INTERAGENCY MEMO: SPANISH SAHARA: PAWN OF NORTHWEST AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001500120001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1974
• Content Type: LIST

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SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
ESTIMATE NUMBER:
INTERAGENCY MEMO: SPANISH SAHARA: PAWN OF
NORTHWEST AFRICA
* Requests for supplemental copies must be checked with the NIO
responsible for that estimate.
ate. Dept. revievv completed
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Secret
5X1
Spanish Sahara: Pawn of Northwest Africa
Secret
6 September 1974
Copy N2 233
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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SPANISH SAHARA:
PAWN OF NORTHWEST AFRICA
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SPANISH SAHARA:
PAWN OF NORTHWEST AFRICA*
1. Spain is embroiled in controversy with
three African countries over the future of
Spanish Sahara. Unless Madrid can devise a
solution to the problem that is acceptable to
all four interested parties-Spain, Algeria, Mo-
rocco, and Mauritania-its withdrawal from
the territory may lead to further instability,
including the possibility of armed conflict.
Although the United States has no major in-
terests in Spanish Sahara, its primary concern
is to prevent the issue from upsetting the peace
of the region.
2. Spanish Sahara, located along the Atlan-
tic coast of northwest Africa, is juridically a
Spanish province and is also claimed by Mo-
rocco and Mauritania. Algeria has also gone
on record as "an interested party" in the fu-
ture disposition of the area. The discovery
of natural resources, primarily phosphates, has
made the territory even more valuable to
Spain and desirable to its neighbors.
*This memorandum was prepared under the aus-
pices of the National Intelligence Officer for the
Middle East. It was principally drafted by CIA and
coordinated with State/INR.
3. As one of the last vestiges of European
colonialism in Africa, Spanish Sahara has been
the focus of much anti-colonial rhetoric and
the UN has passed a number of resolutions
calling for self-determination for the area.
Portugal's recent decision to grant independ-
ence to its African territories and renewed
Moroccan claims have increased pressure on
Spain to relinquish the desert province. Ma-
drid's subsequent decision to hold a referen-
dum in Spanish Sahara next year will generate
attempts by the four interested parties to
influence the outcome of the vote.
Spanish Stewardship
4. Spain's contacts with the area date from
1476 when it established a fort there, but Ma-
drid showed little interest in the territory
until the mid-19th century. At the Congress
of Berlin in 1885, Spain unilaterally pro-
claimed a protectorate over the coastal zone
from Cabo Bojador to Cabo Blanco, to be
administered from the Canary Islands. The
present day borders of Spanish Sahara were
derived from a series of Franco-Spanish con-
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ventions between 1900 and 1912 which did
not consider questions of historical or ethnic
unity.
5. In 1958, Madrid declared the territory
an overseas province of Spain, following
border incursions by armed tribesmen from
Morocco. Three years later the province was
given limited representation in the Spanish
parliament. Political power in the province
is concentrated in the hands of the Spanish
governor general; he is directly responsible
to an official in the office of the Prime Min-
ister. In addition to his civilian function, he
is also the commander in chief of all provin-
cial military forces, including the police.
6. The Spanish have invested heavily in
the Sahara over the last decade, both in the
phosphate enterprise and in social infrastruc-
ture. They have upgraded housing, schooling,
and other facilities, with attendant publicity.
To protect this investment, blunt interna-
tional criticism, and postpone a referendum
on self-determination, the Spanish in 1967
created a general assembly (Yemaa ), com-
posed of 45 tribal chiefs and 40 elected repre-
sentatives, to act as an advisory body on the
province's economic and social development.
Thus far the assembly has toed the Spanish
line, rejecting outside interference, calling for
gradual steps toward self-determination, and
reaffirming loyalty to Spain.
Moroccan Irredentism
7. Upon independence in 1956, Morocco
laid claim to all of Spain's holdings in north-
General Assembly Building
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western Africa. In a joint declaration and
protocol signed in April 1956, Madrid gave
up its protectorate zone in the north of Mo-
rocco. Spain relinquished the southern pro-
tectorate zone of Tarfaya in 1958 and the
enclave of Ifni in 1969. Thus, Spain's present
holdings include Spanish Sahara and five small
presidios-the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla,
on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, and
three small offshore islands.
