THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010055-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: December 30, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
State Department review completed
NSA review completed
Top Secret
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I - 1600
30 December 1966
HIGHLIGHTS
:L. The Military Situation in South Vietnama
No major contacts with the enemy were reported on 30
December (Para. 1). ARVN forces continue their large--
scale operation, DAN CHI 270/D, in the delta with
favor_
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1
f~~ r' Kontum?
(~
P'leiku?
?~an'Me
Sh uo3
'An K.he
~~ w~i~Nh D n
ti. _:
?., ,.
~;hian ~ta.n~g
SOUTH VIETNAM
25 50 7S 100 Mdes
0 25 50 75 1 0 Kilometers
65284 12-66 CIA
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. US combat forces are participating in 12 of
the 31 battalion-size or larger allied ground opera-
tions currently in progress. No major enemy contact
was, :however, reported in any of these operations on
30 December.
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2. An eight-battalion South Vietnamese Army task
force under the control of the ARVN 21st Division is
continuing to press search-and-destroy Operation DAN
CHI 270/D against large-scale Viet Cong troop concen-
trations in the delta provinces of Chuong Thien and
Phong Dinh. In a series of sporadic fire fights on
29 December in an operational area centered about 18
miles west of Can Tho, government regulars killed 35
Viet Cong and captured four. Friendly casualties were
two killed and seven wounded. The action on 29 De-
cember raised cumulative enemy losses in the five-day
ground sweep to 124 killed, eight captured, and 42
weapons seized. ARVN losses have been minimal.
3. In northern coastal Quang Ngai Province,
battalion-strength elements of the ARVN 2nd Division
conducting Operation LIEN KET 78 south-southeast of
Quang Ngai city were attacked on 29 December by a
Communist force employing 60- and 81-mm. mortar and
57-mm, recoilless rifles. ARVN losses included four
killed and 16 wounded compared to known enemy losses
of three killed.
4. In An Giang Province, the Viet Cong have
decided to replace troops in low echelons with those
from higher echelons a reversal of their traditional
milit:ar olic
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This will e
ac ie:ve , by sending district
forces to augmen vi age guerre as, provincial forces
to au ment districts. In addition, there have been
reports that companies from battalions
in cer a~n rovinces have been sent to work with
district forces. The provincial units that have been
mentioned are in Quang Tri, Quang Nam, Pleiku, and Phu Yen,
5. Although some provincial units are apparently
being broken up, there are no indications that Main Force
unit:> have been affected. No units subordinate to a
region, COSVN, or Hanoi High Command have been reported
disbanded. I_1 30 December 1966
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b. In keeping with a re-emphasis on guerrilla
warfare and "grass-roots" political activity, cap-
tured Viet Cong documents are stressing that re-
newed vigor must be applied to troops proselyting.
The traditional "three magic wands" of military
activ:~ty, political activities, and troop proselyting
are still seen as the key to what the Communists be-
lieve is their inevitable victory.
"/ .
as indicated that there will be a mortar
a ac on Saigon on 1 January 1967. This is the
third report of this nature that has been recently
received. Such an attack, although occurring
during the New Year's truce, might be rationalized
in enemy propaganda as a "retaliatory strike" in
retrik~ution for alleged US strikes in the Hanoi
area on 2, 13, and 14 December 1966. Alleged
targei~s for the attack are Independence Palace
and tie US Embassy.
F3 .' The New Year truce is scheduled to begin
at 6:00 P.M. (EST) 30 December and continue until
6:00 ~?.M. (EST) 1 January. Although. no allied mili-
tary offensive operations are scheduled to begin
during this 48-hour period, a full alert will be
maintained. The level of Communist-initiated inci-
dents is expected to be similar to the 102 recorded
during the Christmas cease-fire. Those incidents
were mostly minor and related to allied reconnais-
sance activity.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
9. The Week of 18-24 December compared with
11-17 December'
I. Viet Cong Incidents
Time At- Regimental Battalion
Period tacks size size
11-17 Dec 23 0 0
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I. Viet Cong Incidents (continued)
Time Company
Period size Harassment Terrorism
Time Sabo- Propa- Anti- Total
Period tage ganda Aircraft Incidents
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11-].7 De
18-24 De
c 7
c 29
23 19
19 21
II. Casualties
3
8
6
7
54
57
VC/NVA
GVN
1-17 Dec
18-2 Dec
11-17 Dec
18-2 D
ec
Killed
825
1038
190
203
Wounded
---
----
446
477
Missing/
Captured
88
198
34
37
Killed 88 109 9 9
Wounded 429 571 15 29
Missing/
Captured 2 4 _0 0
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III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA GVN
11-17 Dec 18-24 Dec 11-17 Dec 18-24 Dec
Individual 252 Not 294 136
Crew-Served 21 Reported 13 2
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The US Embassy has confirmed that the port
strike in Saigon has ended, and that dock workers
were returning to work as of 8:00 P.M. (Saigon time)
on 30 December. Unconfirmed press reports state
that the dock workers' union accepted the US Army/
GVN offer to find immediate jobs at the main port
for temporary workers dismissed from the US military-
controlled New Port.
2. The walkout was ended after the Saigon
Council of Trade Unions' call for a general strike
in Saigon to support the part workers went generally
unheeded. Only about five of the 120 affiliated
unions fully participated, principally the more
radical textile unions. Disruption to transporta-
tion and public utilities was minimal. Neither the
port strike nor the general strike call was endorsed
by the top echeclons of the Saigon Council's parent
organization, the Vietnamese Confederation of Trade
Unions (CVT).
