THE FEDAYEEN-POLITICS OF SPOILING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 26, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
jfvvvl~
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
The Fedayeen-Politics of Spoiling
Secret
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 October 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Fedayeen -- Politics of Spoiling
1. The spectacular terrorist attack against Israeli
athletes in Munich in September and the massacre at Lod
airport in May are examples of still another turn in the
tortuous course of Palestinian fedayeen activity. The
commandos had been on the defensive since their defeat by
the Jordanian army in 1970 and their virtual expulsion from
Jordan in 1971. They had lost the support of the public,
Palestinians included. Developments in Jordan seriously
damaged their capability to operate in the Arab world as
well as in Israel, for Egypt and Syria have long imposed
strict controls on operations against Israel from their
* This memorandum was prepared by the office of National
Estimates and discussed with other components of the
CIA who are in general agreement with its judgments.
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territory. In the wake of Israeli raids against fedayeen
areas in Lebanon, the Beirut government too has tightened
restrictions on the guerrillas. In recent months extremists
have gained influence among the fedayeen and more and more
guerrillas have come to see terrorist operations outside
Israel as their only remaining weapon. The new tactics
have, in fedayeen eyes, been successful. This paper examines
the implications of their growing resort to terror.
The Black September Organization
Z. The most notable manifestation of the trend toward
terrorism has been the Black September Organization --
whose name derives from the date of King Husayn's defeat
of the fedayeen in Jordan. Like the bulk of the Palestinian
population, Black September fears that a settlement of the
Arab-Israeli conflict would involve Arab concessions at
the expense of the Palestinians. Black September goes
further in believing that, through fostering acts of
violence against King Husayn and his government as well as
against Israel and its international supporters (principally
the US), tension can be increased and the chances of nego-
tiations reduced.
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leadership is closely intertwined with that of Fatah.
Indeed, it appears that Black September is simply a
cover name that allows Fatah -- the largest and hereto-
fore relatively most moderate guerrilla organization -- to
disclaim responsibility for terrorist operations carried
out by its members, While some question remains about
the degree of control which Fatah's leaders have over
Black September operations, there can be no doubt that they
are aware of its plans. Black September apparently
lacks formal structure and recruits teams for specific
operations from the membership of various fedayeen groups
as well as from Arab emigres and even non-Arabs. This
provides the organization a large reservoir of potential
recruits beyond a small core membership.
4, The Arab terrorists have established links with
extremist organizations outside of the Arab world.
Japanese sympathizers from the "Red Army Faction" have
been trained at fedayeen camps in Syria and Lebanon;
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a contingent. of these carried out the massacre at Lod
airport at the end of May 1972.. Members of the Turkish
People's Liberation Army trained by the Palestinians
kidnapped and killed the Israeli consul general in
Istanbul in May 1971. Turks may even have been involved
in the Munich operation. Members of the Eritrean Libera-
tion Front and. Iranian terrorists have also received
training in the commando camps. Some exploratory contacts
may have been made with a wing of the Irish Republican
Army. It would appear, however, that as yet relationships
between the fedayeen and other national, extremist groups
have been principally on an ad hoc basis. But despite
increased intgrnational security arrangements which may
make it more difficult to operate, their common dilemma
may encourage some of these organizations to collaborate
with the fedayeen.
S.. The fedayeen have had little return from their
lengthy efforts to obtain direct support from the Soviets.
The USSR has long provided arms to some guerrilla organi-
zations through. the governments of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.
This aid has contributed to terrorist operations, but the
Kremlin'is uncomfortable about terrorism and has found
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direct contact with the guerrillas embarrassing. The
fedayeen's growing turn toward terrorism of the Munich
and Lod variety will probably make Moscow even more
wary. At the UN in September Foreign Minister Gromyko
explicitly condemned terrorist actions which culminated
in Munich. Thus while Yasir Arafat and others have made
several trips to Moscow to seek arms and assistance, the
Soviets have not provided the requested aid. Instead
they warned the fedayeen not to embark on hijackings
and assassinations and have encouraged Arafat to line up
the guerrillas behind a moderate approach.
