PANAMA AND CUBA: PROSPECTS FOR CLOSER RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500020007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 19, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Panama and O1ba: Prospects for Closer Relations
;!j - Secret
61
19 January 1972
No. 0823/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
19 January 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Panama and Cuba: Prospects for Closer Relations
Summary
Over the past couple of months, there have
been signs of growing contact between the Cuban and
Panamanian governments. The indicators do not at
this stage suggest a major policy shift on either
side, but--after years of isolation and hostility--
they do reveal a cautious search for expanded ties.
Note: This memorandum was produced jointly by the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of
National Estimates and was coordinated with other
components of the Agency.
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The Changing Panamanian Attitude Toward Cuba
1. On the Panamanian side, the new interest in
Cuba is in line with Torrijos' "revolutionary" pre-
tensions and increasingly nationalist thrust, par-
ticularly his determination to demonstrate Panama's
independence from the US. The beginnings go back
several years. In October 1969, while in the US,
Torrijos stated publicly that he would be willing
to establish a military base in Panama to help
"liberate" Cuba. Radio Havana responded immediately
with a contemptuous denunciation of the general.
2. Until recently, the Torrijos government's
interest in Cuba had been limited mainly to sports
and cultural contacts. Panamanian teams have been
flown by the Panamanian Air Force to Cuba, and Cuban
teams have been regularly welcomed in Panama, There
have been no penalties for travel to Cuba by Panamanian
citizens, and Panamanian leftists have made frequent
trips to Cuba via Mexico. Last year contacts became
more frequent and more significant. In September
Torrijos approved the opening of a Cuban Prensa
Latina office in Panama City, and in December, for
the st time in several years, a Cuban student
delegation was permitted to visit Panama. These
various contacts have provided both governments with
an informal communication channel.
3. Panama's growing interest in Cuba over the
past year does not seem to be the result of a de-
liberate policy decision but is rather an evolu-
tionary development influenced by two interrelated
trends. There is, first, the growing reliance of
the Torrijos government on radical leftists. Fol-
lowing his coup and the effective elimination of
oligarchic rule in October 1968, Torrijos sought
to put his personal stamp on Panamanian history by
developing a new political system. Lacking an
ideology or even a clear program, he adopted the
App
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rhetoric of reform and revolution and then tried to
tailor government action to his rhetoric. He has
attempted to win the support of students, peasants,
workers, and technocrats and has been fostering
agrarian reform, community development, cooperatives,
and a strengthened labor movement. In the process
he has developed a working arrangement with the small,
Moscow-oriented Panamanian Communist Party which al-
lows it a freedom of action denied to all other po-
litical parties. In turn, the Communist Party has
provided support for Torrijos' policies, particularly
for a hard-line negotiating position vis-a-vis the
US. This arrangement has piqued Castro's interest
in the Torrijos government, and at the same has less-
ened Torrijos' own suspicions about contacts with
Communist states.
4. Secondly, the leftist bent of the Torrijos
government reflects, and has encouraged, the develop-
ment of Torrijos' nationalism along anti-US lines.
US coolness to Torrijos immediately after his seizure
of power and a number of coup plots, behind which he
thought he saw the hand of the US Government, height-
ened Torrijos' sense of insecurity and set the stage
for hostility toward the US. Torrijos seems to have
concluded that the way to succeed with the US and at
the same time improve his standing at home was to act
tough and keep the US on the defensive. Dalliance
with Cuba and the Communist bloc thus took on in-
creasing appeal, both as a manifestation of his in-
dependence from the US and as an ace in the hole for
possible use in pressuring the US in the treaty nego-
tiations.
5. These trends have coincided with recent ef-
forts by Torrijos to find international support for
Panama's demands in the Canal Treaty negotiations.
Last November, as the negotiations inched along, the
Torrijos government sought backing for the Panamanian
position from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Spain, and
Mexico. The Costa Rican foreign minister, in a sur-
prise speech before the assembled diplomatic corps,
including the US ambassador, endorsed the Panamanian
stand in ringing anti-imperialist tones, but other
countries have remained generally cool to Torrijos'
overtures.
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6. In a related action, the Torrijos govern-
ment circulated among UN members a lengthy document
setting forth Panamanian views on the treaty issues.
If the negotiations do not produce a treaty satis-
factory to Panama, Torrijos would use Panama's newly
won Security Council seat to maximize international
attention on the canal issue. Recent Cuban-Soviet
pronouncements have given him reason to believe that,
in such an event, Cuba and other Communist states
would demonstrate solidarity with Panama against the
US. Indeed, news services in Communist countries
have already begun to play up the canal issue.
7. Thus, Torrijos has moved cautiously toward
expanding Panamanian ties with Communist countries.
Last October he established diplomatic relations
with Romania. He has permitted Soviet cultural vis-
its to Panama, and has approved the opening of a
TASS office in Panama. In late November, Torrijos'
foreign minister, Juan Tack, publicly hinted for
the first time at the possibility of establishing
diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Growing Cuban Interest in the Torrijos Regime
8. In light of these developments, the increased
Cuban attention to the Torrijos government in recent
months is hardly surprising. The new approach seems
to have received its first official blessing in Cas-
tro's talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin last November.
In the concluding communique the Soviets and Cubans
singled out Panama (along with Chile and Peru) for
special mention. The text expressed "sympathy with
the strivings of the Panamanian people to exercise
full sovereignty over the whole of their national
territory."
9. As their official rhetoric began to focus
more closely on Panama, the Cubans followed up with
new probes and pronouncements.
