CHILE: CONCILIATION, CONFRONTATION, OR COUP?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500030014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 4, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
4 April 1972
SUBJECT: Chile: Conciliation, Confrontation, or Coup?
During the year and a half under the Allende govern-
ment, the Chilean tradition of accommodative politics
has survived, despite rising pressures to by-pass the
constitutional system through coercion and confrontation.
The strength and resiliency of the Chilean political
system is seen in the willingness of most of the chief
political actors to turn to conciliation and compromise
to defuse potentially explosive situations, rather than
let the advocates of political violence carry the day.
This memorandum assesses recent Chilean developments
which, taken together, seem to tilt the odds away from
conciliation and towards confrontation. We still believe
that the system of accommodation will persevere over
the next year or so. But the strains are becoming much
greater and the political polarization more obvious, and
we are less confident than before that the professional
politicians will be able to put together compromises and
make them stick. Thus the odds on a rupture or major
alteration of the Chilean constitutional tradition are
rising.
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1. Summer is over in Chile, but the political atmosphere is
again heating up. Government and opposition leaders alike glibly
refer to a threat of civil war and there is much talk about a "fascist"
conspiracy on one side and a "Stalinist" spectre on the other. Illegal
armed groups representing the extreme left and far right are becoming
more active in the countryside. In addition to the illegal land seizures
by groups identified with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR),
there are now reports of armed landowners (some dubbed "White
Guards") reclaiming seized properties. There are signs that the
military is becoming increasingly concerned and restive, with rightist
politicians stepping up efforts to interest them in a coup. In the face
of the rising political heat, Allende has alluded darkly to the fate of
reformist President Balmaceda whose conflict with Congress led to a
civil war, his overthrow, and his suicide in 1891. Government spokes-
men have even recalled the liquidation of the left in Indonesia in
attempting to dramatize the danger of counterrevolution. At the same
time economic problems are mounting and add still one more set of
pressures to the political arena. Shortages persist and the rate of
inflation is rising.
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2. If one were to take literally the inflammatory rhetoric of
Chilean politicians, it might easily be concluded that Chile today
resembles Spain on the eve of its Civil War. While there may be some
parallels, there are important differences. In Chile, the traditional
rules of the political game areestill in force. At the same time that
the main actors engage in verbal brinksmanship publicly on supposedly
non-negotiable positions, some of them meet privately to try for compromise
solutions. Recently, when the opposition-dominated Congress passed a
constitutional amendment restricting the President's power to nationalize
private businesses, Allende threatened to veto key portions, and claimed
that a two-thirds vote of the Congress would be necessary to override
the veto. The opposition denied this, stating that an absolute majority
would be sufficient to override, after which Allende's only recourse
would be to call a plebiscite to decide the issue. Allende, unwilling to
test his popularity in a referendum at this time, maintained that the
entire question would be decided by the Constitutional Tribunal. The
opposition countered that the problem was outside the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. Amid suggestions from both sides that the conflict could
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trigger a civil war, Allende entered into talks with the Christian
Democrats to reach a compromise. The immediate impasse and the
violent rhetoric continue, but so do efforts for a compromise agreement.
3. This Chilean peculiarity of striving for political accommodation
is one of the striking differences between Chile now and Spain in the
early 1930s. In the highly charged atmosphere prevailing, the willingness
of seemingly implacable political foes to engage in behind-the-scenes
bargaining is a crucial element in preserving the essentially democratic
character of the existing Chilean political system. The relative ease
with which Chilean politicians are able to retreat and compromise when
violent confrontation appears imminent is in part indicative of a shared
stake in the perpetuation of the existing system by leaders of various
and antagonistic political persuasions. Allende himself and the men
who now lead the major Chilean political parties are successful products
of this system who at one time or another have savored the fruits of
power. They are skilled practitioners of the occult political arts.
Practically all have served or are serving in the Chilean Senate, a
body which places a premium on cloakroom conciliation and compromise,
notwithstanding the vitriolic debate on the floor.
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4. Yet this "political transactional ism", as it has been called,
faces an uncertain future in Chile. Extremists of the left and right
perceive little advantage in perpetuating the existing system, and
increasingly appear to be spoiling for what they hope will be a decisive
armed confrontation that settles the issue of Chile's political future
their way. Moreover, while it is difficult to gauge the extent to which
the Chilean public is influenced by repeated allegations of sedition,
impending civil war, etc., these charges may speed the process of
polarization to the point where it would be difficult to check or reverse.
Indeed, there is the danger that the politicians are becoming captives
of their own rhetoric, fearful that their opponents in fact are out to
annihilate them politically and have few compunctions about destroying
Chile's democratic institutions in the process. The usual Chilean
political horsetrading would in time become all but impossible under
such circumstances.
