BOMBING CASUALTIES IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 16, 1967
• Content Type: MF

Approved F Release 2007/03/14: CIA-
' ? TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
16 January 1967
SUBJECT : Bombing Casualties in North Vietnam
1. On 9 January I met with the CIA Subcommittee
of the Senate to present one of our regular briefings
on current matters of intelligence interest. As you
know, Senator Russell invited Senators Mansfield,
Fulbright, and Hickenlooper to attend this session.
2. In my presentation, I did not discuss bombing
in North Vietnam, but when this subject was raised in
the questioning, I spoke from the paper attached as
Tab A. This paper is a gist of the conclusions reached
jointly by CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency in
the latest of a series of monthly assessments of the
bombing prepared for Secretary McNamara.
3. Further questions from the Senators attending
led to the subject of civilian casualties from bombing
in the North. To respond to these questions, we used
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the findings of several studies produced by CIA at the
request of Secretary McNamara. (A detailed account of
these findings, the methodology used, and our reasons
for thinking them valid is attached as Tab B).
4. in summary, we believe, and told the Russell
Subcommittee, that the bombing of North Vietnam had
produced about 29,000 total casualties (killed and
injured) from the beginning of the Rolling Thunder pro-
gram in February 1965 through September 1966. About
11,000 were military and 18,000 were logistics workers
and other civilians. A large proportion of these
18,000--we judge about two thirds--were males engaged
,in truck driving, bridge repair, and other war-related
activities. The 18,000 figure adds up to about one
war-worker or civilian killed or injured per US attack
mission, a remarkably low figure. Of the 29,000 total
casualties, we think about 45 percent were killed and
55 percent injured.
5. Our total figures for killed and injured are
derived from exhaustive study of all the information
which we can gather.
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6. We have considerable confidence that our totals
are in the right ball-park, although obviously we cannot
claim that they are accurate to the nearest thousand.
To put them in perspective there are three factors which'
should be considered:
a, The figure of 18,000 killed and injured,
most of whom were engaged in war-related activities
such as transport of personnel and supplies into
Laos and South Vietnam, is about one per attack
mission (about 17,100 attack missions were flown
through September 1966). This low ratio was
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F I
achieved despite the dense population and the
concentration of armed reconnaissance missions
along heavily populated lines of communication.
b. The figure of 18,000 logistic workers
and other civilians must also be compared with
statistics on South Vietnamese civilians killed,
wounded and kidnaped by Communist terrorism. US
authorities in Saigon have reported a minimum of
about 9,600 South Vietnamese killed and 41,800
kidnaped since 1957. This gives a rough total
of 51,400 plus an unknown but obviously large
number of wounded.
c. Much non-official commentary on the war
has emphasized bombing damage to non-military
objectives. There is, however, a body of evidence
summarized in Tab C,
that our attacks in the North have been directed at
military objectives and conducted with all the care
that a pilot under intense. antiaircraft fire could
hope to exhibit.
L_ I
Richard Helms
Director
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SECRET No Foreign Dissem
EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. The cumulative effects of the air raids on
North Vietnam continue to limit the capability of
the North Vietnamese forces for overt aggression,
but they have not reduced the ability to support
military activity in South Vietnam and Laos, either
at present or increased levels of combat and manpower.
2. The bombings appear to be having some dele-
terious effect on public morale. We have reports of
consumer shortages, and the extensive evacuation of
civilian personnel has caused some economic difficul-
ties. There is no good evidence, however, that the
leadership's resolve to continue the war has been
weakened.
3. The bombings have forced the diversion of
major resources and work forces to repair damage.
North Vietnam has been denied the use of larger
coastal carriers, and is severely limited in the use
of established port facilities. Measurable losses
to the economy and military establishment are esti-
mated at $184 million.
4. On the other hand, POL supplies have not
dropped below 60-day levels since September 1, and
attacks on rail, highway and waterway transportation
have reduced efficiency but have not stopped move-
ment. Energetic construction of,replacement and al-
ternate bridges have rail capabilities at their high-
est level since the bombing stand-down a year ago.
No Foreign ER9T
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CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE BOMBING OF
NORTH VIETNAM
I. Total Casualties
1. The cumulative killed and injured attributable
to the bombing of North Vietnam, estimated
through September 1966, total about 29,000,
of which 18,000 are believed to be logistics
workers and other civilian personnel. Some
13,200 of the total casualties occurred in
1965, of which 6,000 were in the'"civilian"
category. During the first nine months of
1966 we estimate total casualties of 15,700
of which about 11,900 were civilians. (See
Table I). On the basis of sample data through
September 1966 the total casualties in 1966
are estimated to have been about 40 percent
killed and 60 percent injured. This division
is based on averages derived from the sample
cases for which we have hard evidence.
