THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001700020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0605/65
Copy No.
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
3 February 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
SECRET
DIA review(s) completed. GROUP I
Excluded from outomotic
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0605/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(28 January-3 February 1965)
C O N T E N T S
Page
NOTE
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, following page
I. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Khanh is cautious and flexible about
forming successor regime; (p.,.l); ;
Khanh's uncertain intentions arouse
suspicions among key armed forces
commanders (p. 1); Buddhist leaders
have remained largely quiescent,
but likely to continue demands for
major voice in government (p. 3);
Tri Quang plays down anti-American
tone in Buddhist campaign (p. 3);
Quang and Buddhists admit possibility
of penetration of their ranks by
Communists and extremists (p. 3)
Catholics are pessimistic and largely
anti-Khanh (p. 4),
B. MILITARY SITUATION
Communist activity rises abruptly in
pre-Tet period, but not as high as
expected (p. 5); Viet Cong propaganda
teams encourage people to enter VC-
controlled areas for visits during
holidays (p. 5); effects of recent
c i
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ARVN successes discussed (p. 5);
casualty statistics (p. 6).
C. PACIFICATION
Pacification pace is slow; little
progress to report (p. 7); Hop Tac
area has generally favorable situa-
tion (p. 7) customs and harbor police
recover contraband (p. 8).
II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 9
GVN stiffens attitude toward Cambodia
(p. 9); anti-Americanism in Philip-
pines complicating plan to send
Philippine troops to South Vietnam
(p. 9); program to improve US image
offered by Philippine Secretary of
Defense Peralta (p. 9).
III, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 10
Soviet leaders probably hope economic
and military assistance to North Viet-
nam will give them greater voice in
Communist policy in Indochina (p. 10);
DRV publicizes capabilities and readi-
ness to meet military action (p. 11).
ANNEX: Quang Ngai Province A-1
Map, Quang Ngai Province, following page A-5
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NOTE: This issue of the Weekly Report
consists of contributions from the several
participating agencies, but circumstances
did not permit final coordination.
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
General Khanh has apparently been feeling his way
cautiously in setting up a successor to the ousted Iuong
government, but there are signs that he is running into in-
creasing opposition, particularly from the military itself.
There have been allegations by various generals that Khanh
is about to make a bid to have himself named as chief of
state with concurrent control of the armed forces. These
generals have implied that some early move may be afoot
to thwart any such ambitions by Khanh.
Although Buddhist leaders have been portraying out-
ward moderation since the downfall of Premier Huong, they
have disavowed any agreement with Khanh and apparently
intend to retain their freedom of action in the political
sphere. There are increasing signs that many of the mili-
tary are themselves fed up with Buddhist : tactics, and even
suspicious that the Buddhists may try to maneuver the gov-
ernment toward a neutralist solution. Several generals in-
dicate that they are determined to deal forcefully with any
future Buddhist obstructionism.
Catholic circles appear increasingly restive over
Khanh's return to the scene with Buddhist collusion. They
are withholding any active cooperation with Khanh's efforts
to set up a military-civilian council, and some of their
militants, who claim their distrust of Khanh is shared by
the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects and even the average
Buddhist, are reportedly trying to prod sympathetic mili-
tary officers into action against Khanh.
The failure of the Viet Cong to launch any spectacu-
lar pre-Tet military operations suggests that the enemy
has been thwarted, at least for the time being, by recent
ARVN spoiling attacks. ARVN's successes in achieving
tactical surprise over large concentrations of Viet Cong
are encouraging examples of ARVN's good use of intelli-
gence and its willingness to employ quick reaction forces
promptly, aggressively, and effectively. It also may be
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that Viet Cong intelligence on ARVN intention was inade-
quate or that the Viet Cong overestimated their ability to
deal with a superior armed force in a conventional engage-
ment. A continuation of such costly defeats could cause
the Viet Cong to disperse some of their forces.
Despite recent ARVN success, the Viet Cong still re-
tain the capability to initiate multiple large-scale attacks
and to hold positions for short periods. It is anticipated
that the Viet Cong will intensify their activities after the
Tet holidays.
