THE UNITED NATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Release Date: August 16, 2006
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• Content Type: REPORT

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THE UNITED NATIONS:
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS ............... ..................... ....... .. 1
1. The Changing UN ................................................ 3
A. Great Power Retreat ........................................... 4
United States and the Soviet Union .............................. 4
Western Europe ........................................ . .... 5
B. China and Japan in Expanding Roles .................... ....... 5
C. LDC Consensus and Crosscurrents ............. ......... ...... 6
II. The US and the UN: A Balance Sheet ............................... 7
A. The UN as a Liability .......................................... 7
B. The UN as an Asset ........................................... 8
Peacekeeping ................................................. 8
Intergovernmental Agencies .............................. ..... 9
C. Tempering the LDC Challenge .................................. 10
Appendix: UN Budget and Bureaucratic Organization ............ ...... 15
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THE UNITED NATIONS:
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALI
KEY JUDGMENTS
The United Nations, despite the hopes of its champions and the
fears of its detractors, does not greatly influence the basic trends and
developments of world politics. Occasionally it illuminates interna-
tional policy decisions; more often it merely reflects them.
Transition from Western to LDC Dominance
The UN was often a useful forum for the US during the years
when East-West conflicts were the foremost public issues, because
the outcome of votes reflected Washington's diplomatic strength and
Moscow's isolation.
The UN has become a frequent source of embarrassment to the
US, because global forums and the UN agenda are now dominated by
North-South confrontations. The majority of less developed countries
'This study was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Office for
Western Europe by the Office of Political Research of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Although the subject matter was discussed with representatives of other offices and agencies,
no formal attempt at coordination has been undertaken. The views presented represent the
best judgments of the issuing office, which is aware that the complex issues discussed lend
themselves to other interpretations. For further information about this study, please call
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(LDCs) differ both in interests and ideology from the US and other
developed states which they see as defenders of an inequitable
status quo.
LDC dominance in the UN results not only from their surge in
numbers and militancy, but also from the passive stance often assumed
by the US and other developed countries.
The reverses the US encounters at the UN are recurrent but not
cumulative. Their psychological and diplomatic impact has, in fact,
been substantially reduced through repetition.
Benefits
The UN does continue to provide diplomatic and technical bene-
fits which offset the liabilities of political embarrassment and psycho-
logical defeats. These range from its intermediary role in international
conciliation and peacekeeping operations to the functional services of
intergovernmental agencies and conferences.
To the degree that the US wants substantial improvement of re-
lations with the LDCs, the UN provides a convenient forum for de-
veloping points of common interest. On many global issues there is no
suitable alternative.
To the degree that the US wants to counter the LDC challenge,
the UN, by virtue of its parliamentary, global, and bureaucratic struc-
ture, can often serve to delay and dilute LDC demands.
Alternatives
Just as the UN is not the essential source of US difficulties with
the LDCs, changes in the US posture toward the UN would not per se
uncover solutions to those difficulties.
- If the US and the other major powers retreat still further from
active involvement in the UN, the LDCs would probably shift
their attacks to other arenas, where they would be less con-
strained.
- If, instead, the US and the major powers resumed their earlier,
more active roles, a strengthened UN could better serve US
interests in matters such as peacekeeping and technical serv-
ices, but at the same time it would likely increase the effective-
ness of the LDC challenge.
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DISCUSSION
1. THE CHANGING UN
1. Fifteen years ago the UN was an institu-
tion overwhelmingly useful to US policy and
congenial to US interests. Today it is less
often a help than an all too predictable source
of irritation. Once an arena where US policies
could find ready support, it is now a grand-
stand where US policies, together with those
of other developed countries, regularly meet
the harsh criticisms of the multitude of less
developed countries-which now compose 96
out of the organization's 135 members.
2. The UN essentially has no direction or
strength of its own; it mirrors developments
in world politics and reflects the capabilities
and limitations that its members give it. The
transformation of UN politics during the past
decade and a half is basically the result of the
shift in emphasis of global politics from East-
West to North-South confrontation. Essenti-
ally, the UN has become a difficult arena for
the US because North-South relations-now
the predominant theme in global forums-are
themselves difficult.
3. The LDCs, acutely aware of their indi-
vidual weakness, see the UN as one of the few
available arenas in which they can forcefully
express their views from a position of strength.
The UN has become the high ground from
which they can present their arguments for
direct assistance and for alterations in interna-
tional political and economic arrangements.
They are neither ready nor able to offer much
in return. This posture, together with the frus-
trations and resentments they feel, lead the
LDCs to repeated, even dogmatic, criticisms
of the US and other major powers.
