POST-FRANCO SPAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000300020003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 12, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Post-Franco Spain
Secret
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 March 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Post-Franco Spain*
Though occasionally dramatic, developments in Spain
during the past year or two have not basically altered the
political outlook for the post-Franco era. There have been
some changes in degree, but not in kind. Franco is some-
what weaker as he draws nearer to the day he must relinquish
his leadership; Juan Carlos now stands ready to assume titular
leadership of a successor regime which will be dominated by
the military; major elements of the Church are accelerating
efforts to loosen close ties to the regime; the very small
Communist Party is active in the extra-legal Workers'
Commissions; and Spanish workers are exhibiting a growing
willingness to go out on strike. The transition to a new
regime is likely to be non-violent and, at least for a year
or so, Francois successors will emphasize and probably achieve
essential continuity. It will be, however, a continuity beset
by strong pressures for liberalization, from labor and from
opposition forces and even from significant elements within
the new regime itself. On the whole, the already visible
trend toward moderation and Europeanization has a good chance
of being sustained, but much will depend upon how the mili-
tary and other conservative groups react to these pressures.
T his memorandum was prepared by the Office of'RationaZ Estimates
and coordinated within the Central InteZZigence Agency.
GROUP 1
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1. For over thirty years, Franco's political skill and personal
mystique have dominated and held together the varied elements of his
regime. Falangists, the Roman Catholic Church, the military, wealthy
business interests, and the aristocratic elite have all supported
the Caudillo, influenced him in varying degrees, and -- to some
extent -- shared the responsibility of government. No single one of
these elements, however, has been allowed to attain political ascen-
dancy over the others or to challenge the supremacy of Franco.
2. But Franco is now in his 79th year and his vigor and authority
are waning. Both within and outside the government, various forces are
maneuvering for position in the post-Franco era and, as demonstrated
recently in connection with the trial of Basque terrorists at Burgos,
tensions are rising. Nevertheless Franco is still essentially in
charge and the chances of a real eruption before his departure from
the scene are low. Moreover, the tensions are not yet so great as to
indicate a breakdown of the system upon his death. The immediate out-
look after Franco is for a non-violent transition to a regime under
Juan Carlos, who will reign with the support and sufferance of the
military. But few Spaniards in or out of the military believe Juan
Carlos capable of playing more than a figurehead role, and not many
have any particular interest in the restoration of the monarchy. It
will be during the initial period of military tutelage that the main
battle for control of Spain will be joined.
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CONTENDING FORCES
3. The protagonists in the coming struggle may be arrayed under
such familiar banners as Church, Military, Labor, and so on; but the
basic conflict will be between those who advocate the easing or elimi-
nation of the choking restrictions of Francoism and those who believe
that their interests or those of their country are threatened by
currents for change. The rapid economic growth of the past decade
has certainly increased the number of Spaniards willing to live with
the regime. But even within the Spanish Establishment, significant
elements admit that a post-Franco government should move in the
direction of some change, some loosening of present restrictions on
free expression and on the right to form free associations.
Elements of the Establishment
4. Franco's own recognition of the need for at least evolutionary
change was signaled in October, 1969, when he broke precedent by
appointing an "unbalanced" cabinet, dominated by European-minded
technocrats of Opus Dei, the semi-secret Roman Catholic lay order.
Members of this organization -- prominent in Spanish business, finance,
publishing, and education -- are not politically liberal but favor
economic modernization and a loosening of state economic controls.
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5. Opus Dei members insist they follow no central political
guidance and have no particular political ambitions. But enemies
of Opus Dei ranging from Falangists on the right to extremists on
the left profess to believe that the order is bent on controlling
the nation's economic, political, and educational life. And its
conservative critics add that it is undermining Spanish traditionalism
in the process. The Opus Dei faction enjoys a relatively favored
position in the present cabinet and maintains a close relationship
with Juan Carlos and several top military leaders and with Vice
President Carrero Blanco, who appears to have the best chance of suc-
ceeding Franco as President of the Government (Prime Minister). But
the Opus Dei faction has been hurt by a recent financial scandal
allegedly involving Opus Dei members in the government and probably
by the Burgos trial as well; it now seems more vulnerable to political
attack.
6. The attitude of the Church proper toward Opus Dei is mixed.
Some in the hierarchy are no doubt quite close to Opus Dei, others
probably dislike its views and fear its politics, and still others --
particularly those in religious orders, such as the Jesuits -- seem
to view it as a real or potential rival. The attitude of the Church
in Spain toward the Franco regime in general is also mixed. Most of
the top hierarchy still firmly' supports Franco and will undoubtedly
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endorse a continuation of his policies in the post-Franco era. But a
swelling minority of churchmen has been increasingly critical of both
the regime and the Church's role in it. Individual priests and the
labor and youth organizations of the Jesuits and of Catholic Action
are increasingly influential among Spanish. workers and intellectuals
who have tended to reject the Church itself because of its identifica-
tion with the regime. Roughly a third to a half of Spain's bishops
are now considered to be on the "liberal" side, favoring in varying
degrees a separation of Church and State and a stronger, more independent
voice for Spanish workers.
