are more agricul-
tural specialists than missile specialists from Russia in Cuba?
I read somewhere or we heard, that there were more agricultural
specialists than military specialists. I just wondered on what you
base, you reached that conclusion?
Secretary RusK. I believe, sir, there recently has been-was a state-
ment in the Tass statement. I think the figures on specialists, Mr.
Bundy, did you have the latest figures on that?
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SITUATION IN CUBA 41
Mr. BUNDY. [Deleted.]
Chairman RUSSELL. how can we determine what he is doing, Mr.
Bundy? We get such scanty information over there, how can we
tell whether he is teaching them to build a powerline or whether
he is teaching them to engage n radar set so as to fire missiles against
the United States?
Mr. BUNDY. I don't think we can be sure of that, Senator.
[Deleted.]
Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any truth in the news stories that these
people tend to live in colonies, these foreigners?
Mr. BUNDY. Yes, sir ; I think they do, sir.
Secretary RUSK. That has been a pretty general pattern throughout
the world, ~p`1articularly when they are in substantial numbers.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for one question?
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.
DEFENSIVE OR OFFENSIVE BUILDUP IN CUBA
Senator SYMINGTON. The premise of the position the United States
takes is that it is a defensive military development in Cuba. As one
who has followed the missile problems for some years, the Matador
range was hundreds of miles, and could be fired from a truck. The
Snark was thousands of miles in range and did not need a base.
The Soviets for many years have had thousands of missiles from 250
to 1,100 miles.
How do we know that this is essentially a defense buildup? It
would be difficult for anybody to find out what type and character of
missiles we had on, or off, a launching pad i f we wanted to make it so.
Are we perhaps overemphasizing the defensive nature of the mili-
tary equipment given by the Soviets.
I would appreciate your commenting on that.
Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, the statements made thus far turn
upon what we consider to be very accurate information.
Now, it is entirely possible that other type missiles, without, new
heavy installations, could be brought in, but I think the chances are
ve high that we would know about it.
Senator SYMINGTON. If the Chair would yield, we had a ground-
to-air missile with a range of 400 miles, 180 miles beyond Miami from
Cuba, and unquestionably, if we had pursued the Bomarc we would
now have a ground-to-air missile of more than 400 miles.
There is no problem in making such a missile, a ground-to-ground
missile, if that is wanted. So the emphasis on the limited range char-
acteristics of a defensive missile worries me.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, I will ask Mr. Bundy to comment on that,
but I wanted just to indicate that we were talking about the identifica-
tion of the actual type missile itself when we are talking about the
ground-to-air missiles.
Mr. BUNDY. I would simply underscore that in effect, Senator. The
missile is firmly identified, with first-rate eyewitness evidence, as the
SA-2, the so-called guideline, which is an older Soviet missile on which
we have a great deal of information of its characteristics and the range
of that missile, the range at which it can hit, another airplane is about
25 miles.
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42 SITUATION IN CUBA
Now, this whole question of offensive-defensive is, of course, a line
of degree. No piece of hardware is without some offensive capacity.
The point we have been making and I think Secretary McNamara has
underscored in briefing both these committees and the House com-
mittees is that you don't have a significant addition to the offensive
capacity by what has gone into these latest buildups.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't believe I will
ask questions at this time. I am going to go back to some of the
wording of the resolution. I think I will wait until a later time.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis, do you have any questions of
the Secretary?
Senator -STENNIS. I thank the chairman. I would want to say one
thing.
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you what success you had had with
our NATO Allies and others in working on this matter but Senator
Russell's question, I think, virtually covered that. [Deleted.]
The people are disturbed, I think, in all areas of this country. I
don't know what your information is on it, but they need something
reassuring. With all deference to Mr. Bowles, and his position, his
speech did not help one bit yesterday; in fact, I think it hurt his
cause. I say yesterday because that is when I read about his speech.
Do you think the situation in Cuba is less threatening than it was a
year ago, I mean, to our side or to our security?
Secretary RUSK. No, sir.
Senator STENNIS. No.
Secretary RUSK. I do not think so. I -think that you may wish
to have military testimony on what the military requirement would
be in the light of this particular buildup, and that is not a. formidable
addition to the military requirement for Cuba before, say, July.
It is some addition but not much, in terms of the preparatory steps
that would have to be taken.
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CUBA
Senator STENNIS. Now, briefly, and I don't want- to- take up .a lot of
time here, even as much as 10 minutes, but is the economic situation
in Cuba, increasingly worse or better? What is your information on
that, say, as compared to a year ago ?
Secretary RUsii. Well, the President alluded to that in his last
statement.
Senator STENNIS. Yes.
Secretary RUSK. But our information is that the economic situation
there is significantly worse than it was a year ago.
Senator STENNIS. Isn't there considerable economic support coming
in? This was really the question I wanted to ask you about.
Secretary RUSK. There has been some support. I believe that our
figures on Soviet direct aid has been in the order of-$100 million on
the economic side, but nevertheless, we know that there is a signif-
icant drop in sugar production, that the factories are dropping in their
production, that rationing has gone into effect. We know that the
Cubans have allocated only a million dollars of their foreign ex-
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change for medicines whereas their normal intake is around $20
million of medicines. We know, for example, that Canada last year
exported about $32 million to Cuba, and this year Canadian exports
will be about $6 or $7 million.
In other words, there are various indicators that show that the
economic situation in Cuba is much more stringent, and we get in-
formation [deleted] that severe rationing is making an impact, and
this is creating almost an unparalleled situation on the island itself.
Senator STE, NNIS. Well, it just occurs to me that if the Soviets are
really going to let them sag and go hungry, so to speak, from an
economic standpoint, it really doesn't mean business, then, in trying
to put arms in there or build them up any appreciable amount mili-
tarily.
What is your reaction to that thought, the contrast between the
economic downgrading and the military upgrading of strength?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that the Soviets have been under
the most urgent pleas and pressures from Castro for substantial
amounts of aid of every sort. My guess is also that the Soviets have
hoped they would not have to put in a great deal of economic aid
in those categories in which they themselves are short.
For example, foodstuffs-we know they have been upset by the
effect of mismanagement in Cuba in just this field.
They have a good many technicians in there now and I suppose
they will be trying to reorganize production to try to meet that
situation.
Their aid to Cuba, and more particularly also to countries like
Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, has created some strains between them and
Peiping, Peiping having insisted that they have first claim on any-
thing the Soviets can provide.
Senator STENNIS. Yes.
I was going to ask you what we were actually doing toward round-
ing up action as well as attitude for our interest. [Deleted.]
You say you are going to meet with these Latin American states
at the end of the month.
Don't you also have activity going on now among them to meet
this situation in some way other than unilaterally?
Secretary RUSK. We are discussing the matter with a number of
these governments in anticipation of that meeting at the end of the
month.
I called in the ambassadors not long ago to give them full informa-
tion, and we do see individual ones.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator STENNIS. You say you are more encouraged by them here
recently. What is the reason for that?
Secretary RusK. Because I think, sir, they feel the same kind of
concern that the rest of us feel about what has been happening since
July in Cuba and realize this is a growing threat.
Senator STENNIS. And realize the threat is against them?
Secretary Rush. Yes.
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44 SITUATION IN CUBA
COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR BOWLES' STATEMENT
Senator STENNIS. Reverting to Mr. Bowles' statement just one more
time, it seems to me that it is very unfortunate to take that approach.
I just express the hope that something more tangible could be told
without, the scare stories, so to speak, that went with those statements.
I believe that is all.
Secretary RUSK. I believe it is possible the committee might wish
to have his full statement. Certain sentences were used in the press
to the exclusion of others. You might want to have the full state-
ment.
Chairman RUSSELL. All right, we will be glad to print it in the rec-
ord if you wish, but I certainly agree with Senator Stennis that such
parts of it that got out only tended to increase the fear and trepida-
tion and suspicion of the. American people they were not being told
the facts about the situation in Cuba.
Senator STENNIS. Yes, that leaves us in an apparent attitude of
fear, and our adversaries know that as well as our own people as far
as I see.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
(The document referred to follows:)
[Department of State-For the press, for release at 0;30 p.m., Sept. 1.6, 19G2---No. 5591
TOWARD A NEW "REALISM" IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Address by the Honorable Chester Bowles, President's Special Representative and
Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, at the golden jubilee
convention of Hadassah, Pittsburgh, Pa., Sunday, September 16, 1962
I am deeply honored to join with you at this golden jubilee convention of
Hadassah.
social welfare both at Yours is a long and distinguished record of support for human dignity and
full of achievement as your first. Your dedication and second
wisdom will be century urgently
needed in the years ahead.
When I received your invitation to speak here tonight, my first thought was to
focus my remarks on developments in the Middle East, a region which I visited
earlier this year.
In my opinion, however, we are approaching a crisis in our dealings with the
world that threatens to divide our people and which goes to the very heart of our
democratic society. For this reason it occurred to me that a broader discussion
of foreign policy questions might be in order.
It is not surprising that the extraordinary complexity of world affairs has
created a sense of creeping frustration among many Americans.
We are faced with a challenge- that goes far beyond the well publicized com-
ton petition
betw en womdifferen dikinds cold
society that involves lcompeting concepts of
education, industrial development, science, living standards, culture, and indeed
of the very meaning of life.
Although the outcome of this deeper, longer range competition will ultimately
determine the nature of tomorrow's world, the pressures of crises such as Berlin
and Cuba, the awesome escalation of nuclear weapons, and the current angry
exchanges between Moscow and Washington make it difficult for all of us to keep
our perspective.
It may therefore be useful to consider the challenge in terms of the critical
factors which, singly and in combination, will shape tomorrow's world :
These include the development of the Soviet Union as a major industrial and
military power under tough-minded, highly centralized political management :
the replacement of the old China by a vital, centralized Communist state
on the mainland, desperate for economic progress and bitter at past humiliations
by the West ;
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the rapid development of a new nationalistic and largely unified Western
Europe allied to the United States, but increasingly capable of forming a third
force in world affairs;
. the collapse of European colonialism and the dramatic awakening of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, with the resulting creation of potential political
vacuums of vast proportions ;
an unprecedented explosion in science and technology that has opened up
infinite opportunities both for material creation and for destruction ;
. the coming of age of the United States of America at the height of its
industrial and military power, pledged by tradition and current belief to the
cause of human freedom and betterment, but confused by the immensity of its
sudden responsibilities and opportunities, and frustrated by conflicting judgments
as to how best to meet them.
This frustration is reflected in the charge, by some Americans, that our
foreign policy is not sufficiently "practical." "hardheaded," or "realistic" to cope
with the problems we face.
More precisely, it is said that we pay too much attention to the underdeveloped
countries ; that we should support willy-nilly any government that agrees with
our view of world affairs, regardless of its own internal policies ; that we are
wasting our money on foreign aid ; that all we need to assure the peace is bigger
and better missiles ; that we aren't nearly "tough" enough with the Russians ;
that the U.N. is nice in theory but hopelessly ineffective in practice; that we must
stop the Communists with "force" since force is the only thing they understand ;
and that those who see the world in less simplified terms are pussyfooters, pinks,
and cowards.
Such thinking, in my view, is rash, uninformed, and dangerous. If allowed to go
unchallenged, it can draw us into games of Russian roulette and nuclear
"chicken" which may play directly into the hands of our adversaries, and which
ultimately can lead to a world catastrophe.
Let us consider a current example-Cuba.
Although those who now urge us to take direct military action against Cuba
are expressing a frustration which all of us feel, frustration has never been
accepted by historians as an adequate excuse for folly.
The President made it clear at his Thursday press conference that he will act
promptly and vigorously if the Soviet trained and armed Cuban forces threaten
Cuba's neighbors, our naval base at Guantanamo, the approaches to the Panama
Canal, or U.S. security generally.
Of one thing we can be certain : Sooner or later the Cuban people will regain
their independence. Their devotion to freedom has been amply shown through
a century of heroic resistance to oppression. In time they will throw off the
present despotism as they have its predecessors.
But if under present circumstances we were to follow the urgings of the
extremists and to attack Cuba, we would do irreparable harm to the cause of
freedom. We would undercut our influence in world affairs, blacken our reputa-
tion in the U.N., and forfeit our traditional claim to moral leadership, while
destroying thousands of young lives in the process.
Would such action lead to world war III? Although no one can be sure, I am
inclined to doubt it. The recent Soviet message added some convenient loopholes
in fine print.
What it would do is to set the stage for sweeping Soviet victories in the criti-
cally important fields of diplomacy and politics.
With pious protestations of patience in the face of "grave U.S. provocation,"
Soviet spokesmen in the United Nations would charge us with blatant aggres-
sion, and very likely they would win majority support.
We could then expect to see a rising tide of U.S. resentment against the United
Nations, still greater national frustration, a further lessening of our influence in
world affairs, and mounting pressures' for new military adventures.
If we are to maintain public support for a more rational approach, we must
create wider understanding of the factors that are most decisive in international
affairs: The true nature of power in today's revolutionary world ; the influence of
people and the ideas, hopes and fears that move them; the weaknesses as well as
strengths of our adversaries ; and the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war.
Against this background, let its consider the, essential ingredients of an effec-
tive American foreign policy, each reduced to its simplest terms. I suggest the
following:
1. A deep national dedication, reflected in all that we do and say, to the crea-
tion of a more rational and peaceful world.
89479-62-4
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.46 SITUATION IN CUBA
2. An awareness of the limits of unilateral action-political, economic, or
military.
3. An ability to understand the mood of peoples of different cultures and
environment, and a willingness to work with them to create common action on
the widest possible range of subjects.
4. The military capacity to inflict devastating damage on our adversaries if
they should attack us, to cope effectively with local aggression wherever it
occurs, and the will to use our military power to protect our vital interests.
5. An understanding of the awesome dangers of the growing nuclear arms
race and a willingness to negotiate with our Communist adversaries in good
faith for an international control agreement with adequate safeguards.
6. Skill and patience in dealing with friends, neutrals, and adversaries, keep-
ing in mind not only our own interests but also their own, refraining from plac-
ing our opponents in impossible situations, always leaving a door open for peace-
ful adjustment.
As we consider these requirements, we can be sure, at least, of one thing :
A temperate approach of this kind will fail to satisfy the hot-blooded and hot-
headed minority of Americans who seem to assume that with more energy and
more weapons we can "solve" our international problems as a doctor cures a
disease.
Such men are persuaded that life is based on power, and that in the use of
power anything goes. With Voltaire they believe that "God is always on the side
of the heaviest battalions."
In a sense, they echo the outlook of that notorious cynic, Joseph Stalin, who
dismissed the Catholic Church with the question : "How many divisions has
the Pope?"
No thoughtful man doubts that the development of U.S. foreign policy and the
conduct of our relations with other nations in this jungle world of ours is in-
herently a tough-minded business.
Yet even the most casual reading of history will show that those who have
placed their faith in a narrowminded concentration on military power, and
who have remained insensitive to forces which move men to fight or work or
believe, have proved to be wrong far more often than right.
Indeed recent history is replete with examples of the military and diplomatic
dead ends into which these self-styled "realists" have led themselves and their
nations.
For instance, immediately following World War I the then current crop of
"realists" launched a bitter and successful attack on the "visionary" Woodrow
Wilson and the League of Nations.
As a result, we found ourselves committeed to a generation of isolationism,
and, precisely as Mr. Wilson has prophesied, the world was condemned to a
ghastly repeat performance of the "war to end all wars."
In most recent years, the tragic limitations of the "realist" school of thought
have been apparent in regard to developments in Asia and Africa.
In postwar Britain for instance, representatives of the realist school asserted
that if the British withdrew from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma, and the
"irresponsible natives" were left to handle their own affairs, these countries
would promptly fall apart and become easy pickings for the Communists.
Fortunately for us all, this particular group of realists failed to get their way.
More sophisticated British leaders, sensitive to the true realities of the new
postwar world, moved peacefully and creatively to liquidate Queen Victoria's
empire upon which the sun never set ; while the newly free nations proceeded
to demonstrate not only a surprising capacity to govern themselves but an
even more surprising desire to associate themselves in many important ways
with their former colonial masters.
Nowhere was the sterile thinking of the British "realists" more tellingly
refuted than in India. Gandhi's concept of freedom through nonviolent action
fitted the temperament and aspirations of the Indian people.
It was his simple techniques, applied with supreme political skill, that eventu-
ally forced the British to leave India as rulers-and allowed them to return as
friends.
I do not suggest that such techniques are applicable in dealing with a ruth-
less totalitarian adversary. But they fitted India, Gandhi, and the British ; and
for this reason, they worked.
The "realist" school of public policy also had its French chapter in Asia.
Under its influence, a succession of postwar French governments adopted policies
in Indochina for which we are all still paying a heavy price.
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By attempting to maintain a colonial foothold in Asia under impossible polit-
tical and geographic conditions, the French "realists" managed to create what
thoughtful nien feared most : a united front of southeast Asian anticolonialists,
nationalists, and Communists.
The result was the success of the Vietminh war of "national liberation" against
Fr4nce, despite $3, billion worth of American military aid and the courageous
efforts of one of the best professional armies in the world.
The disaster in Indochina taught these realists nothing. It was they who
made it impossible for the French Government to negotiate a reasonable settle-
ment in Algeria-until years of bloodshed had tragically washed away many of
the ties binding Frenchmen and Algerians together.
An even more dramatic example of the bankruptcy of the professional realists
may be seen in the contrast between Soviet and American experience in Europe
after World War II.
While we "softheaded" Americans were pouring billions into rehabilitating
both our allies and our defeated enemies, the "hardheaded" Russians under Stalin
were pillaging all of Eastern Europe and carting off everything that could possibly
be moved.
Now, 15 years later, the United States-having long ago ceased aid to Europe-
is doing a $7 billion a year export trade with Western Europe ; our former
enemies, the West Germans are naw; among our hest customers and firmest allies.
The Russians, on the other hand, are now frantically pouring back the capital
which they had previously removed in a desperate attempt to place their unhappy
satellites on a more solid economic and political footing.
Not only has the U.S.S.R. failed to win lasting allegiance to communism
among their conquered peoples ; they have failed to develop trustworthy military
allies among these embittered populations. Indeed, they were forced a year ago
to build a wall bristling with barbed wire and tommyguns to keep "their"
Germans from leaving en masse for the West.
In view of this record, we may properly ask what constituted true realism
in terms of postwar policies toward Europe-the savage negative approach of
the Communists or the cooperative, partnership approach of the United States?
The lesson of these examples should be clear : A truly realistic policy must be
based not solely on stockpiles of military hardware, but on the power of.-people
,and the power of ideas.
These are the forces of decisive strength through which hundreds of millions
of people, eager for greater opportunity and freedom, can be organized into
movements capable of bringing impossible pressures upon status quo govern-
ments.
This power is underscored by the fact that in the last 15 years one-half of the
people of the world have managed to change their form of government although
preponderant military "power" lay in the hands of the supporters of the status
quo.
Does this mean that military power has suddenly become unimportant? Not
at all.
It means that military force alone cannot produce a peaceful, rational solu-
tion to political problems. This is the meaning of the Nationalist failure on
mainland China, the Soviet failure in Eastern Europe, the debacle at Suez, the
French defeat in Indochina, and the S-year tragedy in Algeria.
As long as ideas influence the minds of men, and as long as men and their
.aspirations are a major component of, power, ideas-both good and evil-will
continue to upset nations, defy armies and write history.
No one has put this concept more clearly than Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan,
America's great naval strategist. "The purpose of military power," Mahan assert-
ed, "is to provide time for moral ideas to take root." The recognition of this
essential dimension of power is, I believe, the new realism.
Now we come to the crucial question : Can we Americans afford to follow
the cynics of our era who discount the power of people and ideas and ask how
many battalions has the Pope?
The United States of America was created out of a faith in people and princi-
ples. Those who would have us abandon this faith would leave us weaker in
maturity than we were at birth.
Let us face the facts : Today, heavy laden with all the ornaments of power,
we are being pressed by a frustrated, misinformed minority to abandon those
very traditions which in the days of our Nation's infancy made us unique and
,beloved.
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If we look closely we will see that whenever people have chosen the muddy
water. of communism, it was because they were so thirsty for change. Our
purpose therefore must once again become what it has always been in our
moments of greatest effectiveness : An overriding commitment to a world of
increasing freedom and opportunity ; a world that ultimately, in Franklin Roose-
velt's words, may achieve for "every man, woman, and child on earth the pos-
sibility of security and well-being.
Behind the crucially important advance lines of our military defense against
Communist aggression, we must create-regardless of what Moscow does or
fails to do-a truly adequate world program designed to meet the age-old prob-
lems of class and war.
Man's greatest accomplishments from the beginning of time have always
been born of great dreams. When human beings are at their most effective
best, it is because they have found some concept larger than themselves in which
to place their hopes.
Every great forward movement in history has been made possible by indi-
viduals who were hardheaded working idealists-each of whom in his time was
bitterly opposed by those who prided themselves on their realism.
In 200 A.D., who would have dreamed that the mighty Roman Empire would
be undermined by a motley group of slaves and near slaves belonging to an
obscure Near Eastern religious cult-called Christianity?
And in 1776 how many realistic observers of events in North America would
have guessed that a ragged Continental Militia could withstand 5 years of war
against the most powerful nation of the time-and win?
Fortunately for mankind, dreams and hopes have always had a way of up-
setting the sterile concepts of conquerors and oppressors. Perhaps that is be-
cause the dreams and hopes that have most roused mankind have always had a
universal quality about them-a questing after brotherhood, liberty, peace,
abundance.
It was hope that brought some of the ablest and most vital people of Europe
as immigrants to America.
It was hope that built our great American West.
It was hope that built a new Europe after World War II and is now building
a dynamic Common Market.
It is hope that will build a new Africa and a new Asia-and that is gradually
beginning to fuel the Alliance for Progress in Latin America.
And what built Israel if it was not hope? What else can explain this rebirth
of an old nation after the passage of centuries, despite obstacles of weather,
geography, and political strife that led the European, American, and Arab real-
ists to assert that the dream itself was monumental nonsense?
The realists of history have traditionally failed to understand the power
of such concepts. And so they have offered drab, intermediate alternatives
that have failed to awaken men's best efforts and that ulttmately have led to
their defeat.
These points underscore the most fundamental question of all for American
policymakers. Precisely what are we seeking in this world? What, in short,
is our national purpose, and what are we willing to do to obtain it?
Our country was built through the power of peole and ideas. What we must
seek today in our relations with the rest of the world is a balance of political
and economic initiative, pledged to human betterment based on traditional
values, and shielded by whatever weapons may be required to defend ourselves
and other non-Communist peoples.
