THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010068-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: October 23, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~ernozrn~in~
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
State Department review completed
NSA review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
Information as of 1600
23 October 1966
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Little significant activity was reported over
the weekend except in an ARVN operation in Quang
Nam Province (Paras, 1-2). Radio stations serv-
ing several North Vietnamese Army elements have
converged in an area in and south of the DMZ just
to the west of National Route 1 (Paras. 3-4).
MACV has revised its criteria for infiltration
into two categories--accepted and possible (Paras.
5-6). NVA and VC Strength in South Vietnam has
been revised downward by some 5,400 (Para. 7).
II. Political .Developments in South Vietnam:
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The special congress of the Bud-
is s as reportedly collapsed (Paras. 6-7).
Constituent Assembly delegates are ready to
elect their permanent officers this week
(Paras. 8-9).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
NSA has tentatively identified a communications
group in Military Region III as a division-level
entity (Paras. 1-2). Daily North Vietnamese
fighter activity is continuing (Paras. 3-4).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: The
communiqu announcing the conclusion of the Commu-
nist summit gathering in Moscow was unsigned,
and mentioned Vietnam only obliquely (Paras. 1-2).
The North Vietnamese continue to disparage the
Manila conference (Para. 5).
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5 ....., f r ' Kontum-
PHNOM
PENH,
NORTH ?Dong Hoi
N..q VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
I ~Ouang Tri
.Atlopeu .
25 50 75 '00Miles
25 50 75 1611 K.IOmeters
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1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. There was little significant action reported
over the weekend in the 30 operations of battalion
size or larger which were in progress. US forces
were conducting 11 of the operations and were part of
a combined force in another. The sharp upsurge in
Viet Cong terrorist activity continued, however,
throughout the country. For example, during the
24-hour period which ended at noon on 21 October
there had been 20 VC attacks and acts of terrorism
which resulted in friendly losses of 79 killed, 75
wounded, and 37 missing. The Viet Cong lost 22
killed in these attacks.
2. A South Vietnamese Army operation which
began on 17 October in Quang Nam Province, some 25
miles southwest of Da Nang, has reportedly killed
235 Viet Cong and captured some 50 weapons. Friendly
casualties in this operation--named TRUY KICH--were
30 killed, 110 wounded, and 40 missing.
North Vietnamese Concentration in the DMZ
3. Intercepted communications of 20 October sug-
gest that the radio stations serving several North
Vietnamese Army elements, which have been located in
and near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for the past
several weeks, have converged on a small area in
and south of the DMZ just to the west of National
Route 1. The radio stations involved include two
subordinates of the 324th Division--one regimental-
sized element and a military intelligence element--
as well as an unidentified subordinate of the DMZ
"Front" headquarters, which controls the 324th and
341st Divisipns in this area. In addition, the
radio station serving the headquarters element of
the 341st Division and a probable regimental sub-
ordinate of the DRV's Military Region IV head-
quarters have moved into this general area.
4. communications of the last
several ays nave -,no discussed any activities which
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appear to be out of the ordinary for these elements,
the redispositioning does suggest that some tactical
activity may be in preparation. Aside from elements
of the 324th Division thought to be in this area,
recently captured documents associated with two reg-
iments of the 341st Division suggest that sizable
forces of this division may also be in Quang Tri
Province.
MACV Revises Infiltration Criteria
5. MACV has revised its criteria for infiltra-
tion into two categories--accepted and possible.
The accepted category is further broken down into
"accepted confirmed" and "accepted probable." An
"accepted confirmed" unit is defined as one which
is determined to exist on the basis of information
provided by a minimum of two captives, returnees or
captured documents (any combination). An "accepted
probable" unit is defined as one which is believed
to exist on the basis of information which can be
evaluated as probably true provided by one captive,
returnee or captured document. A "possible" in-
filtration unit is one which is believed to exist
on the basis of information which can be evaluated
as possibly true, even though no captive, returnee,
or document is available to verify the report or
reports.
6. Infiltration figures have not changed as a
result of the revision of criteria except for the
monthly average. For example, MACV now lists 47,967
infiltrators in the accpeted category for the first
nine months of 1966. There are a total of 20,525
infiltrators now listed in the possible category
(for the first ten months of 1966). Total infiltra-
tion thus far in 1966, therefore, now totals 68,492.
The average for the first nine months of 1966 is
roughly 7,400 men per month. This figure is con-
siderably above that of 4,500 to 6,000 per month which
has been featured prominently in the press; it does
not, however, reflect any significant increase in
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infiltration. Rather, the monthly average now re-
flects the inclusion of the possible category where
previously it did not.
NVA and VC Strength in South Vietnam Revised Downward
7. MACV has revised the strength estimates on
a number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units based
on the latest information from prisoners, returnees,
and documents as well as. casualty counts. As a re-
Sult, over-all Communist main force'strength'now
stands at 108,585--a drop:of some 5,400. Total North
Vietnamese strength in South Vietnam now stands at
45,630--a. drop of 3,270. Total Viet Cong strength
has dropped slightly over 2,000 from 65,114 to 62,955
men.
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Buddhists Special Congress
6. After a series of disorderly sessions
held on 21 and 22 October, the Unified Buddhist
Association dissolved their extraordinary con-
gress without even agreeing on an agenda. It is
not known whether the subsequent meetings will
23 October 1966
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be held this week, but it appears doubtful. The
sessions were marked by lively arguments and dis-
ruptive political tactics; at one point shots were
fired into the air by plainclothes security po-
lice in an attempt to quell the disturbance.
