POST MORTEM OF 1953 PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 30, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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79199
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
30 April 1954
IM AIQDM Ft T HE II ADVIS Ca4KI'1TEE
SUBJECT: Post Moartem of 1953 Production
1. Attaehed (Enclosure "A") Is a state mennt of Intel
ligenee deficiencies which have been identified by revi,ewi
the NM's Prodmed in 1953. This stat++ nt was considered
by your representatives on 27 April.
2. The procedure followed in this case teas ezperimsntal;
it differs from the appretwed procedure (Etolosure "B") In that
the total Production was used as a basis for the statement of
deficiencies rather than having a sepe ate statement prepared
for indiridva1 estimates.
3. As a result of this exercise. we believe that some
modification of the present procedure is desirable aloft the
lines of Enclosure "C".
b.
The Pest Mrtm of 1953 Production will be placed
on the IAC agenda at an early date.
The ppraposed revision of the procedure is su Etted
for review. Yang representatives will, be nested
within the next few days for their views before
it is formally submitted to the IAC.
National Estimates
Distribution "A"
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS Q C l
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ~---
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: i t2
DOCUMENT NO. -
-NO CHANGE !N CLASS, t
I I
I25X1
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! c1o f "A"
30 April, 1954
The topaz g is a r view of Lntelli ace deftc teueies
revealed durirt potion of 1awttcnal last e1ii enca
during 1953. The priaaeipa .. eti tea upot ,ith the 'ivai:- r
are based are 1.i stead in TAB A.
''
as a. An imprtmm* in the L tai n b twee ? ,'
inte.i .i., via,me ec,bMal .a* it the tie l-i ax
z .c.;
Waaahlagtor vnv.ld re "salt in the more
of inte:il.igerce ark the receipt of ad 1ti,
Intels.i re e
b. rmr1y,
to L a re ea~si _ obt;.aat,:,r v`
}, y or. moist r :
and a t , Derl.?) t h a n on the M Ti o "ince
te'11i1jeaice uty, the . atel:
Itie representative of ti L)IfU& reaer's=ate;; the
>n paragraph
a , v
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~- `mi'l
help in analyzing developments in the USSR, an
expanded effort should be made to exploit all
available channels for obtaining economic, political,
scientific, and military information on the Satellites.
c. In view of the relative paucity of information
and intelligence on the USSR, it is important
that what is available be exploited fully.
Soviet propaganda is one source which possibly
could be more fully exploited.
2. SOVIET BLOC
The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the Soviet Bloc
have been widely recognized for a long tima. Many of them will
probably never be filled. During 1953 a need was expressed for
more effort on the resistance potential in the Bloc. Accordingly,
on 8 December 1953, the IAC authorized creation of an Ad The
Resistance Intelligence Committee. Experience during 1953 also
indicated a need for greater collection and research efforts in
the following key areas:
a. Aircraft Production. With the growth of Soviet
atomic power, accurate estimates of Soviet long-
range and fighter aircraft production are of critical
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importance. Efforts should therefore be
continued to improve the basis of estimates
of Soviet aircraft production*
b. Basic Science and Technology. Special emphasis
should be put on the collection and research
effort in the field of electronics.
c. Air Offense and Defense. Continued emphasis on
weapons having possible dual offensive and defensive
mission; missile development and production; and,
aircraft development and production.
d. Soviet Offensive Capabilities. Submarine
characteristics, particularly propulsion, and of
weapons for use with submarines (torpedoes,
mines, and missiles). Of continuing interest
are Soviet capabilities and developments in the
fields of ASV RW, OW, and CW.
*e.
Soviet Defensive Capabilities. Early warning,
filter process, and coeurminications relating to
air defense; airborne radar; and ground control
intercept.
* The representative of the DI/USAF' reserved the position of AFOfl
on paragraphs c., d., and e.
_3_
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f. Economic Trends. Intelligence materials on
the various sectors of the Soviet economy
are inadequate for fully satisfactory analyses
of economic develop?ents and trends. All
agencies having intelligence production
responsibilities in this field should re-
examine and refine so far as possible the
materials relating to its specific areas of
responsibility and each should seek to imp-ova
its field collection efforts.
