THE SOVIET BUILDUP AGAINST CHINA: DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 6, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79ROOWA00080OW-003
3ecret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Soviet Buildup Against China:
Dimensions and Implications
Top Secret
6 May 1969
I\Jo. 4-6T-
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIAIRDP79R00967A000800030003-8 i" .
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R00967A0Q&900030003-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved For.Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009GA000800030003-8
6 may 1969
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 4-69
SUBJECT: The Soviet Buildup Against China: Dimensions and
Implications
The continuing buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear
capabilities opposite China has already far exceeded the level
appropriate to meet "border class" requirements. By the end of
the year, Soviet theater forces along the China border will be
stronger than those deployed in Eastern Europe. Further, there
are some indications that strategic nuclear delivery systems
will be part of the array of Soviet military power oriented
toward China.
While the size and nature of the buildup seems dispro-
portionate to any threat the Chinese now pose, it is evident
that the Soviets take possible future contingencies very
seriously. The Soviet forces will provide a strong deterrent
to Chinese military adventures. Should deterrence fail or
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was pre-
pared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated
with the Office of Strategic Research.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved ForwRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0096yA000800030003-8
should Soviet security interests so dictate, those forces will
be capable of punitive action, limited objective conventional
war, tactical nuclear war, or even a general nuclear assault
on China in conjunction with strategic strikes.
Whether or not these forces are ever used, their creation
and maintenance will inevitably affect Soviet forces opposite
NATO; at a minimum, planned improvements to those forces will
be delayed or stopped, and it Is possible that their capa-
bilities may be degraded. Moreover, the Soviet strategic
concern reflected in the buildup in the East may already be
having far-reaching effects on the other areas of Soviet policy,
particularly in Europe.
I
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved For.Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0094WA000800030003-8
T-O- S-E-C-R-E-T
The Buildup To Date
1. Theater Forces. In 1963, the Soviets were maintaining
a force of about 13 divisions opposite China from Turkestan to
the Far East. Of these, probably fewer than half were combat
ready. There are now 27 divisions either combat ready or
being built up opposite China. We now expect this total to
reach as many as 30, and it is quite likely that most, if not
all of them will be combat-ready divisions. In 1963, there were
two army or corps level headquarters; there are now at least
five and possibly six such headquarters. There was one potential
front level headquarters; there are now probably two.
For greater detail see SR/IR 68-7. "Soviet Military Forces
on the Sino-Soviet Border," September 1968.
See NIE 11-14-63, "Ca abilities of Soviet General Purpose
Forces, 1963-1969" (S) 8 January 1964.
*** Similar to an army group.
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Fqj Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00946yA000800030003-8
2. The ground forces opposite China exceed in number
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and they may exceed those
forces in quality as well, particularly as regards supporting
units. They are receiving some of the latest model tanks and
personnel carriers (T-62 and BTR6O).
I
has greater artillery support than does the entire Soviet Group
of Forces in East Germany (GSFG) -- two artillery divisions and
one or two brigades** -- and that other formations opposite China
also have more artillery strength than most Soviet forces elsewhere.
3. Most remarkable is the level and quality of tactical
nuclear support. Front-level missile support includes 45-54
Scaleboard (SS-12) mobile launchers, 8-12 Shaddock (SSC-1)
launchers, and a larger than normal Scud (SS-1) complement as
well. Soviet front-level tactical missile support in Eastern
* This comparison is a measure of Soviet theater force efforts,
not of relative importance of the Eastern and Western areas.
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are of course much more con-
centrated and are bolstered by allies.
** Three of the five Soviet armies in East Germany have one
brigade of artillery; two armies have none. There is one
artillery division assigned to GSFG.
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release - R00967A000800030003-8
the 5th Army in the Southern Maritime area alone
 Approved FoRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009 4000800030003-8
Europe includes only some 9, possibly 18, Scud launchers. There
appears to be a higher proportion of Frog launchers opposite
China than is found in Soviet ground forces west of the Urals.
4. Since 1966 the Soviets have more than doubled the total
number of tactical aircraft opposite China. A new tactical air
army was created in the Transbaykal MD -- Mongolia area -- which
now has 300 aircraft, making it the second largest Soviet tactical
air army. Another 230 combat tactical aircraft are in the Far
East MD. These numbers continue to grow. Over 30 airfields
have been either renovated or constructed along the Chinese
border. Eight of these are in Mongolia and are as yet unoccupied.
Most of the newly activated tactical air regiments are equipped
with older model aircraft (MIG-17 and IL-28). These aircraft
are better suited for ground attack and reconnaissance missions
than for air defense. The air forces opposite China have a much
higher percentage of the new Hip MI-8 helicopters than do those
opposite NATO.