8. Morocco bases its claim to the Spanish
Sahara on pre-colonial history, when Moroc-
can rulers intermittently exercised varying de-
grees of control over much of the western
Sahara. From the 10th thru the 17th centuries,
Moroccans looked southward, penetrating
Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, southwestern
Algeria, and for a short time Mali. At one
time or another the nomadic peoples in the
area accepted the religious supremacy of the
Sultan. The successive waves of Moroccan
penetration, however, alternated with periods
when Morocco's interest turned northward to
Spain. During these times politico-religious
chieftains from present day Mauritania ex-
tended their control into Morocco, which had
several dynasties of Mauritanian origin.
9. Morocco has argued that the territory
it recovered from the European powers in
1956 represents only part of the Sultan's his-
torical holdings. Indeed, it was not until 1970
that Rabat recognized the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania, ten years after it became in-
dependent. Morocco's claim to part of Algeria
was the cause of a brief border war in 1963.
Both parties signed an agreement in 1972
demarcating their common boundary, but
Rabat has not yet ratified it.
10. Rabat also has economic interests at
stake in Spanish Sahara. Morocco currently
is the third-largest producer and the largest
exporter of phosphate rock in the world. Until
1973 when the world phosphate market began
improving, Morocco viewed Spanish Saharan
phosphates as a threat to its own important
phosphate industry if Spain retained control.
Although these fears no longer seem war-
ranted, Rabat would stand to gain a larger
source of foreign exchange and government
profits if it could acquire control of the area.
Mauritania's Claim
1.1. Like Morocco, the area of present day
Mauritania has exercised varying degrees of
influence in the Sahara, especially at times
when North African Arabs focused their at-
tention on Spain. Spanish Sahara has no "nat-
ural frontiers" and shares its southern and
virtually all of its long eastern border with
Mauritania. Probably as many Saharan nomads
migrate to Mauritania as to Morocco. As a
result, many of the tribes of the territory prob-
ably have more in common with the Moors
who dominate the government in Nouakchott
than with the Arabs and Arabized Berbers
who rule in Rabat or Algiers. Moreover, the
Hassaniya dialect spoken in much of the area
is nearly identical to that spoken in Mauri-
tania and quite different from the Maghrebi
Arabic spoken in Morocco. Thus history can
be used to support Mauritanian as well as
Moroccan claims.
Economic Importance
12. Spanish Sahara is an almost completely
and wasteland. Fishing and livestock raising
constitute the basis of the native economy.
The only crop that can be grown successfully
is barley, and that only occasionally in low-
lying areas after rain. The discovery of a large
underground lake in the Villa Cisneros area
has led to some successful experimental
farming.
13. The Sahara is important to Spain pri-
marily because of large deposits of high-grade
phosphate rock discovered in 1963 in Bu Craa,
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some 60 miles from the coast near Morocco.
Reserves, estimated at 1.4 to 1.7 billion tons
of minerals, are sufficient to put Spanish Sa-
hara among the world's leading producers and
exporters for many years.
14. A Spanish state mining company,
FosBuCraa, is developing the deposits and is
expected to ship as much as two million tons
in 1974. By 1978 production may reach 6
million tons annually, an output worth around
$389 million at current prices. FosBuCraa
has invested at least $200 million to provide
facilities for mining, processing, and transpor-
tation. Total investment in the mining com-
plex, including funds from several non-Spanish
sources, may run as high as $480 million.
15. The facilities and methods for handling
the phosphate ore are among the most modern
in the world. The ore is extracted by open-pit
mining, reduced to concentrates at the Bu
Craa complex, and then transported on a com-
pletely automated belt conveyor system to
ore-loading facilities in El Aaiun. Built by
the Krupp Machinery and Steel Construction
Company of West Germany at a cost of about
$50 million, the innovative system includes
10 six-mile-long conveyors.
16. Expanding Spanish Saharan phosphate
production should find ready buyers abroad.
The increasing demand for fertilizers has
strengthened the world phosphate market.
With assured markets in Spain and low op-
erating and transport costs, Saharan phos-
phates are in a strong competitive position.
17. Other mineral assets could further in-
crease the value of the territory. Surveys show
an estimated 20 to 70 million tons of iron ore
are located in the south at Agracha, but the
economic feasibility of exploiting these de-
posits, which contain undesirable amounts of
titanium, has yet to be determined. In the
late 1950s and throughout the 1960s the
Open Pit Mine near Bu Craa
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Automated Conveyor Belt
Spanish believed that the territory held size-
able petroleum deposits. Concessions for on-
shore exploration awarded to several foreign
companies proved disappointing and were
abandoned in 1969. Since then off-shore con-
cessions have been let to several firms, in-
cluding US companies, and the search
continues.
