PROSPECTS FOR GREECE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 11, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL SNTELLIGENCE AGENCY'
11 September 196$
MEMOAANL~iJM TO THE DIRECTOR
SU&~ECT: PROSPECTS FOR GREECE
1. The political scene in Greece has deteriorated con-
siderably since NIE 29.1-64 (28 October 1964). The conservative
farces which bece~ne entrenched during the Karamanlis regime have
never become reconciled to the pronounced leftward shift shaven
by the Center Union victory in the election of P~abruary 1964.
These elements, especially the top ranking army officers and
the palace, have been jittery over the relaxation of strict
restraints an the far left since the departure of Keremanlis.
As Papandreou moved xi~htast ofz^i:cer~s rau4 of key poaitir~ns i~x
t?xe srrt;~ ~izd security a Drees, bhe~e ela~entu b~egatt to see their fears
reelized. Papcndreou, on-the other hand, was determined t4
have the ultimate say in Greek political life. The ,resulting
crisis has severely shaken political stability, raised the
spectxe of polarizations at the extremes of right and left, and
perhaps has threatened Greece's postwax political structure.
GROUP i
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and ?~~t~ ..I1'~,~.
doclassif ication
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2. While Papandreou's popularity with the voters has
apparently remained extremely high, he has alienated many of
the other major figures in the Center Union by his one-man rule
without reference to party councils and by his efforts to groom
his son Andreas a.s his successar.~
It least in part to counter insinuations
that he was an American stooge (he had been an American citizen
for some yea.rs), he adopted an extremely critical attitude toward
the United States and surrounded himself with a group of leftist
opportunists, some of wham probably are susceptible to Soviet
influence. Hence, in June when Andreas came under heavy fire
from elements in the Center Union for alleged implication in
organizing a leftist, but a.ppa.rently non-Communist, organization
(ASPILtA.) within the Greek Army, the senior Papandreou was
threatened with a major party revolt. It wa.s to protect Andreas
and to stem this tide of criticism that Papandreou sought to gain
more control over the military establishment which wa.s investigating
the ASPIDA affair. This led to a confrontation with 25-year-old
King Constantine who considered the military hie awn special
province.
In the 1g7~'~ elections the Center Union wan 53~ of the vote;
,.t has 171 seats of the 300 seats in parliament. The National
Radical Union has ~~ seats, the Communist front ELtA h~a 22
seats, and the Pro?;ressives f3.
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3? Since July, when the King in effect dismissed Papandreou
from the Prime Ministry, the latter has sought to demonstrate
the impossibility of forming any government not headed by him,
hoping thereby to compel the King to agree to early elections.
He has managed to retain the allegiance of all but about 35
members of his party's representatives in parliament. These
adherents, plus the 22 members of Et)A have been able to prevent
any of the king's choices for prime minister from winning a vote
of confidence. In this situation, Fapandreou has refused to
compromise. Instead, the Papandreous have insisted on immediate
elections. In conjunction with Communist elements, Andreas has
organized demonstrations against the monarchy. While these
demonstrations have on occasion led to rioting and disorder, the
senior Papandreou has not attempted to foment rebellion or to
come to power through any extralegal means.
~+. For his part, the King remains determined to prevent
Papandreou from returning to power. He has used the lure of
the Prime Ministry to induce a succession of Center Union
leaders to desert Papandreou, but none has been able to brim
along enough Center Union members to form a viable government.
With. each successive failure, the King's position has weakened.
Yet he apparently conta.nues to cons?.der instability for an
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indefinite period preferable to the retuxn of Papandreou. He
is still trying to promote a workable ~;overnn!ent under defector
from the Center Union, such a.s Stephanopoulos. For this to be
successful, it would require the defecta.on of seven or eight
more Center Union deputies and the support of the eight Progressives.
We regard the chances of success as no better than even. If this
effort fails, Constantine is considering turning to some non-
party figure. If this in turn fails, the King may, e.s a last
resort, attempt to establish a military dictatorship.
5. The Communists have benefited from this political
impasse. E`HA has, with some success, taken advantage of the
relaxation of security restrictions to i.nerea.se its activity.