The vast majority of men everywhere are seeking the very principles for
which in our own country we have fought a continuing revolution : peace, jus-
tice, material welfare, self-government, and the opportunity to maintain them-
selves and their families with dignity.
The ultimate realism, therefore, is to identify ourselves by action as well as
rhetoric with these basic human aspirations that are so deeply rooted in the
universal principles which have moved men from the beginning of time. In
today's world these are the primary building blocks of national power.
But on one essential point we must be clear beyond all question : The con-
sistent, coherent pursuit of principle in world affairs does not mean a wistful
pandering to elusive world opinion.
It does mean that our country must oppose oppression not only in the Com-
munist countries but everywhere it exists ; that in Asia, Africa, Latin America
we must place our weight squarely behind the forces of freedom and human bet-
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SITUATION IN CUBA 49
grow
terment; that we must
we United m st lly ou selves the
not just
of world peace through world ul w; andr that the
with governments but with peoples.
If the examples of India, Algeria, Indochina, and Israel have proved any-
thing, they have proved that power in our revolutionary world is not exercised
only by those wtih the most guns, but rather by those with the firmest cause
and the will to fight for it.
Let us also remember that blind acceptance of U.S. leadership is not a com-
modity that we can purchase in the international marketplace.
Why should Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans die to assure rising liv-
anthe rest of d for what1they believe to will their
ing
fie themselves only for their own country Like
own interests.
Therefore, if we are to establish a working relationship with the majority
of mankind, we must identify our own self-interests with theirs. We must
do this not through slogans but by expanding the common objectives that we
and they think are important.
Fortunately, these objectives are easy for us Americans to understand and
to accept : freedom from colonial rule ; human dignity for all, regardless of race,
creed or color ; and expanding economic opportunities.
These are the objectives stressed by the first Afro-Asian Conference at
Bandung in Indonesia 7 years ago, and again accepted by the recent Cairo Eco-
nomic Conference of Developing Countries.
As we look to the future, we can learn from the past. The perennial dilemma
of mankind is dramatized by Barbara Tuchman in her recent book The Guns
of August. In this griping acount of the first stages of World War I, we see
in stark, awesome clarity not only the savagery of war but the process by which
leaders of great nations with a deep-seated stake in peace, beset by a variety
of pressures, lost control of their policies and stumbled into war.
In that tragic summer of 1914 there were many-English, French, Austrian,
German, Russian-who clearly foresaw the danger of an imepending holocaust,
yet who were so caught up in previously established positions that they were
unable to substitute realistic new courses of action for those clearly doomed
to failure.
And so it was that intelligent men stumbled, hesitated, and fumbled as the
diplomatic machinery ground to a halt, and that great armies were plummeted
into a bloody conflict-on what had been claimed to, be the most civilized con-
tinent on earth.
The result was the most devastating war mankind had yet known-a war
in which some 30 million died-followed by a hopeless, vindictive peace that
sowed the seeds for a second war even more ghastly than the first.
Now 43 years after the signing of the "Peace" of Versailles, we again see
the world's greatest military powers-this time armed with nuclear weapons
of near-total destructive power-angrily confronting each other in almost all
corners of the world, while harried diplomats again parry and maneuver.
Is it impossible for human beings to learn from history? Are we helpless
in the face of forces which we ourselves have created?
It is time bluntly and boldly to draw the issue. The question at stake here
in America and throughout the world is not the desirability of peace, although
some seem to hold it lightly, but rather how peace-an honest, practical and
lasting peace-can best be secured.
. The road to such a peace is long, tortuous, and exhausting. At every step
we will hear both the voices of the impatient, pressing us in the shrill name
of a sterile "realism" to embark on inviting shortcuts, and those of the faint-
hearted who throw up their hands at the very enormity of the undertaking.
If the worst happens and America should fail on this long road to peace, it
will not be for lack of guts but for lack of sensitivity to the views of others :
for lack of what our forefathers described as a "decent respect for the opinions
of mankind." And this will be due not to defects in the American character,
but because of confusion created by panacea peddlers with no sense of re-
sponsibility, operating in a period of historic complexity against a background
of revolutionary change.
American democracy's greatest strength has always been its ability to create
a working consensus of common belief. In this election year it is important
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above all that we not lose our perspective and that we work together to create
a climate of public discussion leading to such a consensus in which bipartisanship
is more than a slogan.
Without surrendering their essential democratic right to ask hard questions;
political leaders can, if they will, work together across party lines to create
the kind of flexible dynamic policies which the world situation so urgently
demands of us.
Let us all, therefore, gird ourselves for the wise, courageous, and enduring
effort that alone can lead to a more rational world.
Let us reject the rash pleas of trigger-happy adventurers who urge us to
raise our tariffs, cut our budgets, and then declare war. on everyone whooffends
us.
Despite the tumult of missiles, cold war, armaments races, and reckless oratory,
it is those who see our new world in terms of freedom, individual opportunity,
and peace who will write the best remembered pages in the history of our time.
It is the task of our generation of Americans to see that these pages are
a worthy addition to the dramatic story of man's never-ending struggle for
freedom.
Chairman RussELL. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator I-IICxENLOOPER. Just one or two questions of basic rights
here.
EFFECT OF RIO AND OTHER TREATIES ON MONROE DOCTRINE
I think it is fair to assume in its original concept and down through
the years, it was considered under the Monroe Doctrine that we
received the right to take unilateral action if necessary to prevent
the dangers which the Monroe Doctrine pointed to.
Is that a fair interpretation?
Secretary RUSK. That is a statement of our own national attitude
toward it in the 19th century, but this was not necessarily accepted.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand it was our attitude that we
would reserve the right to exercise our own discretion. Of course, we
mentioned the Platt amendment a moment ago which referred specifi-
cally to our reservation of the right to go into Cuba to preserve free
government there. That was changed by the good neighbor policy
in 1934.
In the inter-American defense agreements, and the Rio Treaty,
didn't we in a measure give up the theory that we had the right of
unilateral action in any of these,countries.
Secretary Rusx. What the Rio Treaty did, Senator, was to commit
ourselves to consult with our partners in the hemisphere when mat-
ters of this sort arose. But just as we have
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't there a provision in either the treaty
or the collateral agreements to the effect that no country could invade
or could enter the territory of another country except in self-defense?
That is always reserved. It is an inherent right.
Secretary Rusx. I think except in case of armed attack there was
the obligation to consult.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are we handicapped somewhat by the
agreements we have made so far as unilateral action short of an armed
attack is concerned?
Secretary RusK. I would not think, Senator, that we are handi-
capped in practice for this reason : that as a practical matter we do
want the other members of the hemisphere to be with us to the maxi-
mum extent possible if we have to act against Cuba.
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CAN TIIE UNITED STATES ASSIST OTHER COUNTRIES IN TIIE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE?
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I was merely examining how much we had
curtailed the position which we had traditionally maintained up until
that time. Of course, we have certain agreements which affect the
security of the hemisphere-the Punta del Este agreements, and the
Organization of American States.
Let me ask this : Do. we, in your interpretation, have a right under
these agreements-all of them or any specific one-to police the waters
of the Caribbean for the purpose of protecting other nations in the
Caribbean, at their request, from the exportation of subversive activi-
ties and arms and things like that from Cuba or any other country?
In other words, what would happen if Guatemala said, "We think
we are about to be invaded here, subversively and surreptitiously by
arms and boatloads of people and we would like to have you send
destroyers to stop that kind of monkey business."
Secretary RusK. I think there would be no inhibition of that type
of operation.
Senator IIICKENLOOrER. I am talking about the legal right. I think
we have to do a great many things sometimes and argue the right
later. If it is a matter of acute security, it runs in my mind that
we may have that legal right.
Secretary Rusii. I think we do, sir; although we would claim that
we did, there might be others who claimed that we did not.
But under the declarations in January, at Punta del Este, the ma-
jority asserted its policy and set up a special security committee of
the OAS itself to consult with governments about just such threats,
and we have, in fact, cooperated with governments in the Caribbean
area since Punta del Este against exactly the kind of threat you are
talking about. I think there is no doubt in this hemisphere that
right would be clearly recognized.
Now, somebody else outside might challenge it.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. You would say that our right would be
strengthened if our intervention was on the specific request of the
government fearful of being invaded.
Secretary RUSK. It would be strengthened
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I merely use the, example- of Guatemala.
Suppose the Guatemalan Government said officially, "Look, we think
we are about to be put upon here. Would you send some ships down
here to help us out?"
Secretary Rusii. I think we have gone somewhat beyond that, Sen-
ator, because we have undertaken active cooperation With all of these
governments on just the kind of surveillance and preparations that
you are now talking about. [Deleted.]
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.
Chairman RUSSELL. It is very evident we cannot conclude this
morning. Senator Sparkman and I have agreed to recess until 2:30,.
after we hear Senator Smathers.
Senator Smathers has a conference on the tax bill at 2 o'clock, and
he has a very brief statement to make before the committee.
Senator MORSE. I have to preside at a conference on higher educa
tion this afternoon. After we get through with Senator Smathers,.
can I put a question or two to the Secretary of State?
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52 SITUATION IN CUBA
Chairman RUSSELL. I will be very happy to, but Senator Humphrey
is first.
Senator HuMPfiREV. I will be glad and happy to yield.
Chairman RUSSELL. Can you stay with us?
Secretary Rusg. Yes. I wanted to suggest to the committee that
paragraph 3 of the resolution at Punta del Este on this Special Con-
sultative Committee on Security might well be put in the record.
Chairman RUSSELL. That will appear in conjunction with your dis-
cussion of it.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was referring to that paragraph.
Senator MORSE. I would like to have that in, Mr. Chairman, but I
would like to have the entire act of the Punta del Este Conference
put in the record at this point because it is going to run through all
these discussions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Let me suggest that we have this paragraph in-
serted, and then let the entire treaty be printed at the conclusion of
these hearin s.
SenatorMORSE. It ought to be in the record.
Chairman RUSSELL. That should be done.
(The paragraph referred to follows:)
To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appro-
priate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may
be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or
acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting
from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in
accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as
the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smathers.
Senator SMATHERS Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE A. SMATHERS, A SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator SMATHERS. I had intended to put two resolutions in to be
considered by this joint committee with respect to the recognition
of a government in exile, and the second one with respect to the value
of the recognition or the creation of the Western Hemisphere Military
Alliance.
However, I am for the Mansfield resolution, but I do not want to
complicate that too much at this stage of the proceedings, and inas-
much as I was late, and through my own fault, was not here to make
my argument, what I think I would do, and I just want to put this in
for the record, is I will take my resolutions and offer them on the floor
and ask they then be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee
which would, in effect, separate them from the consideration of the
Mansfield resolution.
I would say, since I have already talked with you, Mr. -Secretary,
about this, I think inevitably we are going to have to take some steps,
affirmative steps, and it seems to me that the only steps that are logical
and can be taken without actually going and making an act of war
through a blockade or something of that character, is to immediately
undertake asking the nations of the Western Hemisphere-and there
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SITUATION IN CUBA 53
is a lot of authority for it--who do not now, like Mexico, Ecuador,
and possibly Chile, who do not want to make an act of war, to at least
get those countries to indicate that they would join with us, if need
be, in what I think eventually will have to be done, and that is put
troops ashore, but if we do that then, of course, we have Latins fight-
ing Latins.
If we get a government-in-exile, we have Cubans, they can be the
first wave, they are the people who are trying to free their own coun-
try, and we avoid the stigma to it great extent of having to say that
we have unilaterally attacked, and we become the victims of all that
propaganda.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will put these resolutions in and have
them referred to the Foreign Relations Committees.
Chairman RUSSELL. You will introduce them? Very well.
Senator Morse.
Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a few questions on the
Monroe Doctrine and on proposals for it blockade and acts of war.
PRONOUNCEMENT ON UNITED STATES-EUROPE RELATIONSHIP BY MONROE
It is true, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that in 1823 when President Mon-
roe sent his message to Congress, part of which has become known as
the Monroe Doctrine, he not only discussed the so-called Monroe Doc-
trine with respect to its application to the Western Hemisphere but
also set forth in that doctrine his position with regard to the U.S. re-
lationships with Euro e?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. He pointed out in the same
declaration that we would not involve ourselves in the affairs of
Europe.
Senator MORSE. When the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated by
President Monroe in 1823, we were very much concerned about the
threat of czarist Russia. Up in my part of the country, the great
Pacific Northwest, there was a fear that czarist Russia had some ag-
gressive designs on the United State through that channel, was there
not?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator MORSE. Is it not true that historians have pointed out that
the reference to our European policy in the message of Monroe in
1823 was an extension or a reaffirmation or it greater detailing of
George Washington's farewell address in regard to our relationships
with Europe?
Secretary RusK. It reflected the fact that the world situation and
our place in it was vastly different than it is today in that we were
concerned about the continued independence of the new nations of this
continent and the possibility they might be upset or overthrown by
the reintroduction of colonialism in this country.
Senator MORSE. We have long since abandoned the European part
of the Monroe message of 1823, by way of whole series of treaties and
agreements on European policy-to mention but one, the NATO
Treaty in regard to which, as the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee knows, I joined as one of the floor leaders at the invitation
of Senator Vandenberg and presented to the Senate article V of that
treaty. It was far removed from the European policy enunciated by
Monroe in 1823.
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54 SITUATION IN CUBA
My question is, it is true, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that we have great-
ly modified the European policy of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823?
Secretary Rush. That is correctz sir.
Senator MoRsE. I happen to believe that there is an important part
of the Monroe Doctrine left, but I also happen to believe that you do
not need the Monroe Doctrine to exercise that power, and I want
your value judgment on this.
EVOLUTION OF TIIE MONROE DOCTRINE
My judgment, as I said in my speech in the Senate the other day,
was that many of these agreements and pacts and treaties we have
entered into in Latin America-the Rio pact, the agreement with Pana-
ma, the agreement at Caracas, the Bogota pact, which is the Organiza-
tion of American States Charter, and now Punta del Este-resulted
in part from the fact that over the decades some of our Latin American
neighbors, as they became more powerful, resented the policy of the
United States of setting itself up under the Monroe Doctrine as a
sort of protector and fatherland, so to speak, of these countries which,
at one time, were colonies of European powers. They sought to work
out an allied relationship, a partnership relationship, a cooperative
relationship with us, and wanted to be consulted and to be in on, shall
we say, the development of any foreign policy for the hemisphere that
the United States might carry out under its pronouncement of the
Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
Do you think that is a fair statement of a growing attitude on the
part of many Latin American countries from the time of the enuncia-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine until the time we started entering into
these pacts and agreements and treaties with our Latin American
neighbors?
Secretary RUSIi. There was a problem, Senator, created between us
and our Latin American friends in some of the situations in which
we tried to assert some of those actions directly relating to European
countries.
If you had a European country and a Latin American country in-
volved in a dispute, if we stepped in, as we did on occasions, and said,
"The Monroe Doctrine makes it impossible for you in Europe to
pursue your dispute beyond a certain point through, pressures and
movement of gunboats and things of that sort," then those European
countries came back to us and said, but then we should take the
responsibility for being sure that their rights in the dispute were
fully complied with.
For example, if we prevent them from collecting debts by force
-under the Monroe Doctrine, they would expect us to collect the debts
for them.
Therefore, they use the pressures in Latin America to enforce their
Tights there, and this created some fear on the part of Latin American
countries that the other side of the Monroe Doctrine represented an
unequal relationship between Latin America and the United,States.
Part of the effort to put this on a hemispheric basis was to separate
out those elements of the Monroe Doctrine on which we could all
agree, the security of the hemisphere, and then try to move together
-with it, and have the hemisphere on the basis of equality.
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MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO PROTECT U.S. SECURITY
Senator MORSE. I would like to have your statement on the next
matter. I will make a statement and then you make a critique of it.
I could do it by cross-examination, but I think we will save time if
we will do it this way.
In these treaties and pacts and agreements that we have entered
into-such as some of those I have enumerated-was it ever our in-
tention to-modify in any way the. doctrine of Monroe that if any
foreign power followed a course of action in the Western Hemisphere
that threatened our security directly or threatened our security in-
directly by destroying the security of another free nation in the hemi-
sphere, we reserved our right to protect that security unilaterally, if
necessary?
Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, if we assume now that the judgments
under the circumstances in each case would be responsible judgments,
that on the basis of responsible judgments as to the threat, what we
did was to say that we ought, if possible, to deal with this on a hemi-
spheric basis, but we did not renounce at the very bottom, at the very
essence of our own national commitments, we did not renounce a
national unilateral interest in those problems if they could not be
handled on a hemispheric basis.
Senator MoRsE. I think it is very important for these hearings to
get this pinned down, because there is so much confusion about the
Monroe Doctrine across the land.
That reserved power is a reserve power of national sovereignty that
we would have had whether Monroe ever sent a message to the Con-
gress in 1823 or not; is that not true?
Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.
Senator MORSE. And the message of Monroe in 1823 clarifies that
doctrine of sovereignty. We have the sovereign power to defend our
security and to take whatever action is necessary in our area of the
world if a foreign power, in turn, follows an aggressive course of
action that endangers our secuirty.
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. In my opening informal statement I
referred to the Monroe Doctrine as one of the expressions of this
underlined national interest that I spoke about.
I think if there was anything that was added to what had appeared
as sovereignty to a sovereign state, it was the declaration that we also
accepted a special responsibility for this hemisphere, and although it
is only 3,000 miles from New York to Paris and although it is 6,000
or 7,000 miles from New York to Buenos Aires, nevertheless we do
accept as a part of our national interest a special responsibility for
this hemisphere.
Senator MORSE. One of the problems that concerns me is the great
threat of communism in many places in Latin America, of which you
are well aware. We saw it very clearly, both at the time of the 1960
Bogota Conference and at the time of the Punta del Este Conference
this January.
I think we can take judicial notice that some of our Latin American
allies have been greatly weakened by Communist forces within their
countries. We never know really from week to week whether or not
one of these countries may be overthrown through a coup or a Com-
munist revolution.
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56 SITUATION IN CUBA
ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A HYPOTHETICAL COMMUNIST REVOLT IN
LATIN AMERICA
Speaking only hypothetically, let us assume that one of our allies in
the Western Hemisphere is overthrown. There is a people's revolt,
and it happens to be Communist revolt. There is an out-and-out
Communist revolt, such as we now realize we had in Cuba. Some of
us were suspicious at the time and dared to say so.
So, a Communist regime is set up in country X. This certainly
destroys the security of the government that existed prior to the revo-
lution, but we cannot say it threatens our security except that you and
I know that our security is threatened whenever any neighboring
country goes Communist. Suppose that the new government says,
"We renounce any cooperation from the United States under the
Monroe Doctrine or any other doctrine-the Act of Punta del Este or
the Act of Bogota. We want none of it. Stay away."
Is it your position that unless that new Communist country follows
a course of action that we can justifiably say endangers the security of
the United States-because-we see an aggressive power building up
with land-to-land missiles and submarine bases and launching pads,
and so on-we would have no right under the Monroe Doctrine or
under existing international law to proceed with an act of force which
would lead to an act of war against that new Communist revolutionary
government?
Secretary RusK. Senator, that is a very fundamental question.
I would think, first, that it must be the primary objective of our
policy to prevent that situation.
Senator MORSE. I'a ree.
Secretary RUSK. I-think you would agree on that.
Senator MORSE. We tried to do that at Punta del Este.
Secretary RUSK. I think it might be worth recalling that about a
year ago the President said that there were two things in Cuba that
were not negotiable : The military relationship with the Soviet bloc,
and the military involvement with the Soviet bloc in this hemisphere;
and, secondly, any attempt on the part of Cuba to export what it was
doing into other countries and interfere with their domestic affairs.
I think that the circumstances that you mentioned would present us
with the gravest possible issues because I cannot quite imagine a Com-
munist revolt of that nature in this hemisphere that would not have
ties with the international Communist conspiracy; so I would not want
to say that the answer to your question is no. I think we have got to
keep the way open.
Senator MORSE. I do not happen to think the question is no, myself,
but we have to deal with the tough ones.
Secretary RUSK. Yes.
JOINT HEMISPHERIC ACTION URGED IN HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Senator MORSE. If you want my position, I happen to think if you
get that kind of a new Communist regime established in country X,
Y, or Z-and I am not naming any of the countries, but let us say that
they are some of the more powerful countries rather close to us-that
we ought to say to the Organization of American -States that under the
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SITUATION IN CUBA 57
Act of Punta del Este, we all made some commitment as to what we
were going to do. We made clear that Marxism-Leninism is not com-
patible with the Western Hemisphere, and we are going to act jointly
to stop it. That is the pledge they made. I want to hold them to that
pledge.
That is where you find me following, may I say, a very impolitic
course of action at this time. I know how impolitic it is. But I want
to hold my country, if I can, within the framework of international
law. I happen to think that the proposals for unilateral action will
take us outside the framework of international law if we have not
exhausted every attempt to get cooperative action through OAS and
ultimately, if necessary, through the United Nations before we go off
on our own unilaterally. ? That is, unless in the course of that time
period there is such an aggressive threat against us that we have to act
to protect our own security, Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine,
in the exercise of the sovereign power on the part of our Government,
I think it is very important that we try to get this joint action of which
we have been speaking through the OAS.
I wish the foreign ministers could meet in less than 10 days,, but I
recognize that it impossible. I know what you have got to do to pre-
pare for it. It takes days and days to prepare for that kind of a
meeting.
IMPORTANCE OF MULTILATERAL APPROACH
I am making these comments to get your judgment on this question :
Is it your opinion that every effort ought to be made on the part of
our Government to try to get our allies in Latin America, and our
allies elsewhere in the world, to act through existing international
bodies for the settlement of this Cuban threat?
Secretary Russ. I think it is of the greatest maximum importance,
Senator, that we try to act jointly with our allies in a matter of this
sort, not only because we have commitments to try to act on it with
them, but also because the United States cannot really act alone in
these matters without heavily involving those who are closely allied
with us.
In other words, they get caught up in it, they bear the consequences,
they have to help carry the load, and I think that the circumstances
which would be impelling to us would also be circumstances which
would be very impelling to them if the time came when we had to
make large scale use of force against threats in Cuba.
EFFECTIVENESS OF A POSSIBLE BLOCKADE
Senator MoRsE. I want now to raise, and let the Secretary com-
ment on, the subject of blockade.
One of my colleages-who is just as sincere and just as patriotic
as I am, but we just disagree, probably on the timing of a blockade
rather than the possible necessity for one eventually, depending upon
future development-is quoted in the paper, and I paraphrase it, as
proposing a blockade, and as setting out in some detail how he would
operate it.
If the ship didn't stop, he would have a shot fired over its bow, and
if it did not stop then he would fire another, and then proceed to take
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what course of action is necessary to prevent it from getting into Cuba,
including, if necessary, the sinking of the ship.