Peoples of Spanish Sahara
18. Except for Europeans and some seden-
tary or seminomadic townsmen, most people
within the Sahara's borders are pastoral no-
mads. There is little if any sense of national
identification with the political entity known
as Spanish Sahara. Indeed, for most of these
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Saharan Family
illiterate nomads, the concept of loyalty does
not extend beyond the tribe or clan to which
they belong. More often than not, the nomad
views the central government as a remote tax
collector that has little relevance to or impact
on. his traditional way of life.
19. Spanish Sahara has an estimated popu-
lation of 60,000 of which 43,000 are indigenous
Africans and about 17,000 are Spaniards. Given
their nomadic lifestyle, it is misleading to re-
gard statistics for the Africans as more than
approximations. The migration of tribes and
clans into and out of Spanish Sahara-deter-
mined by rainfall and grazing conditions-
can halve or double these figures.
20. The peoples of Spanish Sahara are of
Arab, Berber, and black African ancestry. Most
of the people are referred to as Moors, who
both physically and culturally reflect a his-
torical mixture of Arab invaders and Berber
nomads. The latter were probably the original
inhabitants of the area. Black peoples from the
south have also contributed to the present
population.
21. Saharans can be divided into various
classifications based on different criteria such
as social or hierarchical ranks, family or eth-
nographic relationships, and political associa-
tions. The most definitive and probably rele-
vant classification in anticipating the future
political development of Spanish Sahara is one
based primarily on ethnic origins. Using this
yardstick, three groups of nomads are signifi-
cant for the future of Spanish Sahara.
22. The largest group is the Tekna, a rela-
tively peaceful herding people who live in
southern Morocco and northern Spanish Sa-
hara. Many Tckna in the Sahara speak a Ber-
ber dialect and migrate to Morocco for at
least part of the year. :Moroccan authorities
no doubt depend heavily on Tekna nomads
for information on conditions inside the Span-
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ish territory. Since 1958, a number of Tekna
who formerly lived south of the boundary have
remained in Morocco, probably fearing Span-
ish reprisal for some assistance they gave to
insurgents from Morocco.
23. The Reguibat group is probably the
most powerful of the Saharan peoples in Span-
ish Sahara. Called the "Blue People" because
the indigo dye used on their clothing rubs off
on their skin, they range with their camels
across wide expanses of southern Morocco,
Algeria, Spanish Sahara, and Mauritania. They
are known for their ferocity, pride, and ability
with firearms and have dominated the eastern
part of the Spanish province for a considerable
period of time.
24. The allegiance of the Reguibat, who are
no strangers to gun running and desert in-
trigue, has been greatly sought after by com-
peting political interests in the area. To date,
however, they seem to have successfully re-
sisted these attempts. As far back as the turn
of the century, German and Spanish agents
helped Morocco to arm the Reguibat against
French colonial expansion. The Reguibat were
behind several incidents that preceded the
brief Moroccan-Algerian border conflict in
1963. They also were prominently involved in
anti-Spanish demonstrations in El Aaiun in
1970, in which several persons were killed and
many more wounded.
25. A third group, the Ulad Delim, inhabits
the southwestern portion of Spanish Sahara.
Although formerly a much stronger political
force, the Ulad Delim remain important in the
province. They are more Arabized but less
numerous than their chief rivals, the Reguibat.
Large numbers of Ulad Delim and closely as-
sociated peoples live across the border in Mau-
ritania.
Country Positions
Spain
26. In the face of Morocco's irredentist
claims and anti-colonialist sentiment in the
UN, Spain has counted more on diplomacy
than military strength to retain the Sahara.
Madrid has played on the mutual suspicions
of the three African states that have rival in-
terests in the area, while maintaining generally
good bilateral relations with each one. In the
early 1960s, taking advantage of Moroccan
claims to Mauritania and western Algeria,
Spain encouraged Mauritania to stake its own
claim to Spanish Sahara and Algeria to assert
its right, as a neighboring state, to have a voice
in the disposition of the territory. There are
Spanish embassies in each capital, and modest
assistance programs have been undertaken in
each country.
27. Madrid's control of Spanish Sahara has
been the subject of a number of resolutions in
the UN General Assembly. After the first such
resolution in 1965 calling for decolonization of
the territory, Spain announced the following
year that it agreed in principle to self-determi-
nation for the people of Spanish Sahara. Until
1969 Spain regarded these resolutions as in-
nocuous, and in fact voted for them. Madrid
began to abstain, however, when criticism of
Spanish delaying tactics increased, and resolu-
tions began to refer to the "so-called" Spanish
Sahara. Spain nonetheless wants to appear
forthcoming because it seeks support for its
position on Gibraltar in the same Committee
of 24 that considers the Sahara question. More-
over, the arguments that Spain advances to
support its claim to Gibraltar could easily be
used against continued Spanish control of its
Saharan province.