Constituent Assembly Activities
3. On 29 December, the Constituent Assembly
discussed the formal reply received earlier this
week from the Directorate concerning the latter's
refusal to accede to an assembly request that the
Directorate modify its power of veto over the draft
constitution. The assembly took no formal action
on the reply other than to approve a proposal that
the constitution be protected by the deputies after
"we have approved it." The discussions clearly in-
dicated that the assembly is not satisfied with the
Directorate's position, and that the possibility of
a showdown between the assembly and the overnment
is not eliminated, only postponed.
25X1 assem y
c airman an ac uu is s i wor ing on a possi-
ble compromise formula he hopes to sell to the
Directorate.
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4. In its morning session on 29 llecember,
the assembly again discussed whether to provide
for an inspectorate in the constitution, and ap-
proved such a provision in principle. It, how-
ever, deferred a vote on whether the inspectorate
wou:Ld be a separate branch of government. The
assembly also debated the role of political par-
tie:a, and adopted three general constitutional
principles: (1) that parties play an essential
role in a democratic regime, (2) that a two-
party system should be encouraged by the state,
and (3) that the formalization of a political
opposition should be encouraged by the state.
5. Premier Ky, who saw the press on 29 De-
cember while on a trip to the resort area of
Da I,at, is quoted by correspondents as having
indicated that he would be a candidate for
president in a future election if the public
desires, and as claiming that a cease-fire for
the lunar New Year (a four-day period in early
February) may be canceled by the government
if the Viet Cong flagrantly violate the 48-hour
New Year truce. The US Embassy, however, re-
ports that Ky's remarks were just. intended for
effect and that he does not intend to carry
through with them.
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HANQI ~ ~__,F+Q~iaOg Yens ~
-~~ ~k Hon Gai
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Analysis of communications activity among
North Korean Air Force (NKAF) personnel on duty in
the DRV provides a tentative breakdown of their
organization and function. This group is known to
include at least 20 pilots and seven ground controllers
based principally at Phuc Yen Airfield.
2. The pattern of flight activity that has been
observed suggests that the Korean ccntingent is com-
posed of 16 operational pilots and at least four
senior officers. Four groups of four pilots each
have been noted performing 174 of the 182 Korean
sorties detected to date, All o.f these flights appear
to have been performed in MIG-17 aircraft and have
consisted of navigational training, interairfield
transfers, ground-controlled intercept practice, and
defensive patrols. The Koreans have not engaged
any US aircraft in combat thus far, though the nature
of their activity indicates that this may be their
ultimate role. On 19 December, a flight of-NKAF jets
was in the vicinity of a clash between US and North
Vietnamese fighters, but a ground controller at Phuc
Yen instructed the Koreans not to engage the US
planes.
3. The NKAF ground personnel stationed at
Phuc Yen have been detected working in nearly all
phases of the airfield's ground-control operations.
Serving as intercept operators, direction-finders,
tower personnel, and airfield controllers, the Koreans
apparently employ an organization and communications
procedure which parallels the North Vietnamese fighter
control system. On arrival in the DRV in November,
the Korean ground controllers and pilots appeared to
be using the Vietnamese language in voice communic a-
tions; current communications, however, are chiefly
in Korean.
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port:.
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V, COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Party first secretary Le Duan has warned
the people of North Vietnam that they must prepare
themselves for greater hardships and sacrifice in
the coming year. He assured them, however, that
defeat of the U5 was certain despite increased dif-
ficulties. His remarks were made in a recent speech
to a Hanoi antiaircraft artillery unit and were
broadcast over Hanoi radio on 29 December. The full
text is not yet available, but AFP has carried a
summary,
2. Le Duan warned that the US would escalate
the war in the coming year and he pointed out that
an increase in US troop: strength in the South could
be expected. He also raised the possibility of an
invasion of North Vietnam by the US. Le Duan as-
serted, however, that the US will be defeated, pro-
claiming that "even atomic bombs" cannot save the US.
He reminded his audience that both China and the US5R
are capable of retaliation in the atomic field.
3. The party first secretary held up_the Viet
Cong as an example for the northerners of fortitude
under: continuing pressure, He told his listeners
that their life was easy compared to life in the
South, where units, "hunted by the enemy, do not eat
for four or five days "
4. Such a relatively bleak and realistic state-
ment of the Communists? prospects over a long term
is unusual, although not unprecedented for Hanoi
leadership. The aim of such pronouncements seems to
be to prepare the North Vietnamese for hard times
while: at the same tune indicating to them the de-
termination of their leaders to press on with the
war,
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Peking Pressure on Hong Kong as Leave Port
8. Peking may be mounting a campaign to curtail
the use of Hong Kong as a leave area for US forces in
Vietnam. Peking radio raised the issue on 3D December
for the first time since the formal Chinese protest to
the British last February. The broadcast declared
that the Chinese and their "compatriots" in Hong Kong
and Macao opposed the US turning the colony into a
"US military base" and warned that if the British Gov-
ernment persisted "in such suicidal foolishness" it would
be "c:ourting disasterm"
9. The Chinese Communists probably believe that
their recent success against Macao gives them increased
leverage in dealing with the British. However, Peking
is not likely to support its campaign with anything
more than minor harassments.
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