THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010037-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: August 19, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~~ememrnwh~iw~.
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
19 August 1966
State Dept. review completed
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
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19 August 1966
Communist terrorist activity continues in
South Vietnam. Yesterday four Americans were killed
and five wounded in three separate incidents in
the Saigon suburbs. North Vietnam has dispatched
an economic delegation headed by a deputy premier
to Peking to seek further aid.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Australian troops report a heavy engagement with
the Viet Cong in. -Phuoc Tuy Province (Para. 1).
Four Americans were killed and five wounded by
three separate attacks in the Saigon suburbs yester-
day (Para. 2). A South Vietnamese Regional Force
company was ambushed in Thua Thien Province yester-
day (Para. 3). Nearly 5,000 South Vietnamese
refugees reported homeless following the burning
of three villages in Quang Ngai Province this
week (Para. 5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Father Hoang Quyanh lines his organization up
with the Buddhist Institute in opposing the 11
September elections (Para.l). Thich Tri Quang de-
cides not to accept invitation to visit Japan
(Para. 2). Binh Thuan Province Viet Cong plans
to oppose elections (Para. 3).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: A com-
mentary in the Liberation press claims that the
Communists ought to work harder to bring the Hue
and Da Nang "struggle groups" under their con-
trol (Paras. 1-3). The Polish Foreign Ministry
has again asserted that Hanoi might be willing
to modify some of its terms for a settlement of
the war if the US stops bombing (Paras. 4-5).
North Vietnam has dispatched. an economic dele-
gation to Communist China (Para. 6).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Non-Communist Asian
reaction has been cool to an 8 August Thai-Ma-
laysian-Philippine note calling for an appeal for
negotiations to end the Vietnam war (Paras. 1-3).
Sihanouk is apparently taking a somewhat softer
line on US-Cambodian relations (Paras. 4-5). Si-
hanouk indicates that a border agreement with the
Viet Cong has not yet been concluded (Para. 6).
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Ba, Me
Thnot
PHNOM
PENH?
'.,fay Nmh
T uy Hoa
CURRENT SITUATION
19 AUGUST 1966
51: 75 100 Miles
75 5, 71, 100 K,ometers
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Elements of the 6th Battalion of the Royal
Australian Regiment contacted an estimated battalion-
size Communist force near Ba Ria in coastal Phuoc
Tuy Province today? The engagement began when a nor-
mal company-size patrol checking a rubber plantation
ran into a Viet Cong force and was surrounded. Al-
lied artillery hit the area with almost 3,000 shells
while US aircraft dropped 35 tons of explosives and
napalm. Heavy Australian reinforcements arrived in
armored personnel carriers, coming from the rear in
heavy rain and surprising the enemy. In the heavy
fighting that followed, 17 Australians were killed
and 26 wounded. Official casualty figures indicate
138 Viet Cong were killed. Unofficial estimates in-
dicate, however, that more than 215 Communists may
have been killed. A follow-up operation is in prog-
ress.
2. Three separate attacks on US vehicles took
place yesterday in the northeast sections of Saigon
resulting in four Americans killed. One attack on
a US jeep wounded two Americans; another attack on
four vehicles resulted in twc: Americans killed and
three wounded; and the third was against a bulldozer
and killed two Americans.
3. A South Vietnamese Regional Force company
was ambushed by an estimated two-company enemy
force about 18 miles southwest of Hue in Thua Thien
Province yesterday. Friendly casualties were 28
killed, two wounded, and three missing. Viet Cong
losses were not reported,,
4. A tactical air strike was conducted against
an estimated battalion-size Communist force in an
area about 20 miles southeast of Quang Ngai on 19
August? A US airborne observer reported 75 Viet Cong
were killed in the attack,
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5. Three South Vietnamese villages were at-
tacked and burned by Viet Cong guerrillas on 17-18
August in northern Quang Ngai Province. Nearly
5,000 South Vietnamese refugees were made homeless
by the attacks. There were no reports of any cas-
ualties to the civilians in any of the attacks.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Father Hoang Quyanh, leader of the non-
Communist "Front of All Religions," has told the
press that his organization was taking a position
similar to that of the Buddhist Institute communi-
que' of 16 August which outlined their opposition
to the elections. Defying the government to con-
test his organization's stand, Father Quyanh was
quoted as saying, "We will not go to the polls, but
if we do not prevent others from voting, if we do
not organize public demonstrations, how could the
government outlaw us?" There has been no indica-
tion that the government has been considering "out-
lawing" Father Quyanh's front, although there re-
portedly have been recent press rumors in Saigon
that sanctions might be taken against groups of
individuals opposing the elections. Father Quyanh,
according to the press, has decided to accept Ky's
reported offer to debate with anyone who opposed
the elections.
Thich Tri Quang
2.
F ri Quang as turned down an invitation to
visa apan. Although he cited weakness from his
hunger strike as the reason, it is more likely that
he is remaining in Vietnam because he still feels
capable of directing a major portion of Buddhist
affairs through the militants who are now making
most of the Buddhist Institute decisions. Tri
Quang probably also fears that if he departs South
Vietnam, he will find it extremely difficult to
return. The original plan for the visit to Japan
had the approval of both governments. Premier Ky
saw the trip as a "good solution" to the Tri Quang
problem.
