THE PORTUGESE OPPOSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001100050031-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 19, 1963
• Content Type: IM

Appreved For Release 2006/12/275 j H 1 'T00429A001100050031-6 6 e
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OCI No. 1570/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
19 June 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Portugese Opposition
1. Civilian opposition to the Salazar regime,
except for the Communists, is splintered, poorly
organized and without effective leadership. For
the most part, it is drawn from an assortment of
left-of-center elements. These groups, all of them
penetrated to some extent by the Communists, have
mounted two abortive attempts to overthrow the
government in the recent past (once in March 1959
and again in January 1962). They continue to plot
for another try, but given the present apathy of
most of the Portugese public and the watchfulness
of the security forces, their chances of succeed-
ing in the foreseeable future are poorer than they
were after the 1958 presidential election. At
that time there was deep-seated unrest ready to
explode at any moment, and the police proved rather
inept in carrying out counteraction.
2. There is some disaffection within the
armed forces, but not enough to cause the regime
to be concerned at present about a military coup.
Such a development, however, would become a dis-
tinct possibility if Angola or Mozambique were
to be lost. As long as the present regime can
hang on to the African provinces, its chances of
survival are fairly good.
3. The threat of the Portugese Communist
Party (PCP), which claims 8-10,000 members,
hovers in the background. Its aim is to achieve
legal status after the Salazar regime falls
through a deal with the rest of the opposition.
For the present, it is stressing the need for
establishing a united front of all anti-govern-
ment groups rather than revolution. A measure
of the Communists' success is the growing feeling
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Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050031-6
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in many sectors of the non-Communist opposition that
a link up with the Communists is necessary if Salazar
is ever to be overthrown. The Communists have not
so far, however, had much impact on the mass of the
Portugese people.
4. For several years there has been extensive
revolutionary plotting on the part of Portugese
(and Spanish) exiles. Chief among these is Humberto
Delgado, a presidential candidate in 1958. Exile
activity reportedly is centered in Rome where the
Portugese and Spanish movements are joined under
a Supreme Council of Iberian Liberation. This organi-
zation coordinates the activities of the various
exile groups which the Communists have been able to
penetrate as well as those of the so-called New
Opposition. The New Opposition is a clandestine
organization in Portugal itself which has not been
infiltrated by the Communists.
5. Delgado's own organization, the National
Front of Portugese Liberation which set up the
Supreme Council, is also located in Rome. According
to recent reports, it will be moving to Algiers.
The Front's objectives are twofold: fomenting
revolution in the homeland and pushing independence
for Portugal's overseas provinces.
6. Delgado has indicated that the PCP has
a rightful place in any opposition movement; in
fact, the party is already represented in his
organization at the policy-making level. At pre-
sent, Delgado does not have much popular support
in Portugal, in large measure because of his re-
lations with the Communists. He has made several
trips between Brazil, heretofore his headquarters,
and North Africa, western Europe and the Communist
bloc. One report has itthat he recently met with
Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the PCP in
Prague. He is also said to be in touch with various
Angolan nationalist leaders.
SECRET
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Approved For Release 2006/12/27: CIA-RDP79T00429AO01100050031-6