ANTI-JUNTA ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01099A001500070002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 12, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Controlled Dissem
Intelligence Memorandum
Anti Junta Activity Outside of Chile
MORI/CDF review(s)
completed.
Secret
DCI/NIO 1766-74
12 August 1974
Copy
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 014522
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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SUMMARY ..............................................
1
I.
STRONG INITIAL INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE
OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE .............................
2
II.
EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES TO
ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE. ..............
4
The World Peace Council .... .. ...................
4
Other Soviet-Controlled organizations
5
Can Effort ....................................
6
The Role of the French Left .....................
7
Activities in Other Western European Countries ..
8
III.
EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN TROTSKYIST AND OTHER GROUPS
OF THE RADICAL LEFT ..............................
9
Arab Terrorist Support of the Chilean Cause .....
10
IV.
CHILEAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA
11
V.
CHILEAN RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA .....
13
Argentina .......................................
13
Peru .. .. ...............................
14
..... ........................
15
Activity sew ere in Latin America .............
15
The Communist Party
16
The Socialist Party .............................
17
The MIR .........................................
18
General Problems ................................
18
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12 August 1974
ANTI-JUNTA ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF CHILE*.
A variety of elements opposed to the Chilean military
regime have found wide sympathy and support abroad. This support
has been the most extensive in Western Europe, where the fervor
of popular reaction to the violent overthrow of Allende's
government was particularly strong. Refugees from Chile were
welcomed by a number of European and Western Hemisphere
countries, and solidarity committees sprang up, deriving maximum
publicity value from stories, many exaggerated, of tortures
and executions by the military government. The whole spectrum
of the Left joined in sponsoring rallies and fund-raising
activities to support this new-found popular cause. The orthodox
Communist parties were joined by various Trotskyist groups in
urging resistance to the Chilean Government. Moscow and
Havana have played both direct and indirect roles in encouraging
such activity, and official support has been forthcoming from
such governments as the Swedish, Finnish, and British. The
efforts of the various groups have caused problems for Chile in
international forums. Deliveries and servicing of military
equipment from Britain have been suspended, and Chile has had
serious difficulty in securing arms. The resistance groups have
the capacity to cause the Chilean government considerable diffi-
culty and embarrassment, but until they develop an internal capa-
bility in Chile, they will pose no real threat to the stability
of the regime.
This memorandum was prepared by
and coordinated within CIA.
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I. STRONG INITIAL INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE OVERTHROW OF
ALLENDE
1. The coup d'etat in Chile on 11 September 1973 came as
a shock to the Left throughout the world, particularly in Europe.
The Marxist and social democratic camps believed, or wanted to
believe, that the Allende government provided proof that there
was a peaceful road to socialism. To the European Socialists
and Communists in power or nudging toward it, the leftist
government in Chile was confirmation that their course was cor-
rect and that violent revolution was unnecessary. They chose to
ignore the economic mismanagement and the resulting political
polarization that was tearing Chile apart. Three years of
Allende's propaganda had left them unprepared for his sudden
downfall and the paucity of resistance by his supporters.
2. A wave of anger and indignation swept over the continent,
nourished by factual and exaggerated reports of brutal treatment
and executions by the military. Tales of thousands killed and
more thousands imprisoned gained wide acceptance. Although the
Military Junta gradually began to exert control over too zealous
troop commanders, a drum beat campaign had already begun in favor
of Allende supporters who had fled the country, been taken prisoner,
or were being sought by the new government. Three days after the
coup the first solidarity committee was meeting in Liege, Belgium,
and before the end of the month the World Peace Council (WPC) held
a conference in Helsinki, Finland. Chile replaced Vietnam as the
burning issue for leftist idealists and propagandists. There
were demonstrations in Paris and Vienna, Chilean diplomatic mis-
sions were attacked in Paris and Bonn, and solidarity committees
sprang up all over Europe. Swedish organizations of all kinds
became involved in whipping up sentiment and raising money for
Chilean resistance, and the doors were opened for refugees from
Chile.