6. Peking, for its part, has supplied some direct
assistance to the fedayeen. Although the Chinese in the
past have attempted to discourage the guerrillas from
using terrorist tactics outside of Israel, some who
received training in China have been involved in such
operations. Military aid from China has been small in
scale, consisting primarily of small arms and ammunition.
Indeed, Chinese support for the fedayeen has not been of
major significance.
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Igrae1i Regction
7. The Israeli government has decided that the emphasis
by the fedayeen on spectacular acts of terrorism requires
new methods.onIsrael's part. Mrs. Meir has announced what
amounts to a policy of striking at the fedayeen without
waiting for a prior incident. Tel Aviv has always believed
that forceful reaction against guerrilla bases located in
neighboring Arab states would both discourage the fedayeen
and, more important, induce the Arab host governments
themselves to move against the commandos. The Israelis
see King Husayn's blows against the guerrillas in 1970 and
1971 and present Lebanese restrictions on the fedayeen as
the fruit of their forceful retaliation. Tel Aviv obviously
hopes that anticipatory strikes will have even greater
effect.
8. Israel faces problems, however, in pursuing its
policy of hitting the fedayeen on Arab terrority. Guerrilla
installations in Syria are now located well back of the
present cease-fire lines. Hence, ground action against
these bases would necessitate carrying out deep penetrations
cracking the major Syrian defenses. Unquestionably, the
Israeli armed forces have the capability to do this. But
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the Syrians have shown a propensity to return fire rather
than to withdraw. This increases the chances that a raid
would,not be quick and surgical but would result in more
Israeli casualties than Tel Aviv is willing to take.
Equally, Mrs, Meir would be reluctant to accept the
embroilment with both the West and especially the USSR
attendant on forays threatening Damascus or on operations
against Beirut to clean out commando centers there. More-
over, the small terrorist groups necessary for operations
such as Lod or Munich could readily be trained virtually
anywhere -- they need not go near large fedayeen camps.
9. The terrorists have achieved some of the aims of
their recent series of spectacular acts. The attack in
Munich at the time of the Olympics got them the spotlight
they were seeking. It went some way toward demonstrating
that the fedayeen were willing to do more than just talk
against Israel. This gave the flagging guerrilla movement
a shot in the arm, substantially raising the morale of the
commandos. Also of great importance from Fatah's point
of view, the recent wave of terrorism and the major Israeli
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retaliation it provoked further embittered Arab-Israeli
relations. It further isolated Jordan, which alone of
the Arab governments forthrightly condemned the terrorists.
And finally, the fedayeen succeeded in shifting world
attention from efforts to promote a settlement of the
Arab-Israeli conflict to international efforts to combat
terrorism.
10. The terrorists are clearly going to want to con-
tinue the kind of activity which has won them this much.
But their ability to do so and the rate at which they can
proceed will depend on a number of factors. They will
be much affected by the degree of encouragement -- or
discouragement -- they receive from Arab governments. For
in the final analysis they require the toleration if not
the active support of at least a few Arab regimes. Israeli
retaliation may also influence the course of terrorist
activity, as will international measures to combat it. A
number of states have taken stiff measures to restrict
and scrutinize Arab travelers. Inevitably this will com-
plicate plans for further terrorism. But it will not take
much to keep the terrorist organizations alive. And a
daring feat from time to time which evoked publicity and
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response from the Israelis and/or the Arab governments
would no doubt be sufficient to maintain momentum in the
terrorist movement.