4. The shift in the UN agenda and voting
records also reflects changes in the composi-
tion of its membership and in the relative
level of interest shown by the various member
states. In this light, the persistence of the
LDCs' demands and the proliferation of their
numbers are only partly responsible for the
current state of UN politics. The two super-
powers have greatly reduced their involve-
ment in the UN, thus creating opportunities
for the LDCs to seize initiative. West Euro-
pean countries have similarly limited their UN
roles and yielded to the more activist LDCs.
The Chinese and Japanese contributions have
been somewhat different. They have recently
expanded their UN activities, and in so doing
have sought to ingratiate themselves with the
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LDC majority. The net effect of these role
changes, assessed in greater detail in the sec-
tions that follow, has been to facilitate LDC
domination-but of a substantially weakened
UN.
The United States and the Soviet Union
5. In the "war for the minds of men" of the
late 1940s and the 1950s, UN votes were
viewed as significant if superficial skir-
mishes-skirmishes which the West generally
won. Within the General Assembly the UN
was assured of support from West Europeans
and Latin Americans. Various African and
Asian states-which now vote with the LDC
or non-aligned caucus-also reinforced that
majority. In the Security Council the US was
never forced to use its veto while the USSR
amassed a long record of "nyet" votes which
underscored its relative diplomatic isolation.
The Security Council's peacekeeping opera-
tions-such as the Congo operation from 1960
to 1964-also tended to support US goals far
more than Soviet interests. The USSR, while
resenting the US advantage, could not afford
to withdraw from UN diplomacy-the stakes
of global East-West confrontation were too
high and the UN too important a diplomatic
arena.
6. The transformation of the UN to a forum
much less congenial to US policies has coin-
cided with the efforts of the superpowers to
pursue detente and to restrict their involve-
ment in the organization. While the Cold War
was fought publicly before a global audience,
detente is pursued in private bilaterals, away
from the glass buildings and votes of appre-
hensive allies and clients. As both powers re-
treated from open and direct global contest,
their confrontation ceased to be the predomi-
nant public theme of multinational diplomacy
and left a vacuum to be replaced by the bur-
geoning North-South confrontation. LDCs dis-
covered they had not only greater freedom
from the superpowers but also less attention.
When Moscow and Washington no longer
competed for their votes and allegiance, the
growing numbers of LDCs found that a solid
voting majority in the UN was their most ef-
fective instrument for underscoring their posi-
tions and reinforcing their demands.
7. As non-aligned militancy and numbers
grew, both the US and USSR found themselves
targets rather than leaders in UN diplomacy.
They retreated still further from a UN which
seemed increasingly antagonistic-a source
of heightened demands and criticisms from
the LDCs. The superpowers continue to be
active in New York, but they try to avoid using
the public forums of the organization on sensi-
tive and major issues. Their proposals, though
still plentiful, are now often perfunctory. Both
sides invest their most serious diplomatic ef-
forts in defensive manuevers such as opposi-
tion to LDC or Chinese proposals.
8. For the US, the most publicized reversal
came in 1971 when, after 20 years of successful
opposition, it was no longer able to block the
seating of the People's Republic of China and
expulsion of Nationalist China. That defeat
was, however, only a symbolic denouement.
US ability to direct key votes had been eroding
for years, as indicated by a series of defeats,
diplomatic embarrassments, and narrow vic-
tories.
9. The USSR has reaped little advantage
from the decline of US influence in the UN.
The Soviet mistrust of this Western-style par-
liamentary organization has not been abated
by the new role of the LDCs-its superpower
identity far overshadows its revolutionary cre-
dentials in UN diplomacy. Peking, moreover,
has made embarrassment of Moscow and op-
position to Soviet policies the overriding theme
of its UN activities. The disadvantage the
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USSR once suffered in the UN against the US
has to some degree been replaced by the dis-
advantage it now faces against China.
Western Europe
10. West Europeans have also found that
with the shift from East-West to North-South
confrontations, the UN has become a less com-
fortable and less important forum. Although a
widely diverse group, West European states
have followed the same general trend: reduced
involvement in the UN. As the US' chief allies
in the Cold War, many took active roles in the
East-West competition within the UN and
shared the benefits of Western dominance.
They were major arbitrators in Security Coun-
cil negotiations and leaders in peacekeeping
operations. These roles have been largely aban-
doned with the muting of East-West confron-
tations and straining of Atlantic ties.
11. For the members of the European Com-
munity (EC) concentration on regional inte-
gration has also served to reduce attention to
UN affairs. These countries prefer, for ex-
ample, to pursue economic relations with spe-
cific groups of LDCs through European Com-
munity arrangements rather than through UN
mediums. In Community trade relations with
the developing world they receive some recip-
rocal benefits; in the UN, by contrast, they
generally meet greater criticism as former co-
lonial powers and sharper demands for com-
pensatory assistance. To the degree that West
European states do accede to LDC pressure-
even if only through passive acquiescence-
US isolation is further highlighted.