European Satellites. Significant gaps in
intelligence on the Satellites revolve on the
extent and nature of resistance movements, and
the nature of the Soviet mechanism for exercising
control in these countries.
EAST
3. PAR
Hwy of the intelligence deficiencies in the Communist Far
East are similar to those that exist for the Bloc as a Whole. The
most critical gaps throughout the Far East include:
a. Sino-Soviet Relations. Our ability to estimate
Communist capabilities and courses of action in
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the Par East will depend to a large extent on our
knowledge of the nature of all aspects of the
Sino-Soviet relationship. This is largely a
collection problem and should be given a very
high priority.
b. Communist Courses of Action. The reaction and
extent of the effect on Commtnist courses of
action in Asia of a significant change in the
military situation in Indochina.
c. Chinese Communist Economy. Experience during 1953,
particularly in the preparation of SE-37, indicated
a continuing need for more specific and reliable
information on Chinese economic development.
One important example is China's transportation
capabilities, particularly as these affect Chinese
military capabilities.
d. Viet Minh Capabilities and Intentions. During
1953 we have continued to rely almost exclusively
on French sources for information concerning Viet
Minh capabilities and intentions, both military
and political, and concerning Chinese Caaaunist
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support of the Viet Minh. Steps should be
taken to develop independent sources of
intelligence in this field.
f. Indonesia. Preparation of NIE-77 and SE-51
revealed the continuing and urgent need for
more information on the political orientation
of the Indonesian Goverment and the capabilities
and intentions of the Communist and other dissident
groups in Indonesia.
g. Burma. The fluid and confused situation in Burma
requires a steady flow of information on the
orientation of the Burmese Government and its
capabilities and intentions with respect to
Communist and other dissident groups.
* The G-2 representative reserved the position of G-2 on paragraph a.
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1
25X6 TOP SE MM
5- MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA
Experience during 1953 indicated that over-0.l intelligence
coverage of the Middle East is good. The top priority targets
_7w
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remain Iran and Egypt. The principal intelligence gaps noted --
were:
b. Indian Border Areas. Reporting from the Indian
border areas, particularly from Kashmir and Nepal,
was inadequate in view of increasing Cammcmist
interest in the area and indications of increasing
friction between these areas and India.
c. t. Although coverage of the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute was excellent, further coverage would be
useful on the internal political situation,
particularly on the activities of the opposition.
d. Africa Intelligence coverage of Africa is
meager. We rely too heavily on the European
metropoles for the limited Information we receive
on such issues as Communism, nationalism, racial
tension, and intertribal relations. Assuming
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continued growth on the itrortance of Africa .
as a raw material source for the US, and growing
unrest throughout the continent, broader intelligence
coverage will beconve increasingly important.
6. Lim AMERICA
Ovar-all intelligence coverage of Latin America is good. How-
ever, deficiencies exist in the following fields:
a. Military opinion: Fuller reporting is desirable
on the political positions of important military
figures and an treads in the political views of
both senior and jwiior military officers. With
respect to Guatemala, more information is
desirable on the degree of disaffection or
anxiety in the officer corps resulting from
Arbenx' collaboration with Ca nsun(sts and the
army's inability to obtain US military material.
b. Commmism. Fuller inforz tion is needed on trends
in Commilnist party strengths, and on Commtwist
infiltration' of government, labor, and intellectual
circles, especially in Argentina and Bolivia.