3. The coup also produced internal repercussions within the
organized Left in Europe. In Italy it shook delicate political
balances and relations among the Italian political parties, forcing
some to examine basic premises, raising doubts about long-range
plans, and arousing fears of internal divisions. The Italian
Communist Party (PCI) found itself caught between its political
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commitment to the center-left government and its ideological com-
mitment to the extreme Left, which accused the PCI of being soft
on the Chilean military.
4. The Soviets and Cubans were extremely disappointed and
perturbed by Allende's overthrow.
the Russians had felt a clash was inevitable, but they were disa-
greeably surprised that only isolated groups and individuals ac-
tually fought against the military coup. The Soviets criticized
the Chilean Communists for failing to meet violence with violence.
They had expected a leftist uprising of major proportions to re-
sist a military takeover. The USSR immediately embarked on the
task of harnessing the forces under its control throughout the
world in order to oust the Junta and restore the Left to power.
The Cubans also reacted vigorously to the coup, which they saw
as closing opportunities for them in South America. Cuba wel-
comed refugees, started organizing a resistance movement, and
centered a propaganda campaign on appearances of Allende's widow
and daughter.
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II. EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND THEIR LEFTIST AI,.LIES TO ORGANIZE
AN INTERNATIONAL OFFENSIVE
5. The Soviet-controlled international organizations in the
fields of peace, labor, youth, students, women, and others have
been in the vanguard of the effort by the Soviet Bloc countries
to make Chile a central issue and keep it indefinitely before
world attention. The objectives are to turn public opinion against
the Junta, isolate it in world forums, and eventually bring about
its overthrow. Corollary objectives are to create vehicles for
unified action around a "just cause" by which diverse national and
international organizations and individuals work under Communist
aegis, and to promote the Communist cause at the expense of the
West in general. The October war in the Mideast put a temporary
brake on activity, but after the first of the year full focus was
again turned toward Chile.
The World Peace Council
6. Foremost of the Soviet-managed international organizations
engaged in the Chile campaign is the WPC. Less than three weeks
after the coup the WPC sponsored the International Conference of
Solidarity with Chile in Helsinki which set the tone for subsequent
efforts throughout the world. Plans were made to organize a
Popular Unity (UP) apparatus with headquarters in Rome under the
control of the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh). The Soviets
wanted Helsinki, not Rome, but were outvoted. They had control
of finances, however, and insisted on retaining Helsinki as the
source of funds. The Finnish CP was named fund custodian, with
the WPC acting as intermediary.* The Soviets, who provide the
bulk of WPC funds, have not been profligate. They withhold funds
when they are displeased at the efficiency of the Finnish coordina-
ting committee, which was established at the Helsinki conference.
The Soviets want a liaison committee with a broader international 25X1
base, but so far they have been unsuccessful in achieving this goal.
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7. The Helsinki conference was followed in October by a
conference in Moscow, completely dominated by the CPSU, which con-
trolled the list of speakers. The organizers expressed satis-
faction with the results at the meeting, and felt that the mili-
tary coup, while dealing a setback in Chile itself, had provided
the Communist camp with a slogan, "Solidarity with Chile" around
which Social Democratic and Christian parties could be rallied.
8. In December the WPC was seeking prominent world figures
to serve as joint sponsors of a Black Book on Chile, and in February
a meeting was called to set up solidarity conferences in the
Western Hemisphere and Europe for 1974. The WPC also began plan-
ning for an International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes
of the Chilean Military Junta. The Soviets hoped that the Com-
mission and the Black Book would help focus world attention on
Chile and generate support for an International Liaison Com-
mittee for International Solidarity with Chile. Once these ob-
jectives were attained, the WPC expected the Soviets to begin funding
resistance activities in Europe.
9. The preparatory meeting for the Commission of Inquiry
held in Helsinki in late March, was completely dominated by
the Soviets. Taking a detente line, they insisted that Chile
was a strictly internal matter, not like Vietnam, and refused
to allow the proceedings to take an anti-US tone. Nikolay Voschinin,
WPC secretary, was pessimistic over prospects for aiding the
resistance because the Junta appeared to be entrenched. Never-
theless, they said aid to the WPC and the opposition movement
would continue. The conference was a disappointment to WPC offi-
cials and the Soviets alike because little was accomplished.