12. West European efforts to establish a
working EC caucus have also tended to sup-
plant direct involvement in the UN. The EC
caucus even though intended to increase the
Community's influence in New York has not
thus far made significant progress. Much dip-
lomatic activity is invested in searching for a
common EC position-which seldom emerges.
The exigencies of reaching common EC posi-
tions are not only a diversion but also a con-
venient rationale for avoiding controversial is-
sues: West Europeans, less involved in the full
range of global issues than the US, often have
less incentive to enter the fray of divisive UN
debate.
13. Of the West European states, Britain
and France retain the greatest independent
influence in UN diplomacy-they enjoy the
benefits of continued special relations with
their former dependencies and long traditions
of UN leadership. With periodic exceptions,
such as Paris' request for UN consideration of
the energy crisis, even these Security Council
members have greatly reduced their UN ac-
tivities.
B. China and Japan in Expanding Roles
14. Both China and Japan find a UN domi-
nated by LDCs to be a convenient and useful
forum in which to underscore their expanding
international roles. These Asian powers en-
counter far less ideological hostility than West-
ern countries and are actively pursuing better
relations with the LDCs through the UN. Al-
though they also face continual demands from
the LDCs for political and economic assist-
ance, Peking and Tokyo seem more willing
to make such concessions in return for LDC
cooperation. Their motives, however, are dis-
tinct: Peking is enthusiastically courting LDC
allegiance to buttress its position vis-a-vis the
superpowers; Japan tries to maintain good
relations with them while sustaining good
relations with the superpowers through other
channels. In particular, Peking seeks wider
political influence and support for its ideologi-
cal battles with Moscow; Tokyo hopes to as-
sure its commercial relations and access to raw
materials and to underline its self-image as a
global power.
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15. After three years of membership, China
remains essentially concerned with opposing
Soviet policy and championing non-aligned
causes. Peking has accordingly assumed posi-
tions sympathetic to LDC policies on various
economic assistance proposals. In 1973 China
departed from its normal posture of passive
support to lead the non-aligned campaign to
recognize Prince Sihanouk's delegation as the
legal representatives of Cambodia. Peking has,
nonetheless, begun to meet with suspicion
from its "non-aligned allies." LDCs, competing
among themselves for non-aligned leadership,
are not anxious to have China join the lists. For
all its accusations against "superpower hege-
mony," China is viewed essentially as a third
great power, not as a developing country.
16. Japan has been slowly expanding the
scope of its UN policy and responding to non-
aligned pressure. Japan has reacted to black
African criticism of its alleged trade with Rho-
desia and has recently moved toward non-
aligned positions on apartheid issues. In the
wake of the oil embargo, Tokyo has shifted to
a more pro-Arab position on Middle Eastern
issues. Japan, however, also bears the onus of
a rich nation and has found the UN's North-
South barrier difficult to penetrate. Tokyo's
expansive trade relations inevitably draw crit-
icism as comprising a new kind of economic
imperialism. Informal reactions among LDCs
to Japan's lobbying for a permanent Security
Council seat-a primary goal of its UN diplo-
macy-are that if any new seats are added,
they should be held by non-aligned members.
Despite such setbacks, it seems clear that im-
proved LDC relations are sufficiently impor-
tant to both China and Japan to ensure that
they will continue to be actively involved in
the UN even if the leading role of the LDCs
grows stronger.
C. LDC Consensus and Crosscurrents
17. The paramount influence of the LDC
bloc should not disguise the fact that they
arc a group of very disparate states with dif-
fering interests. The members of the so-called
"Group of 77" vary not only in terms of eco-
nomic development-from Chad to Argen-
tina-but also in the nature of their relations
with the US and other developed countries-
from Saudi Arabia to Albania.2 Nevertheless,
on most UN issues these states are able to act
as a bloc. Their solidarity in the UN is a matter
riot only of ideology but also of practical
politics. For the LDCs the stakes of UN diplo-
macy are high and the alternatives-until very
recently-have been few. Nowhere else can
they find the opportunity for sustained global
contacts among themselves and with de-
veloped countries or the leverage to draw at-
tention to their causes.
18. Decolonization created sufficient new
states to provide the LDCs a solid majority in
the General Assembly (they hold 96 out of 135
seats). Their voting power under the UN's
formula of one state one vote has been in-
flated beyond all proportion to their influ-
ence outside of the UN. This margin permits
them to approve or defeat resolutions as long
as there are no major defections from the non-
aligned position. Their majority can also be
used to prevent introduction and discussion
of resolutions as well as deter final votes.