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NORTH
jDong lioi
Muan
Nakhon Phan.
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QUANG TIN
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CON SON
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SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
As of 17 December 1964
Emmm- Corps boundary
Special zone boundary
----- Division boundary
Hop Tac area
46536
2.5 5U 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
BOUNDARY -- . N,--N
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHOR,TAT,ve
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7th Division
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I. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. General Khanh has been cautiously feeling his
way in trying to set up a successor regime to the
ousted Huong government,.and there are signs that he
is now running into serious opposition, particularly
from his military colleagues. Khanh's plans have
shown considerable fluidity, although he is still
moving to set up a 20-man military-civilian council.
The council is ostensibly to be charged with replacing
or confirming the caretaker Huong cabinet under Chief
of State Suu and civilian Acting Premier Nguyen Xuan
Oanh.
2. Various generals on the'Armed Forces Council
(AFC), however,.state that they are convinced that
Khanh intends to have himself named chief of state,
with full control over the armed forces. They report
that he may try to have this move confirmed by a
meeting of the AFC on 5 February, and that he has
ordered command changes to neutralize his opponents.
Some generals argue further that Khanh is plotting,
either through his own contacts or with full Buddhist
collusion, to make himself the "Prince Sihanouk" of
Vietnam by negotiating a deal with the Viet Cong's
National Liberation Front to neutralize South Vietnam.
Although there is no firm evidence that Khanh plans
such moves, and particularly any gesture toward a
negotiated settlement, suspicions over Khanh's in-
tentions are widely shared by key armed forces com-
manders, including generals who are otherwise sus-
picious of one another.
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4. Khanh has provided somewhat conflicting
versions of his plans for the new government. He
has indicated publicly that the Armed Forces Council
will retain full authority over the government, with
the 20-man council having an advisory role. At the
same time, he continues to make plans for the civilian-
military
council
to function as a reconstituted High
National
Council
in setting up a new government.
Khanh's
problems
are compounded by the reluctance
of many
potential
civilian members of the council to
associate with another interim government.
Khanh has stated that elections will be held
for a national assembly in March, as scheduled. The
caretaker government has published the election law
drafted and signed by the Huong government, which
already gives the armed forces a major voice in pick-
ing the assembly--4,000 of the 16,000 electors. How-
ever, there are hints from several quarters, including
Khanh himself, that the elections may be postponed,
or that, in any case, the interim government might
remain in place even after the assembly is formed.
It is possible that the uncertainty surrounding the
legal framework of the new government reflects current
military and civilian opposition to Khanh's maneuvering.
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Khanh himself may have fluctuated between the idea of
retaining a weak Suu-Oanh government which he can
dominate and the possibility of some scheme which could
give him a public mandate to become chief of state, a
goal he has Ion admitted to. F
5. Buddhist leaders have remained largely quiescent,
after some initial moves to pressure the military into
releasing all persons arrested in recent demonstrations.
They also made efforts to stay the execution of a sus-
pected Viet Cong terrorist among the demonstrators,
but eventually acquiesced. Despite Buddhist willing-
ness, however, to use Khanh to obtain Huong's removal,
there is no evidence that they intend to give Khanh
their loyalty. Two generals report that the Buddhists
have now specifically disavowed a pre-coup agreement
under which monks would have retired from the political
scene.
Tri Quang, in a private meeting with US embassy
officers as well as in a press interview, has sought
to play down the significance of anti-American over-
tones in the Buddhist campaign against Huong. He is
privately quoted as saying that the Buddhists would
cooperate with a new government, if given a chance,
and that they would like to control two ministries--
justice and information--and to participate in psycho-
logical warfare activities against the Viet Cong.
Quang is also reported, however, to have said that
the Buddhists would not support General Khanh's per-
sonal ambitions and were still dedicated to the concept
of civilian rule. Some Buddhist laymen have shown an
interest in serving on the 20-man council and even in
a new government, but the Buddhists are likely to re-
main dissatisfied with anything less than a major
voice in the government.
Tri Quang and other Buddhists have also re-
cently admitted the possibility of some Communist pene-
tration of their ranks, and even the possibility that
extremists issued, under their name, a scurrilous
anti-American leaflet,.but they have denied any offi-
cial responsibility for the actions of these elements.