The Commission of Inquiry itself met in East Berlin in April. A
secretariat was set up and a committee established in Buenos Aires
to provide for contact with Chile.
Other Soviet-Controlled organizations
10. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Wom-
en`s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), and the Inter-
national Union of Students (IUS), sent investigators to Chile
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in the months following Allende's overthrow to report on the human
rights issue and arranged programs throughout the world to call
attention to the Chile story. The WIDF arranged for the appearance
of Allende's widow at the UN early in 1974. At the World Trade
Union Congress in Bulgaria in October, the Soviets proposed and
achieved the formation of a broadly based trade union committee
of solidarity with Chile. The WFDY was charged with keeping the
issue alive during the first part of 1974 until other international
events could be organized.
Cuban Effort
11. Perhaps surpassing the Soviets in zeal and in the inter-
national scope of their activities against the Chilean Government
are the Cubans, who consider the Chilean Government a prime target.
The coup was a severe setback for the Cubans and closed off oppor-
tunities that had opened up for them in South America. The Cuban
propaganda machine went into high gear immediately after the coup.
On 14 September Cuba was taking soundings at the UN on a possible
Security Council condemnation of the Chilean military, and later
that month the beginnings of a resistance movement were taking
shape in Havana. Refugees arriving in Cuba formed the nucleus of
a solidarity committee, and the Cubans began to sponsor appearances
of the widow and daughters of Allende at events all over the worlcrX1
12. Cuban intelligence officers play a leadin role in the
various support activities for Chilean resistance
Genera
u ans work closely with the Soviets in organizing and carrying
out international conferences and organizing propaganda work.
Propaganda specialists from both countries met in Havana in may
1974, to map out a year-round campaign against Chile. The Cubans,
like the Soviets, feel they must keep the "abuses" of the Chilean
Junta before world opinion.
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13. Despite this cooperation, there are considerable dif-
ferences of view between the Cubans and the Soviets on the means
of returning Marxists to power in Chile. The Soviets believe in
relatively peaceful means -- political manipulation, control of
labor and other economic forces, infiltration of security forces,
and pressure tactics in international organizations, while the
Cubans are more action-minded and feel force will be needed to
unseat the Junta. Cuban officials give the definite impression
that they favor revolution, but they are cautious about the time
and place. They feel the Chilean people must first tire of the
Junta and its policies. The Cubans are not sanguine about the
prospects of converting the Chilean exiles into guerrilla fighters,
but they have tried to induce a combative spirit in them. Some
exiles have been provided training for eventual infiltration into
Chile.
14. In recent months, the upwards of 1,000 Chilean refugees
in Cuba have caused problems for the government. They are divided
along party and ideological lines much as they were in Chile, with
the Communists disputing with the moderate'Socialists and neither
talking to the extremist elements. Most are generally unhappy
about their lot in Cuba. Although they are provided with housing
and some have work, they feel isolated and cut off from meaningful
political activity. (Something similar has occurred in the large
Chilean contingent in East Germany.)
The Role of the French Left
15. In the spring of 1974, the French Communist Party (PCF),
at the urging of the CPSU, took charge of accelerating joint Com-
munist-Socialist actions in solidarity with the Chilean leftists.
The PCF convoked a meeting of seven French leftist organizations
in March 1974, and about the same time learned from the French
Socialist Party (PSF) that nearly all the European Social Demo-
cratic parties were prepared to participate with the Communists
in a unified campaign to promote resistance to the Junta. The
PCF leaders recognized at once that this meant a single, joint
front could be organized which in their view would have great
historical significance. It would not only damage the Chilean
Junta, but promote Communist-Socialist cooperation in Europe.
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16. The PCF, the PSF, and the other French leftistorganizations
called a European Solidarity Conference in Paris for 6 and 7 July
with an agenda limited to four issues: illegality of the Junta,
an end to the state, of war, an end to oppression, and restoration
of full civil rights in Chile. The strict agenda reflected a
decision to avoid contentious debate. Three hundred delegates
from East European Communist Parties and Western European Communist,
Socialist, and Social Democratic parties attended the meeting.
