AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 11, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010006-7
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966)
AUGUST 1966
5-3690/AP-2F
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
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 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010006-7
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S:C. Sections 793 and 794.
The transmission or revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP900826A001100010006-7
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORT"H11,
VIETNAM
(THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966)
NOTE
THIS JOINT REPORTI PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED
SEPARATELY BY DIA AND CIA, WILL HENCEFORTH
BE PUBLISHED BY THE DIA BEGINNING WITH THIS
ISSUE.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010006-7
 Approve9LFLvKiftepse MRY03FO RIeIF(9WTBIFS1 00010006-7
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH
VIETNAM THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in July and early
August have increased over recent months with particular emphasis on
POL facilities, dispersed POL storage sites, lines of communications
(LOCs) and transportation equipment. After the initial spectacular
air strikes against the major bulk POL facilities, which began in
late June, the campaign against NVN POL has steadied down to a slow
and grinding effort to reduce the remaining bulk capacity and that of
dispersed storage. This effort is slowing down and making difficult
and costly the import and distribution of POL for the North Vietnamese.
2. (S/NFD) All five major rail lines were struck during the
period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh lines are interdicted for
through service, the Hanoi-Dong Dang and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen lines are
probably operational for through service, and the status of the Hanoi-
Haiphong line is uncertain. With the exception of small water craft,
the destruction of transport equipment in July was at the highest
level to date. However, there are no indications that shortages in
transportation have been serious.
3. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese are placing emphasis on the
development of alternate highway routing within the NVN Panhandle
network. Highways in this area have been subject to extensive inter-
diction which has required heavy maintenance and the development of
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longer and lower capacity bypasses. Continued restoration and
construction work on the LOCs throughout the country combined with
the use of expedients have permitted the North Vietnamese to satisfy
their logistic requirements and to continue their support of Communist
activities in South Vietnam and Laos.
4+. (S/NFD) Although there has been no noted change in VC/NVA
military capabilities in South Vietnam which could be attributed to
the air strikes in NVN, the recent B-52 strikes in the DNIZ area dis-
rupted support of the NVA 324B Division and have probably discouraged
operations of this type in the immediate future.
5. (S/NFD) There is evidence that the regime is experiencing
difficulty in implementing its urban evacuation program and that it
has caused some popular dissatisfaction, but there is no concrete
evidence that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale.
6. (S/NFD) Damage to the economy increased by almost
10 million,*
the highest amount of economic loss measured during any reporting
period in this series of reports. Total measurable direct and indirect
losses to the economy and the military establishment are now estimated
at 106 million. The loss of storage capacity in bulk petroleum
facilities has presented Hanoi and its Allies with the necessity of
improvising a makeshift storage and distribution system and conversion
to this system has placed an additional heavy drain on economic
resources. The cumulative debilitating effects on the economy are
* US dollars are used throughout this report.
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becoming increasingly apparent with the disruption of agricultural
and industrial production. It is certain now that economic growth
has stagnated. Shortages of economic goods and hardships are
apparent among some parts of the civilian population but there have
been no sustained and critical hardships among the bulk of the people.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in July and early
August have increased over recent months with particular emphasis
on POL facilities, dispersed POL storage sites, lines of
communications (LOCs) and transportation equipment. Weather
conditions improved in some sections of the country thereby enhancing
the general effectiveness of the strikes in those areas. After the
initial spectacular air strikes against the major bulk POL
facilities, which began in late June, the campaign against NVN POL
has steadied down to a slow and grinding effort to reduce the
remaining bulk capacity and that of dispersed storage. This effort
is slowing down and making difficult and costly the import and
distribution of POL for the North Vietnamese. All five major rail
lines were struck during the period. With the exception of small
water craft the destruction of transport equipment in July was at
the highest level to date. However, there are no indications that
shortages in transportation have become serious.
