THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0609/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
Y
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
3 March 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
SECRET
GROUP I
State Department review completed [da~,ngradi~q ft de=iomficaf-
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ARMY review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH-iN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0609/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION TN SOUTH VIETNAM
(25February-3 March 1965)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, following page
I. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Political maneuvering by generals
to fill role vacated by General
Khanh continues (p. 1); Calls for
peace issued by Buddhist monks,
students, and civilian politicians
(p. 1); General Ky urges Armed
Forces Council to take stand on
peace movement (p. 2); Efforts to
purge the military of "old guard"
remnants continue (p. 2); Khanh may
replace Khiem in Washington as am-
bassador (p. 5); GVN borrowing brings
money supply to highest monthly level
(p. 5).
B. MILITARY SITUATION
Communist gains reflected in ac-
celerating pace of rural insecurity
(p. 6; VC offensive gains momentum
in northern provinces (p. 6); Con-
solidation of Viet Cong gains due
to disruption of communication lines,
particularly railroads (p. 7); Post-
strike intelligence insufficient to
judge damage done to Viet Cong (p. 8);
Casualty statistics (p. 9).
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C. PACIFICATION 10
Nationwide pacification effort
remained stalled (p. 10); Se-
curity situation in five coastal
provinces drastically restricts
government efforts (p. 10) ;
Forced relocation planned in
I Corps area (p. 10) ; Refugees,
total 56,000 in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince (p. 11); Pacification
statistics (p. 11).
II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 12
First contingent of South Korean
troops arrived in Saigon (p. 12);
Sihanouk's Indo-Chinese People's
Conference opened on 1 March (p. 12);
Communist elements may have gained
control of conference (p. 13); GVN
has not requested withdrawal of ICC
teams in South Vietnam (p. 13) ; U
Thant supports political and diplo-
matic negotiations on Vietnam situa-
tion (p. 13); Indian Prime Minister
Shastri calls for Geneva-type con-
ference on`Vietnam (p. 14); France
objects to prior conditions for
Geneva-type conference (p. 14).
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 15
Communist propaganda reaction slow
to 2 March airstrikes (p. 15);
Soviets privately pressure US
allies to inhibit US actions(p. 15).
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
The emergence of peace movements in Buddhist and
other civilian circles occupied increasing attention during
the week. After a series of statements by leading Bud-
dhist monks on the theme of peace, a small student dem-
onstration in Saigon calling for an end to the war, and
the arrest of certain politicians who sponsored a peace
petition signed by 300 civil servants, Quat's cabinet
met to take a stand on the issue. On 1 March, Quat
issued a statement declaring his government opposed
to any negotiated peace until the Communists ceased
infiltration from North Vietnam and ended subversion
in the South.
Although the government has warned that it will
curb propaganda from Communist-inspired groups, it
has distinguished between such groups and the aims of
the Buddhists.
ere is a common theme in the remarks of various
Buddhist leaders concerning a 'return to the "relative
calm" of 1955. Although they have not so far echoed
Communist terms for a settlement, their new emphasis
on peace lends itself to Communist exploitation. The
Buddhists may also use the peace campaign as a
political lever on the Quat government or on the mil-
itary.
A continuing series of command changes within
the armed forces reflects the efforts of various
generals to step into the strongman role vacated by
General Khanh. General Thi, the commander in the
northern provinces, who has so far dictated most of
the changes, reportedly has also sent Premier Quat a
letter recommending. a similar " urification" of the
civilian side of the government.
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The Viet Cong are continuing to make significant
gains in the northern and central provinces of South
Vietnam, particularly along the low coastal regions.
Viet Cong effectiveness in Binh Dinh Province was
manifested in their ability to isolate the coastal
districts and to restrict government control to all
but the district towns and heavily populated areas.
Viet Cong efforts in Binh Dinh were mirrored in the
neighboring coastal provinces of Phu Yen and Khanh
Hoa but were less intense. The government is clearly
on the defensive in the north and has been unable to
contain, much less reverse, Communist gains. It
seems likely that the Viet Cong will increase the
pressure still more in the north, principally through
continued small-scale attacks, harassments and
acts of terrorism. Moreover, the Viet Cong retain
and appear to be improving their capability for
multiple battalion-size attacks against major lucrative
targets in all areas.
Pacification remains stalled and further deteri-
oration of rural security is expected.
The US Embassy reports that growing involve-
ment of US directly in the war in South Vietnam,
including use of US jets, coming on top of strikes
against the North, has tended to offset the psycho-
logical effects of deteriorating security to some
degree, but that, unfortunately, many Vietnamese
seem to welcome increased US participation as an
opportunity for reducing Vietnamese responsibility
for the war effort.