Francois Mitterand of the PSF was the principal driving force be-
hind the meeting and probably the one most responsible for over-
coming Socialist and Social Democratic resistance to meeting with
the Communists. Italian Social Democrats and the British Labour
Party were represented, along with Socialist parties from Belgium, 25X1
Denmark, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and
Df-1-1-f-lie-Inl- The German and ri n Socialists had adamantly opposed
The PC was, owe , ====J
pleased with the results of the conference and soon afterward be-
gan searching for ways to rally the Left around another issue and
thus solidify the broad front that had been brought together on
the popular Chile theme.
17. The speed with which the leftwing organizations in
Europe reacted to the Chile coup is exemplified by the Paris based
Curiel Apparatus, a support group for national liberation move-
ments, with suspected Soviet backing, with headquarters in Paris.
Before the end'of September Henri Curiel had begun to formulate
a clandestine program to oppose the Military Junta. Curiel is
involved in collecting funds, setting up support committees,
dispatching agents to Chile, and training a few selected individuals
in guerrilla warfare. The Curiel program calls for recruiting
activists for training in France, providing exiled activists living
near Chile's borders with the major portion of their funds, and
organizing an international committee to plan clandestine actions.
Some of the funds Curiel has collected came from the World Council
of Churches.
Activities in Other Western European Countries
18. In June 1974 the peace forces in Belgium were engaged in
making preparations for a week of solidarity with Chile scheduled
for September. In Portugal, plans were being formed during July
for a world solidarity conference of workers to be held in Lisbon
in September.
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III. EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN TROTSKYIST AND OTHER GROUPS OF THE
RADICAL LEFT
19., The various groups making up the radical European Left
have their own Chile solidarity programs which both complement
and compete with the Soviet and Cuban-sponsored programs. The
most important and active groups are the Trotskyist Fourth Inter-
national (FI) and the Continuous Struggle (Lotta Continua -- LC)
of Italy.
20. The Trotskyist movement is involved with Chilean re-
sistance in several countries. Trotskyist organizations, like
the Communist League, dominate the French Committee of Support
for the Revolutionary Struggle of the Chilean People, formed
shortly after 11 September. The League's objectives are to de-
velop and popularize aid to the resistance and prolong the debate
on the Allende experience. It organizes material and financial
support, arranges pamphleteering, and conduct rallies. There
are two funds, one for aiding refugees, the other for the pur-
chase of arms and supplies. The committee has Cuban support and
is partial to the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR). It has clashed with the Democratic Chile Committee in Rome
over the latter's preference for dividing funds according to
the Chilean parties' importance -- i.e., their electoral showing.
21. The FI, headquartered in Brussels, sent an agent to
Argentina in February 1974 with the ambitious mission of or-
ganizing "support commandos" for the Chilean resistance and
coordinating the efforts of the Peronist and Marxist left. The
FI has connections with the Argentine Trotskyist terrorist groups
but is enmeshed in intrigues against one of them, the Santucho
faction of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP). The Chilean
section of the FI apparently suffered heavy losses during the
military coup, but other Trotskyists, not affiliated with the
FT, are free inside Chile and cooperating with the MIR.
22. The Trotskyist effort in Italy is aided by the LC and
is centered in the Committee for Support of Chilean Resistance,
with offices in Rome and Milan. Danilo Trelles Fernandez, an
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Uruguayan motion picture producer, is the Rome coordinator. The
principal objective is to raise support for the MIR, under the
slogan of "Arms for the MIR." The LC collected $115,000 after
the coup and sent it to Cuba. The Cubans act as distributing agents.
The LC helped organize a conference of Chilean support committees
in Frankfurt from 24 to 27 April, under the auspices of the
Trotskyist. controlled European Coordinating Committee for Com-
mittees of Support for the Struggle of the Chilean People.
