EASTERN EUROPE: THE NEW BREED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000200010005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 23, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Eastern Europe: The New Breed
Secret
23 April 1970
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 April 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Eastern Europe: The New Breed*
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS
In contrast to their old-guard predecessors, who had close
ties to Moscow, the rising generation of East European leaders,
now in their forties, appears to be more nationalist-minded.
Though still communists, many of these men have become disil-
lusioned with Soviet orthodoxy, tend to interpret the scripture
largely according to the needs of their own societies, and seem
anxious to reduce or eliminate Soviet hegemony. The urgent
need of the East European economies for modernization has in-
creased the awareness of the younger leaders, especially those
who are economic specialists, that major departures from the
Soviet economic model are desirable, perhaps necessary. These
leaders may also be encouraged by the Romanian example to try
to improve their own political positions by appealing to nation-
alist sentiments, a process which could proceed only at Soviet
expense. Not all of these younger leaders fit the new, national
mold, of course; the inclinations of some are conservative, even
pro-Soviet, and the views of others remain wholly obscure. Still,
as the new leaders come into top positions of power they are
likely to present the Soviets with problems of a different degree,
and possibly even of a different kind, than those posed by their
elders.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the
Office of Current Intelligence, Office of Economic
Research, and the Central Reference Service, who concur
in its main judgments.
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I. A GENERATIONAL CHANGE
1. Much has happened since the time after World War II
when the East European communist parties were dominated exclu-
sively by Comintern veterans, wartime partisan leaders, or
Soviet-trained communists who attained power as camp followers
of the Red Army. Time has had its impact: now the likes of
Rakosi, Dimitrov, and Ana Pauker are gone for good; some of
the remaining old-timers -- e.g,, Gomulka (65), and Tito (77)
-- are visibly slowing down and the Soviets perhaps wish that
Ulbricht (77) would, too. In certain of the East European
countries, the remnants of the old guard have sought to keep
"safe" men -- experienced and undistinguished functionaries
usually in their fifties -7 in many key party and government
positions. But the general tendency has been for a new gener-
ation of leaders -- men in their forties -- to move gradually
up the ladder and to find their way- into increasingly re-
sponsible jobs.
2. The pace of this process has varied considerably from
country to country-. It has advanced particularly far in
Yugoslavia, where Tito in the past year or so has placed well-
qualified young activists in key party and government positions
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and has forced most members of the old guard to move on. It
is also well along in Romania, where Ceausescu, himself only
52, has put many younger men in leading positions. In Hungary
and Bulgaria, members of the new generation are now in second
ranking positions and will rise sooner or later. In Poland
and in East Germany, the older generation still holds most of
the key posts, but several promising young people have attained
Politburo status and are becoming increasingly influential.
3. It is of course very difficult to generalize about
the views of so many men in so many diverse circumstances.
To begin with, we know so little about them. Their private
conversations and their public remarks are helpful but are
not necessarily reliable guides to their present inner con-
victions or to their future political behavior. Further,
what may move a man in Poland may be quite different from
what is likely to move his opposite number in, say, Romania.
And, finally, we are dealing here with leaders who must func-
tion in political systems which, more than most, encourage
circumspection and dissembling.
4. Despite all this some generalizations about these
men are possible. We do have bits and pieces of biographic
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information; we do know something about the political environ-
ment in each of these countries; and we are aware that all these
leaders must respond, one way or the other, to the larger forces
operating within and between these societies. Indeed, it is
possible for us to draw a general picture of backgrounds and
attitudes which suggests quite strongly that many of the younger
officials in Eastern Europpare different from their predecessors
-- and different in several important ways.
5. The contrast in background and training is especially
striking. The old-guard communist leaders of Eastern Europe
had usually played an active part in the underground Comintern
conspiracy, received extensive training in the USSR, and collabo-
rated with the Soviets both during wartime partisan struggles
and the subsequent seizure of power in their own countries.
The new, rising generation of leaders has no equivalent old-
school-tie relationship with the Soviet party, or, for that
matter, among themselves. Most of them have had little or no
conspiratorial underground experience. Their formative train-
ing and experience have come instead from their activities and
relationships as party functionaries -- and sometimes as pro-
fessional specialists with only rather nominal party affili-
ation -- in their native lands. They are not held close to
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Moscow or to each other by the bonds of shared wartime or
revolutionary exploits; instead, the focus of their effort
(and perhaps pride of accomplishment) has been on the develop-
ment of their own countries. Thus they have developed a sense
of national identity, different from both the Soviet-oriented
internationalism of their communist elders and the chauvinism
of the pre-war regimes.