3. More reports have been received relating
to plans of the Viet Cong to sabotage the 11 Sep-
tember elections. One of the latest concerns the
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plans of a Viet Cong district committee in Binh
Thuan Province. Included in the plan are attacks
on military bases to be conducted by Communist
municipal troops of Phan Thiet combined with main
force units, as well as attacks against GVN ad-
ministrative offices by sapper teams. Government
officials are to be kidnaped or assassinated and
polls destroyed. More passive activities to sabo-
tage the election include the confiscation of
voter identification cards and propaganda and har-
assing efforts to be directed against the electorate.
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port.
III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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port.
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Vietnamese Communist leadership appears
to have made an extensive analysis of last spring's
Buddhist-inspired "struggle" movement and concluded
that it could become an effective force in both
weakening the Ky government and straining Saigon-
US relations if the movement were to come under con-
trol of the Communists. In a long commentary broad-
cast over Liberation Radio on 2 and 3 August, Hong
Dieu--a pseudonym for an unknown Communist author--
recommended that the Liberation Front begin a new
program of utilization and cooperation with such
politically signficant groups, arguing that last
spring's unrest was unlike previous antigovernment
movements in the South because it represented--in
Communist jargon--a "national revolutionary move-
ment of the masses."
2. The author concluded that the Communists
should openly proselytize among the groups partici-
pating in this movement and any other politically
oriented urban group capable of creating dissident
unrest of this kind--labor unions and religious
student groups in particular. Although admitting
that such groups are still small and relatively
ineffective, he maintained that they are a good
beginning--a nucleus of political agitation which
the Front must work with and develop even further.
3. This appraisal of last spring's Buddhist-
led "struggle" movement in Hue and Da Nang provides
a significant contrast with what appeared to be
a lack of Communist enthusiasm at the time. Through-
out the three months of unrest, the Front seemed to
adopt a very cautious role. It invited those in-
volved to join with the Front and issued traditional
propaganda promises of aid and comfort to anyone in-
volved in this movement, but carefully avoided open
participation in the demonstrations and took no
credit for them. The Front did not inaugurate any
military or political initiative which could signifi-
cantly have assisted the "struaale" forces-
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Warsaw on Negotiations
4. The Polish Foreign Ministry has once again
indicated to the US ambassador in Warsaw that,if
the US stops bombing North Vietnam,Hanoi might be
interested in some modification of its insistence
that the Liberation Front be the sole representa-
tive;of the South Vietnamese people. Michalowski
of the Polish Foreign Ministry expressed his opinion
that Hanoi would not insist that the Front be the
only representative of South Vietnam at any confer-
ence nor would it demand that only the Front program
could be discussed.
5. There is no evidence that the Poles were
authorized by Hanoi to convey these impressions to
the US. In the past, the Poles have not proved re-
liable interpreters of Hanoi's intentions.
North Vietnamese Economic Mission
6. DRV Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi is off
again to China to negotiate economic aid. Nghi
spent two months last summer and another two months
last winter touring bloc countries and negotiating
aid agreements. He may go on to other bloc capitals
on'his current trek.
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1. Non-Communist Asian reaction has been
cool to an 8 August Thai-Malaysian-Philippine
note calling for an appeal tb the countries in-
volved to negotiate an end to the Vietnam war.
2. Although only Afghanistan has officially
turned down the note, a significant number of non-
Communist nations, including India, Ceylon, Paki-
stan, and Indonesia have privately expressed mis-
givings about the proposal. These have largely
centered on the negative reaction already expressed
by Peking and Hanoi, but some Asian officials have
also expressed doubt about the credibility of a
peace effort initiated by Thai Foreign Minister
Thanat, a long-standing exponent of US policy in
South Vietnam.
3. One bright note has been Japan's affirma-
tive response. Tokyo has also indicated that it
will urge favorable replies in New Delhi, Colombo,
and Djakarta. It seems doubtful, however, that
Thanat will receive favorable replies from half of
the 17 Asian nations to which the 8 August note
was sent. Thanat had earlier expressed the inten-
tion of organizing an Asian conference to air views
on the war if he got enough support.
US-Cambodian Relations
4. Sihanouk is apparently taking a somewhat
softer line on his relations with the US. Accord-
ing to press reports, he emphasized in 18 and 19
August statements that Governor Harriman's visit
to Cambodia had been "postponed" rather than "can-
celed." Sihanouk claimed the visit was postponed
because he feared that there would be other border
incidents during Harriman's stay which would "sabo-
tage entirely" the prospect for reconciliation be-
tween Washington and Phnom Penh.
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5. Sihanouk continued, however, to take a
pessimistic view of improved relations with the
US. He reiterated that the US would have to
recognize Cambodia's version of its border with
South Vietnam before diplomatic relations could be
re-established, and observed that a more lasting
improvement in relations would probably not be pos-
sible until the Vietnam war ended.
Cambodian - Viet Con Talks
6. Sihanouk also restated that Cambodia was
prepared to "draw up" a border accord with the Viet
Cong, despite threats from Saigon. He said that
such an accord will "probably" be signed in Phnom
Penh before the end of the year. Sihanouk had
stated earlier this year that a border agreement
with the Viet Cong would be signed in August, and
there have been some indications that negotiations
were held in Phnom Penh in recent weeks. Sihanouk's
careful statements suggest that certain unspecified
differences with the Vietnamese Communists have
not been resolved yet, and that he is still wary
of possible repercussions which could stem from con-
cluding a border agreement with the Viet Cong.
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