28. Last September General Franco an-
nounced that Spanish Sahara would be per-
mitted self-government as a necessary prepara-
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SPAIN j
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CANARY ISLANDS
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Reguibat
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Ulad Delim
Coastal
Miscellaneous
CANARY ISLANDS
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Bu Craa
(Phosphate rock
MAURITANIA
villa
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Bir Gandus
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Agracha
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Tichla
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Economic Activity
Semi-nomadic subsistence agriculture
(barley, livestock)
Irrigated agriculture-Saguia el Hamra Valley
(cereals, fruits, vegetables)
Fishing
Commercial fishing
Mineral deposit
W Z
Tifariti,
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tion for self-determination, but he gave no
timetable. In early July 1974, however, Ma-
drid told the ambassadors of Morocco, Algeria,
and Mauritania that it was preparing to im-
plement a new policy of increased autonomy
for its overseas province. Subsequently, on
August 20, Madrid notified the UN Secretary
General that a referendum to decide the politi-
cal future of Spanish Sahara will be held in the
first half of 1975 under UN supervision. Ma-
drid declared that its decision was consistent
with UN resolutions calling for self-determi-
nation for the peoples of the territory.
29. Although there is probably some senti-
ment, particularly on the part of older military
officers, to hang on in the Sahara, Madrid
appears determined to withdraw. Spain clearly
wants to:
- head off criticism in the UN this fall;
- avoid replacing Portugal as the focus of
anti-colonial rhetoric; and
- maintain its assiduously cultivated good
relations with the Arab states.
30. At the same time, however, the Spanish
will be working to protect their economic and
security interests in the area. Spain will at
least want to recoup its $200 million invest-
ment in the Bu Craa phosphate mine. Madrid
may even seek to retain an interest in the in-
creasingly profitable operation (see section on
economic importance). Madrid may also try
to extract from Morocco concessions relating
to fishing rights in Moroccan waters or even
compensation for expropriated Spanish lands.
31. Madrid views the Sahara as important
to the security of the approaches to the Canary
Islands, only 60 miles offshore, and has ex-
pressed concern over the possibility that an
unfriendly government might establish itself
in the province. Spain might insist on the re-
tention of base rights in the northern Sahara.
Although Morocco has not threatened the
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which
the Spanish consider an integral part of Spain,
Madrid will probably seek to ensure that any
concessions made to Morocco in the Sahara
are accompanied by Moroccan assurances con-
cerning the enclaves.
32. Spain desires to maintain its good rela-
tions and expanding commercial ties with Al-
geria, one of the interested parties, and will
seek to ensure that any agreement with Mo-
rocco is acceptable to Algiers.
Morocco
33. Morocco has been the most active claim-
ant to Spanish Sahara and periodically has
sought to intensify pressure on Madrid to
honor Rabat's irredentism.
34. Hassan is convinced that Spain will not
wish to remain for long as the only significant
colonial power in Africa.
35. When Hassan learned in early July that
Madrid was about to grant increased auton-
omy to its overseas province, he reacted
sharply. He immediately sent a letter to Gen-
eral Franco warning that such a move would
lead to a deterioration in relations. The King
followed up with a speech on July 8 in which
he emphasized that he could not permit the
establishment of a puppet state in the Sahara,
and implied that if discussions failed, other
means would be pursued.
36. Morocco subsequently initiated a major
diplomatic campaign to pressure Spain to
abandon its plans for greater autonomy for its
Saharan province. In late July and early Au-
gust, Moroccan emissaries visited various Arab
and African capitals as well as Asian and East
European countries to seek international sup-
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port for Rabat's position. Although the Arab
and African states will back a demand that
Spain leave, they are not inclined to support
Morocco's territorial ambitions, especially in
view of Mauritania's rival claim to the area
and Algeria's insistence on a role as an inter-
ested party.
37. Eastern Arab countries, always reluctant
to take sides in an inter-Arab quarrel, want to
avoid any dispute that could weaken the ap-
pearance of unity on the far more important
question of a Middle East peace settlement.
38. Morocco has also engaged in saber-
rattling to gain advantage in its dispute with
Spain. Since late July, Rabat has placed its
armed forces on temporary alert, cancelled all
leaves, and mobilized some reservists. Approxi-
mately one quarter of Morocco's ground forces
have been deployed to southern Morocco. Ad-
ditional troops have been sent near the Spanish
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the north.