Chilean, Italian, Spanish, Irish, Danish and German groups par-
ticipated. A good many groups, but not. all, were in favor of col-
lecting money to buy weapons for the MIR. Some 3,000 people
demonstrated at the close of the conference. The Spanish dele-
gates represented Trotskyist-controlled committees in Madrid and
Barcelona.
.Arab Terrorist Support of The Chilean Cause
23. In July the Chilean Ambassador to Lebanon, General Al-
fredo Canales, was gunned down in his Beirut apartment house in
an attempted assassination by Lebanese terrorists sympathetic to
the exile cause. The perpetrators announced that the objective
of the attack was to emphasize the struggle of the third world
against American "imperialism."
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IV. CHILEAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA
24. The Popular Unity forces in exile have been in agree-
ment from the beginning that their primary objective is to over-
throw the Military Junta and return to power. Their ideas on
how to achieve this objective and on the kind of society and
government they want vary, but they have no disagreement on the
primary task. To this end they have set up centers for resist-
ance in several world capitals.
25. Rome is the headquarters for UP activities in Europe
and Havana handles North and South America. The Rome office,
or Rome Committee, as it is sometimes called, combines two
organizations, Democratic Chile (DC) and the Salvador Allende
Association (SAA). The DC, a so-called information and press
agency, represents the UP in Europe and has the backing of the
Soviets, the Cubans, the major Italian leftist parties, includ-
ing the PCI and the PSI, and most Chilean refugees. It promotes
resistance to the Chilean government, raises funds, aids refugees,
and pressures the Italian Government to withhold recognition
of the Chilean Government. It has also attempted to form an
international brigade to fight in Chile, but without success.
The DC is headed by Jorge Arrate, the former head of the Chilean
Copper Corporation. Arrate spent several months in Argentina
before going to Italy. The Cuban Embassy takes a close interest
in the DC and has almost daily contact with it.
26. The SAA, located at the same address, is composed of
Italian leftists and run principally by the PCI. It has the task
of coordinating Chilean-oriented activities of the Italian
left and aiding refugees. The PCI and the PSI are satisfied with
the work of the Association, which they believe is the best of
its kind in Europe. However, the PCI feels the PSI should contri-
bute more. The Italian Government, the Christian Democratic
Party, and Olivetti enterprises have provided support to the
Association.
27. The Chilean Communist leaders in Moscow, led by Volodia
Teitelboim and Manuel Cantero, head the Moscow office of the UP
which is supported by the Soviet Solidarity Committee under
Stepan Shalayev, secretary of the Soviet Central Council of
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Trade Unions. Ljttle is known of the activities of this group,
but they did receive a pledge of support from CPSU leaders in
March.
28. The Algiers Committee has an office with close to
two dozen people, and enjoys the support of"the Algerian Govern-
ment. It is chiefly interested in promoting revolution in
Chile and is engaged in the procurement of automatic weapons in
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The committee, however, consists
primarily of intellectuals and is not fit for guerrilla war-
fare. The Algerians donated at least (US) $50,000 to this group
and may have donated $50,000 more. The head of the committee
is Eduardo Salum, former Chilean Ambassador to Algeria, who is
responsible for all of North Africa, and he maintains contact with
the Rome Committee. Salum has claimed that there was a shipment
of small arms in Naples (source unknown and probably destined for
the MIR or Socialist extremists), but storage and transport pre-
sented problems and the exiles were looking to the Cubans and
Soviets for help.
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V. CHILEAN RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA
29. With the exception of Argentina, and possibly Mexico,
Chilean resistance activity throughout the Western Hemisphere
has been scattered and ineffective. The prevalence of military
and strongman regimes throughout Latin America contributes
markedly to the difficulties of the resistance movement in
developing support activity and operational momentum in the
Hemisphere. Efforts to organize a hemisphere-wide solidarity
conference have sputtered, and the Soviets decided in June to
settle for regional conferences. They are also pushing for a
meeting of Latin American Communist Parties in Havana at the
end of 1974 to deal with Chile and other topics, but the Cubans
have some misgivings about the idea.
Argentina
30. Argentina's geographic proximity and until recently,
political receptivity have provided a good base for exile operations.