I cannot escape the conclusion on the basis of my limited knowledge
of international law with regard to blockades that that would be an
act of aggression, it would be an act of force, and it would be an act
of war under the law of blockade.
Is it your opinion that if we set up that kind of unilateral blockade
without the approval of NATO, without the approval of the Organi-
zation of American States, some of our allies might defy us because
of their historic record of insisting that they will preserve their rights
on the high seas and they will not ever recognize a nonpacific
blockade?
Secretary Rusx. Of course, this necessarily has to be somewhat
speculative.
Senator MORSE. It is hypothetical, but I do not see how you can deal
with these resolutions without considering these possible hypotheticals.
Secretary RUSK. That is right. But I just am looking to a con-
tingency
Senator MORSE. I interrupt once more, and then I will not interrupt
again. We are saying, in effect, to the President "Wears now, going
to give you advance authority really to take what course of action you
think is necessary." As far as my vote is concerned, I do not propose
to give any President of the United States the advance authority to set
up unilaterally a blockade that would constitute an act of force and be
interpreted by some of our allies as an act of war.
Secretary Rusx. Senator, I would think that under present circum-
stances, unless there were a much stronger showing of a clear, and
present danger to the security of the United, States in the Western
Hemisphere, if we tried to enforce blockade, enforced.by unilateral
action that we would meet, at least, the political opposition of most
of our allies, and we would be reminded very strongly of the Suez
situation, generally speaking.
I doubt very much that any one of our allies would resist that by
force to which they replied, but I think they would reserve their rights
freely and would take such political action as they could to get us to
reverse the action.
Senator MORSE. They might send in a ship to test us.
Secretary RUSK. That is under present circumstances. If there was
a. much clearer assurance of a clear and present danger, there would
be a great many other factors that come to bear, and the situation
might well be different.
Senator MORSE. Might very well be different.
POSSIBLE RECOGNITION OF A CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE
There is talk about recognizing some Cuban government in exile.
I raise the question which Cuban government in exile do you think
would be eligible for recognition, for I understand that there is a great
deal of diversity among these Cuban exiles and a great play for power
among the various groups of them.
Would recognizing a government in exile, without having any con-
versations through existing international bodies to which we are com-
mitted by various treaties, create problems with our allies?
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59
Secretary RUSK. I am sure that that would at the present time,
Senator. I don't believe the United States has ever recognized a gov-
ernment in exile which did not originate in its home country, and
which had been driven out then by enemy action, as in the case of
World War IL.
It is true there is not a degree of cohesion among the various refugee
groups outside of Cuba to support at the present time on their part in
a single institutional alternative arrangement for Cuba, given a change
in the situation.
Further than that, I think there is much to be said for the point
that when the time comes for Castro to be overthrown and that regime
to be changed, a great many elements now in Cuba necessarily must
then take part in that.
This is not from the history of these matters a matter to be handled
just by refugees and, therefore, the alternative leadership on the is-
land, must feel they have an important role.
So that we do not at the moment see the political wisdom of our-
selves selecting just any reasonably cooperative group of exiles and
say.,? "So far as we are concerned, you are the Government of Cuba."
I think we would have great difficulty internationally in getting
others to go along with it now.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Senator MonsE. Mr. Chairman, this is the last point I raise for the
Secretaxy's, comment. I want the chairman to know my view on it,
too. I want to joint in a resolution. I think it is important from the
standpoint of confidence of the American people that we have a reso-
lution. I think we have a great opportunity here to educate the
American people as to what the power of the Commander in Chief
is when we are threatened as we are when a crisis such as that in Cuba
occurs.
You spoke about the Korean crisis. Don't forget the first action
by .President Truman was based on his position as Commander in
Chief. The United Nations action followed later. It followed his
first exercise of the Executive power by the President.
I agree with the Chairman it would have been much, much better
if we had had a resolution at that time or an official request on the part
of the President of the United States to the Congress at that time.
Chairman RUSSELL. It would have been passed unanimously the
morning after.
Senator MORSE. I think it would have passed unanimously, and I
was for it.
What greatly concerns me, Mr. Secretary, is that, under the emotion
of the time, we may pass a resolution here that goes beyond the inher-
ent power of the President which is all we need to meet this crisis.
We ought to spell out what that inherent power is.
I think it would be unfortunate if we delegated congressional power
to the President or attempted to do. so. I do not think we can, but
we will never get it tested constitutionally. I think it would be most
unfortunate if we got into a congressional conflict over a resolution
that amounted to a predated declaration of war and that could be
interpreted as seeking to delegate to the President the power to
commit an act of war.
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60 SITUATION IN CUBA
It is so easy to get this Congress into session we could strengthen
our position around the world, if we educate the people around the
world to our constitutional process of checks and balances. The Presi-
dent's action will mean so much more after the Congress has had
explained to it the operative facts that call for a declaration of war
if we get to that point. To protect our security you do not need any
advance authority from the Congress of the United States. The Presi-
dent has that inherently. What -I am worried about is the possibility
of getting a resolution so worded. here that we can lean back in our
congressional chairs and say, "Well, we have passed the burden to
the President. If he thinks we have to make war we have told him
to go ahead and make it."
I still think it is pretty important under our constitutional system
that the actual declaration of war be made by the Congress of the
United -States on the basis of -a message presented by the President to
the Congress containing those -facts that justify a declaration of war.
I wanted you to know the concern of mine because I think it is inherent
in the situation in these closing days of the session of Congress. I am
worried about the time element. I am worried- about the rush in which
we are acting here this week, with all the other things we have to do.
I am, afraid there is not going to be time for the deliberation and the
calling in of all. the witnesses that ought to be called in.
I think we can pass a resolution that will give the President the
backing that he needs and in which we simply say, "We want you to
know that we are aware of your inherent powers as Commander in
Chief. If you find it necessary to use them, go ahead and use them,
and then give us a report immediately as to why it became necessary
for you to take those acts that might lead to an act of war." That is
quite a different thing from the resolution which I have heard dis-
cussed here this morning which, without time to analyze the language,
I interpret to be a predated declaration of war.
I do not think it is necessary to pass that kind of a resolution. I do
not think we should pass that kind of a resolution. On the other hand
I think we ought to make very clear to the President our united bi-
partisan support of his using his Commander in Chief power in any
factual situation which develops that may causehim to have to go all
the way to protect our security. He can do that, Monroe Doctrine or
no Monroe Doctrine. -
I am through, Mr. Chairman. If the Secretary wishes to comment
he may,but I do not ask for it.
INTERNATIONAL EFFECT OF A BLOCKADE
Chairman RussELL. I assume we will thrash that out later in the
committee. But I am a little confused about one question, Mr. Sec-
retary, on this matter of a blockade.
I always had thought that a blockade was, in effect, an act of war
against a country blockaded. I did not know it was an act of war
against everybody who had vessels on the high seas.
Secretary RUSK. Well, the use of force against ships going into a
country blockaded could be interpreted by the country who was
stopped as an act of force, to proceed on the basis of an act of war.
Chairman RussELL. That is seizure, but I thought it was very
clearly defined internationally where a state of war actually existed,
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SITUATION IN CUBA 61
where one country had the power to impose a blockade, that they had
the right to do it. The British relied on that during two World Wars.
Talking about Her Majesty's Government, if a blockade is an act
of war, then if you have the power to enforce the blockade then you
have the right to do it under international law.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think the situation would be quite dif-
ferent if, in fact, there was a state of war between the two countries.
I had supposed we were talking about a blockade short of the exist-
ence of a state of war when I commented on it earlier.
Senator MoRsn. Mr. Chairman, wasn't the War of 1812 in part
really brought about by a blockade?
Chairman RussuLL. I thought it was on search and seizure on the
high seas. The war hawks finally forced us into that war very fool-
, and then only one of them had the courage to fight, the others
sent other men out to fight, because they were seizing American
ships right outside Baltimore Harbor, and were taking American
citizens and impressing them. That is what brought on the War
of 1812.
Senator MoRsn. The blockade factor was very important.
Chairman RussELL. It had very little to do with it. Jefferson rec-
ognized the blockade of France before that time, and the War of
1812 continued.
Speaking of the war hawks in the Congress denouncing the British
and calling us cowards because they would not prevent them from
taking our fellow citizens and putting them on British ships, when
they finally got the country in the war, one of them fought a little
bit, but the others did not fight a day.
RELATIVE IMPORTANOI` OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION
Since we are all making statements here, one thing that distressed
me is the concern that we are going to choke ourselves to death on our
exaggerated fears that the rest of the world won't like us.
I do not want us to get to the point where we have to let our
foreign policy be controlled by whether it meets the favor of all the
peoples on earth. If we do we are doomed.
Khrushchev did not think about that when he went into Hungary
and crushed those boys over there with his tanks, and if he suffered
in international relations, I have not seen it anywhere. The ones who
were his friends are still staying with him, and the ones who opposed
him are still opposing him.
While we must carry out our international commitments, I think
this business of failing to do what we should do because of the fear
of what the rest of the world thinks about us can result in self-
destruction.
Secretary RUSK.. Senator, I do not believe that is a matter that
would hold us back if certain actions became necessary.
For example, we knew when we resumed nuclear testing that world
opinion, by and large, would be negative. Nevertheless, because it
was important for us to resume testing we proceeded and, incidentally,
because we proceeded, world opinion then tended to rally around us to
a considerable degree.
But I do think, as a practical matter, it is of the greatest importance
when we act in matters that involve great danger to the American
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62
people it is an element of strength for us to have the maximum number
of people all over the world for us.
Chairman RussnLL. I approve of that. But the time spent waiting
to build up support in some crisis that might put us at an unconscion-
able disadvantage is what I am talking about.
Senator Humphrey, I am afraid you will have to defer your ques-
tions.
Senator Ilump:aREY. I am not going to be able to come back this
afternoon, and I shall not take any time with the Secretary.
The thing that has disturbed me a little bit this morning is that
there has not been very much comment, unless there was prior to my
coining here, relating to the consequences of unilateral action in the
Cuban situation in terms of other areas of the world in our confronta-
tion of the Soviet power.
I believe, Mr. Secretary, that it is absolutely essential that in this
discussion with some of our colleagues here the relationship of our
situation in Berlin in the coming months, to this critical situation in
Cuba, be clearly spelled out. I think also it is important that you tell
the committee-if you have any concern about it in what areas of
the world we might be faced with heavier Soviet pressures even to the
point of belligerency by Soviet forces, if military action were taken by
our country upon Cuba. I do not say that any of these contingencies
should deny us or should keep us from fulfilling the necessary act in
relationship with Cuba. I want to make quite clear my feeling about
that. I do not think there is anything that we can do that won't have
some repercussions, but I think we ought to evaluate those repercus-
sions and see whether or not what we are doing is worth what may
follow in other parts of the world.
I want to say with Senator Russell that I do not believe in a
foreign policy of being just popular. I think it is very important
that we take action at times which may be unpopular, because you
cannot please everybody in here, much less around the world.
Then, too, Mr. Secretary, since I will not be able to interrogate you,
I would be very interested in knowing just what we are doing right
now to keep up the forces in Cuba that oppose this dictatorship. I
heard this morning on the radio, as I came to work, a reporter who gave
a special on-the-scene report of commando-type activities down in the
Florida Keys. He asked one of the officers in charge whether or not
this had the support of the Government of the United States, and he
said, no, that the main thing they had from the United States was
trouble. He said they were getting no support from the United States.
Nevertheless, it was said that these forces were Cuban and were under
the command and under the training of our military personnel.
This kind of a news story coming out again-it was over the NBC
network, I believe, is disconcerting.
There are a lot of ideas that some of us have about what we might
do, I suppose you have heard them all. What about the possibility
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SITUATION IN CUBA 63
of using some of these Cuban exiles as auxiliary forces among some
of our Central American countries? We would have to make some
offer of help or afford some financial help. There are thousands of
these men, and maybe there would be some political danger to that idea
in the respective countries.
SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN
Furthermore, is it necessary to consult with all of the OAS? This
is a Caribbean area, and from what little I know about Latin America,
the people who are not in the Caribbean area do not think the same
as many of those in the Caribbean-in other words, Venezuela, Pan-
ama, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, these countries,
the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. These countries have a little
different attitude about Mr. Castro and his crowd because they live
right next door. As you know, I expressed concern about Haiti. I
would be willing to bet several years of my public life, if I have that
many, that there are going to be troubles in Haiti. I think there is
going to be trouble in Haiti, and the question is what are we going to
do with that trouble when it comes. Do we have anybody that we are
for? Do we have some plans to see that Haiti does not fall into the
hands of Cuba? There is a good deal of evidence that Duvalier is
already playing footsie with some of the Communist forces.
I would welcome any brief comment you would like to make on some
of those concerns of mine.
Secretary Russ. Senator, on the first part of your question, your
comment about the effect of the worldwide confrontation with the
Soviet bloc, I can comment briefly on that. I did comment on that
before you came in.
Senator IIUMPIIREY. I can read and I will read the record.
Secretary RUSK. But I will comment on that further later on this
afternoon. [Deleted.]
The various refugee groups at the moment are not able because of
a disagreement with each other, rather than agreeing on a single
unified consistent effort, to get all of their activities coordinated.
[Deleted.]
Some of these refugees, of course, are being offered places in our
own Armed Forces. [Deleted.]
By and large, the refugees are not normally those who gravitate
to military service, thus far. They are more the professional people
who have not been as anxious to do that.
We have used them to good advantage in sending teams around
Latin America telling the story of Cuba in some of these other
countries.
Senator HUMPIIREY. Yes.
Secretary RUSK. And the suggestion that the countries immedi-
ately in the Caribbean area might act together, short of the entire
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hemisphere, was clearly envisaged in the Punta del Este Conference
where arrangements were laid on to make this possible.
Senator HUMPHHREY. It would seem to me this is a group of coun-
tries that we might want to pay special attention to at this time.
Secretary RUSK. Well, you see, Senator, if I may remind you, at
Punta del Este where six of the so-called important countries wanted
to abstain on throwing Cuba out of the OAS, we took the view that
the important countries were those that felt themselves threatened.
Senator HuMPIImiy. Right.
Secretary RUSK. And, therefore, we pursued the ,majority view and
got the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS ; so I think we agree with
the implications of your comments on that particular point.
Senator HUAiP REY. Thank you.
Chairman RussELL. Mr. Secretary, I am afraid you are not going
to be able to make it back here by 2:30.
Secretary RUSK. I can be back at 2:30, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. I do not want to press you because we have
kept you over here for more than an hour after normal quitting time.
Secretary RusK. I can be back, if I may.
Chairman RUSSELL. You can?
Secretary RusK. I will have to readjust my schedule.
Chairman RUSSELL. All right. Be here at 2:30.
We will recess until 2:30.
(Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the joint committee took a recess, to
reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.)
(Present: From the Committee on Armed Services: Senators Rus-
sell (presiding), Thurmond, Engle, Bush, and Beall.
(From the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Church and Aiken.)
Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.
Senator Bush?
Senator BUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, has our Government made any request of the Soviet
Government for a demand or warning of the Soviet Government
that they should discontinue this military buildup in Cuba?,
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOM-
PANIED BY WILLIAM P. BUNDY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
AND ABRAM CHAYES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary RUSK. Senator, we know that the Soviet Government
fully understands the attitude of the U.S. Government on this mat-
ter. This has been conveyed to them in a variety of ways. But we
have not formally presented them with a note or formally proposed
any discussion or negotiation on that subject. [Deleted.]
To a considerable extent our view is that there is a special regime
of international law in this hemisphere, that has been historically
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from the point of view of the nations in the Western Hemisphere,
which has its special security arrangements in this hemisphere, and we
would not want to see this put up as a matter of negotiation or bar-
gaining between the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the
world.
Senator Busii. Well, my thought was not that we would suggest
any bargaining, but the question really was whether in view of this
special international law that applies to the Western Hemisphere,
whether we would not be justified as a government in making a formal
demand that they discontinue this buildup, and it is in violation of the
Monroe Doctrine, it is in violation of this body of international law
that is peculiar to our hemisphere and, therefore, it would seem to me
that making such a request would not necessarily oblige us to link
it with any deal respecting Berlin or the Far East or any other place,
because we feel that this is a special situation that applies to the
Western Hemisphere and, particularly to the United States.
Secretary RLTsK. Well, I think there is no doubt whatever that
the Soviet Union fully knows our attitude on this question and on that
point.
I think the only question there is the difference in the means or the
formalities by which one gets this very much to their attention.
I have no doubt whatever that the response of the Soviet Union in its
Tass statement showed that it was fully aware of the attitude of the
American people and the American Government, and also they moved
in its statement to try to meet some of the points that they knew
were very much in our own minds.
But, Senator, I do not really attach too much importance to the
absence of a formal note, given the many ways in which we have of
communicating our attitude to the Soviet Union on these matters.
Senator Busy-r. Has our Government made any official disclosure
of our knowledge of the extent of the military buildup in Cuba and the
extent to which the Russians are assisting Cuba?
We have seen in the press, of course, a great deal of information
from the reports that have been in there.
I have in mind particularly some reports made by one of the New
York Herald Tribune men which was put in the Congressional Rec-
ord. You probably have seen that yourself.
But have we, as a government, made any disclosure to the people
that we know the extent of the buildup?
Secretary Rusx. The President has included information on this
in his statements and has indicated that if the situation changes we
will make further information available. [Deleted.]
The U.S. Information Agency is taking on the rather extensive job
of replying to the Tass statement all over the world, but the essential
elements of the facts there, I think, have been made public, and the
President has indicated he would make additional facts public when
it became known. There have been some reports from refugees and
others that are only partly accurate, and one of our problems is
separating the reports from confirmed information.
We feel we have laid on a number of activities which will help us
sort out report from fact and keep the people factually informed.
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Senator Busii. You said in your opening remarks that respecting
any resolution that the Congress might pass, the Senate might pass,
simplicity was to be emphasized.
In comparing the resolution of Senator Keating and myself which
we introduced, with the one that was introduced by Senator Mans-
field, it seems to me that the Mansfield resolution is much too long,
especially in view of what you have said, and that the other resolution,
the shorter one, is concise and very much to the point. It makes two
major points that are involved here.
One is the basic right of the Cuban people to independence and
self-determination and, secondly, the declaration of the rights and
obligations of the United States in this matter.
We refer to the United States. We do not mention the President
in this. That is due to the fact that we did not want to seek to instruct
the President to do anything that was against the feeling of the
Congress.
The declaration concerning the Cuban people and their rights to
independence, and the declaration of the rights and obligations of the
United States to take action in that connection, in our own behalf,
that is what we have stated.
I do not wish to embarrass you in comparing the two resolutions
inasmuch as you stressed the simplicity or the desire for simplicity,
and I fully agree with the view that the shorter, the more simpler the
resolution, the more effective it would be.
I wonder if you care to express yourself on that comparison, whether
.you would prefer not to do it off the cuff, so to speak, but to give
us a statement in a day or so regarding your views on the resolution.
Of course, we will have to take the responsibility for the resolution.
But it seems to me that the Mansfield resolution, with all due re-
spect to our able leader, Mr. Mansfield, is much too long, much too
involved.
He does not come directly to the point, whereas the Keating-Bush
resolution is very pointed, very brief, and asserts the rights of Cuban
people and the rights of the United States.
Would you care to comment on that or not? I shall not insist cer-
tainly that you do. I do not want to embarrass you in any way. But it
is a pretty serious matter, and I think we would be very pleased to
have you advise us on how you view this situation.
Secretary Rush. Well, Senator, I would not wish at this stage to
set the specific language of one resolution over against the other
because the resolution which might come out of the Congress is, of
course, in the hands of the Congress.
Senator Busiu. That is right.
Secretary RusK. But I think there is some advantage in building up
somewhat more of the background of this problem in relation to not
only our national interests but also the hemispheric interests, and I
think, for example, that it is useful to point out both to them and to
other countries that the governments of the hemisphere did take some
important steps in this matter at Punta del Este in January which
provides a basis for further hemispheric action on this Cuban ques-
tion, and that the Western Hemisphere has already rejected this
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Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba as being incompatible with the
hemisphere.
EMPHASIS NOT ON UNILATERAL ACTION
Now, on the other question, I commented earlier this morning that
I would hope that we would not unduly emphasize the unilateral
aspect of this matter because for practical and political reasons I
do not believe it would come to a point where `unilateral" means
just that because I think that the circumstances in which a clear and
present .anger would require us to take particular action of a cer-
tain sort would be circumstances in which others would work with us
and that, in any event, the United States, acting in a matter of this
sort, would, because of our involvement with others and our influ-
ence in the world, necessarily involve a good many other countries
in the issue.
DOES UNITED STATES HAVE RIGHT TO RESTORE CUBA TO A GOVERNMENT
OF TIIE PEOPLE?
But I think that would be one of the principal problems, whether
we have the right to intervene to restore the Republic of Cuba to a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people which
would, I think, again raise some far-reaching difficulties.
I do not think we have really ever asserted that right. I do not
think we have that right covered by any of our international agree-
ments in relation to the use of armed forces.
We do have certain rights with regard to a direct security threat
to this hemisphere, but I think there are points of that sort that we
would hope to have a chance to go into as the committee considered
the actual wording of a resolution.
Senator ENGLE. You surely would not approve that language, would
you?
Secretary RUSE. Well, I think it would be difficult to assert and
sustain that right, that we have a right to intervene because that, in
effect, as far as Cuba is concerned, would be the substance of the Platt
amendment.
Senator ENGLE. Let us just assume they want to vote themselves
some other kind of government. Are we going to tell them what
they ought to put in there? We cannot do that.
Secretary RUSE. I think, as I read the resolution, the intent seems
to be in the same general direction in which the other members of the
hemisphere resolve that this Marxist-Leninist regime is incompatible
with the obligations of the inter-American system.
But I think this particular language could lead to the impression
that we were breaking new ground here in asserting the national
right to intervene for a rather specifically defined internal structure
of government.
Senator Busii. What is your point on it?
Senator ENGLE. My point is we cannot do it.
Senator BUSH. Cannot do what?
Senator ENGLE. You cannot pass a. resolution that we are going to
restore to the Republic of Cuba a government of the people, by the
people, and for the people. That is our definition, but if they want
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68 SITUATION IN CUBA
to vote a socialistic form of government they can do it, providing
they do it by popular mandate and doing it themselves.
Senator Busu. I have no further questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Engle?
Senator ENGLE. No questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Do you any questions or comments?
Senator ENGLE. No, thank you.
Chairman RUSSELL. Or contributions?
Senator Beall?
Senator BEALL. No questions.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask -a
question or two at this point.
