WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000300220001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Madrid Sends Reinforcements to Spanish.
Enclaves in Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
New Government in Faeroe islands . . . . . . . 2
3&)1
NATO Assesses British Defense Review
West Europeans Searching for Ways to Support
Portuguese Moderates . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
UNCTAD Commodity Talks . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
DOS & DIA review(s) completed.
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Madrid Sends Reinforcements to Spanish Enclaves
in Morocco
Spain's move over the weekend in sending naval
and marine reinforcements to its enclaves of Ceuta
and Melilla on Morocco's Mediterranean coast was
evidently designed to make clear Madrid's rejection
of Moroccan claims to the territories.
Late last month, Rabat made a formal demarche
to the UN Committee on Decolonization requesting
an examination of the status of the Spanish.enclaves.
Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki followed this with
a call for the return of the two enclaves, as well
as Spanish Sahara. The Moroccan move is seen as
an effort by King Hassan to enhance his domestic
prestige, now that interest in the Spanish Sahara
question is diminishing, following referral of that
issue to the International Court of Justice.
The Moroccan action on the enclaves provoked
surprise, alarm, and near-unanimous indignation in
Spain. Spanish military contacts of the US defense
attaches in Madrid immediately stressed that,
although Madrid intends to withdraw from the Sahara,
it will never withdraw from the enclaves.
Spanish officials are aware of their vulnerability
on the Ceuta and Melilla issue in the UN because of
the strong influence exerted in that forum by the
third world nations, which support decolonization.
The US embassy in Madrid believes that if Spain loses
in the UN on this issue, it will: ignore any subsequent
resolution calling for withdrawal from the enclaves.
The enclaves issue is also likely to affect
Madrid's relations with the US. Spain may raise this
issue with the US in the negotiations that resume
today in Madrid over renewal of US base rights in
Spain. Spanish officials reacted negatively to news
of US arms sales to Morocco during the Spanish-Moroccan
dispute over the Sahara, and this bitterness may
intensify.
February 10, 1975
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New Government in Faeroe Islands
Two of the three parties in the coalition
government that came to power in the Faeroe
Islands after the Danish elections on January
9, favor increased self-rule and have taken
a stand against allowing NATO facilities to
remain in the islands. Despite the likelihood
that the Faeroes will demonstrate increased
assertiveness in its relations with Copenhagen,
the new coalition has agreed that no changes
should be made in the fundamental relationship
between the Faeroes and Denmark for the next
four years. Even if the question of NATO facili-
ties is raised, Denmark is unlikely to relinquish
responsibility for the islands' foreign relations
and assuring their defense as O.
F7
February 10, 1975
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NATO Assesses British Defense Review
The discussion of the UK defense review in
NATO's Defense Planning Committee on Friday
represented a grudging acceptance of unpleasant
reality. In general, the NATO ambassadors
sympathized with the UK's economic plight but
criticized the proposed defense program because
it would weaken NATO's northern and southern
flanks and have an adverse political and psycho-
logical impact.
The UK permanent representative, Sir Edward
Peck, clearly set the limits of the debate when
he said that the UK's decision to reduce defense
spending is firm. His government would be will-
ing to consider modifications of its defense pro-
gram within these spending limits, according to
Peck, but it could not reconsider the level of
spending.
Nearly all representatives who spoke expressed
understanding for the UK's situation. Several of
them--mindful of the defense cutbacks their own
governments had been forced to make--echoed the
Dutch permanent representative, who remarked
that "people in glass houses should not throw
stones." The representatives were nevertheless
well aware that the reductions the UK is contem-
plating in its NATO commitment are the most
significant the Alliance has ever been asked to
consider.
Several representatives agreed with the NATO
Military Committee's pessimistic assessment of
the impact of the British actions on NATO's
defenses. The Italian representative bemoaned
the UK's planned departure from the Mediterranean
and asked if London could not at least maintain
its capability to reinforce the southern region.
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The Belgian representative asked if NATO's
southern flank still existed and if it were
possible to defend it. The West German, Danish,
and Norwegian representatives all were concerned
about the UK's intention to reduce significantly
its capability to reinforce NATO's northern
region.
The Belgian representative thought that the
proposed UK cutbacks called NATO's strategy into
question and weakened the Alliance's ability to
deter aggression. Consequently, there would be
a "most striking effect" on public opinion. The
Dutch representative thought that allied "cohesion,
solidarity, and resolve" would suffer.