Although the Andes present a formidable barrier to communication,
there are many isolated passes which can be used successfully
by couriers and infiltrators along the,long international boundary
between Argentina and Chile. Probably the most favorable factor
for the Chilean exiles has been the success. of the Argentine
extremist organizations in carrying out kidnap-ransom operations,
which have yielded experience, skill, and large amounts of money.
31. There are thousands of Chileans in Argentina, some
estimates put the number as high as 14,000. They are grouped
principally in Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Salta, and around Bariloche.
In the weeks following the coup they organized themselves into
two rival groups, one moderate, one radical. They are the Patriotic
Front of Chilean Resistance (FPRC), composed of Communists, moderate
Socialists, Radicals, and members of the moderate faction of the
United Popular Action Movement (MAPU); and the Chilean Revolutionary
Resistance (RRC), composed of the MIR and the radical wings of the
Socialist Party and MAPU. (It is not surprising that the UP in
exile has continued the traditional division between moderates and
extremists that existed in Chile.)
32. In late 1973, the FPRC was reported to possess some 50
rifles, plenty of money, and contacts with the Soviet and Cuban
Embassies. The RRC has received money and arms from the Argentine
extremist organizations. The Santucho faction of the ERP is allied
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with the MIR and recently provided it with US $3 million from
the ransom of a US oil company official. It has furnished other
support services, such as documentation for MIR personnel, and has
agreed to turn over its weapons caches in Chile.
33. The ERP is the anchor organization of the fledgling but
potentially dangerous Latin. American Revolutionary Coordinating
Group, which includes the Chilean MIR, the Uruguayan Tupamaros
(MLN), the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), and possibly
one or more Peruvian groups. The Cubans are behind this inter-
national effort, and in Mario Santucho, they have a guerrilla
fighter of intelligence and energy, who probably envisions himself
as the successor to Che Guevara.
34. The PCCh decided about the beginning of 1974 that much
of the work of reorganizing its commissions and military apparatus
could be done more efficiently and securely outside the country.
It therefore began sending selected members to Argentina and
Peru to meet and make plans, and then return home to implement
them. One of the largest concentrations of PCCh members is in
Mendoza, where 300 young party members are living and working.
There are MIR and Socialist exiles in Mendoza also, but they are
largely inactive.
35. The turbulent political conditions in Argentina have
probably served to distract government attention away from the
Chilean exiles, but this situation may not last too long.
Refugees in Buenos Aires, who number about 1,800, recently
protested a Ministry of Interior order designed to force them
out of the capital into the provinces. Many plan to leave Ar-
gentina. Although the order was issued prior to Peron's death,
there is no evidence to date that the new regime plans to reverse
the trend toward tightening restrictions on Chilean exiles.
36. Owing to its proximity to Chile, Peru presents a
natural haven for resistance fighters. However, tension be-
tween the two governments has actually prevented the Left from
exploiting Peru's geographical position and leftist leanings.
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Because of Peru's concern over Chilean intentions, the govern-
ment watches the Chileans in its midst closely and has taken
steps to severely limit the number of refugees permitted to
stay. Thus, exiles must operate clandestinely to avoid embar-
rassing and antagonizing the Peruvian authorities. There are
indications that they have begun to do this although on a
limited scale. Peru is the site of the International SolidaritY25X1
Commission, through which financial aid to the PCCh is funneled.
Activity Elsewhere in Latin America
38. There have been attacks on Chilean diplomatic missions
in El Salvador and Peru. The Communist Youth of Colombia is
planning a pro-Chile rally for September in Bogota. The rally
will follow a solidarity meeting in Caracas, at which delegates
from all over the world are expected. (Details on these activities
are not yet available.) The MIR is reported also to have support
structures in Venezuela and Panama.
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39. There are serious differences among the Exile Groups.
At first, a certain degree of unity was achieved, and toward
the end of 1973, representatives of the UP parties and the MIR
reached agreement on the basic principles'of the resistance move-
ment, such as the need to isolate the Junta. This unity carried
over into January and was acclaimed by the Socialist Party secre-
tary general Carlos Altamirano, shortly after his escape from
Chile. Thereafter, the individual proclivities of the various
groups began to assert themselves and jell into hard positions.