Even when an "important question" is de-
clared, the LDC caucus can normally muster
the requisite two-thirds majority.3
2 The "Group of 77," now expanded to 96 members,
is the LDC caucusing group in the UN. It is institu-
tionally distinct from the "Non-Aligned Movement"
which is the primary organization of LDC solidarity
outside of the UN. The Non-Aligned Movement has
a smaller membership-approximately 80 states at-
tended the 1973 Non-Aligned Summit-and is gen-
erally considered to be more radical in its policy
recommendations than the Group of 77.
3 Declaring an important question is a parliamentary
defense which US delegates have frequently em-
ployed. It is best known for its repeated application
in defeating Chinese membership. To declare a matter
an important question, however, usually requires ma-
jority approval and such approval has become in-
creasingly difficult to attain as the LDCs gained con-
fidence in their solidarity and greater expertise in the
strategies of parliamentary procedures.
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erg rat of Total[ Membership
1953
Total Members 60
In terms of voting power, the impact has been
intensified by the fact that the less developed states
in 1953 tended to support Western positions rather
than voting as an independent bloc.
1973
Total Members 135
19. The LDCs have now assumed the role
of initiators: their concerns, their problems,
and their preoccupations have become the
principal themes of the UN. Decolonization,
apartheid, economic assistance, trade relations,
revising of international institutions-these
are the LDCs' chief concerns and these are
now the major issues before the General As-
sembly. But these changes in UN roles have
not been without costs to the LDCs. The posi-
tions they propose and approve with ease run
counter to the perceived interests of most in-
dustrial powers, which are increasingly silent
and withdrawn not only from UN debates but
also from the efforts to implement resolutions.
To the degree that the LDCs are less able
to get attention and assistance from the de-
veloped countries, the UN has become less
useful for them. As a global organization
substantially used by only one group of states,
the UN has, in fact, tended to become a
weakened instrument for whatever tasks its
members prescribe.
II. THE US AND THE UN: A BALANCE
SHEET
A. The UN as a Liability
20. As the wealthiest member of an organi-
zation dominated by poor nations, the US is
an easy target for the envy and indignation
of the majority. The US is held politically
liable for both the general LDC grievances
against the industrialized powers and for spe-
cific issues of American policy. LDC causes
are repeatedly dramatized by confrontations
with the most powerful nation in the one
arena where the poor hold some advantage
over the wealthy. During the April 1974 Spe-
cial Session of the General Assembly, US
policy was frequently denounced as a symbol
of foreign exploitation, occupation, and ap-
propriation of resources. While much of the
rhetoric might have been meant only for home
audiences, it has had an impact in obstruct-
ing US proposals.
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21. Specific disputes of individual countries
with the US also become widely supported
LDC causes. In the General Assembly, US
policies such as the continued military pres-
ence in Korea and support for the Khmer
regime in Cambodia are perennially subject
to non-aligned attack. US "colonialism" in
Puerto Rico and the mandated Pacific Islands
and relations with the white regimes of south-
ern Africa are also recurring subjects of gen-
eral debate. A more recent development has
seen non-aligned states use the Security Coun-
cil to focus attention on specific national or
regional grievances which were formerly left
to the Assembly. In 1973, for example, the
Council met in Panama to consider "threats"
to Latin American peace and security. The
two-week meeting focused, in fact, on the
US-Panamanian dispute over the Canal and
concluded with a US veto. The US veto, once
a rarity, is now too common an occurrence
to draw headlines.
22. The recurrent setbacks the US en-
counters at the UN are in many cases limited
in importance precisely because they have
become so predictable-the psychological and
diplomatic impact has dulled with repetition.
While incidents such as the Security Council
meeting in Panama are inconvenient and em-
barrassing, it is difficult to determine what
further cost they may represent for the US.
Such exercises may tend to fortify the resolve
of states which have won "psychological vic-
tories" against the US and make them more
difficult negotiators. There is little evidence,
however, that those states gain more tangible
advantages. Perfunctory votes by the LDC
bloc in favor of a member country's cause,
do not necessarily lead to, or even signify,
more tangible forms of support. Such "psycho-
logical defeats" also seem to have little last-
ing impact on the attitudes of US allies. Even
the cumulative impact of these defeats ap-
pears to be minimal. Certainly the drama of
highlighting the relative diplomatic isolation
of the US has been greatly diminished by
repetition. A US vote with the non-aligned
states-as in the April 1974 Council meeting
on an Israeli attack in Lebanon-is the un-
expected which now draws attention.