6. To be sure, most of these younger men apparently
think of themselves as good communists. They approve of an
authdritarian approach to party and government affairs, they
work for the preservation of communist party rule, and they
understand that some sort of special relationship with the
Soviets is likely to endure. But their definition of communism
is no longer the orthodox Soviet definition, and their test of
what is a good communist does not necessarily correspond to
the Soviet test. Their questions and concerns about the
various facets of the communist system are focused increas-
ingly on "How well does it fit the actual conditions here in
my country?" and "How well does it work?" In short, they tend
to be more pragmatic and less doctrinaire than their prede-
cessors and no more interested in and responsive to Moscow's
desires than they judge they have to be. In contrast with
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their elders, their attitudes have been conditioned by the
convolutions of Soviet attitudes and policies in the period
since World War II, by nationalism, and by the imperatives
of economics.
TT. CONDITIONING FACTOR.'
A. Nationalism. and Soviet Policy
7, Though not then in high positions, the younger men
well remember the Stalinist era, the brutality and militancy
of Soviet overlordship and the distinctly second-class status
accorded their own states. They also remember the pause
following Stalin's death and the ragged efforts -- such as
the New Economic Course -- to revise the means and the con-
sequences of Soviet control. Khrushchev's subsequent de-
Stalinization campaign offered further opportunities for
departures from Soviet orthodoxy and for the expression of
individual national interests; it also shook the loyalties
and beliefs of many of those party members, young and old,
who had somehow retained their faith in the USSR and its
communist system.
8. The Soviet invasion of Hungary no doubt further
dispelled any lingering illusions about the USSR's real. role
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in Eastern Europe, though it certainly did not destroy the hope
of many (perhaps including even Kadar) that in time Khrushchev
would permit each state a meaningful degree of sovereignty.
More recently, Khrushchev's removal in 1964, the general
tightening up within the USSR by his successors and, of
course, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 have surely
dimmed hopes in Eastern Europe for any early development of
a benign Soviet outlook. But these same developments have
also pr bably further discredited the USSR and orthodox
communism in the eyes of many of the younger leaders and
perhaps reinforced their determination to free their countries
from arbitrary Soviet authority.
9 Nationalism obviously remains a potentially powerful
force throughout Eastern Europe. There was a time -- even
after Yugoslavia's break with the USSR in 1948 -- when this
was thought not to be so, when both the Soviets and many
Western observers believed that expressions of nationalism
were no longer possible in these societies. Events in Poland
and Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 have of
course proved otherwise. So too have developments over the
past several years in Romania. In fact, the Romanian case
may prove to be the most interesting and ultimately most im-
portant: the Romanian party, responding essentially to its
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own needs, has developed a program which rests on the propo-
sition that nationalism pays, i.e., that the nationalist (and
anti-Soviet) sentiments of the people can be used to bolster
the power and prestige of the regime.
10. This is significant for two reasons. First, the
added strength which accrues to the regime as a consequence
of its more solid popular base can be used -- and in the
Romanian instance has been used -- to improve the bargaining
position of the regime vis-a-vis the Soviets. (The reverse
happened in Poland in 1957 when Gomulka's power, which rested
in large measure at the time on nationalist-inspired popular
support, was turned back against the people, inter alia to
the benefit of the Soviet Union.) Second, and equally im-
portant, the Romanian experience, like the Yugoslav before
it, demonstrates that a party which hangs together and moves
on its own to reduce or eliminate its dependence on the CPSU
can survive Soviet pressures to conform. This, obviously, is
not the case when a party becomes badly fragmented while seek-
ing to do the same sort of thing in response to internal pres-
sures which have grown mainly outside the party, as in both
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).
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11. The lesson that the East European party leaders --
young and old alike -- learned from the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia was along the lines implied above: the USSR
will intervene militarily if it appears to Moscow that a
client party is on the verge of collapse (Hungary) or on the
point of relinquishing effective monopoly control (Czechoslovakia).