Continued calls for unity showed that necessary concessions on
disputed ideological and tactical points were not forthcoming.
The differences revolve around emphasis and timing, as well as
methods.
The Communist Party
40. The Communists favor a careful, slow reorganization of
the leftist forces, with focus on the labor movement as the vehicle
of expression. The PCCh program is based on the assumption that
economic difficulties and interservice rivalries will eventually
bring down the government. It is counting on an alliance of the
PDC and certain military elements to spearhead the opposition. A
cornerstone of their policy is to entice the Christian Democrats
into a broad, leftist, anti-fascist front. Violence is to be
shunned, and patience, pragmatism, and reconstruction are the
watchwords. A recent PCCh statement hedges somewhat on this point
and allows for violence by the masses. The MIR agrees with the
PCCh on the need to cultivate labor, but this will mean compe-
tition, not cooperation, between these two groups.
41. Signs of internal divisions have begun to appear in the
once-monolithic PCCh. The stresses of recent months have taken
their toll, however, and there are factions of moderates (Provisional
Political Commission), conservatives (who favor dealing with the
military for safety sake), and extremists (who want to begin attacks
on the government). There is ill feeling between the Political
Commission, led by Jorge Insunza, and exile leaders like Manuel
Contero, who want a more dynamic opposition. Insunza is recognized
by the PCCh exiles in Argentina. In May, the PCCh informed these
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exiles and those in Italy that it opposed raising funds for arms
and favored a peaceful, deliberate process of reorganizing the
shattered UP forces. The Political Commission has criticized
decisions by exiles, the Cubans, and the Soviets which show a
loss of faith in PCCh policies. The Party is unhappy with Castro,
who has been mocking its policies, and with the CPSU, which says
the PCCh?s position is weak.
The Socialist Party
42. The Socialists are badly fragmented, with several fac-
tions vying for rank and file support. The moderates are talking
of abandoning Marxism altogether and returning to social demo-
cratic principles. They reject cooperation with the Communists
and blame them and-the Soviets for Allende's downfall. The PS
radicals favor organizing the masses for revolutionary violence.
They are led by their firebrand secretary-general, Carlos
Altamirano. Altamirano, variously reported as having been smug-
gled out of Chile by the MIR, the Cubans, and the Soviets, has
been occupied in issuing propaganda statements throughout Europe,
North Africa, and Communist Asia.
43. Shortly after his escape, Altamirano appeared in Havana
and Moscow, where he lauded the Soviets and criticized the Chi-
nese for maintaining relations with the Junta. Later, his in-
creasingly hard line seemed to draw him closer to the Cubans.
His 25 February statement in Belgrade was studded with such terms
as "illicit actions," "clandestinity," and "uprising following strug-
gle" and with exhortations to revolutionary violence. In March he
spoke of the guerrilla struggle taking shape in Chile on an in-
creasing scale and the possibility of his returning. Then an
April report said Altamirano had been named political leader of
the Rome committee, on condition that he moderate his views to
accommodate to the social democratic parties of Europe, whose
support was being sought.
44. By May Altamirano was speaking in much milder terms. He
called upon revolutionary forces that remained outside the UP during
Allende's regime, to join the struggle, and he stated that the
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broadest unity possible should be established including the
Christian Democrats. This was a reversal of his earlier posi-
tion against accepting non-Marxist forces. At the time of his
more moderate turn, Altamirano may have had a falling out with
Fidel Castro. The Cubans, the MIR, the ERP, and Beatriz Allende
now back another set of PS radicals, led by Ezequiel Ponce.
Adonis Sepulveda heads the so-called "Trotskyist" faction of the
party. All factions still communicate with each other and gen-
erally agree that violent action now is out of the question.
The MIR
45. The MIR is viewed by the Chilean military as its most
dangerous adversary. It too has had internal problems. Many
lower and middle ranking members blame the leaders for the fail-
ure of the organization to stand up to the armed forces during
the coup and criticize them for their overcautious behavior since.