Chairman RussELL. Senator Sparkman?
Senator SPARKMAN. [Deleted.]
I want to ask you is that true or not?
Mr. BUNDY. Yes. This was a new one to me, Senator, and I have
not gone into it in the depth that I should like, and I, therefore, should
like to have permission to give you a better statement which I shall
as soon as I can get the facts together. But essentially the installa-
tions are very different.
The type of - emplacements, the type of supporting facility is very
different as between the surface-to-air missile and a surface-to-surface
missile, and the missiles themselves are very markedly different, so
you can be perfectly confident of your identification even with a
fairly untrained observer.
Now, therefore, I think it would take very major modifications of
those sites, as they are being done now, and they are being done,
all indications are they are being done by forced draft, being done
very rapidly, and while it is a lighter missile, it is like our NIKE,
you can put up launching apparatus without too great difficulty.
Now, the surface-to-surface missile, the RBM's, 700-mile, 1,200-mile,
2,100-mile bracketed range of the missile, differ. Some require very
extensive sites ; others can be made mobile.
I think the 700-mile one can be made mobile, but I am going on the
fragile memory of my intelligence days when I say that.
I think they can be brought in with no reference to site, but I think
in the nature of an observation of an object that big we would know
it if it had been.
So I do not think there has been much real connection between the
two. They have secure installations surrounding these surface-to-
air missiles, but they could have that kind of secure installation before,
and doubteless did have, in connection with their military advisory
activities.
I do not see that they gain much toward a surface-to-surface system
by those surface-to-air missile sites, but I would like permission, if I
may, to check that and confirm it in writing.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. [Deleted.]
Is the range of these missiles a matter of secrecy or has that been
made public ? ,
Mr. BUNnY. No, that has been made public in the Presidents state
ment, Senator.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. What is the range?
Mr. BUNDY. Twenty-five miles.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 69
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Twenty-five miles. I saw a news-
paper column a few days ado which stated that it was from 60 to 80
miles rather than the 25 miles that the President stated. I remem-
bered quite distinctly that it was stated when we were down at the
White House that the range was 25 miles, and it was surface to air.
Mr. BUNDY. That is correct.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. That is the type of installation that
they have there?
Mr. BUNDY. We are confident of the type of missile in this instance.
Secretary RUSK. Even that, Senator, does not mean that we may not
have some-
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I realize that.
Secretary RUSK. Because we are insisting on our right to conduct
surveillance of international waters and airspace, and it would be
well within, in some instances, the range of those weapons.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes. I realize that. Of course, I
certainly hope we carry on that surveillance because I think it is
necessary.
VALUE OF A CUBAN RESOLUTION
Let me ask just this : It is your view, and I think you stated that this
morning, that it would be a good thing, a helpful thing, for Congress
to state its attitude in the form of a resolution with the proper word-
inm which this committee will have to hammer out?
~ecretary RUSK. Yes, sir. But I did take the liberty of pointing
out that the greater unanimity and the simpler such a resolution, the
more effective it would be for the purposes of giving the right signals.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes, I recall that.
My own feeling is that there is unanimity so far as the helpfulness
of a statement of attitude is concerned. I think that probably would
be true throughout Congress.
The matter of agreeing on the exact words may be a little more
difficult because it is, to my way of thinking, a rather technical thing
to get the right word in the right place.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I assume that there are avail able
in the Foreign Relations Committee the following items, but I want
to get President Monroe's message to Congress, a copy of the Rio
Treaty of 1947, and the Punta del Este agreement of 1962 printed
in our hearings. Do you think of any other agreement that should
go in there? The Bogota charter?
Secretary RUSK. I think the Caracas resolution should be, perhaps,
included as a matter of general literature.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did Bogotti relate to this in anywise?
Secretary RUSK. Not specifically. If there is an indication, if you
think it would be well to see how the hemispheric
Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to have available in one little
pamphlet all of the various declarations.
Secretary RUSK. All right ; we will get those to you.
(The documents referred to appear in the appendix.)
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70 SITUATION IN CUBA
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN RESOLUTIONS
Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am not too sure that
I know how to deal wisely in a matter of this kind, but I think Ave
should attempt to be as nearly unanimous as possible. I see in the
resolving clause of the Mansfield resolution the possibilities for a
hairsplitting constitutional argument over the constitutional powers
of Congress, the delegation of those powers, and the inherent powers
of the President.
I am always frightened to hear people talking about inherent pow-
ers. There are some, of course, there have to be. But that is a subject
of so much distortion that inherent powers always frighten me.
I have been looking at these resolutions, and I wish you would look
at the Mansfield resolution, if you have it before you, on page 2.
Secretary RUSK. All. right, sir.
Chairman RUSSELL. It seems to me that we might be wise to report
out a joint resolution.
Acting Chairman SrARKMAN. Concurrent.
Chairman RUSSELL. Joint. As it is now, this is a concurrent reso-
lution and, of course, if it just goes through Congress the President
won't sign it. The resolution refers to the President, and I suggest
a change in this language in the resolving clause to get away from this
constitutional argument that is absolutely certain to result and cause
the loss of 10 or 12 votes of Senators who otherwise would favor
this course of action. I would suggest that we change this to say
that it is the sense of the Congress that the United States is determined
(a), (b), (c). That puts the whole Government, the American people
and the President behind it, and it eliminates a long technical argu-
ment.
What do you think about that? I had forgotten until Senator
Morse started questioning you, the argument we had on the Formosa
resolution over this same thing, and this eliminates both angles of it.
We are not authorizing or directing the President, but we are ex-
pressing the combined determination of the people, the Congress and
the President when he signs it.
If you think it is well for him to sign it, that is just my idea, that
would bring him in to approve it.
Secretary RUSK. Well, on the question, Mr. Chairman, of the dif-
ference between a joint and a concurrent resolution I would appre-
ciate an opportunity to consult on that point, because I have not really
had a chance to discuss that with the President.
Chairman RUSSELL. The only difference is that the President would
not sign a concurrent resolution. It would just go through the two
Houses.
Secretary RUSK. Right.
Chairman RUSSELL. That is a concurrent resolution. If it is a
joint resolution he has to sign it just as he does any other law.
Senator BUSH. Would the Senator yield for a question? Why do
you prefer the joint resolution which would have to be signed as
against the sense of the Congress?
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Chairman RUSSELL. Because of the fact that this other resolution
says that the President of the United States is supported in his
determination. He is in this resolution, and without his signing it,
some people might say, very unfairly and unjustly and untruly, but
nevertheless, you would find some willing listeners, that the President
had no determination. He was completely out of it.
If we are going to make it a joint resolution we would strike out
"It is the sense of the Congress," and say that "The United States is
determined," (a), (b), (o).
If it means anything, it means something then, otherwise we are
going to get into a long constitutional debate as to whether or not
the President possesses all these necessary authorities or whether we
are delegating the authority to him to declare war.
This will eliminate it completely.
Senator CHURCrr. Mr. President, I think unless the language is
changed there is a very serious question raised as to the delegation of
constitutional authority.
Chairman RUSSELL. I could not support this resolution myself ;
I could not vote for it.
Senator Busrr. Mr. Chairman, could I ask you a question?
Chairman RussELL. Yes, indeed.
Senator Busrz. You could make the change of language you sug-
gest, which I think is good, without making it a joint resolution.
Chairman RussELL. Oh, yes, sir. Of course, you could. But why
should we eliminate the President from it?
Senator BUS II. I am not saying I do not agree, but just offhand I
would say that the only reason would be that this is a congressional
resolution and is designed to express the sense of the Congress to
fortify the President.
Chairman RussELL. We are striking out the sense. We say the
United States, and why do you want to eliminate the only man in
the American Government who can really speak for the United States
in international relations? He ought. to be in there.
Senator Busrr. If I understood your correction, your change, it was
to read "Resolved, That it is the sense of Congress'
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. He then said he would strike it out.
Chairman RUSSELL. No. If we are going to make it joint, we would
say, "Resolved by the Senate (House of Representatives concurring),
That the United States is determined," "That the United States is
determined." That brings everybody in, the people, the Congress,
and our only spokesman, whether you like him or not, but lie is the
one man in the United States who has the right to speak for the
United States in foreign relations officially. We can speak our views
in the Senate, but in the field of international relations, he has the
initiative, and there is no way in the world that Congress or anybody
else can take it away from him.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I think you would have to-of course,
this is minor-change this, too. You would have to strike out "The
House of Representatives concurring," and say "Resolved by the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives in Congress assembled," wouldn't
you?
Chairman RUSSELL. We would have to correct that. That brings
everybody into it.
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Secretary Rusx. Mr. Chairman, I regret I do not feel able at the
moment to assist in precise language on this point. I do feel I need
to consult a bit further on it.
Chairman RUSSELL. I wish you would, and let us know right away
because we have to take some action here. We only have until Thurs-
day to get this perfected and the hearings printed and back to the
floor.
Secretary Ruszi. I will indeed, sir.
Chairman RUSSELL. And these changes, in my considered judgment,
will mean the difference of 10 or 12 votes one way or the other, on
this resolution, and I just do not believe it is worthwhile to split hairs
on this part of it and have it look as if you have a division there,
whatever reason it, might be.
Secretary Rusn. If I could express two points that I
Chairman RUSSELL. I want you to be perfectly frank with us.
Secretary RUSK. And I would want to consult others about it in
the executive branch, it would be whether since the President has
made an important and far-reaching declaration just 2 or 3 days
ago on this matter, and since I think both you and we would agree
that he also already has quite extensive uthority and is exercising
very extensive authority
Chairman RussELL. That is correct.
Secretary Rusx. Whether the elimination of that portion of this
language would lead to an implication that the Congress might feel
that the President is not determined or that he does not have very
extensive authority to carry out his responsibilities as Commander
in Chief.
I see also the other constitutional aspect of it, but the Congress
would be unwilling to appear to delegate authority without knowing
what it is that is being delegated. I think this is something
Senator Crruncii. The follow-on language, Mr. Secretary, is so
broad that I could construe this resolution as nothing other than a
sweeping delegation of power, which would seem to me to weaken,
if not to abrogate entirely, the power of the Congress to declare
war.
Chairman RUSSELL. In my judgment this committee, at least I do
not know about the Foreign Relations Committee, but I do not be-
lieve that the Armed Services Committee, is going to make a consti-
tutional assertion that the President of the United States has the
right to declare war, and that is what this does.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. It may do it, and I certainly would
not quarrel with changing it, but Congress could not, if it said such
a thing, do so. It would be without effect. Congress cannot delegate
to the President the right to declare war, because that is lodged in
Congress by the Constitution.
Chairman RUSSELL. We have allowed a great deal of our authority
with respect to interstate commerce to be delegated. We do it by
bills that have 150 pages, delegating such authority not to the Presi-
dent, but to the commissions.
Senator Crrurcii. I think that is an uncontested question and it
never will be brought to court.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 73
Chairman RUSSELL. There is no way to get it tested because the
fighting and shooting are going on then.
Secretary RUsii. I think, Mr. Chairman, since the
Chairman RUSSELL. If you are willing to take out "and possesses
all necessary authority," it is all the same with me.
Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do not-
Chairman RUSSELL. "The President is supported in his determina-
tion"; I have no objection to that.
Secretary RUSK. I think I can say with complete confidence that
there is no intent on the executive side to change the constitutional
responsibilities through such a resolution.
Chairman RUSSELL. But that is a pretty broad assertion, Mr. Sec-
retary.
Secretary RUSK. I think we should find a way to get some common
language here, but I do need a chance to consult.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY WORDING OF RESOLUTION
Chairman RUSSELL. That won't eliminate the controversy, but the
same controversy was raised with respect to the Formosa resolution.
The President has been challenged as to whether he was really serious
in this Cuban situation. I think everybody who knows him is assured
that he is, but that does not keep us from having some doubting
Thomases.
Senator ENGLE. Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt but what, your com-
mittee will support your position on those particular words.
Chairman RUSSELL. There is no question in my mind as to what
the Senate will do about it. If you want to have a row about it, we
can take it out there unchanged.
Senator BUSH. You are speaking now about taking out those words?
Chairman RUSSELL. "And possesses all necessary authority."
Senator Busii. I would agree with that.
Secretary RUSK. I suppose the committee report could make it clear
that there was no intention there to limit such powers as the President
himself already possesses.
Chairman RUSSELL. Indeed not.
Secretary RUSK. There is a singular verb here.
Chairman RUSSELL. Indeed not. I am perfectly willing to go to
the other extreme. But that will cause controversy on the other side.
I am perfectly willing to say the President is hereby authorized by
the Congress to do all these things, even by the use of including the
use of arms.
You have stressed twice there the importance of unanimity, and I
was trying to think of something we could get through that nobody
could vote against unless he said, "I am such a curmudgeon that I am
not going to vote for anything."
Secretary RUSK. I am confident we can get some language to cover
that point.
SUPPORT OF STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Bundy, do you have any statement you
desire to make on this matter?
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Mr. BUNDY. No, sir. I came purely to respond to any questions the
committees might have on matters of a military nature, the military
situation.
The Department of Defense fully supports the statement Secretary
Rusk has made, and the position he has presented.
Senator BUSH. I have one question, Mr. Bundy.
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.
Senator BUSH. [Deleted.]
Senator BUSH. Thank you.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question, Mr. Bundy.
[Deleted.]
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I remember General LeMay, Chief
of Staff of the Air Force, stating that there would be no difficulty in
knocking out those missile sites.
Mr. BUNDY. [Deleted.]
Senator BUSH. May I ask one more question? If you want this
answer off the record, you think it should be answered off the record,
you may answer it off the record.
[Deleted.]
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Chairman RUSSELL. We have with us the distinguished majority
leader of the Senate, who is the author of two of these resolutions,
Senator Mansfield. We have had an interesting hearing. We recog-
nize that your duties kept you on the floor.
Do you have any comments that you care to make?
Senator MANSFIELD. No, no questions, Senator, thank you.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Miller, did you desire to be heard be-
fore the committee?
Senator .MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I do; but I certainly would not
want to detail the Secretary, unless it is your desire to have him pres-
ent when I testify, and I would value any comments he might have to
make. I shall not be long.
Senator MANSFIELD. Was the Secretary present when Senator Keat-
ing was testifying?
Chairman RUSSELL. I believe he was. He came in when Senator
Keating testified.
Secretary RUSK. I came in while he was testifying, but I did not
take part in the colloquy.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond, do you have any questions?
PUBLIC INTEREST IN CUBAN SITUATION
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions
especially, but I might just pass on to Secretary Rusk this informa-
tion.
I visited South Carolina this past week, and without bringing up
the question myself, I had several hundred people approach me about
Cuba.
I want to say there is an intense interest in it, there is great concern
about it, tremendous anxiety about it.
Of course, South Carolina being just next to Georgia and Florida,
we are closer to Cuba than some other parts of the country are.
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It is my judgment that the people want something done. They feel
as if it should be done. They feel that to remain inactive and not
take steps with the buildup of Russian troops in there-and, of course,
there are troops, there is no question about this-that we are jeopardiz-
ing the security of this country.
I believe you stated last week that you did feel the Monroe Doctrine
was being violated-at the joint hearing, you and Secretary McNamara
so testified ; and the people feel that way, too.
So I just wanted to pass that on to you to let you know the thinking
of the people in our State, that they are more deeply concerned about
this than anything I have heard them speak about since I have been a
Senator.
Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator. I practically know, without
having been there recently, if I were back in my own county in Georgia
that my relatives there would be pressing me on the same subject,
no question about that, Senator.
Chairman RUSSELL. You can stay until Senator Miller makes his
brief statement.
Senator Miller, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACK MILLER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA
Senator MILLER. Mr. Chairman, you have before you a copy of my
resolution.
I do want to make it clear that I do not have any pride of authorship
in it, but I would like to point out the standards under which this was
drafted, and recommend to the joint committee-or the two committees
that whatever resolution comes out of this group conform to these
standards.
CLARITY AND DEFINITENESS IN RESOLUTION PRESSED
The first standard I would recommend is that the resolution that
comes out be clear and ringing and definitive. I think that a so-called
watered-down statement, one that is highly ambiguous, one that can
be criticized for being "soft," would be worse than none at all.
I want to make clear I do not hink we have to have one that is
belligerent, but I think we should have one that is clear and ringing
and very hard so far as firmness is concerned, just as firm as steel.
Secondly, I think both Houses ought to be on record on this. I
believe to have its effectiveness it should pass both Houses rather than
just one.
Third, I think it ought to be broad.
Now, we all know from our correspondence that the people are
thinking in terms of Cuba.
While it was not the intention that the callup of the reservists be
necessarily linked with Cuba, the fact is that the American people
have so done, and I think that they will think of Cuba in terms of the
resolution that will be forthcoming from these committees.
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76 SITUATION IN CUBA
MORE THAN CUBA IS INVOLVED
But, nevertheless, I do not think we ought to necessarily confine
it to Cuba. It is more than a Cuban situation.
You will note that in my resolution I recited certain facts in the
whereas clauses relating to Cuba. But I did not confine it entirely
to Cuba, and I did not mention Cuba by name. There is no question
but what Cuba is the one referred to in some of these clauses.
Now, another thing is that Mr. Khrushchev has made the statement
that the Monroe Doctrine is dead. I believe that not to face- up to
that would be a grave error. I think that it is for the Congress of the
United States to say whether the Monroe Doctrine is dead or not, and
I think inasmuch as Mr. Khrushchev has undertaken to say that it is
dead, it would bewell for us to make very clear in a ringing proclama-
tion that it is alive, and I think we ought to so state.
I also believe that it would be highly important for us to make
our statement regarding the existence and aliveness of the Monroe
Doctrine, that it is premised on the right of self-defense. This was
done by the Senate back at the time of the adoption of the multi-
lateral or Kellogg-Briand Treaty and, if I may, I will just read
briefly from page 2 of the committee report in which it says :
The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its national secu-
rity and defense. Under the right of self-defense. allowed by the treaty must
necessarily be included the right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine which is
a part of our system of national defense.
I recommend that be included in the resolution to make it clear
that we are not going to forget about the inherent right of self-
defense of this country.
I recognize that the U.N. Charter is one that we are trying to live
up to, but the inherent right of self-defense is recognized as being
something that is not obliged by the U.N. Charter, and I believe the
failure to mention this in conjunction with our declaration regarding
the viability of the Monroe Doctrine would be a mistake.
Now, finally, I think that this ought to be broad with respect to the
action to be taken.
You will note in my resolution that I merely recommended that we
authorize and direct the President to take such action as is necessary
to prevent any violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
Now, such action may be in concert with the OAS or it may be uni-
lateral. That, I think, is something for the Chief Executive to decide.
It may take the form of mere diplomatic pressures. It may take
the form of economic pressures, such as the embargo that has already
been put into effect.
It might take the form of a war materiel blockade such as I have
recommended.
It might take the form of a general blockade, anything within
the powers of the President is what I had in mind at the time I called
for such action as was necessary.
I believe that if we come up with a resolution that will meet these
tests that we will have something that is meaningful, w- will have
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SITUATION IN CUBA 77
something that the President feels will have the power and support of
Congress fully behind him, and that it will be broad enough so that
lie will have plenty of flexibility needed to meet any of the dangers to
our security that may arise in the Western Hemisphere.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, is that the Kellogg Treaty that re-
nounced war as an instrument of national policy?
Senator MILLER. I quoted from the Senate, an open executive session
report by Mr. Borah from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Report No. 1, 70th Congress, 2d session on January 14, 1929.
Secretary Rush.. Pardon me, sir, that was a statement by Secretary
Kellogg at that time, isn't that what you said?
Senator MILLER. This is the statement of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Mr. Secretary, which I quoted from.
Secretary Rush. Thank you.
Senator MILLER. There are some quotations within the report, but
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made it very clear that this
is a part of our self-defense philosophy. That is all I have, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. We thank you very much for your contribution,
Senator.
Senator Aiken, you have just come in. Do you have any questions?
Senator AIKEN. I am sorry. I had something a. little more difficult
than what went on here. I had a conference on the farm bill.
I do not know what the Secretary of State has heretofore stated, but
I did hear the first witness say this morning that you ought to consult
with the other members of the Organization of American States for
the purpose of collective action. Are you doing that?
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir ; and we expect to have a meeting of the
Foreign Ministers not later than October 2.
Senator AIKEN. Also it was stated that you ought to consult with
the other NATO nations to see if you could persuade them to stop
abettin Communists by permitting their ships to be used to transport
weapon and other goods from Russia, any Russian bloc to Cuba.
Are you consulting with the NATO members?
Secre ary RUSK. Yes, sir; we are.
Pard n me, sir, but there is some material in the record. I did go
into th t a little bit in the morning.
Senator AIKEN. I will have to read the record.
Does the President have power to use the Armed Forces of the
United States in the interests of the United States without further
action }4y the Congress?
Secretary RUSK. Well, this is
Senator AIKEN. Without declaring an emergency?
Secretary RUSK. This varies a great deal with the circumstances,
I would think, Senator.
89479-622--6
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The President has, in fact, over the years on many occasions used
the Armed Forces of the United States without direct reference to the
Congress.
But here or in a situation where there may be a major use of such
forces, I would think that the President would be in consultation with
congressional leadership to consider how the Executive or Legislature
would move together on a matter of that sort.
Senator AIKEN. What authority was exercised before the President
sent the Marines into Lebanon? Was that subsequent to an act of
Congress authorizing it?
Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I do not think there was an act of Con-
gress in that particular respect.
Senator AIKEN. What authority did President Truman exercise in
sending troops into Korea?
Secretary RusK. He acted there as Commander in Chief and under
the general authority also which lay in the United Nations Charter.
But I might point out that he also at that time, before we put our
forces in, consulted the congressional leadership, and it was the advice
of the congressional leadership at that time that he proceeded as Presi-
dent and Commander in Chief, and under the U.N. Charter, and not
call for congressional action.
Senator congressional
I think it is always well to consult congressional
leadership when international matters are concerned, where actual
violence or even financing is involved.
Secretary RusK. Senator, I did say in connection with that this
morning, in connection with such resolutions as Congress wished to
pass, that this does not terminate the discourse between the President
and Congress on this issue. There will be, of course, many other
opportunities of consultation.
Senator AIKEN. Would you say the Monroe Doctrine fully meets
all likely contingencies of today?
Secretary RUSK. No, sir.
Senator AIKEN. That it might be brought up to date?
Secretary RusK. That it might be what?
Senator AIKEN. Brought up to date in view of the rather different
circumstances from those that existed in 1823?
