1967'S ESTIMATIVE RECORD - - FIVE YEARS LATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500040010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 16, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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TS 186181
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 August 1972
SUBJECT: 1967's Estimative Record -- Five Years Later
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 2
II. TOPICS OF GREATEST INTEREST ............. 5
A. Vietnam ............................. 5
B. Soviet Military Forces .......... 7
C. The USSR and its Confrontation
with the US ..............12
.
D. The Arab-Israeli Crisis .............. 16
III. OTHER IMPORTANT TOPICS ...................19
A. China ................................19
B. Korea.. .........................22
C. Latin America ........................ 23
D. Yugoslavia ...........................24
E. Africa.. ...........................25
F. South Asia ..........................26
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE RECORD ...............28
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. A retrospective assessment should avoid being either a white-
wash or an exercise in masochism. Of necessity, it must concentrate
on the more important issues and papers. (In 1967 ONE turned'out 67
NIEs and SNIEs and over 80 estimative memoranda.) The attached dis-
cussion focusses primarily on the score or so of estimates which seem
to be the most important and on a few of the memoranda which dealt
with major issues of 1967.
2. Even when we confine ourselves to the more important issues,
a post-mortem review is not a simple matter of grading in the light of
right answers and wrong ones. For one thing, most papers contain a
number of important estimative judgments and some lesser ones; if
one or more major judgments have proven wrong, then the paper as a
whole probably rates a bad mark even if all the lesser judgments were
good. For another thing, many judgments are necessarily conditional,
e.g., if a, then b; there is an implicit estimate in the "if" clause,
and if the condition suggested fails to materialize, the ensuing-judgments
cannot be deemed either good or bad. Indeed some of our estimates are
addressed entirely to contingencies, and if the assumed circumstances
never came about, we have no way of knowing whether we were right or
wrong. Thus one of our 1967 estimates assessed foreign 25X1
reactions to three postulated cases of US force withdrawals from Europe;
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in the event, none took place and the validity of the estimate
3. Theoretically among the most successful estimates are
those which prove wrong -- but for the right reasons, i.e., the
warning in the estimate comes through so persuasively that policy
makers, upon reading the estimate, take measures to prevent or
minimize the danger. In this case the dire events do not happen
and the estimate, though "wrong", turns our to be a triumph for
the estimator. But this is a rare case, indeed.
4. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of action and reaction,
including the effects of US policy decisions on foreign states,
is an important factor in judging estimates. A notable example
arises in Soviet weapons developments. Soviet programs have their
own technical and bureaucratic imperatives, as do ours, but it is
also true that Soviet policy decisions concerning deployment of
these weapons are sensitive to changes in US strategic military
posture as well. Likewise, while it is not always easy to explain
why a specific US force-oriented decision took place, an appre-
ciation of projected changes in the USSR often enters in. Such
interplay can seldom be specifically documented, as these decisions
on both sides are arrived at out of a complex of considerations.
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Nevertheless, we feel confident that there have been instances
when a judgment in an NIE accurately reflected Soviet intentions
at the time, but subsequent US policy decisions -- influenced in
part by estimates of what the Soviets would do -- caused the
Soviets to reappraise the situation and to alter their course,
thereby causing the estimate to appear faulty.
5. In assessing particular estimates in the following sections,
we have struggled with these and other problems in a fashion which
cannot help being subjective. As a general rule we have excluded
what appear to be the lesser judgments of estimative papers as
well as those judgments which are not readily susceptible to
evaluation. This still leaves a large number of estimative state-
ments, and on the basis of these, we have compiled our review.
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II. TOPICS OF GREATEST INTEREST
6. Vietnam, the USSR's military strength, and the USSR's
position in the world were clearly of great intelligence and
policy interest in 1967. A crisis of great import between
Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out in May and -- involving
as it did both this country and the USSR -- occupied senior
policymaking levels of government.