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I. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Political maneuvering by generals eager to
step into the role vacated by General Khanh con-
tinued without resolution last week amid indications
of a developing emphasis in certain civilian circles
on the subject of peace in Vietnam. Premier Quat's
cabinet met on 26 February to discuss the peace
movements, and on 1 March Quat issued a statement
publicly proclaiming that his government opposed any
peaceful settlement except on conditions that the
Communists end infiltration from North Vietnam and
cease subversion and sabotage inside South Vietnam.
2. The degree of interrelationship between the
calls for peace issued by various leading monks in
the Buddhist hierarchy, by students, and by civilian
politicians, as well as the extent to which these
new campaigns are responsive to Viet Cong direction
are still unclear. A group calling itself the
"Movement for the People's Self-Determination" (MPSD),
headed by three or four prominent politicians not
in the government, has been labeled as Communist-
inspired by government authorities. The government
temporarily arrested some of its leaders when they
attempted to hold a news conference, which allegedly
had been approved by Armed Forces Council strongman
General Thi. One such civilian leader, Nguyen Long,
reportedly was found to possess pro-Communist docu-
ments.
3. Premier Quat has been careful, under press
questioning, to distinguish between the MPSD and a
similar movement led by Quang Lien, a US-educated
monk holding secondary rank in the Buddhist hierarchy.
Quat observed that Lien's movement, and statements
by Thich Tam Chau--head of the Institute--on 23
February had not, like the MPSD, called for a cease-
fire which could lead to an early Communist takeover.
Lien told US embassy officers that he had discussed
his movement with Long's group, but that the two
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had no connections, nor had the Buddhists insti-
gated a peaceful demonstration on 26 February by
about 100 students in Saigon calling for an end
to the war. Lien, who said his movement did not
have official sanction from the entire Buddhist
hierarchy, said he was prepared, if the government
approved, to negotiate with North Vietnam for an
end to the war, but not with the Viet Cong Libera-
tion Front, which would give the Front legal status.
He said be was proposing that the Front disband
and withdraw to North Vietnam, so that American
forces could then be withdrawn. Lien argued that
if the Viet Cong refused, they would then be ex-
posed as aggressors and the South Vietnamese could
more clearly unite to drive them out. He did
little, however, to dispel the impression that his
proposals have anti-American overtones, and on
2 March, in outlining these views to the press,
observed that fighting between Vietnamese benefits
only "foreign bosses." The government has vetoed
Lien's proposal to contact North Vietnam.
4. Thich Tam Chau, apparently-asked by Premier
Quat to clarify his remarks of 23 February, did
not endorse Lien's movement, but said he has asked
Buddhists to pray for peace, and indicated that he
had in mind a return to the situation of 1955 in
which Communists would go to North Vietnam and
"free nationalists" reside in the South. Another
second-ranking monk, Ho Giac, made a speech on
27 February also sounding the theme of peace and
also referring unfavorably to the role of "for-
eigners".
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6. Although it appears that there are some
tactical differences among Buddhist leaders, pos-
sibly mirroring'internal,r"ivalries between the Chau
and Quang factions--and with the former possibly
willing to deal with more unsavory political ele-
ments, there does appear to be a rather consistent
theme among them, including a belief that there is
considerable public sentiment for ending the war.
It is not yet clear whether they hope to channel
such sentiment toward an acceptable settlement of
the war, or whether this is the opening phase of
a campaign which may move closer to Communist
terms. There is some hint that the peace theme
may become a yardstick against which Buddhist sup-
port for the Quat government will be measured,
as well as a possiblity that the Communists them-
selves may be able to influence the direction the
campaign takes regardless of Buddhist intentions.
7. General Ky, commander of the air force,
who reportedly has sought to have the Armed Forces
Council take a stand on the developing peace move-
ments, has issued a statement on his own denouncing
them and advocating that persons "who work for the
Communists" be shot by way of example. Ky and
the Armed Forces Council, meanwhile, have cooperated
with efforts, apparently spearheaded by General Thi
to purge the military of "old guard" remnants,
covering supporters of Diem, General Khanh, the
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19 February coup group, and officers either identi-
fied as corrupt or as anathema to the Buddhists.
9. Behind the formal military appointments to
date, including the reported appointment of General
Thi--vice-premier and defense minister--as secretary-
general of the Armed Forces Council, it appears
likely that a struggle among the generals to fill
Khanhts position is still in urocess.
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11. Premier Quat is now considering naming
General Khanh, who has arrived in the US on 2 March
after stop-offs in Hong Kong and Rome, as ambassador
to the US in place of Khiem. Quat recently told
Ambassador Taylor that he intended to test Khiem's
evident involvement in the abortive coup by summon-
ing home chiefs of mission, and relieving Kh
he refused to return.
Economic Conditions
12. During January, the. money supply increased
by 13 percent over December, the largest monthly in-
crease ever and 31 percent higher than a year ago--
primarily because of an increase in GVN borrowing.
The new cabinet has yet to focus on the rice problem
or to send a letter formally requesting additional
P.L. 480 rice.
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