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TOP Boom
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Co The situation of labor. Nbre concrete information
is desirod on the political orientation and the
economic status of both organized and unorganized
labor in all the countries with politically
significant labor mots,
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%00 Imr,
TAB "A"
0/NE Memo
30 April 1954
PRINCIPAL ICE PRODUCTION BASE FOR 1953 PORT NUM M FINDI*38
1. SOVIET BLOC
MR-65 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957
NIE-81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with
Respect to Germany through Mid-1954
ME-87 Probable Developments within the European
Satellites through Mid-1955
ME-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955
MIS-95 Probable Soviet Bloc Courses of Action
through Mid-1955
SE-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through ltd-1955
SE-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action in Electromagnetic
Warfare
SE-39 Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin
and of the Elevation of Maler3kov to
leadership in the UM
Communist Reactions to US Establishment of
a "Volunteer Freedom Corps"
SE-42 Current Communist Tactics
BE-46 Probable Long-Term Development of the Soviet
Bloc and. Western Power Positions
SE-47 Probable Effect of Recent Developments in
Eastern Germny on Soviet Policy with
Respect to Germany
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2. FAR BAST
NIE-71 Probable Developments in Burma through 1953
HIE-77 Probable Developments in Indonesia
NIE-OC) Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses
of Action in Korea
.NIB-91 Probable Developments in Indochina through
1954
SE-37 Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain
Courses of Action Directed at the Internal
and External Commerce of Communist China
SE-45 Thailand's Ability to Withstand Camso'nist
Pressure or Attacks through Mid-1951
SE-48 Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
of the Republic of Korea with Respect to
the Armistice in Korea
SE-51 The Significance of the Nov Indonesian Government
SE-53 Probable 0,swinist Reactions to Certain Possible
Developments in. Indochina
3. WF N EUROPE
HIE-63 France's Probable Future Role in the Western
Security System
NIE-63/1 Probable Short Term Dwelc rents in French Policy
NIE-71 Probable Outlook for Italy
NMM-93 Probable Devulopnenta in Yugoslavia
SE-51
The Political Outlook in Italy
TOP SECHET
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4. NEAR EAST AFRICA
EM-73 Conditions and Trends in the Middle East
Affecting US Security
NIE-75/1 Probable Develorwnts in Iran through 1953
NIE-76 Probable Developments in Egypt
NO-79 Probable Developments in South Asia
NIE-83 Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa
ME-102 Probable Developments in Iran through 1954
SE-49 The Current Outlook in Iran
IN AH RICA
NIE-84 Probable Developments in Guatemala
NIE-85 Probable Developo&nts in Chile
NIE-86 . Probable Developaents in Brazil
TOP SECRWI'
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 ac1osure "W'
CENTRAL T ua T2 L L ! G E mY SA E k _:J x' ~' ten
(XIM OF NATIONAL
3 June 1952
D A.Sa .> Director/Adm.
Vatl mil H'3t ter
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IMICU ;BI x FOR TIC
SUB3:'CT> Proqedure for Reducing z I~'f e i f~
OW tell genre Eet i to
The at h d procedure ha n teen p r: ? d and bb
e iculated for information pursuant ~ c IA fa r: et on an 22 lby
(see der 2,, :r, t4 ` .) o
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OR X
SECUWIT ' I UTTIM
C E N T d L : i L N T .; L 1. 1 G it ik' ~t E A `~:i u t 1 C Y
3 Jute 1952
E` 'aa Dm ! ILIGENer
IN ILAg~y IOAYtf.Ha ~' ILI{ II:.1C.,?a .T?.V .o~..~.1` m
1. When term u'? of reference are cfra ,&3 'dye roles,
VM be requested asovIA at or i in tae `: ela a
regarding .ioh the is : na 0e to int illiprce. Each a g oy
viii refer h i s< ie to appropriatc= *2aecti ,n agencies with
a request that neo&ed I n, alligen se da. when ;? 'asctit bla
in time for ae in the ett
2. ftring t< pro-p"ation of the inte6at aft,
Inadequacies that qtr di ooI d In twtribi Lions I "Li be
referred to the cr `xibuting agonelcz Jeln anion. This
m97 be dome in ling or though forml .ouXoi nape , Some-
times the elAba tl n will a imt fix ref ramm h, At other
times collection ma~r be :.aces.