B. The UN as an Asset
23. Despite LDC domination, the UN con-
tinues to provide benefits to the US which
offset the liabilities of diplomatic embarrass-
ment and psychological defeats. As an organi-
zation, the UN provides unique services in
peacekeeping and in technical and economic
coordination. As a diplomatic center, it
tempers and disperses some of the more radi-
cal LDC challenges which, if not posed in
the UN, might be raised elsewhere on terms
even less favorable to the US.
Peace-keeping
24. Security Council deliberations are an
effective means of diffusing potentially ex-
plosive international disputes. Long debates
ending in compromise resolutions have be-
come a ritual of international peacekeeping.
The parties to a dispute are provided time
for public presentation of grievances and pri-
vate negotiation. Although such meetings oc-
casionally require the US to take positions
on a dispute in which it has no direct interest,
they more frequently serve to forestall con-
flicts which could ultimately trigger a much
more costly US involvement.
25. UN peacekeeping operations have played
a similar role in reinforcing cease-fire agree-
ments. The great majority of these UN efforts
have either directly or indirectly supported
US interests. There are presently three such
operations in being which have directly as-
sisted US policy positions-the UN forces in
Cyprus, Egypt, and Syria. Although the UN
forces are seldom capable of militarily en-
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forcing a cease-fire, they constitute a politi-
cal restraint against reopened hostilities. The
necessity of overrunning an international
peacekeeping force before reaching enemy
lines considerably raises the political costs of
a renewal of hostilities and provides the
parties with a face-saving rationalization for
not attempting to seize more territory.
Intergovernmental Agencies
26. The UN's family of inter-governmental
agencies provides a widely used network of
functional services. They are sufficiently valu-
able not only to the US but also to a wide
range of developed and developing states to
ensure their survival even if the UN's major
diplomatic organs fell into disuse. Fifteen
agencies serve as centers for the coordination
of economic, social, and industrial relations.4
Agencies such as the International Monetary
Fund, World Bank, and International Finance
Corporation are effective centers of economic
consultations and multilateral aid programs.
The International Civil Aviation Organization
and International Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization have been useful forums of inter-
national regulations of commercial aviation
and maritime industries. The US has main-
' The fifteen intergovernmental agencies are as-
sociated with the General Assembly under the um-
brella of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
They are: International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), International Labour Organization (ILO),
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), United National Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World
Health Organization (WHO), International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank or
IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC),
International Development Association (IDA), Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), Universal Postal
Union (UPU), International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), Inter-Government Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO), and General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
tained substantially greater influence in these
agencies than in the central political organs.
LDCs which are unwilling to be counted
among US supporters in more visible forums
often will concede to US positions in the rela-
tive privacy of agency deliberations, where
the pressures for non-aligned solidarity are
significantly weaker.
27. One of the more interesting recent de-
velopments in the UN has been the trend of
referring difficult issues from the policy bodies
to the technical agencies. The April 1974
Special Session on Raw Materials concluded
with a request that outstanding problems-
which are monumental-be pursued in the
Economic and Social Council. In 1973, Se-
curity Council members, determined to avoid
a public confrontation on the Israeli diver-
sion of a Lebanese airliner, referred the dis-
pute to the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization. The referral of a topic from the
Security Council to an agency was unusual,
but it followed what is becoming an estab-
lished pattern in the Assembly. In addition,
UN members are increasingly using these
technical bodies to introduce controversial
issues before broaching them in the Assembly.
North Korean and North Vietnamese mem-
bership have both been tested in various
agencies for soundings of likely responses in
the Assembly.
28. This trend toward greater use of the
agencies is valuable to the degree that these
bodies are able to serve as safety valves for
the major organs and eventually provide a
setting for more objective deliberations. It is
also advantageous to US interests since Ameri-
can influence is usually stronger in these
agencies than in the political bodies. A po-
tential drawback of this development, how-
ever, is the possibility that such increased
pressures may politicize the agencies and
render them less capable of executing their
technical responsibilities.
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C. Tempering the LDC Challenge
29. As the diplomatic center for the LDC
challenge to the rich countries, the UN repre-
sents a mixed political value to the US. The
UN arena is a liability in the sense that it
has been converted into an LDC tool to publi-
cize their causes and embarrass the developed
states. But its very weakness and unwieldiness
may make it preferable as an alternative to
potentially more radical channels for LDC
activities-and hence an asset to industrialized
states. The UN tends to modify the more
extreme LDC demands against the US and
other developed states. Even under the domi-
nation of states committed to radical change,
the UN remains essentially a conservative
institution. Like most institutions in the West-
ern legal tradition, it operates far more easily
to protect existing arrangements than to alter
them.
