THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010037-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: October 13, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
::A90rodmi-I
State Department review
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NSA review completed
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
13 October 1966
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FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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Communications intelligence indicates that the
North Vietnamese 630th Division headquarters has
moved north from its Chu Pong Mountain redoubt and
that the division is assuming a posture which sug-
gests it is ready for offensive operations.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
No recent major ground engagements have been reported
in South Vietnam; however, US and ARVN forces contin-
ued to encounter determined enemy resistance near the
Demilitarized Zone in northernmost Quang Tri Province
(Paras. 1-3). There are indications in SIGINT that
the focal point of the North Vietnamese Army's 630th
Division activities may have shifted northward from
the Chu Pong Mountain area of southwestern Pleiku
Province to southwestern Kontum Province (Paras. 4-6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The southern cabinet - northern military dispute ap-
pears to be suspended until after the Manila Confer-
ence, but the underlying antipathies suggest that there
will be more trouble in the future (Paras? 1-7).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: In-
tercepted communications indicate that North Vietnam
may be getting six additional Shanghai-class fast pa-
trol boats from Communist China (Para. 1). North Viet-
nams new naval command post is approaching operational
status (Paras. 2-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
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Soviet
premier osygin a ac a ina on October for
failing to join in united action on Vietnam (Para.
7). A Liberation Front central committee member
has been killed in South Vietnam, according to a
Hanoi broadcast.. (Paras. 8-9).
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NORTH Dong Hoi
VIETNAM
(P Saravane
Xcntum-
North ard
t. De Ioyment-'-&,rf
~.._./ of Elements ~r:_Prelku
of 630th NVA
Division
Chu Pong Mountain/
C A M B 0 D I A to Drang Valley Area
.Phu Lai
.Quang Ngai
&P RAflO +
rPAUEY_EPE MII
25 50 75 100Mdes
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. US combat forces are participating in 10
of the 28 battalion-size or larger allied search-
and-destroy operations currently in progress. No
recent major contact has been reported in any of
these operations.
2. In Operation PRAIRIE, elements of one US Ma-
rine battalion, supported by a tank platoon and ar-
tillery, engaged a Communist force of undetermined
size on 12 October about 23 miles northwest of Quang
Tri city. In the ensuing firefight, one marine was
killed, six wounded, and two tanks were disabled;
enemy losses were not reported. Contact was later
re-established with an estimated North Vietnamese
Army platoon in the same general area. Two marines
were killed and 17 wounded in this encounter, as
against known enemy losses of three killed.
3. Meanwhile, on the right flank of US Marine
Operation PRAIRIE, an ARVN battalion participating
in Operation LAM SON 318 was shelled on 12-October
by an estimated 20 rounds of enemy 60-mm. mortar
fire. The action, centered about 15 miles northwest
of Quang Tri City, resulted in friendly casualties
of four killed and 30 wounded (two US).
Northward Deployment by Elements of 630th NVA Divi-
sion
4. The movement of a headquarters element of
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 630th Division into
Kontum Province, coupled with recent SIGINT locations
on a number of unidentified enemy military radio sta-
tions in the southwestern Kontum - northwestern Pleiku
Province area, suggests that the focal point of the
630th Division's activities may have moved northward
from the Chu Pong Mountain area. -Prior to 9 Septem-
ber, the 630th Front Headquarters and its forward ele-
ments had been operating jointly in the Ia Drang Val-
ley area of southwestern Pleiku Province. On 9 Sep-
tember, however, a communications link appeared
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Premier Ky appears to have convinced the
six dissident southern ministers not to leave their
posts in the cabinet for the time being. The under-
lying causes of the dissension still largely exist,
however, and a showdown may develop after the Manila
Conference, according to the US Embassy. Ky, Chief
of State Thieu, and other influential government
functionaries have been trying to calm the opposing
parties in the dispute by hosting dinners during
which they have been able to vent their ire.
2. According to the US Embassy, the resigning
ministers are determined to force police director
Nguyen Ngoc Loan out of the government. Ky has re-
portedly shown his willingness to make some conces-
sions to the group, but has given no indication that
he would relieve Loan. Youth Minister Trieu, one of
the six southern ministers, told an embassy officer
that he would retain his post until at least mid-
November unless there were other incidents of abuse
in the meantime. He thought he could convince the
other five ministers to follow suit.
3. The differences of opinion between the
southern ministers and their northern antagonists
have been blamed on traditional regional rivalries.
The crux of the disturbance within that inherent
problem is the southerners'- belief that certain
northern militarists and their supporters are in-
creasingly misusing their power. The principal an-
tagonist in the dispute is General Loan. Loan's
authority and responsibility have been on the rise,
especially following his successful role in putting
down the Buddhist-led antigovernment dissidence in
I,Corps and Saigon last spring.
4. Loan and his brother-in-law, Van Van Cua,
the mayor of Saigon, have aroused the ire of the
southerners by their reported intimidation of sub-
cabinet and administrative persons in the government
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and by their manipulation of the press. Several
antisouthern pamphlets have appeare4 in Saigon
lately which are believed to have originated with
Loan and to have been distributed through the Mili-
tary Security Service (MSS), which he also heads.
Loan has also attempted to place his MSS Confidants
strategically in the National Police in order to
enhance his control over the internal security or-
gans.
5. Loan is linked with the "Baby Turks," a
group of young military officers who are opposed to
civilianizing the government and to making further
concessions to antigovernment groups. Several other
northern military officers in the government are
probably in sympathy with Loan, notably Minister of
Information Nguyen Bao Tri and III Corps commander
Le Nguyen Khang.