Secretary RUSK. The circumstances are quite different. But I
did in my opening informal remarks this morning refer to the Monroe
Doctrine. I find somewhat in the same terms that Senator Miller used
that the Monore Doctrine is an expression of the right of self-defense
of the United States. It is not the only way to state it, and it is not
itself completely all-inclusive on the self-security interest of the
United States.
Senator AIKEN. In view of the changing conditions of the world,
the Monroe Doctrine does cover by itself the contingencies arising
in the Western Hemisphere?
Secretary Ruse. We have international commitments not only by
ourselves but with others that put us in a much stronger position than
the Monroe Doctrine standing alone.
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SITUATION IN CUBA 79
Senator AIKEN. Apparently it is the prerogative of each American
to interpret it according to his own opinion, which is something
which creates a problem.
Secretary RUSK. It is a problem both because of the changing
circumstances and because we now concentrate to a large extent on a
portion of the Monroe Doctrine. It was brought out this morning
that the Monroe Doctrine also included our withholding direct partic?
ipation of the United States from Europe.
Senator AIKEN. I think the Monroe Doctrine is as good an instru-
ment that we have, as far as it goes, but it cannot cover all the things
that happen today. Assuming that the Organization of American
States refuses to cooperate in the Cuban situation and the members
of NATO refuse to cooperate, what do you do then?
Secretary RUSK. I think that we, and a number of countries who
feel as we do, would have to consider their acting together.
Senator AIKEN. Compatible nations will have to act together?
Secretary RusK. Yes, sir.
Senator AIKEN. That is all.
LEBANESE SITUATION IN 1958
Chairman RUSSELL. I was interested to hear you say, Mr. Secre-
tary, that there was no legal basis for the sending of Marines into
Lebanon.
Do you recall anything about the Middle Eastern resolution?
Secretary Rusin. I beg your pardon, sir. I did not say there was no
legal basis. I said I did not recall that the actual dispatch of the
Marines into Lebanon was done under an exact statute of Congress.
Chairman RussLr.L. We had passed a resolution just a short time
before that that authorized the President to cooperate with and assist
any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East,
and the United States was prepared to use Armed Forces to assist
any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed
aggression from any country controlled by international communism.
The Lebanese asked us to come in there, did they not?
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.. I am sorry
Chairman RUSSELL. I was in those conferences at the White House,
and it all was done
Secretary Rusx. Perhaps it was an inadvertence on my part. I
thought the timing of this resolution came considerably before that.
Chairman RussELL. It did. But it was in effect and it said that
we were prepared to use the Armed Forces to assist any country there
that requested our aid.
Secretary Rush. I was not aware, but again I would have to re-
fresh my memory on this, sir, that a case was made at the time that
the threat in Lebanon was in fact a Communist threat, and the reso-
lution here rather specifically is aimed at a Communist threat.
Chairman RUSSELL. This was aimed at the Communists, no question
about that.
Secretary RusK. I would have to check my memory on that.
Chairman RUSSELL. We were invited into Lebanon.
Secretary RusK. That is quite right, sir.
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~0 SITUATION IN CUBA
Senator AIKEN. What I was trying to bring out, Mr. Chairman,
is whether the resolution was necessary before the President could
send the marines into Lebanon or whether it was adopted as assurance
that the Congress would back the President up if he did send them
-there.
Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that may be a case of the chicken and
the egg there. But there is no question but what the President could
have sent them in there whether we had the resolution or not. You
may have copies of that booklet they prepared, I think you were in
the State Department at the time, of the more than 100 instances
where the President had used the Armed Forces without the sanction
of Congress.
Secretary RUSK. All right, sir, I will be glad to get that to you.
(The information referred to is as follows:)
BACI{GROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to II. Res. 28)
II. INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-19345
1798-1800-Undeclared naval war with France.-This contest included land
actions, such as that in the Dominican Republic, city of -Puerto Plata, where
marines captured a French privateer under the guns of the forts.
1801-05-Tripoli,-The First Barbary War, including the George Washington
and Philadelphia affairs and the Eaton expedition, during which a few marines
landed with United States Agent William Eaton to raise a force against Tripoli
in an effort to free the crew of the Philadelphia. Tripoli declared war but not
the United States.
1806-Mexico (Spanish territory).-Capt. Z. M. Pike, with a platoon of troops,
invaded Spanish territory at the headwaters of the Rio Grande deliberately and
on orders from Gen. James Wilkinson. Ile, was made prisoner without resistance
at a fort he constructed in present day Colorado, taken to Mexico, later released
after seizure of his papers. There was a political purpose, still a mystery.
i806-10-Gulf of Mexico.-American gunboats operated from New Orleans
against Spanish and French privateers, such as LaFitte, off the Mississippi Delta,
chiefly under Capt. John Shaw and Master Commandant David Porter.
1810-West Florida (Spanish territory).-Gov. Claiborne of Louisiana, on
orders of the President, occupied with troops territory in dispute east of
Mississippi as far as the Pearl River, later the eastern boundary of Louisiana.
He was authorized to seize as far east as the Perdido River. No armed clash.
1812-Amelia Island and other part of cast Florida, then under Spain.-Tempo-
rary possession was authorized by President Madison and by Congress, to prevent
occupation by any other power ; but possession was obtained by Gen. George
Matthews in so irregular a manner that his measures were disavowed by the
President.
1812-15-Great Britain.-War of 1812. Formally declared.
1813-West Florida (Spanish territory).-On authority given by Congress,
General Wilkinson seized Mobile Bay in April with 600 soldiers. A small Spanish
garrison gave way. Thus we advanced into disputed territory to the Perdido
River, as projected in 1810. No fighting.
1813-14-Marquesas Islands.-Built a fort on island of Nukahiva to protect
three prize ships which had been captured from the British.
1814-Spanish Floridia.-Gen. Andrew Jackson took Pensacola and drove out
the British with whom the United States was at war.
1814-25-Caribbean.-Engagements between pirates and American ships or
squadrons took place repeatedly especially ashore and offshore about Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Yucatan. Three thousand pirate attacks on
merchantmen were reported between 1815 and 1828. In 1822 Commodore
James Biddle employed a squadron of two frigates, four sloops of war, two brigs,
four schooners, and two gunboats in the West Indies.
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1815-Algiers.-The Second Barbary War, declared by our enemies but not
by the United States. Congress authorized an expedition. A large fleet under
Decatur attacked Algiers and obtained indemnities.
1815-Tripoli.-After securing an agreement from Algiers, Decatur demon-
strated with his squadron at Tunis and Tripoli, where he secured indemnities for
offenses against us during the War of 1812.
1816-Spanish Florida.-United States forces destroyed Nichols Fort, called
also NegTo Fort, because it harbored raiders into United States territory.
1816-18-Spanish Florida-First Seminole War.-The Seminole Indians, whose
area was a resort for escaped slaves and border ruffians, were attacked by troops
under Generals Jackson and Gaines and pursued into northern Florida. Spanish
posts were attacked and occupied, British citizens executed. There was neither
a declaration of war nor any congressional authorization, but the Executive was
sustained.
1817-Amelia Island (Spanish territory off Florida).-Under orders of Presi-
dent Monroe, United States forces landed and expelled a group of smugglers,
adventurers, and freebooters.
1818-Oregon.-The U.S.S. Ontario, dispatched from Washington, landed at
the Columbia River and in August took possession. Britain had conceded
sovereignty but Russia and Spain asserted claims to the area.
18.20-23-Africa.-Naval units raided the slave traffic pursuant to the 1819
act of Congress.
1822-Cuba.-United States naval forces suppressing piracy landed on the
northwest coast of Cuba and burned a pirate station.
1823-Cuba.-Brief landings in pursuit of pirates occurred April 8 near Escon-
dido ; April 16 near Cayo Blanco ; July 11 at Siquapa Bay; July 21 at Cape Cruz;
and October 23 at Camrioca.
1824-Cuba.-In October the U.S.S. Porpoise landed bluejackets near Matan-
zas in pursuit of pirates. This was during the cruise authorized in 1822.
1824-Puerto Rico (Spanish territory).-Commodore David Porter with a
landing party attacked the town of Fajardo which had sheltered pirates and
insulted American naval officers. He landed with 200 men in November and
forced an apology.
1825-Cuba.-In March cooperating American and British forces landed at
Segua La Grande to capture pirates.
1827-Greece.-In October and November landing parties hunted pirates on
the islands of Argenteire, Miconi, and Andross.
1831-32-Falkland Islands.-To investigate the capture of three American
sealing vessels and to protect American interests.
1832-Sumatra-February 6 to 9.-To punish natives of the town of Quallah
Battoo for depredations on American shipping.
1833-Argentina-October 31 to November 15.-A force was sent ashore at
Buenos Aires to protect the interests of the United States and other countries
during an insurrection.
1835-36-Peru-December 10, 1835 to January 2.1,, 1836, and August 31 to
December 2, 1836.-Marines protected American interests in Callao and Lima
during an attempted revolution.
1836-Meccico.-General Gaines occupied Nacogdoches (Tex.), disputed terri-
tory, from July to December during the Texan war for independence, under
orders to cross the "imaginary boundary line" if an Indian outbreak threatened.
1838-39-Sumatra-December 24, 1838, to January It, 1839.-To punish natives
of the towns of Quallah Battoo and Muckie (Mukki) for depredations on Ameri-
can shipping.
1840-Fiji Islands-July.-To punish natives for attacking American explor-
ing and surveying parties.
1841-Drummond Island, Kingsmill Group.-To avenge the murder of a
seaman by the natives.
1841-Samoa-February 24..-To avenge the murder of an American seaman
on Upolu Island.
1842-Mexico: Commodore T. A. C. Jones, in command of a squadron long
cruising off California, occupied Monterey, Calif., on October 19, believing war
had come. He discovered peace, withdrew, and saluted. A similar incident
occurred a week later at San Diego.
1843-Africa, November 29 to December 16.-Four United States vessels demon-
strated and landed various parties (one of 200 marines and sailors) to discourage
piracy and the slave trade along the Ivory coast, etc., and to punish attacks by
the natives on American seamen and shipping.
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82 SITUATION IN CUBA
1844-Mexico.-President Tyler deployed our forces to protect Texas against
Mexico, pending Senate approval of a treaty of annexation. (Later rejected.)
He defended his action against a Senate resolution of inquiry. This was a
demonstration or preparation.
1846-18-Mexico, the Mexican War.-President Polk's occupation of disputed
territory precipitated it. War formally declared.
1849-Smyrna.-In July a naval force gained release of an American seized by
Austrian officials.
1851-Turkey.-After a massacre of foreigners (including Americans) at Jaffa
in January, a demonstration by our Mediterranean Squadron was ordered along
the Turkish (Levant) coast. Apparently no shots fired.
1851-Johanna Island (east of Africa), August. To exact redress for the un-
lawful imprisonment of the captain of an American whaling brig.
1852-53-Argentina-February 3 to 12, 1852; September 17, 1852 to April (8)
1853.-Marines were landed and maintained in Buenos Aires to. protect Ameri-
can interests during a revolution.
1853-Nicaragua-March 11 to 13.-To protect American lives and interests
during political disturbances.
185354--Japan.-The "opening of Japan" and the Perry Expedition.
1853-54-Ryukya and Bonin Islands.-Commodore Perry on three visits before
going to Japan and while waiting for a reply from Japan made a naval demon-
stration, landing marines twice, and secured a coaling concession from the
ruler of Naha on Okinawa. He also demonstrated in the Bonin Islands. All to
secure facilities for commerce.
1854-China-April 4 to. June 15 or 17.-To protect American interests in and
near Shanghai during Chinese civil strife.
1854-Nicaragua--July 9 to 15.-San Juan del Norte (Greytown) was de-
stroyed to avenge an insult to the American Minister to Nicaragua.
1855-China-May 19 to 21 (g).-To protect American interests in Shanghai.
August 3 to 5 to fight pirates near Hong Kong.
1855-Fiji Islands-September 12 to November 4.-To seek reparations for
depredations on Americans.
1855-Uruguay-November 25 to 29 or 30.-United States and European naval
forces landed to protect American interests during an attempted revolution in
Montevideo.
1856-Panama, Republic of New Grenada-September 19 to 22: To protect
American interests during an insurrection.
1856-China-October 22 to December 6.-To protect American interests at
Canton during hostilities between the British and the Chinese ; and to avenge an
unprovoked assault upon an unarmed boat displaying the United States flag.
1857-Nicaragua-April to May, November to December.-To oppose William
Walker's attempt to get control of the country. In May Commander C. H. Davis
of the United States Navy, with some marines, received Walker's surrender
and protected his men from the retaliation of native allies who had been fighting
Walker. In November and December of the same -year United States vessels
Saratoga, Wabash, and Fulton opposed another attempt of William Walker on
Nicaragua. Commodore Hiram Paulding's act of landing marines and compelling
the removal of Walker to the United States, was tacitly disavowed by Secretary
of State Lewis Cass, and Paulding was forced into retirement.
1858-Uruguay-January 2 to 27: Forces from 2 United States- warships
landed to protect American property during a revolution in Montevideo.
1858-Fiji Islands-October 6 to 16, To chastise the natives for the murder
of two American citizens.
1858-59-Turkey.-Display of naval force along the Levant at the request of
the Secretary of State after massacre of Americans at Jaffa and mistreatment
elsewhere "to remind the authorities (of Turkey) * * * of the power of the
United States."
1859-Paraguay.-Congress authorized a naval squadron to seek redress for
an attack on a naval vessel in the Parana River during 1855. Apologies were
made after a large display of force.
1859-Mexico.-Two hundred United States soldiers crossed the Rio Grande
in pursuit of the Mexican bandit Cortina.
1859-China-July 31 to August 2.-For the protection of American interests
in Shanghai.
1860-Angola, Portuguese West Africa-March 1.-To protect American lives
and property at Kissembo when the natives became troublesome.
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1860-Colombia, Bay of Panama-September 27 to October 8.-To protect
American interests during a revolution.
1863-Japan-July 16.-To redress an insult to the American flag--firing on
an American vessel-at Shimonoseki.
1864-Japan-July 14 to August 3, approximately.-To protect the United
States Minister to Japan when he visited Yedo to negotiate concerning some
American claims against Japan, and to make his negotiations easier by impress-
ing the Japanese with American power.
1864-Japan-September 4 to 14-Straits of Shimonoseki.-To compel Japan
and the Prince of Nagato in particular to permit the Straits to be used by foreign
shipping in accordance with treaties already signed.
1865-Panama-March 9 and 10.-To protect the lives and property of Ameri-
can residents during a revolution.
1866-D%leni.co.-To protect American residents, General Sedgwick and 100
men in November obtained surrender of Matamoras. After 3 days he was ordered
by our Government to withdraw. His act was repudiated by the President.
1866-China-June 20 to July 7.-To punish an assault on the American consul
at Newchwang ; July 14, for consultation with authorities on shore ; August 9,
at Shanghai, to help extinguish a serious fire in the city.
1867-Island of Formosa-June 12.-To punish a horde of savages who were
supposed to have murdered the crew of a wrecked American vessel.
1868--Japan (Osaka, Hiogo, Nagasaki, Yokohama, and Negata).-Mainly,
February 1p to 8, April 4 to May 12, June 12 and 13.-To protect American inter-
ests during the civil war in Japan over the abolition of the Shogunate and the
restoration of the Mikado.
1868-Uruguay-February 7 and 8, 19 to 26.-To protect foreign residents and
the customhouse during an insurrection at Montevideo.
1868-Colombia-April 7-at Aspinwall.-To protect passengers and treasure
in transit during the absence of local police or troops on the occasion of the death
of the President of Colombia.
1870-Mexico, June 17 and 18.-To destroy the pirate ship Forward, which had
been run aground about 40 miles up the Rio Tecapan.
1870-Hawaiian Islands-September 21.-To place the American flag at half
mast upon the death of Queen Kalama, when the American consul at Honolulu
would not assume responsibility for so doing.
1871-Korea-June 10 to 12.--To punish natives for depredations on Ameri-
cans, particularly for murdering the crew of the General Sherman and burning
the schooner, and for later firing on other American small boats taking soundings
up the Salee River.
1873-Colombia (Bay of Panama) -May 7 to 22, September 23 to October 9.-
To protect American interests during hostilities over possession of the govern-
ment of the State of Panama.
1873-Mexico.-United States troops crossed the Mexican border repeatedly
in pursuit of cattle and other thieves. There were some reciprocal pursuits by
Mexican troops into our border territory. The cases were only technically in-
vasions, if that, although Mexico protested constantly. Notable cases were at
Remolina in May 1873 and at Las Cuevas in 1875. Washington orders often
supported these excursions. Agreements between Mexico and the United States,
the first in 1882, finally legitimized such raids. They continued intermittently,
with minor disputes, until 1896.
1874-Hawaiian Islands-February 12 to 20.-To preserve order and protect
American lives and interests during the inauguration of a new king.
1876-Mexico-May 18.-To police the town of Matamoros temporarily while
it was without other government.
1882-Egypt--July 14 to 18.-To protect American interests during warfare
between British and Egyptians and looting of. the city of Alexandria by Arabs.
1885-Panama (Colon)-January 18 and 19.-To guard the valuables in
transit over the Panama Railroad, and the safes and vaults of the company
during revolutionary activity. In March, April, and May in the cities of Colon
and Panama, to reestablish freedom of transit during revolutionary activity.
1888-Korea-June.-To protect American residents in Seoul during unset-
tled political conditions, when an. outbreak of the populace was expected.
1888-89-Sannoa-November 14, 1888, to March 20, 1889.-To protect Amer-
ican citizens and the consulate during a native civil war.
1888-Haiti-December 20.-To persuade the Haitian Government to give
up an American steamer which had been seized on the charge of breach of
blockade.
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1889-Hawaiian Islands-July 30 and 31.-To protect American interests at
Honolulu during a revolution.
1890-Argentina.-A naval party landed to protect our consulate and legation
in Buenos Aires.
1891-Haiti.-To protect American lives and property on Navassa Island when
Negro laborers got out of control.
1891-Bering Sea.-July 2 to October 5.-To stop seal poaching.
1891-Chile-August 28 to 30.-To protect the American consulate and the
women and children who had taken refuge in it during a revolution in Val-
paraiso.
1893-Hawaii-January 16 to April 1.-Ostensibly to protect American lives
and property ; actually to promote a provisional government under Sanford B.
Dole. This action was disavowed by the United States.
1894-Brazil-January.-To protect American commerce and shipping at
Rio de Janeiro during a Brazilian civil war. No landing was attempted but
there was a display of naval force.
1894-Nicaragua-July 6 to August 7.-To protect American interests at Blue-
fields following a revolution.
1894-96-Korean-July 24, 1894 to April 3, 1896.-To protect American lives
and interests at Seoul during and following the Sino-Japanese War. A guard
of marines was kept at the American legation most of the time until April
1896.
1894-95-China.-Marines were stationed at Tientsin and penetrated to Peking
for protection purposes during the Sino-Japanese War.
1894-95-China,.-Naval vessel beached and used as a fort at Newchwang for
protection of American nationals.
1895-Colombia-March 8 to 9.-To protect American interests during an
attack on the town of Bocas del Toro by a bandit chieftain.
1896-Nicar6gua-May 2 to 4.-To protect American interests in Corinto dur-
ing political unrest.
1898-Nicaragua-February 7 and 8.-To protect American lives and property
at San Juan del Sur.
1898-Spain.-The Spanish-American War. Fully declared.
1898-99-China-November 5, 1898, to March 15, 1899.-To provide a guard
for the legation at Peking and the consulate at Tienttin during contest between
the Dowager Empress and her son.
1899-Nicaragua.-To protect American interests at San Juan del Norte,
February 22 to March 5, and at Blueflelds a few weeks later in connection with
the insurrection of Gen. Juan P. Reyes.
1899-Samoa-March 13 to May 15.-To protect American interests and to
take part in a bloody contention over the succession to the throne.
1899-1901-Philippine Islands.-To protect American interests following the
war with Spain, and to conquer the island by defeating the Filipinos in their
war for independence.
1900-China-May 21, to September 28.-To protect foreign lives during the
Boxer rising, particularly at Peking. For many years after this experience a
permanent legation guard was maintained in Peking, and was strengthened at
times as trouble threatened. It was still there in 1934.
1901-Colombia (State of Panama)-November 20 to December 4.-To protect
American property on the Isthmus and to keep transit lines open during serious
revolutionary disturbances.
1902-Colombia-April 16 to 28.-To protect American lives and property at
Bocas del Toro during a civil war.
1902-Columbia (State of Panama) -September 17 to November 18.-To place
armed guards on all trains crossing the Isthmus and to keep the railroad line
open.
1903-Honduras-March 23 to 30 or 31.-To protect the American consulate
and the steamship wharf at Puerto Cortez during a period of revolutionary
activity.
1,903-Dominican Republic-lit arch 30 to April 21.-To protect American inter-
ests in the city of Santo Domingo during a revolutionary outbreak.
1903-Syria-September 7 to 12.-To protect the American consulate in Beirut
when a local Moslem uprising was feared.
1,903-11-Panama.-To protect American interests and lives during and follow-
ing the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isth-
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mian Canal. With brief intermissions, United States Marines were stationed on
the Isthmus from November 4, 1903, to January 21, 1914, to guard American
interests.
1904-Dominican Republic--January 2 to February 11.-To protect American
interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and Santo Domingo City during revolutionary
fighting.
1904-5-Korea-January 5, 1904, to November 11, 1,905. To guard the Ameri-
can Legation in Seoul.
1904-Tangier, Morocco.-"We want either Perdicaris alive or Itaisuli dead."
Demonstration by a squadron to force release of a kidnapped American. Marine
guard landed to protect consul general.
1904-Panama-November 17 to 24.-To protect American lives and property
at Ancon at the time of a threatened insurrection.
1904-05-ICorea.-Marine guard sent to Seoul for protection during Russo-
Japanese War.
1906-9-Cuba-September 1906 to January 23, 1909.-Intervention to restore
order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government after serious revolu-
tionary activity.
1907-Ionduras-March 18 to June 8.-To protect American interests during
a war between Honduras and Nicaragua ; troops were stationed for a few days or
weeks in Trujillo, Ceiba, Puerto Cortez, San Pedro, Laguna, and Choloma.
1910-Nicaragua-February 22.-During a civil war, to get information of
conditions at Corinto ; May 19, to September 4, to protect American interests at
Bluefields.
1911-Honduras-January 26 and some weeks thereafter.-To protect American
lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras.
1911-China.-Approaching stages of the nationalist revolution. An ensign
and 10 men in October tried to enter Wuchang to rescue missionaries but retired
on being warned away.
A small landing force guarded American private property and consulate at
Hankow in October.
A marine guard was established in November over the cable stations at
Shanghai.