There are now a total of 530 tactical combat aircraft in the
Transbaykal and Far East MD's.
I
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Foelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00947o4000800030003-8
5. Strategic Forces. Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA)
units would almost certainly be involved if the Soviets are
planning for full-scale nuclear contingencies in the area.
Such involvement is suggested by a recent highly unusual exer-
cise in which a Badger medium bomber regiment from the western
USSR (Southwest Bomber Command) deployed to the Far East and
conducted exercises. Medium bombers of this command have been
consistently oriented toward Europe, although they have on
occasion deployed to western Arctic airfields to carry out naval
support missions. LRA units in the Far East have been conducting
reconnaissance against China regularly since 1965. Last year the
LRA headquarters at Blagoveschensk on the border, was moved to
Ukraina, deeper inside the USSR, perhaps for physical security
reasons. Since then there has been a split in the command and
control setup for LRA in the Far East with a new, high echelon
headquarters established at Irkutsk. Although the foregoing is
not conclusive evidence of Soviet planning for LRA bomber missions
in China, such planning would be a logical development in view of
other Soviet military preparations. Soviet medium bombers could
probably penetrate Chinese air defenses rather easily to deliver
either conventional or nuclear bombs.
-6-
D
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Fg Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009fr7A000800030003-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
6. There is nothing arrayed against China comparable to
the massive MR/IRBM force targeted against Europe. However,
the Soviets could use some of their ICBMs against China if
necessary.
7. Evidence of Soviet strategic attack preparations against
China is thus quite tenuous at present, but it should not be
too surprising if more such indications come to light. Theater
force preparations for military contingencies in the east,
including that for tactical nuclear warfare, leave no doubt as
to the seriousness of Soviet concern. Given that concern and
the nature of the strategic military problems in a war with
China, it would be remarkable if the Soviets did not reorient
some of their strategic attack capabilities.
8. Soviet reconnaissance of China also provides a strong
indication of Soviet strategic concern. Since 1965 there has
been a sharp increase in reconnaissance activity against China;
This is most evident in the satellite reconnaissance effort.
- 7 -
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved FoLgelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009A000800030003-8
25X1
25X1
The Nature of the Buildup and Its Probable Goals
9?
The bulk of the buildup described above began in 1966,
and the decision to proceed with it was probably taken in 1965.
The Soviets must have then reached the decision that large
scale warfare was at least as likely against China as against
NATO.
10. This being the case, the size and nature of the build-
up was probably determined largely by geographical considera-
tions, and these all but dictate that the Soviet military posture
must be suitable for offensive rather than merely defensive
operations. From Turkestan eastward, the militarily important
For a fuller discussion of political indicators of such a
decision see ONE Special Memorandum 7-68, "The Soviet
Milita Buildup Along the Chinese Border," 25 March 1968
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved For.Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79RO09WA000800030003-8
terrain on the Soviet side consists of a thin strip of territory
adjacent to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The vast Siberian
territory north of this strip might as well be an ocean as far
as organization of defense-in-depth is concerned. But unlike
an ocean, it provides no hope of an alternate to the Trans-
Siberian Railroad for a lifeline to the USSR's European power
base. The military experience of the Soviets in the area --
the Russo-Japanese border clashes of the 1930's and the World
War II invasion of Manchuria -- also would incline them toward
an offensive strategy.
11. Another aspect of geography affecting the buildup is
the sparseness of Soviet population in the area. There are
only about 13 million people east of Novosibirsk (this figure
has remained constant for at least a decade), and many of them
are military or government employees. There are no significant
prospects for drawing additional military manpower from the
area. Thus the Soviets must draw from the Western USSR to
man their forces in the East, and they must keep them at or
near combat-ready strength. Facilities for large combat-ready
-9-
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2071010 : - 00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Fq,&Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R0099+1A000800030003-8
forces were not available and had to be constructed. Distance
from industrial areas demand that higher levels of supply be
on hand. These factors make the cost of maintaining forces
opposite China considerably higher.
12. The spectre of two-front war has probably exerted
considerable influence on the size and posture of Soviet forces
oriented toward China. Barring a well-established detente with
the West, the Soviets would probably consider a war in the east
an exploitable opportunity for NATO. This would argue strongly
for an in-being capability to get any Sino-Soviet conflict
over with very quickly. For the most serious contingencies
this would involve the Soviet use of nuclear weapons, perhaps
on a massive scale, despite the obvious political disadvantages.
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 266 J =103, 0 1 . - 9R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Foxr Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00WA000800030003-8
13. From the foregoing we can venture a prediciton of the
size and posture of Soviet forces arrayed against China when
the buildup is complete. Evidence from the buildup to date indi-
cates that the Soviets have decided to place strong, offensively-
posture, nuclear missile-equipped theater forces astride all the
good avenues of approach into North China and opposite Sinkiang
Province.