7. The foreign and economic policies associated with Opus Dei
ministers are widely supported in the business community. Close
economic ties with Western Europe and the US, increased foreign invest-
ment in Spain, gradual normalization of relations with the Soviet Bloc,
and increased trade with North Africa, the Middle East, and Latin
America -- all are meeting with increasing approval on the part of
Spanish businessmen who have become markedly more self-confident during
the past decade of growing prosperity. There are of course some
businessmen who remain dependent on Spain's traditional "closed
corporation" economic system and oppose a free market economy which
could jeopardize their interests. And those with ties to the landed
aristocracy oppose the growing pressures for social and economic change.
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But many who are hostile to Opus Dei as an organization now support the
continued modernization and Europeanization of the economy and seem
less fearful than formerly of gradual political liberalization.
8. The Falange, formerly one of the most important groups in the
National Movement -- Spain's only legal political party -- has been
steadily downgraded by Franco since the mid-1940s when its fascist
aspects became an increasing embarrassment. It now lacks both a power
center and a popular following. The ability of diehard Falangists to
engage in effective resistance to change will be helped if they can
ally themselves with conservative military leaders, as they apparently
did last December during the large pro-Franco and anti-Opus Dei demon-
strations following the trial at Burgos.
9. The Spanish Army, which dominates the other armed forces and
the internal security services, has been the guarantor of order and
of Franco's authority since the civil war. By tradition, by personal
interest, and by conviction, most senior Army officers are devoted to
preserving the form and stability of the regime. Among the lower
echelons, however, there is much less satisfaction with the status quo.
Promotions are slow and dependent upon "connections", which the younger
officers, coming from lower middle class backgrounds, do not have;
military pay has lagged badly behind civilian pay in many sectors of
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the economy; inflation is making ever deeper inroads into meager
salaries, and -- unlike the top brass -- the younger officers are
unable to supplement their earnings through lucrative family or
business contacts; and, in many cases, senior officers have shown
themselves to be incapable of dealing with the technical complexities
of modern military concepts. Discontent among junior officers is not
likely to reach the point of an open split in the intensely hierarchy-
conscious Army. But it is no longer true that the Spanish officer
corps is monolithic in its outlook, and this will become increasingly
important, and evident, as some of the younger officers inherit the
positions of their superannuated superiors.
Opposing Forces
10. The quality of life has been measurably improved for most
Spaniards, and expectations and demands for further improvement are
on the rise; Spain is no longer isolated from the main currents of
European thought -- with over 23 million visitors in 1970, it has
become the leading tourist country in Europe. Fear of radical
change of a Marxist or Anarchist variety has declined, even among the
regime's most reactionary elements. But while major critics of the
regime do not threaten its survival while Franco lives, they have be-
come increasingly vocal in the face of division and uncertainty among
the regime's traditional supporters.
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11, One of the most important political developments in recent
years has been the growth of the illegal Workers' Commissions. Formed
in 1962 and initially sponsored by Church-connected organizations to
protest the management bias of the government-controlled syndicates,
they now control an estimated five to ten percent of the Spanish labor
force. In many instances, they have achieved de facto recognition from
management in negotiations to settle labor disputes. The Commissions
are linked in a loose system of provincial and regional confederations
under a national coordinating committee and secretariat. Many
Commission leaders have outside affiliations with Church groups and
illegal political parties, but some do not. The Communists are active
in the movement and appear to dominate some of the Commissions.
12. The Workers' Commissions do not now have the capacity to
organize a general strike. They have had some success, however, in
leading demonstrations and strikes in several areas. To date, their
efforts have been directed primarily at economic rather than political
ends. But the Commissions provide valuable training ground for
political activity and leadership, and their growing effectiveness is
itself a challenge to the regime's prohibition of free association.
13. Though there were few student demonstrations last year,
tensions among Spanish university students remain high. The goals
of student activists have become increasingly political as demands
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for reforms of the universities have been superseded by demands for
reforms of the regime. But Spanish students, by themselves, do not
pose much of a threat to the present or post-Franco regime. Only a
small minority of the 154,000 university students in Spain are
politically active; and the traditional hostility of the workers to
the rich men's sons in the universities has effectively blocked the
efforts of a few student and worker leaders to reach any large-scale
cooperative arrangement.