Landing forces were sent for protection to Nanking, Chinkiang, Taku and
elsewhere.
1912-Honduras.-Small force landed to prevent seizure by the Government of
an American-owned railroad at Puerto Cortez. Forces withdrawn after the
United States disapproved the action.
1912-Panama.-Troops, on request of both political parties, supervised elec-
tions outside the Canal Zone.
1912-Cuba-June 5 to August 5.-To protect American interests in the
Province of Oriente, and in Habana.
1912-0hina-9_ugust 24 to, 26, on Kentucky Island, and August 26 to 30 at
Camp Nicholson.-To protect Americans and American interests during revolu-
tionary activity.
1912-Turkey-November 18 to December 3.-To guard the American legation
at Constantinople during Balkan War.
1912-25-Nicaragua-August to November 1912.-To protect American
interests during an attempted revolution. A small force serving as a legation
guard and as a promoter of peace and governmental stability, remained until
August 5, 1925.
1912-41-China.-The disorders which began with the Kuomintang rebellion
in 1912, which were redirected by the invasion of China by Japan and finally
ended by war between Japan and the United States in 1941, led to demonstra-
tions and land parties for protection in China continuously and at many
points from 1912 on to 1941. The guard at Peking and along the route to the
sea was maintained until 1941. In 1927, the United States had 5,670 troops
ashore in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters. In 1933 we had 3,027 armed
men ashore. All this protective action was in general terms based on treaties
with China ranging from 1858 to 1901.
1913-Mexico-September 5 to 7.-A few marines landed at Ciaris Estero to
aid in evacuating American citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made
dangerous for foreigners by civil strife.
1914-Haiti--January 29 to February 9, February 20 to 21, October 19.-To
protect American nationals in a time of dangerous unrest.
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1914-Dominican Republic-June and July.-During a revolutionary move-
ment, United States naval forces by gunfire stopped the bombardment of Puerto
Plata, and by threat of force maintained Santo Domingo City as a neutral zone.
1914-17-Mexico.-The undeclared Mexican-American hostilities following the
Dolphin affair and Villa's raids included capture of Vera Cruz and later Per-
shing's expedition into northern Mexico.
1915-34-Ilaiti-July 28, 1915, to August 15, 1934.-To maintain order during
a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.
1916-24-Dominican Republic-May 1916 to September 1924.-To maintain
order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.
1917-18.-World War I. Fully declared.
1917-22-Cuba.-To protect American interests during an insurrection and
subsequent unsettled conditions. Most of the United States armed forces left
Cuba by August 1919, but two companies remained at Camaguey until February
1922.
1.918-19-Mexico.-After withdrawal of the Pershing expedition, our troops
entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits at least three times in 1918 and six in 1919.
In August 1918 American and Mexican troops fought at Nogales.
1918-20-Panama.-For police duty according to treaty stipulations, at Chir-
iqui, during election disturbances and subsequent unrest.
1918-20-Soviet Russia.-Marines were landed at and near Vladivostok in
June and July to protect the American consulate and other points in the fight-
ing between the Bolsheviki troops and the Czech Army which had traversed
Siberia from the western front. A joint proclamation of emergency government
and neutrality was issued by the American, Japanese, British, French, and Czech
commanders in July and our party remained until late August.
In August the project expanded. Then 7,000 men were landed in. Vladivostok
and remained until January 1920, as part of an allied occupation force.
In September 1918, 5,000 American troops joined the allied intervention force
at Archangel, suffered 500 casualties and remained until June 1919.
A handful of marines took part earlier in a British landing on the Murman
coast (near Norway) but only incidentally.
All these operations were to offset effects of the Bolsheviki revolution in Russia
and were partly supported by Czarist or Kerensky elements. No war was
declared. 'Bolsheviks elements participated at times with us but Soviet Russia
still claims damages.
.1919-Honduras-September 8 to 12.-A landing force was sent ashore to
maintain order in ,a neutral zone during an attempted revolution.
1920-22-Russia (Siberia) February 16, 1920, to November 19, 1922.-A marine
-guard to protect the United States radio station and property on Russian Island,
Bay of Vladivostok.
1920-China-March 14.-A landing force was sent 'ashore for a few hoursto
protect lives during a disturbance at Kiukiang.
1920-Guatemala-April 9 to 27.-T'o protect the American Legation and
other American interests, such as the cable station, during a period of fighting
between Unionists and the Government of Guatemala.
1,921-Panama-Costa Rica.-American naval squadrons demonstratedin April
on both sides of the Isthmus to prevent war between the two countries over a
boundary dispute.
1922-Turkey-September and October.-A landing force was sent shore with
consent of both Greek and Turkish authorities, to protect American lives and
property when the Turkish Nationalists entered Smyrna.
1924-Honduras-February 28 to March 31, September 10 to 15.-To protect
American lives and interests during election hostilities.
1924-China-September.-Marines were landed to protect Americans and
other foreigners in Shanghai during Chinese factional hostilities.
1925-China-January 15 to August 29.-Fighting of Chinese factions accom-
panied by riots and demonstrations in Shanghai necessitated landing American
forces to protect lives and property in the International 'Settlement.
1925-Honduras-April 19 to 21.-To protect foreigners at La Ceiba during a
political upheaval.
1925-Panama-October 12 to.23.-Strikes and rent riots led to the landing of
about 600 American troops to keep order and protect American interests.
1926-33-Nicaragua-May 7 to June 5, 1926; August 27, 1926, to January 3,
1933.-The coup d'etat of General Chamorro aroused revolutionary activities
leading to the landing of American marines to protect the interests of the United
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States. United states forces came and went, but seem not to have left the
country entirely until January 3, 1933. Their work included activity against the
outlaw leader Sandino in 1928.
1926-China-August and September.-The Nationalist attack on FIankow
necessitated the landing of American naval forces to protect American citizens.
A small guard was maintained at the consulate general even after September 16,
when the rest of the forces were withdrawn. Likewise, when Nationalist forces
captured Kiukiang, naval forces were landed for the protection of foreigners
November 4 to 6.
1927-0hina-February.-Fighting at Shanghai caused American naval forces
and marines to be increased there. In March a naval guard was stationed
at the American. consulate at Nanking after Nationalist forces captured the city.
American and British destroyers later used shell fire to protect Americans and
other foreigners. "Following this incident additional forces of marines and
naval vessels were ordered to China and stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai
and Tientsin."
1933-Cuba.-During a revolution against President Gerardo Machado naval
forces demonstrated but no landing was made.
1940-Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigna, Trini-
dad, and British Guiana.-Troops were sent to guard air and naval bases ob-
tained by negotiation with Great Britain. These were sometimes called lend-
lease bases.
1941-Greenland.-Taken under protection of the United States in April.
1941-Netherlands (Dutch Guiana).-In November the President ordered
American troops to occupy Dutch Guiana but by agreement with the Netherlands
government in exile. Brazil cooperated to protect aluminum ore supply from
the bauxite mines in Surinam.
1941 Iceland.-Taken under the protection of the United States, with consent
of its Government, for strategic reasons.
1941 Germany.-Sometime in the spring the President ordered the Navy to
patrol ship lanes to Europe. By July our warships were convoying and by
September were attacking German submarines. There was no authorization of
Congress or declaration of war. In November, the Neutrality Act was partly
repealed to protect military aid to Britain, Russia, etc.
1941-45-Germanp, Italy, Japan, etc.-World War II. Fully declared.
1942-Labrador.-Army-Navy air bases established.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Of course, in the Near East situation
isn't it true that he had the tripartite agreement to stand on even with-
out the resolution? I never did think that the Middle East resolution
was necessary at all.
Senator AIIciN. No; I do not think so. I think it was an indication
that the Congress intended to back up the President if he did send the
Marines in there.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. We had a terrific legislative battle about
whether it was necessary or not. If you can point out in this where
it is necessary I would like it pointed out.
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I do not think it is, but it is a good
thing to show the backing.
Chairman RUSSELL. So did the Middle East resolution; at least we
thought it did. We fought over it for 2 weeks, and there were 18 or
20 votes against it.
Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, the report that you asked for, I
gather, is almost a collector's item because it has been used so much,
but we do have a citation, and we will confer
Chairman RUSSELL. Is that entitled "Powers of the President in
Sending Armed Forces Outside the United States"?
Secretary RUSK. It is "Union Calendar No. 22, House Report, 82d
Congress, 1st Session, Background Information on the Use of U.S.
Armed Forces in Foreign Countries."
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Chairman RUSSELL. That is right. I know it impressed me tre-
mendously. I sat up all one night reading it when it first came out
because it had several historical situations there which I had never
heard about. This may be a good occasion to seize on this important
resolution to have it reprinted.
Secretary RUSK. It is most valuable as a, study of it.
Mr. OIIAYEs. It could be brought up to date because it goes only to
1951.
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.
Senator AIKEN. You may recall Russia said that if we sent Marines
into Lebanon it would mean war. We sent them in and, in fact, they
came out in 2 or 3 months' time, as I recall it.
Chairman RUSSELL. That was a remarkable deception we practiced
on ourselves, apparently, about Lebanon. But a lot of one battle
group got a nice long ride, we rushed airplanes over to Germany and
flew them down into Turkey and then into Lebanon. The Marines
got wet going ashore, but they were welcomed by all the bathing
beauties in Lebanon. [Laughter.]
Acting Chairman SPARKMAN. I do not recall anything else I
wanted to discuss.
Chairman RUSSELL. Does anyone else have any further questions?
If not, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your cooperation.
(Whereupon, at 3 :40 p.m., the committees adjourned.)
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
TILE MONROE DOCTRINE
(Excerpts from President Monroe's Message to Congress, December 2, 1823)
At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the
minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been
transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange
by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations
on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made
by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has like-
wise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous
by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have
invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to
cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions
to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they
may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a prin-
ciple in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that
the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects
for future colonialization by any European powers. * * *
It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was
then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the, condition of the people of
those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary mod-
eration. It need scarcely be remarked that. the result has been so far very
different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the
globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our
oorigin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens
of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty
.and happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars
-of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken
any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our
rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make prep-
:ration for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of
necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious
ern all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied
mowers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This dif-
ference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and
to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much
blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citi-
zens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation
is devoted. We owe it, 'therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations exist-
ing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should
consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With 'the existing colo-
nies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall
not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence
and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration
and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for
the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their
destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation
of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between
those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of
their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere,
provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent au-
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thorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part
of the United States indispensable to their security.
The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled.
Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied
powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves,
to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent
such interposition may be carried, on the same principle is a question in which
all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even
those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy
in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have
so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which
is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers ; to consider the
government de facto as the legitimate government for us ; to cultivate friendly
relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly
policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to in-
juries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are emi-
nently and conspiculously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should
extend their political system to any portion of either continent without en-
dangering our peace and happiness ; nor can anyone believe that our southern
brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally
impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with
indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain
and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be
obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United
States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will
pursue the same course. * * *
APPENDIX B
INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, SEPTEMBER 2, 1947
In the name of their Peoples, the Governments represented at the Inter-
America Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security,
desirous of consolidating and strengthening their relations of friendship and
good neighborliness, and
Considering :
That Resolution VIII of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War
and Peace, which met in Mexico City, recommended the conclusion of a treaty
to prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries
of America ;
That the High Contracting Parties reiterate their will to remain united in an
inter-American system consistent with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations, and reaffirm the existence of the agreement which they have concluded
concerning those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security which are appropriate for regional action ;
That the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their adherence to the principles
of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, and especially to those set forth
in the preamble and declarations of the Act of Chapultepec, all of which should
be understood to be accepted as standards of their mutual relations and as the
juridical basis of the Inter-American System ;
That the American States propose, in order to improve the procedures for
the pacific settlement of their controversies, to conclude the treaty concerning
the "Inter-American Peace System" envisaged in Resolutions IX and XXXIX
of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace ;
That the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American
Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals and to their will to
cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes of a
policy of peace ;
That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that juri-
dical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that
peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on. the inter-
national recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indis-
pensable well-being of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for
the international realization of justice and security ;
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Have resolved, in conformity with the objectives stated above, to conclude
the following Treaty, in order to assure peace, through adequate means, to
provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any
American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of
them :
The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their
international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or
of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 2
As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, the High
Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise
between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any
such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the
Inter-American System before referring It to the General Assembly or the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations.
1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the Amer-
ican States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties under-
takes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision
of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the
Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may in-
dividually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding para-
graph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ
of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those
measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should
be taken.
3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack
which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory
of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas,
the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.
4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until
the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.
The region to which this Treaty refers is bounded as follows : beginning at
the North Pole ; thence due south to a point 74 degrees north latitude, 10 degrees
west longitude ; thence by a rhumb line to a point 47 degrees 30 minutes north
latitude, 50 degrees west longitude ; thence by a rhumb line to a point 35 degrees
north latitude, 60 degrees west longitude ; thence due south to a point in 20
degrees north latitude ; thence by a rhumb line to a point 5 degrees north
latitude, 24 degrees west longitude; thence due south to the South Pole; thence
due north to a point 30 degrees south latitude, 90 degrees west longitude ; thence
by a rhumb line to a point on the Equator at 97 degrees west longitude ; thence
by a rhumb line to a point 15 degrees north latitude, 120 degrees west longitude ;
thence by a rhumb line to a point 50 degrees north latitude, 170 degrees east
longitude ; thence due north to a point in 54 degrees north latitude ; thence by
a rhumb line to a point 65 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 168 degrees 58
minutes 5 seconds west longitude ; thence due north to the North Pole.
The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council
of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter
of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities under-
taken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the
purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.
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ARTICLE 6
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression
which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental
conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of
America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree
on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the vic-
tim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for
the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the
Continent.
ARTICLE 7
In the case of a conflict between two or more American States, without
prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, the High Contracting Parties, meeting in con-
sultation shall call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and restore
matters to the state quo ante bellum, and shall take in addition all other
necessary measures to reestablish or maintain inter-American peace and security
and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection of the
pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and
in the application of the measures which the consultative meeting may agree
upon.
For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consul-
tation may agree will comprise one or more of the following : recall of chiefs
of diplomatic missions ; breaking of diplomatic relations ; breaking of consular
relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radio telegraphic
communications ; and use of armed force.
ARTICLE 9
In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize
as aggression, the following shall be considered as such :
a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or
the land, sea or air forces of another State ;
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American
State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with
a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers
thus demarcated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective
jurisdiction of another State.
ARTICLE 10
None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights
and, obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United
Nations.
ARTICLE 11
The consultations to which this Treaty refers shall be carried out by aneans
of the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics which
have ratified the Treaty, or in the manner or by the organ which in the future
may be agreed upon.
ARTICLE 12
The Governing Board of the Pan American Union may act provisionally as an
organ of consultation until the meeting of the Organ of Consultation referred to
in the preceding Article takes place.
ARTICLE 13
The consultations shall be initiated at the request addressed to the Governing
Board of the Pan American Union by any of the Signatory States which has
ratified the Treaty.
ARTICLE 14
In the voting refered to in this Treaty only the representatives of the Signatory
States which have ratified the Treaty may take part.
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The Governing Board of the Pan American Union shall act in all matters con-
cerning this Treaty as an organ of liaison among the Signatory States which
have ratified this Treaty and between these States and the United Nations.
The decisions of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union referred to in
Articles 13 and 15 above shall be taken by an absolute majority of the Mem-
bers entitited to vote.
ARTICLE 17
The Organ of Consultation shall take its decisions by a vote of two-thirds of
the Signatory States which have ratified the Treaty.
In the case of a situation or dispute between American States, the parties
directly interested shall be excluded from the voting referred to in two preceding
Articles.
To constitute a quorum in all the meetings referred to in the previous Articles,
it shall be necessary that the number of States represented shall be at least
equal to the number of votes necessary for the taking of the decision.
Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8
shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty,
with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force with-
out its consent.
ARTICLE 21
The measures agreed upon by the Organ of Consultation shall be executed
through the procedures and agencies now existing or -those which may in the
future be established.
This Treaty shall come into effect between the States which ratify it as soon
as the ratifications of two-thirds of the Signatory States have been deposited.
This Treaty is open for signature by the American States at the city of Rio
de Janeiro, and shall be ratified by the Signatory States as soon as possible in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The ratifications
shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall notify the
Signatory States of each deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an
exchange of ratifications.
The present Treaty shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United
Nations through the Pan American Union, when two-thirds of the Signatory
States have deposited their ratifications.
This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced by any
High Contracting Party by a notification in writing to the Pan American Union,
which shall inform all the other High Contracting Parties of each notification
of denunciation received. After the expiration of two years from the date of the
receipt by the Pan American Union of a notification of denunciation by any High
Contracting Party, the present Treaty shall cease to be in force and with respect
to such State, but shall remain in full force and effect with respect to all the
other High Contracting Parties.
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The principles and fundamental provisions of this Treaty shall be incorporated
in the Organic Pact of the Inter-American System.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their
full powers found to be in due and proper form, sign this Treaty on behalf of
their respective Governments, on the dates appearing opposite their signatures.
Done in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in four texts respectively in the English,
French, Portguese and Spanish languages, on the second of September nineteen
hundred forty-seven.
Reservation of Hondouras :
The Delegation of Honduras, in signing the present Treaty and in connec-
tion with Article 9, section (b), does so with the reservation that the
boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua is definitely demarcated by the
Joint Boundary Commission of nineteen hundred and nineteen hundred and
one, starting from a point in the Gulf of Fonseca, in the Pacific Ocean, to
Portillo de Teotecacinte and, from this point to the Atlantic, by the line
that His Majesty the King of Spain's arbitral award established on the
twenty third of December of nineteen hundred and six.
FINAL ACT OF THE EIGHTII MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, SERVING AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION IN APPLICATION OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, PUNTA DEL EST'E, URUGUAY,
JANUARY 22-31, 1962
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recip-
rocal Assistance, was held in the city of Punta del Este, Uruguay, from January
22 to 31, 1962.
The Meeting was convoked by a resolution of the Council of the Organization
of American States adopted on December 4, 1961, the text of which is as follows:
The Council of the Organization of American States,
Considering:
The note presented by the Delegation of Colombia, dated November 9, 1961,
in which it requests the convocation of a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance, to consider the threats to the peace and to the political
independence of the American states that might arise from the intervention of
extracontinental powers directed toward breaking American solidarity,
Resolves:
1. To convoke a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to
serve as Organ of Consultation, in accordance with Articles 6 and 11 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in order to consider the threats to
the peace and to the political independence of the American states referred to in
the preamble of this resolution, and particularly to point out the various type of
threats to the peace or certain acts that, in the event they occur, justify the
application of measures for the maintenance of the peace and security, pursuant
to Chapter V of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the
provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and to de-
termine the measures that it is advisable to take for the maintenance of the
peace and security of the Continent.
2. To set January 1.0, 1962, as the date for the inauguration of the Meeting.
3. To authorize the Chairman of the Council to present to the Council, at the
appropriate time, after consultation with the representatives of the member
states, a recommendation on the site of the Meeting of Consultation.
On December 22, 1961, the saine Council modified the provisions as to site and
date of the meeting by a resolution that reads as follows :
The Council of the Organization of American States
Resolves:
1. To thank the National Council of the Government of Uruguay and accept
its generous offer to be host, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to the Eighth Meeting
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of consultation of ministers of Foreign Affairs to Serve as Organ of Consultation
in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which was
convoked by a resolution of December 4, 1961, of the Council of the Organization.
2. To set the date of January 22, 1962, for the opening of the Meeting.
The Members of the Meeting, in the order of procedence determined by lot,
are listed below :
Panama : His Excellency Galileo Solis, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Paraguay : His Excellency Raul Sapena Pastor, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Cuba : Ills Excellency Osvaldo DorticOs Torrcedo, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Nicaragua : His Excellency Rene Schick, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Honduras : His Excellency Andres Alvarado Puerto, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs ;
El Salvador : His Excellency Rafael Eguizabal Tobias, Minister of Foreign
Affairs ;
Argentina : His Excellency Miguel Angel Cdrean.o, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Peru : his Excellency Luis Alvarado G., Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Chile : His Excellency Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Colombia : His Excellency Jose Joaquin Caicedo Castilla, Minister of Foreign
Affairs ;
Bolivia : His Excellency Jose F ellman Velarde, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Costa Rica: Ills Excellency Alfredo Vargas Fernandez, Minister of Foreign
Affairs ;
Mexico : His Excellency Manuel Tello, Secretary of Foreign Affairs ;
Venezuela : His Excellency Marcos Falcon Briceno, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs ;
Haiti : His Excellency Rene Chalmers, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ;
Guatemala : His Excellency Jesus Unda Murillo, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
Dominican Republic : his Excellency Jose Antonio Bonilla Atiles, Minister of
Foreign Affairs ;
Ecuador : Ills Excellency Francisco Acosta Yepez, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;
United States of America : Ills Excellency Dean Rusk, Secretary of State;
Brazil: His Excellency Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas, Minister
of Foreign Affairs ;
Uruguay : His Excellency Romero Martinez Montero, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
The Meeting was also attended by Ills Excellency Jose A. Mora, Secretary
General of the Organization of American States.
His Excellency Eduardo Victor Haedo, President of the National Council of
Government of Uruguay, opened the Meeting on the afternoon of January 22,
1962. At the inaugural session the speakers were : His Excellency Homero Marti-
nez Montero, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay ; His Excellency Alfredo
Vargas Fernandez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rico; and His Excellency
Jose A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States. The
Government of the Republic of Uruguay designated His Excellency Homero
Martinez Montero, Minister of Foreign Affairs of that country, as Provisional
President of the Meeting. Mr. Martinez was elected Permanent President at the
first plenary session, held on January 23. At the same session His Excellency
Galileo Solis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama, was elected Vice President
of the Meeting.
Pursuant to the Regulations of the Meeting, the Government of the Republic
of Uruguay appointed Mr. Gustavo Margariflos, as Secretary General of the
Meeting.
The Meeting was governed by the Regulations of the Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as, Organ of Consultation in Application
of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, approved by the Council
of the Organization of American States at its meeting of July 29, 1960.
In accordance with the Regulations, the Meeting designated a Credentials
Committee composed of El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay. A Style Committee
composed of Colombia, Haiti, United States of America, and Brazil was also
appointed.
In conformity with the provisions of Article 20 of the Regulations, a General
Committee, composed of all the Members, was established to consider the topics
of the Meeting and to submit its conclusions to a plenary session of the Meeting
for approval. The General Committee appointed His Excellency Marcos Falcon
Bricefio, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, and His Excellency Alfredo
Vargas Fernandez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rico, as Chairman and
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Rapporteur, respectively. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica
found it necessary to return to his country, His Excellency Rafael J. Oreamuno,
Special Delegate from the same country, was elected to serve as Rapporteur.