But -- especially among the younger leaders -- this lesson by
itself may in time prove quite insufficient for Soviet purposes;
it does not disallow modest and gradual reform with nationalist
undertones, as now practiced in Hungary, nor does it prohibit
the formation of regimes dominated by politicians who might
seek broad sources of political strength from within their
own societies. Theemergence of regimes of this character
would encourage or even force (as in Romania) the adoption of
policies which pursue genuine national (and nationalist)
interests. This does not mean that a party leader in these
circumstances would find himself a captive of mere public
whim; it might mean, however, that it would be easier and
politically more sensible for him to take account of politi-
cal currents at home rather than political current's in Moscow.
B. The Economic Imperative
12. An aspect of Soviet authority most resented by the
younger leaders is Moscow's insistence that each state within
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its sphere must conform to an economic model which -- as is
now becoming increasingly obvious -- does not even serve the
USSR well. The damage done the East European economies by the
imposition of Stalinist norms in the late 1940's and early
1950's is well known. The subsequent failure of most of these
economies to improve very much through partial reforms and
piecemeal measures -- a process still underway -- is also
clearly evident. Accordingly, pressures are growing for
some fundamental restructuring. Ota Sik, the prominent Czech
economist who was anxious to reshape the Czechoslovak economy
along lines somewhat akin to Yugoslavia's "market socialism",
has of course been repudiated by the present regime in Prague.
But Sik's ideas, and those of others like him, retain a sort
of underground currency throughout Eastern Europe, a fact at
least partially testified to by continuing Soviet nervousness
about all such beliefs.
13. The fact is that many knowledgeable East Europeans
can now see clear advantages in some form of economic decentrali-
zation, whether entirely Sikian or not. At the same time, they
can see an available bank of Western know-how and technology
far richer than that existing -- or likely soon to exist -- in
the USSR. The urge to improve economic results is not confined
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to economists. It also seems to be felt deeply by many who
fall within the category of party technocrat -- that class of
party professionals whose qualifications and career orientation
have led to specialization in economic planning or adminis-
tration. Sometimes men in this group have acquired some engi-
neering background; sometimes they have obtained academic
degrees. Most often, however, their economic expertise has
been acquired from practical experience, rather than from
academic training.
14. Many party technocrats are involved in the culti-
vation of economic ties with other countries and in the
acquisition of modern technological processes from the West.
The quest for economic efficiency usually leads them to be-
come involved as well in experimentation with economic reform.
Moreover, the resultant consciousness of the gap between Commu-
nist pretensions and actual performance sometimes has an eroding
effect on their political views. Sometimes the policies they
initiate primarily to introduce change into the economy also
entail parallel political innovation. This tendency has long
been characteristic of the Yugoslav economic reform; it was
present in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and at the present time is
apparent in Hungary.*
See ONE Memorandum, "The Hungarian Experiment: Kadar's
Not-so-Middle Way". 5 January 1970.
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15. The technocrat most responsible for the economic
reform program in Hungary is Central Committee Secretary and
Politburo member Rezso Nyers (46), the party's leading economic
expert. Nyers has indicated that he is well aware of the
political implications of real economic reform. Indeed, he
has said so.
16. Neither in East Germany nor in Poland is there any
evidence of movement toward political liberalization. This is
certainly not surprising in view of the repressive, neo-Stalinist
nature of the Ulbricht regime and the conservatism and fear of
experimentation of the Gomulka regime. But technocrats in these
countries are aware of developments elsewhere, and it is incon-
ceivable that they could be altogether immune to the pressures
for real reform -- including political reform -- which have
produced movement elsewhere. The removal of restraints in
either country would surely bring reformist ideas to the sur-
face, either quickly -- as in Czechoslovakia where restraints
vanished so completely and rapidly -- or gradually and cau-
tiously, as is now the case in Hungary.
17. The chief party technocrats in East Germany, Guenter
Mittag (43), and Werner Jarowinsky (42), have both been deeply
involved in the limited economic reform program, the "New
Economic System", initiated by the regime in 1963. Mittag,
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the yougest Politburo member and the party's leading economic
expert, is known to be realistic -- as opposed to doctrinaire
-- in economic matters, despite his unquestioned allegiance
to the party and to Ulbricht. Jarowinsky, an equally well
educated and qualified economist whose specialty is trade
and supply matters, has advocated the introduction of modern
technological methods into the East German economy. In
Poland, the two chief party technocrats, Jaszczuk and Gieruk
(in their mid-fifties), have helped to develop Poland's own
version of economic reform. Jaszczuk, the principal economic
spokesman for the regime, has shown by his speeches that he
is decidedly pragmatic in his approach to economic policy.