Despite Buddhist claims that they will devote them-
selves, for the present, to reorganization of their
hierarchy, leading monks show little intention of
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withdrawing from active Politics.
the Buddhists may
soon raise demands that ex-Premier Huong be brought
to trial. Various generals, including some of the
"young Turks" who have in the past curried Buddhist
favor, have been warning that any further Buddhist
agitation will be dealt with firmly. General Dong,
Saigon's tough military commander, says he expects
shortly to be "fighting the Buddhists in the streets."
6. Catholic circles have made little secret of
their pessimism over Khanh's return to the scene and
over a possible Khanh-Buddhist alliance. The Arch-
bishop of Saigon, Nguyen Van Binh, is refusing any
direct cooperation with Khanh in naming Catholic
representatives to the military-civilian council,
although he is reported to have agreed
to disband the Catholic crp.ain corps as a means
of getting the Buddhists to do likewise. Leaders of
more militant northern Catholic refugee groups, how-
ever, are predicting that Khanh's acts will lead to
an early Buddhist takeover and to a neutralist regime
which, the sa could provoke a forceful Catholic
reaction.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. The number and intensity of Viet Cong-initiated
activities rose abruptly in the pre-Tet period. The
increase, however, was not as extensive as expected.
There were no spectacular large-scale Viet Cong
actions, possibly as a result of recent ARVN spoil-
ing attacks. Three attacks were reported which
probably involved forces larger than one company.
District towns in Quang Nam and Vinh Long were at-
tacked but not overrun, and a large enemy force
conducted a damaging attack against a regional biv-
ouac area in An Giang.
There was a significant rise in the number
of small-scale attacks, the highest weekly total
since early December. Most Communist activity,
however, consisted of terrorism and acts of sabo-
tage. For the first time since October, Viet Cong
sabotage seriously interrupted traffic on the
main roads in III Corps. Although railroad sabo-
tage remained at the same relatively low level of
last week, the effects of earlier floods and sabotage
are still being felt. Railroad repairs south of
Da Nang, in the provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin,
and Quang Ngai have not been completed.
Communist activities, including armed at-
tacks, were heaviest in IV Corps with military
targets the principle Viet Cong objective. Enemy
activities elsewhere consisted principally of
terrorism although in I Corps, the Viet Cong
emphasis appeared to be on military targets.
Viet Cong propaganda teams were reported
to be explott.ing-,t'he seven-day Tet "truce," pror
claimed by the Liberation Front, encouraging the
people to enter Viet Cong-controlled areas and to
visit their families. Since the "ceasefire" period
began on 31 January, Viet Cong military activity
has dropped off sharply.
2. It seems likely that recent ARVN successes
against Viet Cong concentration have had a deterrent
effect and disrupted the enemy's timetable for
pre-Tet large-scale attacks. The government offensive
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noted last week seemed to gain a bit more momentum
this week, as overall military activity increased,
as did the number of operations engaging enemy
forces. This occurred despite intensified poli-
ticking by senior officers in Saigon and a High
Command directive encouraging pre-Tet leaves.
Several government operations this week gained
significant victories over the Viet Cong as a re-
sult of sound and aggressive application of ARVN's
superiority in arms, mobility and air power.
An operation in Dinh Tuong Province, terminated
on 27 January and resulted in 152 Viet Cong killed
and numerous weapons captured against only minor
friendly losses. In Phu Yen Province a search-and-
destroy operation was initiated against a 250-man
Viet Cong force. With the coast line blocked by
the Junk Force and escape routes on land cut off,
the Viet Cong, who had holed up in caves, were
subjected to a punishing air attack. The operation
resulted in 88 of the enemy killed and an estimated
60 others carried away. The continuation of such
successful operations is needed in order to reduce
significantly Viet Cong military capabilities and
wrest the military initiative from the enemy.
3. Casualties and weapon losses reflected the
increased level of combat this week. Government
personnel casualties increased from 806 (201 KIA)
to 849 (225 KIA) this week. Communist casualties
climbed to 798 (638 KIA) from 742 (546 KIA) of the
previous week. Government losses of weapons rose
for the second straight week to 503 from 346. The
capture of Viet Cong weapons, however, declined
for the second straight week to 175 from 190.