2. (S/NFD) As of 11 August 1966, about 76 per cent of JCS
targeted POL storage capacity (100,840 M.T.) has been destroyed by
the air campaign. The JCS targeted capacity at the time of the
first attack is now estimated to have consisted of some 131,660 M.T.
located in 13 facilities. This represents a revision of previous
estimates of JCS targeted capacity due to analysis of much better
photography obtained for bomb damage assessments. Capacity remaining
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at these sites is estimated to be some 30,820 M. T. (See Tab A). POL
storage at Phuc Yen and Kep are located near jet airfields and have
not been authorized for strikes. These facilities together with
additional dispersed storage on or near the airfields have provided
fuel for the continued high levels of NVN air activity during the
reporting period.
3? (S/NFD) The program for the dispersal of POL supplies and
storage in NVN is continuing and some of these installations have
also been struck. Additional semi-permanent tank sites and drum
storage sites are being identified regularly. Particularly
significant is the discovery of POL storage in areas which the M -N
apparently consider "secure." Storage has been seen in tanks
implanted in dikes, in drums dispersed through villages, at churches
and in cemeteries. Strikes against these sites would have propaganda
value to the NVN. Continuation of this type of dispersal practice
can be expected.
4. (S/NFD) An immediate effect of the POL strikes, particularly
those at Haiphong, was to disrupt the flow of POL to North Vietnam
by sea. Imports in April and May reached as much as 34,300 M.T.
per month. Since the POL strikes began in June, no tankers have
off-loaded at the Haiphong terminal, but POL in drums has been
noted on dry cargo vessels. Imports of POL by railroad, coastal
barges and craft, and to a very limited extent by air have probably
occurred. No pattern of the use of alternative routes has yet been
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detected. It is probable that several methods of delivery or a
combination of methods will eventually evolve. About 1,000 M.T. of
imports, primarily in dry cargo ships, have been noted in the last
45 days compared with an average of 22,000 M.T. per month during
the first half of 1966. Presently one Soviet tanker is en route to
Haiphong and is due there about 25 August. If this tanker proceeds
to Haiphong, it should give an indication of whether direct tanker
shipment of bulk POL to North Vietnam will be resumed.
(S) No evidence of any shortage of POL has been noted,
and it must be assumed that stocks on hand have been adequate to
sustain necessary operations. How long this condition will continue
is not clear at this time. High priority activities such as military
transport, SAM support, and aircraft operations will no doubt be
sustained at the expense of other POL consuming functions.
6. (S/NFD) All five major rail lines were struck during July.
Two lines are interdicted for through service, two are probably
operational for through service, and the status of the remaining line
is uncertain. Rail shuttle service, however, undoubtedly continues
between interdictions on those lines which are closed to through
traffic. Moreover, increased inland and coastal water traffic
apparently has largely compensated for the decrease in rail traffic.
We estimate that there has been little change in transport
performance in terms of either ton-kilometers or tons carried in
the first half of 1966. The Hanoi-Lao Cai line is interdicted for
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through service between Viet Tri and Hanoi at the Viet Tri rail-
road/highway bridge. All bridges north of Viet Tri on this line
have been repaired. The Hanoi-Vinh line is open for through
traffic at least as far south as Qui Vinh. The Hanoi-Dong Dang
rail line probably is open for through service. Aerial photography
of 8 August indicates that one of the two bridges at Cao Nung has
been repaired and the Dap Cau bridge on the Hanoi-Dong Dung line
probably also has been repaired. Pilots reported the destruction
of two railroad bridges on the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen line on 25 July,
but photographic confirmation has not been received. In any
event, enough time has elapsed to permit the resumption of through
service on this line. The Hai Duong railroad/highway bridge on the
Hanoi-Haiphong rail line was restruck on 10 August but assessment
of the damage is not yet available. The Hanoi-Haiphong line was
operational for through traffic prior to the 10 August strike.