Gierek, party boss and industrial czar in Silesia, combines
a somewhat dogmatic approach to politics and ideology with
a down-to-earth approach to economic questions. He has not
hesitated to rely on the technical intelligentsia to achieve
economic efficiency.
18. One of Romania's principal party technocrats is
Manea Manescu (53), Chairman of the Economic Council, who
as a qualified economist has held many economic posts in the
regime. He has also had responsibility in the fields of
science and culture, where he was at one time described as
a key leader of Romania's cultural thaw. A different type,
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but an example of the able young economic and technical
specialists Ceausescu has brought into the party and govern-
ment leadership is his friend, Cornel Burtica (38), Minister
of Foreign Trade, who came from the same part of the country
(Oltenie) as Ceausescu, and whose prior experience was pri-
marily in foreign affairs. In his present post Burtica is
actively helping to develop Romania's economic ties with the
West, at the same time as he promotes greater independence
for "Socialist" Romania.
C. Counteracting Forces
19. The force of nationalism and the imperatives of
economics do not of course operate within the various East
European states unopposed. Even in Yugoslavia there are
elements which dislike the tacitly anti-Soviet stance of the
dominant group and which resist the reformist bent of the
majority in the party. And, elsewhere, there are still many
officials -- including younger officials -- who respect ortho-
doxy, are persuaded by doctrine, and in general fear departures
from past, Soviet-oriented practices.
20. Those who tend to be most cautious in these respects
are the party functionaries whose jobs concern party organization
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and control -- e.g., supervision of cadres, security matters,
ideological/propaganda actiVities. It seems that those who
feel they might someday have to act to keep the lid on are
more inclined than their party colleagues to hold to the old
and tested ways,
21. One example in Hungary of this more conservative
type of party functionary is Bela Biszku (48), who has risen
to the number two position in the party after Kadar. In
Bulgaria, equivalent types are Stanko Todorov (49), who
administers the party for party leader Zhivkov, and Venelin
Kotsev ()-i-3), party specialist in ideological and cultural
affairs. In Poland the chief comers in the party include
Stanislaw Kociolek (39), an ideological expert, and two
young functionaries of proven ability, Jan Szydlak (44)
and Jozef Tejchma (42). A typical example of the tough
young East German functionary is Gerhard Grtieneberg (48),
an agricultural specialist of pronounced hard-line tendencies.
22. Circumstances are of course different in Romania.
The regime as a whole is authoritarian, though it is not
necessarily bound by ideology and is certainly not sym-
pathetic to the USSR. Some younger Romanian leaders in the
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party apparatus seem to be brothers under the skin of their
counterparts elsewhere: e.g., Virgil Trofin (43), cadre chief
and number two in the party, and Gheorghe Pana (4o), member
of the party Secretariat and Presidium and a close associate
of Ceausescu.
III. CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL
23. While their backgrounds and the conditioning factors
noted above throw some light on the tendencies of the younger
leaders as a group, their tendencies as individuals are more
difficult to assess. As careerists, of course, many of them
are bound to be strongly influenced by opportunism. But the
behavior of each is a product of many factors, including soci-
ological and environmental background, career experience,
relationships between these men and their colleagues, and
the position of their country vis-a-vis the outside world,
especially its neighbors.
24. By no means least important is the character and
personality of the individual leader himself. Unfortunately,
information available to us on these matters is not very
helpful. The sort of information which frequently is avail-
able in the files, largely sociological data and the career
record of the leader himself, provides only a limited insight
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into probable political behavior. Both Alexander Dubcek and
Imre Nagy for example, had records as reliable party func-
tionaries before they played their particular roles in history.
25. Dubcek was educated in the USSR before the war, and
in the midst of his career in the Slovak party in the mid-fifties
was sent to Msocow for three years' training at the Higher Party
School. His pro-Soviet credentials were impressive, as was his
record as a Slovak party careeriSt. By the mid-sixties there
was little in his record to suggest his subsequent behavior.
The Hungarian national deviationist, Imre Nagy, spent about
half his life in the Soviet Union. A trusted "Muscovite"
communist, he returned to Hungary after the war, hanging on
to the coattails of the Red Army. He had a long career as a
trusted party functionary (including prewar underground experi-
ence in Hungary), and his background suggested he would be
staunchly loyal to the party and to Msocow. Indeed, he first
became Prime Minister in Hungary in July 1953 at Soviet behest.