2. The composition of the casualties resulting
from the 1966 air campaign differs notably
from that in 1965. Over 75 percent of the
casualties in 1966 were logistics workers
and other civilians, compared with 45 percent
in 1965. Armed reconnaissance against mili-
tary supply routes, which accounted for only
52 percent of the casualties in 1965 accounted
for an estimated 93 percent of the total in
1966.
3. The increase in casualties during 1966 is a
function of the growing scale of the air
campaign, the greater emphasis on armed re-
connaissance against lines of communications
and the selection of a few fixed targets
located in more heavily populated areas.
Despite the increase in casualties, however,
the number per mission has remained about
stable.
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4. The preponderance of civilian casualties
resulting from the acceleration of armed
reconnaissance has in large measure in-
volved those civilians working at. military
targets or directly engaged in the mainte-
nance and operation of the logistics system
which moves supplies and personnel into Laos
and South Vietnam. Hence, it is heavily
weighted with transport repair crews, truck
drivers, and personnel operating logistic
craft on the rivers. The bombing campaign
has generally been quite selective. The
few official North Vietnamese statements
protesting the extent of civilian casualties,
while vigorously presented, actually cite
very small numbers of personnel. The May
1966 North Vietnamese letter to the Interna-
tional Red Cross claimed only 239 civilian casu-
alties since 31 January 1966, although implying
many more. The Education Ministry in October
1966 stated that 300 students and 30 teachers
had been killed since the bombings began.
The well-publicized propaganda statement on
the attacks against Nam Dinh, where heavy
casualties would be expected, indicated that
37 percent of total casualties were innocent
victims of the war--women, children and the
aged. One would expect this propaganda
statement. to make the maximum claim possible.
Even if the specific casualty claims for Nam
Dinh were accurate, this percentage would not
seem unduly high. Nam Dinh is a heavily de-
fended population center subjected to heavy
attacks and with many of its military targets
located in densely populated areas. It is
hardly a typical case, and this percentage
should probably be regarded as the upper limit
for casualties sustained by so-called innocent
victims.
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III. Applicability of the Nam Dinh Claims
7. Total casualties at Nam Dinh
The propaganda statement* distributed by the
DRV Ambassador to foreign correspondents in
Moscow early in November 1966 claims that
from early 1965 to September 20, 1966, air
attacks against Nam Dinh killed 89 persons
among them 23 children and 39 women. Wounded
numbered 405, including 41 children and 81
women.
The methodology used in calculating casual-
ties in urban areas in the CIA report An Eval-
uation of Allied (US and GVN) Air Attacks
Against North Vietnam CIA SC No. 11394/65,
8 November 1965, was based on the city of
Nam Dinh, which was used as a case study.
The casualties at Nam Dinh in November 1965
were computed using composite estimates based
on p_e-strike estimates prepared for the JCS;
a DIA estimate, assuming warning and based on
examination of post-strike photography; and
an estimate drawn from World War II experi-
ence. The latter was based on a review of
casualties in bombed German cities during
1943, before blockbusters were used and fire
storms were created. It was concluded that
casualties (killed and wounded) for each air,
strike in urban areas would range from a min-
imum of 1 per 18,000 in population exposed to a
probable of 1 per 12,000 to a maximum of 1 per
8,333. Applying these factors to the popula-
tion of Nam Dinh (about 90,000)** and to the
six air strikes that had been launched against
this city in November 1965, casualties were
estimated as follows:
*Report on US War Crimes in Nam Dinh, by Committee
for the Investigation of US Imperialists War Crimes
in Viet Nam of Nam Ha Province.
**Based on a city with a population of 90,000 casu-
alties per air strike range from a minimum of 5 and
a probable of 7.5 to a maximum of 10.8.
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The propaganda statement mentioned above
claims that from early 1965 to 20 Septem-
ber 1966 a total of 47 day and night air
strikes were completed against Nam Dinh,
killing.and wounding a total of 494 per-
sons. Applying the estimating methodology
used in the November 1965 CIA report to
the number of air strikes claimed by the
Communists produces casualty estimates as
follows:
In a press conference on 29 December 1966,
a Pentagon spokesman stated that military
targets in Nam Dinh had been struck 64
times. Our methodology, described above,
based on this number of strikes would pro-
duce casualty estimated as follows:
On the basis of these various methods of
measuring probable casualties, we conclude
that official North Vietnamese claims on
Nam Dinh may be accurate as to total num-
bers.