7; 1967 was a year in which the main intelligence issues
of the Vietnamese conflict were addressed at length in a number
of NIEs. The issues were: communist capabilities for fighting
the war in South Vietnam; the significance of Cambodia to the
communist effort; and, communist responses to certain hypothetical
escalatory actions.
g.. Capabilities were discussed mainly in SNIE 14.3-67, which
provided work for many hands in the Community through the year
and was finally published in November. It was the second big
"capabilities" estimate on the Vietnamese war and covered the
subject in great detail, with lengthy arguments during coordination
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on most significant issues. The paper came down heavily on a
judgment that communist military strength in South Vietnam was
on the decline -- and indeed it was -- but a brief epilogue on
strategic options unfortunately pictured Hanoi as resigned to
a "protracted war" of attrition against Allied forces; two
months later the Tet '68 offensive occurred.
9. The Cambodian role in the war was covered in SNIE 57-67
(January) and SNIE 57/1-67 (December). The Sihanoukville supply
issue did not surface in all its vigor until 1968, but these
earlier estimates were also characterized by spirited coordination
sessions. Both papers emerged, however, with a clearly conservative
view of Cambodia's role -- current and potential -- as a funnel for
arms to VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam; indeed, there was little
evidence to support a contrary view. Nonetheless, in retrospect,
one must question the reasoning in January NIE that "it seems
unlikely that they (the Vietnamese communists) would rely in any
major way on such an uncertain and indirect source (as the Sihanouk-
ville route)." This cast of mind regarding the Sihanoukville route
tended to persist through 1968.
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16, The third category of papers on Vietnam falls into the
"what if" type. In retrospect, NIEs of this year -- unlikely many
of the previous year or two -- were relatively relaxed about
Soviet and Chinese reactions to US moves to escalate the conflict.
Thus, SNIE 11-11-67, while concluding that US escalation of the
war "might" seriously affect a number of bilateral dealings
between the USSR and the USA, also stated: "we think it unlikely"
that the Soviets would want to provoke a real crisis with the US.
B. Soviet Military Forces
11.. The NIEs produced in 1967 on Soviet military forces were
more general than present-day estimates, addressed fewer issues,
and in much less detail. NIE 11-14-67, Soviet General Purpose
Forces, for instance, was a document of 28 pages which provided
only a broad-brush treatment of Warsaw Pact general purpose forces.
In contrast, NIE 11-14-71, Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations in
Eurasia, was 215 pages long and discussed these forces and their
capabilities in great detail.
12. In order to evaluate these NIEs, it is useful to cate-
gorize the judgments found in them. Broad general judgments about
future capabilities and courses of action have generally held up
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well; such judgments are based on a broad range of considerations,
not often subject to change through the appearance of specific
new data. Judgments about specific capabilities existing in 1967
have also stood the test of time; they usually had hard evidence
to support them, but sometimes did not. Predictions of specific
future capabilities and force levels are a more chancy business;
estimates in this category were sometimes right on the mark, but
sometimes wide of it. NIEs have often been low on numbers for
important force projections, but accorded the Soviets a more rapid
growth in weapons technology than actually took place. The para-
graphs that follow assess a representative group of specific examples
of these general statements -- in the areas of air defense, the
Soviet navy, the SA-5, ICBM deployment, and MIRVs -- without trying
to cover all major judgments.
13.. Judgment on an Existing Operational Capability: NIE 11-3-67
estimated the Soviet air defense system then to have "generally no
capability against low-altitude penetrations below)
but also estimated that the Soviets would exert major efforts to
meet their requirement for lower altitude capability. The deploy-
ment of new radars, SAMs, and aircraft predicted in 1967 has
improved the situation somewhat and although "Soviet capabilities
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against aircraft penetrating at altitudes below
(NIE 11-3-71)
14. Judgment on Mission and an Existing Capability. In 1967
the mission and capabilities of the SA-5 were still in dispute.