26. Certain factors in the careers of Dubcek and Nagy
later proved to have an important influence on their subse-
quent political attitudes, but it would have been difficult
to conclude so at the time. Thus, when Dubcek attended
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Higher Party School in Moscow he was deeply influenced by
Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, which affected his
later desire to redress Stalinist injustices at home. Imre
Nagy's long experience in the USSR only strengthened his
deep conviction that socialism should be developed differently
in Hungary.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS
27. If what we have said about their general tendencies
is correct, then the younger communist leaders who will be
gradually rising to the top in Eastern Europe during the next
few years will present the Soviets with problems of a different
degree and perhaps even of a different kind than those posed
by their predecessors. Their background and training, which
is clearly different from that of their elders, together with
the various forces tending to influence them toward more prag-
matic, more independent behavior, make it clear that the problem
of preserving order and discipline in the future -- a period in
which Western economic and technological influence in Eastern
Europe will steadily increase -- will be increasingly diffi-
cult for Moscow. At a minimum, the tendencies of the new
leaders will add to the already considerable difficulties of
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maintaining the status quo and manipulating events to Soviet
advantage in Eastern Europe. All factors, of course, are
not working in this same direction. The tendencies of these
men are far from uniform, and the impact of the younger
leaders on their countries as they ascend to power is likely
to be uneven.
28. One reason for this is the considerable variation
in local circumstances and national traditions, which will
affect both the courses adopted by individual leaders and the
manner in which the local populace responds. Thus, a severe
political crisis in, say, Poland would be unlikely to develop
in the same way as the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. The
Czechs, though pressing very hard during the "Prague Spring"
for basic changes in the system, did so in a moderate, non-
violent way, in conformity with national traditions. The
Poles, on the other hand, have a heritage of militant nation-
alism in which futile but heroic acts of resistance have played
a significant role, as often as not against Russian oppressors.
The chances are that a crisis in Poland (and probably in
Hungary too) would escalate much more quickly to dramatic
proportions. Facets of national character and tradition will,
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in fact, help to mold events and to shape the attitudes of
the younger leaders in all of the East European states.
29. The impact of the new leaders 'will also be affected
importantly by the Soviet attitude and behavior toward Eastern
Europe -- in particular how the Soviets manage their relations
with these new leaders. This is a complicated matter, as re-
vealed on the one hand by the Soviet decision to invade
Czechoslovakia, and on the other by continued tolerance of
maverick Romania. The course of Soviet foreign policy will
also have an important bearing on Soviet attitudes in Eastern
Europe, especially the development of relations with the US,
with Western Europe, and with China. And in coming years
Soviet behavior will perhaps be further complicated by yet
other questions, such as whether and to what extent a liberal
trend will be allowed to develop in the Soviet Union itself,
or whether changes in the East European leaderships will be
paralleled by changes in the Soviet hierarchy.
30. Still, certain assumptions can be made about Soviet
behavior -- e.g., that it will continue to tread a wavering
median line between determination to preserve the communist
order in Eastern Europe and, on the other hand reluctance
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to intervene with force unless a clear and present danger to
communist control should develop. On this assumption, we would
expect the impact of the new leaders in the various East European
countries to be felt, in the near term, more or less along the
following lines:
31. GDR. In East Germany, second-echelon leaders are
not yet in positions from which they are likely to achieve
primacy during the next few years. In the event of Ulbricht's
death or incapacitation, power seems likely to be divided
among somewhat older party and government functionaries -- e.g,,
Honecker and Staph -- although it will be shared increasingly
by younger, well-trained, pragmatic functionaries, such as
Guenter Mittag, who are valued for their ability and expertise.
Though the Soviets probably will take care to see that the
adherents of Ulbricht's ideological views will remain in the
ascendancy, the present regime-encouraged trend toward greater
pragmatism and use of Western technology in the economy seems
likely to continue.
32. Poland. Younger, second-echelon leaders in Poland
are still only on the periphery of power and are thus unlikely
to achieve top positions quickly even in the event of a change
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at the top. Their influence, however, is likely to be felt
increasingly in top party councils, and if a factional struggle
should arise following Gomulka's demise, one or another of their
number might well end up at the top. Moreover, if one of them
proved to have real qualities as a political leader, he might
feel tempted to play (a la Moczar) on the long-suppressed
national feelings of the Poles in order to strengthen his own
position.