7. (S) Although the amount of railroad rolling stock destroyed
or damaged in July (310) was somewhat less than that during June,
one locomotive was destroyed and three were damaged. In early
August, three more locomotives were destroyed. This is the first
period in several months that locomotives have been reported
destroyed or damaged. The air strikes on railroad equipment have
been steadily reducing the NVN inventory and there have been no
indications of a major effort to import replacements. Some equip-
ment has probably been made available through release of equipment
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 ApprovSE craase ff ti/0 {'5:wr-vsiq9 mgeq"00010006-7
formerly used for hauling Chinese shipments to Kunming via Hanoi.
Some equipment also could have been transferred from the Kunming
railway system, but no significant influx of such equipment has
been noted. Cumulative totals of damaged and destroyed targets are
shown in Tab B.
8. (S) A fairly successful level of road interdiction was
achieved during the period. Most of the effort was in the area south
of the 20th Parallel. This area has been subject to extensive
interdiction requiring heavy maintenance and development of longer
and lower capacity bypasses. The North Vietnamese are placing
emphasis on the development of alternate highway routing within the
NVN Panhandle network. They have also continued restoration and
construction work on the major LOCs throughout the country and have
resorted to other measures where expedient. These include the
employment of ferries, floating bridges, submerged causeways, and
even temporary bridging across destroyed spans which is removed
during daylight hours. These efforts have permitted the North
Vietnamese to satisfy their logistic requirements and to continue
their support of Communist activities in SVN and Laos.
9. (S/NFD) Although no JCS targeted waterway facilities or
ports were struck, transshipment facilities at Phat Diem, Thai Binh,
and Nam Dinh were attacked repeatedly and numerous buildings were
reported destroyed or damaged.
8
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10. (S/NFD) Aerial operations extended over 19 waterway
routes and resulted in nearly 1,200 craft reported damaged or
destroyed; significant increases in secondary explosions and POL-
type fires were also noted. Reported activity against craft on the
Red River, the Song Lo, and the Song Chay, northwest of Hanoi is
also significant because these routes are capable of providing
support to the southward movement of materiel from China and can
act as alternates and supplements of other lines of communication.
Increased transport activity was noted on waterway routes clearing
the Haiphong area and in the Red River delta area.
11. (S/NFD) Heavy strikes continued to be concentrated against
the intracoastal waterway between Vinh and Thanh Hoa, and have
hindered through waterway movement on this important north-south
route. Highlighting operations south of the 20th Parallel were
strikes against craft on the Song Ngan Pho. Significant concentrations
of craft have been detected on this route periodically, indicating
probable support of road infiltration activity via Nape Pass into Laos.
12. (S/NFD) Air strikes against EW and GCI type radars have
left the NVN air warning system generally intact. A 20 per cent
increase in equipment in the past 30 days, has meant that these
strikes have had virtually no long term effect on the NVN radar
system. Air strikes against the Kep Radar Site on 1 July were
effective in keeping the site inactive for 20 days. The effect
of strikes against radars supporting AAA and SAM sites has been
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 Approv C * L l g fOO :R EI' N91 ff ( 00010006-7
difficult to evaluate. Although equipment has been damaged or
destroyed as a result of individual strikes, there is no evidence
of loss in the total NVN radar inventory which would suggest a steady
and rapid replacement of lost equipment has been attained.
13. (S/NFD) The armed forces of NVN continue to expand and the
infiltration of men and materiel into SVN and Laos continues at a
high rate. There has been no noted change in VC/NVA military
capabilities in SVN, which could be attributed to the air strikes in
NVN. The recent B-52 strikes in the DMZ area appear to have dis-
rupted support of the 324B Division in northern SVN and called world
attention to North Vietnam's extensive preparations in that area.
These strikes coupled with the successful friendly ground operations
in the area immediately south of the DMZ have probably discouraged
operations of this type in the immediate future. The strikes on POL
facilities have had no apparent effect on infiltration activity. The
effects of these strikes would more likely be noted first in other
areas, such as the civilian economy.