6. Ky has been trying to offset southern dis-
satisfaction by according the southerners more influ-
ence in the government. Southerners gained some
ground when Ky reorganized his cabinet early last
July. In spite of these concessions, influential
northerners have maintained an upper hand in the gov-
ernment. Southern pressures, however, have been in-
creasingly augmented by General Dang Van'Quang, the
IV Corps commander, who has reportedly tried on oc-
casion to discredit Premier Ky. Nguyen Huu Co, the
southern defense minister, has also been accused of
attempting, to maneuver Ky out of the government.
7. Most of the criticism of Loan in the pres-
ent dispute has come from Vo Long Trieu, the minis-
ter of youth, who, like Loan, is a good friend of Ky.
This increases the difficulty Ky faces in balancing
opposing forces.
Trieu is being
acted by e o er ive minis rs in the "resigna-
tion" group and by Au Truong Thanh, the economy
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minister, I
Nguyen Luu Vien, the
civilian deputy premier an a -member of the Directo-
rate, is backing Trieu because of traditional south-
ern sympathy. Trieu's most ardent advocate, however,
is Tran Van Van, the chairman of the Peoples-Army
Council, and a leading deputy on the Constituent As-
sembly.
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North Vietnamese Naval Bases
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. The North Vietnamese naval command post at
Bai Chay sent a message to one of its units on 11 Oc-
tober containing a reference to picking up six 100-ton
ships in Communist China. The type of ships involved
were not specified, but it is possible that the DRV
is receiving replacements for its hard.-hit fleet of
patrol and motor torpedo boats. The ships, which
may be on their way to North Vietnam, could be small
transport vessels or perhaps six of the seven Swatow-
class motor gunboats believed to be undergoing re-
pairs in Chinese shipyards. A more likely possibility,
however, is that the ships are Shanghai-class fast
patrol boats--the only ship in the current DRV naval
order of battle with a displacement of 100 tons.
North Vietnam now has four Shanghais, and a captured
DRV naval officer stated in July 1966 that Commu-
nist China had promised to supply an additional eight
vessels of this class.
New Naval Command Post Nears Completion
2. On 3 October 1966 the port commander in Hai-
phong reported to the naval command post at Bai Chay
that construction was under way for a new command
post at Binh Dong. The site for the new headquarters
is located at a pier complex on the north side of the
Cua Cam River opposite Haiphong. It has previously
been associated with the "Group 125" sea infiltration
authority. It is possible that, with the general
withdrawal of North Vietnamese naval units into the
port of Haiphong in mid-August, the DRV Navy has
elected to abandon its forward operating bases at
Bai Chay and Pho Cac Ba in favor of a consolidated
command based at Haiphong.
3. In the ten days since the construction of
the new post began, various messages have been inter-
cepted dealing with problems of construction, supply,
personnel, and communications. On 9 October, Haiphong
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between the Front headquarters and its forward ele-
ments, indicating that a separation had occurred.
By 16 September, one of the elements was observed
deploying to the extreme southwestern portion of
Kontum Province near the Pleiku-Cambodian border.
5. There are as yet no firm indications in
SIGINT as to whether all of the Front's approxi-
mately 40 radio substations have been involved in
the northward deployment. Deployments of this
magnitude accompanied by a clustering of military
communications terminals, have in the past pre-
ceded offensive operations by elements of the
630th Division.
6. Allied forces immediately available to
counter a major offensive thrust by elements of
the 630th Division in the southwestern Kontum Prov-
ince area include four battalions of the US 25th
Infantry-Division and one battalion of the US 4th
Infantry?Division. These units are currently par-
ticipating in Phase III of long-term Cambodian
border surveillance Operation PAUL REVERE.
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notified Bai Chay that the headquarters was nearing
completion and Bai Chay responded by stating that
its operations department political officer and
two watch officers would arrive in halohong on the
19th. A subsequent message on 12 October indicated
that the new facility would be complete on the 17th.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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Kosygin Attacks Chinese
7. Moscow's recent propaganda crescendo against
Communist China has focused even more sharply on Pe-
king's refusal to join in common action against the
US in Vietnam. The Soviet leaders clearly find
Peking vulnerable on this issue, and the USSR has
been able to exploit China's obstructionist stand
to good effect among foreign Communist parties.
Even the North Koreans have castigated China for
its stubborn refusal to cooperate in the defense
of North Vietnam. Soviet Premier Kosygin chose this
line of attack in a 13 October speech in which he,
in effect, blamed China for continued "US aggres-
sion"'in Vietnam. He contended that, if China had
only agreed to a joint rebuff to US actions there,
"a quick end would have been put to US outrages."
Liberation Front Leader Dies
8. The Liberation News Agency has announced
the death of another Front central committee mem-
ber, Vu Tung. The VC announced last August that
Buddhist leader Thom Me The Nhom was killed in July
by "American bullets." According to a 12 October
broadcast from Hanoi, Vu Tung was killed in a US
bombing raid near Saigon on 20 September. This is
the first public acknowledgment of an earlier de-
fector report that two central committee members
had been killed in bombin raids in January--Vu
Tung and Tran Huu Trang.
He turned imse
in last arc an -
por
that Vu Tung had b
een killed in a B-52
strike near the capital i
n January.
9. Vu Tung was also in propaganda work--a
journalist by profession and the editor of the VC
newspaper for the Saigon - Gia Dinh area. If
the defector's-version of the details of Vu Tung's
death are correct, the public announcement was de-
layed for nine months and has fudged the details.
There have been no reports to either deny or con-
firm the death of Tran Huu Trang.
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