Despite the hand-wringing, the discussion
produced very few practical suggestions about how
the UK could maintain its activities on NATO's
flanks while still reducing defense expenditures.
only the Canadian representative echoed Ambassador
Bruce's suggestion that the UK might realize some
savings through cooperative programs, such as the
standardization of weapons.
NATO Secretary General Luns intends to send
a letter to UK defense minister Mason this week
summarizing the views heard in the debate
and expressing the hope that consultations between
the UK and its allies on the defense program will
continue until final decision re made in London.
February 10, 1975
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I "Opp
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West Europeans Searching for Ways to
Support Portuguese Moderates
West European officials are expressing grow-
ing concern about the drift to the left in Portugal,
but are having trouble finding ways to lend support
to moderate forces.
Although confused by Portuguese developments,
many officials believe that the future of democracy
in Portugal depends on the elections taking place
on schedule, not later than April 25. The officials
are aware of estimates giving the Portuguese Com-
munist Party less than 10 percent of the vote. They
nevertheless fear that the Communists may attempt to
postpone or subvert the elections in order to retain
their appearance of strength.
The actions by extreme leftists in breaking up
a center-right party congress in Oporto last month
received much attention in the European press,
especially since representatives of several West
European parties were there.
The inability of the Portuguese government to
specify its aid requirements has frustrated the
other Europeans in their attempts to provide direct
bilateral aid to Portugal. The UK has embarked upon
a modest assistance program, however, and Norway is
at present negotiating a technical assistance pact.
Several EC-capitals have expressed interest in
a Dutch proposal to "untie" development aid to the
former Portuguese colonies, thus allowing them to
turn to Portugal instead of the donor country for
goods and services.
February 10, 1975
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The French, Danes, and Italians want to use
EC channels to provide governmental assistance,
but the EC Commission is reluctant to commit the
community to any long-term preferential arrange-
ments until the political situation in Lisbon
stabilizes. EC Vice President Soames will visit
Portugal this week to discuss the aid situation
and to publicize EC interest in Portugal.
The intent of this visit and that of UK
Foreign Secretary Callaghan's last week is to
provide moral support for Portuguese moderates.
In the period prior to the elections, such visits
by European leaders may provide the best means by
which Europe can respond to Portuguese Foreign
Minister Soares' recent call for support of plu-
ralistic democracy in Portugal.
The Dutch Socialist Party, meanwhile, has
launched a campaign to collect funds for its
Portuguese counterpart. Social Democratic and
Labor parties in the UK, Italy, and West Germany
are also considering various forms of direct
narty-to-party assistance- F_
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UNCTAD Commodity Talks
At this week's meeting in Geneva of the com-
mittee on commodities of the UN Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the developing
states will take a major step in their efforts
to breathe life into the resolutions demanding
a "new economic order" which they have imposed
on UN members. The overwhelming majorities
enjoyed by the developing countries enabled
these states, at a special session of the
UN on development last spring and at the
UN general assembly in the fall, to adopt
steamroller tactics and force adoption of
a Declaration for a New World Economic Order
and a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States. Both included provisions unpalatable
to most of the industrialized states. Other
meetings are scheduled for this year and
next on the problems of the developing states,
the most important of which are another special
UN general assembly in September 1975 and
a major UNCTAD gathering in Nairobi in May
1976.
This week's Geneva session comes on
the heels of a meeting last week in Dakar of
70-odd developing states aimed at establish-
ing a common. position on commodity and develop-
ment issues.
At the Dakar conference, the participants
recited their familiar litany of complaints
over exploitation by the industrialized states.
The developing states agreed to seek "economic
emancipation and the
of f
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means of their economic development." They
further pledged unity in the case of agression--
"economic or otherwise"--directed against
developing states.
The delegates endorsed the communique
issued at last month's OPEC ministerial meeting
in Algiers which calls for expanding the scope
of a French-sponsored meeting of oil producers
and consumers to include raw materials and
development. The developing states also demanded
that they be allowed to select their own partic-
ipants in the meeting rather than allow France
to invite whom it chooses.
The principal debate in Geneva will
be over an "integrated program for commodities"
prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat in response
to one of the provisions adopted at last
spring's special UN session. The corollary
issue of indexation--tying the prices for
raw material exports to those of manufactured
goods imported by developing countries--
will not be emphasized in Geneva because
the developed states want to avoid the subject
at all costs and the developing countries
have agreed to give priority to the integrated
program on commodities. Indexation will
nevertheless return to influence future meetings
on development because many of the developing
states feel some such scheme is the only
means by which they can maintain the earning
power of their exports.
