CYPRUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MEMO

Mr. McCone
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DEPARTMENT OF.STATE
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THEE PRESIDENT
NSC Meeting
July 7
12 Noon
Subject: Cyprus
The attached memorandum has been prepared for use
in connection with the July 7, 1964 NSC discussion on
Cyprus.
r
Acting'Secretary
cc: NSC Members
State Dept. review completed SECRET-EXDIS
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MEMORANDUM FOR NSC MEETING
Subject: Cyprus
The next six critical weeks may well decide whether there wil'.
be war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The chances of
avoiding conflict may be less than 50%.
This paper describes the forces that may lead to a crisis.
It discusses the measures we are taking to try to avoid a series
of events that could tear up the whole right wing of NATO.
I.
THE ATMOSPHERE
Greece and Turkey are each committed to finding a Cyprus
solution that requires no loss of face. Overhanging the,,Cyprus
issue are two thousand years of Greek-Turkish antipathy. Today
events, not people, are in command. Each side is acting a
Greek tragedy obsessed by a sense of the inevitable.
II.
MOTIVATIONS
A. Greece:- The Greeks are convinced that time is on their
side. The Turkish position is being progressively eroded. In due
course they feel that they will be able to annex Cyprus without the
need for any concessions to the Turks. Prime'Minister Papandreou'
was obviously shaken by the President's argument that he must find
a peaceful settlement and by his statement that the United States
could not oppose a Turkish move by force.
B. Turkey:- The Turks recognize that they are steadily losing.
Prime Minister Inonu and the responsible leaders in the Government
know the costs and dangers of a military intervention. 'Yet if they
lose further ground to the Greeks and the hope of an acceptable
settlement continues to fade, they will be under irresistible
pressures to exercise what they regard as their valid treaty
rights
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of unilateral intervention.
III
EVENTS THAT MAY TRIGGER MILITARY ACTION
Two kinds of events may lead the Turks to undertake military
action against Cyprus:
(a) The breakdown of the Geneva talks--which would
destroy the hope of a political solution; and
(b) events on the Island prejudicial to the Turks or the
Turk-Cypriots.
A. Breakdown at Geneva
If the Greek representative at Geneva shows no flexibility,
Prime Minister Inonu will be deprived of his last argument against
invasion. The Turks stood down action on June 5 in the hope that
the United States would be able to Drovide them an alternative in
the form of a political solution. This hope will vanish if the ta11'
break down--or if, after some weeks, they clearly appear to be
leading nowhere.
B. Events on the Island
For the last several weeks the Greek Government has been sur-
reptitiously introducing into Cyprus not only equipment but officers
and men of the Greek Army. F__ I 25X1
there may be as many as 4,000 there now (including the treaty-
authorized contingent). Since the Greek-Cypriots control the ports
and airfields, this, infiltration is easily achieved.
The Turks are also sending in "volunteers" from the mainland.
Since they must be landed on the coast in small boats, the number
introduced so far probably does not exceed 1,500 (including the
treaty contingent).
Turkish awareness that the Greek buildup is far outrunning their
own is producing mounting anxiety. The activities of General Grivar-_.
who is organizing an armed force of Greek Cypriots that is expected
ultimately to total. 30 to 35 thousand men and who is publicly
proclaiming the advent of en oosis--further contributes to Turkish
disquiet.
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These developments threaten the Turk Cypriots with two
possibilities: (a) the danger that when the Greek strength is
deemed adequate General Grivas may take over the government and
announce a plebiscite to bring about immediate enosis (union with
Greece) as an accomplished fact and (b) the danger that growing
Greek military strength on the Island will substantially increase
the cost of Turkish intervention.
The continued preoccupation with these two possibilities may
increase the pressure for a Turkish intervention now. At the same
time, the buildup of military forces on both sides could reach the
flash point, causing an incident that'would have chain reactions
all over the Island. In addition, there is the chance that, if
the Turkish Cypriots become convinced that increasing Greek
superiority is diminishing the possibility of intervention, they
may provoke an incident. There is evidence that they are develop-
ing a GotterdavmEu1ag spirit.
IV
THE LIKELY COURSE OF MILITARY ACTION
The DOD will be prepared to make a military presentation at
the NSC meeting.
The essential points are:
(a) The Turks have the capability for establishing a
substantial beachhead in the area around Kyrenia
and securing the pass that dominates the Nicosia
Plain;
(b) They might be able to exercise some deterrent effect
on Greek-Cypriot reprisals against the Turk-Cypriot
population by threatening air action against Greek-
Cypriots.
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To put the full Turkish 39th Division ashore, however,
with its equipment would require at least a week.
V.
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES
Our objectives are twofold:
(a) To do everything possible to avoid a military collision
between two of our NATO allies by bringing about an agreed
settlement; and
(b) If a Turkish military intervention does occur, to assure
the taking of measures to minimize the bloodshed, limit escala-
tion,and restrict the damage to the NATO Alliance.
A. Bringing About an Agreed Solution
The only realistic possibility of a political solution is
through a deal between the Greek and Turkish Governments. If
Greece and Turkey can be brought together, the Greek Govern-
ment should be able to handle the Government of Cyprus.
