INTELLIGENCE REPORT PREPARED WEEKLY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010040-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 1, 2006
Sequence Number: 
40
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 22, 1966
Content Type: 
IR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010040-9.pdf182.67 KB
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Approved For Release-2007/03/06: CIA-RDP7.91Q a D1"_1.r0010040 9 22 August 1966 No. 1864/66 i r Copy No. ' ~ L+ INTFILL1UENCF: RETORT State Dept. review completed 11,cp ICd cckiv 9.:r tin I:NIOtt 1N''I RI)FPAK V NUN [ AL (JROUP I)IRECIORA"IT OF IN II'll LLIGENCE Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP7986`'100010040-9 Approved Forlease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T008001100010040-9 This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010040-9 Approved For Rele a 2007S CQ1"79T00826A0044i00010040-9 C O N T E N T S Page 1. Israel-Syria. . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . 1 South Africa. . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? . ? 2 4. Dominican Republic. . . . . . . . . ? ? ? Approved For Release 2007/03/( CgPT0826A001100010040-9 Approved For XT00826A001 1MII010040-9 The increasingly belligerent posture adopted by both Israel and Syria in the wake of the 15 Au- gust border clash may lead to further and more serious exchanges. The latest incident, in which two Syrian MIGs were shot down, apparently began when an Israeli patrol boat fired on Syrian positions before run- ning aground about 50 meters off the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee). The Israelis, who claim the entire lake, had refrained from ap- proaching closer than about 250 meters to shore since 1962. Following this incident, the Israeli chief of staff authorized "hot pursuit" in future air encounters. In recent months Israel has adopted a harder line toward Syria regarding the activities of Fatah terrorists. On 14 July, in retaliation for a se- ries of border incidents, Israeli planes destroyed equipment at the site of the Syrian water-diversion project in the area east of the lake. Israeli troops had previously made reprisal raids against alleged Fatah bases in Jordan and Lebanon, whose governments oppose the terrorist operations. The 14 July incident was the first time that Fatah actions drew Israeli retaliation directly against Syria, whose government has long supported the terrorists by providing training fa- cilities and a propaganda outlet. Syrian authorities have now stated that Syria will no longer resort to the United Nations, but will strike inside Israel if there are further Is- raeli "provocations." There is also the danger that Syrian commanders on the border might permit, or even encourage, infiltrations into Israel in direct violation of orders from Damascus. The com- manders might hope to exploit the subsequent ex- change to satisfy their own ambitions in the un- settled Syrian political situation. I I -1- 22 August 1966 Approved or Release - Approve 2. SOUTH AFRICA The Verwoerd government, buttressed by confi- dence in its economic and military strength and by its success in turning back recent external threats, seems to be adopting bolder tactics in foreign af- fairs. Recent events in the Congo provide further evi- dence of the same tendency. There the Verwoerd gov- ernment appears to be operating with a sophistica- tion totally lacking in the defensive-minded Afri- kaner regimes of the past. Pretoria may in fact have deliberately surfaced the recent coup plotting involving Tshombe and Belgian business interests. Verwoerd may thus have worked to preserve the posi- tion of Mobutu and to keep out of power a man who previously had been very close to the authorities in southern Africa. This instance suggests that South Africa may occasionally, in the interest of stability, support Africans termed "moderate" by the US. Verwoerd has quite clearly to en Britain's measure over Rhodesia, ana Unus sees the US as the only country that might have both the means will to intervene forcefully in the region. 22 August 1966 25X1 Approve~ For Release - -- -- - - -----700825 - -- - - 000 - -- " -9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010040-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010040-9 Approved For Release.2007/0 :GR "WT00826A0011.0010040-9 4. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC On 11 August President Balaguer called for a vaguely defined political truce that would include legislation banning certain political activities. Balaguer's move could alienate moderate leftist elements whose support he will need when he comes out with controversial military and economic re- forms. Balaguer has stressed that the proposed law will "permit and protect" both routine party ac- tivity and "merciless" censure of his government. He told US Ambassador Crimmins on 15 August that the law was aimed at curbing recent extreme-left- ist agitation. Balaguer has reassured the public that he does not intend to return to Trujillo's "peace of the graveyard." Despite Balaguer's assurances, the intent of the proposed law is not entirely clear. a major purpose is psyc o ogica to deter t e Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) from adopting a role of opposition for opposi- tion's sake. Balaguer suspects that Bosch and radicals in the PRD are not the "constructive critics" they profess to be. The reaction of the Dominican left to the pro- posal is mixed. Some moderate leaders of Bosch's party reportedly feel it to be "basically worth- while" but in need of clarification. Bosch him- self has asserted to US officials that Balaguer is out to destroy the PRD. Extremists characterize the proposal as dictatorial, and have challenged Balaguer to enforce it.. One danger is that the loose wording of the proposed law could be used by some police and mil- itary elements to justify heavy-handed throttling of the left. This in turn could lead to increased leftist attacks on the regime. -4- 22 August 1966 Approved For Release 2007/03/ ~-MM0826A001100010040-9 Approved FoIease 2007/03/df'`Ch4--44T9T008001100010040-9 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010040-9 SECRET