VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000900030002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI ROM Cdr ''
Please return to
presentation Staff
I
State Department review
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VIETJAM
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NEW
I . - The ceasefire for Buddha's birthday passed with a
relatively small amount of *nosy-initiated activity.
A. The, only sizeable enemy action came in an attack,
just a low minutes after the ceasefire began on
22 May, against a US Army company in a defensive
poeltl6n southwest of Pleiku City in the central'
highlands.
1. Twelve American were killed and 67 wounded in
the exchange of fire and infantry contact which
continued sporadically throughout the ceasefire.
B. There was no significant contact with enemy forces
reported in the DMZ area during the ceasefire.
Elsewhere, there were scattered minor incidents.
C. We have no reports as yet that the Communists
attempted to take advantage of the ceasefire to
move large amounts of supplies.
1. It takes a while for information of this type
to Dome in, however,, and later reports may ir4di.6
cafe extensive Communist re-supply activities,
most probably in southern North Vietnam.
State' D erpartme nt review(s)
completed.
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II. Reports of the damage to the Hanoi targets in the air
strikes of 19 and, 211 May are conflicting. However, it
appears that substantial damage was done to the Hanoi
theermal'power plant in' the 21 May strike.
A. The North Vietnamese have nonetheless Managed to
get electricity restored in some areas of the
capital, possibly by drawing on other stations in
their power grid.
8,. US aircraft which have been in the vicinity during
the last f the city dark.
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C. There in reports of bomb
damage to the embassy area or to the Hanoi water
water works claimed by Western observers in Hanoi.
D-. We believe it likely that there was some accidental
damage to the embassy area,of Hanoi, as reported by
Western observers.
1. US aircraft and spent ammunition apparently fell
in the area..
There have been no reports of heavy civil casualties
in the raids.
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IV. We have not detected any new bloc weapons in
the DRY air defense arsenal lately, but 96 me
could be on the way. We are examining the
evidence particularly for the following types:
A. The SS-3 SIIYS R...?tbfe Is a 650 NM ballistic
missile F7
B. The SCUD tactical ballistic missile with a
range of 150 NU. This weapon has been
deployed in some East European countries
and would provide the DRV with an opportunity
to attack off-shore shipping and some large
fixed installations such as Da Nang Airfield
from the southern DRV.
C. The Salish is a 60 NU surface-to-surface
version of an older naval cruise missile. It
has been supplied to Cuba and Eastern European
countries and would be used against shipping
or tactical ground targets.
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D. The Shaddock to a 300 NM missile which would
allow the DRV to attack fixed targets ,in the
northern half of South Vietnam from the
southern halt of the ARV. It has not been
made available to non-Soviet forces.
E. The FROG surface-to-surface unguided rockets
would be' useful in a tactical 'situation such'
as that in the DMZ area. It has a range of up
to 48 miles in its various models and has
been deployed through the bloc and Cuba.
F. COASTAL DEFENSE missiles such as the SAMLET,
STYX, KENNEL are used primarily against shipping.
1. In addition to the above offensive missile
systems, we might expect to see continuing
deliveries of late-model all-weather MIG-wls
plus additional- MXG-17 aircraft. We could
also look for improved versions of Soviet
air-to-air missiles.
2. In the ground forces we might expect larger
rockets--up to 240smr---as well `ass heavier
artillery and anti-aircraft weapons. We
have already seen some of this equipment--
field guns of 130mm for example, as well an
132mm and 140mm rockets.
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;Nl'I:'!il V1.kTNA%1I S 'I1C; LOSS
IV.. The tot;iI numl:>er of north Vietnamese n_ircrnft snot
(Own now stands at 69.
The seriously deg-rcnded North
Vietnaiicse Ii 'c;htcr ' iii rcraft dw_i.nuled even further
over the paste three clays with the shootdown of ten--
possibly 1,1--aircraft,
and the possible- 604""Otion,
of four others on tine ground.
R. The North Vietnamese are known to have a considerable
reserve of MG i.uterccptors
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Chinese Attitude
VII. As for Peking's attitude, we believe that the
Chinese Communists consider things are going
reasonably well in Vietnam from their point of view.
A. As they see it, Hanoi remains steadfast, and
Communists forces in South Vietnam continue
fighting, at a comparatively modest cost to
China.