Leadership and Public Reactions
14. (S/NFD) The recent intensification of the US bombings
on North Vietnam does not appear to have markedly affected the
DRV leadership's resolve to press on with the war. Statements by
North Vietnamese leaders in recent weeks have expressed this resolve
in extremely strong and unyielding language. This was most clearly
evident in President Ho Chi Minh's appeal of 17 July. In that
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 ApprovS Fto lP er /OF/O -( 9t4R&BM100010006-7
address, the DRV leader asserted that even if the US should bring
a million troops to Vietnam, destroy Hanoi, Haiphong and the North
Vietnamese industrial enterprises, and pit thousands of planes
against the North, the Vietnamese Communists will still be victorious
even though the war may last 20 years or longer.
15. (S/NFD) Ho Chi Minh also dramatized North Vietnam's
determination to persist in its struggle with "US imperialism" by
signing a decree calling for "partial mobilization" of the reserves.
Later clarifications indicated that most of the effort would be
applied to improving the readiness of the militia, paramilitary,
and youth groups rather than to provide for a substantial growth of
the armed forces. It would appear that this decree was promulgated
primarily for propaganda purposes and to heighten the populace's
involvement in the war effort.
16. (S) An article in the party daily Nhan Dan on 7 August,
indicated that the regime is experiencing some difficulty in
implementing its program of evacuating a large portion of the
urban population. The editorial pointed out that it was necessary
to further accelerate the evacuation in order to preserve human
life and that "educational mobilization" must be undertaken to imbue
a spirit of "unity and mutual assistance" among the peoples in the
evacuated areas. In addition, Nhan Dan implied that stronger
population control measures were necessary to make the evacuation
be of "lasting character" and to keep the resettled individuals from
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drifting back to the cities. While the evacuation program has caused
some popular dissatisfaction, there continues to be no concrete
evidence that the air strikes against the North have significantly
weakened popular morale.
Effects on the Economy
17. (S/NFD) Damage to the economy increased by almost $10 million,
the highest amount of economic loss measured during any reporting
period in this series of reports. Damage for the period was almost
one-sixth of the total damage sustained by the economy of North
Vietnam since the ROLLING THUNDER program began. Destruction and
damage to transportation equipment accounted for the largest part of
this increase, but significant losses were also accounted for by
decreases in foreign exchange earnings, and the destruction and
damage of petroleum storage facilities, bridges, and electric power
plants.
18. (S/NFD) The loss of storage capacity in the principal
bulk petroleum storage facilities has presented Hanoi and its Allies
with the necessity of improvising a makeshift storage and distribution
system for petroleum. The conversion to the new system is placing
an additional heavy drain on economic resources and the operation of
the system will increase the cost of acquiring and distributing new
supplies of petroleum. However, the availability of substantial
stocks in remaining bulk storage and dispersed facilities, has
apparently enabled the North Vietnamese to maintain petroleum
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 Approves E? c KeTse 03110 QJ-FTQ 4:&S(B b0010006-7
distribution and economic activity. The attacks against railroad
transportation have continued to interrupt through service on all
of the major lines for varying periods of time and contributed
substantially to the disruption of transport within the country.
Damage to electric power plants has gradually eroded almost one-
third of total power generating capacity.
19. (S/NED) The cumulative debilitating effects on the economy
are becoming increasingly apparent. Industrial production has already
been affected adversely by the diversion of skilled labor and capital
to the repair of bomb damage, interruptions and uncertainties in
distribution patterns, and the further dispersal of production
facilities. Local industry which accounts for almost half of all
industrial output has received considerable emphasis in development
programs since early 1965. But on 3 August, Hanoi noted that the
output of local industry during the first half of 1966 remained at
almost the same level as in the first half of 1965. Recent
propaganda statements highlight the achievements of local industry
but are silent about the modern and centralized industries, thus
tacitly confirming previous estimates of continued deterioration in
industrial performance. Moreover, the intensified dispersal of
additional light industry and handicraft enterprises to rural areas
will decrease the prospects for growth in local industry.