Integrated Program
The integrated program would establish
international stocks for a number of commodities
to be used to stabilize prices at remunerative
levels for the producers. The stocks would
be financed by a central fund to which producers
and consumers would contribute. For commodity
markets in which stockpiles could not provide
stability or would be difficult to maintain
February 10, 1975
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STAN LEY by Murray Ball
Continuing the adventures of the Great Palaeolithic Hero
"NO 1EA FOR YOU TONIGHT
Doe USJ4$SS You LEGGO
,- , By DOSE ! "
One view of the development problem
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the program would provide direct compensatory
financing to developing states whose earnings
from their exports decline below a certain
Level.
The program implies that for some minerals
producer cartels could maintain price levels.
The draft program pays lip service to the
need to consider consumer interests.
The goal of the UNCTAD secretariat is
to secure acceptance now in principle for
the program and get the details worked out
before the UNCTAD Trade Development Board
meets this summer.
Developing States
The developing states will certainly
maintain, in Geneva, the united front they
have been showing on economic issues in the
UN. They are nevertheless not a homogeneous
group and are divided by regional interests,
ideological differences, disparity in levels
of development and endowment in natural resources.
Radical elements among these states
have led the developing country bloc in demanding
recognition of its new power and influence.
These countries are likely to insist on a
rapid adoption of the commodities program, or
even more radical programs.
The moderates are nevertheless cautioning
that the developing countries do not have
very much real power outside of the UN forum
where they hold an automatic majority and
that adoption of radical positions only increases
the resistance of the industrialized states
to cooperating in multilateral development
plans. The moderates also realize that exploitation
of commodity issues is shaky ground on which
to attain developing country solidarity,
since not all developing states are commodity
producers. Moreover, some of the industrialized
states are also exporters of raw materials
February 10, 1975
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and stand to benefit more from commodity
arrangements than the developing countries.
Still, the moderate states have not
yet broken solidarity with the developing-
country bloc on economic issues and are not
likely to do so in Geneva. They see little
alternative offered by the developed countries
to help them face their economic problems.
Moderate elements lack an effective
spokesman for their position and the radicals,
led by Algeria, have remained well organized
and prepared to meet internal and external
challenges to their leadership. Last week's
meeting in Dakar, Senegal reflects this;
Algeria financed, organized and set the agenda
for the affair. Senegal--along with the other
moderate developing states--found itself car-
ried along in support of radical positions at
a meeting held in its own capital.
Looking for an alternative to the radical
positions, the moderates could seize on certain
provisions in the recently negotiated trade
and aid agreement--to be known as the Lome
Convention--between the EC and 46 developing
states. The agreement commits the EC to
protect the developing states' purchasing
power earned from exports of 12 commodities
to the EC.
Formal agreement to this provision is
the first such accord between developing
and developed states, and the moderates may
point to this concession, reached by negotiation,
as a more concrete achievement than any reached
by the confrontational tactics of the radicals.
The latter may well argue that the EC agreement
is limited in scope and that a stronger version
of its provisions have in any case been incorporated
in the proposed integrated commodity program.
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Developed Country Attitudes
The industrialized states met in late
January in the OECD to coordinate their position
for the Geneva meeting, agreeing to maintain
a common front and to avoid confrontation
with the developing states if possible. Many
of the industrialized states are themselves
interested in some mechanism that would lend
stability to commodity markets. They are
also concerned that the success of the oil
producers may encourage the development of
other commodity cartels. The emphasis of
the industrialized countries will thus be
on gaining multilateral and bilateral guarantees
of access to raw materials.
While they will consider the commodity
program in a "positive perspective," the
industrialized states have agreed to take II
a slow approach. They want more time to
study the program and point out that the
proposal is both complex and would be difficult
to administer as presently conceived. They
want to be sure that the commodity program
would not be used to support prices above
long-term equilibrium levels but only to
smooth out temporary price fluctuations.
The EC countries, for their part, may
seek political capital in Geneva from their
concessions in the Lome Convention on earnings
stabilization, claiming that the agreement
shows that the community is taking the interests
of the developing countries to heart. Although
most of the 46 states that signed the agreement
with the EC are traditionally members of
the moderate camp among developing states,
the debate on commodities has not approached
the point where the solidarity of the developing
states will be seriously tested by calculations
of economic benefit. While eager to curry
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favor with developing states when possible, the
EC is not likely to break ranks with the other
industrialized countries in their cautious approach
to the proposed commodity schemes.
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Secret
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