B. The Chinese have repeatedly asserted, and
probably still believe, that time is on the
Communist side.
C. Their idea is that if the war can be kept
going long enough, the political pressures
in the United States and on the United States
will become insupportable.
1. We think they would increase the level
of such support if Hanoi asks for it.
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food, and "technical assistance"
VII. With this estimate of the situation, Peking also
would agree on the immediate objective of a
military stalemate, costly to the United States
and to the Vietnamese but not to the Chinese.
A. To achieve this, the Chinese will continue to
give the Vietnamese Communists war material,
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IX. Peking would take another long, hard look at the
cards, however, if a change in the overall situation
required a more direct Chinese involvement and greater
risk of war to keep the Vietnamese fighting.
A. The Chinese all along have tried to hold down
the danger of a military confrontation with the
United States, for all their uncompromising public
stance and periodic pledges of support for Hanoi.
1. If anything, they are now less disposed to
intervene directly than they were in 1965.
B. Peking's caution has increased in direct
proportion to the level of the U.S. effort
in Vietnam. Chinese propaganda has decreased
steadily in volume and vehemence since the
spring of 1966.
C. Chinese Communist spokesmen have indicated
privately for two years that China would come
into the war if U.S. aircraft attacked targets
in China, or if there were a major U.S. invasion
of North Vietnam.
1. These conditions. probably still hold in
general today, although it is unlikely that
Peking's response to either situation
would be automatic.
2. The Chinese might also move to establish
a buffer zone outside the Chinese frontier if
North Vietnamese collapse looked imminent.
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D. There are no indications, however, that Peking
thinks any of these contingencies are likely
in the near future--as a result of either
U.S. or Chinese initiative.
X. To take a brief look at Hong Kong, the Chinese
Communists are clearly out to undercut the position
of the British government in the colony, and at
the same time expand their own base of public support.
A. The success Peking had last winter in humiliating
the Portuguese in Macao may have encouraged the
Chinese'to challenge the British when labor
troubles in Hong Kong created the opportunity
early in May.
B. The firm stand taken by London and the tough
tactics of the Hong Kong police appear to
have given Peking second thoughts.
C. I doubt that the Chinese are ready to jeopardize the
$550 million in foreign exchange which they obtained
through Hong Kong last year.
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Nev
. There is, of course, room for misjudgment,
and the Chinese may feel they can still put
considerably more pressure on the British
without serious risk to Peking's economic
stake in a British Hong Kong.
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THE MIDDLE EAST
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I.f The situation in the Middle East took a very
serious turn last night, although there is no
evidence that either Israel or the Arab nations
really want a war
,
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N+ ...,.._. _...,...,_
The trouble is that--except for the smaller
nations like Jordan and Lebanon--neither do
they want peace very badly.
B. Now Nasir, who is not prepared for war with
Israel, has announced that he is closing
the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and
he must know that to the Israelis, this ranks
as a casus belli.
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IT. The crisis has arisen from the persistent raids
by Palestinian terrorists
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A. The Israelis trounced the Syrians in an
air battle on April 7. There have been 14
terrorist incidents since then. The Israelis,
concerned because the raids are showing growing
capabilities, have renewed their standard
warnings of retaliation.
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 Ap
The Soviets face real difficulties; they
don't want a full-blown war, particularly one
which could well bring U.S. commitments into
play, and yet they would rather stay "on the
side of the Arabs" than come down unequivocally
on the side of peace. Unrest and tension are
and have been exceptionally useful to the
Soviets in their attempt to erode Western
influence in the Middle East.
C. The private Soviet line was probably given
to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow last Friday
when Thompson told Dobryni.n he hoped that the
Soviets were exerting as much pressure in Syria
as we were in Israel. Dobrynin answered;
"I think we can match you."
V. Even with restraining Soviet pressures, the danger
lies in the fact that the leaders on each side are
being moved by the chain of events, rather than
controling those events at this point.
A. The Israelis, for example.,.feel that they
must now patrol by land and. air into Sinai,
and there is a hint of fatalism in the Arab
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moves which is clearly expressed in Nasir's
aggressive announcement about the Gulf of
Aqaba.
B. Under the circumstances, war can now come
from accident, incident, or miscalculation.
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