Although these enclaves have not been an is-
sue in the current controversy, King Hassan
apparently wants to remind Madrid that the
two cities are vulnerable.
39. King Hassan hopes that his campaign
to reclaim Spanish Sahara will strengthen his
domestic position and distract attention from
his country's political and economic problems.
Given the strong irredentist sentiment shared
by many Moroccans, the King might be willing
to use limited force to back up his claim. As
it has in the past, Morocco might again send
armed tribesmen across the border to provoke
clashes and attract international attention in
order to increase pressure on Spain for a settle-
ment favorable to Morocco. Conversely, a fail-
ure to achieve annexation of at least part of the
territory might create severe domestic pres-
sures on Hassan. He may have pushed the is-
sue too far to retreat gracefully.
40. So far, however, Morocco has been cir-
cumspect in using military pressure tactics.
King Hassan wants to create a sense of ur-
gency, but he does not want to close the door
to continuing dialogue with Madrid. The King
received a letter from General Franco in late
July urging bilateral talks, and the Moroccan
prime minister and foreign minister visited
Madrid on August 12-14 to begin negotiations.
Although there was no significant movement
by either side, the positive tone of the joint
communique and initial Moroccan press re-
actions set the stage for further bilateral meet-
ings.
41. Madrid's subsequent decision to hold a
referendum in the territory in 1975 caused
King Hassan to attach tough conditions to Mo-
rocco's agreement to a referendum. He insisted
that any vote must occur under international
control after Spanish troops and administra-
tion had been withdrawn. He further indicated
that he would oppose holding the referendum
if the principle of independence for Sahara
were included. In the past, Rabat had implic-
itly accepted independence as one option, pro-
vided the 20,000-25,000 Saharans it claims live
in Morocco were allowed to vote.
42. If Spain withdrew its troops prior to the
referendum, Hassan might be tempted to push
across the border. If a referendum went
against Moroccan interests, Hassan might
move to annex the territory forcibly, in the
hope that Algeria would not react militarily.
43. Morocco's is the one claim that cannot
be ignored. Hassan may be staking out a max-
imum position in his recent pronouncements,
but he will need to show some gain for his ef-
forts. He would, however, be willing to meet
Spain's primary concerns. In exchange for
recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the
territory, Rabat has offered to make conces-
sions such as granting base rights for pro-
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tecting the Canary Islands and a joint venture
with Spain to exploit the territory's phosphate
deposits. While this solution would satisfy
Spanish strategic interests and Moroccan
territorial claims, it would be unacceptable to
Algeria and Mauritania.
Mauritania
44. Mauritania is less interested in pressing
its claims than in countering Morocco's. It has
not forgotten that "greater Morocco" also in-
cluded Mauritania, and fears Rabat might not
be satisfied with the acquisition of Spanish
Sahara. Mauritania's primary concern is to
avoid sharing a common border with Morocco.
A buffer state under Spanish or independent
rule best serves Nouakchott's needs.
45. To date, the Mauritanians have been
publicly cautious in reacting to Morocco's in-
tensified campaign to recover Spanish Sahara.
They have previously relied on Algerian sup-
port to defend their interests. If Algerian
backing seemed to dwindle, however, Mauri-
tania might well undertake a diplomatic offen-
sive on its own in Arab, OAU, and Third
World circles.
46. In early August the Mauritanian foreign
minister publicly supported self-determination
for the peoples of Spanish Sahara even though
the area was "Mauritanian territory." He later
termed the Spanish referendum proposal a
positive step forward. He also reiterated an
earlier call for renewed consultation with Al-
geria and Morocco. Tripartite talks between
these countries have been held occasionally
since 1970, but their conflicting interests have
prevented any agreement on practical steps
to hasten decolonization of the Sahara.
47. In an apparent attempt to revive these
consultations Mauritanian President Ould Dad-
dah visited Algiers and Rabat during the sec-
ond week of August. At the end of his visit in
Algiers, the government-controlled press there
published a carefully worded editorial that
implicitly criticized Moroccan tactics on the
Saharan question, but avoided outright rejec-
tion of Morocco's claims. In Rabat, both heads
of state minimized their differences in public
by agreeing to maintain contacts regarding
the liquidation of colonialism, while avoiding
any reference as to who gets what when the
Spanish leave.
48. The military option is foreclosed to Mau-
ritania unless it were to receive substantial
support from Algeria.
Algeria
49. Algeria makes no territorial claims of
its own to the Sahara, although it has stead-
fastly maintained that it is an interested party
with political and security interests to protect.