At the closing session of the Meeting, which took place on January 31, this
Final Act was signed. At that session addresses were given by His Excellency
Homero Martinez Montero, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, and His
Excellency Luis Alvarado G, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru.
As a result of their deliberations, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs approved the following resolutions :
I. COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN AMERICA
1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American republics, convened in
their Eighth Meeting of Consultation, declare that the continental unity and the
democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger.
The Ministers have been able to verify that the subversive offensive of com-
munist governments, their agents and the organizations which they control,
has increased in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruction of
democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the
service of extracontinental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified
offensive are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing
bodies of the international communist movement, that one of its principal objec-
tives is the establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries
and in Latin America ; and the- existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in
Cuba which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the
communist powers.
2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and hide their true intentions,
the communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the
less-favored sectors of the population and the just national aspirations of the
various peoples. With the pretext of defending popular interests, freedom is
suppressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are violated and
the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dictator-
ship of a single party. Under the slogan of "anti-imperialism" they try to estab-
lish an oppressive, aggressive, imperialism, which subordinates the subjugated
nations to the militaristic and aggressive interests of extracontinental powers.
By maliciously utilizing the very principles of the inter-American system, they
attempt to undermine democratic institutions and to strengthen and protect
political penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of communist
governments and their agents constitute one of the most subtle and dangerous
forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of the hemisphere to the
intensification of the subversive offensive of communist governments, their agents,
and the organizations that they control and to the tactics and methods that they
employ and also warn them of the dangers this situation represents to representa-
tive democracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-determination of
peoples.
The principles of communism are incompatible with the principle of the
inter-American system.
4. Convinced that the integrity of the democratic revolution of the American
states can and must be preserved in the face of the subversive offensive of com-
munism, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs proclaim the following basic political
principles :
a. The faith of the American peoples in human rights, liberty, and na-
tional independence as a fundamental reason for their existence, as con-
ceived by the founding fathers who destroyed colonialism and brought the
American republics into being ;
b. The prinicple of nonintervention and the right of peoples to organize
their way of life freely in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, ex-
pressing their will through free elections, without foreign interference. The
fallacies of communist propaganda cannot and should not obscure or hide the
difference in philosophy which these principles represent when they are ex-
pressed by a democratic American country, and when communist govern-
ments and their agents attempt to utilize them for their own benefit;
c. The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of
isolating or combatting communism, may facilitate the appearance or
strengthening of reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to re-
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press ideas of social progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic
labor organizations and cultural and political movements with communist
subversion ;
d. The affirmation that communism is not the way to achieve economic
development and the elimination of social injustice in America. On the
contrary, a democratic regime can encompass all the efforts for economic
advancement and all of the measures for improvement and social progress
without sacrificing the fundamental values of the human being. The mission
of the peoples and governments of the hemisphere during the present gen-
eration is to achieve an accelerated development of their economies and to
put an end to poverty, injustice, illness, and ignorance as was agreed in the
Charter of Punta del Este ; and
e. The most essential contribution of each American state in the collective
effort to protect the inter-American system against communism is a steadily
greater respect for human rights, improvement in democratic institutions
and practices, and the adoption of measures that truly express the impulse
for a revolutionary change in the economic and social structures of the
American republics.
II. SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AGAINST TIIE SUBVERSIVE
ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
Whereas:
International communism makes use of highly complex techniques of sub-
version in opposing which certain states may benefit from mutual advice and
support;
The American states are firmly united for the common goal of fighting the
subversive action of international communism and for the preservation of democ-
racy in the Americas, as expressed in Resolution XXXII of the Ninth Inter-
national Conference of American States, held in Bogota, in 1948, and that for such
purpose they can and should assist each other, mainly through the use of the
institutional resources of the Organization of American States; and
It is advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council of the Organization
of American States a body of an advisory nature, made up of experts, the main
purpose of which would be to advise the member governments which, as the case
may be, require and request such assistance.
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as
Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance,
Resolves:
1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain
all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression,
subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such
acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this
hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member
states with regard thereto.
2. To direct the Council of the Organization to establish a Special Consultative
Committee of experts on security matters, for the purpose of advising the member
states that may desire and request such assistance, the following procedures
being observed :
a. The Council of the Organization shall select the membership of the
Special Consultative Committee on Security from a list of candidates pre-
sented by the governments, and shall define immediately terms of reference
for the Committee with a view to achieving the full purposes of this
resolution.
b. The Committee shall submit reports to such member states as may
request its assistance ; however, it shall not publish these reports without
obtaining express authorization. from the state dealt with in the report.
c. The Special Consultative Committee on Security shall submit to the
Council of the Organization, no later than May 1, 1962, an initial general
report, with pertinent recommendations regarding measures which should
be taken.
d. The Committee shall function at the Pan American Union, which shall
extend to it the technical, administrative, and financial facilities required for
the work of the Committee.
e. The Committee shall function for the period deemed advisable by the
Council of the Organization.
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98 SITUATION IN CUBA
3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider
appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as
may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats
or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting
from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in
accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as
the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
III. REITERATION OF TIIE PRINCIPLES OP NONINTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Whereas:
This meeting has been convoked by a resolution of the Council of the Organiza-
tion of American States that invoked Article d of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance :
It is necessary to maintain the principles of nonintervention and self-determina-
tion set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States, because
these principles are a basic part of the juridical system that governs relations
among the republics of the hemisphere and makes friendly relations among them
possible;
In the Charter of the Organization of American States and in the Declaration
of Santiago, signed in August 1959, all the governments of the American States
agreed voluntarily that they should result from free elections ;
The will of the people, expressed through unrestricted suffrage, assures the
formation of governments that represent more faithfully and without yielding
to the interests of a privileged few the basic aspirations to freedom and social
justice, the constant need for economic progress, and the call of brotherhood that
all our peoples feel throughout the hemisphere ;
Formation by free elections of the governments that comprise the Organization
of American States is therefore the surest guarantee for the peace of the hemi-
sphere and the security and political independence of each and every one of the
nations that comprise it; and
Freedom to contract obligations is an inseparable part of the principle of the
self-determination of nations, and consequently a request by one or more coun-
tries that such obligations be complied with. does not signify intervention,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance
Resolves:
1. To reiterate its adherence to the principles of self-determination and non-
intervention as guiding standards of coexistence among the American nations.
2. To urge that the governments of the member countries of the Organization
of American States, bearing in mind the present situation, and complying with
the principles and aims set forth in the Charter of the Organization and the
Declaration of Santiago, organize themselves on the basis of free elections that
express, without restriction, the will of the people.
Whereas:
The preamble to the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims
that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can
only mean the consolidation on this hemisphere, within the framework of demo-
cratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on
respect for the essential rights of man ;
The same charter reaffirms, among its principles, the requirement that the
political organization of the American states be based on the effective exercise of
representative democracy, even as it reasserts the fundamental rights of the
individual ;
The Charter confirms the right of each state to develop, freely and naturally,
its cultural, political, and economic life, while respecting in this free development
the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality ;
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance affirms as a manifest
truth, that juridical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace,
and that peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the
international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the
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SITUATION IN CUBA 99
indispensable well-being of the people, and on the effectiveness, of democracy for
the international realization of justice and security ; and
According to the principles and attributes of the democratic system in this
hemisphere, as stated in the Declaration of Santiago, Chile, the governments of
the American republics should be the result of free elections, and perpetuation
in power, or the exercise of power without a fixed term and with the manifest
intent of perpetuation, is incompatible with the effective exercise of democracy,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance
Resolves
To recommend that the governments of the American states, whose structure
or acts are incompatible with the effective exercise of representative democracy,
hold free elections in their respective countries, as the most effective means of
consulting the sovereign will of their peoples, to guarantee the restoration of a
legal order based on the authority of the law and respect for the rights of the
individual.
Whereas:
The American states have the capacity to eradicate the profound evils of eco-
nomic and social underdevelopment ;
Resolution XI of the Fifth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and Resolution V of the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs declare that economic cooperation among the American states is
necessary for the stability of democracy and the safeguarding of human rights,
and that such cooperation is essential to the strengthening of the solidarity of
the hemisphere and the reinforcement of the inter-American system in the face
of threats that might affect it ; and
In view of the fact that all the nations of the Americas have recognized their
urgent need for economic and social development, it is necessary that they in-
tensify immediately their self-help and cooperative efforts under the Alliance for
Progress and the Charter of Punta del Este, on the basis of the adoption of vig-
orous reforms and large-scale internal efforts by the developing countries con-
cerned and a mobilization of all the necessary financial and technical resources
by the highly developed nations.
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance
Declares:
1. That the preservation and strengthening of free and democratic institutions
in the American republics require, as an essential condition, the prompt, accel-
erated execution of an unprecedented effort to promote their economic and social
development for which effort the public and private, domestic and foreign finan-
cial resources necessary to those objectives are to be made available, economic
and social reforms are to be established, and every necessary internal effort is. to
be made in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of Punta del Este.
2. That it is essential to promote energetically and vigorously the basic in-
dustries of the Latin American countries, to liberalize trade in raw materials by
the elimination of undue restrictions, to seek to avoid violent fluctuations in their
prices, to encourage the modernization and expansion of services in order that
industrialization may rest on its own appropriate bases, to mobilize unexploited
natural resources in order to increase national wealth and to make such in-
creased wealth available to persons of all economic and social groups, and to
satisfy quickly, among other aspirations, the needs for work, housing, land,
health, and education.
VI. EXCLUSION Or, TIIE PRESENT GOvERNMENT OF CUBA FROM PARTICIPATION
IN TIIE, INTER-AMERIOAN SYSTEM
Whereas:
The inter-American system is based on consistent adherence by its constituent
states to certain objectives and principles of solidarity, set forth in the instru-
ments that govern it ;
Among these objectives and principles are those of respect for the freedom
of man and preservation of his rights, the full exercise of representative democ-
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racy, nonintervention of one state in the internal or external affairs of another,
and rejection of alliances and agreement that may lead to intervention in
America by extracontinental powers.
The Seventh meeting of consultation of ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in
San Jose, Costa Rica, condemned the intervention or the threat of intervention
of extracontinental communist powers in the hemisphere and reiterated the obli-
gation of the American states to observe faithfully the principles of the regional
organization ;
The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social
system based on the doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extraconti-
nental communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in
America on the part of the Soviet Union.
The Report of the Inter-America Peace Committee to the Eighth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs establishes that:
The present connections of the Government of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet
bloc of countries are evidently incompatible with the principles and standards
that govern the regional system, and particularly with the collective security
established by the Charter of the OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance [page 39] ;
The abovementioned Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee also states
that:
It is evident that the ties of the Cuban Government with the Sino-Soviet
bloc will prevent the said government from fulfilling the obligations stipu-
lated in the Charter of the Organization and the Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance [page 40] ;
Such a situation in an American state violates the obligations inherent in mem-
bership in the regional system and is incompatible with that system ;
The attitude adopted by the present Government of Cuba and its acceptance
of military assistance offered by extracontinental communist powers breaks down
the effective defense of the inter-American system ; and
No member state of the inter-American system can claim the rights and privi-
leges pertaining thereto if it denies or fails to recognize the corresponding obli-
gations,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance
Declares:
1. That, as a consequence of repeated acts, the present government of Cuba
has voluntarily placed itself outside the inter-American system.
2. That this situation demands unceasing vigilance on the part of the member
states of the Organization of American States, which shall report to the Council
any fact or situation that could endanger the peace and security of the hemi-
sphere.
3. That the American states have a collective interest in strengthening the
inter-American system and reuniting it on the basis of respect for human rights
and the principles and objectives relative to the exercise of democracy set forth
in the Charter of the Organization ; and, therefore,
Resolves:
1. That adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to
Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and the align-
ment of such a. government with the communist bloc breaks the unity and
solidarity of the hemisphere.
2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself
as a Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with the principles and objec-
tives of the inter-American system.
3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Government of Cuba from
participation in the inter-American system.
4. That the Council of the Organization of American States and. the other
organs and organizations of the inter-American system adopt without delay the
measures necessary to carry out this resolution.
Whereas:
The Inter-American Defense Board was established pursuant to Resolution
39 of the Third Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, held in Rio de
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SITUATION IN CUBA 101
Janeiro in 1942, recommending the immediate meeting of a commission composed
of military and naval technicians appointed by each of the governments to study
and to suggest to them measures necessary for the defense of the hemisphere ;
The Inter-American Defense Board, on April 26, 1961, resolved that the
participation of the Cuban regime in defense planning is highly prejudicial to
the work of the Board and to the security of the hemisphere; and
The present Government of Cuba is identified with the aims and policies of
the Sino-Soviet bloc,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance.
Resolves:
To exclude immediately the present Government of Cuba from the Inter-
American Defense Board until the Council of the Organization of American
States shall determine by a vote of two thirds of its members that membership
of the Government of Cuba is not prejudicial to the work of the Board or to the
security of the hemisphere.
Whereas:
The Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Eighth Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs states, with regard to the intense
subversive activity in which the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Cuban
Government are engaged in America, that such activity constitutes "a serious
violation of fundamental principles of the inter-American system" ; and,
During the past three years 13 American states have found it necessary to
break diplomatic relations with the present Government of Cuba.
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving
as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance.
Resolves:
1. To suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war
of every kind.
2. To charge the Council of the Organization of American States, in accordance
with the circumstances and with due consideration for the constitutional or legal
limitations of each and every one of the member states, with studying the feasi-
bility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade to other items, with
special attention to items of strategic importance.
3. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States to dis-
continue, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members, the measure or
measures adopted pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, at such time as the
Government of Cuba demonstrates its compatibility with the purposes and
principlesi of the system.
IX. REVISIONS OF TALI STATUTE OF TIIE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
Whereas:
The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, by Resolu-
tion VIII, created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and charged
it with furthering respect for human rights in the American states ;
Notwithstanding the noble and persevering effort carried on by that Com-
mission in the exercise of its mandate, the inadequacy of the faculties and attri-
butions conferred upon it by its statute have made it difficult for the Commission
to fulfill its assigned mission;
There is a pressing need for accelerating development in the hemisphere of the
collective defense of human rights, so that this development may result in inter-
national legal protection of these rights ; and
There is an obvious relation between violations of human rights and the inter-
national tensions that work against the harmony, peace, and unity of the hemi-
phere,
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as
Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance
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Resolves :
To recommend to the Council of the Organization of American States that it
revise the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, broaden-
ing and strengthening the Commission's attributes and faculties to such an extent
as to permit it effectively to further respect for these rights in the countries of
the hemisphere.
STATEMENT OF HONDURAS
Honduras wishes to have the explanation of the position it adopted in voting
for Resolution VI, Exclusion of the Present Government of Cuba from Participa-
tion in the Inter-American System, recorded in the Final Act.
With regard to the observations of a juridical nature made by distinguished
foreign ministers, Honduras maintains the existence of sufficient bases in the
letter and in the spirit of the treaties and conventions of the regional system.
In the last analysis, however, in view of the threat to the peace and security
of the hemisphere, in view of the threat to the dignity and freedom of the inhabi-
tants of the Americas, and in view of the political presence of the Soviet Union
in America, the Delegation of Honduras, aware of the juridical doubt that might
arise, has not hesitated to give the benefit of the doubt to the defense of demos.
racy in America.
STATEMENT OF ARGENTINA
In view of the statement made by the Representative of Uruguay at the second
plenary session, held on January 31, 1962, the Delegation of Argentina wishes, to
record that it reiterates the juridical views expressed by Dr. Miguel Angel
Cdreano, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, at the ninth session of the
General Committee, in explanation of his vote on Resolution VI of this Final
Act.
STATEMENT OF COLOMBIA
The position of Colombia has been defined in the two statements that will be
shown in the minutes of the second plenary session of this Eighth Meeting of
Consultation, and that refer to general policy and to Resolution VI.
STATEMENT OF MEXICO
The Delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter of record in the Final
Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that,
in its opinion, the exclusion of a member state is not juridically possible unless
the Charter of the Organization of American States is first amended pursuant
to the procedure established in Article 111.
STATEMENT OF IIAITI
My country is proud to have participated in these discussions, which have
taken place in an amtosphere of calm, of courtesy, and of mutual respect.
Haiti came to Punta del Este with the firm intention of defending the principles
of nonintervention and self-determination of peoples, with all that they imply.
Haiti remains firmly attached to these intanagible principles, which guarantee
an order of mutual respect in relations among peoples of different languages
and cultures.
Here Haiti has become persuaded that "the fallacies of communist propa-
ganda cannot and should not obscure or hide the difference in philosophy which
these principles represent when they are expressed by a democratic American
country, and when communist governments and their agents attempt to utilize
them for their own benefit."
This is the sole reason for the change in the position and attitude of my
country, which is honored to have had a modest part in resolving a problem
which jeopardized the peace, the solidarity, and the unity of the hemisphere.
STATEMENT OF ECUADOR
The Delegation of Ecuador wishes to state in the record that the exclusion of
a member state from the inter-American system could only be accomplished
through the prior amendment of the Charter of the Organization of American
States to grant the power to exclude a state.
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The Charter is the constitutional juridical statute that prevails over any other
inter-American instrument.
STATEMENT OF ECUADOR ON RESOLUTION VIII
Ecuador abstained from voting, inasmuch as sanctions are being applied, by
invoking the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, sanctions that begin with the
suspension of traffic in arms with the possibility of being extended. to other items,
with special attention to items of strategic importance, a concept that might
include basic necessities of which the Cuban people should not be deprived and
thus make the present situation more critical.
Of course, Ecuador, as a peace-loving country, reaffirms its faith in peaceful
methods to settle controversies between states and condemns illegal traffic in
arms.
In view of,the statement made by the Representative of Uruguay at the plenary
session held on January 31, 1962, the Delegation of Brazil reaffirms the validity
of the juridical bases of the position taken by its country with respect to Resolu-
tion VI of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, which position was explained
at length by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil in statements made at the
sessions of the General Committee held on January 24 and 30, 1962.
The Delegation of Uruguay wishes to state in the record that, in adopting
its position in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, far from violating or forgetting
the juridical standards applicable to the Cuban case, it adhered strictly to them,
as befits its old and honorable tradition of being a defender of legality. The
bases for this position were explained at the plenary session held on January 31,
as will be shown in the minutes of that session.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs sign the present Final
Act.
DONE in the city of Punta del Este, Uruguay, on January thirty one, nineteen
hundred sixty two. The Secretary General shall deposit the original of the Final
Act in the Archives of the Pan American Union, which will transmit the authen-
ticated copies thereof to the governments of the American republics.
APPENDIX D
TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, CARACAS, VENEZUELA, MARCH 1-28, 1954
RESOLUTION 93
Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the
American States Against the Intervention of International Communism
WHEREAS :
The American republics at the Ninth International Conference of American
States declared that international communism, by its anti-democratic nature
and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American
freedom, and resolved to adopt within their respective territories the measures
necessary to eradicate and prevent subversive activities;
The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recognized
that, in addition to adequate internal measures in each state, a. high degree of
international cooperation is required to eradicate the danger which the subver-
sive activities of international communism pose for the American States ; and
Thee aggressive character of the international communist movement continues
to constitute, in the context of world affairs, a special sand immediate threat
to the national institutions and the peace and security of the American States,
and to the right of each state to develop its cultural, political, and economic life
freely and naturally without intervention in its internal or external affairs by
other states,
The Tenth Inter-American Conference
Condemns :
The activities of the international communist movement as constituting inter-
vention in American affairs ;
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Expresses :
The determination of the American States to take the necessary measures to
protect their political independence against the intervention of international
communism, acting in the interests of an alien depotism ;
Reiterates :
The faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative
democracy as the best means to promote their social and political progress; and
Declares :
That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American
State by the international Communist movement, extending to, this Hemisphere
the 'political system of an extraco?ntinental power, would constitute a threat to the
sovereignty and. political independence of the American States, endangering the
peace of America, and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the
adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.
That, without prejudice to such other measures as: they may consider desir-
able, special attention be given by each of the American governments: to the
following steps for the purpose of counteracting the subversive activities of
the international communist movement within their respective jurisdictions :
1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and sources
of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the international com-
munist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of
those who act as its agents or, in its behalf ; and
2. The exchange of information among governments. to assist in fulfilling
the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Conferences
and Meetings of Ministers! of Foreign Affairs regarding international com-
munism.
This declaration of foreign policy made by the! American republics in relation
to dangers originating outside this Hemisphere is designed to protect and not to
impair the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own
form of government and economic system and to live, its own social and cultural
life.
APpaNDIx E
CHARTER Or THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
PART ONE
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND PURPOSES
ARTICLE 1
The American States establish by this Charter the international organization
that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and. Justice, to promote
their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity and their independence. Within the United
Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency.
All American States that ratify the present Charter are Members of the
Organization.
ARTICLE 3
Any new political entity that arises from the union of several Member States
and that, as such, ratifies the present Charter, shall become a Member of the
Organization. The entry of the new political entity into the Organization shall
result in the loss of membership of each one of the States which constitute it.
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ARTICLE 4
The Organization of American states, in order to put into practice the prin-
ciples on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes :
a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
b) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific
settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States ;
c) To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event
of aggression ;
(1) To seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that
may arise among them ; and
e) To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural
development.
CHAPTER II
ARTICLE 5
The American States reaffirm the following principles'
a) International law is the standard of conduct of States in their recipro-
cal relations, ;
b) International order consists essentially of respect for the personality,
sovereignty and independence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of
obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law ;
e) Good faith shall govern the relations between States;
d) The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are
sought through it require the political organization of those States on the
basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy ;
e) The American States condemn war of aggression: victory does not
give rights ;
f) An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggres-
sion against all the other American States ;
g) Controversies of an international character arising between two or
more American States, shall be settled by peaceful procedures ;
h) Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace;
i) Economic cooperation is essential to the common welfare and pros-
perity of the peoples of the continent;
j) The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex ;
k) The spiritual unity of the continent is based on respect for the cul-
tural values of the American countries and requires their close cooperation
for the high purposes of civilization ;
1) The education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom
and peace.
CHAPTER III
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
ARTICLE 6
States are juridically equal, enjoy equal rights and equal capacity to exercise
these rights, and have equal duties. The rights of each State depend not upon
its power to ensure the exercise thereof, but upon the mere fact of its existence
as a person under international law.
ARTICLE 7
Every American State has the duty to respect the rights enjoyed by every
other State in accordance with international law.