The NIE said "The mission of the Tallinn system is defense against
the airborne threat, particularly against high performance aircraft
and standoff weapons."I
15. In 1971 the intelligence community agreed "that the SA-5
system is not now used to provide ABM defense and is not well suited
for such use." It further agreed that "there is ample evidence
that currently deployed SAMs have not been modified to provide them
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with a ballistic missile defense capability" and that this is a
"very unlikely Soviet course of action." But the NIE did agree
that the SA-5 could have some limited capabilities against
unscreened ballistic missiles with large radar cross sections in
defense of a very small area around the SAM site.
16.? Judgments on General Future Developments. NIE 11-14-67
concluded that "The Soviets are well on their way toward developing
a large modern Navy as an instrument for the projection of national
power...The Soviets are developing forces which, over the longer
term, will significantly improve their ability to support their
political interests in other parts of the world, but we doubt that
they intend to develop a capability to engage in distant limited
warfare with a major power." Soviet ship construction, command
and control developments, training, and exercises have in the past
five years rapidly increased the size and flexibility of the
Soviet Navy. A greater number of ships have operated further from
home, demonstrating a powerful presence in many sea areas of the
world. But the Soviets have not in this time constructed the afloat
air or logistic forces to permit them to support distant operations
against major opposition.
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17.. Judgments on Specific Future Developments. NIE 11-8-67,
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces, had more specific "out on a limb"
estimates than any of the other NIEs. It said the Soviets would
have 1,000-1,300 ICBMs by mid-1972, giving as a rationale that
they would wish at least rough equality with the US. We inter-
preted this general goal -- since confirmed by SALT -- to mean
numbers equal to or slightly higher than US numbers.* That the
Soviets have built more ICBMs than we estimated is now well known.
The Soviets now have 1,407 ICBM launchers at regular ICBM com-
plexes
(which are probably
intended for use against peripheral targets ) and
under construction.
18. Once we detect the prototype of a new weapon system,
or the initial testing of one, we try to predict the time when it
will first be introduced into the operational forces
I I
problems and our predictions have been off by a year or so.
-- Estimates correctly predicted the initial operational capa-
bility (IOC) of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and Y-class submarine
two years in advance, and of the Flogger aircraft five
years in advance
We thought the lower end of the range appropriate if the Soviets
were to phase out the SS-7 and SS-8, but the high side if they did not.
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-- On the other hand, the IOC of Foxbat was two years
later than we had estimated.
19.. In other instances we have estimated that the Soviets
could, or would, develop important new weapon systems on which
we had little or no evidence at the time the judgment was made.
NIE 11-8-67, for example, estimated that the Soviets could
develop and deploy MIRVs on a new large liquid ICBM with greatly
improved accuracy by as early as 1972 "if development were to
be initiated in the very near future." While the NIE did not say
such a development would take place, many interpreted it to mean
this. For some reason the Soviets have not yet fielded a MIRV
system. We do not know whether this is because they have not yet
acquired the necessary technology, whether they have up to now not
considered a MIRV system necessary, or whether they have encountered
problems in the development stage, Our present judgment is that
they will soon begin testing a MIRV system.
C. The USSR and Its Confrontation with the US
20.. The Soviet confrontation with the US, a central issue in
1967 as in other years, is covered in NIEs on a number of problems
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in different parts of the world. The Soviet response to possible
US escalation in Vietnam has been addressed in Section A. And
Soviet actions and policies in the Mediterranean and Middle East
will provide the transition at the end of this section to the
Arab-Israeli crisis.
21. NIE 11-7-67, Soviet Foreign Policy, (September 1967)
was the principal estimative paper on the USSR for the year. It
covered: (a) The Post-Khrushchev record; (b) Foreign Policy and
the Leadership; and (c) Current Issues of Policy. The discussions
under these headings emphasized Soviet setbacks, problems, and
caution, and it could be said that they did so to a fault. Cer-
tainly the paper failed to anticipate the more vigorous Soviet
foreign policy evident during the past couple of years. But the
emphasis appears appropriate for 1967 and the judgments were
generally sound for 1968 and 1969. And the NIE did anticipate
the survival of the collective leadership, expect continued
problems for the Soviets in Eastern Europe, suggest a forward
Soviet detente policy in Western Europe, emphasize Moscow's likely
desire to keep channels to Washington open, warn of continued
trouble with China, and so on.