In keeping with its carefully cultivated anti-
colonial image, Algeria has publicly supported
decolonization of the Spanish province.
50. The realities of Algeria's position are
far more complex; Spanish Sahara is but one
aspect of the larger problems of overall rela-
tions with Morocco and Maghreb stability.
The suspicious Algerian mentality views all
neighbors as potential enemies-especially
Morocco, with a political system and ideology
that differs radically from Algeria's. The
visions of an irredentist Morocco, which in
the past laid claim to part of Algeria, and
memories of the 1963 border war have not
faded. Rabat's failure to ratify an agreement
signed in 1972 that renounced all Moroccan
claims to Algerian territory remains a stick-
ing point in relations with Algeria, which uni-
laterally ratified the agreement last year.
51. Thus far President Boumediene has
done nothing to oppose King Hassan's cur-
rent efforts to have the Saharan issue settled
in his favor. The Algerian leader's preoccupa-
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0973 summit meeting on Spanish Sahara in Agadir, Morocco. From left to
right: Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, Algerian President Boumediene,
Moroccan K,ng Hassan.
tion with matters such as OAPEC oil policies,
the Middle East question and Palestinian
rights, and various domestic issues may ac-
count for his silence. B- may prefer that the
Saharan issue not coin(. to a head now, and
may avoid taking a public stand for as long
as possible.
52. Avoiding public involvement in the
controversy does not n wan that Algiers will
acquiesce to Moroccan annexation. Algeria
does not necessarily wish to see an extension
of Moroccan sovereignty. Algeria has large
deposits of iron ore in hre '1'indouf region near
ilie border with Spanish Sahara and may
eventually w ish to export the ore through the
Sahara.
53. On the other hand, Algeria may view
good relations with Morocco, including
Rabat's ratification of the border agreement
as more desirable than opposing Morocco's
claim to Spanish Sahara. Moroccan aggran-
dizement in Spanish Sahara would not sig-
nificantly alter the strait gic economic balance
between Morocco and Algeria.
54. Algeria cannot castly discount Mauri-
tanian interests, however. The relationship
between l3oumedicnc and Ould Daddah is
close. Algeria values the concept of Arab
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solidarity. In this arena, Mauritania matters
as well as Morocco.
55. A senior Algerian official has indicated
Algiers continues to support
UN resolutions calling for self-determination
for the peoples of Spanish Sahara. He added
that perhaps the best solution would be a
referendum held under UN auspices leading
to independence, guaranteed and supported
economically by Spain and the three neigh-
boring African states. Although Saharans
would have the option to merge with Morocco,
he expressed confidence that they would
choose independence in any fairly conducted
referendum.
56. Algeria's faith in the referendum results
thus puts it against Morocco which wants a
referendum only under stringent conditions
that would not permit the option of inde-
pendence.
57. Politically, Algeria is capable of foiling
Moroccan designs for enlisting Third World
support on Spanish Sahara. If pressed to take
a stand, Algeria could use its considerable
influence in the Arab League, the Nonaligned
Movement, the OAU and the UN to mount
a campaign in support of self-determination
as called for under existing UN resolutions.
When Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika
becomes president of the UN General As-
sembly this fall, he will be in an ideal posi-
tion to coordinate such an effort.
58. It is less clear, however, that Algeria
would challenge Morocco, if Hassan, frus-
trated in his attempts to achieve a political
solution, chose the route of military con-
quest. If Algerian and Moroccan forces en-
gaged in hostilities, the outcome would be
unpredictable. Algerian forces are better
equipped and trained, but some Moroccan
troops were recently tested in the Syrian front.
Also the Moroccans would be fighting for the
concept of greater Morocco, and they were
the victors in the 1963 border war.
Outlook
59. Spain is searching for a compromise
that will permit Madrid to appear responsive
to UN resolutions calling for a referendum
on self-determination and to preserve good re-
lations with the Arab world by conciliating
Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Mauritania.
It also wants to maintain good relations with
Morocco and protect its economic investment
in Spanish Sahara, and claims it needs se-
curity guarantees to protect the approaches
to the Canary Islands.
60. The proposal to hold a referendum
under UN auspices meets the concern over
the UN and possibly Algeria and Mauritania.
An agreement acceptable to Morocco best
satisfies the remaining requirements.