The Soviets are now concentrating on completing the
buildup of army and front level supporting units and increasing
tactical air strength. We have detected no additional divisions
being generated in the area although we cannot rule out the rumored
transfer of existing divisions from other areas to the Chinese
border. The buildup could be completed in early 1970 and be
postured about as follows:
-- The Far East Military District with headquarters at
Khabarovsk will probably become a front in-being with some
15 divisions. This front will have much heavier conventional
and tactical nuclear fire power, and much heavier service
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007103107 m - 9R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved F r Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00?9IA000800030003-8
support than the potential fronts opposite NATO. Armies of
this front will be stationed in three main groupings on
the northern and eastern borders of Manchuria, astride the
WW II invasion routes.
-- Transbaykal MD-Mongolia probably will become a small
front in-being* with two Soviet armies, including the eight
Soviet divisions already there. Such a front would control
Soviet and Mongolian forces astride the WW II invasion
routes into North China. It would probably be more heavily
supported and more combat ready than potential fronts in
the Western USSR, but because the Transbaykal MD is buffered
by Mongolian territory, it will probably not achieve the
peacetime size and readiness of the Far Eastern front; in
wartime it might be reinforced from the Siberian, Volga,
the North Caucasus MDs.
-- The Soviets will probably continue to station at least a
corps in Turkestan opposite Sinkiang adequate to overwhelm
* The commander of this military district, General Belik,
was recently promoted to four-star rank, indicating the
growing military importance of this area. Belik had been
deputy commander of GSFG and is a leading Soviet tank
warfare expert.
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2 07/03/07: CIA-RDP79 0967A000800030003-8
25X1
25X1
 Approved Fc J elease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009 4000800030003-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
the light Chinese defense of that province. This force will
be heavily supported with tactical nuclear missiles. This
force could be expanded fairly quickly from within the Turkestan
Military District.
14. The Soviets will probably direct more of their strategic
attack capability against Communist China. Tactical nuclear
capabilities in the east will probably continue to exceed consider-
ably those of Soviet forces opposing NATO.
15. Soviet forces in European USSR may no longer serve
exclusively as ready reinforcements against NATO but may double
as reinforcements against China. The smaller, less ready forces
in the central military districts (Siberian, Volga, North Caucasus
and Ural) may be upgraded to provide reinforcements.
The View from China
16. The Chinese military posture vis-a-vis the Soviets
certainly does not provide a rationale for the Soviet military
buildup. Chinese security elements along the border have been
belligerent and grossly obnoxious; minor skirmishes and at least
one sizable armed clash (the Ussuri incident) have occurred. The
- 13 -
-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T
I I
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Fo Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009b-A000800030003-8
Chinese are aware of the Soviet buildup (although probably not in
detail); they have protested it vigorously. But in general they
have done remarkably little with their regular military forces in
response to the Soviet buildup.
17. Substantial Chinese ground forces have for many years
been stationed in Manchuria and adjacent areas of North China.
They are well away from the border, however, and have made no
apparent movements to improve their dispositions to attack or defend
in a conflict with the Soviets. There has been some increase of
Chinese strength in Sinkiang, but that area remains thinly
garrisoned. Ethnic minorities along the borders have been removed
and replaced with quasi-military Chinese "Production- Construction
Corps." There has been no apparent priority given the Sino-Soviet
border in the fairly extensive efforts of the past several years
to improve Chinese air defense.
Soviet Military Strategy Toward China
18. Deterrence. Viewed from the West, the Soviets appear
to be overreacting to the Chinese threat. It is hard to see how
the Soviets could visualize a deliberate large-scale Chinese
invasion of the USSR. Even if the Kremlin takes seriously the
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
F__ I
25X1
25X1
- 1I -
Approved For Release 2
 Approved Fo.Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R009OA000800030003-8
aggressive Chinese talk about regaining disputed territories,
the obvious Soviet superior military strength prior to the build-
up appeared more than adequate to deter direct military aggression.
But the Soviets often appear ultra-conservative in the matter of
deterrence. Viewed from Moscow, the threat from the Chinese
must appear at least as great as the threat from NATO. China
must look massive, hostile, irrational -- and worst of all, close.
19. The future Chinese threat may appear even more ominous.
The Chinese will acquire a significant medium range nuclear
attack capability long before they pose a nuclear threat to the
US. As the Chinese nuclear capability grows, the price the Soviets
would pay to exploit their own nuclear advantage will grow, and the
deterrent effect of that advantage to Chinese non-nuclear aggression
will progressively decline. The presentation in the Kremlin of
the Chinese threat by the Soviet military leadership would
certainly reflect the conservatism of the professional military
viewpoint, the institutional interests of the military establish-
ment, and the historic Russian dread of Oriental expansion.