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C. PACIFICATION
1. The pace of pacification activity throughout
the nation fell off during the past week and there
was little progress to report. Unsettled political
conditions in Saigon, the advent of Tet and the
shortage of ttoops in some areas all contributed to
the decline in activity.
2. Extensive requirements for static defense
missions in all five provinces of I Corps have impeded
and will probably continue to impede pacification
efforts throughout the corps until troop shortages
can be alleviated. Forces available for mobile
operations and reaction to Viet Cong attacks are
limited. The senior American adviser to the ARVN
lst Division has stated that no further pacification
progress can be expected in Quang Tri and Thua Thien
until more ARVN or paramilitary forces are made avail-
able.
3. In the II Corps zone, the coming of Tet and
civic unrest in some of the zone's major cities diverted
attention from pacification efforts;.-!In Binh Dinh
Province, reductions in troop strength caused a slow-
down in pacification activities. The province chiefs
in Tuyen Duc and Khanh Hoa were diverted from pacifica-
tion duties because of rioting by Buddhists and students
in Dalat and Nha Trang.
4. In IV Corps, the pacification effort was stag-
nant except for planning for future operations. Forty-
four of 48 authorized sub-sector teams were operational
at the end of the week. United States Special Forces
"A" teams in Chau Doc and Kien Tuong provinces were
scheduled to assume concurrent missions as sub-sector
advisory teams on 1 February. A US Special Forces "A"
(12-man) detachment is to be deployed to Phu Quoc Island,
Kien Giang Province, to undertake pacification operations.
5. In the Hop Tac area, the situation has been
generally favorable although there has been a marked
increase of Viet Cong activity in some parts of the
area under direct III Corps control, especially in
Bien Hoa Province. The Capital Military District and
Rung Sat Special Zone have been relatively quiet and
free of important Viet Cong contact. Five additional
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hamlets were completed during the past week, raising
to 292 the number reported by US Advisers as meeting
the six-point criteria for a completed hamlet. Secur-
ing operations are underway in 88 other hamlets.
Twenty-three boats have been assigned to operate
checkpoints on important waterways in the Rung Sat
Special Zone, Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh and Long An provinces,
as part of the resources and population control program.
Customs and harbor police have recently recovered large
amounts of contraband in the form of antibiotics and
medicines. Controls on foreign vessels plying the
waters in the area of Vung Tau, Nha Be (10-15 kilo-
meters down the Saigon River:"from Saigon) and Saigon
will be tightened to prevent off-loading of contraband.
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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. CAMBODIA
1. Recent developments suggest a continued
stiffening of the Vietnamese Government's atti-
tude toward Cambodia. The GVN issued a strong
declaration on 31 January denouncing Cambodia's
plans to hold an ":,Indochinese Peoples' Conference"
and charging collusion between Cambodia, North
Vietnam, and the Liberation Front to extend Com-
munist control over South Vietnam. The statement
warned Sihanouk that he must bear the consequences
for raising tensions in the area resulting from
his call for a conference and his recent terri-
torial claims against South Vietnam.
2. This declaration follows by a few days
another strong declaration issued on 27 January
which denounced the Cambodian Government for
having sentenced to death on 26 December a South
Vietnamese soldier captured during a May border
incident.
3. In the meantime, minor border incidents
continue along the Cambodian border.
B. PHILIPPINES
1. Embassy Manila reported that the current
wave of anti-Americanism is complicating the
Philippine Government's plan to send troops to
South Vietnam. Philippine Secretary of Defense
Peralta has recommended that the US initiate a
campaign in the Philippines to improve the US
image. He suggests an immediate and dramatic
increase in US military assistance to the Philip-
pines and a USIS directed program to impress the
public with the US need for Philippine aid to
South Vietnam.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MOSCOW-HANOI RELATIONS
1. The new Soviet leadership's increased
interest in and support for North Vietnam was under-
scored by the announcement that Premier Kosygin and
a high level Soviet military, economic, and party
delegation will leave for Hanoi on 4 February. The
visit probably foreshadows an increase in Soviet
military assistance to North Vietnam and possibly
a new long-range economic aid agreement. A special
Soviet economic delegation arrived in Hanoi last
week
It is possible that the Soviets have al-
ready delivered some air defense hardware. Recent
aerial photography revealed the presence of at
least six 37mm. self-propelled antiaircraft guns
in the vicinity of Phuc Yen airfield. This is the
first identification of this Soviet weapon in
either North Vietnam or Communist China, and sug-
gests direct Soviet assistance to North Vietnam.