---As a parliamentary organization the UN
encourages consensus-seeking and long
deliberations. Extreme proposals are
muted in the normal processes of pre-
paring draft resolutions, caucus state-
ments, and committee reports. All the
parliamentary alternatives for avoiding
a confrontation and delaying decisions
are available. Draft resolutions can be
left in committee, referred to a panel
of experts, directed to a special ad hoc
committee for further study, postponed
until the next session, or rephrased in
compromise language and approved with-
out consequence.
- As a global organization the UN encom-
passes the widest possible circle of actors
to negotiate proposals. Although its
world-wide scale has in many ways been
the organization's chief contribution to
the LDCs in the establishment of an in-
fluential non-aligned movement, that
global scale has also meant that the more
radical particular interests have generally
been compromised to win the support of
the LDC bloc as a whole.
- The UN is also a bureaucratic organiza-
tion which divides authority among its
multiple components. Policy approval re-
quires the involvement of numerous
bodies. Common procedures for a Gen-
eral Assembly resolution require approval
of the agenda item by a General Com-
mittee, special committee hearings and
approval, a report from the Secretariat,
reconsideration by the committee and
plenary approval. Implementation nor-
mally falls to the Secretariat where the
US, by virtue of its placements of ap-
pointees and established associations,
still maintains substantial influence.
30. All of these characteristics of the UN-
its parliamentary, global, and bureaucratic
structure-delay and dilute LDC demands
upon the US and other developed states. These
characteristics also accentuate the internal di-
visions among the LDCs. Frictions of con-
flicting interests within this diverse group of
nearly a hundred states are, in turn, one of
the most effective restraints upon the non-
aligned movement. LDCs have traditionally
been jealous of their regional identities and
separate interests. A newer but equally deep
division is growing between the "third and
fourth worlds"-the have and have-not LDCs.
The recent increase of oil prices, which in-
jured countries such as India far more than
the developed states, has underlined the sharp
conflicts of economic interests among these
states.
31. Competition for leadership is another
source of tension which has grown as the LDC
group has increased in size and political rec-
ognition-the greater the success of the non-
aligned group, the sharper the competition.
Algeria's request in the name of the non-
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aligned movement for the General Assembly
Special Session on Raw Materials stimulated
resentment among many unconsulted LDCs
and especially among states such as India and
Yugoslavia which feel that they also have a
claim to speak for the movement. This resent-
ment was one of the reasons the LDCs came
to the session with little preparation and little
agreement upon specific goals and proposals.
Such internal competition is likely to be a
continuing impediment to LDC programs in
the UN. The LDC consultative arrangements
include no formal provisions for designating
a spokesman. Informally, the personality, ac-
tivism, and ideological credits of a particular
leader-such as Algeria's Boumediene-are
generally the major factors in determining
which state can most successfully presume to
represent the group. These standards are suf-
ficiently subjective and ephemeral to ensure
that leadership competition-like the other di-
visions among LDC members-will be a con-
tinuing check upon their activities in the UN.
III. ALTERNATIVES
32. The US, despite the weakening of its
positions over the years, still is the UN's single
most influential member. The UN's current
decline is as much a product of the major
power retreat as of the LDC excesses. Thus,
one of the most important questions in the or-
ganization's future is whether the US is to be-
come more directly involved in UN affairs or
continue its retreat. The UN's weakness and
detachment from "real politics" stem in a large
part from the fact that its principal constitu-
ency is the LDCs who are relatively powerless
in world affairs. Greater US involvement in
the organization would stimulate the fuller
participation of other major countries and do
much to correct this imbalance. On the other
hand, a continuation of the US movement
away from UN affairs would contribute to the
further distortion of UN politics and further
erosion of the organization's usefulness as a
forum for serious international deliberation.
Ignored by the US and other important pow-
ers, the UN would almost certainly become for
diplomatic purposes a hollow shell. Neither
alternative-greater US support of the UN or
more systematic neglect-would in itself sig-
nificantly relieve basic tensions with the LDCs.
An adjustment of US policy in either direction
would instead find further combinations of
mixed benefits and liabilities.
33. A UN in which the US and the major
powers were more involved would be more
effective in serving those interests which are
common to all members. With greater political
and financial support from developed coun-
tries, the UN could better carry out the peace-
keeping and technical services which support
the global concerns and activities of the indus-
trialized nations. A UN in which the latter as-
sumed more active roles would also be less
preoccupied by the exclusive concerns of de-
veloping nations. Industrialized members
would regain the portion of UN initiative
which they have lost through default.