20. (S) The disruption of normal farming schedules caused by
air attacks and the diversion of labor to the repair of bomb damage
13
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have combined with a poor growing season to create a substantial
shortfall in the spring agricultural crop. For the same reasons
there have been planting delays which may make it difficult to
achieve a successful 10th month harvest.
21. (S/NFD) The problems in both industrial and agricultural
production may be exacerbated if the recent "partial" mobilization
of reservists increases the shortage of managerial and administrative
skills for the operation of the economy. Worker efficiency may
also decline as a result of renewed emphasis upon the evacuation
of non-essential personnel -- including dependents -- from the
cities. It is certain now that economic growth has stagnated
and that shortages of economic goods and hardships are apparent
among some parts of the civilian population. The cost to Hanoi of
the air strikes in both financial and material terms, however, is
more than compensated by economic aid and technical assistance
provided by other Communist countries. Moreover, the primarily
agrarian nature of the subsistence economy of North Vietnam means
that there will probably be no sustained and critical hardship among
the bulk of the population as a consequence of the conduct of the
air war to date.
22. (S/NFD) The Thai Nguyen and Viet Tri thermal electric
power plants were damaged by air strikes in July. Damage to the
Thai Nguyen plant, the third largest power plant in North Vietnam,
resulted in the loss of some 10-20,000 kilowatt of capacity, with
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the total electric capacity now out of service in North Vietnam
estimated at 60-70,000 kilowatt -- almost one-third of the national
capacity. Damage to the Viet Tri plant was slight, probably
causing a suspension of service for several days at most. Partial
restoration of service at the Thai Nguyen plant may have already
been accomplished, but complete restoration of service will require
at least one year and probably will not be possible without foreign
assistance. The capacity probably remaining intact at the Thai
Nguyen power plant -- about one-third the original generating
capacity -- is not sufficient to meet the total demands of the local
community, including the iron and steel complex, and, simultaneously,
to transmit power to Hanoi. Transmission to Hanoi may be given
priority because the shortage of electricity already being
experienced there has required rationing. The power available to
Hanoi, which could meet only about 80 per cent of requirements after
the Uong Bi power plant was put out of operation in April 1966,
would be reduced to about 60 per cent of normal demand by the loss
of power from Thai Nguyen. Moreover, the power needs in Thai
Nguyen are probably less critical.
23. (S/NFD) Analysis of bomb damage to the Viet Tri Paper Mill
indicates that the mill will be unable to resume production for at
least six months and perhaps more than a year. Reconstruction and
repairs probably will not be possible without foreign assistance.
North Vietnam will also have to turn to imports to offset the loss
in output. The mill, built with Chinese aid, has a reported capacity
15
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of 30,500 tons per year of printing paper, stationery, and cement
bagging paper and is by far the largest producer of paper products
in North Vietnam.
24. (S) Direct losses caused by air strikes against economic
and military facilities and equipment measured in terms of estimated
reconstruction or replacement cost are now estimated at some
91 million
Economic Facilities and Equipment Military Facilities and Equipment
Million Million
Targets Dollars Targets Dollars
Railroad/Highway Bridges l/ Barracks 16.3
Reconstruction 13.2
Temporary Repairs 3.0 2/ Ammunition Storage 4.5
Transportation Equipment 18.9 3/ Supply Depots 3.2
Railroad Yards and Ports 1.0 Radar and Communications 1.1
Electric Power Plants 7.1 Naval Bases 0.8
Principal Bulk Petroleum SAM Sites 1.8
Storage Facilities 2.2 1+/ Aircraft 10.0
Airfields 0.4
Manufacturing Facilities 2.1 Naval Craft 4.3 5/
Miscellaneous Targets of
Armed Reconnaissance 0.8
Total x+7.5
1 The estimate in this category is incomplete because of inadequate
post-strike photography.
2/ Includes $2.1 million expended to date on temporary repairs and
$0.9 million required to provide temporary repairs for structure
damaged but not yet restored to operable condition.