ARTICLE 8
The fundamental rights of States. may not be impaired in any manner what-
soever.
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ARTICLE 9
The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by other
States. Even before being recognized, the State has the right to defend its in-
tegrity and independence, to provide for its preservation and prosperity, and
consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests,
to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of
its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of the
rights of other States in accordance with international law.
ARTICLE 10
Recognition implies that the State granting it accepts the personality of the
new State, with all the rights and duties that international law prescribes for
the two States.
ARTICLE 11
The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own life does not
authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State.
The jurisdiction of States within the limits of their national territory is
exercised equally over all the inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens.
ARTICLE 13
Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life
freely and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights
of the individual and the principles of universal morality.
ARTICLE 14
Respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitute standards. for
the development of peaceful relations among States. International treaties and
agreements should be public.
ARTICLE 15
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form
of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic and cultural elements.
ARTICLE 10
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic
or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind.
ARTICLE 17
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even tempo-
rarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisi-
tions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion
shall be recognized.
ARTICLE 18
The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to
have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance
with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.
ARTICLE. 19
Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance
with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in
Articles 15 and 17.
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CHAPTER IV
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OAP DISPUTES
ARTICLE 20
All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be
submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being
referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.
ARTICLES 21
The following are peaceful procedures : direct negotiation, good offices, media-
tion, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those
which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time.
ARTICLE 22
In the event that a dispute arises between two or more American States which,
in the opinion of one of them, cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic
channels, the Parties shall agree on some other peaceful procedure that will
ARTICLE 23
A special treaty will establish adequate procedures for the pacific settlement
of disputes and will determine the appropriate means for their application, so
that no dispute between American States shall fail of definitive settlement
ARTICLE 24
Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the
inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence
of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other
American States.
ARTICLE 25
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed
attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-
continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or
by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or
collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in
the special treaties on the subject.
CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC STANDARDS
ARTICLE 20
The Member States agree to cooperate with one another, as far as their re-
sources may permit and their laws may provide, in the broadest spirit of good
neighborliness, in order to strengthen their economic structure, develop their
agriculture and mining, promote their industry and increase their trade.
If the economy of an American State is affected by serious conditions that
cannot be satisfactorily remedied by its own unaided effort, such State may
place its economic problems before the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council to seek through consultation the most appropriate solution for such
problems.
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CHAPTER VII
SOCIAL STANDARDS
ARTICLE 28
The Member States agree to cooperate with one another to achieve just and
decent living conditions for their -entire populations.
ARTICLE 29
The Member States agree upon the desirability of developing their social legis-
lation on the following bases :
a) All human beings, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex,
creed or social condition, have the right to attain material well-being and
spiritual growth under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of oppor-
tunity, and economic security ;
b) Work is a right and a social duty ; it shall not be considered as an
article of commerce ; it demands respect for freedom of association and for
the dignity of the worker ; and it is to be performed under conditions that
ensure life, health and a decent standard of living, both during the working
years and during old age, or when any circumstance deprives the individual
of the possibility of working.
CHAPTER VIII
CULTURAL STANDARDS
ARTICLE 30
The Member States agree to promote, in accordance with their constitutional
provisions and their material resources, the exercise of the right to education,
on the following bases :
a) Elementary education shall be compulsory and, when provided by the
State, shall be without cost ;
b) Higher education shall be available to all, without distinction as to
race, nationality, sex, language, creed or social condition.
ARTICLE 31
With due consideration for the national character of each State, the Member
States undertake to facilitate free cultural interchange by every medium of
expression.
-PART TWO
CHAPTER IX
THE ORGANS
ARTICLE 32
The Organization of American States accomplishes its purposes by means of :
a) The Inter-American Conference;
b) The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs :
c) The Council ;
d) The Pan American Union;
e) The Specialized Conferences ; and
f) The Specialized Organizations.
CHAPTER X
THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
ARTICLE 33
The Inter-American Conference is the supreme organ of the Organization
of American States. It decides the general action and policy of the Organization
and determines the structure and functions of its Organs, and has the authority
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to consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States.
These functions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this
Charter and of other inter-;American treaties, -
ARTICLE 34
All Member States have the right to be represented at the Inter-American
Conference. Each State has the right to one vote.
,ARTICLE 36'
The Conference shall convene every five years at the time fixed by the Council
of the Organization, after consultation with the government of the country
where the Conference is to be held.
ARTICLE 3 s
In special circumstances and with the approval of two-thirds of the American
Governments, a special Inter-American Conference may be held, or the date
of the next regular Conference may be changed.
Each Inter-American Conference shall designate the place of meeting of the,
next Conference. If for any unforeseen reason the Conferencecannot be held
at the place designated, the Council of the Organization shall designate a new
place.
ARTICLE 88
The program and regulations of the Inter-American Conference shall be
prepared by the Council of the Organization and submitted to the Member States
for consideration.
CHAPTER XI
THE MEFETING. OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ARTICLE 39
The Meeting of Consultati, n, of Ministers, of Foreign Affairs shall be held in
order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the
American States, and to serve as the 0rgan=of Consultation
ARTICLE 40 .
Any Member State may request that a Meeting of Consultation be called. The
request shall be addressed to the Council of the Organization, which shall
decide by an absolute majority whether a meeting should be held.
ARTICLE -41. - - -
The program and regulations of the Meeting of Consultation shall be prepared
by the Council of the Organization and submitted to the Member States for
consideration.
ARTICLE 42
If, for exceptional reasons, a Minister of Foreign Affairs is unable to attend
the meeting, he shall be represented by a special delegate.
ARTICLE 43
- ,:
In case of an armed attack within the territory of an`Americftn State or within
the region of security delimited by treaties in force, a Meeting of Consultation
shall be held without delay. Such Meeting shall be called immediately by the
Chairman of the Council of the Organization, who shall at the same time call a
meeting of the Council Itself.
ARTICLE 44 - - '
An Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the Organ of
Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection
with the application of existing special treaties on 'collective security.
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, ....
?ARTICLE 4.5
The Advisory Defense Committee shall be composed of the highest military
authorities of the American States participating in the Meeting of Consultation..
Under exceptional circumstances the Governments may appoint substitutes. Eaci;.
State shall be entitled to one vote.
ARTICLE` 40
The Advisory Defense Committee shall be convoked under the same conditions
as the Organ of Consultation, when the latter deals with matters relating to
defense against aggression.
ARTICLE 47.
The Committee shall also meet when the Conference or the Meeting of Con-
sultation or the Governments, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States,.
assign to it technical studies or reports on specific subjects.
CIIArTER XII
THE COUNCIL
ARTICLE 48
The Council of the Organization of American States is composed of one Repre-
sentative of each Member State of the Organization, especially. appointed by the.
respective Government, with the rank of Ambassador. The appointment may
be given to the diplomatic representative accredited to the Government of the
country in which the Council has its seat. During the absence of the titular,
Representative, the Government may appoint an interim Representative.
The Council shall elect a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, who shall serve for
one year and shall not be eligible for election to either of those positions for the
term immediately following.
ARTICLE 50
The Council takes cognizance, within the limits of the present Charter and of
inter-American treaties and agreements, of any matter referred to it by the Inter-
American Conference or the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs.
ARTICLE 51
The Council shall be responsible for the proper discharge by the Pan American
Union of the duties assigned to it.
ARTICLE 52
The Council shall serve provisionally as the Organ of Consultation when the
circumstances contemplated in Article 43 of this Charter arise,
ARTICLE 53
It is also the duty of the Council :
a) To draft and submit to the Governments and to the Inter-American
Conference proposals for the creation of new Specialized Organizations or
for the combination, adaptation or elimination of existing ones, including
matters relating to the financing and support thereof ;
b) To draft recommendations to the Governments, the Inter-American
Conference, the Specialized Conferences or the Specialized Organizations, for
the coordination of the activities and programs of such organizations, after
consultation with them;
c) To conclude agreements with the Inter-American Specialized Organiza.
tions to determine the relations that shall exist between the respective agency
and the Organization ;
d) To conclude agreements or special arrangements for cooperation with
other American organizations of recognized international standing;
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e) To promote and facilitate collaboration between the Organization of
American States and the United Nations, as well as between Inter-American
Specialized Organizations and similar international agencies ;
f) To adopt resolutions that will enable the Secretary General to perform
the duties envisaged in Article 84;
g) To perform the other duties assigned to it by the present Charter.
ARTICLE 54
The Council shall establish the bases for fixing the quota that each Government
is to contribute to the maintenance of the Pan American Union, taking into
account the ability to pay of the respective countries and their determination to
contribute in an equitable manner. The budget, after approval by the Council,
shall be transmitted to the Governments at least six months before the first day
of the fiscal year, with a statement of the annual quota of each country. Deci-
sions on budgetary matters require the approval of two-third of the members of
the Council.
ARTICLE 55
The Council shall formulate its own regulations.
ARTICLE 56
The Council shall function at the seat of the Pan American Union.
ARTICLE 57
The following are organs of the Council of the Organization of American
States:
a) The Inter-American Economic and Social Council;
b) The Inter-American Council of. Jurists; and
c) The Lnter-American Cultural Council.
ARTICLE 58
The organs referred to in the preceding article shall have technical autonomy
within the limits of this Charter ; but their decisions shall not encroach upon the
sphere of action of the Council of the Organization.
ARTICLE 59
The organs of the Council of the Organization are composed of representatives
of all the Member States of the Organization.
The organs of the Council of the Organization shall, as far ash possibley render
to the Governments such technical services as the latter may request ; and they
shall advise the Council of the Organization on matters within their jurisdiction
ARTICLE 61
The organs of the Council of the Organization shall, in agreement with the
Council, establish cooperative relations with the corresponding organs of the
United Nations and with the national or international agencies that function
within their respective spheres of action.
ARTICLE 82
The Council of the Organization, with the advice of the appropriate bodies
and after consultation with the Governments, shall formulate the statutes of its
organs in accordance with and in the execution of the provisions of this Charter.
A) h6Inter A mean cononvtc and Social Coto W1
ARTICLE 0
The Inter-American Economic and Social Council has for its principal pur-
pose the promotion of the economic and social welfare of the American nations
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through effective cooperation for the better utilization of their natural resources,
the development of their agriculture and industry and the raising of the stand-
ards of living of their peoples.
ARTICLE 64
To accomplish this purpose the Council shall :
a) Propose the means by which the American nations may give each other
technical assistance in making studies and formulating and executing plans
to carry out the purposes referred to in Article 26 and to develop and
improve their social services ;
b) Act as coordinating agency for all official inter-American activities of
an economic and social nature;
c) Undertake studies on its own initiative or at the request of any Mem-
ber State ;
d) Assemble and prepare reports on economic and social matters for the
use of the Member States ;
e) Suggest to the Council of the Organization the advisability of holding
specialized conferences on economic and social matters ;
f) Carry on such other activities as may be assigned to it by the Inter-
American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, or the Council of the Organization.
ARTICLE 65
The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, composed of technical
delegates appointed by each Member State, shall meet on its' own initiative or on
that of the Council of the Organization.
ARTICLE 66
The Inter-American Economic and Social Council shall function at the seat
of the Pan American Union, but it may hold meetings in any American city by
a majority decision of the Member States.
B) The Inter-American Council of Jurists,
ARTICLE 67
The purpose of the Inter-American Council of Jurists is to serve as an ad-
visory body on juridical matters ; to promote the development and codification
of public and private international law ; and to study the possibility of attain-
ing uniformity in the legislation of the various American countries, insofar
as it may appear desirable.
ARTICLE 68
The Inter-American Juridical Committee of Rio de Janeiro shall be the
permanent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists.
ARTICLE 69
The Juridical Committee shall be composed of jurists of the nine countries
selected by the Inter-American Conference, The selection of the jurists shall
be wade by the Inter-American Council of Jurists from a panel submitted'
by each country chosen by the Conference. The Members of the Juridical
Committee represent all Member States of the Organization. The Council of
the Organization is empowered to fill any vacancies that occur during the
intervals between Inter-American Conferences and between meetings of the
Inter-American Council of Jurists.
ARTICLE 70
The Juridical Committee shall undertake such studies and preparatory work
r
as are assigned to it by the Inter-American Council of Jurists, the Inter--
American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, or the Council of the Organization: It may also undertake those,
studies and projects which, on its own initiative, it considers advisable.
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ARTICLE 71
The Inter-American Council of Jurists and the juridical committee should
seek the cooperation of national committees for the codification of international
law, of institutes of international and comparative law, and of other specialized
ARTICLE 72
The Inter-American Council of Jurists shall meet when convened by the
Council of the Organization, at the place determined by the Council of Jurists
at its previous meeting.
C) The Inter-American Cultural Council
ARTICLE 73
The purpose of the Inter-American Cultural Council is to promote friendly
relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples, in order
to strengthen the peaceful sentiments that have characterized the evolution
of America, through the promotion of educational, scientific and cultural ex-
To this end the principal functions of the Council shall be:
a) To sponsor inter-American cultural activities ;
b) To collect and supply information on cultural activities carried on in
and among the American States by private and official agencies both national
and international in character ;
c) To promote the adoption of basic educational programs adapted to the
needs of all population groups in the American countries;
d) To promote, in addition, the adoption of special programs of training,
education and culture for the indigenous groups of the American countries;
e) To cooperate in the protection, preservation and increase of the cultural
heritage of the continent ;
f) To promote cooperation among the American nations in the fields of
education, science and culture, by means of the exchange of materials for
research and study, as well as the exchange of teachers, students, specialists
and, in general, such other persons and materials as are useful for the
realization of these ends ;
g) To encourage the education of the peoples for harmonious interna-
tional relations ;
h) To carry on such other activities as may be assigned to it by the In-
ter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
reign Affairs, or the Council of the Organization.
ARTICLE 75
The Inter-American Cultural Council shall determine the place of its next
meeting and shall be convened by the Council of the Organization on the date
chosen by the latter in agreement with the Government of the country selected
as the seat of the meeting.
ARTICLE 76
There shall be a Committee for Cultural Action of which five States, chosen at
,each Inter-American Conference, shall be members. The individuals composing
the Committee for Cultural Action shall be selected by the Inter-American Cul-
tural Council from a panel submitted by each country chosen by the Conference,
.and they shall be specialists in education or cultural matters. When the Inter-
American Cultural Council and the Inter-American Conference are not in ses-
sion, the Council of the Organization may fill vacancies that arise and replace
:those countries that find it necessary to discontinue their cooperation.
ARTICLE 77
The Committee for Cultural Action shall function as the permanent committee
,of the Inter-American Cultural Council, for the purpose of preparing any studies
that the latter may assign to it. With respect to these studies the Council shall
have the final decision.
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CHAPTER. XIII
TIIE PAN AMERICAN UNION
ARTICLE 78
The Pan American Union is the central and permanent organ of the Organiza-
tion of American States and the General Secretariat of the Organization. it
shall perform the duties assigned to it in this Charter and such other duties as
may be assigned to it in other inter-American treaties and agreements.
ARTICLE 79
There shall be a Secretary General of the Organization, who shall be elected
by the Council for a ten-year term and who may not be reelected or be succeeded
by a person of the same nationality. In the event of a vacancy in the office of
Secretary General, the Council shall, within the next ninety days, elect a suc-
cessor to fill the office for the remainder of-the term, who may be reelected if
the vacancy occurs during the second half of the term.
ARTICLE 80
The Secretary General shall direct the Pan American Union and be the legal
representative thereof.
ARTICLE 81
The Secretary General shall participate with voice, but without vote, in the
deliberations of the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Specialized Conferences, and the Council and
its organs.
ARTICLE 82
The Pan American Union, through its technical and information offices shall,
under the direction of the Council promote economic, social, juridical and cul-
tural relations among all the Member States of the Organization.
ARTICLE 83
The Pan American Union shall also perform the following functions :
a) Transmit ex officio to Member States the convocation to the Inter-
American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, and the Specialized Conferences ;
b) Advise the Council and its organs in the preparation of programs and
regulations of the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Specialized Conferences ;
c) Place, to the extent of its ability, at the disposal of the Government of
the country where a conference is to be held, the technical aid and per-
sonnel which such Government may request ;
d) Serve as custodian of the documents and archives of the Inter-Ameri-
can Conference, of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, and, insofar as possible, of the Specialized Conferences-;
e) Serve as depository of the instruments of ratification of inter-American
agreements ;
f) Perform the functions entrusted to it by the Inter-American Conference,
and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ;
_g) Submit to the Council an annual report on the activities of the Or-
ganization ;
h) Submit to the Inter-American Conference a report on the work accom-
plished by the Organs of the Organization since the previous Conference.
ARTICLE 84
It is the duty of the Secretary General :
a) To establish, with the approval of the Council, such technical and
administrative offices of the .Pan American Union as are necessary to
accomplish its purposes;
b) To determine the number of department heads, officers and employees
of the Pan American Union ; to appoint them, regulate their powers and
duties, and fix their compensation, in accordance with general standards
established by the Council.
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ARTICLE 85
There shall be an Assistant Secretary General, elected by the Council for a
term of ten years and eligible for reelection. In the event of a vacancy in the
office of Assistant Secretary General, the Council shall, within the. next ninety-
days, elect a successor to fill such office for the remainder of the term.
The Assistant Secretary General shall be the Secretary of the Council. He
.shall perform the duties of the Secretary General during the temporary absence
or disability of the latter, or during the ninety-day vacancy referred to in
Article 79. He shall also serve as advisory officer to the Secretary General, with
the power to act as his delegate in all matters that the Secretary General may
entrust to him.
ARTICLE 87
The Council, by a two-thirds vote of its members, may remove the Secretary
General or the Assistant Secretary General whenever the proper functioning of
the Organization so demands.
ARTICLE 88
The heads of the respective departments of the Pan American Union, appointed
by the Secretary General, shall be the Executive 'Secretaries of the Inter-Ameri-
can Economic and Social Council, the Council of Jurists and the Cultural
Council.
In the performance of their duties the personnel shall not seek or receive
instructions from any government or from any other authority outside the
Pan American Union. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect
upon their position as international officials responsible only to the Union.
Every Member of the Organization of American States pledges itself to
respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the
Secretary General and the personnel, and not to seek to influence them in
the discharge of their duties.
In selecting its personnel the Pan American Union shall give first considera-
tion to efficiency, competence and integrity ; but at the same time importance
shall be given to the necessity of recruiting personnel on as broad a geographical
basis as possible.
ARTICLE 92
The seat of the Pan American Union is the city of Washington.
CHAPTER XIV
THE SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE'S
ARTICLE 93
The Specialized Conferences shall meet to deal with special technical matters
or to develop specific aspects of inter-American cooperation, when it is so de-
cided by the Inter-American Conference or the Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs ; when inter-American agreements so provide ; or when
the Council of the Organization considers it necessary, either on its own initia-
tive or at the request of one of its organs or of one of the 'Specialized
Organizations.
The program and regulations of the Specialized Conferences shall be pre-
pared by the organs of the Council of the Organization or by the Specialized
Organizations concerned ; they shall be submitted to the Member Governments
for consideration and transmitted to the Council for its information.
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CHAPTER XV
THE SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS
ARTICLE 96
For the purposes of the present Charter, Inter-American Specialized Orga-
nizations are the intergovernmental organizations established by multilateral
agreements and having specific functions with respect to technical matters of
common interest to the American States.
The Council shall, for the purposes stated in Article 53, maintain a register
of the Organizations that fulfill the conditions set forth in the foregoing Article.
The Specialized Organizations shall enjoy the fullest technical autonomy and
shall take into account the recommendations of the Council, in conformity with
the provisions of the present Charter.
The Specialized Organizations shall submit to the Council periodic reports on
the progress of their work and on their annual budgets and expenses.
Agreements between the Council and the Specialized Organizations contem-
plated in paragraph c) or Article 53 may provide that such Organizations trans-
mit their budgets to the Council for approval. Arrangements may also be made
for the Pan American Union to receive the quotas of the contributing countries
and distribute them in accordance with the said agreements.
The Specialized Organizations shall establish cooperative relations with world
agencies of the same character in order to coordinate their activities. In con-
cluding agreements with international agencies of a worldwide character, the
Inter-American Specialized Organizations shall preserve their identity and their
status as integral parts of the Organization of American States, even when they
perform regional functions of international agencies.
In determining the geographic location of the Specialized Organizations the
interests of all the American States shall be taken into account.
PART THREE
CHAPTER XVI
THE UNITED NATIONS
ARTICLE 102
None of the provisions of this Charter shall be construed as impairing the
rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United
Nations. -
CHAPTER XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 103
The Organization of American States shall enjoy in the territory of each Mem-
ber such legal capacity, privileges and immunities as arenecessary for the
exercise of Its functions and the accomplishment of its purposes. -
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ARTICLE 104
The Representatives of the Governments on the Council of the Organization,
the representatives on the organs of the Council, the personnel of their delega-
tions, as well as the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General
of the Organization, shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary for
the independent performance of their duties.
The juridical status of the Inter-American Specialized Organizations and
the privileges and immunities that should be granted to them and to their per-
sonnel, as well as to the officials of the Pan American Union, shall be deter-
mined in each case through agreements between the respective organizations
and the Governments concerned.
ARTICLE 106
Correspondence of the Organization of American States, including printed
matter and parcels, bearing the frank thereof, shall be carried free of charge
in the mails of the Member States.
The Organization. of American States does not recognize any restriction on
the eligibility of men and, women to participate in the activities of the various:
Organs and to hold positions therein.
CHAPTER XVIII
RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE
ARTICLE 108
The present Charter shall remain open for signature by the American States
and shall be ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional proce-
dures. The original instrument, the Spanish, English, Portuguese and French
texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Pan American
Union, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments for
purposes of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Pan American Union, which shall notify the signatory States of such deposit.
ARTICLE 100
The present Charter shall enter into force among the ratifying States when
two-thirds of the signatory States have deposited their ratifications. It shall
enter into force with respect to the remaining States in the order in which they
deposit their ratifications.
ARTICLE 110
The present Charter shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United
Nations through the Pan American Union.
ARTICLII 111
Amendments to the present Charter may be adopted only at an Inter-American
Conference convened for that purpose. Amendments shall enter into force in
accordance with the terms and the procedure set forth in Article 109.
The present Charter shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced
by any Member State upon written notification to the ran American Union.
which shall communicate to all the others each notice of denunciation received.
After two years from the date on which the Pan American Union receives a
notice of denunciation, the present Charter shall cease to be in force with respect
to the denouncing State, which shall cease to belong to the Organization after
it has fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose full powers
have been presented and found to be in good and due form, sign the present
Charter at the city of Bogota, Colombia, on the dates that appear opposite their
respective signatures.
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