THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S00427A000100060003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 19, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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19 MAY 1961
MEMORANDUM I"OR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT The Situation in Guatemala and El Salvador
1. President Miguel Ydigoras, now raid-way in his
six-year term, has faced almost constant plotting against
his regime by factions of his political opposition, ranging
from the extreme left to the extreme right, and by dissident
military officers, He has been unable to build an effective
political machine of his own and unwilling to resort to
harsh authoritarian methods. He has retained power largely
by very adeptly manipulating his opponents against one
another and thus preventing the development of a unified
opposition. While he has considerable personal popularity
among unorganized elements in the lower classes, he has
failed to convey a sense of accomplishment or direction to
the more politically aware Guatemalans. Many in this
category--including dissident army officers--feel the
President is motivated solely by his desire to retain power.
They condemn him for tolerating widespread graft among his
aides, including members of his family.
State Dept. review completed
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3. For the first time since the fall of Arbenz in
1054, most top Communist leaders are now back in Guatemala
where they are actively reorganizing the party and attempting
to strengthen their influence in labor and other front groups.
The party, with about 1,100 members and perhaps an equal
number of sympathizers, is still relatively weak however;
they were unable to organize strong effective pro-Castro
demonstrations last month. Ydigoras blames the increased
Communist activity on Congress' watering down of his pro-
posed anti-Communist legislation earlier this year. Actually,
the Communists have benefitted more from Ydigoras' success
in weakening the leftist but strongly anti-Communist Revolu-
tionary party (PR), the only Guatemalan party with a degree
of mass support and Ydigoras' most potent political adversary.
Continued weakening of the PR would further enhance Communist
efforts to regain a monopoly over Guatemala's strong leftist-
nationalist movement.
4. Ydigoras is probably Fidel Castro's prime target
in Central America. Arbenz has been in Cuba since last
July and a number of his associates even longer. The
arrival in Cuba last month of Arbenz' notorious police chief,
Rogelio Cruz Wer, has been confirmed. Guatemalans frequently
travel between Cuba and home and it is expected that Communist
activity in Guatemala is receiving and will receive increasing
guidance and support from Cuba.
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El Salvador
5. The strongly an si-Communis ~ provisional govern-
men of El Salvador is controlled by army officers strongly
committed to a program of basic socio-economic reform. The
gulf between the extremely wealthy few and the impoverished
majority is probably greater in Al Salvador than in any
other Latin American country; the country's three month
experience with a Communist-influenced regime, which was
overthrown by present government leaders last January,
jolted many Salvadorans into a recognition that reforms
must be implemented quickly to stem Communist gains.
6. Officers now in government positions and on
active duly in the armed forces appear, at least on the
surface, to be united in support of the governmeni.'s pro-
gram. The dominant officer group is composed largely of
relatively young men who had been junior officers prior
to the military coups of last October and January. Many
of the senior officers were displaced and a number of
them are now abroad.
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7. The changes in the government last month, reducing
the ruling civilian-military directorate to three members
and reshuffling the cabinet, eliminated certain officials
not wholly in support of the reform program. The American
embassy considers the new cabinet officers capable and
amenable to guidance and support by the US. Although the
government continues to voice its intention to relinquish
power to an elected government before the end of the year,
the military is unlikely to relinquish control until its
reform program seems assured.
S. The government's first reforms--the reduction
in rents for low income housing and a paid day of rest
on Sundays for agricultural workers--aroused considerable
resistance from the wealthy, which the government is
seeking to counter. The Catholic hierarchy now feels
that reforms are long overdue in El Salvador, and a high
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Church official has described the upper classes as
"s i:uaned'f by the reversal of the historic position of
the army and the Church which had been their traditional
allies.
HUNTINGTON D. S HELD N
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
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