8. Casualties Among Women and Children
Armed reconnaissance sorties accounted for
more than 99 percent of the total attack
sorties flown in th first nine months of
1966, compared with about 75 percent of
those flown in 1965. The emphasis on
armed reconnaissance rather than attacks
on fixed targets during 1966 resulted in
armed reconnaissance accounting for an
estimated 93 percent of total casualties,
compared with 52 percent in 1965. The
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swing away from attacks on JCS-designated
fixed targets had several notable results
in terms of casualties in North Vietnam.
In 1965 a greater emphasis on attacks on
fixed targets, which are predominantly
military, resulted in military personnel
accounting for about 55 percent of total
casualties. In 1966, however, military
personnel accounted for only about 24
percent of total casualties.
The preponderance of civilian casualties
resulting from the acceleration of armed
reconnaissance has in large measure in-
volved those civilians who are most di-
rectly engaged in maintenance and opera-
tion of the logistic system moving sup-
plies and personnel into Laos and South
Vietnam. Through September 1966, over
20,000 units of transport equipment
and miscellaneous transport facilities
have been destroyed or damaged by armed
reconnaissance missions.
Armed reconnaissance missions also have
destroyed or damaged over 10,000 miscel-
laneous military facilities such as bar-
racks, supply warehouses, antiaircraft
sites, radar and communications sites.
Through 30 September 1966 only 175 JCS
fixed targets of all types had been at-
tacked, of which 9.3 were direct military
targets and 54 were railroad and highway
bridges. There were less than 30 JCS
fixed targets struck in the built-up areas
where one might reasonably expect to find
some concentration of women and children.
This is not to say that there have been
no casualties among women and children
as a result of substantial damage to
military and transport facilities and
equipment, including railroad and highway
bridges. But by the nature of the func-
tions these targets perform and their rel-
ative isolation from civilian activities
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the probability of there being women and
children in the target areas should not be
high. This probability must be substan-
tially less where men's work is being done,
even by Vietnamese standards, than it would
be in attacks on the more important economic
targets in built-up areas. In the case of
Nam Dinh the Communists claim that over one-
third of the casualties to 20 September 1966
were women and children.. There is no way of
confirming or denying this statement. Never-
theless, it would appear to establish an up-
per limit to the percentage of this type of
casualties in urban attacks. The attacks
against Nam Dinh are not typical of the
preponderance of the air strikes against
North Vietnam. It would be logical to char-
acterize the attacks against Nam Dinh as one
extreme, and the bulk of the armed reconnais-
sance attacks against transport and military
targets as the other extreme. In.the aggre-
gate of casualties, therefore, women and child-
ren would not be a large element.
Casualties among women and children would come
from those too imprudent to stay away from re-
pair activity, or those so unforktunate as to be
present when our pilots have had to dump
their bomb loads in order to avoid operational
disasters.
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Casualties Resulting from the Bombing of North Vietnam
1965
January-
September 1966
Total
000
11,900
170
Attacks on fixed targets
2,000
700
2,700
Attacks on armed recon-
naissance missions
4,000
11,200
15,200
Military
7,200
3,800
11,000
Attacks on fix
ed targets
4,300
400
4,700
Attacks on arm
naissance miss
ed recon-
ions
2,900
3,400
6,300
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No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem
No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only
EVIDENCE OF THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF US AIR STRIKES ON
NORTH VIETNAM
1. Post-strike photography provides good evi-
dence that US air strikes have generally been ac-
curate. There have been some occasions when ord-
nance was off target as aresult of aircraft being
hit and misfiring or because of some other accident,
but the evidence indicates that such mishaps are in-
frequent.
2. Despite these limitations, there have been
some reports on the accuracy of the bomb-
ings in the Hanoi-Haiphong area
These reports have provided
evidence of the generally precise nature of the air
strikes as well as information indicating that ci-
vilian casualties from these air strikes have been
low.
No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only
No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem
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8. Even the North Vietnamese on occasion have
admitted that civilian casualties from the air strikes
are limited.
No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only
No Forei n Dissem/Control ed Dissem
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16 January 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Runk
The 8ecrc: tart' of State
A- .,P,:J ,/- AVI .) "Z/ 1 f~ , T // / % 1st/
This is the final version of the
memorandum on bombing casualties for the
President, a rough draft of which we
sent to you this morning. We delivered
this version to the White House late this
afternoon. Dick Helms *sked that I send
you a copy for your information.
J,
R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment :
RJS:yd
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
I - DCI w/o att
T - DDI w/o att
?CI/iiC 'r/o att
 a,
MEMORANSM
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
11
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Vance
Secretary Rusk
0