3/ Excludes destruction and damage to trucks in Laos.
T+/ Excludes destruction and damage to support facilities and the
contents of the tanks.
5/ The high value of destruction shown in the previous month's
estimate was based on intelligence which was subsequently proven
in error.
x-3.2
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the 1966 fall rice crop of
11.5 million, and losses in
measurable indirect losses, there are many other losses and cost to
the economy and the military establishment which cannot be assigned
values. These would include the loss of production and lower
productivity of labor resulting from the dispersal of industry, time
lost from work as a consequence of civil defense measures, and loss
of production caused by shortages of electric power.
25. (S) The air strikes on Haiphong were probably one of the
important factors which have caused the virtual cessation of Free
World shipping to NVN. Only one ship, chartered out of Hong Kong,
has been to Haiphong since June compared with an average of nine Free
World ships per month in the first six months of 1966. Communist
shipping, however, has remained. about the same. Dry cargo deliveries
by sea, however, reached a record volume. The large volume of cargo
arriving at Haiphong plus the frequent interruption of port operations
during air raid alerts has produced some port congestion. Exports of
apatite in July, the first such shipments since August 1965, were far
below the normal levels before the bombing. Coal shipments from
Cam Pha have continued to decline since the air strikes against coal
processing and loading facilities in mid-April.
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NORTH VIETNAM: GROSS CAPACITY AT PRINCIPAL
PETROLEUM STORAGE FACILITIES
(In metric tons of average petroleum)
Capacity
At Time of First Attack
Capacity
11 August 1966
Haiphong
1+0,620
4,330
Nguyen Khe
7,500
6,680 a/
Bac Giang b/
1,960
1,260
Do Son
2,860
2,860
Viet Tri c/
1,400
1,320
Duong Nham
4,130
2,070
Vinh d/
12,030
1,180
Phu Qui d/ e/
7,560
0
Hanoi
30,620
0
Phu Van d/
840
0
Nam Dinh d/
11,020
0
Phuc Yen f/
9,910
9,910
(Sub-Total)
(130,1+50)
(29,610)
Kep f/ g/
1,210
1,210
Total 131,660
Destroyed:
Cumulative from first attack - 100,840
From 28 June - 70,570
30,820
a/ Does not reflect damage inflicted on 19 July, undetermined as
of 10 August.
b/ Four tanks with capacity of 3,460 tons were removed prior to
28 June and new location had not been identified as of 10 August.
c/ One tank with capacity of about 1,350 tons was removed prior to
28 June and new location had not been identified as of 10 August.
d/ This site was attacked during the period 1964-65.
e/ Construction of this facility consisting of nine tanks was not
completed nor was the facility ever operational before the site
was destroyed in mid-1965-
fl This site was not attacked as of 10 August.
Z/ Kep is considered to be a dispersed site rather than a principal
storage facility but carries a JCS target number.
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RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 11 AUGUST 1966
Total Targets
Targets
Struck
% Of National
Fixed Targets
c/
No.
d/
ar eted
o %r 7o
No(*)
d/
%
o.
ttacks
b/
Strike
Sorties
Destroyed Inactive
Barracks
443 man
62
9.63
45
23
204
2287
21.79
5.56
Ammo De ots
112.6 MT
18
6.7
13
75.7
52
1155
73.4
37.51
POL Storage
131.6 MT
13
A
11
88.4
30
387
76.6
Supply Depots
10550 sq ft
26
8.6
17
19.0
50
599
12.22
2.0
Power Plants
187 KW
19
7.6
6
27.5
25
238
33.0
Maritime Ports
7.8 ST/Dy
10
5
5
28
17
219
13.0
2.63
RR Yards
33.7 ST/D
4
8
2
19
17
135
9.3
Explosive Plant
1 MT
1
00
1
100
3
28
71.0
Airfields
23
4
12
359
Naval Bases
15
3
16
213
Bridges
883
46
179 e/
2371
Commo Install
45
2
2
15
Radar Sites
50
15
63 e/
406
SAM Sites
125
47
54
315
Locks & Dams
91
2
2
10
Ferries
34
11
7e/
44
NOTE: Change reflects update of
448 sorties from error in 350 on
24 Feb 66.
Total Sorties: 8,983 Results f/
Armed Recce Sorties Destroyed Damaged
51,281 Vessels 2,255 3,668
Vehicles 1,517 1,384
POL Storage Excludes Dispersed Storage. RR Stock 946 1,247
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summary assigned to principal target.
c/ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement shown.