5. One of the great uncertainties is how much and how fast the
attitude of the military may be changing. Reports are accumulating of
military officers professing a willingness to intervene when "the time
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is ripe". Although they are vague on the question of how and when
this condition will be fulfilled, the most likely circumstance would
be an actual or threatened breakdown of public order. The conservative
National Party and possibly some Christian Democrats may already
favor a coup, but the military would probably be reluctant to assume
responsibility for an unconstitutional change of government unless it
perceived that a broad range of Chilean public opinion favored such
an outcome. Clearly, this is not yet the case. The revelations of
Jack Anderson are bound to exert some inhibitory effect on the plans
of military and civilian plotters, if only because any move against the
regime now would be associated in the public mind with US machinations.
On the other hand, if the Allende government and especially the leftist
extremists move too quickly and crudely to take advantage of this
issue - - i. e. , by a broad crackdown on opposition groups -- disgruntled
military and civilian elements may be forced to move in self defense.
6. For a number of reasons, a direct military seizure of power
does not seem to be the most likely outcome even if a major crisis
were to force the military's hand. Like most Chileans, military men
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generally take great pride in the national heritage of respect for
legality and constitutional order. And unlike many other Latin
American military establishments, the Chilean armed forces take
their role to be servants rather than arbiters of the national
constitution. Consequently the military would not relish forcing
Allende out of office except in circumstances which appeared to
allow no other acceptable solution. A more likely military response
in a crisis would be an effort to exert heavy pressure on Allende to
force changes in personnel and policies, to defuse the crisis and
foster a return to order. While the constitution technically would
remain inviolate, even this level of military intervention would
represent a sharp break with Chilean political practice.
7. If there were widespread violence and the government
appeared unable or unwilling to restore order, one could thus
envisage a military ultimatum to Allende which at a minimum
would demand carte blanche to re-establish peace. In such circum-
stances, the odds are that Allende (backed in particular by the
Communist Party which has long had a phobia about the threat of a
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military coup) would yield to military demands. This would probably
involve allowing the military and the Carabineros to crack down on
those leftist extremists who would not accept the curbing of their
revolution (including some in Allende's own Socialist Party). But
Allende would perceive that he had little choice if he wished to remain
in office and consolidate the considerable gains already made. Once
some semblance of order was reinstituted the military would be in a
good position to demand a major continuing voice in policy on the
grounds that a renewal of large-scale violence had to be averted.
8. A development that could foreclose the possibility of
effective military intervention would be the emergence of a deep
division within the Chilean military itself. If concurrent with escalating
violent encounters between pro- and anti-Allende forces, the military
is riven by the same kind of conflict that divides the populace as a
whole, the consequence could be military inaction. If this occurred,
the prospect of civil war would loom larger. We would estimate that
the likelihood in the immediate future of either a fullscale civil war,
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or of a military seizure of power, is quite low. The odds that the
military will assume an important political role sometime over the
next year or so is of a distinctly higher order of magnitude. In fact,
growing numbers of professional politicians, in as well as out of the
government, may come to welcome some form of military intervention
to save the system from what they would perceive as a worse disaster --
such as civil war.
9. If obliged at this point in time to make a prediction, we
would still say that the Chilean proclivity for avoiding the brink is
likely to prevent an early breakdown or major alteration of the political
system. But we nonetheless recognize that the resort to political
violence and inflammatory rhetoric is rising and the strength of the
constitutional system is eroding -- processes which cannot continue
indefinitely without dramatic consequences. Thus we would conclude
that the chances of the present constitutional arrangement surviving
intact over the next several years are poor.
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M. Henry A. Ki tng r
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
have becoe convinced that the chances
of the constitutional ar4er in Chile have
ed by remit events. The attached mesno-
g this view may be of interest in
Ith the planned SRG session on Chile.
Attaent: ward Helms
Me moral, dated 4 April 1972
Subject: Chile: Conciliation, 5 April 1972
C oahvetation, or C
Identical buck slip w/Attachment sent to
Sec. Rogers and Asat Sec. Charles A. Meyer
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~M UM ~FV ? The Record
This paper was mentioned at the DCI Morning meeting
this date. A copy was hand delivered to
I Ifor General Walters
Bronson eedy
Dick Lehman
14 April 72
(DATE)
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FORM GN 54 101 WHICH RELACMES
BEM USED101 (47)
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Mr. Proctor
The DCI has asked to have this piece sent
to Rogers, Kissinger, and Meyer.
John Huizenga
Identical note to Colby and Karamessines
5 April 72
(DATE)
FORM IOI WHIICHCMAYFBEMUS10-101
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M tM K Director INR
The attached has been sent to the Secretary and
Assistant Secretary Meyer.
John Huizenga
5 April 72
(DATE)
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FORM NO. 10 1 WHICH REPLACES
MAY F BE M 10-01 1471
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There is a growing conviction among the Chile
watchers that the internal struggle there may be
approaching the point at which /he constitutional order
cannot survive. A resort to olence in some form could
not be estimated relia y in dvance, partly because it is
likely to be triggered b so e chance combination of
circumstances. We will an NIE in late May but I
thought you might like to be alerted now to what we think
is happening.
App
Jo7vquizenga
4 April 1972
(DATE)
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