34. Greater involvement and demonstrated
interest in the UN by the US and other devel-
oped states would also tend to soften the LDC
offensive; many of the LDCs' more strident
challenges arise from the frustration they feel
at not receiving serious attention from the af-
fluent members. A growing number of LDCs,
moreover, are promoting the achievement of
tangible economic gains rather than additional
rhetorical victories. They realize that stirring
resolutions condemning exploitation by the
rich and powerful states are counterproductive
to the extent that they alienate the industrial-
ized states which must underwrite the eco-
nomic benefits desperately needed by the poor
countries. This pragmatic tendency would be
likely to gain more general support among the
LDCs-and, in effect, produce softer rhetoric
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and a greater willingness to compromise in UN
deliberation-if there were a demonstrated
renewal of attention and support from the de-
veloped members. Under such conditions, the
UN would be a more effective forum for ne-
gotiating North-South issues, and for develop-
ing whatever interests are shared by industri-
alized and developed states.
35. These benefits would, however, be al-
loyed with predictable pitfalls. Although the
manner and extent of their domination would
be modified, the LDCs would continue to re-
tain the sway of majority voting power. To the
degree that they choose to exercise that power,
the UN would be a sharper weapon for the
LDCs to use in their challenge to the indus-
trialized world-which though possibly mu-
ted is certain to continue. A strengthened UN
would in this respect present certain greater
liabilities to the US. If the UN were taken
more seriously by the world community, the
psychological defeats and diplomatic embar-
rassments the US faces there would also be
taken more seriously.
36. A UN weakened by further US neglect
offers a reverse mixture of benefits and liabili-
ties. The organization, largely deserted by the
industrial powers, would be an increasingly
ineffective tool for dramatizing LDC concerns.
The LDCs would be left to perform diplomatic
charades before an empty house. But at the
same time, the organization would be unable
to serve as a forum for serious North-South
negotiations-such as the 1974 Law of the
Sea Conference-which do serve US interests.
It would also be less capable of providing
peacekeeping and technical services. Peace-
keeping efforts would be difficult to organize
and impossible to sustain. The specialized
agencies would continue but only under the
shadow of increased politicization.
37. A secondary liability of a weakened UN
is the prospect that the LDCs would eventu-
ally also become disillusioned with the organ-
ization and turn to more radical channels for
expressing their concerns. They would be en-
couraged to vent their frustrations through
more specialized forums-such as regional
cartels of producers of raw materials-in
which they would be not only less restrained
but also perhaps more effective in challenging
the policies of industrialized powers.
38. The problems which the US faces in the
UN would also be encountered in dealings
with the LDCs in alternative forums-and
most likely under circumstances considerably
less amenable to US interests than the condi-
tions of UN diplomacy. The LDCs are becom-
ing markedly more restive over the kind of re-
straints which the UN's procedures impose on
them. Partly because they resent the indiffer-
ence of the powers to their causes, they have
begun to oppose the application in new
forums of voting and caucus arrangements
which have traditionally been used in the UN.
The modifying influences of UN procedures
mattered relatively little in the past because
LDCs had few alternatives to working through
the UN. The LDCs are becoming more con-
scious of other pressure points; whatever the
objective results of the oil embargo, the devel-
oping states believe it worked and are ready
to use it as a model for other coordinated eco-
nomic actions. In the future, they may find
further sources of leverage-the developed
world may need not only their commodities
but also their cooperation in managing global
problems in such diverse fields as ocean use,
food and population concerns, environmental
safeguards, trade and monetary regulations.
39. Few problems or solutions are located
in the UN itself. That organization can only
reflect-with certain parliamentary distor-
tions-the stresses of North-South confronta-
tion. At least as long as North-South problems
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T%r
continue as the central theme in global forums,
the US's policy toward the UN has little chance
of being any more successful than its overall
relations with the LDCs. To the extent that
relations with the LDCs become more im-
portant to the US, the UN may become more
useful; to the extent that US relations with the
LDCs improve, the UN may become more
hospitable to US concerns.
40. Both within and outside of the UN, the
problems of LDC relations admit few simple
or final solutions. The US and other major
powers are finding increased needs for inter-
action with the LDCs, while those countries
are discovering a greater capacity to exact
payment for their cooperation. The differences
between the developed and developing world
are, moreover, ideologically and substantively
profound; clashes over the allocation of politi-
cal and physical resources are unavoidable.
Potential US tactics for dealing with such
clashes range from efforts to manipulate the
LDCs-divide and forestall their challenges-
to efforts to find and develop legitimate points
of common interest. The UN can assist US
policy, as a bureaucratic deflector of the LDC
challenge or as an arena for serious negotia-
tions. But the UN cannot be used in either
way without incurring certain reciprocal costs.
It can only provide a setting for symptomatic
treatment of a problem which originates not
in its chambers but outside.
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APPENDIX
UN Budget and, Bureaucratic Organization
Budget: The UN's regular budget meets all
normal operating costs. These include Secre-
tariat salaries, General Assembly and Security
Council expenses, conference costs, informa-
tion activities, and operating expenses of the
International Court of Justice and of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment. Peace-keeping operations, such as
the forces now in the Middle East and on
Cyprus, are financed through special accounts.