33. Romania. AS a result of Ceausescu's efforts, the
Romanian regime probably will continue to be dominated largely
by younger leaders who seem disposed to continue the present
nationalist, albeit internally conservative policy, provided,
of course, that the Soviets do not intervene with force.
34. Bulgaria. Though Zhivkov also has brought some
younger leaders into the top echelons of the party, including
the present party cadre chief, Todorov, a younger leader
probably will continue Bulgaria's pro-Soviet orientation,
which in Zhivkov's case has been fairly obsequious, and
probably will be equally reluctant to countenance liberal
domestic policies. One very good reason for such reluctance,
of course, is the presence and potentially contagious influence
of liberalism in neighboring Yugoslavia.
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35. Hungaa. If, for some reason or other, Kadar
should be displaced during the next few years, one of the
younger leaders he has groomed for the leadership, such as
Biszku or Komocsin, might well succeed him. If so, it is
conceivable that a conservative type such as Biszku might
seek to reverse the economic and political reforms. How-
ever, the economic reform program (the New Economic Mechanism")
seems fairly solidly established by now and, whatever his in-
clination, Kadar's successor may find it extremely difficult
to reverse it. Indeed, he might well find it politically
expedient to continue the present liberal program, or even
to step up the pace. Moreover, a new leader might not
appreciate the dangers of increasing the tempo or be able
to control it as well as Kadar does, in which case the
Soviets might well be presented at some point with another
criOis.
36. Yugoslavia. Tito has made great efforts to establish
the basis for an orderly transition on his departure from power.
But when this occurs leadership will pass into collective hands,
and it will be surprising if after his departure factionalism
and regional antagonisms do not produce some turmoil in the
party and country. Nevertheless, there seems to be enough
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support for his variant model of communism, so that an attempt
to revert to the Soviet model would be unlikely to succeed.
Indeed, the younger Yugoslav leaders are more likely to con-
tinue the present trend in the direction of a Western-type
political and economic system.
37 Czechoslovakia. Since the Soviet intervention in
August 1968, the most promising younger liberal party leaders
(e.g., Mlynar, Cisar, Slavik, Spacek, Simon) gradually have
been weeded out of positions of influence in the regime. What
remains of the younger element of leaders is for th most part
a combination of conservatives, ultra-conservatives, and oppor-
tunists. Should Husak be displaced at some point, any younger
leader who would be likely to succeed him is unlikely to be
able to alter the present repressive, conservative trend, for
quite some time, or to permit any resurgence of liberalism,
at least so long as the Soviets remain in the country.
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ANNEX
The attached annex lists selected promising
younger leaders from each of the East European
countries whose backgrounds were examined in the
preparation of this paper. It is intended to
supplement the paper by providing some insight
into the backgrounds, training, and career ex-
perience of these men,
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ANNEX
Age
Education
Training Specialty
Post
Poland
Stanislaw Kociolek
36
Univ (Dr)
Party Fnctry
Politburo
Jan Szydlak
43
Party Sch
Ideolog Aff
Party Sec't
Boleslaw Jaszczuk
56
Technical
Engineering Economics
Party Sec't
Politburo
Josef Tejchma
42
Party Sch
Engineering Agr/Youth
Party Sec't
Politburo
Stefan Olszowski
38
Univ
Ideolog Aff
Party Sec't