7. The disruptive tactics, which included
demonstrators with placards denouncing the con-
gress, appear to have been part of a deliberate
plan by moderate Institute chairman Thich Tam
Chau; and his followers to keep the militants from
choosing another chairman and packing a new In-
stitute council with their own monks. The for-
mer council, of which Tam Chau was chairman, re-
signed on 13 October, leaving the Buddhist hier-
archy theoretically leaderless. The militant-
moderate schism has apparently suffered another
blow and, according to the embassy, it is likely
that Tam Chau will leave the Unified Buddhist
Association, taking the northern Buddhists, the
Cambodian Theravada Buddhists, and the remain-
ing moderates with him.
Constituent Assembly
8. The last hurdle blocking the way to
final approval of the assembly's procedural
rules was cleared on 21 October. Discussion
of the previously passed controversial article
two was reopened and debated at some length.
Several amended versions were brought to a
vote before the deputies finally approved a mild
one stating that the "chief responsibility of
the constituent assembly is to draft and approve
a constitution." A broader version stating
that the constituent assembly would have other
responsibilities according to the demands of
the situation was offered by Tran Van Van, but
it was voted down. Van has been one of the
behind-the-scenes agitators for more southern
influence in the current cabinet dispute.
23 October 1966
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9., The election of officers to some 20 per-
manent positions in the assembly should be ac-
complished this week. The front-runners for the
top positions, "primeri1y those of chairman and
secretary general, are still Phan Khac Suu, Tran
Van Van, Phan Quang Dan, and La Thanh Nghe.
According to an embassy appraisal, the officers
will be el4~!cte&one at a time, rather than in
blocs or slates, thus minimizing the tendency to-
ward regional or religious affiliations.
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.,~ Lai Chau?
(?
? Rhong Saly k; J ~: Nghia Lo? Yen Bai
Dien Bien Phu ?
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Vang Vieng
Ban Chieng
Linh
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VIENT E ,.4n. Khai
T H A I L A N D ~
Muang Nakhon Phano"'~?Khammouane
Mong Gai,. I? -
Vtnh Linh
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NORTH VIETNAM
? Deng Ha
B Ho Su '~,.~QuangTri
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Muong No`??-.,VIETNAM
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?Saravane
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
to A communications group which first appeared
in late 1965 in Military Region III of North Vietnam
has been tentatively identified by NSA as serving an
unidentified division-level entity. The headquarters
of this unit, located in the Ninh Binh area, communi-
cates with five subordinate terminals.
2. It is not known whether this unidentified
division is a.new unit or is one that has deployed
to MR III from elsewhere in North Vietnam. The
SIGINT order of battle tentatively identifies two
other divisions in Military Region III--the 304th
and 330th.
North Vietnamese Air Activity
3. During the period 12-19 October there were
no reactions by North Vietnamese fighters to US
strike activity, primarily because adverse weather
restricted US sorties. Nevertheless, Phuc Yen -
based fighters were active every day flying approxi-
mately 75 sorties out of a total of some 156 pre-
flighted. Vietnamese pilots engaged in one practice
ground-controlled intercept (GCI) exercise as well as
ground gunnery and weather reconnaissance flights.
About a third of the 75 sorties flown were in MIG-21
aircraft while all sorties were confined to the normal
areas used by Phuc Yen fighters.
4. Soviet partidipation in North Vietnamese air
activity continues to be noted. Three Soviet pilots
on 21 October flew a probable radar calibration mission
under the control of a Russian ground controller.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
23 October 1966
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The communique announcing the conclusion of
the Communist summit gathering in Moscow, which ended
on 21 October, was "remarkable for its total lack of
clues as to reasons for the meetings and the subjects
discussed," according to the US Embassy in Moscow.
2. The communique, which mentioned Vietnam only
obliquely, was unsigned and apparently drafted to
avoid comment on agreement or identity of views.
The embassy speculated that the absence of a joint
statement probably reflected an advance agreement not
to make one--"an agreement which may have been a
condition for acceptance in the first place by some
participants (e.g., the Rumanians.)"
Peking Reiterates Its Standard Position on Vietnam
3. In a People's Daily Observer article on
23 October, Peking once again accused the Soviet
Union of collaborating with the US to "sell out"
the Vietnamese and reiterated China's opposition to
any compromise settlement of the war. Asserting
that the "secret meeting" at the White House between
Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Johnson on
10 October was further proof of Soviet perfidy, the
article alleged that the USSR was calling for "peace
talks" through a "pause in bombing" to allow the
US to remain in Vietnam and to "strangle the Viet-
namese revolution." The article repeated Peking's
insistence that a settlement of the war would have
to be in accordance with the DRV four-point stand
and the Liberation Front five-part statement.
However, it went on to add in familiar language
that the Vietnamese people would have to bear primary
responsibility for conducting the war.
4. Despite Peking~s vituperation against Mos-
cow, it is continuing to allow at least some Soviet
goods to reach Vietnam by rail through China. I
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Hanoi Comments on the Manila Conference
5. The North Vietnamese are continuing to
disparage the Manila Conference. President Ho Chi
Minh, speaking at the North Vietnam Congress of
People's Security Fo`ces on 22 October, suggested
the gathering was a "plot to enlarge the war." On
the other hand, the Hanoi daily Nhan Dan commented
on the 23rd that one of President Johnson'!s objec-
tives at Manila was "to campaign for the Democratic
Party in the November elections...by clamoring again
for peace."
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