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22< The heavy Soviet presence in the Middle East and eastern
Mediterranean was by 1967 a fact of international life, accepted
even by those powers most anxious to limit or contest it. Its
beginnings date back to 1955 and 1956, when, as NIE 11-4-56 put
it, "A concurrence of developments... combined to provide the USSR
an opportunity to inject its influence forcefully into the Middle
East." Subsequent NIEs took much the same estimative path, warn-
ing of strong Soviet ambitions in the area, noting the opportunities
available to the USSR, and cautioning that there are constraints
on Soviet behavior.
23e The general judgments of NIE 11-6-67, Soviet Strategy
and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin, have passed the test
of time. For example: "...Soviet policy is likely to find numerous
opportunities in the Mediterranean and its adjacent areas in the
years ahead", and "...local conflicts might occur in which the
Soviets would wish to support their clients at some fairly high
level of risk short of actual intervention". The estimate also
correctly judged that the USSR would not run high risks of an
East-West conflict for the sake of the Arab cause. SNIE 11-13-67
of 20 July assessed what the Russians were up to in rearming the
Arabs states. It correctly noted the likelihood of " a further
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influx of Soviet advisors,oma(and) and increased Soviet military
presence in Arab ports and military facilities."
24m. SNIE 11-9-68 of 18 January accurately totted up the
account, noting that USSR faced "both new problems and new
opportunities" that the Arabs were more dependent on it, that
resumption of hostilities would produce a dangerous and unpre-
dictable situation, and that Soviet and Egyptian policies on
many important issues would remain congruent. It also advised
that Arab ports and airbases could be used and might even be run
in part by Soviet advisory personnel. The estimate also said,
"The Soviets will probably continue efforts to make the Med-
iterranean a less favorable environment for US naval forces....
They have.
25. Overall, the estimative record on projecting Soviet
activity in this area has been good -- neither reassuring in
terms of Soviet designs nor overly alarmist in terms of likely
Soviet accomplishments. The papers did not foresee certain
specific events of the kind which subsequently transform the
attitudes and actions of the interested parties. The Arab-
Israeli war of 1967 is a most important one; it not only led to a
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transformation of the Russian-Egyptian relationship but also to
a shift in US policy from something near even-handedness to much
closer alignment with Israel. Another specific example is Israeli
resort to air action which publicly exposed Egypt's weakness in the
winter of 1969-1970 and resulted in the deployment of Soviet com-
bat forces to Egypt. And though we have, for many years and in
many instances, emphasized the force of nationalism in the Middle
East and elsewhere as a constraint on the spread of Soviet in-
fluence, none of these estimates suggested -- and none could have
foreseen -- the sudden and dramatic reversal received by the Soviets
in Egypt since July 1972.
26. We published an estimate (NIE 30-67) on 13 April which
addressed the possibility that a basic change might be occurring
in the Arab-Israeli crisis. We noted that "Rivalries and disputes
among the Arabs ...create some danger of precipitating crises from
which large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop," and
that "The Israelis ...would resort to force on a large-scale only
if they felt their security endangered." Very true, but the esti-
mate hardly conveyed to the reader that such a crisis would appear
within two months, Moreover, the estimate concluded with the
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pronouncement: "In any event, the threat of great power inter-
vention has had a sobering effect upon proposals to resolve the
problem by military force, and the chances are good that it will
continue to do so'.'. The crisis that led to the war, however,
proceeded from a series of miscalculations which could hardly
have been foreseen in the estimate.