However, following leftist gains in the July 1864 municipal
elections, Papandreou began to take a firmer lane against E'nA.
Nevertheless, EDA oupported Papandreou in his struggle against
the conservative elements. At least initially, ELF supported
demonstrations against the King, though only the hard-core
pro-Chinese wing favored violence. Mare recently, however,
some EDA leaders appear to be having second thoughts about the
wisdom of identifying their fortunes with Papandreou. They are
concerned that their followers were moving into Papandreou's
camp and they also wished to escape blame far disorders, Indeed,
these leaders have even begets to voice sharp public criticism of
Papandreou.
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Political Outlook
6. Na lasting solution of the present Greek political
crisis seems likely with the present parliament. Even should
some overnment manage to gain a vote of confidence, it would
probably be unstable, depending on a razor-thin majority made
up of disparate groups ranging from rightist National Radical
Union members to the farmer members of the left win{; of the
Center Union. We believe that such a coalition would not
maintain its unity very long; it would be under strong pressure
both within and outside parliament from pro-Fapa.ndreou elements.
It seems likely that within six months any coalition government
which excluded Papandreou would fall. But by that time, tempers
may have coaled to the point where the King and the political
parties would be prepared to hold elections.
7. If Papandreou should lose control over a citable
number of his presently loyal deputies, which. is possible but
not probable, the Center Union Party miht be completely shattered.
Over the short run this would enhance the prospects for survival
of any coalition the King might succeed in putting together.
At the same time, it could lead eventually to a return to the
sharp polarization between right and extreme left which char-
acterized the scene durinU the early years of the Karamanlis
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reg3_me. If no new moderate leftist party or grouping appeared,
a lame number of Greeks would have no alternative but to support
the Communists, who would thus become a major influence on the
Greek scene.
$. If the King is unable to establish a workable govern-
ment and remains determined to avoid elections within the next
six to n_~_ne months, he will probably see no alternative but to
attempt to install some form of d~_ctatorial regime based on the
military. In Greece?s present political climate, we believe
such a coot?e-would be fraught with great danger. There
appeaxs tabs no military or civilian figure with sufficient
prestige and ability to establish an effective government of
this kind. Thus we believe that such. a move would lead to
considerable demonstrations and violence of a kind which in
time might turn into a ej.vil war. Tlais would severely strain
the resources and. loyalty of the military, which might itself
split. In extreme circumstances, the King would prefer to rely
on the National Radical Un:i_an. We believe thot this party has
not yet sera.ously faced such a possibility and, if forced to
do so, would probably break up.
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g. If elections were held within the next six to nine
months, Papandreou would stand a Goad chance of winning a.
majar:ity in parl'~ament. Once in power with a cammandinG mandate
and freed from the restxs.int of the former Center Union defectors,
Papa.ndreau would be likely to move to Limit the role and influence
of the crown in Greek political life. He taouJ_d also probably
take steps to brine the military establishment under parliamentary
rather than palace control. If their position were severely
weakened, the palc.ce and the military might feel unable to
resist such moves, thouih Papandreou could move prematurely e.nd
precipitate a last-ditch effort by the King to establish a
military regime.
1b. Papandreou himself' is unlikely to cooperate willingly
with the Communists in domestic matters. We also doubt that
he would make any significant ehanGes in Greece's pro Western
foreign policy. He seems convinced that a close tie with, the
US is desirable on Geners.l Grounds; he would also be hesitant
to antagonize the US unduly lest it side with Turkey in regional
disputes, particularly Cyprus. However, Andreas probably would
urge a more leftist and anti. American Line an his father. More
~.mportantly, Andreo.s probably would became involved in new troubles,
and the sen:~.or Papandreou has demonstrated a willingness to
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subordinate other considerations to protecta.ng his son. An
additional. danger might arise if Papandreou failed to receive
a parliamentary majority. Tn such a case, we believe he would
seek defectors from other part_es, but failing this, he might
not xefuse to accept EDA votes as a condition for his political.
survival., l"t is diffioult to predict the effect of these
possibilities, but we do not believe that they would ].cad s.
Papandreou government to make substantial alterations in Greece's
foreign policy.
FOR THE BOARD 4F NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
Acting Chairman
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