11. To date, most of the terrorist operations have
struck against Israelis or Jordanians. The bombing of the
partly American-owned trans-Alpine oil terminal at Trieste
in August and the letter-bomb campaign, however, show that
the guerrillas are determined to be more far ranging. In
the future, therefore, the fedayeen may look for oppor-
tunities to hit US diplomatic installations and/or kidnap
or kill American officials around the world, perhaps even
in the US. It is equally possible that they will seek to
sabotage American oil installations abroad or perhaps
overseas US military facilities where they judge security
lax. Indeed, it would be surprising if the terrorists
did not soon attempt a spectacular operation directed
primarily against the US.
12. The Arab states adjoining Israel already effectively
limit operations by the guerrillas across the border. But
none save Jordan, whose regime is an avowed target of the
fedayeen, is likely to move of its own accord to take the
sort of forceful measures required to prevent terrorist
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activity, especially when it is carried out in non-Arab
states. It would take great outside pressure to induce
the Lebanese government, which shows the most signs of
wanting to follow in Jordan's footsteps, to accept the
political and economic costs of efforts to dislodge the
#edayeen from Beirut itself. Indeed, the delicate balance
on which the Beirut government depends might not be able
to withstand the strains of an all-out operation to
eliminate the Palestinian guerrillas. And, if pressed,
the fedayeen could move their headquarters to Libya,
which has increasingly encouraged the terrorists in recent
months..
13. Arab states further from Israel would strongly
resist outside pressure to reduce their support for the
Palestinian guerrillas. Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia,
which supply the main financial backing to the fedayeen,
are highly sensitive to any suggestion of being pressed
on this issue. They do not consider the terrorist acts
as more barbaric than Israel's actions against the Pales-
tinians. King Faysal, for example, has expressed dis-
pleasure at the Japanese government for its condemnation of
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the fedayeen action at Munich. Libya's Qadhafi is even
more emotional and has the financial resources to be
impervious to outside economic pressures. Direct Israeli
retaliation against Libya would also be exceedingly
difficult and would only stiffen Qadhafi's determination.
Thus the guerrillas almost certainly will continue to
receive enough sympathy and support to carry on their
campaign of terror at some level.
14. Fedayeen pride in the success of spectacular
acts of terrorism will not induce greater cooperation
among the rival guerrilla groups. Instead, Black Sep-
tember successes may spur the Front for the Liberation
of Palestine and other splinter groups to step up their
own terrorist efforts in order to boost their own prestige.
Even within Fatah itself, the rise of Black September
is proving unsettling. It is strengthening the extrem-
ists in Fatah who have long been pressing Arafat for
greater influence. The Black September Organization will
almost inevitably play a larger role in making Fatah
policy. If the Black September leaders clash with the
wider leadership in Fatah, they may even split off to form
a wholly independent body. In any event, the growing
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influence of the extremist faction will weaken the position
of Yasir Arafat, who is already under fire for the failures
in Jordan. Tt is not clear who would emerge if Arafat
were actually displaced, but the chances of change in
Fatah's leadership are growing.
15. ContOuing recourse to terror by the fddayeen
will breed counter-terror by their opponents. Some Israelis
themselves have frequently been tempted to retaliate in
kind, particularly when they concluded that regular mili-
tary operations were not enough reply to the terrorists.
Thus it is possible that Tel Aviv may launch a major cam-
paign to assassinate Arab guerrilla leaders, although
through mechanisms that do not publicly implicate Israel.
Jprdan.is likely to initiate or expand its own terrorist
operations against the fedayeen.
16. In sum, despite their defeat in conventional
military encounters with Israel and in confrontations with
Husayn, the fedayeen have shown that they cannot be counted
out of the Middle East equation. They are certainly not
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likely tp make much headway in weakening the Israeli
position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But they still
can play -- and are playing -- a spoiling role, in respect
of negotiations toward a settlement. For they are able to
provoke both the Arab governments, and especially the
Israelis, into reactions that further embitter the con-
flict. And they areable to concentrate the attention of
the outside world on themselves rather than on parties
to the conflict who are willing to entertain thoughts of
compromise.
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