27o On the other hand, the estimate was categoric and clear
about Israel's military superiority over the Arab states. The
Isradlis "could best any one of their neighbors and probably all
of them collectively.
has not been difficult over the years to be right on Israeli
military superiority -- SNIE 30-3-67 of August said that Tel
Aviv's margin of superiority was even greater than before the war
-- but it has sometimes been hard to convince others in the
Community and elsewhere in Washington that Israel could and would
wallop the Arabs under virtually any conceivable cicrumstance.
2gm. The Office did a good deal of estimating and judging
via memoranda during that crisis, A memorandum for the White House
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29.. The review of events connected with the Cultural Revo-
lution looks fairly good in retrospect. The judgment that China's
domestic situation would remain tense and inherently unstable so
long as Mao remained in control seems justified by last year's
purge of Lin Piao and company. Estimates on the succession have
yet to be tested. But the scenario in NIE 13-7-67 would not be
greatly altered if written today; although the purge of Lin Piao
obviously changes the lineup. The estimate argued that Lin lacked
the "political acumen" to survive the inevitable infighting, a
judgment borne out earlier than expected. The main conclusion on
internal prospects was that despite the divisive impact of the Cul-
tural Revolution and the remote chance of a coup against Mao,
the basic thrust was toward preservation of national unity -- a
judgment not particularly startling now, but considered fairly bold
at the time.
30. The major error in NIE 13-7-67 is the failure to allow
for greater flexibility in Peking's foreign policy. Specifically,
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the estimate states that "so long as the Maoists retain control,
Peking is unlikely to make any important changes in the general
line of its foreign policy... unremitting hostility to the US and
the USSR is likely to remain the predominant feature...'.. Some
may argue as to whether Maoists are currently in charge, but in any
case the currently improved US-Chinese relations are a consequence
of interaction between Washington and Peking, and determining how
much is due to China and how much to the US is not simple.
31. NIE 13-5-67 on the Economic Outlook for Communist China
discussed the probable impact of the Cultural Revolution on the
economy, saying that if turmoil continued, the economy "... seems
likely to deteriorate somewhat, though probably not to the point
of causing a sharp decline in industrial production, widespread
unemployment, or acute food shortages". Turmoil hit its peak in
1967 and slowly subsided through 1968 into 1969; further substantial
deterioration in the economy did not occur thereafter. The estimate
correctly concluded that another "leap forward" which was expected
at the time by several knowledgeable analysts, was not likely. The
estimate also pointed out accurately that the high priority for the
weapons program would be maintained.
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32., In NIE 13-3-67, Communist China's Military Policy and
Its General Purpose and Air Defense Forces, the judgment that
"whatever the outcome of the current [1967] political crisis, any
Chinese leadership will probably continue to work towards a dominant
position in Asia and a great power status on the world scene" is
one of those generalities that could hardly be expected to have gone
wrong. It is just as true today as 5 years ago.
33., The same NIE said, "The present outlook is for a gradual
but general increase in the capabilities of the forces as the process
of modernization goes forward over the next few years." But "the
limitations and demands on China's economic and technical capa-
bilities are such that conventional forces will remain deficient
in modern equipment at least into the 1970s".
34. As in the case of Soviet military papers, a few estimates
overshot the mark and few fell short in the matter of timing of
IOC of weapons. NIE 13.8-67 estimated a Chinese ICBM "in the early
"r970s, possibly as early as 1970-1971 but probably later". We
now estimate mid-1970s.
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35,. SNIE 14.2-67, published in September, was our first
estimative response to the North Korean shift to violent tactics
against South Korea. With little intramural fighting, the esti-
mators agreed that the North's actions did not indicate an inten-
tion to invade the South or to escalate toward other forms of
major military action.
I The estimate was also on the mark
in downgrading the possibilities for a communist-led guerrilla
movement in the South.