The weapons may have been delivered in late
December.
The new Soviet leaders almost certainly
hope that an increase in economic and military
assistance to North Vietnam will give them a
greater voice in the formulation of Communist
policy in Indochina. They may also hope that
their newly demonstrated interest in the area will
serve as a deterrent to possible US extension of
the war to North Vietnam. Kosygin and company will
probably also press Hanoi to return to its tradi-
tional position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Apparently in anticipation of increased
Soviet support, Hanoi began, following Premier
Pham Van Dong's return from Moscow last November,
to damp-down its public criticism of Soviet policy.
The theme of "bloc unity" is now once again getting
attention in Hanoi propaganda, as the Vietnamese
seek, for the present at least, to avoid giving
offense to either Moscow or Peiping.
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It is unlikely that any increase in the
Soviet presence in Hanoi will alter such basic
policies as promotion of violent revolution or sup-
port of Peiping on issues which harmonize with
Hanoi's own state interests.
B. DRV INTERNAL
1. During the past month the DRV has devoted
extensive publicity to the capability and readiness
of its armed forces to meet any prospective mili-
tary action directed against the DRV.. On,3 Feb-
ruary, the DRV announced that a meeting of its
highest military policy group--the National Defense
Council--had taken place in January to discuss the
status of North Vietnamese armed capabilities. The
announcement implied that Hanoi believes there is
a good chance of some direct US military action
against the DRV. As a consequence, the National
Defense Council called on the people and armed
forces of the DRV to "get ready to fight," and
urged continued military preparations in such
fields as "antiaircraft work," and defense of the
"frontier demarcation line." The meeting coin-
cides with other indications that Hanoi is now
moving to strengthen its military defenses.
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ANNEX
SITUATION IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
1. The government's position in Quang Ngai
Province within the last few months has declined
sharply. The Viet Cong have made serious inroads
into the vital coastal plain area of this province
and now virtually control the southernmost district
of Duc Phu. The most recent report of the US Mission
Reporting Unit presents a pessimistic picture of the
situation in Quang Ngai, and holds out little hope
for the GVN to check the Communist effort with the
resources that it has in place.
2. Quang Ngai has long been a stronghold of
the Communist subversive effort in Vietnam. The
Viet Minh have maintained redoubts there, as do the
Viet Cong. The Viet Cong strength is estimated to
be about 5,670 in Quang Ngai, an addition of some
400 since the beginning of October. Included in
this total are 2,235 main force troops organized
into one regional headquarters,MR5, one regimental
headquarters, three infantry battalions, and one
weapons battalion; provincial units are given as
two battalions with a combined strength of 1,155;
while local forces are estimated to number 2,280.
In addition to these units, province officials
suspect one or two more battalions are operating in
this province. The Viet Cong are estimated to be
capable of massing three or four battalions at any
point in the province, but have not mounted any
large unit operations since September, when the
last battalion-strength operation occurred. The
Viet Cong leadership apparently feels that there
is no necessity to operate with massed units since
their small-unit operations are working so effectively.
3. The regular government units in Quang Ngai
are the 51st ARVN Regiment--an independent unit--
and two Ranger battalions, with a combined strength
of 3,150 men, or some 30 percent below authorized
strength. Thus Viet Cong main force and provincial
strength is presently slightly greater than that of
regular ARVN units, a condition which severely hampers
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the ability of the government units to seize and
maintain the initiative. There is no government
reaction force held in general reserve in the area.