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail
cuts made.
/ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of
air strikes.
(~~) These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted
and struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e.,
barracks, supply and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US worldwide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US worldwide military POL storage capacity is 15,452,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average $ value of 1 MT of POL products
is $28.
US worldwide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft.).
Total kilowatt capacity of power plants serving metropolitan areas: New York - 7.6
million; Chicago - 6 million; Washington (DC and Md/suburbs only) - 2.4 million.
Approves PC IMe~ sg_ f%WMM3f - ~II ~ T(B>~2&g(~0 0010006-7
 ApprovgtFfk etas~2 0116 /0 3 /12 RCS-E,pP79BV$.2ft 100010006-7
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA/CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
DEFENSE
SECDEF 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 Cys
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET I Cy
TREASURY 1 Cy
USIA 1 Cy
AID 1 Cy
NASA 1 Cy
NSA 5 Cys
STATE 12 Cys
AEC 1 Cy
FBI 1 Cy
NIC 1 Cy
ACDA 1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS 1 Cy
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 1 Cy
J-1 1 Cy
J-3 2 Cys
J-4 1 Cy
J-5 1 Cy
J-6 1 Cy
SACSA 1 Cy
NMCC 3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
DCSOPS 1 Cy
ACSFOR _ 1 Cy
ACSI 1 Cy
ACSI-CI 1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 Cy
STAG 1 Cy
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2 Cys
DNI 1 Cy
OP-921E 1 Cy
OP-922Y1 1 Cy
OP-922Y2 1 Cy
OP-92B1 1 Cy
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
ACS,I/USAF 1 Cy
AFNINDI 3 Cys
AFNIEBB 1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation) 1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library) 1 Cy
Approvel JRD se N0603f1o RlEjl&ff Tjyfyqt0M00010006-7
 Approvet E_C ft se 2p ff llgl6ftfUJ410fflArQp1#0010006-7
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
G-2
1 Cy
1 Cy
CINCPAC
2
Cys
CINCPACAF
1
Cy
C INCU SA RPA C
1
Cy
CINCPACFLT
1
Cy
COMUSMACV
2
Cys
7AF
1
Cy
CINCLANT
1
Cy
CINCSTRIKE
1
Cy
CINCSAC
1
Cy
SAC 544
1
Cy
CINCTAC
1
Cy
AFSTRIKE
1
Cy
CONTIC
1
Cy
CINCALCOM
1
Cy
CINCEUR
1
Cy
CINCUSAREUR
1
Cy
CINCUSAFE
1
Cy
C INCNA VEU R
1
Cy
CINCCONAD
1
Cy
CIA
125
Cys
DIA:
DIADR
1
Cy
DIADD
1
Cy
DIAAP
1
Cy
SC-1
I
Cy
xx
1
Cy.
AP-2
1
Cy
AP-2A3
2
Cys
AP-2F
4
Cys
AP-1
1
Cy
AP-1C3
1
Cy
AP-1H2
1
Cy
CO-2C
1
Cy
JT
1
Cy
CI
1
Cy
AP-1R2
1
Cy
AP-1R3
1
Cy
AP-1T
2
Cys
JS
1
Cy
Approved pr Q~rare 2C A /1 f 6 , fff7 ff 0Q1 6 '#010006-7
 Ann ld For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01101 ------ _ 25X1
Ann-1, Ld For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0011061^^^a-7 125X1