Party Sch
Mieczyslaw Moczar
56
Elementary
Partisan Sec Matters
Party Sec't
Edward Gierek
56
Univ (Eng)
Engineering Economics
Politburo
Hungary
Bela Biszku
48
Secondary
Party Acad Party Fnctry
Party Sec't
'46
Party Sch
Politburo
Rezso Nyers
Elementary
Technical Economics
Party Sec't
Politburo
Zoltan Komocsin
46
Elementary
Higher Party Intrabloc
Party Sec't
Sch (Moscow) Relations
Politburo
Karoly Erdelyi
42
University
Higher Party Foreign Aff
Minister
School
Peter Varkonyi
39
University
Ideolog Aff
Dep Minister
Karoly Nemeth
47
Party Sch
Party Fnctry
(Card Member)
Politburo
Gyorgy Aczel
52
University
Economics Idolog Aff
Party Sec't
Cultural Aff
East Germany
Guenter Mittag
43
Univ (Dr)
Economics
Politburo
Party Sec't
Werner Jarowinsky
42
Univ (Dr)
Economics
Party Sec't
Gerhard Grueneberg
48
Elementary
Party Fnctry
Politburo
Agriculture
Party Sec't
Guenther Kleiber
38
University
Elec Engrg Data Proces-
sing
Politburo
(Cand Member)
Werner Lamberz
40
Party Sch
Party Fnctry
Party Sec't
Ideolog Aff
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Age
Education
Training
Specialty
Post
Romania
Virgil Tro fin
44
Elementary
Party Fnctry
Presidium
Youth
Party Sect
Agriculture
Paul Niculescu-
46
Security
Teacher
Ideolog Aff
Presidium
Mizil
Party Sch
(Marxism-
Cultural Aff
Party Sec't
Leninism)
Cornel Burt ica
38
Technical
Elec Engrg
Economics
Minister
Foreign Aff
Ilie Verdet
4)4
Technical
Party Acad
Party. Fnctry
Presidium
Party Sch
1st Dep Prem
Dimitriu Popescu
41
Party Enctry
Party. Sect
Ideolog Aff
Cultural Aff
Gheorghe Pana
4o
Party Functry
Presidium
Party Sect
IOn Iliescu
43
Technical
Engineering
Youth
Minister
(USSR)
Bulgaria
Luchezar Avramov
48
University
Elec Engrg
Party. Fnctry
Minister
Economics
Politburo.
(Cand Member)
Stanko Todorov
49
University
Party Fnctry
Politburo
Party Sect
Venelin Kotsev
44
Higher
Ideolog Aff
Party Sec't
Party Sch
Cultural Aff
Krustyu Trichkov
43
Elementary
Higher
Party. Erie try
Politburo
Party Sch
(Cand Member)
Tano Tsolov
51
Secondary
Party Fnctry
Politburo
Economics
Pep Premier
Albania
Ramiz Alia
44
Secondary
Ideolog Aff
Party Sect
Cultural Aff
Politburo
Nesti Nase
47
Secondary
Foreign Aff
Mil-Aster
Nexhmije Hoxha 48
Secondary
Party Fnctry
Govt Post
(Enver Hoxha's wife)
Rita Marko
50
Elementary
Higher
Party Fnctry
Politburo
Party Sch
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Yugoslavia
Age
Education
Training
Specialty.
Post
Krste Crvenkovski
48
University
Party- Fnctry
Exec Bureau
Cultural. Aff
Marko Nikezic
48
University
Foreign. Aff
Central Comm
Mirko Tepavac
47
Secondary.
Party Fnctry
Minister
Party Sch
Foreign Aff
Kiro Gligorov
52
University.
Economics
Exec Bureau
Law
Dimce Beiovski
46
University
Foreign Aff
LCY
Law
Presidium
Miroslav Pecujlic
40
Univ --(Dr)
Teacher
Party Fnctry
Exec Bureau
Budislav Soskic
44
University
ideolog Aff
Exec Bureau
Party Fnctry
Cultural Aff
Mika Tripalo
43
University
Party. Fnctry
Exec Bureau.
Law
Stane Dolanc
44
University
Teacher
Party Fn,try
Exec Bureau
Law
Marxism-
Leninism
Mitja Ribicic
50
University
Security
Party. Frotry
Prime
Law
Matters
Minister
Czechoslovakia
Zdenek Mlynar
39
University.
Legal Aff
Purged after
Law
Aug '68
(Liberal.)
Vaclav Slavik
49
University
Party Fnctry
ideolog Aff
Purged after
Aug '68
(Libea.al)
Josef Spacek
42
Secondary
Party Sch
Party Fnctry
Purged after
Party Sch
Aug '68
(Liberal)
Cestmir Cisar
50
Univ (Dr)
Ideolog Aff
Purged after
Cultural Aff
Aug '68
(Liberal)
Bohumil Simon
49
Party Fnctry
Purged after
Aug '68
(Liberal)
Lubomir Strougal
45
Univ (Dr)
Party Fnctry
Premier
Antonin Kapek
47
Technical
Engineering
Party. Fnctry
Presidium
Economics
Jan Piller
47
Technical
Party Sch
Party Fnctry
Presidium
Economics
Drahomir Kolder
44
Elementary
Party. Sch
Party Fru try
Govt Post
Economics
Alois Indra
49
Party Fnry
Party Sect
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