The three battalions of the 51st are largely com-
mitted to static defense missions, while the Ranger
battalions are operating ineffectively in Duc Pho
district. The ARVN units have had very little suc-
cess in their recruiting efforts in Quang Ngai.
4. Regional Forces consist of 19 rifle companies
and a support company with a present-for-duty strength
of 2,430. The Popular Force assigned strength is
10,000, but this force is operating with only 65 to
70 percent of its strength present for duty. Recruit-
ment for the paramilitary forces is good, but the
Popular Forces have a morale problem largely created
by lack of supplies and equipment.
5. The security situation has grown worse in
the past several months as the government continues
to lose new areas to the Viet Cong. Communist con-
trol in the piedmont and mountainous areas is vir-
tually total with the GVN holding only small areas
around district capitals in these regions. Thirty-
five percent of the province population of 650,000
is under Viet Cong domination while the GVN exerts
strong control over only 17 percent of the population.
The remainder of the people are ijn,,areas undergoing
pacification or "cleared" of Viet Cong. Only the
province capital, Quang Ngai, is considered to be
truly pacified. Although 113 hamlets containing
165,000 persons were reported in early December to
have met the six-point criteria for a completed
hamlet, their record of resistance to Viet Cong
attacks is poor. The GVN controls, in some measure,
60 percent of the province rice lands,. but the Viet
Cong are now. thought to control enough rice production
that, given normal crops, they will have a year's.
supply of rice on hand.
6. Government presence is strongest in Tu Nghia,
Nghia Hanh, and Son Tinh districts, in the center of
the lowland area, and extends with diminishing strength
north to Binh Son district and south through central
Mo Duc district to Duc Pho district. The Viet Cong
have expanded their control over considerable portions
of Duc Pho, Mo Duc, and Son Tinh districts on either
side of Route 1. In Duc Pho, everything except the
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district capital is in their hands. The Communists
are apparently consolidating their holdings in Mo
Duc and Duc Pho by digging in and building fortified
positions.
7. The low level of the pacification effort in
Quang Ngai is due mainly to the lack of sufficient
government military strength to deal with the Viet
Cong. Total government regular and paramilitary forces
outnumber the Viet Cong by less than three to one, and
cannot field sizable forces to seek out and destroy
the Communist forces. Pacification plans for 1965 in
the province, which have been partially tied into the
I Corps master plan, are quite unrealistic in terms
of what the government expects to accomplish within
the.given time frame with the forces available. Part
of the 1965 pacification plan calls for the clearing
of Route 1 as well as the completion of 178 hamlets
by the end of March 1965.
8. Other obstacles in the way of the pacification
effort are conflicts between military commanders and
civil administrators, lack of financial and material
support from central government ministries in Saigon,
and the failure of local officials to make timely use
of resources available to them.
9. Some aspects of the pacification program have
shown positive results. There are now fourteen full-
strength pacification teams operating with increasing
effectiveness. Of special note is the success of five
forty-man "special platoons" in-,accomplishing useful
intelligence gathering assignments.while pursuing their
civil action, psychological warfare, and military duties.
10. The people of Quang Ngai Province appear to be
growing more weary of war every day. Along with this
weariness is a growing apathy and a desire for security,
regardless of which side can provide it. The GVN still
has a residue of goodwill among the people as evidenced
by the information that authorities are able to gather
about the Viet Cong, but this cannot last indefinitely.
In view of the lack of sufficient GVN forces in the
province to cope with the growing strength of the Viet
Cong, it is unrealistic to expect that government
pacification efforts, even if carried out more effec-
tively in-the future, could seriously hurt the Communists.
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If the government continues only economy of force
activities, it seems clear that it will be only a
matter of time before all the rural areas of the
province come under the control of the Viet Cong.
The initiative in Quang Ngai presently lies with
the Viet Cong, alid :it .rili 1:;be 1:.- their,. actions ".-that
determine tae,course of events there.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
QUA ~v,
k~()NrUM
PIE IKU
Province (Tinh) boundary
O Province capital
District (Quan) boundary
0 District capital
NOTE: The name of each district is the same as its capital.
0
Tra Bong
Chuon'g
0 Nghiar
Route
Railroad
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SECRET
SECRET
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