However, the search for a solution will be rendered
almost impossible if Makarios is brought into the negotiations
before Athens and Ankara have reached a meeting of the minds. His
Beatitude has shown by his conduct that he does not want a
negotiated solution. He wants a unitary Cypriot state in which
the Turk-Cypriot minority would be submerged. He is prepared
to play games with the USSR and the, Afro-Asian Bloc to achieve
this--even at the risk of creating another. Cuba.
We have, therefore, concentrated on pressing for a
negotiation between Greece and Turkey, as the two responsible
governments most directly concerned.
The President emphasized to Prime Minister Papandreou that
unless he negotiated with the Turks he ran the risk of
precipitating a disastrous war. At the same time he emphasized
to Prime Minister Inonu that a military action against Cyprus
could yield nothing but calamity.
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The pressure on these two Prime Ministers resulted in an
agreement to undertake negotiations at Geneva under conditions
where--with luck--the United States could continue to apply
pressure to both sides.. The Greek and Turkish Governments has each
named a representative to meet with the UN Mediator. The President
has sent Mr. Dean Acheson to Geneva to advise and assist the
Mediator and to conduct: discussions with the two representatives.
B. Possible Shape of Settlement
The Greek Government is publicly committed to the achievement
of enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece). So long as the Greek
Government pursues this line the Turkish Government will continue
to insist upon double gnosis (partition with the two parts uniting
with the respective metropoles).
The United States has so far refused.to put forward any
solution. It has, however, proposed the following specifications
which a solution should fulfill:
1. It should come about with the full approval of both
Greece and Turkey:
2. It should be permanent;
3. It should leave Cyprus in responsible hands;
4. It should involve no humiliation to either side;
5. It cannot in the nature of things be entirely
satisfactory to either side;
6. It should be broadly acceptable to the population
involved.
We have, of course, studied a wide range of possible solutions.
On the basis of these studies Mr. Acheson will be in position to
propose various elements for inclusion in a final package--if that
proves advisable at Geneva,
C. Ancillary Measures in Support of Negotiation
In support of the Geneva negotiations, we are seeking to bring
about additional pressure on both sides through--
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(a) enlisting the aid of our other NATO allies;
(b) arranging for military discussions between General
Lemnitzer as SACEUR and the top military of Greece, Turkey
and other NATO countries;
(c) exploring all available channels to key individuals
having influence on Greek policy (Onassis, Niarchos, etc.) in
order to impress on them the serious economic consequences of
letting the Cyrus oroblem remain unresolved; and
(d) conducting tripartite talks with the British and
Canadians (to be held in Washington on Thursday).
VI
MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CONSEQUENCES
OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION
A. Contingency p:Lans
We have developed extensive contingency planning designed to
minimize the consequences of a Turkish intervention.
This planning includes the following:
(1) The use of the Security Council to limit the conflict
through such measures as a ceasefire, a stand-still, the
employment of the UST peacekeeping force to maintain the cease-
fire, a call for immediate negotiations, and an appeal for
nonintervention by other states.
(2) An emergency NATO Foreign Ministers meeting to
mobilize support for containing the hostilities and for a
negotiated settlement.
(3) The development of a plan for action by the UN force
on the Island to minimize bloodshed by protecting threatened
elements of the population in ore-planned safe havens. (This
will be discussed with the British and the Canadians on
Thursday and we have alerted our posts in other countries
contributing components to the UN force in preparation for
discussions at the appropriate time.
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(4) We have sent a mission to Athens to update the
arrangements for evacuating Americans (including tourists)
from Greece in the event that a Turkish intervention pre-
cipitates a wave of anti-American feeling.
(5) We are reviewing plans for evacuating Americans
from Ankara and Nicosia and are perfecting arrangements for
protecting Embassy property in all three capitals.
B. Measures to Prevent Greek-Turkish Collision
Should the Turks move we would seek to avoid a collision with
the Greeks by diplomatic moves designed to keep their armed forces
apart. There might be considerable delay before Greek national
forces could engage Turkish national forces in substantial strength--
although the existence of Greek national elements on Cyprus today
renders an ultimate avoidance of a clash less possible.
In any event, we should seek to dissuade the Greeks.,from
attempting to attack Turkish forces while the Security Council is
illusions that this
arranging a ceasefire. We shoud we be
can under
cooperation
will be easy to achieve, even if of the other NATO powers.
C. Use of Sixth Fleet and other U.S. Military-Forces
The President made it clear to Prime Minister Papandreou that
we do not propose to use U.milNorrYdoforce
intendrto useatheTurkish
Sixth
military action against Cyprus. Fleet to roll back a Turkish beachhead once achieved.
Plans should, however, be made to ready U.S. military forces
for precautionary moves in the. event of Soviet intervention and for
the evacuation of American personnel.
Our best estimate is that while the Soviet Union would join in
deploring the Turks' military intervention and would no doubt utter
threats against the Turks, it would not engage its own forces in
any Cyprus crisis. We cannot~hiswcrisisiofoNATOhthroughbmility oves that
Moscow might seek to exploit
elsewhere in the world, i.e., Cuba, Berlin, etc.
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