36., The same NIE warned of "miscalculations" by the ag-
gressive North Koreans which might indeed lead to serious fighting
with the South, though it saw such acts chiefly in the context
of some interchange along the DMZ. In January 1968, of course,
the Blue House/pueblo crisis erupted. A February 1968 "Memo to
Holders" reaffirmed our belief that Pyongyang wanted no war and would
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not "deliberately provoke" it, but underlined the obviously in-
creased perils of "miscalculation". A year later, we had the EC-121
shootdown, and further cause for concern; but since then relative
quiet has prevailed in Korea.
C. Latin America
37,.. The most ambitious Latin American estimate in 1967 was
NIE 80/90-67, Economic Trends and Prospects in Latin America. This
was the 'first estimative treatment of economic developments in
Latin America as a whole. The main judgment of the estimate was
that economic prospects for the region were not good. While this
assessment was not welcomed by some policy makers who were trying
to make the Alliance for Progress a success, subsequent deve-
lopments in Latin America have borne out the correctness of the
judgment.
38.. During 1967 much effort went into the preparation of
NIE 80/90-68, The Potential for Revolution in Latin America,
which was completed in March of 1968, Its major judgments were:
(1) that the revolutionary potential for guerrilla insurgencies
was quite limited; (2) that revolutionary forces were shifting
to the cities; (3) that nationalism was a stronger motivating
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force than ideology; and (4) that the government to be elected in
Chile in 1970 might follow revolutionary policies. All of these
points look good in retrospect.
39. NIE 84-67 addressed the prospects for the Canal Treaties
and correctly indicated that they were in trouble. It also esti-
mated that the Panamanian traditional elite would be hard-pressed
to maintain their dominance of Panamanian politics. In retrospect,
one wished that the judgments could have been more sharply put,
but the message was there and the reader was furnished a rough
guide to the future.
D. Yugoslavia
40. NIE 15-67, The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967. This
was a good paper -- its judgments were perceptive and were con-
vincingly conveyed. It addressed the right issues -- the nationali-
ties problem, the direction of the various economic and political
programs, the country's likely international position, and possible
developments in the post-Tito period -- and drew the appropriate
conclusions. To be sure, were we rewriting the estimate today, we
would not make all our judgments in exactly the same way. There would
be differences in emphasis, for example, in our treatment of the
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course of Yugoslav development after Tito. The 1967 paper was some-
what more optimistic about the chances of federal survival than we
would be today; our current view gives greater stress to the
chances of internal tension and conflict in post-Tito Yugoslavia.
But we still hold the view that Yugoslavia will survive intact.
E. Africa
41. The major event in Africa in 1967 was the outbreak of
civil war in Nigeria. ONE produced a Memo for the Director in
mid-June which assessed the deterioration of Nigerian unity, and
stated that war between the Federal Government and Eastern Nigeria
was imminent. The war began in the first few days of July. We
correctly evaluated the effectiveness of the combatants, in suitably
negative terms. We erred, however, in assessing the probable
length of the war. We thought it would be over in a short time,
basing our judgment on the ineptness of the armies, logistic prob-
lems, and the general African tendency either to patch up a
seemingly irreconcilable quarrel or to lose interest fairly quickly
in the whole thing. We did not pick a winner since neither side
presented many winning qualities. In actual fact, the war lasted
until early 1970.
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42. In an estimate on the Nigerian War, issued in May 1968,
the Conclusions begin with: "The Federal Military Governments' forces
clearly hold the upper hand...and a military victory for Biafra
seems highly unlikely." Not all of the judgments in the 1968
estimate were accurate, but it has always been hard to coordinate
Nigerian estimates.
43. Two other African estimates of 1967, in retrospect
pretty routine, addressed topics which at that time were con-
troversial. NIE 73-67, south Africa, and NIE 70-1-67, Libera-
tion Movements, came to the conclusions that white rule in
southern Africa was likely to prevail for quite some time, and
that the black African insurgencies would not accomplish much.