3. DuAng t'ha time when the aim ft ant:' to iv Wore
LAG rep aentati . a if the inadeqya.cy of dlab) ; tte131gence
to # 4, th:a requirement may be di,SCU' sssa d a i1h within
the meeting or i ormany outside U. if a subsequent draft
this draft will note the requirement with a
sit eme t t' e a priate agency eitl has been or In
there1q requested to olari or am< . the post.
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4. ArUw _ estJte is fi s ted each, me Rim coUesxt
co n nt s from appropriate ttr en and refer than to t: yj mis'tn
Director for Natlcww2 & t tes. Ora the baz ls the tents,
m pplemented by kLa mm ? .- , the Off lm of National Fasttwtt z
a. Prepare a "Consolidated Critique" containing
the octtsmwits reoeived 4 age sies and also
O/ vlam with a r y i di tin waak-
nessem in the conclusions or supporting ovideme
that, ara a ested etth by thn commmts or
by Q/IE itself, Such a uGormlidated Cr1tigcte'
will . be cl nilat. ed to they agemies. for infer,=-,
mt:'atx,
ba In dition$, on its own :r itlat-i a or at the
request of ejM- of the psr ,icilmtti 'r C agsnaies~
draft a proposed "Stat nt of te1li oe
Def,tcienclesa" This ll 1 inte11ig'
deficiencies pointed out in ommments received
t a noiis and also those believed by O/M,
to OXIAp
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5, Folio dng circulation of a daft Statensent, (der,
4 b), o w i l l c am a meeting to be attended by x presentative
of the agencies,, and of the Assistant Director for Intelligence
Coordination, CIA. pose of this mew 9 g gill be (1) to
determine other existing inteUigence is inadequate and in
what rea cts; (2) to determine whether corrective action is
needed in the collection or research fields
6, After this meting a State nt of findings will, be
forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence. This State-
ment nay be accompanied by reco ndations for actions; if
appropriate, or by a statement that no specific action is
recosmended and that e-, agency will take continuing action
within the field of ite x sponsibi_lities. Upon receipt of this
Stat * t the Director of Central Intelligence will forward it
to the members of the I,AC for info. .tion or action, as
appropriate.
7. By receipt of a copy of the Statama t, the :1aict- t
Director for Intelligence Coordination will be designated as the
DCVs action officer.
- 3 ..
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ftclosura "C"
DRAFT
I IOF:APIDUM FOR TIE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT s Revision of Procedure for Reducing Intelligence
Deficiencies in National Intelligence
Deficiencies
REFERENCE s Paragraph 2p IAC4!'71 and ONE Memorandum to
IAC on above subject dated 3 June 1952,
lo The existing procedure!for reducing intelligence
deficiencies in National Intelligence Estimates has been found
unsatisfactory and is only occasionally used, The principal
reason for this disuse appears to stem from the difficulty of
using individual and often specialized estimates as a basis for
formulating comprehensive guides for collection and research
by the appropriate agencies.
Based on a trail run covering 1953 productionp the
IAC representatives have concluded that such comprehensive
guidance could better be provided by a quarterly critique
on intelligence gaps to be published as part of the quarterly
program for the production of National Intelligence Estimates.
Such a.publication would permit the IAC to discharge its
responsibility for detecting and reducing intelligence deficiencies
more effectively than a series of overlapping and narrow directives
tied specifically to individual estimates.
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RDCONNDAT ION
3o It is therefore recommended that the IAC revise its
procedure as follows (reference ONE Memorandum of 3 June 1952):
ao No change in Paragraphs I thru 3
bo Paragraphs 4 thru ? to read as follows:
"lto After an estimate is finished, each agency will
collect comments from appropriate sources and refer
then to the Assistant Director for National Estimates.
On the basis of these eommints,supplemented by its own
views, the Office of National Estimates will prepare
a quarterly "Statement of Intelligence Deficiencies".
The statement may be accompanied by recommendations
for action, if appropriate, or by a statement that no
specific action is recommended and that each agency will
take continuing action within the field of its
responsibilitieso After the IAC representatives have
convened to discus this draft statement, the final
report will be submitted for approval by the IACo"
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