Most technical cooperation programs are fi-
nanced from voluntary donations.
The regular budget is drawn from contri-
butions assessed against the member states.
The percentage share assigned to each of the
135 member's contribution is based on a for-
mula in which the major determinant is the
state's ability to pay, as measured by such
factors as GNP and per capita income. There
is, however, an absolute minimum and maxi-
mum share which any member can pay: no
state may contribute less than 0.4 percent of
the total budget, the portion paid by many of
the smaller LDCs, or more than 25 percent,
a ceiling which in practice applies only to the
US. Until 1973 the maximum assessment, and
US contribution, was fixed at 31.72 percent.
At the US' initiative, however, the General As-
sembly approved a revised scale of assess-
ments setting the new ceiling. As a result the
US contribution to the UN regular budget for
1974 is $59.5 million or nearly $20 million less
than it would have been under the old system.
While the US contribution has been re-
duced, the total UN budget has continued to
expand. A $540.5 million two-year budget was
approved for 1974 and 1975-this represents
an annual increase from 1973 of approximately
11.4 percent. Requests for services and as-
sistance to the LDCs represent only a rela-
tively small part of the pressures for increased
expenditures. More than half of the projected
annual increase will be consumed by infla-
tion. Additional activities encouraged by the
major powers-such as the Law of the Sea
and World Food Conferences, narcotics pro-
grams, and enlargement of the truce super-
visory force in the Middle East-have also
placed further demands on the UN's chron-
ically strained budget.
Bureaucratic Organization: The UN struc-
ture follows the basic structure of Western
parliamentary governments: there are two
representative bodies and an executive: the
General Assembly, Security Council, and the
Secretariat. The General Assembly's broad
mandate-any question related to peace and
security or to the promotion of world pros-
perity and justice-is limited only by a pro-
hibition against considering matters before
the Security Council or matters strictly re-
lated to members' internal affairs. The As-
sembly also controls the budget and elects
the Secretary-General. In all of its work the
Assembly relies heavily upon an extensive
committee system. A General Committee rec-
ommends what items the Assembly should
consider and organizes the agenda. Seven
main committees regularly discuss agenda
items and propose action and special com-
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mittees are often appointed to consider par-
ticular problems.
The Security Council, a much smaller organ
and more specialized focus on the maintenance
of peace and security, conducts most of its
business in full session. Of its fifteen members,
the five major powers retain permanent seats
while the other ten members are elected by
the General Assembly for two-year terms. The
Council requires a vote of nine out of the
fifteen members to pass a decision on what
is called a "procedural" matter-any internal
question not directly affecting outside interest.
"Substantive" matters require a vote of nine,
including all five permanent members. Any
nation may bring to the attention of the Se-
curity Council any dispute that seems likely
to lead to a breach of the peace.
The Secretary-General may also bring issues
to the attention of the Security Council. In
this and his other duties, the Secretary-Gen-
eral is both a political initiator and the or-
ganization's chief administrative officer. His
office is also responsible for numerous pre-
paratory studies and special reports requested
by the other organs and an annual report to
the General Assembly on the work of the
organization. The Secretary-General acts as
administrative officer for the meetings of the
Assembly, the Security Council, the Trustee-
ship Council, and ECOSOC. In these jobs he
employs various members of the Secretariat,
of which he is the executive head.
The other primary organs of the UN are
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
the International Court of Justice, and the
Trusteeship Council. ECOSOC is responsible,
under the authority of the General Assembly,
for the economic and social activities of the
UN. It functions through six subsidiary com-
missions on statistics, population, social de-
velopment, human rights, status of women,
and narcotic drugs. ECOSOC also encom-
passes four regional economic commissions.
The specialized agencies (see page 9) work
with the UN through the coordinating ma-
chinery of ECOSOC. The Trusteeship Coun-
cil also acts under the authority of the Gen-
eral Assembly. It bears principal responsibility
for the supervision of territories placed under
the UN's trusteeship system. The Council con-
sists of all member states administering trust
territories, permanent members of the Security
Council, and enough non-administering coun-
tries elected by the Assembly to ensure that
membership is equally divided between ad-
ministering and non-administering states. The
International Court of justice, which has its
seat at The Hague, adjudicates all cases which
are referred to it by parties to its statute (all
UN members are automatically parties) and
provides advisory opinion on any legal ques-
tion requested by the Assembly or the Se-
curity Council. The fifteen members of the
Court are elected by Assembly and the Coun-
cil for terms of nine years.
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Memorandum
The United Nations: Problems and Potential
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