Referendum
61. Madrid's decision to hold a referendum
in the Sahara under UN supervision next year
seems to have committed Spain to this course
of action. The three African parties interested
in the future of the territory will disagree
on the terms for such a referendum. Morocco
may continue to insist on pre-conditions for
a referendum, such as omission of independ-
ence as an option, that are unacceptable to
Algeria and Mauritania. Even under UN
auspices, it would be next to impossible to
ensure an honest referendum and the results
might immediately be challenged by one or
another of the interested states. Moreover the
Saharans, including the ones in Morocco, may
be less favorably disposed to Morocco than
Rabat assumes, and with Spanish encourage-
ment may vote against union with Morocco.
Rabat claims it would reject anything short
of a clear vote for union with Morocco. In-
dependence would create a power vacuum
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with these same states competing for in-
fluence; armed conflict would be difficult to
avoid.
Guaranteed Agreement
62. Given the likelihood of instability, Ma-
drid might seek prior agreement among the
neighboring states so that all four states would
have a vested interest in the new country,
perhaps as guarantors of its independence,
and would provide economic assistance. This
would allow Spain to comply with existing UN
resolutions and to shift considerable respon-
sibility to the Africans for ensuring the via-
bility of an independent Sahara. Algeria pre-
fers this alternative and Mauritania would
willingly accept it.
The Potential for Conflict
63. Morocco would oppose any agreement
that permitted Spanish Sahara to become in-
dependent. It fears an independent Sahara
would be dominated by Algeria and Mauri-
tania; the former because it is an important
political actor in Arab and Third World
arenas; the latter because it shares with
Spanish Sahara an ethnic and cultural identity.
64. Morocco would actively oppose this
solution and might use tribesmen in southern
Morocco for guerrilla activity or regular
ground forces for limited commando raids.
The Spanish would oppose such incursions
but would probably not retaliate across the
Morocco border. Spain will respond if at-
tacked, but has little inclination to become
embroiled in a conflict defending a territory
it has decided to relinquish.
65. Rabat could also exert pressure on the
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the
north by cutting off water supplies and the
flow of tourists through these points into
Morocco. Without water, they would be diffi-
cult to defend and resupply would be costly.
Spain might also react militarily if seriously
provoked.
66. Morocco might also make a military
move if Spain withdrew its troops after grant-
ing independence. Under these circumstances,
Rabat would gamble against Algeria's attempt-
ing to counter its military advance. The
Algerian reaction is difficult to predict. CIA
believes that an Algerian-Moroccan military
confrontation would be a distinct possibility,
although Algiers would first exhaust all dip-
lomatic options. State/INR believes Algeria's
recent public silence on the Sahara question
may well reflect an unwillingness to provoke
Morocco on an issue in which it has no over-
riding interest. Moreover, INR finds no evi-
dence to indicate that Algeria has yet mounted
a serious diplomatic campaign to thwart Mo-
roccan ambitions in Spanish Sahara. On
balance (and admitting the paucity of in-
formation available), INR considers that Al-
geria is not presently contemplating hostilities
with Morocco over this issue-notwithstand-
ing some indications of Moroccan apprehen-
sions to the contrary.
Negotiated Withdrawal
67. Failing an agreement on a referendum,
Madrid may turn to direct negotiations lead-
ing to an orderly withdrawal from Spanish
Sahara. Madrid might first seek a bilateral
deal with Morocco. King Hassan has reiterated
his belief that this would be the best solution
and has suggested that such talks might be
facilitated by a UN mediator.
68. In exchange for recognition of Moroc-
can sovereignty over the territory, Rabat has
offered to make concessions such as granting
base rights for protecting the Canary Islands
and a joint venture with Spain to exploit the
territory's phosphate deposits. While this so-
lution would satisfy Spanish strategic interests
and Moroccan territorial claims, it would be
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unacceptable to Algeria and Mauritania. The
Algerians could be expected to use every
possible diplomatic means to block such an
agreement and might resort to force if they
were not a party to a settlement. Mauritania
would follow Algeria's lead.
Partition: A Possible Compromise
69. Faced with opposition to a bilateral
settlement, Spain might draw Algeria and
Mauritania along with Morocco into a series
of extended negotiations. Barring a break-
down of talks, a compromise solution parti-
tioning Spanish Sahara might emerge that
would:
- give Morocco the smaller northern region
with its phosphate deposits,
- guarantee Algeria transit rights for its
mineral exports,
-- give Mauritania the larger southern por-
tion containing iron ore, and
- grant Spain residual base rights and par-
ticipation in the exploitation of the area's
mineral wealth.
Such a compromise would seem to meet the
interests of Spain, Algeria, and Mauritania.
Morocco wants outright annexation of all the
territory, but in the end it might be forced to
settle for less to avoid a conflict.