44. Two estimates, SNIE 31/32-67, The indo-Pakistani Arms
Race and Its Economic Implications, and NIE 31-67, India's Domestic
Prospects, reflect the very different situation -- and the very
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different US policy -- of the time. The former was requested as
an input to a policy proposal that the US get India and Pakistan
to agree to mutual reduction of forces, The estimate's judgment
that the proposed cuts would have only a nominal economic impact
was a conclusion which certain policy makers disliked. The military
forces of the time were accurately described and future force
projections were on target. The estimate also said that India
could beat Pakistan and that, with increasing domestic arms pro-
duction and Soviet military aid, the former's margin of superiority
would increase.
45.. NIE 31-67 was less satisfactory. The economic analysis
was flawed by over-emphasisi on India's balance
of payments problems and consequent need for larger amounts of foreign
aid. Coming after two bad agricultural years in India, it did not
foresee the rapid rise in wheat production of the 1969-1971 period,
which gave India 110 million tons of food grains in the latter
year,and hence it underestimated overall growth prospects. The poli-
tical section was an accurate prognosis, in general terms, of the
1967-1969 period. Written before Mrs. Gandhi began to show her
political muscle, it didn't predict her ultimate triumph. It is
doubtful that even she thought then that she could dominate India
to the extent that she does today.
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IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE RECORD
46. This review has been confined to one year, but it was
a fairly representative year, and ought to permit some useful
reflections on the capabilities of the estimating process and on
systemic strengths and limitations of the art. It serves little
purpose to say the record is good, bad or indifferent, or to give
it a grade, as Stewart Alsop once did in an article on intelli-
gence estimates (B or even B+). This kind of shorthand label
really has no meaning, and depends entirely on selection of cri-
teria. The real question is, good, bad or indifferent in relation
to what?
47,. Some will argue that the occurrence of any important
international event -- or even unimportant ones -- not clearly
predicted in so many words in a recent NIE adds up to an estima-
tive failure. This is to expect too much. The art of estimating
has improved over the years, but there has been no breakthrough
into prophetic revelation, History is not foreordained or immune
from accident, the interaction of leaders' whims and the occasional
long shot. Many important features of today's scene would have
appeared quite improbable five or ten years ago, and could have
been predicted-only by wildly lucky guesses.
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48; At the other extreme is the view that an estimate must
be judged correct if some general language in it can be reasonably
interpreted to "cover" an event or series of events that subse-
quently occur. This approach can easily turn into talmudic jus-
tification of little interest to anyone but the author of the
language in question. Between these extremes, a serious inquiry
into the quality and relevance of the estimative record must take
into account a number of matters including selection of subject,
what should have been addressed that was not, what emphases were
misplaced, what prevailing prejudices affected the estimates
either directly or in terms of impelling the estimators to argue
against some widespread attitude deemed fallacious, etc.
49,, This last consideration involves a perennial problem.
The goal, of course, is to make estimates -- in scope, emphasis
and substance -- strictly objective pieces, not only purveying
our best judgments without fear or favor but also giving right
and proper treatment in terms of emphasis, of the questions asked.
In the real world, one is often tempted to "estimate against"
something; that is, to dwell with more or with less emphasis on
some aspect of a question because, in the prevailing climate, one
is aware that this particular aspect is a matter,of widely-held
misconceptions or of particular bureaucratic conflicts which
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suggest that if the message is to be got across, some adjustment
in emphasis is the only way to do it; it will otherwise be lost.
This fact of life can affect not only what we say but what sub-
jects are addressed. The only sound principle must remain that
of objectivity, of faithfully reflecting reality as we see it.
But in assessing the record, one must keep in mind the context
within which estimates were prepared at any given time, since
this will sometimes explain why particular problems-were addressed
rather than others, and why they were treated in particular ways.