14. There is a certain comic opera aspect to the Spanish political
opposition, with its plethora of badly fragmented Socialist, Christian
Democratic, Communist, and Anarchist parties, each busy with clandestine
plots and propaganda. None to date has commanded significant popular
support, and none is strong enough or well enough organized to threaten
the regime's existence. They are all eager to harness the growing
worker and student movement to their own ends, and all now demand the
right of associations -- political parties, labor organizations, stu-
dent unions -- to exist legally and free of government control.
15. If political parties should be legalized in Spain, none of
the existing opposition parties seems likely to emerge as a dominant
force. Still, the Socialists would benefit initially from their close
relations with and support from West European Socialists and unionists
and from the traditional anti-clericalism of many Spanish workers and
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intellectuals. A fairly strong Christian Democratic Party might also
emerge, drawing support from some of the Workers' Commissions, various
religious organizations, and members of the business community. The
orthodox Communists are probably the best organized but are few in
number, and the Spanish Communist movement as a whole is in factional
disarray. In any case, popular hostility to Communism is deep and.
widespread, knowing this, the orthodox Communists are working for
tactical alliances with one or both of the larger groups.
16. While the authoritarian pattern of Spanish government will
no doubt persist for some time after Franco goes, there will clearly
be many pressures to alter many of the practices and even the structure
of the regime. There will also be a period -- perhaps lasting for
several years -- of shifting alliances among and within groups which
now count as regime and opposition. Those in the regime, and especially
the military, will certainly occupy advantageous positions, and this will
improve chances for an orderly evolution. Economic improvements, better
and more widespread education, population movement, and increased contacts
with Western Europe have done something to soften class, religious,
political, and regional animosities.
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17. But there are obviously some very serious obstacles to
gradual and orderly change. Even if none of the contending groups
should try to bring down the system, they could nevertheless make
it difficult for the government to control the course of events. The
arena of politics might spread on an ever widening scale from the
councils of government to the general public. Labor organizations
would probably become stronger and more independent; workers would
feel even freer to strike. The role of students and student movements
would probably also grow; student demonstrations would become more
frequent and marked increasingly by violence. The Communists, Anarchists,
and Basque and Catalan separatists might seize the opportunity for mis-
chiefmaking. A recession or serious inflation, if it should occur,
would make it easier for these various oppositionists to garner popular
support.
18. If events began to unfold in this manner, some of the military
chiefs almost certainly would seek to restore "stability" by imposing
a more authoritarian system. Providing civil disruption were great
enough, they probably could unite around one of their own number and
gain the approval of their own forces and of many Falange, Church, and
business leaders. But there would be a question about how long they
could keep the situation stabilized. And it is possible that the mili-
tary leaders could not gain the cooperation or acquiescence of powerful
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segments of Spanish society in the imposition of a military dictatorship
-- in short that they could not put humpty-dumpty back together again.
19. On the whole, the already visible trend toward moderation and
Europeanization has a good chance of being sustained. Much will depend
upon how the military and other conservative groups react to the pres-
sures for change. If the pressures become too strong and the reaction
too repressive, Spain could plunge into a spiral of violence. On the
other hand, moderate pressures and a regime which makes concessions to
them would enable Spain to evolve peacefully into the West European mold.
20. In the political milieu which seems likely to emerge, foreign
influences will play an increasingly important role. Spaniards who
think of themselves as "modern" will more and more look to West
Europeans for ideas and for material support. (This process is already
well underway, as indicated by the conclusion last year of Spain's
preferential trade agreement with the EC and of the Spanish/French arms
deals.) Various Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Communist groups,
and their trade union affiliates, already receive training and support
from their brother organizations in Western Europe, and more than a
million Spaniards have worked there since 1960. Expanding Spanish
contacts with other nations would in effect mean a reduction in the
relative influence which the US now exerts -- especially if Spain should
achieve its long-coveted association with NATO. Indeed, one of the few
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areas of agreement shared by almost all the rival Spanish forces is a
desire to lessen their present dependence on the US and to diversify
their foreign ties. But most want these new links in addition to,
rather than instead of, those with the US.
21. On the whole, the Spaniards seem likely to continue to view
their relations with the US largely in pragmatic terms. There will
nevertheless be a possibility that various factions in Spain may try
to use, or abuse, the US in their domestic power struggle. Despite
Spain's increasing contacts with Europe, a large element of xenophobia
still is part of the Spanish character. A pretext for anti-Americanism
already exists in the bitterness felt by opposition groups over US
military and economic,support of Franco's regime. At best, the situation
could evolve gradually in a way for the US to remain aloof and on good
terms with all. At worst, the US military role in Spain could become
a target for the frustrations and defeats of the contending factions.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Here Is the memorandum on Spain which I promise
you.
We propose to give it on Monday the ordinary
distribution of an ONE Memorandum, with the usual
cover.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
Attachment:
Memorandum, dated 12 March 71
"Post- Franco Spain"
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 lo' WHICH MAY BE USED.
(DATE)
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