This has resulted in factionalism. The MIR does retain a rela-
tively efficient underground organization in Chile which has been
built up over the years. In January, the MIR estimated it had
500 "fighters" available. Funds from abroad, principally Argen-
tina, continue to support in-country MIR activities, but lack
of a broad support base and the effectiveness of the security
forces has prevented development of the MIR's "revolutionary
army."
General Problems
46. Other issues hampering the resistance movement are
communications problems and frictions between exiles and home
forces over direction of the movement. The efficiency and alert-
ness of the Chilean security forces have made communications be-
tween comrades at home and those in exile very difficult and
dangerous. Some groups have only occasional contact across bor-
ders. Depite lip service given to the concept that those in
Chile have the final. say on strategy and tactics, the exiles
seem to make their own decisions, frequently to the disgust of
those at home. While this problem may create serious diffi-
culties for some organizations, those that succeed in keeping
the vital funds flowing to their comrades in Chile should be
able to overcome it.
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47. In the months since the coup, money has flowed to the
exiles and their political organizations in ample amounts to
support activists by providing for safehouses, weapons, explosives,
air fares, vehicles, food, and lodging. Western Europe has been
the principal source of funds. Indirect support has been available
too in the form of jobs and subsidies. The Swedish Prime
Minister publicly presented Beatriz Allende with a check for 25X1
$110,000. in early 1974, the FPRC in
Argentina received ~50,000 from Wes
the UK and $30,000 from other sources
48. The Algerian Government provided US'$50,000 to the local
solidarity committee in May for arms, and the committee is
expecting another donation in an equal amount from the same source.
Finnish members of the International Commission of Inquiry esti-
mated in February the cost of the coming Commission meeting to
be about US $45,000 and they requested $30,000 from the Foreign
Ministry. The Argentine ERP announced during June that it was
donating US $3 million of the ransom obtained in the Samuelson
kidnaping to the Chilean MIR. During early 1974 two-thirds
of the funds collected by the French solidarity committee
were turned over to Rome and the other one-third was used in
France for resistance work, including refugee support. Some
US $60 million in French francs was in the hands of the Paris
solidarity committee in the Spring. The Rome committee received
US $100,000 from the Iraqi Ba'ath Party in early 1974.
49. At the beginning of 1974 all Rome Committee funds were
being divided among six Chilean organizations on a prorated basis,
according to the results of the last political and trade union
elections. Thus the PCCh was allotted 30 percent, the PS 30
percent, the Radical Party 10 percent, and the MIR and the two
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factions of the United Popular Action Movement (MA,PU) shared the
remainder. The allocation idea came from the PCCh and the Cubans.
According to Trotskyists in France, the MIR strongly resented
this arrangement and boycotted a conference called by the Cubans
in February to organize a united front. The dispute strained
relations between the MIR and Cuba for a while, and the Cubans
were influential in denying the MIR funds held in Buenos Aires.
During this period MIR leaders expressed skepticism that any
funds collected in Europe and sent to the Cubans would ever
arrive in Chile. The Trotskyists in France and Italy took
the MIR side, as did the Swedish Social Democrats and the
French trade unions and began providing money directly. By
April the allotment system was changed to give the MIR 30
percent; 10 percent was allotted to the Radicals and the other
small parties.
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Secret
Secret
hi, NY 9e it r
E/Ofly
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MEMORANDUM FOR: LA/NIO
I _J called me today to request
permission to show "Anti-Junta Activity
Outside of Chile" to a Senate Select
Committee staffer, who would look at it
here in the Agency. Ray thought this would
give the staffer a more balanced view of
the situation in Chile. I had some reservati
about it because I am not sure that it would
accomplish the desired a objective.
=assured me the docum ent would not
be declassified, taken out of the building,
or used other than for the staffer's back-
ground. He said he had alread obt fined
approval from OCI.
(DATE)
I said OK.
FORM
AUGN 54 10I WHICH REPLACES
MAYF BEM USED.
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 A mbO mtdF i t TI T 01
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TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
I S
I
2
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6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
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INFORMATION
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40
FORM N0. 917 Use previous editions
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