20. The evidence to date indicates that a very pessimistic
view of the threat from China does indeed prevail in the Kremlin.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79 00967A000800030003-8
 Approved Fo ,Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R0096TA000800030003-8
The military buildup against China may be fully consistent with
the Soviet view of requirements for deterrence of Chinese military
initiatives ranging from infiltration of irregulars to all-out
war. Theater force dispositions are distincltly offensive and
suggest that the Soviet deterrent is based on capabilities to
inflict severe punitive action inside China, with or without
the use of nuclear weapons.
Soviet military exercises in the Far East have played China as
the opponent, and have involved Soviet use of nuclear weapons.
Dispositions in Mongolia not only block potential Chinese incursions,
but could be, lead elements for a heavily armored offensive
ground force around Lake Baykal which might attack either toward
Peking or toward the Chinese missile and nuclear facilities.
Wars of Limited Objectives
21. While deterrence is probably the primary determining
factor in the size and posture of Soviet forces deployed against
- 16 -
25X1
25X1
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1
Approved For Release 2 - 00967A000800030003-8
 Approved FQrRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0094 WA000800030003-8
T-O-P S-E- -R-E-T
I I
China, other possible uses for these forces have almost certainly
been taken into account. Given an opportunity or an excuse, the
Soviets would probably excise the Chinese nuclear threat. There
can be little doubt that Chinese nuclear facilities would be
attacked immediately should large scale conflict with the
Chinese break out. The Soviets may also wish to have forces ready
to exploit any opportunity to create buffer states in Manchuria
or. Sinkiang.
Total War
22. The Soviets probably consider total war with China a
remote contingency, but apparently do not rule it out. Any
large-scale Soviet strategic attack against China would probably
be a massive attack on centers of population and industry, since
more discrete targeting of Chinese military installations would
not necessarily disable the Chinese Army.
Implications for Soviet Policy Elsewhere
23. The buildup against China is a very expensive proposition.
To the initial costs of creating, equipping and housing the newly
activated or enlarged units is added the incremental costs of
- 17 -
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 007/03/07 : CIA-RDP7 R00967A000800030003-8 25X1
 Approved F" Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00107A000800030003-8
long-distance land transport and the increased costs of maintaining
large forces in combat ready status in sub-arctic conditions. The
Soviet effort can be compared with an attempt on the part of the
US to maintain such large forces in Alaska, with its similar
labor scarcity and environmental problems. The costs to the
Soviets must certainly increase the strain of military expenditures
on their economy, and thus put the buildup against China in com-
petition with other Soviet military efforts, especially the
maintenance and improvement of theater forces opposing NATO.
Soviet problems in resource allocation along with considerations of
military strategy undoubtedly bolster arguments for detente with
the West.
24. The buildup against China has almost certainly had an
adverse effect on the Soviet theater forces opposing NATO.
"While there has been no reduction in the total nwr~ber of
divisions earmarked for use against the Central Region of NATO,
there has been a diversion of men and materiel which could have
been used to increase the readiness and accelerate the moderni-
zation of those divisions.* The mobile tactical missile units
As noted in NIE 11-1 -6 , at least two of the Soviet divisions
used in the Czechoslovakian crisis had few or no armored personnel
carriers. Such vehicles are appearing in large numbers along
the Chinese border.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79FI00967A000800030003-8
 Approved FQ&Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009A000800030003-8
now deployed along the border may have been originally intended for
the forces opposing NATO. We know that cadres were taken from
ground forces west of the Urals to build up units in the east. One
of the tactical air regiments was transferred from the Baltic MD.
Pilots for the new air regiments in the east were drawn from
existing regiments elsewhere in the USSR.
25. It now appears that the Soviet Union, having tried with
indifferent success to get political support against China from
its Eastern European allies, is attempting to involve these
countries in the military confrontation with China. Warsaw
Pact ministers of defense and their delegations to the USSR (Czech
and Polish) have visited, of all places, the Transbaykal Military
District, perhaps to be impressed by the seriousness of the Soviet
military situtation vis-a-vis China. The Foreign Minister of
Bulgaria, Bashev, has been quoted as saying that the Warsaw Pact
would respond to a Chinese attack on the USSR -- a quote which has
alarmed the rest of Eastern Europe. The same is true of rumors
concerning the stationing of East European forces opposite China.
These cannot now be regarded as more than reflections of anxiety
- 19 -
Approved For Release 20q
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
 Approved Fo4Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0091 A000800030003-8
among the East Europeans, but that anxiety may not be
entirely baseless.
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2 07/03/07 : CIA-RDP79 00967A000800030003-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000800030003-8