50. Despite the essential distinction between estimat1ng
and prophecy, it remains true that insights into the future are
what people mainly want and expect from estimates, and what they
are most often retrospectively judged on. In judging them, one
ought to employ realistic criteria about what can reasonably be
expected. Estimates do not and cannot serve very well as vehicles
for precise prediction of specific events, sudden or dramatic
occurrences which, almost by definition, involve the unexpected
and the unusual. The exact nature and especially the timing of
such occurrences are too subject to accident, coincidence and
other uncertainties. We have sometimes done-reasonably well in
allowing for these possibilities -- particularly when they loomed
in advance as contingencies which would have important effects.
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More often we have not, and the moral is that estimates can be no
substitute for daily attention to current reporting. The two
forms of intelligence must be used together.
51, As an office, it is part of our job to keep the impor-
tant estimates under constant review in the light of new events
and intelligence, We do so formally in connection with the
quarterly scheduling process, informally in a variety of daily
ways. Sometimes we propose an estimate to supplement or supplant
one which has been dated; often we schedule a less formal memoran-
dum to assess a new development in relation to judgments in stand-
ing estimates. In recent years we have been doing the latter more
frequently and systematically than was once the practice.
52. By and large in 1967, we addressed the right issues
in national estimates or memoranda-- but not all of them. It
should, of course, be noted that sometimes the community omits
doing NIE's, not because an important matter is overlooked or
underappreciated, but because it was so much covered elsewhere
or there is such wide agreement that an NIE would have added
little. A retrospective review will always suggest some sub-
jects that, if they had been done, would make the record look
more complete but would at the time have been considered by all
a waste of time and effort.
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53. If it is not fair to judge an estimate by success or
failure in predictions of discrete events, it is certainly legi-
timate to ask whether it identified and interpreted the major
forces at work in a situation. If it failed to do this, it is a
poor job by any standards, X review of 1967 does not turn up any
serious deficiencies on this score, and it is probably fair to
say that if some hypothetical policy maker had relied on the body
of estimative literature of that year, supplemented by current
reporting, he would not have gone far wrong in-any important
respects.
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we decided after long and detailed debate on
the merits, that the paper should reflect disagreement and show
clearly why. This approach has been used quite frequently in the
major military estimates, and all testimony is that consumers
find it helpful. The important thing, as we see it, is to use
the technique sparingly, confining it to important issues on which
there is legitimate room for uncertainty and disagreement, and to
make sure that the conflicting arguments face each other respon-
sively.
55e Another way in which we have moved toward leveling with
the reader in recent years is to pay more attention to identifying
our uncertainties, and not just when they involve dissents by one
or more agencies. We have all been sufficiently impressed with
the limits on our ability to foresee the future, so that increas-
ingly national estimates address alternate lines of development,
even where this involves exploring the short end of the odds. We
still feel obligation, where possible, to delineate the most
probable case, but it has been customary in recent years to follow
this up by acknowledging that things could go in different ways
and to suggest, so far as we can, not only what different ways but
what factors or contingencies, sometimes including possible US
actions, might make the difference between alternatives -- (This
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is known in modern social science as isolating the variables and
is highly approved). In fact, it rests on a decent appreciation
of the dynamic and often chancy qualities that shape history and
on the fact that intelligence coverage of most problems no matter
how good, is seldom complete and the gaps may prove important
determinants in the event. This approach is more realistic and
intellectually defensible than static prediction -- though often
harder to do -- and it is, or ought to be, more useful to the
serious user of estimates, Estimates are, after all, not essays
in academic speculation but hopefully aids to appreciating a
problem and what may or may not be done about it.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
You may recall that at the annual planning
conference, in connection with a discussion of ways
to evaluate performance, you asked that we undertake '
a retrospective assessment of our production of five
years ago. This paper is the result. For those of us
regularly seized of the problems of estimating, such
an exercise has modest utility, since we are only too
well aware of our successes and failures and the
limitations of our craft. But the paper may give you
a better feel for where we were then and where we
think we are now.
John Huizenga
17 August 1972
a J~*a~. ~~ (DATE
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ILLEGIB
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