WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON ANGOLA (CONTRIBUTIONS TO NSSM 234)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01142A001400020006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 22, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: West European Attitudes on Angola
(Contributions to NSSM 234)
In General
1. The West European governments, although disturbed over Soviet
intervention in support of the MPLA in Angola, are not prepared to give
public backing to counter-measures -- especially in association with
South Africa.
-- The West Europeans recognize that the MPLA leader
Augustinho Neto is Marxist-oriented. They doubt,
however, that the Soviets will be able to overcome
African nationalist tendencies sufficiently to
establish lasting dominance over Angola by support-
ing the MPLA.
-- Only the conservative press for the most.part, unlike
the political leaders, sees the US facing a test of
its will and ability to contain Soviet expansion.
-- While West European leaders have accepted the news of
US material aid for MPLA opponents with little criti-
cism, they do not favor US military intervention.
With the exception of France and possibly Greece,
most would be relieved if the US wound down its direct
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involvement. They are skeptical about the wisdom of
US involvement, and hope that other approaches can be
found.
-- All will be reluctant to go against any consensus that
may be reached at the OAU meeting in January.
The West Europeans evidently see Africa as a sphere
where their influence will continue to be important
and believe they will be able to compete effectively
with the Soviets there by such arrangements as the EC's
Lome accord, which grants preferential treatment to 46
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries.*
government favors non-intervention and maintains
that none of the factions has earned recognition by establishing its
control of Angola. At a recent NATO meeting, Foreign Secretary Callaghan
recommended strong support for the OAU's recent call for the removal of
all foreign troops and the setting up of a government of national unity
in which all three factions would participate. Callaghan argued that
* The opinion of Western European business leaders in Angola is not 25X1
clear, although we have had the impression in the past that a number of
them supported FNLA/Unita. 25X1
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France
play an active role in Angola.
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In relations
with Moscow, the French government is taking the line across the board
that the Soviets must be told with clarity and determination exactly
how the West expects them to act within the framework of detente.
7. The French have been sending military equipment to FNLA/Unita
through Senegal and Zaire, and probably would not be opposed to continued
or increased US support -- short of sending US nationals to fight in
Angola. Nevertheless, for domestic political reasons, Paris has chosen
a public stance of neutrality. In particular, France hopes to avoid
the need for any public defense of involvement in a conflict in Africa
on the same side as the South Africans.
8. As a long-term objective, France hopes to create a "Latin
Africa" grouping by bringing Portugal's former colonies into closer
association with ex-colonies of France, Belgium, and Spain. The French
are prepared to pay a certain price in aid and verbal support to enlarge
their African orbit and, in return, expect access to extensive resources.
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Italy
9. Italian leaders apparently hope that the Angolan situation
does not escalate into a superpower dispute in which Rome would be
expected to take sides, thus adding another issue to the country's
domestic conflict between left and right. The Italian Communist
Party, which has given lukewarm endorsement to the MPLA, is also
eager to avoid sharp debate on the issue. The party's efforts to
distance itself from the Soviets could suffer if the party were
forced, through sharp debate, to step up its support for the Soviet-
backed group.
Others
10. In NATO discussions, Greece stressed that, despite the
rhetoric or detente, the allies should watch the behavior of the
Soviets and their friends in situations'such as Angola. The Dutch
and the Danes, on the other hand, advocate the cessation of all for-
eign intervention there and would support a coalition of contending
Angolan movements. If the MPLA should succeed in dominating Angola,
they believe that this would not necessarily lead to Soviet-satellite
status. They argue that the West might most usefully encourage nation-
alist tendencies to check Soviet influence.
NATO
11. Angola has been discussed in NATO councils, producing ambiv-
alent statements of concern over the Soviet role, along with expressions
of hope that the US can somehow prevent a Soviet success without being
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involved in fighting. It can be inferred that West European govern-
ments would oppose any vigorous role for NATO in the Angolan affair.
They would do so on the grounds that the problem lies outside NATO's
defined area, and that NATO is not under obligation to support US
policy there if its members find such action not consistent with their
own policies and perceived interests. And while they share the US
concern over the Soviet involvement, their attitudes on European
intervention range from skepticism to outright opposition.
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