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I I These intimations were followed in
early December by the first published report in Cuba
of the possibility of a resumption of Cuban-Panamanian
relations. At the end of December, the new interest
in Panama was again officially underscored in the
communique following Cuban President Dorticos' talks
in Moscow. Finally, in early January, a Cuban spokes-
man for the first time singled out the Torrijos gov-
ernment--as well as the Panamanian people--as worthy
of support "in the recovery of the nation's sover-
eignty over the Canal Zone."
10. The Cubans still seem uncertain, however,
of Torrijos' real attitude toward the Castro gov-
ernment, and they appear somewhat disenchanted with
Torrijos as a political leader. This uncertainty
is reflected in reports that the Cubans were main-
taining a dual policy toward the Torrijos government.
On the one hand, they were interested in supporting
and encouraging its anti-US posture. On the other
hand, they remained wary of Torrijos personally
Recent Panamanian-Cuban Contacts
11. The developing pattern of indirect con-
tacts between Panama and Cuba was overlaid suddenly
by direct official communication on a major issue
in the wake of the Cuban seizure of two freighters
under the Panamanian flag--the Layla Express on 5
December and the Johnny Express on 15 December. The
Castro regime claime the
two vessels, owned by a -amp y or an- asur ban
exiles in Miami, were "pirate ships" which had taken
part in earlier raids against Cuba. The captain
and a crewman of the Johnny Express were held by the
Cubans on spy charges, but Castro invited Panama to
send a mission to discuss release of the remaining
26 crewmen of the two freighters. Torrijos responded
wii-h Alacrity. dispatching a three-man delegation,
The e ega-
tion found Castro
in
an agreeable negotiating mood,
and arrangements
for
release of the crewmen were
quickly settled.
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13. Torrijos has indicated he values Castro's
growing attention to his government. The government-
controlled Panamanian press has given prominent play
to the high-level attention and cooperation which
Castro extended to the Panamanian delegation. Tor-
rijos probably sees the success of the mission as
certification of his own "revolutionary" credentials,
and. is proud of his diplomatic accomplishment in a
matter in which the US was seemingly powerless.
Implications
14. What does all this add. up to? Probably
not an immediate dramatic change in Panamanian-Cuban
relations. The growing pattern of contacts does,
however, reflect a recognition of common interests,
though not necessarily common priorities or objec-
tives.
15. Castro's new interest in the Torrijos
regime is quite in line with the Cuban policy shift--
evident since the emergence of Velasco's nationalist
military regime in Peru--toward support for "revolu-
tionary" governments which have come to power with-
out guerrilla warfare. Castro is now seeking to
build up government-to-government contacts with
Latin American regimes which seem reasonably recep-
tive to breaking with the US policy of isolating
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Cuba. He has clearly fixed upon this approach-as a
way of circumventing the OAS, which he continues to
denounce, and as the most promising path to the re-
establishment of Cuba in the Latin American community
on terms favorable to his objectives. He appears to
feel that, as Cuba resumes ties with Latin American
countries, he will be able to exercise an increasingly
influential role in nourishing anti-Yankee attitudes
and in encouraging some governments toward more
forceful revolutionary strategies than they might
otherwise be inclined to adopt. These are not aims
which Castro can expect to achieve in the short run,
but he may see an important longer range opportunity
in making common cause with the anti-US nationalistic
tendencies which continue to gain strength in the
area.
16. Castro probably has few illusions that
Torrijos actually intends to move aggressively to-
wards genuine revolution in Panama at this time.
But he is evidently counting on increasing his in-
fluence on the Torrijos government as a. means of
keeping it.on the revolutionary path. Castro prob-
ably hopes to capitalize on growing nationalism in
Panama and on the likelihood of growing strain in
its relations with the US. He apparently wants
Torrijos to stop short of a full-scale confrontation
with the US over the present round of negotiations
for a. Canal Treaty for fear that this could lead to
Torrijos' downfall. But he probably hopes that Tor-
rijos will assert himself more aggressively as a
revolutionary nationalist after signing a new Canal
Treaty. This, again from Castro's point of view,
would lay the basis for a: common front between
Panama and Cuba, particularly on ways to reduce US.
influence in the Caribbean area.
17. For his part, Torrijos is likely to re-
main cautious about making any dramatic overtures
to Castro as long as treaty negotiations with the
US continue. The caution is part of a careful
balancing act which Torrijos is trying to perform.
On the one side, just as he is willing to use
Panamanian Communists to provide some of the organi-
zational talent needed to launch new programs and
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maintain himself in power, he probably welcomes the
new pro-Panama stance of the Cubans. And he is
likely to want to keep open the possibility of a
closer alignment to demonstrate his independence of
the US. As a quid pro quo he will probably be will-
ing to lend Panamanian backing to efforts by some
Latin American countries to modify OAS sanctions
against the Castro regime.
18. On the other side, he probably thinks he
has a chance of getting an acceptable treaty package
from the US, and he is not about to throw way this
chance, either through precipitous violence against
the Canal Zone or through open alliance with an
avowed antagonist of the US. As long as this pos-
sibility is still open, Torrijos would have little
reason to commit himself to a common strategy with
the Castro regime.
19. If, however, the treaty talks are broken
off or reach an impasse in a way which leads Tor-
rijos to believe he has no chance for a negotiated
"victory" on the Canal issue, he would probably opt
for all-out confrontation with the US. In this case,
he would probably feel he had nothing to lose by
accepting international support from any and all
quarters--including Cuba.
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