US Interests
70. Spain's importance to the US is due
primarily to the strategic value of its geo-
graphic location at the western entrance to
the Mediterranean. The US has four major
bases in the country
aid and sales and slightly more than $1 billion
in economic assistance under a defense and
economic assistance agreement first signed
in 1953. American direct investment in Spain
is at least $900 million, with more than $100
million in new investment each year. To pro-
tect these interests, the US has maintained
close bilateral ties with Spain and encouraged
Madrid's general pro-Western political and
economic orientation, basic commitment to
the defense of the West, and ultimate partici-
pation in the EC and NATO.
71. The Spanish claim a six-mile territorial
sea and recognize only the right of innocent
passage through the Straits of Gibraltar; in
practice they have not questioned submerged
submarines transiting the straits. A six-mile
territorial sea measured from the Spanish
mainland and the enclave of Ceuta in Mo-
rocco, together with the doctrine of innocent
passage, theoretically puts Madrid in a posi-
tion to control the entrance to the Mediter-
reanean thereby rendering Gibraltar useless
to the UK or NATO. In effect, the Spanish
are equally interested in observing Algerian
and Moroccan activities from these vantage
points. Although the Spanish do not expect
they would be allowed to exercise such con-
trol, they can use their position to enhance
their bargaining position in a settlement of
the Gibraltar dispute and membership in
NATO.
72. Like Spain, Morocco's strategic impor-
tance to the US derives from its location at
the western entrance to the Mediterranean.
An unfriendly government in Morocco could
threaten to extend its territorial waters and
interpret strictly the doctrine of innocent pas-
sage to impede free passage through and
over the Straits of Gibraltar. The US has no
mutual defense commitments with Morocco.
and reserve storage
depots. There are approximately 9,500 military
personnel in Spain and some 37,500 American
citizens reside there. As of mid-1973, the US
had provided Spain $836 million in military
25X1
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goods and services. The total American com-
There are approximately munity is approximately 700.
1,100 military personnel and 1,500 private
American citizens in Morocco. US military
assistance, grant and sale, totaled about $112
million through mid-1973, and a major arms
sales package is under consideration. US eco-
nomic assistance for the same period totaled
about $806 million, of which more than half
consisted of loans. American private
ment is estimated to be $70 million.
Implications for the US
76. The US has no important interests in the
Sahara. US Steel has not responded to a Span-
ish approach to invest in the phosphate mining
complex. Our primary concern is the stability
of the region. The US has sought to remain
on good terms with all parties concerned and
has expressed the hope for a peaceful settle-
ment between Spain and Morocco that takes
into account the concerns expressed by Algeria
and Mauritania.
73. The US has only limited interests in
Mauritania. Washington has no important
treaties or agreements with Nouakchott. There
is no fixed US investment in Mauritania, but
US oil companies engaged in exploration there
have already spent some $20 million. US eco-
nomic assistance through mid-1973 totaled
nearly $8 million. The total American presence
there is 23.
74. Despite major policy differences on in-
ternational political issues, US cooperation
with Algeria has been increasing in the eco-
nomic field. The primary US interest in its
relations with Algeria is to insure continued
access to Algeria's natural resources through
long-range cooperation agreements. Algeria
has the fourth largest proven reserves of natu-
ral gas in the world and produces about one
million barrels per day of low sulfur crude oil.
The Boumediene government is firmly com-
mitted to rapid industrialization financed by
the sale of oil and gas. It sees the US as a major
market for these products and as a source of
capital and technology.
75. Before Algiers broke relations with the
US in June 1967, the US had provided $180
million in economic assistance, primarily grant
food aid. US direct investment is small but
Algeria offers an expanding market for US
77. Nevertheless, if such a settlement can-
not be achieved, and Morocco's hardening
position makes it at least questionable, the
Spanish Sahara issue poses certain problems
for the US. The question of the referendum
may well arise in the General Assembly; Mo-
rocco has also indicated that it may ignore a
UN resolution to carry out the referendum if
independence for Spanish Sahara is included
as an option. The US may be subjected to
pressures from both Madrid and Rabat.
78. As a major arms supplier to both Spain
and Morocco, the US is vulnerable to charges
of aiding an arms build-up in an unstable
area.
79. If Morocco presses for annexation and
fails, Hassan may be subjected to internal pres-
sures that could topple him.
80. A solution that would be acceptable to
both Rabat and Madrid might be in the best
interests of the US, since Morocco's is the claim
that will not be dismissed. Such a solution,
however, might alienate Algeria and Mauri-
tania and create problems with other Third
World countries for which the option of self-
determination is of the greatest importance.
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Secret
Secret
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